text,category,saul-7b_perplexity,llama2-7b_perplexity,mistral-7b_perplexity
"Service Lloyds then sought judicial review of the administrative appeal ruling, and Bestor obtained summary judgment in his favor and was awarded attorney's fees for that litigation. See HN1 [ ] TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.221(c) (providing for carrier's liability for claimant's attorney's fees if claimant prevails in carrier's action for judicial review). Service Lloyds did not appeal the summary judgment.",Party Submissions,8.33303,8.472657,10.500998
"Given the lack of clarity regarding the nature and extent of Claimants' voluntary production, Respondent asks the Tribunal to order production of all documents requested under this point, excluding the documents related to communications with Claimants' counsel in relation to the present arbitration or which were otherwise prepared for the purpose of providing or obtaining legal advice. TRIBUNAL’S Documents showing the exercise of Kalemegdan's management and control from 26 April 2012 until today, including in particular the minutes of the meetings of the board of directors of Kalemegdan during which the topic of Obnova was discussed or internal notes and communications between the shareholders concerning decisions related to Obnova.",Legal Decisions,12.9429865,11.511887,13.876815
"Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Expanded Standard Possession Order, if a weekend period of possession by L M O ends on or is immediately followed by a student holiday or a teacher in-service day that falls on a Monday during the regular school term, as determined by the school in which the child is enrolled, or a federal, state, or local holiday that falls on a Monday during the summer months when school is not in session, that weekend period of possession shall end at 6:00 p.m. on that Monday.",Party Submissions,6.5373387,5.891062,6.3419595
"N.W.2d 857, 860 (Minn.Ct.App.1987); Fleming v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 188 Kan. 571, 363 P.2d 432, 436 (1961). 18 Having concluded the Smith County court has exclusive jurisdiction, we necessarily reject application of the dominant jurisdiction doctrine because the Harris County court is not a proper forum. See Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 248. Further, the Harris and Smith County suits do not involve the same parties as required for dominant jurisdiction to apply; the carrier is a party to the Smith County suit, but not the Harris County suit.",Party Submissions,5.645947,6.8477063,7.2625837
"The Eastland court of appeals also followed the Cockerham rule in Reaves. Reaves v. Reaves, 2012 WL 3799668 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.). That case involved the transfer of an annuity owned by wife prior to marriage. In the process of financial planning, husband and the financial planner conspired to cause wife to transfer her separate property annuity to the names of husband and wife jointly. Id. at *3. The trial court allowed parol evidence as to the intent of the parties in the transfer transaction. Id. The trial court found that wife did not intend to make a gift to husband of her annuity. Id. The Texarkana court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, relying on the Cockerham parol evidence rule. Id. at *5.",Party Submissions,5.1018844,5.471272,5.482365
"To the Honorable Court: The Texas Municipal League (TML) is a non-profit association with a membership of over 1,170 Texas cities. TML provides legislative, legal, and educational services to its members. The Texas City Attorneys Association (TCAA), an affiliate of TML, is an organization of over 500 attorneys who represent Texas cities and city officials in the performance of their duties. Believing that the issue before this Court is of great significance to Texas cities, TML respectfully submits this letter of amici curiae in the above-referenced cause.1 Amici curiae urge the Court to grant the City of Dallas’ pending Motion for Rehearing for the following reasons.",Party Submissions,4.297444,4.3544273,4.537291
"Here, the court of appeals found that this case alleged a departure from the accepted standards of professional or administrative services directly related to health care.",Party Submissions,23.705563,25.955467,36.81634
"This case is markedly different. The Amarillo Court first recognized specifically that it was required to consider the reports in their entirety. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *2. Next, the Court referred to both experts’ reports repeatedly; discussed both of their opinions; and even assumed “the reports sufficiently describe the occurrence of an asphyxia event[.]” Id. at *3-*4. In fact, the Court went through all alleged breaches of the standard of care by Dr. Castillo and discussed the lack of an adequate causation opinion for each. Id. at *4-*5. This case is, therefore, completely dissimilar to E.D. In fact, the Amarillo Court’s analysis specifically avoids the same pitfalls this Court criticized in E.D.",Party Submissions,9.765836,10.320754,10.353567
"These opinions are a far cry from a statement that various intrapartum factors “suggest[ed] the possibility” of stroke. (CR.794) As set out at length above, neither Dr. Tappan nor Dr. Null explained why or how the alleged stroke or asphyxia event occurred, much less tied it to conduct of the nurses. The lower court hardly engaged in weighing credibility – the problem in Abshire and Miller. Instead, the court applied an admittedly “lenient” review of the reports. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 17324338, at *2. Even “pars[ing]” and “reorder[ing]” the reports could not save them as critical causation elements were simply lacking. Id.",Party Submissions,16.789034,18.748302,18.70665
"Considering the course of labor and delivery and H.W.’s condition at birth, Dr. Tappan concluded that H.W. suffered an in-utero asphyxia injury during the final hour to hour and half of labor. App. 7, CR 670-71. He believed Dr. Castillo was responsible for this result for two main reasons. App. 7, CR 670-71.",Party Submissions,8.218005,10.716197,10.7844305
"In addition, documents post-dating the issuance of the Comptroller General’s 21 September 2020 report do not appear prima facie relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute.",Legal Decisions,13.294591,15.189142,15.4426
"R: Bueno, la medida impuesta corresponde a una medida de seguridad, es decir, es una medida que tiene por objeto evitar que se continúe generando un riesgo de daño al ambiente, los recursos naturales, derivados de las obras o actividades que se estén inspeccionando.",Party Submissions,8.936325,13.292164,11.691511
"For the foregoing reasons (and those provided in Respondent’s prior written and oral submissions), Respondent respectfully requests that the Tribunal dismiss all of Claimants’ claims for want of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, on the merits, and award Respondent the costs and fees, including attorneys’ fees, it has incurred in this arbitration, which, given the complexity of the issues under dispute, have been significant.",Legal Decisions,5.180367,5.359992,5.1755295
"Arbitration Rule 21 2.1. The Tribunal was constituted on September 6, 2023, in accordance with the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules. The Parties confirmed that the Tribunal was properly constituted and that no Party has any objection to the appointment of any Member of the Tribunal.",Legal Decisions,4.496398,5.264604,5.0578265
"In article XVII, the parties to the Hooks/Bordages Leases adopted an entirely different framework for “Time, Method and Manner” of payment under the leases. The introductory paragraph waived Texas Natural Resources Code Sections 91.401 through 91.406 and stated they “shall not be applicable.” The parties also spelled out that it would apply to “all royalty payments” and “in lieu of” those statutory provisions. Does it make sense that they went to such lengths just to replicate a simple interest regime already provided by the Natural Resources Code?",Party Submissions,15.916157,15.666642,15.705405
"Finally, even if Yellowfin’s suit is not barred by any statute of limitations, it has waived its right to collect Santos’s debt.",Party Submissions,14.242337,22.842646,26.078861
"Jurisdiction lies with this Court under section 22.001(a)(6) of the Texas Government Code, and sections 109.002 and 263.405 of the Texas Family Code.",Party Submissions,5.585038,6.7248006,7.3135147
"Specifically, World Car proved that HMA required 100% sales efficiency by demanding that standard and using it to impose real consequences.",Party Submissions,123.73143,127.39901,156.94206
"Although Gal ovelho’s property was never deprived completely of its economic value, we conclude that the second Penn Central factor weighs in Gal ovelho’s favor, i.e., in favor of finding a taking. See id. Galovelho’s primary investment-backed expectation for the property was to operate a full-service dine-in restaurant at its full capacity. According to Galovelho’s pleading, that expectation complied with its lease, its certificate of occupancy, and its history of operation. We do not question that the Emergency Orders interfered temporarily with Gal ovelho’s expectations for its business. See id.",Party Submissions,10.283108,12.691557,12.875985
Convention Article 43(a); Arbitration Rule 38 18.1. Witness statements and expert reports shall be filed together with the Parties’ pleadings.,Legal Decisions,14.584942,14.041458,17.169813
"The requested documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute in that they address the property rights of Obnova which Claimants claim were expropriated by the adoption of the 2013 DRP. As Claimants are Obnova's shareholders, the requested documents are in their possession, custody or control.",Legal Decisions,11.655353,13.408414,13.89507
"After [**2] its reimbursement claim was denied under the TWCA, Sonic sought judicial review of that decision. The trial court rendered judgment in Sonic's favor, and TMI appeals the trial court's judgment (the ""judicial review case"") in Cause No. 14-05-00111-CV. Sonic's contract claims against TMI have remained abated since October 2003 and, in Cause No. 14-05-0770-CV, Sonic seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to lift abatement. We have consolidated the cases for purposes of this opinion.",Party Submissions,6.032519,6.789475,6.894207
The United States objects to Request No. 1.f for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.,Legal Decisions,8.477822,13.354382,14.446341
"The resulting opinion conflicts with this Court ’ s jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of the other intermediate appellate courts, and Chapter 74’s plain text. Review is needed to ensure the faithful application of the TMLA and this Court’s precedent.",Party Submissions,12.256976,15.064078,15.09685
"The course and scope issue also became the subject of a workers' compensation proceeding. After Tyler paid Reynaldo's funeral expenses, it sought reimbursement from its workers' compensation carrier. The carrier contested the compensability of Reynaldo's death asserting it did not occur in the course and scope of his employment. After the parties were unable to resolve their dispute at a benefit review conference, a contested case hearing was held. The hearing officer ruled that Reynaldo sustained a compensable injury and awarded death benefits to the Gaonas and burial benefits to Tyler. The carrier appealed that decision to an appeals panel. In what the appeals panel called an unusual turn of events, the Gaonas also contested the decision. 3 The appeals panel affirmed the hearing officer's decision.",Party Submissions,6.229193,5.924054,6.4934344
"Dr. Tappan’s lack of qualifications and proposed opinions are no different than those in three similar cases where the appellate courts rejected obstetricians’ opinions about neurological injuries because they failed to establish their expertise to do so. In Tenet v. De La Riva, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that an obstetrician could not offer an opinion about the cause of an infant’s neurological injuries because the physician’s report and curriculum vitae were silent about his qualifications in pediatric neurology. Tenet, 351 S.W.3d at 407 (“if [the expert] had some experience in practicing pediatric neurology, he would qualify as an expert in this regard, but neither his report nor curriculum vitae demonstrate any recent experience in perinatology.”). Likewise, here, nothing in Dr. Tappan’s report or CV suggests he has knowledge, training, or experience as a pediatric neurologist.",Party Submissions,6.1987314,5.941319,7.075626
"Dr. Castillo disagrees with the Walkers’ Statement of Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error, and this case does not raise any question of law that is important to the jurisprudence of this State. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.001(a).",Party Submissions,7.414938,7.8472466,7.955081
"For these reasons, we find that the plain language of the termination clause, containing an all-embracing termination of any and all of Backes’s obligations under the guaranty, shows the parties’ cle ar intent that completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco building would bring an end to Backes’ s obligations under the guaranty, including those that had matured. See Transcor Astra Grp. S.A. v. Petrobras Am. Inc., No. 20-0932, 2022 WL 1275238, at *7 (Tex. Apr. 29, 2022); Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex. 2008). Because we find that the termination clause was not ambiguous, we also find that the trial court erred to the extent that it considered extraneous evidence, other than extrinsic evidence of the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the bridge loan document, to determine t he parties’ intent. See Barrow-Shaver, 590 S.W.3d 480, 483 –84. Nevertheless, since the trial court’s construction of the termination clause was correct, any such error was harmless. See id. at 480.",Party Submissions,6.334241,6.1021185,6.732246
"No right or obligation under, or interest in, this Agreement shall be assigned without prior written consent of both TDCC and UCC; provided, however, that TDCC may assign any part of its interest in, or any of its rights or obligations under, this Agreement to any TDCC Affiliate at any time without prior written consent from UCC.",Contract,5.1481175,4.89811,6.7969937
"Awardee understands that the Company’s Confidential Information includes not only the individual categories of information identified in this Section, but also the compilation and/or aggregation of the Company’s information, which is and has been compiled/aggregated via significant effort and expense and which has value to the Company and to the Company’s employees as used in furtherance of the Company’s business.",Contract,8.969471,8.739056,9.243515
,Legislation,nan,nan,nan
"The Motion also claims that the appellate court improperly deferred to the “trial court’s legal conclusions.” 5 However, because no findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested, there were no legal conclusions upon which the appellate court could have deferred. Instead, the appellate court correctly applied the abuse of discretion standard to the trial court’s denial as a whole, relying upon “any appropriate legal theory urged,” an approach supported by a plethora of precedent.",Party Submissions,7.311925,7.3885217,8.696626
"Such tentative earnings shall not be due or payable to Subcontractor or anyone else claiming in Subcontractor's place and stead, including but not limited to Subcontractor’s surety, a Trustee in bankruptcy, receiver or assignee of Subcontractor, and will be subject to offset, until and unless Subcontractor’s Work is fully and satisfactorily completed and any amounts under a, b, or c above are fully paid and satisfied. McCarthy may demand written evidence of Subcontractor's financial capability to perform and that Subcontractor has made such payments at any time.",Party Submissions,10.318955,9.610429,10.551647
"The first session of the Tribunal was held on Monday, 6 November 2023 at 6:00 a.m. (Washington, D.C.) / 11:00 a.m. (London) / 12:00 p.m. (Lagos and Paris) / 7:00 p.m. (Singapore) by video conference.",Legal Decisions,3.1845481,3.2659907,3.238524
"Una vez que el inversionista haya iniciado un procedimiento ante un tribunal competente de la Parte en cuyo territorio se hubiera admitido la inversión o haya notificado a la otra Parte su intención de iniciar cualquiera de los procedimientos arbitrales indicados en el Artículo 12.18 (5), la elección de uno u otro procedimiento será definitivo.",Legal Decisions,6.1422234,10.175448,8.113117
"In short, HSMiller did not meet its burden of showing either prong of gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence, and there is legally insufficient evidence to support the jury’s gross negligence verdict. The Court can and should render a take nothing judgment on the gross negligence claim against the Lawyers. See Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d at 141 & n.23.",Party Submissions,7.7167377,8.07513,8.874061
"McCarthy its monthly Subcontractor’s Application for Payment by the date established by McCarthy, McCarthy may at its option include in its monthly pay application to the Owner for Work performed during the preceding month such amount as it may deem proper for the Work of Subcontractor for the preceding month and Subcontractor agrees to accept such approved portion thereof in lieu of monthly payment based upon Subcontractor's Application for Payment.",Party Submissions,9.129399,9.366323,9.976537
"The proportionate responsibility chapter, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch. 33, does not apply to an action to collect workers' compensation benefits under the workers' compensation law of the state of Texas (Subtitle A, Title 5, Labor Code). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.002(c)(1) (West 2020).",Party Submissions,3.5543244,3.9753585,3.8323278
"Oncor contends that §1.111(e) agreements do not preclude section 25.25(c) motions, but only section 25.25(c-1) and (d) motions. The argument rests on the fact that section 25.25(c-1) and (d-1) prohibit corrections under sub-sections (c-1) and (d) when an agreement has been reached on value, but no such language exists regarding sub-section (c).",Party Submissions,7.0917344,7.5605145,7.5102806
"I certify that the foregoing petition for review is in compliance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure because it contains 4,471 words and has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point Georgia font for text and 12-point Georgia font for footnotes, which meets the typeface requirements.",Party Submissions,5.185313,5.3864613,6.875795
"The illegal-assignment issue was fully briefed in the trial court and at the Fifth Court of Appeals in the first malpractice trial and appeal. That court’s opinion fully addressed the issue and held against the Lawyers. Henry S. Miller, 2016 WL 4821684 at *2ؘ–3.",Party Submissions,14.8404665,17.746212,17.181967
"TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 2. Liberty shall continue to provide to Ames continuous and adequate sewer service that complies with TWC Chapter 26, TWC § 13.041(h)(1), and 30 TAC Chapters 35 and 291 of TCEQ's rules; 3. This Order shall expire in 120 days, unless extended; 4. Pursuant to TWC § 5.504, the Commission hereby sets a hearing to consider \Vhether to arm, modify or set aside this Emergency Order at its regular Agenda meeting on August 24, 2022, at 9:30 a.m., at TCEQ Park 35 Complex, 12100 Park 35 Circle, Building E, Room 201 S, Austin, Texas; 5. The provisions of this Order shall apply to and be binding upon Liberty and Ames. Liberty and Ames shall give notice of this Order to personnel ,vho maintain day-to-day control over the operations rerenced in this Order; 6. The Chief Clerk of the Commission shall mail a copy of this Order to all parties; and 7, If any provision, sentence, clause, or phrase of this Order is r any reason held to be invalid, the invalidity of any portion shall not aect the validity of the remaining portions of this Order.",Party Submissions,6.7053876,5.7020793,6.4418626
"What is the amount, if any, by which the judgment actually rendered in the Underlying Lawsuit exceeded the judgment that would have been rendered but for the negligence you have found on the part of the Terry Defendants?",Party Submissions,10.427486,13.890754,13.023688
"Terry designated Defterios, HSMiller and Diamond State as RTPs in both malpractice trials. (CR275, 885; 11RR191-99, 214-24) Before the first malpractice trial, Diamond State settled with HSMiller. (CR337) The jury was asked to determine the percentage of responsibility of all three in the first trial. (CR885) In the retrial, however, the trial court rejected Terry’s submissions that the proportionate responsibility of all three be included in the charge. (9SCR8405-08; 20RR658-61; CR541-52) 50 While a trial court’s decision to submit or refuse a jury question or instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion, Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012), a trial court is required to submit a properly requested question raised by the pleadings and evidence and necessary for the jury to render a proper verdict. TEX. R. CIV. P. 278. The failure to submit a proper responsible third party “skew[s] the proceedings,” In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding), and “probably cause[s] the rendition of an improper judgment” and “probably prevent[s] the petitioner from properly presenting the case to the appellate courts.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1. As this Court recently reiterated in Gregory v. Chohan, “litigants have a significant and substantive right to allow the fact finder to determine the proportionate responsibility of all responsible parties.” 670 S.W.3d 548, 568 (Tex. 2023) (quoting In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d at 509) (internal punctuations omitted). The failure to submit responsible third parties and settling defendants under Chapter 33 is reversible error resulting in a new trial. See id.",Party Submissions,6.4700184,6.5484605,6.9645686
"This Court ultimately held that despite the presence of a fee-splitting provision in In re Poly-America agreement, the claimant did not “demonstrate[] that the ability to pursue his claim in the arbitral forum hinge[d] upon his payment of the estimated costs; to the contrary, depending upon the circumstances, [the claimant] may not have [] bear[ed] any cost at all.” Id. at 356.",Party Submissions,13.576959,14.033831,14.828512
"Galovelho argues that this Bruen test now applies to any government regulation of a constitutional right. Because the Texas constitution purportedly protects against the type of conduct he challenges, Galovelho contends that appellees “ must demonstrate there is a valid, constitutional, and historical basis for their actions. ” We reject Galovelho’s argument that the Bruen test is applicable in any context other than the Second Amendment. But regardless, appellees have in fact established that they had a valid constitutional and historical basis for the Emergency Orders. See, e.g., Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 792 (“ Uncompensated destruction of property has been occasionally justified by reason of war, riot, pestilence or other great public calamity. ”).",Party Submissions,9.927121,10.096356,10.794103
Claimant’s contingency fee arrangement already since June 2022. The Respondent has failed to discharge its burden of proof regarding urgency.,Legal Decisions,22.709139,17.851622,24.053434
"The Tribunal concurs with their view that the applicable law is to be found in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and Article IX of the BIT, the provisions of which are to be interpreted in accordance with the rules of international law respecting treaty interpretation. Those rules are generally considered to have been codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. While the Vienna Convention is not in force between Latvia and Norway, the rules and principles of treaty interpretation contained in Articles 31 to 33 are generally regarded as declaratory of customary international law and will therefore be applied as such.",Legal Decisions,5.0199213,4.7784414,5.2623153
"Finally, the Walkers complain that the Court of Appeals also erred in requiring that the experts should have explained why one of the allegedly negligent acts was not “too attenuated” to H.W.’s harm. (Pet. Br. at 27). The problem with the Walkers’ argument is that both Dr. Tappan and Dr. Null claim H.W. sustained an in-utero asphyxia injury, and that the seminal events of his birth occurred an hour to an hour and a half before he was born. (CR.671, 709). Yet Dr. Tappan also criticized Dr. Castillo’s and Baptist’s care beginning six hours earlier.",Party Submissions,11.328181,11.99171,12.764037
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 1.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,25.8679,30.320728,37.255703
"In the event that a judgment is obtained and recovered through the bankruptcy court against the settling defendant, then this Court has held that recovery would be applied as a credit against the plaintiff’s judgment against the separate, jointly-liable tortfeasor. Quinney Elec., Inc. v. Kondos Entm’t, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1999) (“Instead, the trial court properly foreclosed Quinney’s double recovery of contract damages by crediting Quinney’s judgment against Kondos and Snyder with the amount Quinney received from the bankruptcy court judgment.”). And if the trustee clawed back the settlement through a preference and then later settled the claim in the bankruptcy court, the separate tortfeasor could also claim a credit. See Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 108 S.W.3d 923, 925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied), overruled on other grounds by Duffey v. Sleep Ctr. of Longview, 598 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (applying settlement credit after Texas Capital “filed a motion with the state trial court asking it to reduce Texas Capital’s liability for the judgment by the amount of Ballow’s bankruptcy settlement with Sandefer.”).",Party Submissions,6.063376,5.9960985,6.239491
The United States objects to Request No. 3.i for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.,Legal Decisions,9.046106,13.500893,16.311207
"As noted below, the fact of third-party funding from external funders is not prohibited, whether via a contingency agreement or funding by a funder.56 In the past, contingency arrangements did not require disclosure, so there are no cases of disclosure of such otherwise privileged arrangements. The existence of a contingency agreement does not indicate that this claim is frivolous or without merit – just the opposite. It means that experienced, qualified counsel believes that the case is so worthy that counsel is willing to risk their time in the expectation of a significant award. Neither would the situation be any different if Riverside received other forms of Third-Party Funding from an outside funder for the same reason.",Party Submissions,13.836111,13.364781,14.702453
"The very purpose of a front-end jurisdictional inquiry is to avoid subjecting an entity with immunity, such as Midland, from the process and expenses of litigation when there are no facts that give rise to jurisdiction. Following Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction in which Midland provided evidence establishing that it had never permitted the alleged disposals to discharge into Midland’s wastewater collection system, the burden shifted to Weatherford to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tex. Dep’t of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 221 (Tex. 2004); (CR 54, 348, 359); Weatherford Int’l, LLC v. City of Midland, 652 S.W.3d 905, 915 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2022, pet. filed). Absent Weatherford presenting such a fact issue, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction, and the claim is dismissed. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 234. Weatherford’s only attempt to offer any “facts” in response to Midland’s Plea was the Ramboll Report, a report prepared by Weatherford’s environmental consultants, that referenced unidentified alleged third party disposers of contaminants and hypothesized that such disposals then leaked out of Midland’s sewage system. (CR 165–66.) The report further referenced purported interviews with an unidentified former employee of the alleged dischargers. Such multi-layered hearsay was properly excluded from the record,5 and Weatherford never presented or attempted to present any other evidence. (CR 385–86); Weatherford Int’l, 652 S.W.3d at 915. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Weatherford failed to meet its jurisdictional burden, and it was unnecessary to analyze the underlying SWDA statute when “pursuant to the statute’s unambiguous terms, the SWDA’s cost-recovery provision does not apply to the allegations and subject matter—i.e., a domestic wastewater collection system—that form the factual basis of the claims that Weatherford has asserted. .. .” Id.",Party Submissions,6.1654267,6.2875094,6.4315195
"The characterization of property as either community or separate is determined by the inception of title to the property. Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex. App—Fort Worth 2004, no pet). Inception of title occurs “when aparty rst has aright of claim to the property by virtue ofwhich title is nally vested.” Id. The-major cOnsideration in determining the characterization of property as community or separate is the intention of the spouses by the circumstances surrounding the inception of title. Id.",Party Submissions,8.411721,9.523512,8.715241
"But the Section 29(7) exception to collateral estoppel is not appropriate because (1) any non-party exception does not apply, in light of what Samson did to sever this Bordages case from Hooks and the subsequent intertwined history of the cases (with one lease in both cases) and (2) the policy purposes of the Restatement do not warrant exempting this case from ordinary rules of issue preclusion.",Party Submissions,22.877714,21.766636,26.504068
"The jury erred when it terminated A.S.’s parental rights to R.W. based upon grounds (D), (E), (F), (N) and (O) of subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. Likewise, termination of A.S. ’s parental rights was not within the best interest of R.W.",Party Submissions,6.0339875,6.3693542,6.09618
"Business Day or, in the case of investment allocations received after a time specified by the Committee, the next Business Day, and shall be applied prospectively.",Contract,15.85,20.73515,37.00025
"Dr. Donald Null, a neonatologist who has managed hundreds of patients with findings similar to H.W.’s, reviewed Dr. Tappan’s report and agreed with his conclusions. App. 9, CR 709. In Dr. Null’s opinion, H.W.’s normal fetal heart rate early in labor and his condition post-delivery (his need for resuscitation, assisted ventilation, and cooling therapy, as well as his coagulopathy and severe acidosis) were consistent with an antenatal asphyxia event that occurred late during labor. App. 9, CR 709. Dr. Null also noted that there was no evidence that Mrs. Walker’s pregnancy complications harmed H.W. or that infection, brain malformation, or an old injury could explain H.W.’s condition at birth. App. 9, CR 709. Dr. Null believed that had H.W. been delivered only an hour to an hour and a half earlier, he would more likely than not avoided the degree of brain injury from which he suffers. App. 9, CR 709.",Party Submissions,6.022232,6.380126,6.590268
"And E.D., like this case, involved birth-injury claims brought against both a physician and a hospital. 644 S.W.3d at 667. Like the intermediate court in Abshire, the court of appeals in E.D. found the claimants’ expert reports deficient for failing, at least in the court’s view, to explain why any inferences drawn from the medical records were “medically preferable.” Tex. Health Care, P.L.L.C. v. E.D. by & Through B.O., No. 02-18-00300-CV, 2020 WL 1057332, at *9 (Tex. App. —Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2020), rev’d, 644 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2022) (“The report must explain why the inferences drawn are medically preferable to competing inferences that are equally consistent with the known facts.”). This Court disagreed that Chapter 74 required such a showing, confirming again that the “fair summary benchmark” is not evidentiary. E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 667 (quoting Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 226).",Party Submissions,4.8290796,5.009592,5.1422124
The Lawyers say there is no collateral attack because they were not parties to the bankruptcy court proceedings. Lawyers’ Brief at 45.,Party Submissions,15.030692,17.778233,23.001675
"In the instant case, Intervenor questioned A.S. about being stopped by law enforcement and being arrested for a misdemeanor drug possession charge while pregnant. See 3 RR 41. A video, without an appropriate sponsoring witness, was admitted before the jury of A.S.’s arrest. See 3 RR 45-46. As well, the jury heard testimony that A.S. was positive for methamphetamines during the time she was pregnant with R.W.",Party Submissions,10.015285,9.111267,11.272531
"Documents showing the exercise of Coropi's management and control from 26 April 2012 until today, including in particular minutes of the meetings of the board of directors of Coropi during which the topic of Obnova was discussed or internal notes and communications between the shareholders and/or Coropi's directors concerning decisions related to Obnova.",Legal Decisions,13.363918,10.682851,14.688361
The Respondent understands that this Request has been withdrawn. The Respondent reserves the right to object to any further request for these documents in due course.,Legal Decisions,12.391204,10.437552,13.697888
"El Sr. Chodorow reconoció abiertamente este hecho durante su contrainterrogatorio: Q. Okay. There is no information on file about the availability of the type of transportation facilities or means available at each of VMC's production facilities and distribution yards in the U.S.; correct? A. (Mr. Chodorow) That's correct. Q. Okay. And there is no information on file about production capacity and costs of each of VMC's production facilities in the U.S.; correct? A. (Mr. Chodorow) That's correct.234 198. Aunque el Sr. Chodorow reconoció que contar con esa información “sería útil” para un análisis de mitigación, no estuvo de acuerdo en que fuese necesaria.235 Para la Demandada es bastante obvio que sí lo es.",Party Submissions,7.0354223,9.459542,8.602191
Any and all documents relied upon to estimate implementation costs of the 2013 DRP presented in the Concept of the 2013 DRP prepared in 2010 (submitted as exhibit C-330).,Legal Decisions,17.240494,17.373022,18.682201
"Contractors Pollution Liability coverage is written on a Claims Made basis, the Certificate of Insurance will clearly so state. In addition to the coverage specifications listed above, such policy shall provide, and the Certificate of Insurance will list, that the retroactive date coincides with or precedes Subcontractors commencement of work under this Agreement. If insurance is terminated for any reason, Subcontractor shall purchase an extended reporting provision of at least five (5) years to report claims in connection with this Agreement.",Party Submissions,9.9259205,7.356621,10.722415
Time of Election. The date on which a modification election is submitted to the Committee must be at least twelve (12) months prior to the date on which payment is scheduled to commence under the Payment Schedule in effect prior to the modification.,Contract,6.5882354,7.9128566,9.855241
"The Martinez Family contends that the district court could lift the abatement because the DWC order is void for want of jurisdiction in absence of a pending claim. We have already rejected the Martinez Family's jurisdictional theory rooted in a distinction between potential claims and pending claims. The Martinez Family also argues that—to whatever extent DWC might otherwise have jurisdiction over the contested issue here—DWC lost that jurisdiction when the claim was rendered moot, which the Martinez Family believes occurred on July 26, 2020, when the [*20] statute of limitations had allegedly run on any claim the Martinez Family might file. We reject this argument, as well.",Party Submissions,8.422646,9.016046,8.943125
"There are four very different versions of what Mann was doing on morning of his accident. One version is that he was crossing Up River Road on his way back to his personal vehicle, for personal reasons. 17 The second version is that he was on the side of the road gathering drinks for the other workers that he supervised. 18 The third version was that he was going to a safety meeting. 19 And a fourth was that he was *6 going to inspect an excavation site for his crew. 20 However, this “statement” was obtained by Bay's worker's compensation coordinator, Pamela McShann, after Mann informed her that he had counsel and is therefore inadmissible. 21 There are no conclusive facts establishing that Mann was in the course and scope of his employment.",Party Submissions,11.849041,12.422646,13.3346815
"Annotations This Section cited in 28 TAC § 42.105, (relating to Medical Fee Guideline); 28 TAC § 133.304, (relating to Notice of Medical Payment Dispute); 28 TAC § 134.1000, (relating to Mental Health Treatment Guideline).",Party Submissions,7.058867,7.332791,7.0092
"As to the second through fourth Dow factors, Midland affirmatively proved that it did not have the authority, obligation, or control over the disposal of the Contaminants. Carl Craigo, Midland’s Director of Utilities, is the person responsible for the permitting and files regarding past and present permits or authorizations. Craigo is the only person who would have known about Midland’s pretreatment licenses and any disposals Midland would have authorized of such pollutants. Craigo affirmatively showed, after a thorough search through Midland’s files, that no such permit or authorization from the City of Midland ever existed for either Hy-Bon or EndDevices. (CR 54.) As such, any alleged disposal would have occurred (if it occurred at all) without Midland’s consent, and further, would have been in direct violation of Midland’s ordinances.",Party Submissions,13.3414135,14.6344595,14.873656
"Bay has cited numerous cases in its reply brief holding that the “passive receipt” doctrine survived Heldenfels, or have at least recited the “passive receipt” standard as the law. Bay Reply BOM at 11-12 & n.1. This Court should take the opportunity to define “undue advantage,” officially adopt the passive receipt doctrine, and find that the charge is not erroneous. Alternatively, to the extent the Court finds the charge was erroneous, the Court should remand for a new trial under a proper jury charge. VII. What does the Restatement say about the passive receipts theory At oral argument, Justice Busby asked what the Restatement says about the passive receipts theory of unjust enrichment. There is not a single Restatement section that synthesizes the various unjust enrichment theories similar to the Court’s decision in Heldenfels. Rather, there are numerous provisions in the Restatement that deal with passive receipts of benefits in different contexts, and they all support recovery by Bay, Ltd. in this case.",Party Submissions,9.5014925,9.722243,10.355762
"SuppCR14, 21. Samson argued severance would “promote judicial economy and efficiency” (SuppCR7). Samson identified issues common to the cases, including what it called Claim 6: “Most Favored Nations Claim/Late Charges (‘Tract 4/14 Lease’).” Samson pressed for severance of those identical claims, assuring the court that there was no risk of inconsistent adjudications because the Hooks case would resolve Late Charges and other common issues in what became this Bordages case: Those claims [] made under the “Tract 4/14 Leases” are absolutely unique to that lease form...Therefore, if the Hooks’ claim is severed, its resolution in the first case as to claims 6, 7 and 8 – whether by trial or motion for summary judgment – is very likely to resolve many of the same issues that are common, and unique, to all of the “Tract 4/14 Lease” Plaintiffs in the second case .",Party Submissions,16.257599,18.352087,18.775034
"TMI contends the cases relied on by Sonic are inapposite because a workers' compensation claim is at issue in this case. Relying primarily on American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 122 (Tex. 2001), and In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., 107 S.W.3d 832 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding), TMI argues that claims involving bad faith and negligence must be abated [**29] pending a final resolution of prerequisite or related workers' compensation claims.",Party Submissions,5.819627,6.067388,6.3686013
"Claimants also allege that Coropi exercised control over and directed the business decisions of Kalemegdan, and indirectly Obnova. In particular, Claimants refer to the so-called letter of instruction dated 26 April 2012 and the two trust deeds dated 26 April 2012 and 12 August 2012, which purport to give Coropi control over Mr Djura Obradović's shares in Kalemegdan (and by extension, Kalemegdan's shares in Obnova).",Legal Decisions,7.7363033,7.9305363,8.550344
"In adecree of divorce or annulment, the court shall determine the rights of both spouses in apension, retirement plan, annuity, and bonus, among other things. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §7.003. Generally, personal earnings are community pr0perty if earned during marriage. See Williams v. Williams, 246' S.W.3d 207, 21 5 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).",Party Submissions,6.4949293,6.8092365,7.2045507
"On January 14, 2021, the Oklahoma court denied McCarthy’s motion to dismiss and ordered McCarthy to answer the lawsuit; McCarthy answered the Oklahoma case and asserted counterclaims against MVP on January 29, 2021.",Party Submissions,6.576544,6.7115965,7.3395243
The treatment referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall as a minimum not be less favourable than that which is granted with regard to investments by investors of any third state.,Legal Decisions,9.915648,8.274026,11.942193
"Here, the evidence shows that Husband owned his home before the current marriage as a result of prior divorce proceedings. (6RR D 754– 760). The house was titled solely in Husband’s name and under the inception of title doctrine was unquestionably Husband’s separate property. (5RR 38:14–21). During the marriage, the parties elected to refinance the house mortgage. (5RR 39:1–11, 40:1–23). Wife took charge of the process and interfaced with the lender and title company. The deed executed by the parties as part of the refinance indicates both Husband and Wife as grantors, and Husband and Wife as grantees. (5RR 40:15– 23, 41:12–25, 43:3–25, 44:1-4; 3RR 141:18–25, 142:1–24; 6RR B 584–589). Husband testified that it was “strange” that the deed referred to Wife as grantor because she had no ownership interest to grant and he thought the title company got confused.",Party Submissions,5.942967,6.0298734,6.6015277
"S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 841 (Tex. 2010).",Party Submissions,3.5070076,4.200554,5.048914
"The decision on review shall set forth: (i) the specific reason or reasons for the denial; (ii) specific references to the pertinent Plan provisions on which the denial is based; (iii) a statement that the Claimant is entitled to receive, upon request and free of charge, reasonable access to and copies of all documents, records, or other information relevant (as defined above) to the Claimant’s claim; and (iv) a statement describing any voluntary appeal procedures offered by the plan and a statement of the Claimant’s right to bring an action under Section 502(a) of ERISA.",Contract,2.4072318,2.8663402,3.2649655
"Claimant s’ Memorial on the Merits Friday, 1 March 2024 Respondent’s Identification of Preliminary Objections and Request for Bifurcation Friday, 12 April 2024 Claimants’ Response to the Request for Bifurcation Friday, 24 May 2024 Tribunal’s Decision on Bifurcation Friday, 21 June 2024 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction Friday, 27 September 2024 Claimant s’ Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction Friday, 3 January 2025 Parties to identify witnesses and experts for cross-examination, if any Friday, 31 January 2025 Pre-hearing CMC Friday, 14 February 2025 Hearing on Jurisdiction (by video-conference) 10-11 March 2025 (12 March 2025 in reserve) If the Tribunal upholds its jurisdiction, a new calendar will be set for the merits phase.",Legal Decisions,3.7983885,3.776756,3.9390974
"The court of appeals also committed an error of law by holding Petitioners cannot bring a premises defect claim where there is no physical defect, which is an issue of such importance to the state’s jurisprudence that it should be corrected. See TEX. R. APP. P. 56.1(a)(5). Finally, this Court has not yet decided whether Texas recognizes a common law duty for owners and operators of public pools to provide lifeguards and make the premises safe, and this Court should address an important question of state law that was decided by the court of appeals.",Party Submissions,7.0948567,8.546744,7.8064756
"These documents were co ntained in hardcopy or electronic files on computers, phones, hard drives and/or USB keys belonging to the Claimant that were seized by the Respondent either during his arrestation or his detention and not returned to the Claimant since then. The requested information is therefore within the possession of the relevant Qatari governmental entities, agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore the Respondent is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,13.390581,13.452183,14.155488
"The number of Restricted Stock Units, vesting schedule of the Restricted Stock Units, and Award Date with respect to this Award, all of which are accessible to you through your brokerage account with the Company’s designated brokerage firm (“the Designated Broker”), are hereby incorporated into this Agreement by reference if not set forth above.",Contract,8.267981,7.6651278,8.474465
"Synopsis Employee brought action against employer alleging bad faith denial of reasonable and timely workers' compensation benefits. The 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, John J. Specia, Jr., J., granted summary judgment to employer. Employee appealed. The San Antonio Court of Appeals, Green, J., 21 S.W.3d 414, affirmed. Employee petitioned for review. The Supreme Court held that it would grant employee's petition for review and remand for appropriate action.",Party Submissions,5.496981,5.400754,5.4886646
"But while the facts here stem from the sanctions case, as explained in more detail below, this case is different, cleaner, less complicated, and deserving of another look. This case raises important statutory and common law questions of first impression unrelated to the sanctions case.",Party Submissions,15.217662,17.701347,18.466635
"Before this Court stayed all proceedings below during the pendency of the petition for review, the parties—including Rafiei—were participating in discovery in the trial court.1 The Court knows that because Rafiei argued that he wanted to continue with discovery. Rafiei’s Response to Appellant’s Motion to Stay Trial Court Proceedings (July 10, 2023), p. 4.",Party Submissions,9.018791,11.572508,11.314844
Possession 1. The fact of having or holding property in one's power; the exercise of dominion over property. 2. The right under which one may exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others; the continuing exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of a material object. 3. Civil law. The detention or use of a physical thing with the intent to hold it as one's own. 4. (usu. pl.) Something that a person owns or controls.,Party Submissions,7.233634,7.851753,7.3492928
"First : MVP’s argument hinges on the hope that this Court does not review the record. While MVP’s brief trumpets “waiver” on almost every page, the record does not support this argument—or the court of appeals’ waiver holding. Unlike the cases relied on by MVP (discussed below), RLB never once conceded that the MCC’s forum-selection/choice-of-law clause and waiver language applied to RLB and its claims. To the contrary, RLB repeatedly disagreed with the assertion that these MCC provisions applied to it through the Subcontract. R.0335 (MCC is only “ostensibly incorporated into the Subcontract”), R.0343 (MCC is only “allegedly” incorporated into the Subcontract), R.0684-85 (“RLB has not waived its rights regarding the forum selection clause or the choice of law clause in the [MCC] that MVP considers RLB as not having any rights under”). RLB also repeatedly sought to hold MVP to its burden of proof and raised numerous arguments to dispute the relief MVP sought in the trial court: abatement. R.0340, 0348-49, 0682.",Party Submissions,8.655294,8.358414,9.045674
"Mexico’s obligations toward First Majestic, the Tribunal does not need to deal with the Claimant’s procedural arguments referred to in para. 48 above.",Legal Decisions,18.761887,25.710333,28.003521
"To require the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study on the impacts of seasonal and nonresident homeownership on data collected by the Bureau of the Census, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.4083657,5.4194174,5.2057905
"This renders Resolution No. 141 a “measure taken in wilful disregard of due process and proper procedure ”, which is another articulation of arbitrariness according to EDF v. Romania ’s definition.",Legal Decisions,30.42705,35.08436,36.97436
"Weatherford now asks the Court to bypass the jurisdictional and definitional deficiencies upon which the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Weatherford’s claims, and instead focus on statutory interpretation that is not ripe for analysis in the absence of underlying jurisdictional facts. There is no deviation from this Court’s precedent by the Trial Court and Court of Appeals, as neither forum needed to perform a SWDA substantive law analysis in the absence of requisite jurisdictional facts. The Court should therefore deny Weatherford’s Petition, as Weatherford has failed to invoke any waiver of Midland’s immunity to its SWDA contribution claims.",Party Submissions,10.497941,10.664004,10.932384
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session; the 1st C.S.; the 2nd C.S.; the 3rd C.S. and the 4th C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the November 7, 2023 election results.",Party Submissions,4.4236245,3.9969761,5.1074567
"Citing De La Riva and Alonzo, among others, the court held the pathologist was not qualified. Id. Although he was “undoubtedly an experienced pathologist, [] there is nothing in the report or curriculum vitae explicitly addressing whether, or how, his vast experience as a pathologist qualifies him to opine on whether appellants’ negligence caused [decedent’s] injuries” related to a fall from the patient’s bed. Id.",Party Submissions,12.065375,11.562069,13.425122
"Perú ,239 Abaclat c. Argentina240 y SGS c. Paraguay241 para concluir que la jurisprudencia internacional ha establecido elementos que ilustran el tipo de actuaciones soberanas por parte de órganos o entidades estatales, que van más allá de un rol puramente contractual respecto de los inversionistas y sus inversiones, y que efectivamente comprometen la responsabilidad 233 Contestación a Objeciones, ¶ 110. 234 Dúplica sobre Objeciones, ¶ 106, con referencia a la Contestación a Objeciones, ¶¶ 76-78. 235 Dúplica sobre Objeciones, ¶ 107, con referencia a la Contestación a Objeciones, ¶¶ 120-145. 236 Dúplica sobre Objeciones, ¶ 108, con referencia a Convial Callao S.A. y CCI -Compañía de Concesiones de Infraestructura S.A. c. República del Perú, Caso CIADI No. ARB/10/2, Laudo Final, 21 de mayo de 2013 (CL-143), ¶ 517. 237 Dúplica sobre Objeciones, ¶ 109. 238 Siemens A.G. c. República Argentina, Caso CIADI No. ARB/02/8, Laudo, 17 de enero de 2007 (CL-105), ¶ 254. 239 Convial Callao S.A. y CCI -Compañía de Concesiones de Infraestructura S.A. c. República del Perú, Caso CIADI No. ARB/10/2, Laudo Final, 21 de mayo de 2013 (CL-143), ¶ 513. 240 Abaclat y otros c. República Argentina, Caso CIADI No. ARB/07/5, Decisión sobre Jurisdicción y Admisibilidad, 4 de agosto de 2011 ( RL-14 ), ¶ 238. 241 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. c. República del Paraguay, Caso CIADI No. ARB/07/29, Laudo, 10 de febrero de 2012 ( CL-152 ), ¶ 73.",Legal Decisions,3.0041776,3.5276487,3.1189375
"This conclusion of law contains both a conclusion of law that “a ny and all of Backes ’ s obligations as Guarantor under his Repayment Guaranty have terminated and been discharged pursuant to the Termination Clause ” and a finding of fact that “‘ construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco Building ’ was completed when THC approved the second Part C to the Texas application for State Tax Credits and thereafter the proceeds of the State Tax Credits were ready to be paid, which occurred on February 11, 2020.” Although Osprin challenges the conclusion of law, in the body of its brief, it does not challenge the fact-finding that the historic tax credit rehabilitation was completed when THC approved the second Part C and the state tax credits were ready to be paid.",Party Submissions,11.476489,11.715564,12.039734
"In public international law, the doctrine of estoppel protects legitimate expectations of States induced by the conduct of another State. The term stems from common and Anglo-American law, without being identical with the different forms found in domestic law. It is supported by the protection of good faith (bona fide) in the traditions of civil law. Despite varying perceptions and definitions in doctrine and practice, the following features and essential components of estoppel in public international law are generally accepted today, as stated by Judge Spender in the Temple of Preah Vihear Case, “the principle operates to prevent a State contesting before the Court a situation contrary to a clear and unequivocal representation previously made by it to another State, either expressly or impliedly, on which representation the other State was, in the circumstances, entitled to rely and in fact did rely, and as a result that other State has been prejudiced or the State making it has secured some benefit or advantage for itself.” (Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear [Cambodia v Thailand] [Merits] [Dissenting Opinion of Sir Percy Spender] 143–44).542 507. The Tribunal also subscribes to the position summarized in the Pope & Talbot v.",Legal Decisions,8.169266,9.006425,8.453819
"We see no difference in the agreements in the Houston Cement case, where the value of inventory was specified in the agreements but the agreements did not accurately reflect the value of actual inventory on hand, and the agreement in the present case, where the value of “transmission line(s)” was specified in the a greement but the agreement did not accurately reflect the actual value of the transmission lines present.",Party Submissions,11.425223,10.338816,12.168082
"Gallaher is factually distinguishable as well. Gallaher involved a newspaper article in which, absent attribution language, a reader would have virtually no ability to determine whether the allegation was being leveled by the newspaper, or whether the newspaper was only reporting (accurately) that the allegation had been made. The Program, on the other hand, is a visual documentary, not a written article. Documentary viewers can easily discern when an allegation is being leveled by an interviewee and not the documentarian, not least because they can see the interviewee saying it out loud. Imposing a “THIS IS A THIRD-PARTY ALLEGATION” disclaimer requirement would not only reach beyond the statute’s plain text, but would be absurd under the facts presented.",Party Submissions,9.326503,9.817746,10.06567
"OSI Systems, Inc. (the “Company”) hereby adopts the Second Amended and Restated OSI Systems, Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan (the “Plan”), effective December 1, 2023 (the “Second Restatement Date”). This Plan amends and restates in its entirety the Amended and Restated OSI Systems, Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan adopted on April 25, 2014 (the “2014 A&R Plan”), which amended and restated the OSI Systems, Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan adopted on May 9, 2008. In order to provide Participants with additional flexibility to elect Payment Schedules with respect to future Deferrals, this restatement, among other updates: (i) renames a Participant’s “Separation from Service Account” as his or her “Retirement Account” and (ii) permits each Participant to establish one or more “Separation from Service Account” in addition to his or her Retirement Account with respect to amounts deferred under any Compensation Deferral Agreement that becomes effective and irrevocable on or after the Second Restatement Date. Nothing in this restatement is intended to change or does in fact change the time or form of payment of amounts deferred under the Plan as in existence prior to the Second Restatement Date, including without limitation, the time and form of payment of any Retirement Account.",Contract,3.4047427,3.452871,3.5519245
"PRAYER For these reasons, Petitioners request that the Court grant their motion for rehearing and then grant their petition for review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, and remand for further proceedings. Petitioners also pray for all other relief to which they are entitled.",Party Submissions,5.243953,6.763958,6.9409146
"However, we agree with our sister court that the third Penn Central factor weighs heavily against finding a taking in this case. See id. at *8. The character of the governmental action in this case is nothing like a physical invasion. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The Emergency Orders must be viewed in the context of the existing national public health emergency, during which “restrictions were issued to combat ‘ the imminent threat of disaster’ posed by COVID–19, a contagious and deadly virus. ” See Stand for Something Grp. Live, 2022 WL 11485464 at *8.",Party Submissions,9.120527,8.922677,9.469778
"Relator relies on dicta from In re Anthony, stating that “[t]he Legislature has since made clear. .. that candidates may not amend their applications once the filing deadline passes.” Pet.10 (quoting 642 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Tex. 2022)). But Anthony never reached the remedial question because it held “that Anthony’s application is not defective.” 642 S.W.3d at 591. As recently as 2020, this Court cited with approval Francis and its holding that candidates can be given the opportunity to cure. See In re Green Party of Texas, 630 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Tex. 2020) (“[U]nder In re Francis, an opportunity to cure should be provided when a candidate could still comply with Election Code requirements.”). This line of cases remains good law. IV. Removing Justice Devine from the ballot would violate the U.S.",Party Submissions,6.640139,7.61267,7.2404375
"The court of appeals largely based its decision on Bayou Terrace Investment Corp. v. Lyles, which held that a “lis pendens is a part of the judicial process and the resulting absolute privilege bars a suit for damages arising from the filing of the lis pendens.” 881 S.W.2d 810, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (citing Prappas v. Meyerland Cmty. Improv. Ass’n, 795 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied)). The court then concluded that extension of the privilege was justified because “[a]n abstract of judgment, likewise, is a part of a judicial proceeding in that it is a necessary step to convert a money judgment into a judicial lien that may later be executed against real property to satisfy a judgment.” 2022 WL 1038372, at *6 (citations omitted).",Party Submissions,4.7039065,4.777135,4.7824583
"The Agreed Motion alleges the lawsuits arise out of incidents leading up to, during and following a live performance by Travis Scott during the Astroworld Festival outside NRG Park on November 5, 2021. These incidents are collectively referred to in the Agreed Motion as the Incident.",Party Submissions,6.985821,6.777225,8.377017
"Certain Companies Owned by Duke Energy International Latin America, Ltd submitted as Exhibit C-568 that the restructuring of the Claimant’s investment was done to (i) facilitate compliance with newly issued Resolution 7/2003 Section 1 of the Argentine Superintendency of Corporations, (ii) relocate certain holding companies to countries more favorable for Argentine purposes, (iii) streamline the organizational structure and thus minimize administration costs, and (iv) obtain certain Argentine tax benefits derived from the tax treaty between Spain and Argentina. 477 462. The Claimant’s witnesses confirmed the tax-driven reorganization during the Hearing.",Legal Decisions,14.476116,12.060888,14.8545475
"Respondent notes that in principle Claimants do not object to this request, “ with the exception of any documents created in preparation for and/or in connection with the conduct of the present arbitration” However, Claimants' willingness to produce the documents is made uncertain and is overshadowed by the fact that they have raised the two grounds based on which they in fact object to produce.",Legal Decisions,17.767775,18.134167,17.657549
"Wright is distinguishable. There, this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that an expert report was deficient for concluding that the patient might have had “the possibility of a better outcome ” when the report failed to explain how the negligent conduct caused the patient ’ s injury. Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53.",Party Submissions,8.519325,9.726834,10.908399
"Arbitration Rule 32 21.1. The oral procedure shall consist of a hearing for examination of witnesses and experts, if any, and for oral arguments.",Legal Decisions,14.105354,10.21655,16.646767
"JUAN DELAPENA, Individually and as § IN THE DISTRICT COURT next friend of C.D.L.P., a Minor, § and KORINA DELAPENA, § individually and on behalf of the estate of § C.D., Deceased Minor. § § Plaintiffs, § § v. § 201st JUDICIAL DISTRICT § HIGHPOINT COMMUNITY § MINISTRIES d/b/a HIGH HOPES § SUMMER CAMP, and § CITY OF CEDAR PARK § § Defendants. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS ON THIS the 2nd day of September, 2021 came on to be heard Defendant City of Cedar Park’s Plea to the Jurisdiction. After careful consideration of the City of Cedar Park’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, the responses, the replies, the briefs, the evidence, the pleadings, and arguments of counsel, this Court DENIES The City of Cedar Park’s Plea to the Jurisdiction. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Defendant City of Cedar Park’s Plea to the Jurisdiction is DENIED in its entirety. All relief not expressly granted is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.",Party Submissions,3.9277956,3.915153,4.2086697
"This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 56.1(a)(3), (a)(5), and (a)(6), and Texas Government Code § 22.001(a). This appeal involves construction of Texas Health & Safety Code § 341.0645 and Texas Administrative Code title 25, § 265.191, regarding whether governmental units have an affirmative duty to provide lifeguards and abide by pool safety standards prescribed by HHSC.",Party Submissions,5.610616,6.447747,5.794509
"Participant. Participant means an Eligible Employee who has been given notification of his or her eligibility to defer Compensation under the Plan under Section 3.1 and any other person with an Account Balance greater than zero, regardless of whether such individual continues to be an Eligible Employee. A Participant’s continued participation in the Plan shall be governed by Section 3.2 of the Plan.",Contract,5.3019814,5.2080245,6.196908
"Notional Investment becomes effective generally, but not more frequently than once per business day. The Committee from time to time may specify such times, frequencies, methods, rules and procedures for calculating the value of any particular Notional Investment (for example, specifying that interest on money market funds shall be calculated and credited on a monthly basis).",Contract,14.301804,15.389882,17.028242
"Wife acknOwledges that a‘trial court need not divide community pr0perty equally, but rather the, division mustbe equitable. She contends the trial court abused its discretion by making aproperty division that was manifestly unjust and unfair and Operated to punish her for her fault in the diverce. She speeical-ly contends the trial court did not factor in the attorney’s fees she owed when making-a just and right division of the assets. We disagree.",Party Submissions,16.943396,19.856552,19.791899
"Rafiei failed to show that the delegation provision was unconscionable. Additionally, Rafiei did not demonstrate that the arbitration agreement as a whole was unconscionable.",Party Submissions,6.545333,10.8814335,9.868936
"Claimants disagree with Serbia’s interpretation of the Cyprus -Serbia BIT and, by extension, with Serbia’s description of alleged relevance and materiality of the requested documents. Claimants will address S erbia’s arguments in detail in their Reply.",Legal Decisions,15.044007,15.256587,17.29033
"Because of its historic designation, the Texaco building was eligible to participate in the Federal Historic Preservation Tax Incentive Program. The federal program is administered by the Internal Revenue Service and was created to incentivize the private sector to invest in the rehabilitation and re-use of historic buildings by offering federal income tax credits to developers undertaking such efforts. The income tax credits are available for qualified rehabilitation expenditures (also known as QREs), which are amounts spent on the rehabilitation of historic components of a building, as determined by the Secretary of the Interior.",Party Submissions,4.483946,3.8816383,4.551594
"Q... . But anyway, as of 1995 in the real-property records of the [County] of Galveston, we seek the City of Friendswood claims a road called Windemere Road, right?",Party Submissions,40.058735,42.107014,59.196312
"As discussed above, the Oncor’s pet. complains of actions taken by the Wilbarger CAD, which does not fall within the scope of the DJA’s express waiver provisions. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 622 (finding no waiver of immunity under the DJA where the Plaintiff did not challenge the validity of a statute, but TxDOT's actions under it). In a similar case, Boll v. Cameron Appraisal Dist., 445 S.W.3d 397 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, no pet. ), property owners sued under the DJA challenging the purported unconstitutional and unlawful taxation of their trailer homes. The appellate court found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear any of the property owners’ claims under the DJA, including their claim for attorney's fees, because they were not challenging the validity of a provision of the Tax Code. Instead, they were challenging the appraisal district's actions under it, and the DJA did not expressly waive immunity for those claims. Id. at 400. Like the plaintiffs in Boll and Sefzik, Oncor here does not challenge a particular ordinance or statute. Accordingly, the DJA does not waive immunity and the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear Oncor’s claims under the DJA against Wilbarger CAD. Id. C. There is no jurisdiction under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act Oncor cannot challenge the assessment of ad valorem taxes on its property through the Declaratory Judgment Act because the Texas Property Tax Code is a pervasive regulatory scheme that provides the exclusive means for taxpayers to resolve valuation disputes. See TEX. TAX CODE § 42.09 (“Remedies Exclusive”); In re ExxonMobil Corp ., 153 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding). Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court has held that “the Act cannot be invoked when it would interfere with some other exclusive remedy or some other entity's exclusive jurisdiction.” MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P ., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2009). The Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used as a vehicle to avoid or evade the exclusive administrative process and remedies in the tax code. Fort Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc ., 48 S.W.3d 366, 370-371 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet. ).",Party Submissions,4.3571362,4.5298553,4.5989366
"Barina’s attempt to read an attribution requirement into the statute finds no support in the cases she cites. In Gallaher, the court noted (in dicta ) the defendant newspaper’s attribution, stating that it “expressly qualified its reporting with sourcing language.” Resp. Br. at 32 (citing 2022 WL 2071779 at *9). But the court did not hold that such sourcing language was required for the third-party-allegation rule to apply. Instead, the court made clear that, “to be accorded summary judgment on this so-called ‘third-party allegation’ defense, the Newspaper had only to conclusively prove that it accurately reported the information it received [...]— which it did.” Id. at *9 (emphasis added); accord Hall at 380 (“[M]edia outlets that accurately report allegations made by a third party about matters of public concern can assert the truth as a defense.”). That is precisely what the Petitioners did here.",Party Submissions,8.789799,9.2479,9.043798
"The first session of the Tribunal was held on October 25, 2023, at 12 pm (Washington, DC time), by videoconference. The session was adjourned at 12:40 pm.",Legal Decisions,4.8105145,5.6901493,5.460332
"The jurisdictional limits on the justice of the peace courts’ powers in eviction cases serve to prevent other courts from drawing the impermissible inference that abandoning immediate possession in an eviction action equates to abandoning any right of possession or claim of damages in a district court action. ( See Pet. Br. 30-31) The court of appeals’ decision transgresses all these legal boundaries, notwithstanding Respondents’ misguided effort s to recast the decision as entirely fact-based.",Party Submissions,17.899176,18.516083,17.596876
"And thus far, at least one other court has relied on the analysis in the case. See Aguilera v. Costilla, No. 13-21-00135-CV, 2023 WL 2711129, at *8 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi – Edinburg Mar. 30, 2023), reconsid. en banc denied, No. 13-21-00135-CV, 2023 WL 3879854 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi – Edinburg June 8, 2023, pet. filed).",Party Submissions,3.5724628,4.095866,3.8591232
The United States objects to Request No. 3.b for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.,Legal Decisions,7.552367,12.250849,13.200073
"Lost Participants or Beneficiaries. Any Participant or Beneficiary who is entitled to a benefit from the Plan has the duty to keep the Committee advised of his or her current mailing address. If benefit payments are returned to the Plan or are not presented for payment after a reasonable amount of time, the Committee shall presume that the payee is missing. The Committee, after making such efforts as in its discretion it deems reasonable and appropriate to locate the payee, shall stop payment on any uncashed checks and may discontinue making future payments until contact with the payee is restored.",Contract,5.2648764,5.4899373,6.185686
"TAX CODE § 1.111(e); also citing TEX. TAX CODE § 41.01(b); also citing MHCB (USA) Leas. & Fin. Corp. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist. Review Bd., 249 S.W.3d 68, 83-84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied.).",Party Submissions,5.677622,7.0796213,6.1153655
"A critical aspect of the above-cited governing AAA rules is that there is no cap of any kind on the arbitration fees and expenses that Rafiei would have to pay. Indeed, this clause essentially employs the very same kind of language that was deemed unconscionable in Santorsola, and lacks much of the protective language found in In re Poly-Am .",Party Submissions,19.10589,20.789293,22.680159
"Fleming Defendants cite one document filed by the Harpst trial plaintiffs on November 1, 2016 before severance on November 4, 2016 (XXI CR 13571), in which they mention the fact that the Wilson Plaintiffs would be willing to sign a confidentiality agreement if the drug company requested it. This was merely reiterating a well-established fact that all the parties were already aware of. Fleming Defendants had tried to block certain evidence for allegedly violating a very old confidentiality agreement with the drug company, and to avoid that result Wilson Plaintiffs had always indicated a willingness to sign a confidentiality agreement if that would help with admissibility for their trials when they eventually came up. But such a confidentiality agreement was never made, the evidence was never allowed in, and pointing out Wilson Plaintiffs ’ willingness to make a confidentiality agreement does not mean that the Wilson Plaintiffs somehow controlled or represented the Harpst Plaintiffs or vice versa.",Party Submissions,11.412899,10.815294,11.546086
"West Headnotes (10) [1] Administrative Law and Procedure Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Courts Determination of questions of jurisdiction in general Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction, including the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, is a question of law.",Party Submissions,7.9127264,10.210944,9.07072
"The principle of waiver is the core of the agreement between Oncor and Dis- trict, and Oncor’s waiver of its right to pursue further proceedings is enforceable.",Party Submissions,17.555275,16.3322,22.726446
"Osprin complains that the trial court erred when it concluded that Backes was released and discharged from all of his obligations under the guaranty agreement when the conditions of the termination clause were fulfilled. Osprin argues that the termination clause should be 15 interpreted to mean that the fulfilled conditions only discharged and released future, executory obligations. Relying on cases in which a party exercised its right to terminate a contract, Osprin insists that terminating a contract only relieves the party of liability on defaults that occur after the termination date but does not discharge obligations that have arisen and matured before the termination date. See Gulf Liquids New River Project, LLC v. Gulsby Eng’g, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 54, 66 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy Res., Ltd., 99 F.3d 746, 754 (5th Cir. 1996).",Party Submissions,6.461935,7.1035585,7.237767
"The majority cites cases that did not involve self-dealing by an interested director or manager. 661 S.W.3d at 443 (citing Connolly v. Gasmire, 257 S.W.3d 831, 845–46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); In re GGP, Inc. S’holder Litig ., C.A. No. 2018-0267-JRS, 2021 WL 2102326, at *17 n.195 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2021) (mem. op.); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig ., C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 WL 1381331, at *18 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (mem. op.); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002)).",Party Submissions,3.4709635,3.707751,3.6156852
"UCC Member's or designee's facilities pursuant to a Separate Contract. For avoidance of doubt, the Burnel line connected to UCC's Seadrift Operations is Intermediary Equipment.",Contract,32.08462,37.528347,54.369526
"Other Costs and Expenses USD 32,230.39 Total: 582. The Tribunal’s decision on costs is governed by Articles 38 to 40 of the UNCITRAL Rules.",Legal Decisions,12.014675,12.050121,12.910308
"Respondent disputes this. Respondent points to Article 1(3)(b) of the Cyprus-Serbia BIT, which requires the investor to prove that its seat is in the territory of Cyprus and argues that regardless of whether the Tribunal applies international law or Cyprus law to determine what ""seat"" means under the BIT, the term ""seat"" requires effective management by the Cyprus entity, which the Cypriot Claimants failed to prove.",Legal Decisions,6.954768,8.109608,7.627364
"Sections 1.111(e)(2) and 25.25(c-1)(4) and (d-1) may readily be harmonized to give effect to both. Sections (c-1)(4) (d-1) create a bar to bringing a motion for correction under sub-sections (c-1) and (d), the sections for correcting rendition errors and value errors that exceed 1/3 of the appraised value. One of named exceptions to each is that the property owner appeared and offered evidence on the same issue at a protest hearing under §§ 41.41, 41.45. Creating a list of disqualifiers for bringing a sub-sections (c-1) and (d) motions that does not list the disqualifier of having previously entered a § 1.111(e) agreement could be interpreted to implicitly repeal § 1.111(e)(2) as applied to sub-sections (c-1) and (d) motions. Thus, the disqualifier of § 1.111(e)(2) is repeated in § 25.25(c-1)(4) and (d-1). Both statutes are thus given effect.",Party Submissions,6.4100566,7.683069,6.6259246
"For the avoidance of doubt, Respondent has already conducted a search and has not located any lease agreements concluded between Obnova and Serbia and/or Luka Beograd other than the ones already on the record. Claimants' statement that documents from the period predating Obnova's privatization should be in the possession and control of Serbia, rather than Claimants is erroneous. There is no reason for the documentation of the entity undergoing privatization to be in Serbia’s possession. On the contrary, such documentation always remains within privatization entity, i.e. Obnova. Therefore, all Obnova's documentation should be available to Claimants.",Legal Decisions,10.7781515,11.142212,10.966582
"It is the plaintiff’s initial burden to plead facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and we review this question as a matter of law. City of Austin v. Leggett, 257 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226). We construe the pleadings liberally, accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, and look to the plaintiff’s intent. See id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226). If the pleadings are deficient but do not demonstrate an incurable defect, then the issue is one of pleading sufficiency, and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend their pleadings. Id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27). Conversely, if it becomes clear that the plaintiff cannot allege a viable waiver of immunity, then the suit should simply be dismissed. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007).",Party Submissions,2.9228458,3.1371305,3.1408093
"The legislature has vested the power to determine whether a claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits solely in Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers Compensation (DWC), subject to judicial review. A trial court cannot adjudicate an employee's claim for bad-faith denial of workers' compensation benefits without first determining whether that employee was entitled to benefits at the time of the denial, a question within the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction. And the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction to determine compensability necessarily encompasses exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury or death occurred in the course and scope of employment. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.011(10) defines compensable injury as an injury that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is payable.",Party Submissions,4.0994678,4.3311934,4.2553377
"Coinbase also moved the District Court to stay its proceedings pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. The District Court denied Coinbase's stay motion, and the Ninth Circuit likewise declined to stay the District Court's proceedings pending appeal.",Party Submissions,5.017424,5.9630733,7.988486
"To amend the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 to improve biorefinery, renewable chemical, and biobased product manufacturing assistance, and for other purposes.",Legislation,3.376766,2.792667,3.091083
"To establish an advisory group to encourage and foster collaborative efforts among individuals and entities engaged in disaster recovery relating to debris removal, and for other purposes.",Legislation,13.6348915,10.29262,15.7715
"Code Section 409A. For U.S. taxpayers, it is the intent that the grant of the Award as set forth in this Agreement shall qualify for exemption from or comply with the requirements of Section 409A of the Code, and any ambiguities herein will be interpreted to so qualify or comply. The Company reserves the right, to the extent the Company deems necessary or advisable in its sole discretion, to unilaterally amend or modify this Agreement as may be necessary to ensure that all payments provided for under this Agreement are made in a manner that qualifies for exemption from or complies with Section 409A of the Code; provided, however, that the Company makes no representation that the grant, vesting, or settlement of the Award will be exempt from or comply with Section 409A of the Code and makes no undertaking to preclude Section 409A of the Code from applying to the grant, vesting or settlement of the Award granted pursuant to this Agreement. The Company will have no liability to you or any other party if the Award, the delivery of Shares upon settlement of the Award or other payment hereunder that is intended to be exempt from, or compliant with, Section 409A of the Code, is not so exempt or compliant, or for any action taken by the Company with respect thereto.",Contract,2.178675,2.159498,2.414418
"Ed., Page 524, Sec. 438. Thus, whether property is separate, or community is determined by its character at inception. Barnett v.",Party Submissions,19.478666,32.898476,30.711197
"Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc., 562 S.W.3d 69 (2018) [7] Administrative Law and Procedure Exclusive or original jurisdiction Administrative Law and Procedure Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies If the Legislature expressly or impliedly grants an agency sole authority to make an initial determination in disputes within the agency's regulatory domain, the agency has exclusive jurisdiction, and a party must exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking recourse through judicial review.",Party Submissions,7.901106,6.7082157,7.9629636
This Guaranty is a continuing guaranty of payment and not of collection and cannot be revoked by Guarantor and shall continue to be effective with respect to any indebtedness referenced in Section 1 hereof arising or created after any attempted revocation hereof.,Party Submissions,5.77883,6.408208,7.8515387
"Under Texas law, an unconscionable contract is unenforceable. Id. at 348. “[T]he theory behind unconscionability in contract law is that courts should not enforce a transaction so one-sided, with so gross a disparity in the values exchanged, that no rational contracting party would have entered the contract.” In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 892 (Tex. 2010) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981)).",Party Submissions,3.7182417,3.465113,3.838661
"By July 2016, the anticipated amount of QREs to be incurred on rehabilitating the Texaco building increased, which resulted in an expectancy of more state tax credits than anticipated when the bridge loan closed. TX 1111 provided updated and audited projections of QREs to First NBC and requested additional funding based on the availability of additional state tax credits to serve as collateral. Based on these projections, First NBC loaned TX 1111 an additional $10,000,000. On July 5, 2016, First NBC and TX 1111 entered into an Amended Bridge Loan Agreement to reflect the additional $10,000,000 extension of credit. An Amended Assignment Agreement was also executed to reflect TX 1111 ’s assignment of increased Contributions it expected to receive for the state tax credits, as well as an indirect and contingent interest in contributions from the federal tax credit investor. Neither the note nor the security and pledge agreement were amended. Likewise, the guaranty was neither amended nor increased.",Party Submissions,7.4210825,6.674789,7.5584993
"Instead, it informs jurors of the legal mechanics of a motion to strike proceeding as colored by the factual allegations here. Any comment on the evidence is the definition of incidental. See Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d at 24. The best sense I can make of the majority's reading—to the extent it considers the “incidentally” language in rule 277 at all—is that incidental means only small or minuscule. But that ignores the other use of incidental, which is “liable to happen as a consequence of an activity.” 2 The majority cites several cases to support a conclusion that the instruction directly instructed jurors how the court had ruled and is objectionable for that reason. 3 But unlike those cases, the court here made no announcement that it had concluded either party was correct on any issue, and it gave no hint that the court favored one party over the other because it had already decided for that party on particular issues. The majority hyperelasticizes the principle those cases stand for and in the process, ignores the incidental effect an instruction might have as opposed to a specific instruction regarding prior final findings the court has made.",Party Submissions,16.527054,15.312963,17.065218
"Respondents ultimately correctly concede that appraisal review boards and courts “may examine a settlement agreement to discern its contents” to determine “what the agreement covered” and what the settlement precludes a tribunal from doing. See Respondents’ Brief at 24. They even argue that it would be “irrational” not to acknowledge a tribunal’s power to do that. Id. at 25. According to Respondents, “[o]therwise, one could argue that the existence of any settlement agreement with an appraisal district on any property, with any owner[,] precluded any subsequent protest.” Id. That is exactly what Respondents are arguing to this Court. The argument is, indeed, irrational. Courts must have the power to construe section 1.111(e) agreements to determine whether they bar subsequent claims. The lower court’s contrary decision conflicts with this Court’s decisions in both Matagorda County and Willacy County, supra.",Party Submissions,8.892719,9.380506,9.386756
"But even taken on its own terms, Respondents’ tale makes no sense. Westwood did not “go out of business” or “sh ut ... down” as part of “a b roader strategic decision.” (Resp. 12, 31, 38) It simply changed its name from “Westwood Motorcars, LLC” to “Westwood Motors LLC” and continued selling cars under the new name. (8RR154-55, 159-60 ) So it had the same need for “warehouse” space after the name-change as before.",Party Submissions,13.268,13.928803,15.09201
"On April 28, 2005, Santos executed a Note and Security Agreement (the “Note”) in the principal amount of $24,398.00. CR2:49 -56. The unpaid balance was to accrue interest at a rate of eleven and one quarter percent (11.25%). CR2:49. The Note was payable to the order of First Franklin a division of Nat. City Bank of In. (“First Franklin”). CR2:49.",Party Submissions,6.6773267,6.325102,8.340376
"The Mandarino and Hays courts correctly read Section 51.003(a) by harmonizing it not only with Section 16.004, but other law regarding limitations. If the Note is a negotiable instrument, it is governed by Texas Business & Commerce Code § 3.118, and limitations could not run until either acceleration or the last installment due date. If the Note is not a negotiable instrument, nevertheless Texas law considers it an installment loan, with a breach occurring each time an installment payment is missed. Gabriel v. Alhabbal, 618 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Goldfield v. Kassoff, 470 S.W.2d 216, 217 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ); Stille v. Colborn, 740 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987). There could thus be no “accrual” of all monetary obligations under the Note unless Respondent exercised its optional acceleration clause. The demand for payment was an integral part of the cause of action, and a condition precedent to the right to sue; this means that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the demand was made. Intermedics, Inc. v. Grady, 683 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).",Party Submissions,5.1548786,5.0547676,5.2291236
"In listing the additional evidence attached to the summary judgment record in Briggs, the Fourth Circuit observed: “In addition to the OCIP manual and the documents previously discussed, the record also includes an affidavit from Mitsui's [the workers carrier] vice president and regional claims manager, Dale Wimer. *16 Wimer's affidavit states Toyota manufacturing “purchased an insurance policy from Mitsui under which multiple entities received workers' compensation insurance” and notes the “OCIP was purchased for work performed at the Toyota Motor Manufacturing plant in San Antonio, Texas.” The affidavit also states Briggs received workers' compensation benefits under the policy purchased by Toyota Manufacturing. In addition, the record contains the deposition testimony of Toyota Manufacturing's OCIP coordinator, Lauri Andrews. Andrews testified she believed the Walbridge/Bartlett Cocke joint venture was participating in the OCIP because its venturers, i.e., Walbridge Aldinger Company and Bartlett Cocke L.P., each had insurance policies issued to them by Mitsui. She further stated that a contractor “would be in violation of their contract with Toyota likely” if it was not enrolled in the OCIP. ” Briggs at 283.",Party Submissions,9.9048,9.069083,9.917821
"HN6 [ ] Preclusion of Judgments, Estoppel Under the quasi-estoppel principle, a party is precluded from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by the party. The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a party to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which it acquiesced, or of which it accepted a benefit.",Party Submissions,7.7775483,8.937442,8.829863
"Petitioners claim that this Court somehow implicitly overruled its prior precedent of Romero v. KPH Consolidated., Inc .6 Petitioners argue that the Court's Opinion conflicts with Romero's holding that a harm analysis is appropriate when 1 Motion for Rehearing (Mot.), p. 3. 2 Opinion (Op.), p. 34. 3 Op., p. 36 4 Op., p. 37. 5 Id. 6 166 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2005).",Party Submissions,6.4374847,7.2894864,7.391764
"Mr. Trumbull ( with whom was Mr. Hughes ), in support of the motion: 1. Unless Congress have given appellate jurisdiction to this court, it will be conceded that none can exist.",Party Submissions,19.584036,16.625835,22.131935
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the requested documents from the Assembly of the City of Belgrade in accordance with the applicable regulations157. In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".158 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Assembly in order to obtain documents in question.159 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants, to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves.",Legal Decisions,11.706743,13.019329,13.0123625
"Open Government and protecting the First Amendment, as well as publishing guidebooks on various legal issues, including access to public information.",Party Submissions,23.41802,23.995846,34.88925
"Without relevant expert testimony that the Lawyers breached their standard of care in stipulating that HSMiller was responsible for the conduct of its own vice-president in representing a potential buyer (HSMiller’s core business), legally insufficient evidence supports a finding of negligence based on the Defterios stipulation.",Party Submissions,28.178913,28.298477,35.771595
"But the “communication” granted absolute privilege by the court of appeals here is an abstract of judgment that was not made during a judicial proceeding and plays no role in protecting the rights of the general public to full and free administration of justice—it protects only the pocketbooks of specific institutions by hampering other individuals’ right to sell their property. By definition, an abstract of judgment must be filed after “judgment was rendered” at the conclusion of a judicial proceeding. TEX. PROP. CODE § 52.003. Upon recording in the real property records, it “constitutes a lien on and attaches to any real property of the [judgment debtor].” Id. § 52.001. And that is precisely why the Hospitals improperly filed and then refused to unequivocally withdraw their abstracts: to manipulate the system and prematurely try to protect their ability to collect an attorney’s fees award (then already twice-reversed) by hampering the Naths’ ability to sell a specific piece of real property.5 None of the public policy reasons or justifications for the privilege supports expanding it to cover an abstract of judgment.",Party Submissions,10.459765,10.380315,10.327754
"Having sustained each of Bay's issues, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment disposing of Bay's exclusive-remedy defense. We remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.",Party Submissions,6.770438,9.291239,10.79496
"Barina mounts little real resistance to this argument, arguing instead that the Program’s full context makes it clear that the statements are statements of fact. See Resp. Br. at 34-39. This is not a meaningful dispute. Petitioners wholeheartedly agree with Barina’s exhortation that this Court should view the report as a whole. Petitioners are confident that after doing so, this Court will conclude that the Program’s statements are rhetorical hyperbole or statements of opinion based on disclosed facts. See Pet. Br. at 34-35, 38; Lilith Fund for Reprod. Equity v. Dickson, 662 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2023) (making clear that “[a]ny limitation that defamation law places on free speech, however, may not muzzle a speaker from asserting an opinion in an ongoing debate about the law.”). That is particularly true for the type of advocacy-oriented speech the Program represents (see Pet. Br. at 34-35), characterizing the court-authorized financial exploitation of wards by guardians as criminal or a crime is not an assertion of verifiable fact, but rather the kind of moral questioning of purely legal behavior that this Court has long given the strongest possible legal protections.",Party Submissions,10.673128,9.938215,11.089034
"B. Specifically, the court of appeals held that this case involved a breach of the duty to create and maintain medical records (although none were alleged nor should be presumed) and would fall under the professional or administrative services component of the second element.",Party Submissions,23.35057,23.98052,29.689056
"Serbia does not seem to dispute that the requested documents are not in Claimants’ possession, custody or control. Serbia only asserts that the requested documents are “ in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties. ” This assertion is incorrect for the same reasons that Claimants already explained in paragraphs 30 to 47 above and in their response to Serbia’s objections to Requests No. 6. Claimants hereby incorporate all those arguments.244 Furthermore, as explained above, even if the requested documents had been “ equally and effectively available to both parties ” ( quod non ), Serbia would still be obliged to allow Claimants access to the responsive documents — as long as the Tribunal concluded that the documents are relevant and material and thus should be produced.245 DECISION 99 NO.",Legal Decisions,8.621873,9.202181,9.25237
"The Amarillo Court correctly noted that there is no explanation of how a prolonged second stage of labor or heart rate abnormalities caused any birth injury. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 17324338 at *4. At best, in a generic paragraph applicable to both defendants, Dr. Tappan opined that the clinical presentation “suggests the possibility that [H.W.] sustained a perinatal arterial ischemic stroke.” (CR.794 (emphasis added)) There is no explanation of how or why prolonged second stage of labor, heart rate abnormalities, or anything else could have led to a possible stroke. This is insufficient under the statute. See Constancio v. Bray, 266 S.W.3d 149, 157-58 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (report did not explain cause of anoxic encephalopathy, how it could have been prevented by increased monitoring, or whether and how it caused death).",Party Submissions,7.7363753,8.810222,8.73827
"Here, Oncor argues that it discovered it was mistaken after it made its § 1.111(e) agreement. But that does not change the fact that there was harmony of opinion as to the value being per the agreement at the time of written agreement. Because that final value was a matter on which a protest could have been filed, and indeed was filed and then denied, the agreement is final as to value. TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e).",Party Submissions,13.449584,15.741779,15.668241
"CKC alleged specific facts in support of its allegations that Alpesh had engaged in self-dealing, CR472-73, ¶ 58; the usurpation of corporate opportunities, CR471, ¶ 53 and CR472-73, ¶ 58; the diversion of CKC employees to perform services that did not benefit CKC, CR462, ¶ 36 and CR473, ¶ 58; and the diversion of $1.1 million in funds from CKC to Alpesh, CR467, ¶44 and 473, ¶ 58. Respondents’ argument that this case does not turn on Alpesh’s self-dealing cannot withstand review of the controlling facts and the governing law.",Party Submissions,6.0288577,6.0383463,6.4624224
"CKC respectfully asks this Court to call for briefs on the merits, grant review, reverse the judgments of the lower courts, and grant all other proper relief.",Party Submissions,13.486267,20.105938,18.502619
"After negotiations to extend the maturity date of the bridge loan failed, Osprin filed this suit in April 2018. In response to the lawsuit, Rusk Investors interpleaded the $23,605,580.00 in Contributions into the registry of the court in July 2018. In October 2018, Osprin filed a motion for partial summary judgment to obtain a release of the interpleaded funds. After the motion was set for hearing, the parties submitted an agreed order to release those funds to Osprin. In accordance with the bridge loan agreement, Osprin applied those funds as follows: 11 (1) $290,462.35 to legal fees, costs, and other expenses; (2) $2,604,811.64 to interest; and (3) $20,927,919.06 to principal.",Party Submissions,6.5595026,6.4761615,7.4755406
"The Gaonas argue that they may be denied any recovery if the Smith County suit is tried first because the position they take in that suit depends on the outcome of the Harris County trial. We disagree. Regardless of their strategy for trying the negligence claims first, when Reynaldo elected to participate in the system, he voluntarily relegated his common-law rights and remedies in favor of the rights ensured by the Act.",Party Submissions,17.872797,19.801592,21.895885
"The statutory text would have been directed at the courts if the Legislature intended to overrule this Court’s then-decade-old holding that “a court may order equitable relief from a statutory deadline” in the Election Code, In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d at 318, as well as the application of that doctrine in cases like Francis. Instead, section 141.032(g) is directed at what “candidate[s]” can do; it is not directed at what equitable judicial remedies courts may order in appropriate circumstances. The Legislature, moreover, could have amended Section 273.081, which governs injunctive relief under the Election Code, see In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d at 317, if it intended to disapprove of this Court’s equitable remedies for election filing deadlines. But it did not.",Party Submissions,6.1881514,6.6752076,6.897491
"In Tyler, another workers' compensation case, this Court determined that judicial review is a part of the statutory process under the TWCA, and because the viability of the negligence action there depended on whether the deceased worker was within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his death, an issue under the exclusive jurisdiction of the TWCC, abatement of the negligence action pending a final determination in the judicial review case was necessary. 107 S.W.3d at 836, 843 .",Party Submissions,7.189808,8.012973,8.761756
"HN9 [ ] ""The mootness doctrine implicates subject-matter jurisdiction."" Pantera Energy Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 150 S.W.3d 466, 471 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (citing Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home & Serv. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1993) ). ""A case becomes moot when:. .. one seeks to obtain a judgment on some controversy, when in reality none exists, or. .. when one seeks a judgment on some matter which, when rendered for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect on a then-existing controversy."" Id. (citing Texas Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) ). Here, there is no doubt a controversy exists: Texas Mutual and the Martinez Family disagree as to the proper mechanism for obtaining redress for Bruno's fatal injury. HN10 [ ] For that very reason, the suit for judicial review will result in a judgment that will, indeed, have a ""practical legal effect"" on the controversy. See id. Moreover, while the statute of limitations governing a claim for death benefits generally runs on the one-year anniversary of the date of the employee's death, see Tex. Labor Code § 409.007(a), the passing of that anniversary is not an absolute bar to asserting such a claim, see id. § (b)(2) (""Failure to file in the time required. .. bars the claim unless. .. good cause exists for the failure to file a claim.""). Thus, this [*21] case is not moot.",Party Submissions,5.3374643,5.843227,6.058524
"For column 5: Indicate the zone of the DA where the survey was carried out, including as many rows as necessary: infested zone (IZ) or buffer zone (BZ), using separate rows. Where applicable, indicate the area of the IZ where the survey was carried out (e.g. last 20 km adjacent to the BZ, around nurseries) in different rows.",Legislation,16.336569,19.42103,18.422579
M Our verdict is not unanimous. Ten Ofus have agreed t0 each and every answer and have signed the signature below.,Party Submissions,78.70157,124.58003,114.83452
"Sonic appealed the hearing officer's decision regarding Cochran's election of remedies and its entitlement to reimbursement. On May 22, 2002, the appeals panel issued its decision, affirming the hearing officer's determinations and concluding as follows: The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant elected to pursue a remedy and recover compensation under the workers' compensation laws of the State of Alabama. .. . **** 1 Sonic's policy with TMI contained an ""Other States Endorsement"" that provided coverage for employees injured while working outside of Texas. 2 The Croix defendants are not a party to the appeal, but are real parties in interest in the mandamus proceeding. 3 Specifically, the sum represents payments made to Cochran from June 3, 1997 to July 6, 2001.",Party Submissions,7.150109,8.101489,7.977407
"Dr. Null’s discussion is limited to generally describing H.W.’s condition after birth, noting it is “consistent with an asphyxia event that occurred late in the course of labor,” and then concluding he “would not have suffered the degree of birth injury that he has” if he had been delivered earlier. (CR.709). That is not functionally different from the Wright expert’s “possibly had a chance at a better outcome” opinion.",Party Submissions,14.750427,18.512835,18.790377
"It is certainly true that in very limited circumstances described in TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25(c) a property owner is allowed to contest aspects of appraisals five years in arrears. But, that is not the case when the property owner and appraisal district have reached an agreement on the value pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e). Indeed, avoiding such latent recalculations is undoubtedly a significant factor to inducing appraisal districts to enter the type of agreements which Oncor seek s to treat so lightly. IV. Harris County Appraisal District v. Jacob S. McDonald and 1615 Houston’s First Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Jacob S. McDonald and 1615 Tabor, LLC, No. 01-19-00990-CV, 2021 WL 3556215 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] August 12, 2021, no pet. ) (mem. op.) (“1615 Tabor”). The case upheld a § 1.111(e) agreement and rendered judgment for the appraisal district. Id. at *5. The holding in the case is irrelevant to these proceedings.",Party Submissions,7.079038,6.9759846,7.2589507
"North Star unless that exceeded Seagourmet’s processing capacity.363 While the Tribunal has some reservations about the asserted unwritten agreement between the two companies, it has nevertheless concluded that the evidence that the contractual relationship between North Star and Seagourmet went beyond a series of unconnected contracts for the sale of goods and that North Star operated on the basis that Seagourmet had an obligation to take and pay for catches of snow crab; this is sufficient to justify the Tribunal in finding that North Star had an investment within the meaning of Article I(1)(iii) of the BIT.",Legal Decisions,12.772153,12.134429,13.614644
"While we recognize the supreme court decided Loya based on the MSA, which is distinguishable to the present facts, we nonetheless find its dicta instructive.",Party Submissions,21.443747,31.70468,40.49079
"In Graham v. Franco, the Supreme Court explained: A much later case of this Court reverted to a test more akin to that prevailing under the Spanish and Mexican law, and several early opinions of this Court, dealing with community property. It applied an affirmative test; i.e., that property is community which is acquired by the work, efforts or labor of the spouses or their agents, as income from their property, or as a gift to the community. Such property, acquired by the joint efforts of the spouses, was regarded as acquired by ‘onerous title’ and belonged to the community. Norris v. Vaughn, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953); DeBlane v. Lynch, 23 Tex. 25 (1859); Smith v. Strahan, 16 TEX. 314 (1856); Epperson v. Jones, 65 TEX. 425 (1886); De Funiak, Principles of Community Property (1971) ⸹ 62; Moynihan, Community Property, 2 American Law of Property (1952) ⸹ 7.16.",Party Submissions,8.303875,8.954174,8.46686
"To amend the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, to expand the replacement of stolen EBT benefits under the supplemental nutrition assistance program.",Legislation,8.239103,5.234174,7.526433
"In fact, the majority's supercharged version of Griggs contradicts its own account of Congress's intent. Consider the statutes that the majority points to as models of how Congress would reject a mandatory-general-stay rule. Ante, at 1921 – 1922, and n. 6; see supra, at 1925 – 1926. Under those statutes, the majority says, Congress intends that an interlocutory appeal does **1929 “ not ... automatically stay district court proceedings.” Ante, at 1921. Yet, the majority also seemingly accepts that under those statutes, “the Griggs principle applies.” Ante, at 1920. And per “the Griggs principle” as the majority sees it, in some cases an interlocutory appeal does automatically stay district court proceedings. Ante, at 1919 – 1920. So a mandatory general stay is thus both prohibited (by the statutory text) and required (by the majority's view of Griggs ). 3 As this contradiction underscores, the majority's *757 holding is untethered from any statute and any existing conception of Griggs .",Party Submissions,7.038979,6.734011,7.2035317
"Discretionary Bonus Wife argues the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Husband a2019 discretionary bonus as his separate property because the evidence conclusively established he earned the bonus during marriage even though he received it post-divorce. Husband responds controlling case law is to the contrary; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion .by awarding him the discretionary bonus.",Party Submissions,6.5224786,7.302171,8.342333
"The trial court concluded that each party was responsible for their own attomey’s fees. The-Final Decree further stated that Wife “shall pay, as apart ofthe division of the estate. .. [a]ll debts, charges, liabilities, and other obligations. incurred solely b'y the “rife unless. express provision is made in this decree to the contrary.” The nal decree specifically included in this allocation one hundred percent-of the $12,000 loan 'or'n her parents for attomey’s fees. Thus, the record indicates the trial. court considered Wife’s attomey’s fees debt when making its just and right division of'the assets.",Party Submissions,16.87524,15.626902,19.116247
"But nowhere does Dr. Tappan mention (much less explain) that he has experience evaluating newborns, neurological injuries in newborns, or what does or does not cause neurological injuries in newborns. The words “neurology” and “neurological”—let alone “ischemia,” “hypoxia,” “stroke,” or “encephalopathy”— are not even mentioned in his curriculum vitae. (CR.787-99).",Party Submissions,7.384413,7.844387,8.519678
"In stark contrast, Rafiei's agreement lacks any safeguard against potentially exorbitant costs. This omission means that Rafiei faces not only his share of the arbitration costs but also all other associated expenses, without any ceiling or limit. Rafiei provided the trial court with evidence that the unreasonably expensive filing expenses and unlimited fee-splitting required by the delegation clause and (separately) by the remainder of the arbitration agreement were both independently unconscionable because each would operate to bar him from being able to litigate his claims. The Fourteen Court of Appeals agreed.",Party Submissions,15.625571,17.01034,19.344666
"Furthermore, pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 42.01(a)(1)(B), as well as (C) and (E), a property owner is authorized to appeal the order of an ARB on a § 25.25 motion. As referenced above, in an appeal under chapter 42, an ARB is not a proper party. Pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 42.24, the district court is authorized to grant relief notwithstanding the absence of the ARB as a party.",Party Submissions,5.7514052,6.3815255,6.9448767
B. A reasonable person could view the episode’s gist as accusing Tonya of exploiting Charlie by placing him in an unwarranted guardianship to convert his assets for her personal benefit.,Party Submissions,26.699621,41.497356,38.60208
"In short, the Wilson plaintiffs litigated as a unified group in 2010, 2011-2015, and in 2016 all the way to the November trial.",Party Submissions,10.091307,10.018796,12.450244
"The carrier began providing workers' compensation benefits, but it later disputed the claim on the grounds that a condition was preexisting. However, the claimant prevailed at administrative hearings and on judicial review. Fees for the claimant's attorney were deducted from the claimant's recovery. The claimant later filed a breach of contract action seeking to recover the administrative attorney's fees. The carrier's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was granted, and this appeal followed. In affirming, the appellate court determined that the claimant had to exhaust his administrative remedies. The claim for attorney's fees, whether grounded in contract or tort, was based on the carrier's dispute of the claimant's entitlement to benefits. That was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Texas Worker's Compensation Commission. Moreover, both 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 152.3(d), (e) and Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.221 governed the award and payment of attorney's fees during the administrative phase of a workers' compensation proceeding.",Party Submissions,4.5101113,4.352313,4.6888313
"Although ROCIP's have been held to apply vertically, horizontally, and diagonally to all contractors, subcontractors, or sub-contractors enrolled in a ROCIP, there are no authorities that hold that a ROCIP applies to shield employers from the negligent acts of co-employees not participating in a ROCIP.",Party Submissions,9.718307,12.022323,12.769559
"Claimants maintain their request and respectfully request the Tribunal to order the production of the responsive documents. The requested document is relevant and material As Claimants explained above, the requested document represents a request based on which the Serbian Republic Geodetic Authority prepared a “ NOTICE ” submitted as Serbia’s exhibit R -043. Serbia relies on this document to argue that Obnova’s buildings at Dunavska 17 -19 were allegedly “ built before Obnova was established in December 1948. ”22 Based on this assertion, Serbia argues that there is no evidence that Obnova acquired these buildings.23 Serbia, therefore, uses Exhibit R-043 as an important part of its defense. However, as explained above, this exhibit was compiled by Serbia’s own authorities (the Serbian Republic Geodetic Authority) for the sol e purpose of this arbitration and based on Serbia’s own request. Needless to say, the scope of Serbia’s request necessarily predetermines the scope of the response, on which Serbia now relies in this arbitration. The requested document will show whether exhibit R-043 was compiled in an objective manner and thus represents reliable evidence. As a result, the requested document is directly relevant and material to assess the veracity of Serbia’s claim that Obnova did not build the buildings at Dunavska 17 -19 and does not have any rights to these buildings. For the avoidance of doubt, Serbia’s argument that if “ Claimants consider that the information contained in the exhibit R-043 [sic] may be inaccurate or incomplete, they could have sought additional information they consider relevant from the Cadastre ” is not serious. Enough to say, Claimants requested production of certain documents necessary to assess completeness and accuracy of exhibit R-043 in some of their other requests ( e.g. Requests Nos. 6-7 and 9-12). However, Serbia objects to production of any such documents as well.",Legal Decisions,8.118179,8.055395,7.808711
"FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, DOW MULTINATIONAL HOLDING LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the “Borrower”), promises to pay to the order of UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, a New York corporation (the “Lender”), the principal sum of USD 1,543,400,000 or such lesser amount as shall be outstanding (the “Loan”) pursuant to the terms of that certain Term Loan Agreement, dated as of December 1, 2023 (as amended, amended and restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, the “Loan Agreement”), between the Lender and the Borrower. Capitalized terms used herein and not defined have the meanings assigned to such terms in the Loan Agreement.",Contract,2.6253994,2.4042258,2.8450022
"On the basis of the evidence in the record, under the income approach to damages as proposed by Claimant, what would Claimant’s damages be if the flow of income was to be determined on the basis of the market price ex-works off CALICA?",Party Submissions,20.839344,23.098064,23.037216
"We granted this permissive appeal to address four questions posed by the trial court concerning the exclusive-remedy defense. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3. Because we resolve each of these questions in favor of Bay, we reverse the summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.",Party Submissions,5.7372417,6.911627,7.3050103
Claimants agree to conduct a reasonable search for and produce documents responsive to this request that are in the Claimants’ possession and/or control.,Legal Decisions,8.80494,12.352917,11.246558
ASEY ) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to Supporting the contributions of Catholic schools in the United States and celebrating the 50th annual National Catholic Schools Week.,Legislation,17.661077,14.959908,24.350405
"This Court should review the appellate court’s sua sponte creation of an “endorsement” exception to the third-party allegation rule and clarify that the statute allows no such exception. The court of appeals misapplied Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Hall3 and Rosenthal to erroneously craft a rule that if a speaker takes an “extra step” of endorsing the words of another, then the speaker loses the third-party-allegation rule’s protections. Pet. Br. at 24-29. But there is no such exception, and its creation by the appellate court provides this Court with two reasons to grant review. First, the third-party-allegation rule has been wrongly judicially conscripted in the past. See Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 65 n.18 (Tex. 2013) (declining to recognize a formal third-party-allegation rule). In response, the Texas Legislature in 2015 amended section 73.005 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code to clarify how broadly defined the rule is intended to be. CPRC § 73.005(b); see Scripps NP Operating, LLC v. Carter, 573 S.W.3d 781, 791 (Tex. 2019). Allowing the court of appeals to chip away at that rule not only contradicts this Court’s actual holding in Hall—that the rule applies to publications, like the Program, that report on large-scale controversies—but also thwarts the Legislature’s specific purpose in amending Section 73.005. See Senate Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence Committee Report (Unamended) of Senate Bill No. 627 (Huffman) (2015 Reg. Sess.), May 13, 2015 (noting that purpose of amendment is to help protect “reports of questionable activities in public entities ... [as] too often it is the media that first uncovers problems that need to be investigated or for which there needs to be legislative reform.”). Second, judicially creating an “endorsement” exception “will chill First Amendment speech.” Hall, 579 S.W.3d at 382. The third-party-allegation rule is designed to allow all manner of journalists—including documentarians like Petitioners—the freedom to engage in newsgathering that “involves investigating, tracking down related stories, and providing context for readers.” Hall, 579 S.W.3d at 382; Pet. Br. at 28-29. Any limit on the rule will imperil their ability to do so.",Party Submissions,6.228487,6.031054,6.2493515
"Removing Justice Devine from the ballot in these circumstances would be fundamentally unfair. That remedy would prevent millions of Texans from again voting for Justice Devine based on alleged technical defects in a few of the signatures on his ballot petition (i.e., that a few signers had previously signed Relator’s petition). These purported defects arose through no fault of Justice Devine’s, they prejudice no one, and they are being raised now in a purely opportunistic and entirely untimely fashion. Equitable principles therefore require denying Relator’s mandamus petition, and this Court “will not issue an original writ of mandamus absent a compelling reason.” Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 142 (1996) (cleaned up). This case is not a close call under these standards.",Party Submissions,8.441761,8.619382,9.111191
"But every court confronted with actual collusion and position shifting after a legal malpractice claim assignment has voided it on grounds of public policy or judicial estoppel. Notably, the decisions from states that allow assignments of these claims or proceeds often state that they were not confronted with collusion or position shifting. E.g., Eagle Mountain City v. Parsons Kinghorn & Harris, P.C., 2017 UT 31, ¶ 12, ¶¶ 44-45, 408 P.3d 322, 325, 334; see also N. H. Ins. Co. v. McCann, 707 N.E.2d 332, 336-38 (Mass. 1999). (See App. C) 8 This Court has already held that collusion and position switching violate the very core of a fair, just judicial system, and has invalidated the assignment of a legal malpractice claim to the client’s litigation opponent. See Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, writ ref’d); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996). This case involves the assignment of most of the proceeds of such a claim and should be treated no differently than Zuniga or Gandy.",Party Submissions,6.427544,6.863531,6.790805
"Respondent "" to commission the Comptroller General "" to investigate the MOPC contracts, which State entity would have issued that decision, and how that such decision would have led to the September 21, 2020 report. Indeed, such report (Exhibit R-0024, p. 7 of the PDF) is clear that it arises from a review of “libramientos” pending at the time of assuming the direction of the General Comptroller's Office.",Legal Decisions,26.778502,23.439386,26.842857
"The parties appear to agree that if Bay is to qualify as Mann's statutory employer, it is to be through the definition of employer that is set forth in the ROCIP provision. See TEX.",Party Submissions,26.499033,26.259035,34.57606
"The employee argued the employer was estopped from asserting she was injured in the course and scope of her employment. The court held that the employee failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on her equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel theories. As to her equitable estoppel claim, the court observed that the employee was required to file a workers' compensation claim within one year after the date of her injury. She had retained an attorney by, at most, two months after her injury. Therefore, she had an attorney to advise that her injury might have occurred in the course and scope of her employment and thus she needed to pursue a workers' compensation claim. Accordingly, the employee was not without knowledge, or means of knowledge, that she might have been injured in the course and scope of her employment, despite any contrary representation by the employer. The employee was not denied recovery for her injury based on the employer's inconsistent positions. Rather, she was denied recovery because she elected not to timely pursue a workers' compensation claim. Thus, it was not unconscionable for the employer to rely on the exclusivity provision as a defense to the suit.",Party Submissions,4.5776763,4.6015267,4.9420958
"In the intriguingly-captioned New York Party Shuttle, LLC, v. Bilello, 414 SW3d, 206, Tex. App.-- (Houston [1st] 2013, no pet), the First Court of Appeals succinctly lays out the elements of mistake, and what must be proved to invoke it. Petitioner can do no better.",Party Submissions,12.143558,12.347243,13.868167
"Indeed (i) both Parties typically refer to General Asphalt next to “Bluport Asphalt” and “Inversiones Titanio” ( see e.g. SoC, ¶¶ 56, 182; SoC, ¶¶ 355, 465); and (ii) the Respondent has voluntarily produced to the Claimant the contracts (and related documents) with Bluport Asphalt and Inversiones Titanio ( see Requests 1-4 supra).",Legal Decisions,14.587502,14.467249,16.173847
"Fourth, Barina willfully misconstrues the fair-comment and fair-report privileges. In claiming that Petitioners cannot avail themselves of the fair-comment privilege, Barina characterizes Petitioners’ alleged conclusion that her conduct is exploitative as a false statement of fact. Even if that commentary were contained in the Program, however, commentary on the underlying guardianship proceeding is precisely what the fair-comment privilege is meant to protect. Barina further asserts that reporting loses the protection of the fair-report privilege if it includes anything from outside the official proceeding it is describing. In effect, Barina conceives of a privilege that would only apply to unabridged reprints of court opinions. That is simply not the law.",Party Submissions,11.656408,12.102185,11.514086
"HN1 [ ] Standards of Review, Abuse of Discretion The standards generally applied in a mandamus proceeding are well established. Mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law and only where the petitioning party lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. A trial court has no discretion to misapply the law.",Party Submissions,6.202292,7.465005,8.00812
"Fleming Defendants briefly mentioned one more Taylor privity path in their Reply Brief at page 11, which was the third (“Taylor Privity Path 3”) that reads as follows: Third, we have confirmed that, “in certain limited circumstances,” a nonparty may be bound by a judgment because she was “adequately represented by someone with the same interests who [wa]s a party” to the suit. Richards, 517 U. S., at 798 (internal quotation marks omitted).",Party Submissions,12.488606,13.392114,13.029154
"Fourth, the AAA permits fee waivers in hardship cases. Brief on the Merits, p. 18. Under Olshan, it is Rafiei’s burden to show that he has sought a fee reduction if he is going to complain of unconscionability. 328 S.W.3d at 897 (“there is no evidence that the homeowners have made any effort to reduce the likely charges through requests for fee waivers”).",Party Submissions,13.957505,14.695492,16.168793
"Id., at 198. That appears to be the case here. F. Producing an expert report upon the adequacy of the medical records was impossible here since the medical records in this case had all been destroyed.",Party Submissions,16.862904,22.547613,22.126375
"In re Olshan centered around a dispute where the homeowners were governed by the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules. 328 S.W.3d at 886-87. Under these rules, the costs that a consumer, like the homeowners in Olshan, would have to bear were limited and clearly delineated. Specifically, the homeowners' fees were capped, ensuring that arbitration remained an affordable and accessible means of dispute resolution. Id. at 896.",Party Submissions,7.9230638,7.3550644,9.217004
"C. All past due royalties (including any compensatory royalties payable under Paragraph VI.B) shall be subject to a Late Charge based on the amount due and calculated at the maximum rate allowed by law commencing on the day after the last day on which such monthly royalty payment could have been timely made and for every calendar month and/or fraction thereof from the due date until paid, plus attorney’s fees, court costs, and other costs in connection with the collection of the unpaid amounts. Any Late Charge that may become applicable shall be due and payable on the last day of each month when this provision becomes applicable.",Party Submissions,7.6346855,7.7630224,8.385379
"Not only does the SWDA definition of “solid waste facility” carve out and exclude the only infrastructure alleged to be at issue by Weatherford’s petition (a sewer system), the SWDA also requires action by a potentially responsible party to qualify that party as a defendant. The SWDA identifies four categories of a person “responsible for solid waste,” once again requiring an act to qualify under the statute rather than creating a strict liability framework.",Party Submissions,18.035389,16.162064,19.641298
No Legal or Equitable Rights or Interest. No Participant or other person shall have any legal or equitable rights or interest in this Plan that are not expressly granted in this Plan. Participation in this Plan does not give any person any right to be retained in the service of the Participating Employer. The right and power of a Participating Employer to dismiss or discharge an Employee is expressly reserved. The Participating Employers make no representations or warranties as to the tax consequences to a Participant or a Participant’s beneficiaries resulting from a deferral of income pursuant to the Plan.,Contract,4.015721,4.0901947,4.3833117
"As explained above,45 Serbia relies on exhibit R-043 to argue that Obnova does not have rights to its buildings at Dunavska 17-19. However, as also explained above, R-043 only includes excerpts from various sketches referred in R-043. These excerpts are insufficient to properly identify the original documents from which they were taken. The requested documents will show which specific documents were used to compile R-043 and, in turn, whether such documents support Serbia’s claim that Obnova does not have any rights to buildings at Dunavska 17-19. The documents will also make it possible to check whether the Serbian Republic Geodetic Authority made any mistakes when preparing Exhibit R-043 for the purposes of this arbitration. The requested documents are therefore directly relevant and material to assess the veracity of Serbia’s claim th at Obnova does not have any rights to these buildings and evaluate the evidence that Serbia adduces to support that claim. DECISION Any and all sketches ( in Serbian: skice ) that have been prepared for Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 between 1946 and 1995.",Legal Decisions,8.089886,7.926841,8.04694
"Most importantly, Exhibit 7of the Brief of Appellees, (RR Vol. 2, Ex.7), a copy of which is attached hereto in the Appendix as Tab 3, shows that the management team of Integrity Aviation, a Texas Corporation, located in and doing business in Texas, consists of Victor Farias and Matt Marsenison. The last page of Exhibit 7 shows an address of Integrity Aviation at 2 Spencer Road, Suite 103, Boerne, Texas 78006. (RR Vol. 2, Ex. 7, and Appendix, Tab 3) This is a contract entered into by Marsenison with a Texas resident, in Texas.",Party Submissions,10.130182,10.394037,11.183679
"Under current law, and under the present Family Code, a bonus is treated as deferred compensation. There is a time allocation rule from this Court on pensions.",Party Submissions,38.520416,38.87823,44.990517
"Nature of the Case: This is a venue dispute involving the interpretation of forum selection, choice of law and waiver provisions in a contract. Plaintiff RLB is a subcontractor that performed dredging work for general contractor McCarthy in connection with project owner MVP’s construction of a new marine terminal along the Houston Ship Channel. RLB sued McCarthy1 and MVP in Harris County, Texas, alleging failure to pay RLB “additional compensation for the differing site conditions RLB encountered.” By that time, MVP had already filed a lawsuit involving the same core dispute against McCarthy in Oklahoma state court. MVP filed a plea in abatement in the Texas action—relying on forum selection, choice of law and waiver provisions in its contract with McCarthy—requesting that RLB’s claims be abated or dismissed pending resolution of the Oklahoma case.",Party Submissions,6.1334243,5.7111,6.062553
"Comm'n, 767 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. 1989). The Opinion’s failure to address Weatherford’s central issue based on R.R. Street failed to comply with rule 47.1.",Party Submissions,7.824526,9.804071,12.138361
"The Walkers do not advocate for a new or different standard. They instead argue that Amarillo Court used a wrong standard based on its citation to Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson, 649 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. 2022). The lower court did no such thing. The court, in fact, faithfully applied the standards set out by this Court and properly held the reports, even read together, did not adequately address causation.",Party Submissions,14.068726,14.965073,15.662889
The results of the surveys carried out pursuant to Article 5 shall be submitted to the Commission using the template referred to in the Annex.,Legislation,8.063866,8.328502,12.83147
"Further, in In re Olshan, the homeowners attempted to argue that the arbitration costs were prohibitive. To support their claim, they provided AAA invoices from other arbitrations, hoping to draw parallels to their case. Id. at 897. This Court, however, found that the evidence wasn't legally sufficient to determine that they would ""actually"" be charged excessive fees.",Party Submissions,11.811322,11.7799225,13.768471
"When medical experts provide reports under Chapter 74 of the TMLA full of medical jargon, but lacking in specificity, is it the courts’ job to interpret them and connect the dots? The Walkers say “yes.” Not so fast.",Party Submissions,22.402687,24.617453,24.41586
The majority opinion raised this “subjective material benefits” test sua sponte. Respondents did not argue in the trial court or in the court of appeals that the subjective material significance of the benefits Alpesh received from his alleged misconduct was a relevant factor in a demand-futility analysis. CKC had no notice that it was an issue in the case before the majority raised it sua sponte. The majority opinion adopted this test without the benefit of briefing by either side.,Party Submissions,14.695079,13.922535,13.761884
"The court of appeals agreed with the City and held that Petitioners’ claims must sound in premises liability. Delapena, 2022 WL 16993493, at *4 (citing Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 385). The court of appeals held that the City’s failure to enforce the Mandatory Safety Policy was not a “use” of property, but a misuse or non-use of “information,” and not actionable under the Tort Claims Act. Id. at *5.7 The court also rejected Petitioners’ claims regarding the failure to provide a lifejacket. Id. at *6.",Party Submissions,6.864822,7.1245394,7.475691
"McCarthy also disputed whether MVP is liable for the Additional Costs, asserting that RLB’s claim could be “passed through” to MVP. R.208 ¶14.",Party Submissions,18.977367,22.295948,25.004072
"C. All past due royalties (including any compensatory royalties payable under Paragraph VI.B) shall be subject to a Late Charge based on the amount of past due royalties1 and calculated at the maximum rate allowed by law commencing on the day after the last day on which such monthly royalty payment could have been timely made and for every calendar month and/or fraction thereof from the due date until paid, plus attorney’s fees, court costs, and other costs in connection with the collection of the unpaid amounts royalties. Only for purposes of lease termination under Art. XVII.D, 2 Any any Late Charge that may become applicable shall be due and payable on the last day of each month when this provision becomes applicable.",Party Submissions,10.686224,10.86389,11.800921
"Moving on from the Green Tree opinion, Rafiei cites a number of decisions from other jurisdictions. Response at 14. However, Rafiei does not argue that those cases provide any basis for changing Texas law on the subject.",Party Submissions,13.798987,21.236095,20.366077
"This document complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of Rule 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains 5,822 words, excluding any parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,3.7589278,4.8449206,5.4984913
"Each defendant whose conduct is implicated in a preliminary report “ must file and serve any objection to the sufficiency of the report not later than the 21st day after the date it was served, failing which all objections are waived.” Zanchi v. Lane, 408 S.W.3d 373, 379 (Tex. 2013) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(a)). As such, appellate review is limited to the grounds stated in the Section 74.351(b) dismissal motion filed in the trial court. Pepper v. Wilson, No. 02-22-00107-CV, 2023 WL 2534626, at *14 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth Mar. 16, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Thompson v. Fong, 650 S.W.3d 164, 168 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied) (refusing to consider argument that reports did not constitute “expert reports” under section 74.351 when that argument did not track the objections made in the trial court); Williams v. Mora, 264 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App. — Waco 2008, no pet.) (refusing to consider new objections made for the first time on appeal).",Party Submissions,3.8601544,4.0406866,3.8750803
"I write separately because I believe that the granting of the petition for permissive appeal in this case is improper, and the petition should have been denied.",Party Submissions,7.7301064,8.70782,10.92132
"Dr. Tappan’s report confirms that he has experience in diagnosing and managing women in the second stage of labor and the “indications and techniques” for vaginal and cesarean deliveries. (CR.787) But, Dr. Tappan is not licensed in and is not “actively practicing medicine in rendering medical care services” in the area of pediatric neurology or diagnosing the cause of neurological deficits in infants. Nor does he have any demonstrated substantial training or experience in diagnosing or opining as to the cause of neurological injury in infants. The mere fact he has delivered babies does not automatically qualify him to opine as to what caused injuries in a baby. Some other expertise, training, and practice must be demonstrated in the report.",Party Submissions,9.97612,9.204465,10.755829
"Samson now rewrites “past due royalty payments” in art XVII.D as “past due late charges.” Under art. XVII.D, the Lessor can give notice of “intention to terminate,” but can actually terminate the lease only if the Lessee fails to timely pay the “past due royalty payments.” So not paying a Late Charge is not a ground for lease termination. Art. XVII.D does not even mention Late Charges. It creates an option, not a condition, and provides the lease “shall not terminate” if the Lessee pays all past due royalty payments with “interest as provided herein.” This does not refer to Late Charges, but “interest” the Lessee may owe.",Party Submissions,9.666944,8.876219,9.959739
"The obligations of the Company under the Plan shall be conditional on such payment arrangements, and the Company and its Subsidiaries shall, to the extent permitted by law, have the right to deduct any such taxes from any payment otherwise due to the Participant. The Committee may establish such procedures as it deems appropriate for the settlement of withholding obligations with Shares. The Participant should consult his or her own tax advisor for more information concerning the tax consequences of the grant and settlement of Performance Share Units under this Award Agreement.",Contract,4.3403053,4.922997,5.4960566
"This case presents the perplexing contention that Rafiei cannot pursue his $1,000,000 claim because of the possibility he may be responsible for payment of $7,675 in AAA fees and arbitration costs. If that assertion were true, it would confound any rational economic appraisal and almost certainly would be the only time in the history of Texas personal injury litigation that a plaintiff was unable to find a lawyer to handle a $1,000,000 claim because of expected costs of less than $8,000. But Rafiei’s contention is not supported by the evidence he advanced in the trial court. Rafiei’s initial burden is to demonstrate that an arbitration of the delegation provision in Rafiei’s contract with Lennar is unconscionably costly when considered alone.",Party Submissions,9.092549,9.659745,9.330463
"To require the Secretary of Agriculture to designate and maintain at least 20 percent of the total number of trails in the Shawnee National Forest for trail riding by covered vehicles, and for other purposes.",Legislation,9.20518,8.723287,9.99219
"If the Court concludes that the delegation provision is unconscionable, it should hold that the arbitration agreement as a whole is not unconscionable. The disposition is the same, it should vacate the order of the trial court with instructions to refer the dispute into arbitration.",Party Submissions,9.621702,11.365877,11.234442
"Headings. The headings of Sections are included solely for convenience of reference, and if there is any conflict between such headings and the text of this Plan, the text shall control.",Contract,3.6240923,5.727489,7.3568344
"Second, the Raymond court could have also interpreted the Raymond deed as having significant or express recitals under the significant recital theory. The Raymond deed states that husband conveyed “an undivided one-half interest in the property”. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 81. A significant recital (sometimes called an express recital) includes language that clearly expresses the intent to gift property. This court in Belkin v. Ray held that a significant recital conveying a property from Husband to Wife “as her separate estate” clearly evidenced the intent of the parties, eliminating the propriety of contrary evidence. Belkin v. Ray, 176 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. 1943). Further, in Pevehouse, husband and wife owned community property that was, during marriage, conveyed to Wife as her separate property. Pevehouse v. Pevehouse, 304 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1957, writ dism’d). The deed contained a significant recital that Husband deeded the land to Wife “as her separate property.” Id. at 771. The deed referenced separate property several times. Thus, the recital unquestionably established that the property was meant to be conveyed as separate property.",Party Submissions,6.170921,6.6556716,6.2864466
"We recognize that, HN7 [ ] unlike equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel [*11] requires no showing of misrepresentation or detrimental reliance. Steubner Realty 19, Ltd., 817 S.W.2d at 164. However, in this case, the particular quasi-estoppel/unconscionability reasoning offered by Douglas necessarily requires a reliance component due to her suggestion she was precluded from filing a workers' compensation claim based on Moody's earlier position. Therefore, we employ a similar analysis for her equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel theories.",Party Submissions,11.892473,15.186973,14.041087
BSA respectfully requests that the Court deny the petition for review. BSA further respectfully requests that if the Court grants the petition for review that the court of appeals’ judgment be affirmed as to BSA and that the matter be remanded to the trial court for determination of the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs that should be awarded to BSA. BSA requests such other and further relief to which it may be entitled.,Party Submissions,4.475884,4.390516,5.3987374
"Recognizing Associated Builders and Contractors Florida East Coast Chapter and the many vital contributions merit shop commercial, industrial, and infrastructure construction contractors make to the quality of life of the people of Florida.",Legislation,12.439865,10.954901,10.47777
"Arbitration Rules 10 and 11 6.1. The President may exercise the Tribunal’s power to fix and extend time limits for the completion of each procedural step in the proceeding under Arbitration Rules 10(1) and 11(3), in accordance with Arbitration Rules 10(3) and 11(4).",Legal Decisions,5.4320397,5.1765914,5.848212
"As provided above, Carl Craigo, as Midland’s Director of Utilities, is the only person who would know and have access to any permits or other authorizations pertaining to the alleged disposals. After a diligent search through Midland’s records—the only place such document could be found— Midland found no such permit, authorization, or any other document indicating any knowledge, agreement, or understanding of the alleged disposals. If Weatherford was allowed to conduct discovery and submitted a Request for Production to Midland seeking any such documents, the response would be the same: no responsive documents can be found.",Party Submissions,12.109083,13.954757,12.849449
"The termination of parental rights is twofold. “First, the parent must have engaged in any one of the acts or omissions itemized” in section 161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code. Id. “Second, termination must be in the best interest of a child.” Id. Notably, “both elements must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and proof of one element does not alleviate petitioner’s burden of proving the other.” Id. at 391.",Party Submissions,4.9292164,5.5534124,5.48708
"Further, Mann had no burden to point out Bay's legal error previously unless Bay first established its affirmative defense under the law and evidence presented in its summary judgment proof. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 222-23 (Tex. 1999). “The trial court may not grant summary judgment by default because the non-movant did not respond to the summary judgment motion when the movant's summary judgment proof is legally insufficient.” Id. at 223. Bay had the burden to establish its right to summary judgment on the issues expressly presented to the trial court by conclusively proving all elements of its defense as a matter of law. Id. Accordingly, the court should be mindful of any attempt by Bay to flip the burden of production or proof to Mann who was not required to alert the trial court to the deficiencies in Bay's proof. Because Bay has failed to prove the affirmative defense of “exclusive remedies” as a matter of law, this court should affirm the trial court's ruling.",Party Submissions,6.2566504,6.32694,7.198847
"In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., Inc., 107 S.W.3d 832 (2003) McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex.2002). An agency has exclusive jurisdiction when a statutory scheme indicates the Legislature intended the statutory process to be the exclusive means of remedying the problem to which the statute is addressed. Id. 7 Whether an agency has exclusive jurisdiction depends on statutory interpretation.",Party Submissions,5.673472,5.7669983,6.4658413
"To make improvements to the child tax credit, to provide tax incentives to promote economic growth, to provide special rules for the taxation of certain residents of Tai-wan with income from sources within the United States, to provide tax relief with respect to certain Federal disasters, to make improvements to the low-income housing tax credit, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.9794884,8.317884,7.6307635
"A ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction or a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226-228 (Tex. 2004). A trial court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction may consider evidence in addition to the pleadings, and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). The undisputed evidence of jurisdictional facts is that Oncor’s predecessor and Wilbarger CAD executed an agreement that addressed the value of Oncor’s property for tax year 2019. Oncor admits execution. See Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition I C.R. 31-34. II. Settlement Agreements Are Highly Favored.",Party Submissions,4.3985023,5.014325,5.214168
"Demandante. De hecho, el experto de la Demandante solo conoce la existencia de 4 cenotes, 84 situación que confirma los hallazgos del Dictamen de SEMARNAT. Este informe permite suponer que se puede suponer que varios de estos cenotes desaparecieron o fueron fusionados con los lagos artificiales a consecuencia de la actividad extractiva desmedida.",Party Submissions,12.294942,16.559435,15.33597
Respondent’s negotiation of the contract; and Refidomsa’s (non)fulfillment of its responsibilities under the contract—are directly relevant to the central question of whether Respondent discriminated against Claimant in favor of similarly-situated Dominican-owned companies. Id.,Legal Decisions,11.363832,13.070793,12.965172
MVP contends the Subcontract’s “flow-down” provisions bind RLB to the waiver provisions in MCC paragraph 47.7. MVP asks this Court to improperly insert contractual language that is not there.,Party Submissions,21.380714,24.556864,29.990454
"The Diocese had the initial burden to show a settlement amount that covered the same injury. See Sky View, 555 S.W.3d at 107. The forbearance agreement allocates $175,000.00 to the constitutional lien on Mendietta’s homestead and provides that Mendietta will pay $750/month towards that injury. (2CR916). In exchange, Bay, Ltd. agreed not to foreclose on the homestead. ( Id. ). Thus the Diocese did not even meet Sky View’s first step—it did not show a settlement agreement for $1.9 million. Even so, if the burden shifted to Bay, Ltd., it presented evidence that even if Mendietta paid $750/month for the rest of his life, no amount would ever be credited toward the injury relating to the Diocese’s property.",Party Submissions,11.231209,10.881436,12.271046
"GENERAL JURISDICTION General jurisdiction can be exercised if the non-resident defendant’s contacts in a forum are continuous and systematic. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2nd 404 (1984).",Party Submissions,2.2341383,2.7122629,2.76946
"Likewise, under section 40, “[a] person who obtains a benefit by an act of trespass or conversion, by comparable interference with other protected interests in tangible property, or in consequence of such an act by another, is liable in restitution to the victim of the wrong.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST E NRICHMENT § 40 (2011). Further under section 17, “[a] transfer by an agent, trustee, or other fiduciary outside the scope of the transferor’s authority, or otherwise in breach of the transferor’s duty to the principal or beneficiary, is subject to rescission and restitution. The transferee is liable in restitution to the principal or beneficiary as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.” Id. § 17.",Party Submissions,4.8303566,5.5647807,4.8022084
"PCC : Respondent objects to this request on the basis that Claimants have failed to explain why the requested documents are not in their possession, custody or control. These documents must b e in Obnova’s, i.e., Claimants’ possession, custody or control as documents submitted as exhibits R -037, R-038 and R-039 concern Obnova.",Legal Decisions,12.942404,11.92426,14.662587
"The declaration of Carl Craigo, Midland’s Director of Utilities, accurately stated that Midland owns and operates a domestic wastewater treatment plant, subject to a TPDES permit. (CR 54.) Weatherford insists that Midland intentionally mislabels the sewage system as “domestic,” and this, and this alone, led to an incorrect application of the domestic sewage exclusion. There has been no dispute that Midland operates a sewage system. What Weatherford offers instead, as addressed above, is that Midland must demonstrate that the alleged leaks occurred after a mixture with domestic waste before the domestic sewage exclusion can apply. Craigo did not include information providing such mixture details because it was unnecessary, as the domestic sewage exclusion only applies to a solid waste facility, as the Court of Appeals rightly concluded: “the statutory definitions of ‘solid waste facility’ and ‘solid waste’ are fatal to Weatherford’s cost-recovery claim against the City[.]” Weatherford Int’l, 652 S.W.3d at 915. Consequently, Craigo’s declaration was factually correct, admitted by the Trial Court, and further, is not inconsistent with the holding in R.R. Street .",Party Submissions,10.885144,11.110875,10.789837
"Rather, it is seeking to ensure that its entitlement to the VAT refunds, which has not been the subject of a challenge under the ongoing NAFTA dispute, should not be gutted by the unauthorized deposit of the refunds by the SAT. Such unauthorized deposits of VAT refunds owing to PEM were made after the filing of the Request for Arbitration to the present date.",Legal Decisions,13.117337,11.34025,14.076928
"On Appeal from the 469th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 469-53096-2017. Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Carlyle and Garcia participating.",Party Submissions,4.467838,4.546655,6.623096
"MVP contends RLB should have asked the trial court to determine which claims were and which were not within the scope of MCC paragraph 47.7. MVP’s Brief at 61-62. Once again, the Court should be wary of MVP’s misleading “waiver” arguments.",Party Submissions,15.863401,16.927761,18.222256
"Notwithstanding the Thursday periods of possession during the regular school term and the weekend periods of possession ORDERED for L M O it is expressly ORDERED that H A O shall have a superior right of possession of the child as follows: 1. Spring Vacation in Odd-Numbered Years -In odd-numbered years, beginning at the time the child is dismissed from school for the school's spring vacation and ending at the time school resumes after that vacation.",Party Submissions,12.970588,14.556927,15.886603
"Section 5. Determination of Severance Benefit. Subject to the provisions of Section 4 above and this Section 5, if a Participant incurs a Qualifying Termination, the Participant shall be entitled to a “Severance Benefit.” A “Severance Benefit” shall consist of a “Severance Allowance” determined in accordance with this Section 5, subject to the Participant’s eligibility (and eligibility of members of the Participant’s family), a Benefits Credit payment, determined in accordance with Section 6 below, the Vesting Acceleration Benefit described in Section 7 below and, at the discretion of the Plan Administrator, “Outplacement Services” described in Section 8 below.",Contract,4.3726773,4.1526675,4.3376007
"The trial court correctly applied the threshold standard here when it found that the reports from the Walkers ’ three experts establish that their claims are not frivolous. And in enacting § 74.351(l), the Legislature committed this determination to the trial court’s discretion. But the Seventh Court believed that the dispute should have been decided differently.",Party Submissions,14.744411,14.995396,17.459187
"The supreme court indicated, however, that the terms of the husband’s employment also supported its interpretation that the broad denition of “Jture earnings” in the MSA encompassed all the money the husband received after the partition date regardless of when the underlying work was performed. ,Id. at 452. Specically, the court‘ noted that the husband’s annual bonus Was completely discretionary and “typically” paid, if at all, in March or April. Id. “Quite simply, when the parties signed the MSA in June 2010, no 2011 bonus existed” and did not come into existence. until the board declared it. Id. “[T]he purely discretionary bonus constitutes future income.” Id.",Party Submissions,17.184286,15.0448065,16.129093
"If the El Paso court’s opinion stands, distributors and manufacturers will be incentivized to try imposing all sorts of unreasonable sales standards on franchised dealers by enforcing them through lesser consequences than franchise termination ( e.g., withholding allocations) and communicating them outside dealership agreements. This would gut the Legislature’s protections for dealers because performance standards are rarely (if ever) in the dealer agreement and lesser sanctions like reductions in inventory can cause a dealer to be unable to compete and ultimately lose its franchise.",Party Submissions,15.601,14.623878,15.299314
"It is not the “court’s function to question the wisdom of these statutes or to seek to rewrite them based upon [its] view of public policy.” Sowell v. Int’l Ints., L.P., 416 S.W.3d 593, 600 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied 2013). If the Legislature had intended to limit Section 51.003(a) to only actions brought to recover the foreclosing lender’s debt, it could have done so. O ther legislatures have. For instance, California’s anti-deficiency statute prevents recovery of deficiencies remaining only on a note “under [whose] power of sale” the foreclosure took place. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 580d(a). The California Supreme Court has accordingly held that the statute, by its text, applies only to post-foreclosure debts remaining on “the instrument securing the note sued up on.” Roseleaf, 378 P.2d at 101. Here, no similar limiting language appears. And “changing the meaning of the statute by adding words to it ... is a legislative function, not a judicial function.” City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. 2008).",Party Submissions,5.825976,5.89184,6.1580215
A recording of the session was made and deposited in the archives of ICSID. The recording was distributed to the Members of the Tribunal and the Parties.,Legal Decisions,9.31471,8.1345825,11.284988
"For purposes of the foregoing, unless otherwise required under applicable Section 409A Requirements, any distribution that a Participant elects to receive in a series of installments shall be treated as being a single payment on the date of the first installment of such series.",Contract,6.5000935,6.826898,7.384648
"Respondents inform this Court that “[c]ertain [j]urisdictional [f]acts [w]ere and [r]emain undisputed.” See Respondents’ Brief at 5, 21. But there is no evidence of many of the “facts” Respondents rely on. Compare, e.g ., Respondents’ Brief at 5, 21 and Petitioner’s Brief at 41–43. Petitioner MCI must correct some of Respondents’ most glaring misstatements. First, Respondents claim that “[t]he Motor Coach is [m]anufactured and [d]istributed by Petitioner.” There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner MCI manufactured or designed the bus that crashed in Mexico. Instead, the evidence in the record shows that the bus that crashed in Mexico was manufactured by a wholly separate Canadian company. CR408–09. Respondents’ Brief finally even concedes as much. See Respondents’ Brief at 1 (“The bus in question was a 2004 MCI J4500 motor coach (the ‘Motor Coach’) designed and manufactured by Motor Coach Industries Limited (‘MCIL’) in 2004 in Canada.”). Respondents continue to ignore the individual corporate identities of Petitioner MCI, the Canadian manufacturer (MCIL), and MCISS. But there is no basis to impute the jurisdictional contacts of these entities to Petitioner MCI— 11 particularly where the courts below have found that there is no specific jurisdiction for Respondents’ claims against MCISS and MCIL and Respondents have never challenged those findings.",Party Submissions,5.945922,5.8235965,6.2181644
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,26.068045,30.948666,38.062782
"TADA’s Letter (Apr. 19, 2023). As explained above, if the El Paso court’s ruling stands, manufacturers/distributors could try to use it to argue that they are not “requir[ing]” unreasonable standards if they (1) impose lesser consequences than franchise termination (like reduced inventory), or (2) impose the standards outside the dealer agreement. This is not a niche issue affecting only this case, but one that impacts every manufacturer, distributer, and dealer in Texas—and indirectly, Texas consumers.",Party Submissions,14.209672,13.404272,15.448525
We need the above information to support this project.734 516. Mr Hågensen replied on 16 May 2013: 1. Russian vessels cannot catch snow crab in the NØS / Svalbard zone. This is because the snow crab is not a part of the fisheries agreement between Russia and Norway. The same applies to other foreign vessels.,Legal Decisions,20.862099,20.699966,23.956095
"In Green Tree, the plaintiff had “failed to support [her] assertion” that “[a]rbitration costs are high, and that she did not have the resources to arbitrate.” Id. at 90 n.6. The Court explained that the plaintiff’s “discussion of costs relied entirely on unfounded assumptions” because, among other things, she did not show that “she would be charged the filing fee or arbitrator’s fee that she identified.” Id. Specifically, the Court explains in footnote six that the plaintiff conceded that the arbitration agreement did not designate a particular arbitration association. Thus, any factual showing that the “American Arbitration Association would conduct the arbitration, or that, if it did, she would be charged the filing fee or arbitrator's fee that she identified” did not “afford a sufficient basis for concluding that [the plaintiff] would in fact have incurred substantial costs in the event her claim went to arbitration.” Id. ; Id. at n. 6.",Party Submissions,6.502753,7.540351,7.0769544
"Failure (in whole or in part) or delay on the part of either TDCC or a UCC Member in performance of any of the obligations imposed upon it shall be excused and such party shall not be liable for damages or otherwise when such failure or delay is beyond the control of TDCC or such UCC Member (“force majeure event”). Such events include, but are not limited to, the following: labor difficulties, total or partial loss or shortage of raw component material or products ordinarily required by TDCC; breakdown, either total or partial, of either party's equipment, or act of God or nature. However, the settlement of strikes or lockouts shall be entirely within the discretion of the party having the difficulty. TDCC agrees to give written notice to UCC, and UCC agrees to give written notice (for itself and on behalf of the other UCC Members) when experiencing a force majeure event as soon as practicable.",Contract,7.9230075,7.007517,8.456
"Id. at *2. Yet the Austin court correctly applied § 2301.467(a)(1)’s plain meaning, holding that the distributor “required” the standard by authoritatively asking a dealer to comply with the standard on pain of adverse consequences.",Party Submissions,20.442719,20.457493,21.057241
"Footnotes 1 C.R. at 8. 2 C.R. at 9; 457-463. 3 Id. 4 C.R. at 458. 5 C.R. at 19. 6 C.R. at 26. 7 Appellants Brief at 1. 8 A “ROCIP” by design, is a flexible Rotating Owner Controlled Insurance Program permitted under 406.123 of the Texas Labor Code. ROCIPs and OCIPs have no legal distinction for the purposes of this court's review of the authorities and arguments of the parties. 9 Id.",Party Submissions,8.157723,7.874252,8.4362335
"Contract or its enforcement. App. 4. Again, RLB’s live pleading asserts that RLB’s claims all arise out of or relate to the Subcontract and the Owner Contract. R.451 ¶9.",Party Submissions,19.215672,21.402935,28.595467
"The City next assaults application of the SWDA by suggesting the City could only be liable under a strict liability statute and insisting the SWDA does not impose strict liability. The City neither distinguishes nor even discusses any of Weatherford’s cited authorities treating CERCLA as imposing strict liability. (Brief 38). These provisions were the model for the SWDA. R.R. Street, 166 S.W.3d at 238. The City cites no authority remotely suggesting CERCLA or the SWDA are not strict liability statutes. (Response 36). It points to no supporting language in either statute requiring either knowledge or a culpable mental state.1 Such requirements cannot be added in the guise of interpretation. “A court may not judicially amend a statute by adding words ... [but] must apply the statute as written.” ExxonMobil v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex. 2017). The Texas City Attorneys Association's 2017 summer conference presentation and website label the idea ""[e]nvironmental laws only punish ...",Party Submissions,9.657589,9.774126,10.383964
"This Promissory Note evidences the Loan made under the Loan Agreement, and is entitled to the benefits of the Loan Agreement, as the same may be amended, amended and restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, the provisions of which are hereby incorporated by reference. The Loan Agreement provides for, among other things, the acceleration of the maturity hereof upon the occurrence of certain events and for prepayments in certain circumstances, upon certain terms and conditions.",Contract,3.2825482,3.3962362,4.1239495
"THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and rendered. The Court orders the judgment of the trial court REVERSED and RENDERS judgment in accordance with its opinion. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appellees.",Party Submissions,2.619824,5.0882025,5.891198
"As explained above, the requested documents will show that the City of Belgrade considered Obnova to be the user of its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 and charged Obnova a fee for the use of the land at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. This is inconsistent with Serbia’s position in this arbitration that Obnova was not a rightful user of its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. This fact also supports Claimants’ position that Obnova had the right of use over the land plots at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23, as the City of Belgrade would not have otherwise charged Obnova the fee for the use of these land plots. Requested documents are not in Claimants’ possession, custody or control Requested documents were issued before Obnova’s privatization and, therefore, before Claimants acquired ownership and control over Obnova. Claimants have reviewed Obnova’s archives t hat are available to them and confirm that they do not contain the requested documents.",Legal Decisions,4.875284,5.3824263,4.78873
"B. Employer Element [12] By its first issue, Bay asserts that it qualified as Mann's statutory employer. It is undisputed that Bay was Mann's actual employer under the common-law definition of “employer”. In the context of workers' compensation, though, “employer” is a statutory term that does not always align with the common-law definition. See Wingfoot Enters. v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d 134, 145 (Tex. 2003).",Party Submissions,6.0170407,6.852819,7.0752645
"For column 13: Provide the risk factors in different rows, using as many rows as necessary. For each risk factor indicate the risk level and corresponding relative risk and proportion of host population.",Legislation,27.912209,39.60617,40.198742
"FROM: _______________________________________________ 1. IN CONSIDERATION of being provided with materials in connection with the arbitration between Ruby River Capital LLC and Canada, over which claims for confidentiality have been advanced (“Confidential Information”), I hereby agree to maintain the confidentiality of such material. It shall not be copied or disclosed to any other person who has not signed a Confidentiality Undertaking nor shall the material so obtained be used by me for any purposes other than in connection with this proceeding.",Legal Decisions,11.432119,10.757601,11.719754
"A reviewing court construes statutory provisions to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, and it ascertains that intent by first looking to the plain and common meaning of the statute's words. The court must also view a statute's terms in context and give them full effect. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (2005). When examining the provisions within the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, the court should keep in mind the comprehensive nature of the Act.",Party Submissions,4.572381,4.8580275,5.3340015
"The district court conducted a hearing on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and heard extensive evidence presented by both sides. SCR44-400 (City’s jurisdictional evidence); CR73-150 (Petitioners’ jurisdictional evidence). After hearing all of the evidence, the district court took the matter under advisement and ultimately denied the City’s Plea to the jurisdiction. CR165.",Party Submissions,6.725858,7.153306,7.9611635
"To amend the Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994 to improve the Office of Urban Agriculture and Innovative Production, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.123856,3.0034869,3.842181
"As this Court has previously held, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding of jurisdiction, the finding by the Trial Court of denial of the Special Appearance stands. In determining whether there is a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the Court must look to only the evidence supporting the Trial Court finding, and not to examine evidence presented by the Defendant, which is exactly what the Court of Appeals did.",Party Submissions,6.6007967,7.836512,7.6666903
Convention Article 44; Arbitration Rule 1 1.1. These proceedings are conducted in accordance with the ICSID Arbitration Rules in force as of 1 July 2022.,Legal Decisions,8.226347,8.63814,11.06506
UCC shall make payments to TDCC for product purchased and services rendered hereunder within five (5) business days of the receipt of TDCC's invoice. Invoices shall be issued once per month as soon as possible after the end of such month.,Contract,8.42827,8.522925,11.07534
Bestor contends in his first issue that his breach of contract claim is not barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision and that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over his breach-of-contract claim.,Party Submissions,6.464039,8.186392,9.933042
To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to confirm the requirement to observe the election administration procedures in congressional elections.,Legislation,12.372925,11.666412,13.023952
"Thus, believing that DWC ""has the exclusive jurisdiction to make the initial determination of whether Bruno was an employee of Hellas at the time of his fatal injury or illness,"" Hellas filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for abatement. In the filing, Hellas prayed that the Martinez Family's ""suit be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, abated pending a final, appealable decision of the DWC or any court to which a proper appeal of the DWC's decision has been made."" At the hearing on the plea and motion, Hellas argued that the issue of employment status—if decided in its favor—would dispose of all the Martinez Family's tort theories. Hellas also submitted evidence that it had followed all applicable regulations in providing the Martinez Family with the workers' compensation claim form and a disclosure of rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. The Martinez Family, meanwhile, denied that DWC has any jurisdiction over the disputed issues. The district court ultimately took the plea and motion under advisement [*5] and then issued an order abating the case until July 1, 2020, ""to allow. .. the parties to invoke the jurisdiction of [DWC]."" It further indicated that if no party had invoked that jurisdiction by July 19, 2020—the one-year anniversary of Bruno's death and therefore the last day the Martinez Family could file a claim for benefits, see id. § 409.007(a) —the court would lift the abatement.",Party Submissions,5.90813,6.2856593,6.468857
"Plan Administration. This Plan shall be administered by the Committee which shall have discretionary authority to make, amend, interpret and enforce all appropriate rules and regulations for the administration of this Plan and to utilize its discretion to decide or resolve any and all questions, including but not limited to eligibility for benefits and interpretations of this Plan and its terms, as may arise in connection with the Plan. Claims for benefits shall be filed with the Committee and resolved in accordance with the claims procedures in Article XII.",Contract,4.516287,4.4182115,5.3291235
"Petitioners first cite to the facts of Casteel where the jury was instructed on thirteen statutory causes of action, where as a matter of law, only nine were legally valid. Similarly, here, the jury was instructed on two legal theories of negligence and one of them, the yield sign theory, was deemed invalid as a matter of law due to the lack of any material facts supporting a proximate cause finding. The Opinion is wholly consistent with Casteel and its holding was correctly applied here.",Party Submissions,12.029898,11.473795,12.408744
"It is ORDERED that appellees Greg Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Texas; Collin County, Texas, and the City of Frisco, Texas recover their costs of this appeal from appellant Galovelho LLC.",Party Submissions,9.097872,9.636618,12.816166
"Under the family-code there is apresumption that property possessed by either spouse at the dissolUtion of the marriage is presumed to be community property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §3.003(a). Only community property is subject to the trial court’s just and right division. Barnard v. Barnard, 133 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex. App—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).",Party Submissions,4.915375,5.6850095,5.2203236
"Yellowfin’s reliance on the rule that the limitations period “runs against each installment from the time it becomes due,” Gabriel v. Alhabbal, 618 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ denied), is beside the point, Resp. Br. 18-19. That rule applies before a loan is accelerated, not when, as here, the full balance has already come due — that is, has been accelerated — upon foreclosure. Accelerating the note has the same effect as the note “matur[ing] under its own terms.” See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Express Limousines, Inc., No. 03-21-00266-CV, 2022 WL 3048235, at *3 (Tex. App. — Austin Aug. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). And that is when the limitations period commences. Id.",Party Submissions,5.218899,5.293282,5.572262
"App. — El Paso 1990, writ denied)). So it makes little difference whether Respondents “disclaimed any appellate issue about res judicata,” whether the court of appeals insisted “it was not ruling on res judicata,” or whether the “opinion cites no case about res judicata.” (Resp. 16) The opinion’s underpinning logic is more akin to collateral estoppel anyway, b ecause the court of appeals treated “the issue” of Westwood’s abandonment of the premises as having been “decided” in the forcible entry and detainer proceeding, and therefore preventing “ relitigation ” of the issue in district court. Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am ., 845 S.W.2d 794, 802 (Tex. 1992). In any event, the fact that the court held that the forcible entry and detainer proceeding ’ s result “precluded [Westwood] from recovering damages,” and prevented Westwood from being able to satisfy “at least one element” of its “constructive eviction and breach of contract claims, ” showed the court’s belief that the result in an eviction proceeding will control the different proceedings in district court. (Op. 2, 6) And that violates Texas statutes defining the boundaries between the jurisdiction of Texas district courts and lower courts in eviction cases regardless of the particular reason for that preclusion. Respondents do nothing to prove otherwise except to insist those boundaries pertain only to “ res judicata ” when they plainly do not.",Party Submissions,9.302792,10.1853485,10.629138
To amend the Consumer Product Safety Act to strike provisions relating to the maximum civil penalties for violations of product safety standards.,Legislation,8.620973,6.965145,8.925964
"As noted there, Oncor brought its suit under, inter alia, section 25.25(g), which independently authorizes a property owner to “file suit to compel the board to order a change in the appraisal roll as required by this section. .. .” CR.32-33. Section 25.25(g) does not prohibit a property owner from naming an appraisal review board as a defendant. This provision—the one most specific to appeals of motions under section 25.25—arguably waives immunity from suit because it establishes administrative remedies a property owner may pursue against an appraisal review board. For that reason and to avoid any defensive argument that Oncor somehow failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by failing to name the Board as a defendant, Oncor named both the Board and the District as defendants.",Party Submissions,7.9283566,8.794771,8.732922
"And the timing amplifies the inequity. “[E]quity aids the diligent and not those who slumber on their rights.” Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993) (cleaned up). This Court’s elections precedent could not be clearer: • “Never is adherence to that general rule more important than when candidates seek, at a late hour, to constrain the choices available to voters in an election.” Self, 652 S.W.3d at 830. • “[I]nvoking judicial authority in the election context requires unusual dispatch—the sort of speed not reasonably demanded of parties and lawyers when interests less compelling than our society’s need for smooth and uninterrupted elections are at stake.” Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 764. • The party invoking judicial power must show that “circumstances beyond [his] control create [any] time-sensitive controversies requiring speedy judicial resolution.” Self, 652 S.W.3d at 830.",Party Submissions,8.102952,9.657465,9.759588
"TEX. TAX CODE § 42.01(a)(1) contains a list of the things an owner is entitled to appeal to the trial court. One of those things is an appeal of an order of an appraisal review board determining a motion filed under section 25.25. TEX. TAX CODE § 42.01(a)(1)(B). However, “[a] petition for review may not be brought against the appraisal review board.” TEX. TAX CODE § 42.21(b).",Party Submissions,4.5669813,5.0805454,4.8490067
"In its mandamus petition, Sonic argues that continued abatement of its contract claims is an abuse of discretion because there is no authority to support abatement, and the orders are a violation of the Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution. See TEX. CONST. Art. I, § 13. We begin with the appeal.",Party Submissions,6.756715,8.633703,8.513963
"HN7 [ ] Statute of Limitations, Time Limitations Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 409.003 provides that a claim may be initiated by an employee or a person acting on the employee's behalf not later than one year after the date on which the injury occurred.",Party Submissions,7.3446293,10.072282,8.258965
RLB.BOM.56. RLB also argues that the Subcontract affords it three “permissible” “potential venue options.” Id. 59-60. RLB is wrong.,Party Submissions,26.01444,24.162275,28.15324
"Agreement shall apply to any and all work performed by or for Subcontractor, including, but not limited to, Change Order work, extra work and work performed on Subcontractor’s behalf by McCarthy or others.",Party Submissions,10.31763,7.7234507,10.409951
"To ensure that a declaration for a major disaster or emergency is made on a timely basis, rural areas receive assistance, and for other purposes.",Legislation,16.661722,15.439534,19.711014
Article 1121 NAFTA nor its waiver since it has not challenged this measure as being in breach of NAFTA nor has it submitted any claim in that respect in the present arbitration.,Legal Decisions,18.69975,19.586256,27.559658
"Respondents completely ignore this passage from the court’s order on rehearing, instead emphasizing two carefully curated snippets from the main opinion — one suggesting that Westwood did not “identify any act” by Respondents as the cause “for its decision to abandon the appeal” and vaca te the premises, and another noting that Westwood vacated “without qualification. ” (Resp. 22 quoting Op. 5, 6) But the full context of these passages makes clear that the court of appeals was not speaking about any absence of evidence that Respondents had constructively evicted Westwood, or that Westwood had failed to complain of that constructive eviction. And no such contention could have been maintained because the record is replete with evidence of Respondents’ acts of interference with Westwood’s righ t of possession that forced it to leave —and Westwood’s repeated complaints about that interference. The court was instead speaking about the contents of the agreed judgment and Westwood’s supposed failure to indicate its continued “protest” against Respond ents’ harassment, which the court deemed fatal to Westwood’s claims in the district court, regardless of Westwood’s evidence of constructive eviction. ( See Pet. Br. 22) Accordingly, the passage on which Respondents rely in trying to prove the court of appeals ’ opinion rested on the evidence actually proves the opposite — that it rested entirely on the purported legal effect of the agreed judgment.",Party Submissions,10.260782,10.660298,11.4130535
"To answer ""Yes"" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer ""No"" to the following question only upon a vote of ten or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question.",Party Submissions,10.281696,9.1311865,10.885298
"To prevent anticompetitive conduct through the use of pricing algorithms by prohibiting the use of pricing algorithms that can facilitate collusion through the use of nonpublic competitor data, creating an antitrust law enforcement audit tool, increasing transparency, and enforcing violations through the Sherman Act and Federal Trade Commission Act, and for other purposes.",Legislation,10.62951,9.364967,11.107366
"The legal concepts that Petitioner is attempting to discard are longstanding and repeatedly confirmed by courts. Where there is a debt secured by a note, which is in turn, secured by a lien, the note and the lien constitute separate obligations. Aguero v. Ramirez, 70 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied). More than a hundred years ago, it was recognized that a lender could be barred from enforcing a lien but still recover the money due on a note, holding that when the Legislature enacted a statute governing liens, “no attempt was made to disturb, or modify, the provisions of article 5705, which prescribes the manner of renewing personal obligations.” Adams v. Harris, 190 S.W. 245, 246 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1916, no writ). More recently, courts have stated that “Texas law differentiates between enforcement of a promissory note and foreclosure.” Montoya v. AmCAP Mortgage, Ltd., No. 01-20-00799-CV (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 11, 2022, pet. denied)(mem. op.)(quoting Bierwirth v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 03-11-00644-CV, 2012 WL 3793190, at *4 (Tex.App.-Austin Aug. 30, 2012, pet. denied (mem. op.).",Party Submissions,4.49928,4.58741,4.6428146
"Indeed, the detailed fee structure outlined in Rafiei's agreement provides concrete evidence of likely and specific costs. The exactitude with which Rafiei's agreement outlines potential costs, from filing fees to arbitrator compensation, means that Rafiei's financial commitment is not based on speculation or assumption. Rather, it's grounded in concrete, established terms. This stands in sharp contrast to Shattenkirk, where the vague nature of potential expenses meant costs remained speculative.",Party Submissions,16.381409,17.700926,20.593998
"Disability Benefits. Appeal of a denied Disability Benefits claim must be filed in writing with the Appeals Committee no later than one hundred eighty (180) days after receipt of the written notification of such claim denial. The review shall be conducted by the Appeals Committee (exclusive of the person who made the initial adverse decision or such person’s subordinate). In reviewing the appeal, the Appeals Committee shall: (i) not afford deference to the initial denial of the claim, (ii) consult a medical professional who has appropriate training and experience in the field of medicine relating to the Claimant’s Disability and who was neither consulted as part of the initial denial nor is the subordinate of such individual, and (iii) identify the medical or vocational experts whose advice was obtained with respect to the initial benefit denial, without regard to whether the advice was relied upon in making the decision. The Appeals Committee shall make its decision regarding the merits of the denied claim within 45 days following receipt of the appeal (or within ninety (90) days after such receipt, in a case where there are special circumstances requiring extension of time for reviewing the appealed claim). If an extension of time for reviewing the appeal is required because of special circumstances, written notice of the extension shall be furnished to the Claimant prior to the commencement of the extension. The notice will indicate the special circumstances requiring the extension of time and the date by which the Appeals Committee expects to render the determination on review. Following its review of any additional information submitted by the Claimant, the Appeals Committee shall render a decision on its review of the denied claim.",Contract,3.9335625,4.309663,4.477676
"The City contends that the Delapenas ’ pleadings and the jurisdictional record do not support a waiver of immunity. The Delapenas respond that they have alleged two valid claims under the TTCA, and they stress that neither claim is a premises defect claim. They first allege that “the City negligently used real property by operating Buttercup [P]ool in violation of its own adopted safety policies.” They describe this claim as both a failure to implement policy and a negligent activity.",Party Submissions,16.030708,18.167978,19.41572
"The oxytocin infusion protocol also allowed the nurses to administer terbutaline when a fetal heart rate is not responding to the discontinuation of Pitocin. App. 7, CR 669. Dr. Tappan believed the nurses should have done so when Dr. Castillo made the decision to perform a C-section at 15:52. App. 7, CR 669.",Party Submissions,10.971219,10.887621,12.319052
Claimants agree to conduct a reasonable search for and produce documents responsive to this request that are in the Claimants’ possession and/or control.,Legal Decisions,8.80494,12.352917,11.246558
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Cadastre, in accordance with the applicable regulations.26 In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".27 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Cadastre in order to obtain documents in question.28 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents, so it is not justified encumbering Respondent with a task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. As Claimants have already obtained certain documentation from the Cadastre (see for example, exhibits C-162 to C-166 and C-329), there is no compelling reason why they cannot also request the documents whose production they now seek. R, M : Claimants have not established the purported relevance and materiality of the requested documents. Claimants seek the requested documents in order to assess the source material for the sketches contained in Exhibit R-043. They do not, however, explain why this information is relevant and material for their case.",Legal Decisions,9.287797,10.038307,9.984479
"Much of the court of appeals’ analysis is devoted to Petitioners’ request to replead, which the court denied, relying on the “open” and “obvious” exception to a landowner’s duty. Id. at *6. First, the court suggested that 7 But see Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 872 (Tex. Mar. 10, 2023) (reversing and rejecting a similar non-use argument relied on by the same court of appeals).",Party Submissions,9.258796,9.066316,10.16745
"What was the fair market value. ifany, 0f Trinity‘s property immediately after the City‘s non—approval ofone 0r more Ofthe SUPS‘?",Party Submissions,88.29747,96.326385,75.699875
"Finally, McCarthy makes “comity” and “judicial economy” arguments it did not present in the trial court or court of appeals, claiming that dismissal of the Texas case “comports with principles of comity and judicial economy.” McCarthy’s Brief at 18. Comity is “not a constitutional obligation” nor a matter of right, but rather is a “principle of mutual convenience whereby one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another [state].” Griffith v. Griffith, 341 S.W.3d 43, 54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.). The general rule is that when an identical lawsuit is first filed in another state—in cases involving an enforceable forum-selection clause—Texas courts will stay the later-filed proceeding pending adjudication of the first suit. In re AutoNation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663, 670 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). McCarthy ignores that neither RLB nor Travelers is a party to the Oklahoma lawsuit: only MVP and McCarthy are. These lawsuits are hardly “identical.” See, e.g., Crown Leasing Corp. v. Sims, 92 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.).",Party Submissions,5.088243,5.5345397,5.498013
"Even if the lower court did improperly extend Thompson, there is no harmful error. Applying the standard previously set out by this Court, the expert reports were insufficient. There simply was no explained causal connection as to the BSA nurses. See supra Part B.",Party Submissions,26.716137,27.763723,36.218784
To allow the Farm Credit Administration the option to examine low-risk Farm Credit System institutions under a 24-month cycle.,Legislation,15.986629,16.442415,16.338577
"Backes or Guarantor Respondent and Cross-Petitioner Leon J. Backes, Guarantor pursuant to the Bridge Loan Repayment Guaranty and CEO and founder of Provident Realty Advisors.",Party Submissions,20.989815,20.113317,22.650919
"Rather, respondents continue to assert that the UDJA no longer constitutes a waiver of governmental immunity from a suit seeking a declaration of rights under a contract or statute, citing Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) and its progeny. But they do not address the opinions Oncor cited to the contrary. See Montrose Mgmt. Dist. v. 1620 Hawthorne, Ltd., 435 S.W.3d 393, 404 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (“[I]f a party joins such a governmental entity and seeks a declaration construing an ordinance or statute, immunity from suit is waived.”); Pharmserv Inc. v. Texas Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, No. 03-13-00526-CV, 2015 WL 1612006, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 9, 2015, no pet.) (“[T]he UDJA does waive a governmental entity’s immunity for a declaration construing a statute ....”).",Party Submissions,4.3426986,4.8641,4.705375
"Mexico, and other awards on indirect expropriation,756 support a submission that expropriation can result from “ the vitiation of an investor’s legitimate expectations” and cite the Tecmed v. Mexico award as finding that the “repudiation of the investor’s legitimate expectation of an economic return on its investment ” could constitute an indirect expropriation.757 Norway disputes that these awards sustain those propositions but even if they did, the Tribunal recalls that it has already rejected the Claimants’ argument that they had a legitimate expectation of being able to take snow crab in the Norwegian sector of the Loop Hole (see paragraphs 502 to 528, above). Similarly, the Tribunal has rejected the Claimants’ contentions that Norway acted arbitrarily, without sound basis under UNCLOS or for improper purposes in determining that snow crab is a sedentary species and then banning EU vessels from taking snow crab on the Norwegian outer continental shelf (see paragraphs 532 to 544, above).",Legal Decisions,9.099485,9.519759,9.870653
"H-6. Seventy-eight percent (78%), whether matured or unmatured, accrued or unaccrued, bested or otherwise, together with all increases thereof, the proceeds therefrom, and any other rights related to H A OKS pension plan with Bank of America existing by reason of H A OKS past, present or future employment as of December 9, 2019. This award will be more particularly defined in a Qualifi Domestic Relations Order signed by the Court on or after the date the Final Decree of Divorce is signed.",Party Submissions,15.617184,15.186452,18.180365
"Elections should be decided at the ballot box—not by a candidate’s dilatory litigation. Justice Walker’s (“Relator”) mandamus petition is part of an unfortunately continuing trend where individuals seeking public office attempt to use Election Code technicalities at the last minute to remove their electoral opponents from the ballot. “The public interest,” however, “is best served when public offices are decided by fair and vigorous elections, not technicalities leading to default.” In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 542 (Tex. 2006). There is no basis in equity or this Court’s precedent to grant Relator’s requested relief of removing Justice Devine from the ballot. To the contrary, such relief would violate the U.S. and Texas Constitutions and create damaging precedent encouraging delay, gamesmanship, and sandbagging.",Party Submissions,8.951673,8.294464,8.901159
"HN14 [ ] We previously determined that a negligence case against a nonsubscribing employer is an action for workers' compensation benefits under the TWCA. Keng I, 976 S.W.2d at 891. That decision has not been overruled. Therefore, under the facts of this case, designation of a responsible third party under Section 33.004 is barred under the express terms of the statute. Based on this reasoning, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking the designation of responsible third parties. Consequently, ETMC Athens fails to establish its entitlement to mandamus relief.",Party Submissions,8.305087,9.604127,9.575481
Respondents’ position would defeat the Legislature’s textually-evident policy goal by eschewing reasonableness whenever a manufacturer/distributor demands a standard outside a dealer agreement (as would usually be the case) or with consequences short of dealer termination (as would often be the case). Enforcing the plain meaning of “require” is essential to effectuate § 2301.467(a)(1)’s sound policy.,Party Submissions,18.482967,16.482233,20.297302
"For these reasons, amici respectfully urge the Court to grant the petition and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.",Party Submissions,4.26529,5.443796,6.9726024
"Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that Bay met the requirements of Tex. Lab Code § 406.123 with a written agreement and the proper and timely filing of the agreement as outlined above, there is still no authority that extends immunity *21 for a co-employee tort-feasor who is outside of a potential ROCIP's policy's scope of coverage. If the court reaches this issue, it would be a case of first impression.",Party Submissions,14.99117,19.714304,18.806242
"The Contract rates are tied to externalities Liberty bears resulting from its customer’s excessive flows. Particularly, Liberty’s WWTP has a finite capacity, and continually treating amounts in excess of the TAV can subject it to additional costs and TCEQ enforcement. (CR 39.) The Additional Service Charge exists to cover those costs, and without them Liberty would be operating at a loss. (CR 4, 42.) The Additional Service Charge is in fact a high-volume rate tied to sewage quantities over and above the Contract’s TAV and importantly, is charged after treatment of that sewage. (CR 45.) Volume-based rates like t he Contract’s Additional Service Charge are frequently used in the industry, not as penalties, but as agreed-upon payments for additional services rendered when a wholesale provider accepts flows from customer cities. See Am. Pub. Works Ass’n et al., Core Attributes of Effectively Managed Wastewater Collection Sys., 31 (2010), https://www2.apwa.net/documents/resourcecenter/final%20core%20attri butes%20july%202010.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2023). To characterize the Additional Service Charge as a penalty ignores the plain (and agreed upon) language of the Contract: higher flows drive higher treatment costs. Ames’s post hoc attempts to walk away from its contractual payment duties cannot change that fundamental reality, nor can it misconstrue agreed-upon rates as penalties simply because Ames has not paid such rates in full.",Party Submissions,11.414061,11.266344,11.851408
Freestone County. It does not indicate that R.L.S. was arrested for warrants from the City of Mexia. This discrepancy is immaterial to the disposition of this appeal.,Party Submissions,10.641014,22.739204,21.180613
"The conditions set by the referenced competent institutions for the issuance of the 2013 DRP reflect these institutions’ position towards the adoption of the 2013 DRP and the protection of public interest that eac h of these authorities is tasked to safeguard. The requested documents are relevant and material to assess the factors considered by the individual authorities that were required, under Serbian law, to provide the conditions for adoption of the 2013 DRP — i ncluding whether they considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 and if so, their contemporaneous understanding of the extent of these rights.",Legal Decisions,15.820331,17.234766,15.600051
"Loya v. Loya. In Loya, the wife filed a post-divorce proceeding to divide a bonus husband received approximately 9 months after the parties’ divorce. Loya v.",Party Submissions,11.552483,12.143421,12.778988
"I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document has been served on the following counsel of record via e-service in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, on October 25, 2023.",Party Submissions,4.285384,5.163581,7.1316314
"Relying on an intermediate appellate opinion from Ohio, the court of appeals suggested that the City, and conceivably, any other owner and operator of a public pool had no duty to protect swimmers because the dangers of swimming are open and obvious. Delapena, 2022 WL 16993493, at *4 (citing Mullens, 719 N.E.2d at 604).8 But the Mullens opinion dealt with a drowning of an invitee to a private party with a pool on a residential property. Mullens, 719 N.E.2d at 601. This does not support the sweeping holding by the court of appeals that no owner of a pool, even one who operates a Class A or Class B public pool, owes a duty to protect swimmers.",Party Submissions,6.464807,6.5417843,7.3805795
"In a decree of divorce or annulment, the court shall determine the rights of both spouses in a pension, retirement plan, annuity, individual retirement account, employee stock option plan, stock option, or other form of savings, bonus, profit-sharing, or other employer plan or financial plan of an employee or a participant, regardless of whether the person is self-employed, in the nature of compensation or savings.",Party Submissions,7.693747,7.0924425,8.148394
"In the event that a court of competent jurisdiction determines that any portion of this Agreement or the Note is in violation of any statute or public policy, then only the portions of this Agreement or the Note that violate such statute or public policy are stricken. All portions of this Agreement and the Note that do not violate any statute or public policy continue in full force and effect. Any court order striking any portion of this Agreement or the Note modifies the stricken terms as narrowly as possible to give as much effect as possible to the intentions of the parties pursuant to this Agreement or the Note, as the case may be.",Contract,3.612988,3.50304,3.9397037
"As explained above, Serbia disputes that Obnova built the buildings presently existing at its premises. The requested documents are relevant and material to demonstrate that Obnova’s buildings at its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 were built after Obnova’s establishment in 1948.",Legal Decisions,15.267737,16.99449,16.039064
"To improve the process for awarding grants under certain programs of the Department of Transportation to certain counties in which the majority of land is owned or managed by the Federal Government and to other units of local government and Tribal governments in those counties, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.8961706,6.9554424,8.036147
So McCarthy had to retain—and MVP had to pay for—another subcontractor to assist RLB in completing that work. R.196.,Party Submissions,28.744421,48.556396,50.74084
"Andrea Laporta, the compensation executive for the consumer and small business banking organization, testied during the hearing. She conrmed that Husband would receive a$140,000 bonus from Bank of America on February 15, 2020 “as long as he remains an active employee. However, if Husband was no longer an employee as of the date of the distribution, regardless of resignation or ring, then he was not entitled to receive it. She conrmed that the board determined the bonus amount, if any, in mid to late November 2019 based on work Husband performed during the 2019 scal year; however, the board did not approve it until January 2020.",Party Submissions,12.565924,12.0225525,12.492299
"Relatedly, this Court should also address whether Texas recognizes a common law duty for pool owners and operators of public bathing establishments to exercise reasonable care in the operation and maintenance of pools. This Court does not appear to have directly addressed this issue.",Party Submissions,10.58121,12.766101,13.426732
"Along the same vein, the Walkers repeatedly cite Aguilera v. Costilla, No. 13-21-00135-CV, 2023 WL 2711129 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 30, 2023, pet. filed) in an attempt to transform the Amarillo Court’s opinion into something it is not. Aguilera cited that opinion – in its discussion of standard of care – for the unremarkable proposition that an expert report untethered to facts is conclusory. Id. at *8. The Corpus Christi Court cited this Court’s opinion in Palacios in the same string cite for the same general rule. Id. The Corpus Christi Court did not delve into analysis, discuss the Amarillo Court’s causation analysis, apply (or even cite) Thompson or its reasoning, or expand any of this Court’s prior precedent. The citation to the Amarillo Court’s opinion is hardly noteworthy.",Party Submissions,6.3216624,7.7060266,7.1520076
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session; the 1st C.S.; the 2nd C.S.; the 3rd C.S. and the 4th C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the November 7, 2023 election results.",Party Submissions,4.4236245,3.9969761,5.1074567
"A candidate for Justice, Supreme Court who chooses to pay the filing fee must also accompany his or her application with a petition containing a minimum of 50 signatures from each court of appeals district. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.021(g). This petition must comply with the requirements for petitions generally under the 5 Election Code. Id. (requiring judicial petitions to comply with the same requirements prescribed under Subsection (b), Section 172.021); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.021(b) (requiring petitions to satisfy the requirements prescribed by Section 141.062); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 141.062 (requiring petitions to contain valid signatures in the number required and comply with any other applicable requirements for validity prescribed in the Election Code). Section 141.066, Election Code prohibits persons from signing the petition of more than one candidate for the same office in the same election. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 141.066(a). Furthermore, the same section declares that, “A signature on a candidate's petition is invalid if the signer signed the petition subsequent to signing a petition of another candidate for the same office in the same election.” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 141.066(c).",Party Submissions,3.6987834,3.8390515,4.0118923
"Oncor’s key jurisdictional argument is that because the 1.111(e) agreement entered into by Sharyland is voidable by reason of mutual mistake of fact, it cannot operate as a bar to its suit. Petitioner asserts that the undisputed evidence in the record affirmatively establishes the opposite. In fact, it establishes the opposite.",Party Submissions,12.895038,13.296724,14.366833
"While not a gist case, Huckabee v. Time Warner Ent’mt Co. is also instructive. Huckabee concerned a TV documentary about child custody proceedings that was critical of the family court system. 19 S.W.3d 413, 417 (Tex. 2000). The judge in two of the cases featured in the documentary sued for defamation, arguing—much as Barina does here—that the film was one-sided and “omitted important facts that would have led viewers to conclude that his [actions in the cases were] justified.” Id. at 419. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claims, holding that one of the challenged statements was “a criticism of the family courts in general and not of Judge Huckabee in particular and, as a result, was not defamatory” of him. Id. at 429; see also Harvest House Publishers v. Local Church, 190 S.W.3d 204 at 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (dismissing claim on of-and-concerning grounds where plaintiff tried to hold defendant liable for passages in a book that discussed criminal activity by others).",Party Submissions,5.988705,6.2698126,6.2893977
"IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ...................................................... i Nature of the Case: The Delapena Family (Petitioners) sued the City of Cedar Park (City) for the wrongful death of their daughter Catiana Delapena (Catiana), who drowned at Buttercup Pool when the City failed to enforce its mandatory safety policy for use of the pool. CR 34-37. The policy required the City to deny access to Catiana because there were too few staff and lifeguards to adequately monitor 112 children. See id. Petitioners also brought a bystander claim for Catiana’s sister, who observed her death. CR38. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction. SCR6.",Party Submissions,11.496484,9.477923,11.358092
"Therefore, in addition to Bestor's attorney's fee claim being based on Service Lloyds' dispute of Bestor's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits, a pervasive administrative and statutory scheme exists for the award and payment of a claimant's attorney's fees in the administrative phase of a workers' compensation proceeding.",Party Submissions,11.029629,10.369082,13.504314
Respondent takes note of Claimants' agreement to conduct a search for and to produce non-privileged documents that are responsive to this request. Respondent requests Claimants to provide a privilege log as explained in Respondent’s general comments above.,Legal Decisions,10.838362,10.699582,12.767634
"For the avoidance of any doubt, Claimants also reiterate their general objection to the production of any documents covered by privilege under legal or ethical rules and express their disagreement with Serbia’s interpretation of the Cyprus-Serbia BIT and, by extension, with Serbia’s description of alleged relevance and materiality of the requested documents. Claimants will address Serbia’s arguments in detail in their Reply.",Legal Decisions,9.457714,9.291194,10.070399
"Finally, Respondent cites Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 795 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding) for the proposition that since he puts the constitutionality of Texas’ primary system at issue by claiming it infringes on the Republican Party’s freedom of association, a factual record must be developed, precluding mandamus relief. Rather, Brady is not the King’s-X Respondent makes it out to be. Brady involved an as-applied challenge of statutory construction, which obviously necessitates a factual record to decide. Here, there is no factual dispute and, importantly, the underlying statute is clear—50 signatures are required for each judicial district, and duplicates do not count. This Court, is not faced with competing statutory constructions. This Court’s holding in Brady was centered on disputed areas of fact. Here, neither Respondent nor Devine dispute any facts related to Devine’s petition or Respondent’s duty to reject it. Therefore, this Court need not accept Respondent’s and Devine’s invitation to excise Texas’ primary and ballot 12 application regulations as unconstitutional infringements on freedom of association, especially where the great weight of constitutional jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and this Court is against them.",Party Submissions,8.685978,8.367015,8.911945
"Expressing support for the designation of January 30, 2024, as CTE (chronic traumatic encephalopathy) and RHI (repeated head impacts) Awareness Day.",Legislation,6.468268,5.735739,6.810324
"In [**7] 2001, after Sonic filed its reimbursement claim with the TWCC, Sonic's contract claims were abated pending a determination of the compensability of Cochran's injury. The abatement order was temporarily lifted in January 2003, and the cases were subsequently consolidated. Both parties then moved for summary judgment on the election of remedies issue in the consolidated cases. The trial court granted Sonic's motion, and in its final order, 6 awarded Sonic $ 78,023.89 under section 409.009, reversed the appeals panel's decision on whether Cochran had made an election of remedies and on Sonic's entitlement to reimbursement, and denied TMI's summary judgment motion. TMI appeals the trial court's judgment.",Party Submissions,6.679863,6.9804554,8.045547
"For the avoidance of any doubt, Claimants reiterate their general objection to production of any documents covered by privilege under the legal or ethical rules.",Legal Decisions,15.440399,16.272959,20.018091
"Q. And that is consistent with what you’ve described on Exhibit 12 a couple of years earlier, about four years earlier, four years before the recordation, as roadbed, correct”?",Party Submissions,30.065548,35.67814,45.488026
"Next, Bay attempted to secure standing before the Division as a “sub-claimant.” To do so, Bay alleges that it paid some medical bills for Mr. Mann's injuries. 24 While there is no competent evidence that the bills were paid as Bay claims, Bay has also failed to establish any standing to raise an original proceeding before the Division as an employer of a denied claim. The law only grants direct standing to an employer if a carrier to an employer's workers' compensation carrier, accepts a claim and the employer disputes it. An employer without its own workers' *7 compensation policy has no standing at all unless it attempts to obtain reimbursement as a “sub-claimant” on an already compensable claim. Those facts are not present in this case.",Party Submissions,15.382498,13.925983,17.757656
"Fourth, the jury in the underlying trial found that HSMiller — not just Defterios — engaged in fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Also, HSMiller’s own head-in-the-sand approach to Defterios’s business dealings and its decision to anoint him as a vice president, were negligent acts that contributed to the judgment against it at the underlying trial. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 33.003(a), 33.011(1).",Party Submissions,8.77606,8.628816,9.501187
Any and all documents representing “ Elaborate on the relocation of the trolleybus turning point from Rajiceva street ” referred in Section 9.3 of Serbia’s exhibit R-101.,Legal Decisions,62.539207,71.14493,70.62618
"Binding Decisions or Actions. The decision or action of the Committee in respect of any question arising out of or in connection with the administration, interpretation and application of the Plan and the rules and regulations thereunder shall be final and conclusive and binding upon all persons having any interest in the Plan.",Contract,3.6039524,5.3062854,5.176811
"Specified Employee. Specified Employee means an Employee who, as of the date of his Separation from Service, is a “key employee” of the Company or any Affiliate, any stock of which is actively traded on an established securities market or otherwise.",Contract,4.0674405,5.3978653,5.0721793
"For example, in RDG Ltd. P’ship v. Gexa Corp., RDG contended that Gexa had “failed to present evidence of fraud, duress, or the taking of undue advantage that would render its retention of the benefit unconscionable.” No. 14-04-00679-CV, 2005 WL 949171, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that retaining the benefit of a mistake constituted the taking of an undue advantage, and that RDG had passively received the benefit of electricity provided by Gexa to an entire apartment building that it would be unconscionable for RDG to retain at Gexa’s expense. Id. In addressing RDG’s argument, which is nearly identical to that made by the Diocese here, the Fourteenth Court held that Heldenfels was not inconsistent with the “passive receipt” doctrine: We fail to see any contradiction between the two doctrines, but, instead, find they are fully compatible, and any determination on unjust enrichment will necessarily depend upon the evidence presented in the case. In any event, several courts of appeals have relied on the “passively received” language even after the Texas Supreme Court decided Heldenfels Brothers. Moreover, the supreme court in Heldenfels Brothers did not address the “passively retained” language or otherwise disapprove or overrule any case law applying that language in unjust enrichment analysis. Therefore, we conclude the “passively retained” language is still viable.",Party Submissions,5.670469,5.995526,6.043421
The Respondent understands that this Request has been withdrawn. The Respondent reserves the right to object to any further request for these documents in due course.,Legal Decisions,12.391204,10.437552,13.697888
"Under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 33.003 and 33.004, the responsibility of Defterios should have been submitted to the jury.",Party Submissions,9.39524,10.056212,11.0911
"Notwithstanding any Specified Date election of a Participant, if a Participant incurs a Separation from Service, dies or becomes Disabled, in each case before distributions with respect to a Specified Date Account have commenced, such amounts shall be paid in accordance with the time and form of payment applicable to the Participant’s Separation from Service Benefit, Death Benefit or Disability Benefit (as applicable). With respect to Specified Date Account, Balances that have commenced to be paid in installment payments prior to the date of the Separation form Service, death or Disability, such Specified Date accounts shall continue to be paid in accordance with the form of payment election applicable to the Specified Date Account.",Contract,5.468285,4.8084273,6.5397077
"Further, with respect to the Texas Property Code bond claim, MVP misrepresents the language of Section 53.175(b) in claiming that venue for a bond claim is permissive rather than mandatory in Harris County. Compare MVP’s Brief at 68, with TEX. PROP. CODE § 53.175(b). Section 53.175(b) makes it permissive to have multiple lawsuits by different obligees under one bond—but it is still mandatory to bring any suit in a court in the county where the real property is located (here Harris County, Texas). Moreover, neither McCarthy nor MVP disputes that the Oklahoma court would not have jurisdiction over Travelers. In short, RLB’s bond claim would potentially be lost if the entire underlying Texas case were dismissed.",Party Submissions,8.429944,8.382649,8.859325
Claimant does not make a similar request concerning the contracts with the other companies for which it requests documents and does not explain why this specific request concerning the contract with Refidomsa would be relevant to its discrimination claim.,Legal Decisions,22.794472,21.254534,25.572353
"HN2 [ ] Standards of Review, Abuse of Discretion A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or, stated differently, when it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles. When a trial court fails to analyze or apply the law correctly, it has clearly abused its discretion. The trial court has no discretion in determining the law or applying the law to the facts. However, when considering a writ of mandamus, an appellate court focuses on the result reached by the trial court rather than its reasons. If the trial court expresses an incorrect legal reason for its ruling, an appellate court will nevertheless uphold the order on any other grounds supported by the record.",Party Submissions,5.1559625,5.549349,5.929122
"January 20, 2017 to the present, National Archives (to the extent that documents in the National Archives originated from USTR or the State Document Request No.",Legal Decisions,23.641958,26.736044,35.41306
"Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.075(a) provides that an employee who elects to pursue his remedy under the workers' compensation laws of another jurisdiction, and who recovers benefits under those laws, may not recover under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA). Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.075(a) (2006). Under Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 409.009 (2006), a person may file a claim with the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission as a subclaimant if that person has: (1) provided compensation, including health care provided by a health care insurer, directly or indirectly, to or for an employee or legal beneficiary; and (2) sought and been refused reimbursement from the insurance carrier. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 409.009 .",Party Submissions,3.6554523,4.0498605,3.7695048
"Request No. 10: The Request is denied. The Claimant is requesting access to documents mostly prepared by the Claimant himself and relating in whole or in part to the encounter organized by the Claimant between Qatar representative Dr Ali bin Smikh Al Marri and Pope Francis on January 31, 2019. Such documents are not material to assess the Claimant’s investment in Qatar for the purpose of preparing his forthcoming Memorial, nor are they relevant as an input for a quantum expert evaluating such investment before any submissions have been exchanged on the merits of the instant case, as this is argued in the Claimant’s rubric on the “Relevance and Materiality according to the Requesting Party”.",Legal Decisions,16.727356,15.017747,16.287119
"Petitioners next assert that the Court's opinion Casteel opinion has also been overruled but fails to clearly articulate how the opinion conflicts with Casteel. The Opinion is wholly consistent with Casteel because the jury considered a legal theory that failed as a matter of law and the Court could not determine if the unsupported 5 theory was the basis for the jury's verdict. Casteel requires a finding of harmful error and reversal. III. The Opinion did not ""misapply"" Casteel and its progeny.",Party Submissions,11.276482,13.119501,12.545756
"On August 28, 2015, First NBC and TX 1111 entered into the bridge loan and executed the following agreements: (1) a bridge loan agreement outlining the financing terms; (2) a bridge loan promissory note in the maximum principal amount of $20,000,000.00, containing the repayment terms; (3) a bridge loan security and pledge agreement providing First NBC with a security interest in the Contributions as its only collateral; and (4) an assignment of rights to capital contributions in which First NBC was assigned all of TX 1111 ’s right, title, and interest in and to the Contributions. In conjunction with the bridge loan, Backes signed the guaranty for 8 the amounts due and owing under the bridge loan, up to $20,000,000.00.",Party Submissions,5.485706,5.2695107,5.742879
"In Shattenkirk, the absence of specified arbitration rules and a silent stance on arbitration costs rendered any determination on the prohibitive nature of costs speculative. 669 S.W.3d at 399. This Court emphasized that without clear terms, the nature of potential costs was indeterminate. Id.",Party Submissions,15.748233,18.43365,21.083616
"Delegation of Authority. In the administration of this Plan, the Committee may, from time to time, employ agents and delegate to them such administrative duties as it sees fit, and may from time to time consult with legal counsel who shall be legal counsel to the Company and such other professional advisors as the Committee may determine.",Contract,4.985158,6.0296383,7.1492558
"Beoland was the plan commissioner for the 2015 DRP, with responsibilities described at Request No. 25 above. The requested documents are relevant and material for evaluating the factors that Beoland took into account when developing the 2015 DRP, especially the reasons for the decision to rezone for residential purposes a significantly larger land plot, owned by the City of Belgrade, which was already designated and used for traffic infrastructure, located directly across the street from Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23.",Legal Decisions,19.459677,17.89799,20.963049
"Therefore, only these two Coastal States have the exclusive rights to harvest sedentary species on the continental shelf of the Barents Sea.",Legal Decisions,21.390354,16.318113,19.402596
"Please sign and return to me the attached Consent for Child to Travel Outside the United States together with the child's original passports within ten days after you receive this notice and consent form, same being ______________________________, 20____.",Party Submissions,12.877154,16.13232,16.141853
"In sum, Yellowfin ’s brief does not (because it cannot) dispute that Section 51.003(a)’s plain text covers this suit. That’s all this Court needs to say to reverse.",Party Submissions,19.073982,24.183853,22.752089
"Article 1 – Given the depletion of the resources available in the WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET Stabilization Fund and the differences between the Seasonal Price fixed and the Hourly Spot Market Prices recorded, the methodology described in this resolution is hereby temporarily established in order 4 Resolution 2/2002, dated 14 March 2002, fifth whereas clause (C-186). 5 Resolution 240/2003, dated 14 August 2003, fifth whereas clause (C-8). 6 Resolution 406/2003, dated 8 September 2003, third whereas clause (C-9).",Legal Decisions,8.779771,8.26018,8.649447
The United States objects to Request No. 1.e for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.,Legal Decisions,8.422973,13.04287,14.180471
"R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how the requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the opinion of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Spatial Planning is relevant to the question of Obnova's alleged property rights or material to the Tribunal's determination of this question. This is a classic ""fishing expedition"", with Claimants simply casting about for any documents which might contain information they consider helpful in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case.",Legal Decisions,12.208328,10.814919,13.334119
"Trial Court: 201st Judicial District Court, Travis County The Honorable Amy Clark-Meachum Disposition in the Trial Court: The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. CR165, App’x Tab A.",Party Submissions,10.723872,17.033098,11.787843
"Municipal de Antigua Guatemala mediante el Acta Municipal 51-2019 del 6 de junio de 2019 que, luego de ser recurrida por TRECSA el 17 de septiembre de 2019 ante el Tribunal de lo Contencioso Administrativo, fue confirmada.",Legal Decisions,7.9128304,10.574901,8.680362
"Having determined that no abuse of discretion occurred under the facts of this case, we deny ETMC Athens's petition for writ of mandamus. We lift our stay of October 11, 2023.",Party Submissions,10.017067,10.999854,15.77151
"The Parties hereby agree that, pursuant to each Specified Agreement, Dow will designate UCC to provide or receive services thereunder, as applicable. In accordance with such designation, UCC shall be entitled to exercise Dow’s rights as service recipient thereunder, and UCC shall satisfy Dow’s obligations as the service provider thereunder.",Contract,10.097015,9.667607,9.999175
"But in Del Lago, this Court affirmatively rejected the notion that premises liability claims were limited to physical defects only. See Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 776. In Del Lago, this Court found that the plaintiff’s claim was “properly submitted on a premises-liability theory” as the plaintiff “primarily complained of Del Lago’s nonfeasance—its failure to remedy an unreasonably dangerous condition. .. and failure to react promptly.” Id. In Sampson, this Court again reiterated that “a claim for a condition or use of real property is a premises defect claim under the Tort Claims Act. . .” Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 385 (emphasis added) (citing Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 230 (Tex. 2004)).",Party Submissions,4.973477,5.1959443,5.5539823
"The written notice may be in the form attached to this order as Exhibit A , Notice of Intent for Child to Travel Outside the United States.",Party Submissions,13.8425455,13.82522,20.273876
"Governing Law. To the extent not preempted by ERISA, the laws of the State of California shall govern the construction and administration of the Plan.",Contract,3.8844004,4.817119,5.8647804
"If the text is ambiguous or if the interpretation under Article 31 of the VCLT leads to a result that is manifestly absurd and unreasonable, then Article 32 of the VCLT clearly allows resort to supplementary means of interpretation.",Legal Decisions,5.332859,5.7226562,5.7517033
"I certify that this Reply Brief complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(C) because it contains 4,463 words, excluding the parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1), in 14-point Palatino Linotype font.",Party Submissions,3.6497335,5.0303545,6.6607428
"The Delapenas originally filed a friendly suit against High Hopes Summer Camp. They subsequently amended their petition to bring survival and wrongful death claims against the City, as well as a bystander claim on behalf of Catiana ’s sister, who witnessed Catiana ’s drowning. They alleged the City was negligent in: (1) operating the pool without an adequate number of qualified lifeguards; (2) failing to provide Catiana with an available life jacket; and (3) negligently implementing the City’s pool safety policy .",Party Submissions,10.485749,10.058625,11.002901
The SAT’s unwillingness to allow Claimant and PEM access to VAT refunds based on its entitlement as an exporter of silver and gold.,Party Submissions,60.93975,37.769943,49.175346
"July 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court has no discretion to divest a spouse of his separate property. Barnard, 133 S.W.3d at 789.",Party Submissions,5.6640177,10.979571,12.639989
"NATURE OF THE CASE: This suit involves the parent-child relationship and termination of parental rights. TRIAL COURT: The Honorable Judge Amy Smith, 402nd Judicial District Court, Wood County, Texas, signed an Order of Termination on May 10, 2023. COURT OF APPEALS: Sixth Court of Appeals, Texarkana, Texas. PARTIES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS: Appellant: A.S., Mother of R.W. Appellee: Department of Family and Protective Services DISPOSITION: Justice Rambin authored the court’s opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice C.J., and Justice van Cleef. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgement. No motions for rehearing were filed. STATUS OF OPINION: The Court’s opinion is a memorandum opinion and is therefore not published.",Party Submissions,5.024495,5.6506934,5.321396
"S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex.1988); see also Howell v. Mauzy, 899 S.W.2d 690, 698 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994, writ denied). Courts may examine the equities of the situation in deciding whether the plea is timely filed. See Howell, 899 S.W.2d at 698. At oral argument, Gaetjen's counsel suggested that Luby's should have sought abatement when it answered the lawsuit and asserted the exclusive remedy defense. At that time, it made no sense to seek an abatement because TIG had closed its file and Gaetjen's claim was not pending before the Commission. Moreover, we note that it was Gaetjen who did not seek review of TIG's denial and then waited almost two years to file suit. The fact that Luby's participated in discovery *818 was of necessity to defend itself, not a waiver.",Party Submissions,6.2146487,6.9636374,7.4856586
"As such, Liberty met its burden in its pleadings, and Ames did not present any fact that would require a further showing of an established fact. Finally, the payments Ames owes Liberty under the Contract are not penalties but are standard volume-based charges that are routinely used in similar contracts in which wastewater sewage is transferred to another entity for treatment. Ames argues that the contractually provided high-volume Additional Service Charge effectively amounts to liquidated damages that is therefore an unenforceable penalty. City of Ames’s Petition for Review at 17 (the “Pet’r’s Pet.”). The Contract details the reasons for the TAV and plainly contemplates Liberty providing wastewater treatment for flows above that threshold. (CR 37, 39, 41.) Ames agreed to such provisions by signing the Contract, and the Additional Service Charge exists to offset these costs and applies to wastewater received by Liberty. (CR 39, 44.) To require Liberty to treat its customer’s excess flows for free would frustrate the very purpose of Chapter 271, as Liberty would have no recourse for its customer’s nonpayment for service received. Consequently, the Additional Service Charge is not a penalty at all, but instead is tied to services Ames received.",Party Submissions,12.743714,11.782003,13.785728
"In a non-unanimous decision, the jury terminated A.S.’s parental rights to R.W. in a trial that took place in May 8 through May 10, 2023. Nevertheless, the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to terminate A.S.’s parental rights to R.W. based upon the following grounds: (D), (E), (F), (N), and (O). Likewise, it was not within the best interest of R.W. to terminate A.S.’s parental rights.",Party Submissions,4.74728,5.4775724,5.2003045
"For column 23: Indicate the sensitivity of the survey, as defined in International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) 31. This value of the achieved confidence level of pest freedom is calculated based on the examinations (and/or samples) performed given the method sensitivity and the design prevalence.",Legislation,20.802994,20.70035,23.48823
"APPLICATION OF OTHER RULES If the provisions of law of either Party, or obligations under international law existing at present or established hereafter between the Parties in addition to the present Agreement, contain rules, whether general or specific, entitling investments by investors of the other Party to treatment more favourable than is provided for by the present Agreement, such rules shall, to the extent that they are more favourable prevail over the present Agreement.",Legal Decisions,7.9097333,6.594371,8.318801
"Kimberly Walker was about ten weeks pregnant when she first saw Dr. Castillo. (CR.664). Aside from peritonitis surgery when she was twenty-two weeks pregnant, Mrs. Walker’s pregnancy was uneventful. (CR.665).",Party Submissions,10.996697,10.495924,15.1601305
"ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, MILLS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT As required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I certify that, according to the word count of the computer program used to prepare this brief on the merits, the brief contains 6,135 words.",Party Submissions,5.3604054,6.6356683,7.4759746
"Nationalization, expropriation or any other measure having similar characteristics or effects that might be adopted by the authorities of one Party against investments made in its territory by investors of the other Party shall be effected only in the public interest, in accordance with the law, and shall in no case be discriminatory. The Party adopting such measures shall pay the investor or his assignee appropriate compensation, without undue delay and in freely convertible currency. 930. Article V of the BIT sets forth a three-prong test for an unlawful expropriation: − First, the object of an expropriation must be an investment. − Second, there must be an interference with such an investment in the form of an expropriation or any other measure having similar characteristics or effects to an expropriation or nationalization.",Legal Decisions,5.603618,5.727101,5.4383607
"In Sampson this Court held that a “claim for a condition or use of real property is a premises defect claim under the Tort Claims Act.” See Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 385 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 230). The Court however, “decline[d] to eliminate all distinction between premises conditions and negligent activities.” Id. at 388.",Party Submissions,6.5133533,7.5944185,7.627828
"To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to impose a corporate tax rate increase on companies whose ratio of compensation of the CEO or other highest paid employee to median worker compensation is more than 50 to 1, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.256529,4.7225924,4.104987
"To amend title 49, United States Code, to establish a program to provide grants to eligible recipients for eligible operating support costs of public transportation, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.588118,4.3228993,6.402948
To amend the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act to allow the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into self-determination contracts with Indian Tribes and Tribal organizations to carry out supplemental nutrition assistance programs.,Legislation,3.4756527,2.9373686,3.748306
"Petitioner’s Issue Two again fabricates a split between the Appellate Opinion and this Court’s opinions in Skufca, Ha, Whiteley, and Kohlmeyer. Respondents do not wish to belabor the point that these prior opinions are factually and legally distinguishable, but due to Petitioner’s repeated efforts to tie these matters together, it bears additional clarification. The Motion states that “Respondents have pled damages caused by Petitioners’ alleged breach of the Subcontract” and as such, arbitration is necessary. Again, this statement is incorrect. Respondents, the trial 8 court, and the appellate court all concurred that Respondents’ plead damages caused by a separate contract, aside from the Subcontract.",Party Submissions,13.414448,12.101268,13.96578
"Therefore, the Tribunal grants the Request in relation to the Manifests and Declarations that cleared the importation of AC-30 in the execution of the Refidomsa contracts.",Legal Decisions,53.473644,38.585068,52.44251
"REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING World Car respectfully asks the Court to reconsider the denial of World Car’s petition for review. This case squarely and cleanly presents a statutory-interpretation issue that is the subject of conflicting appellate decisions. As reflected in the petition-stage amicus brief urging this Court’s review, this issue is exceptionally important to the auto industry it directly affects, while also indirectly impacting consumers. And the legal errors committed below are so glaring and easily resolved that they at least warrant correction by per curiam opinion. With or without oral argument, the Court should reverse.",Party Submissions,11.532345,11.828253,12.56895
For column 18: Indicate the number of trapping sites in case this number differs from the number of traps (column 17) (e.g. the same trap is used in different places).,Legislation,11.303838,14.095594,14.548625
"Further, since Osprin had pursued its remedies under the Guaranty prior to the completion of the project, its rights clearly predated any possible termination.",Party Submissions,27.219675,38.900574,42.58536
"First Majestic Silver Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/21/14, Claimant’s Response to Preliminary Objection to Jurisdiction, dated September 1, 2023. Decision on Provisional Measures See First Majestic Silver Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 21/14, Decision on the Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures, dated May 26, 2023.",Party Submissions,3.2470307,3.544935,3.4878929
"However, two reasons compel us to conclude that the Division does not have exclusive jurisdiction. First, “[t]he determination of whether any type of claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [Division] depends on whether the claim is based on a claimant's entitlement to benefits.” Bestor v. Serv. Lloyds Ins. Co., 276 S.W.3d 549, 553 (Tex.",Party Submissions,6.0587783,6.493872,6.421746
"LIABILITY. Subcontractor shall procure and maintain in force Workers Compensation/Employers Liability insurance. All Subcontractor employees shall be covered under such policies, including employees who are sole proprietors, shareholders, corporate officers, members or partners, and whether or not required by applicable law.",Party Submissions,8.9038315,6.9095006,10.421501
"Preparation of, as well as any changes, revisions and/or edits to sketches and Cadastral Plans must be preceded by geometric surveys. Geometers conducting these surveys prepare notes that reflect their findings. As explained above, Serbia argues in the Counter-Memorial that Claimants did not prove that Obnova built the buildings presently existing at its premises and argue that all of Obnova’s buildings at Dunavska 17 -19 had been built before the creation of Obnova’s predecessor Otpad. 66 The requested documents are relevant and material to confirm when the buildings at Dunavska 17-19, as well as Dunavska 23, were built.",Legal Decisions,15.6541,17.56248,16.397387
"City of Dallas to R. R.8t S. Properties, Inc. recorded in Volume 88158, Page 2342, OfficialPublic Records, Dallas County, Texas.",Party Submissions,23.961687,26.06387,33.208954
Claimant limits its request in this manner for purposes of cost and time efficiency and to further limit the burden placed upon the Respondent.,Legal Decisions,20.50081,26.284473,28.937195
"When construing Section 51.003(a), the Court’s objective is to determine and give effect to legislative intent. Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). The Court should not look to extraneous matters for an intent not stated in the statute. Id. The Court should yield to the plain sense of the words the Legislature chose, and must not engage in forced or strained construction. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997). If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, the provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.026 (West 2013). It is not the court’s function to question the wisdom of conflicting statutes, or seek to rewrite them based on the Court’s view of public policy. Nat’l Liabl. & Fire Ins. Co., 15 S.W.3d at 527; Lee v. City of Houston, 807 S.W.2d 290, 2903 (Tex. 1991).",Party Submissions,3.6110299,3.9675744,3.991597
"But even looking at both the agreement and judgment, the incorporation of the Mendietta judgment does not change the fact that Mendietta never promised to pay Bay, Ltd. $1.9 million. There is no promise to pay $1.9 million in either document. (2CR915–29). Reading them together to create a $1.9 million payment obligation would be adding terms to the parties’ agreement, which this Court has repeatedly held is improper. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 162 (Tex. 2003) (holding the Court “may neither rewrite the parties’ contract nor add to its language.”). Moreover, focusing on an agreed judgment, rather than the amount and allocation in the settlement agreement, is unworkable and can create absurd results. For example, “[m]any litigants use a nonsuit as a procedural device to effectuate a settlement agreement, intentionally dismissing claims with prejudice.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. 2010). In a typical settlement, the plaintiff agrees to accept a lump sum, releases their claims against the defendant, and agrees to nonsuit the claims with prejudice when that sum is paid. See id. If the plaintiff has sued joint tortfeasors for the same injuries, and a settlement agreement with one tortfeasor incorporates a nonsuit order,1 then what is the settlement credit for the co-tortfeasor? If the Court focuses on the settlement agreement’s amount and allocation, then in this simple hypothetical, the settlement amount would be the lump sum the defendant paid for the same injury. But what if the Court focuses on the incorporated judgment? If the judgment is the focus, the credit in this hypothetical would be zero, given that the nonsuit with prejudice did not award the plaintiff anything. But that holding would result in the precise harm the one-satisfaction rule is designed to prevent—a double recovery.",Party Submissions,6.8256903,7.0114107,7.0889254
"The name-change issue that Respondents did brief is entirely meritless. That issue relates solely to the damages that Westwood would be entitled to recover under the jury’s verdict if the court of appeals’ judgment is reversed. And while Respondents insist that Westwood’s name change creates “intractable problems” for the entire damages award (Resp. 31), it actually leaves most of it untouched.",Party Submissions,13.814327,13.65877,15.10837
"Just as in Briggs, Bay now seeks to use the ROCIP manuals as proof of compliance with the requirements of the Act. But as observed in Briggs, an OCIP manual falls short of constituting an express written agreement for purposes of the Act. Id. at 284, (citing In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. 2010) (noting policy manual did not constitute a contract)). Similarly, the Valero ROCIP manuals relied upon by Bay specifically defer to an actual contract: “In the event of a conflict between this ROCIP Manual and the contractual agreement, the requirements of the Agreement shall control.” 28 But, as noted above, they are not themselves “written agreement(s)” that satisfy the statute.",Party Submissions,10.101906,10.092651,11.049298
"Where a meeting of the minds is contested, as it is here, determination of the existence of a contract is a question of fact. See Runnells v.",Party Submissions,8.447962,12.235891,10.414847
"A. The actions of Norway definitely led to the drop, a sharp drop of revenues of that company, due to the fact that vessels which were serviced by that company were not able to continue fishery. Q. Does that include Russian vessels as well as the North Star vessels ?",Legal Decisions,35.38483,36.53291,38.842606
An objection to a timely RTP motion may be sustained only if the motion fails to plead sufficient facts concerning the RTP’s responsibility.,Party Submissions,21.918541,22.823452,23.70285
"Sharyland protested only P&A’s market valuation of the total, statewide transmission line and the comparative equality of that valuation. Market value and comparative equality of taxation are the only two grounds checked on Sharyland’s protests, which are in the record. CR.263-65; CR.390-400 (Sharyland’s June 2019 Protests, Appendix A to Oncor’s Brief). Those are the only issues Sharyland settled when it agreed to an appraised value of its transmission line in Wilbarger County. The one-page settlement agreement specifically says, “the subject matter of the protest. .. has been settled.” CR.266; CR.401 (Settlement of June 2019 Protests, Appendix B to Oncor’s Brief) (emphasis added). Respondents’ intimation that Sharyland actually protested and settled the issue of whether there was an objective clerical error on the appraisal roll is factually incorrect. The face of the settlement document does not support that suggestion. See id. Nor does any evidence.",Party Submissions,10.370244,11.780842,11.716457
McCarthy Subcontract -11-01-12-2017 Rev. Pollution Liability Policies shall contain endorsements waiving all rights of subrogation against all additional insureds.,Party Submissions,17.620846,14.497707,20.90316
"Dr. Null’s report is likewise conclusory, speculative, and insufficient under the TMLA. Dr. Null did not explain what happened or what actually caused the injury. At best, he noted that clinical findings were “consistent with an antenatal asphyxia event,” but how and why the alleged event may have occurred is left unknown. (CR.805) Perhaps more to the point, he did not link any of the harm to nursing actions/inactions. Even reading the reports together, the reader is left guessing and filling in blanks to make the causal connection between the conduct of the nurses and any injury. This is impermissible under the TMLA. Bowie Mem’l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 53.",Party Submissions,9.549671,10.62723,11.508251
"On that front, Dr. Tappan has been a board certified obstetrician and gynecologist since 1976. App. 7, CR 668. He currently serves as an ob-gyn hospitalist at Barstow Community Hospital in Barstow, California, where he maintains an active obstetrics and gynecology clinical practice. Id. Dr. Tappan is an expert in managing labor and delivery, and his report detailed his experience treating the same complications that Mrs. Walker experienced during H.W. ’ s delivery here: I have an active clinical practice that includes both obstetrics and gynecology. I have clinical experience in the diagnosis, evaluation, and management of pregnant patients near term, including those with preterm of membranes and whose labor requires augmentation with Pitocin (oxytocin). I also have knowledge and expertise diagnosing and managing patients with non-reassuring fetal heart rate patterns and those with a prolonged 2nd stage of labor. I am aware of the indications and techniques for operative vaginal delivery and cesarean section, as well as the prevention and management of fetal head impaction in the maternal pelvis at the time of cesarean delivery. App. 7, CR 663.",Party Submissions,6.4933233,6.6750784,6.800769
"A cause of action under the TMLA has three basic elements: (1) the defendant must be a physician or health care provider: (2) the claim must concern treatment, lack of treatment or a departure from the accepted standards of medical care, health care or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care; and (3) the defendant’s act or omission complained of must have proximately caused the injury.",Party Submissions,4.7089767,6.2906494,5.576024
"Is the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over Respondent’s counterclaim contingent on the Tribunal having jurisdiction over Claimant’s ancillary claim? Assuming, without deciding, that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over Claimant’s ancillary claim, does this have as a consequence that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over Respondent’s counterclaim?",Party Submissions,3.7180989,4.1098447,4.106893
"To require the Administrator of the Small Business Administration to des- ignate a point of contact for for-profit child care providers, submit a report to Congress, and for other purposes.",Legislation,8.505772,7.6641555,8.675883
"ARB/20/48 y ARB/21/59 bajo un solo procedimiento arbitral, presentada el 14 de diciembre de 2021 por las Demandantes de conformidad con el Artículo 12.28(2) del Tratado.",Legal Decisions,9.095434,12.354026,12.443243
"Objeciones son inadmisibles; e. Ordene a las Demandantes reembolsar íntegramente a Guatemala los costos en los que ha incurrido el Estado en la defensa de sus intereses en el presente arbitraje, junto con intereses a una tasa comercial razonable a juicio del Tribunal, desde el momento en que el Estado incurrió en dichas costas y hasta la fecha de su pago efectivo; y f. Ordene cualquier otra medida que el Tribunal estime oportuna y adecuada.",Legal Decisions,6.879873,10.056171,8.706421
"Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants already obtained certain documentation from the Cadastre (see for example, exhibits C-162 to C-166 and C-329), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek.",Legal Decisions,19.14841,21.952898,22.316986
"Convention Article 44; Arbitration Rule 1, Article 1120(2) NAFTA 1.1. These proceedings are conducted in accordance with the ICSID Arbitration Rules in force as of July 1, 2022, except to the extent that they are modified by Section B, Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.",Legal Decisions,7.4236345,7.2122235,8.391529
Miller resulted from gross negligence by the Terry Defendants in not timely seeking to designate James Flaven a responsible third party?,Party Submissions,62.250755,113.03547,99.879395
"Arbitration Rule 29(4)(i) 22.1. Sound recordings shall be made of all hearings and sessions. The sound recordings shall be provided to the Parties, the Tribunal Members, and the Assistant.",Legal Decisions,12.640158,13.372277,13.557599
"Moreover, the cost of the improvements is not the only evidence of damages the jury heard. The jury also received evidence of the increase in property value during the duration of the lease with Mendietta. (9RRPX44). Plaintiff’s exhibits, admitted into evidence, included an appraisal report by Gardner Appraisal Group, Inc. of the value of the Ranch on November 11, 2010 and June 17, 2013. ( Id. ; 4RR22). That report concluded that the value of the property on November 11, 2010 was $1,321,000.00, while the value of the property on June 17, 2013 was $1,431,000.00. ( Id. ). But the jury also heard that the Diocese later sold the property for $2,100,000.00—an increase in value of almost $800,000.00. (6RR97, 106; 4RR22; 9RRPX38). The jury was not instructed, nor was any limitation requested, on the jury’s ability to consider this evidence. Under the Restatement, the jury would have been right to award Bay, Ltd.’s costs for the improvements in the amount of $458,426.14. (2CR836-844).",Party Submissions,6.212268,5.7707186,6.7085953
"Weatherford had an opportunity in its response to Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction to submit admissible evidence to connect the dots between an alleged disposal of solid waste and the actions of defendant Midland. It did not do so, and cannot now correct its jurisdictional shortcomings on appeal by asking the Court to look past them, assume the application of the SWDA statute against Midland, and then go a step further to analyze whether an exclusion to that statute should implicate Midland.",Party Submissions,14.216398,18.076975,15.484313
"The Seventh Court apparently misunderstood Thompson to require proof not only that each provider ’ s individual negligence was a substantial factor in a claimant ’ s injury, but also proof that each individual act of each provider was a substantial factor contributing to the outcome. See Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *5. The Court concluded the experts here fell short because “[w]hile [they]proffered a litany of allegedly deficient conduct, they failed to explain how and why each caused, within reasonably medical probability, [H .W.’ s] eventual subacute infarction before birth. ” Id. Nothing about Thompson supports the Seventh Court ’ s “individual acts ” requirement at any point, much less at the threshold stage.",Party Submissions,12.616559,14.218978,13.8057165
"In its sixth issue, Galovel ho complains of the trial court’s “preemptive and prophylactic ban” on its ability to amend its pleading. It argues that the trial court’s August 14, 2020 order violates the open courts provision of the Texas constitution and that it prevented Galovelho’s ability to update its responses to changes in the Emergency Orders.",Party Submissions,12.737597,15.353428,14.095098
"The Diocese argues that the charge did not inquire whether the Diocese had “obtained a benefit from Bay ‘by fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue advantage’. .. .” Diocese BOM at 45. But the language of the charge included all that was necessary to sustain a claim for unjust enrichment.",Party Submissions,12.2559,16.159555,16.105732
To ensure that women seeking an abortion receive an ultrasound and the opportunity to review the ultrasound before giving informed consent to receive an abortion.,Legislation,7.707691,8.790737,9.325488
"PCC: The requested documents must be in Obnova’s, i.e., Claimants’, possession, custody or control since “ AGREEMENT ON PROVISION AND USE OF PORT AND WAREHOUSE SERVICES” (exhibit R-015) was concluded by Obnova.",Legal Decisions,22.844145,16.730442,24.891144
"Similarly, Devine’s argument that the Texas does not have a compelling governmental interest in only allowing single individual voters to sign the petition of only one candidate in one election is without merit. There is absolutely no First Amendment implication to TEX. ELEC. CODE § 141.066(i) for either citizens or candidates. Ironically, the U.S. Supreme Court settled a very similar issue in American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974). In White, the Supreme Court upheld Texas’ prohibition against signing an independent nominating petition while voting in a primary since a voter may choose to vote or to sign a nominating petition, but not to do both. White, 415 U.S. at 768. (holding it is not “invidious to disqualify those who have voted in a primary from signing petitions for another party seeking ballot position for its candidates for the same offices.”) State restrictions on an individual’s ability to support more than one candidate in the same election are 9 constitutional and do not infringe on that individual’s (or the candidate’s) freedom of speech (or association). Id .",Party Submissions,6.848775,6.454038,6.8302674
"You represent that, except as you have disclosed in writing to the Company on Exhibit A attached hereto, you are not bound by the terms of any agreement with any other party (aside from standard employee non-disclosure agreements with previous employers) to refrain from using or disclosing any trade secret or confidential or proprietary information in the course of your employment with the Company, to refrain from competing, directly or indirectly, with the business of any previous employer or any other party or to refrain from soliciting employees, customers or suppliers of such previous employer or other party. You further represent that your performance of all the terms of this Agreement and the performance of your duties as an employee of the Company do not and will not conflict with or breach any agreement with any prior employer or other party (including any nondisclosure or non-competition agreement), and that you will not disclose to the Company or induce the Company to use any confidential or proprietary information or material belonging to any previous employer or others.",Contract,3.0440233,3.7136579,3.5303664
"The Change in Control Payment will be made in a lump sum cash payment as soon as practicable, but in no event more than ten (10) days after Release Effective Date. Except as otherwise provided under law or the terms of any other employee benefit plan in which Executive participates, Executive shall not be entitled to receive any additional compensation or benefits from the Company after the termination date.",Contract,4.5876174,5.0606236,5.5185285
"In contrast to a tenant like the one in Kemp, a tenant who abandons a leased premise because the landlord’s harassment forces it to leave—as Westwood did here—has established the central element of a constructive-eviction claim. And it does not matter whether that decision is forced upon the tenant before, during, or after the eviction proceeding on appeal from the judgment.",Party Submissions,12.839544,12.601858,14.755703
"If a medical expert in one specialty area is offered as an expert in another specialty, the expert’s qualifications to offer that opinion must be contained within the four corners of the expert report; they may not be inferred. Carreon v. Kelly, No. 04-21-00538, 2023 WL 3733918 at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, May 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Qualifications of an expert must appear in the expert report and curriculum vitae and cannot be inferred.”); Tenet Hosps., Ltd. v. De La Riva, 351 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (“the proffered medical expert’s expertise must be evident from the four corners of his report and curriculum vitae”).",Party Submissions,4.472373,5.1898074,4.535507
"RLB later alleged it encountered “differing site conditions” and claimed it incurred over $4,830,236 in additional costs (Additional Costs). R.195; R.468 ¶45.",Party Submissions,16.219135,20.094614,20.708885
"Outstanding Balance at San Jacinto Building Investors, LP and a shell company and special purpose entity created for tax purposes. Borrower is indirectly owned by Leon J. Backes. Bridge Loan Agreement executed by FNBC and TX1111, effective August 28, 2015. First NBC Bank in New Orleans, Louisiana, which provided the loan of $ 20 million, later increased to $30 million dollars, to TX 1111 to finance the historic rehabilitation Project. The Bank was closed and went into receivership in April 2017. Bridge Loan Repayment Guaranty, executed by Backes and FNBC and effective August 28, 2015. (App. A.) FNBC or OSPrin. August 28, 2017, the maturity date of the Bridge Loan. Opinion in this appeal issued by the Texarkana Court of Appeals, NO. 06-21-00085-CV. OSPrin II, LLC, successor in interest to FNBC. The deficiency amount due under the Bridge Loan and guaranteed by Backes, including unpaid principal, interest, default interest, collection costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees.",Party Submissions,10.75998,10.14269,11.1586685
"This extra non-statutory language weighed in on an important issue in the case: whether Terry should have designated Flaven from the beginning of the lawsuit and whether he was negligent because he did not do so. (8RR16:9-23, 172:15-175:21; 9RR113:5-14; 11RR257:18-258:18, 268:14-24, 336) Per HSMiller’s experts, had Terry designated Flaven from the beginning, the designation would not have been struck because Terry only needed to show that Flaven did not go through with the proposed transaction. (8RR16:9-23, 16 172:15-175:21; 9RR113:5-14; 11RR257:18-258:18, 268:14-24, 336) To prove the failed transaction, they argued, Terry did not need to find Flaven.",Party Submissions,6.223387,6.170627,6.568307
"Claimant’s original request referred to “General Asphalt,” the colloquial industry name of the AC-30 supplier formally known as “General Supply Corporation S.R.L.” Claimant requests that Respondent confirm whether it has conducted a reasonable search for the AC-30 contracts it entered into with General Supply Corporation S.R.L. If Respondent has not conducted such a search, Claimant asks that it be ordered to do so.",Legal Decisions,9.464855,9.375725,9.675591
"HN12 [ ] A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to abate is within the court's discretion. See Project Eng'g USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716, 724 (Tex. App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) ; see also Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (Tex. 1985) (concluding that abatement is an incidental ruling by the trial court not subject to mandamus review). There are exceptions, however, to this general rule. See, e.g., In re Luby's Cafeterias, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (noting exceptions); See also In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d 297, 306 (Tex. App.-- San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding) (concluding that an indefinite abatement was an abuse of the trial court's discretion).",Party Submissions,3.643749,3.8201227,3.8520226
"But more than that, this “evidence” was a deceit: the product of position-shifting of the most insidious kind. Its primary purveyors — 9 the plaintiff’s lawyer in the underlying trial and a hired expert — took different legal positions than the plaintiff’s lawyer took in the underlying trial.",Party Submissions,17.62913,20.777674,18.542439
"Tratándose de actos administrativos, para someter una reclamación al foro interno o al arbitraje previsto en este Artículo, será indispensable agotar previamente la vía gubernativa o administrativa, por parte del inversionista o de su inversión, cuando la legislación de la Parte así lo exija. Dicho agotamiento en ningún caso podrá exceder un plazo de seis (6) meses desde la fecha de su iniciación por el inversionista y no deberá impedir que el inversionista solicite las consultas referidas en el párrafo 3 del presente Artículo.",Legal Decisions,5.7540083,11.018524,7.4923882
"HN5 [ ] Once a responsible third party has been designated, and after an adequate time for discovery has passed, a party may move to strike the designation ""on the ground that there is no evidence that the designated person is responsible for any portion of the claimant's alleged injury or damage."" Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004( l ). ""The court shall grant the motion to strike unless a defendant produces sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the designated person's responsibility for the claimant's injury or damage."" Id. Thus, the question for the trial court is sufficient evidence, more than a scintilla, [*6] for a reasonable jury to find the responsible third party responsible for a portion of the claimant's injury or damages. In re Transit Mix Concrete & Materials Co., No. 12-13-00364-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 5136, 2014 WL 1922724, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 14, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).",Party Submissions,4.0336637,4.470753,4.353067
Effect on Accounts. An election to modify a Payment Schedule is specific to the Account or payment event to which it applies and shall not be construed to affect the Payment Schedules of any other Accounts.,Contract,12.91484,16.568233,20.994825
"Notwithstanding the foregoing, if at any time you become an officer required to file reports pursuant to Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, then with respect to any part of this Award that is then unvested, vesting shall in addition be contingent on and subject to satisfaction of such performance criteria for such performance period as the Plan Administrator shall establish with specific reference to this Award, and this Award shall be cancelled without the issuance of Common Stock if and to the extent any such performance criteria are not satisfied.",Contract,5.1969576,5.81326,6.573759
We are a company called Ishavsbruket AS and located in Båtsfjord and currently we are working on investigating a topic regarding snow crab and in this regard there are some questions that we would like to ask you.,Legal Decisions,20.193882,25.867685,21.931559
"In similar fashion, on March 16, 2020, Collin County Judge Chris Hill issued a proclamation after the Commissioner’s Court declared a state of disaster in Collin County. The county issued its own executive order, inter alia, incorporating Abbott’s GA -08 and stating that “ persons shall avoid eating or drinking at bars, restaurants, and food courts. .. However, the use of drive-thru, pickup, or delivery – 3– options for bars, restaurants, and food courts is allowed and highly encouraged throughout the limited duration of [Abbott’s] Executive Order.” Second Executive Order.",Party Submissions,6.76666,8.453303,7.218081
"The Lawyers did raise the issue below, and, regardless, the “law of the case” doctrine shuts the door on HSMiller’s arguments. In the malpractice litigation alone, the parties have been through two jury trials and two separate appeals, and this Court denied review of the first appeal. See Orders at No. 16-0875 (Dec. 15, 2017 Tex.) 12 ( Newsom, Terry & Newsom, L.L.P. v. Henry S. Miller Comm. Co .) (denying review from Henry S. Miller Comm. Co. v. Newsom, Terry & Newsom, L.L.P. (“Henry S. Miller”), No. 05-14-0188-CV, 2016 WL 4821684 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 14, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).",Party Submissions,6.67237,6.8983126,7.1505437
"Here, it is undisputed that MVP is not a signatory to the Subcontract. And the MCC prohibits McCarthy from assigning any portion of the MCC without MVP’s written consent—and no assignment occurred. Supp.R.0771. MVP does not identify any privity of contract between MVP and RLB or another valid theory that would potentially entitle MVP to enforce the Subcontract against RLB. See Cappadonna Elec. Mgmt. v. Cameron Cnty., 180 S.W.3d 364, 371-73 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.) (nonsignatory subcontractor generally cannot enforce an arbitration provision of a prime contract it did not sign or incorporate by reference into the subcontract). Further, the “flow-down” provisions (and the Subcontract as a whole) do not contain any language suggesting MVP is somehow a party to the Subcontract that can enforce it. Pinto Tech., 526 S.W.3d at 445. Nor does the Subcontract state that MVP has any third-party beneficiary rights to enforce any Subcontract provision.",Party Submissions,6.9206505,6.8284717,7.3062572
"Energy Secretariat the authority to issue the “ economic dispatch rules to be applied. ”776 Article 35 of the Electricity Law specifically provides: The technical dispatch of the Argentine Interconnection System (SADI), shall be a responsibility of the National Load Dispatch Agency (Despacho Nacional de Cargas, or DNDC), an agency to be established as a stock company with capital represented by registered, non-endorsable shares, the majority of which shall be initially held by the Energy Secretariat. Subsequently, the different participants in the Wholesale Electricity Market (WEM) shall be entitled to have an interest therein. State participation, which shall at first represent a majority stake, may be reduced by the National Executive Branch up to ten per cent (10 %) of the corporate capital; however, this percentage shall ensure participation and veto rights in the Board of Directors.",Legal Decisions,13.185262,14.05505,14.284792
"The Lawyers will stand primarily on the briefing in their merits brief on this issue but do want to remind the Court that HSMiller cites only two cases to support its preemption and collateral-attack arguments. Neither is remotely like this case. For example, one of the cases involved “enormous” asbestos-related claims against Federal-Mogul Global, which involved trusts Congress created to “resolve 17 massive asbestos liability.” In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 357, 363 (3d Cir. 2012). Undoing what the bankruptcy court did there would contravene laws Congress passed for that specific problem. Id. Here no special laws are at issue. And the Lawyers are not trying to undo anything. The bankruptcy court approved the arrangement for its own purposes — to protect the bankrupt and its secured creditors. It did not, and could not, decide whether the assignment of a legal malpractice claim was valid under Texas law. That is this Court’s role.",Party Submissions,10.27323,10.207217,10.802439
"The TMLA requires health care liability claimants to serve an expert report upon each defendant shortly after the defendant files its answer. Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 223 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(a)). The Legislature’s primary objective in requiring this early report is to reduce the expense of health care liability claims by weeding out frivolous malpractice claims in the early stages of litigation. Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 556. The Act is intended to deter baseless claims, not block earnest ones. Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, 392 S.W.3d 625, 631 (Tex. 2013).",Party Submissions,4.8523216,5.224407,5.240254
"February 6, 2024. Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order without intervention of any point of order to consider in the House the resolution (H. Res. 863) impeaching Alejandro Nicholas Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Secu-rity, for high crimes and misdemeanors. The amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Homeland Security now printed in the resolution shall be considered as adopted. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the resolution, as amended, to adoption without intervening motion or demand for division of the question except two hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Homeland Security or their respective des-ignees.",Legislation,3.495012,2.962774,3.3488526
"Id. at 416-17. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Claims for declaratory relief such as those made by Oncor in this case have been repeatedly rejected by the courts. See, e.g., Cameron Appraisal Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. 2006). In Cameron, owners of travel trailers brought suit against the appraisal district for a declaratory judgment that the trailers were not subject to ad valorem taxation. This Court dealt with that argument in less than two pages, stating the Tax Code’s administrative procedures were “exclusive” and pointing out that “we have repeatedly held that ‘a taxpayer's failure to pursue an appraisal review board proceeding deprives the courts of jurisdiction to decide most matters relating to ad valorem taxes.’” Id. at 502 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in Joaquin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Shelby Cty. Appraisal Dist., a taxing unit requested a declaratory judgment that the appraisal district violated the law by assessing property on the basis of a percentage of its appraised value and preventing the correct assessment of value. Joaquin, No. 12-13-00038-CV, 2014 WL 5511479 (Tex. App.—Tyler, Aug. 29, 2014, pet. denied). The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the taxing unit’s DJA action, and the appellate court upheld it, finding the DJA inapplicable because Chapter 42 of the Tax Code specified the taxing unit’s exclusive remedies. Id. at *5.",Party Submissions,4.7803593,4.941943,4.8424964
"In Welder, a contract right giving the husband the right to acquire lands was obtained before marriage, but the conditions of the contract were not met until during marriage, at which time title vested. Id. The court held that the property was the husband's separate property because his claim to the property was acquired before marriage. Id .",Party Submissions,12.04133,15.949672,16.581617
"WHEREAS, the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of the Company has determined, that it is advisable and in the best interests of the Company to enter into this Amendment.",Contract,3.9492886,4.244657,5.1290717
"Mandamus relief from this Court is a matter of last resort. As this Court has repeatedly cautioned, mandamus relief under any circumstances is an “extraordinary remedy that is available only in limited circumstances.” In re Hotze, 627 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, mandamus relief is available only where the ordinary judicial process—a petition brought in a trial court, and litigated, as necessary, through appeal—cannot provide a relator with adequate relief to which he is entitled. See, e.g., In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464-65 (Tex. 2008). And where this Court shares mandamus jurisdiction with the courts of appeals or district courts, it strongly disfavors original mandamus petitions brought in this Court initially, entertaining such an application only on the showing of a “compelling reason” for bypassing the court of appeals. Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(e).",Party Submissions,4.887405,4.8618956,5.098499
"Perhaps more importantly, however, Respondents ’ effort to explain away the court of appeals’ opinion as merely enforcing some “voluntary agreement” between Westwood and Virtuolotry is irreconcilable with the opinion itself. In that opinion, the court of appeals never even looked for such an agreement because it would have been irrelevant under the court’s analysis, which focused solely and impermissibly on the “preclusive” legal effect of Westwood’s decision to withdraw its appeal in the county court and enter into the agreed judgment. Indeed, the court of appeals concluded that it would take an agreement to vary the judgment’s otherwise applicable legal effect. It contended that to preserve its claims in the district court, Westwood would have had to force Respondents into including a concession in the agreed judgment that an “act of Virtuolotry or Boyd” was “the cause for its decision to abandon its appeal” (Op. 5) or “qualifying” the abandonment to clarify its intention to assert a continuing “right to possession” (Op. on Rehr’g 2). Westwood, however, did not have to do either. Respondents’ effort to rewrite the opinion shows how scant its arguments really are. II. The actual reasons behind the court of appeals’ decision are indefensible.",Party Submissions,12.617386,13.376174,13.085376
"The City points to nothing in the SWDA’s definition of “solid waste facility” materially different from CERCLA’s standard for purposes of the issue presented by its jurisdictional plea. Under CERCLA, to the extent relevant to a sewer system, “facility” is broadly defined to include “any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, [or] storage container.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(A); see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 n. 15 (2d Cir. 1985) (“facility” is defined broadly).",Party Submissions,3.9534776,3.7361293,4.5471063
"Respondents and the court of appeals confuse a procedurally secured lien with a fraudulent lien claim based on the lien. And, the argument they repeatedly rely on is that the lien is not fraudulent because it says it is not. However, Petitioners’ ipse dixit cannot curtail Petitioners’ substantive rights.",Party Submissions,14.181618,15.592164,17.283293
"If contemporaneous with or within eighteen (18) months after a Change in Control that occurred during the Employment Period (a) the Company terminates Executive’s employment without Cause or (b) Executive terminates his employment for Good Reason, then, provided Executive complies with the requirements set forth in Section 3.7, Section 3.8, and Section 3.9, Executive will be eligible to receive, in lieu of the benefits described in Section 3.3: (i) a cash payment (the “Change in Control Payment”) equal to the sum of (a) twelve (12) months of Executive’s then current Base Salary plus (b) Executive’s then-current target annual bonus, less applicable withholdings; and (ii) the COBRA Continuation Benefit. Any outstanding awards under the Long-Term Incentive Plan shall be paid in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Long-Term Incentive Plan and the applicable awards.",Contract,3.3157115,3.212394,3.4834654
"In dividing nonvested pension rights as community property, the court must take into account of the possibility that death or termination of employment may destroy those rights before they mature. In some cases the trial court may be able to evaluate this risk in determining the present value of those rights. .. But if the court concludes that because of uncertainties affecting the vesting or maturation of the pension that it should not attempt to divide the present value of the rights, it can instead award each spouse an appropriate portion of each pension payment as it is paid. This method of dividing the community interest in the pension renders it unnecessary for the court to compute the present value of the pension rights, and divides equally the risk that the pension will fail to vest.",Party Submissions,7.862443,7.3644147,8.5116
"Even if Tatum, Hall, and Huckabee did not foreclose Barina’s arguments (and they do), Barina’s heavy reliance on Rosenthal would still be misplaced. In Rosenthal, this Court held that the gist of the defendant magazine’s article was that Rosenthal had engaged in criminal conduct by fraudulently obtaining welfare benefits, relying on statements and juxtapositions in the challenged article that unambiguously implied specific, verifiably fraudulent misconduct, in a column labelled “CRIME”. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d at 431-432. The challenged article also stated expressly that Rosenthal “must have been less than forthcoming” when she applied for benefits, emphasizing ultimately immaterial inconsistencies in her application and noting that “[f]alsifying such a document is a felony.” Id. at 437.6 The article also detailed Rosenthal’s “criminal history of theft,” and included an unrelated mug shot thereby implying that her welfare fraud was of a piece with her past criminal conduct. Id. at 436, 431. The Program, however, makes no such direct allegations of criminality about Barina. Rather, Barina’s actions, as well as those of the other guardians profiled, are consistently and repeatedly characterized as court-sanctioned and legal—the opposite of criminal.",Party Submissions,9.153679,9.211852,9.433903
The United States objects to Request No. 2.h for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.,Legal Decisions,9.501662,15.558016,16.896479
"Declaratory Relief Galovelho’s Second Amended P etition also sought a judgment declaring that “the challenged Executive Orders and local orders violate the Texas Disaster Relief Act and are unconstitutional.” In its fourth appellate issue, Galovelho argues that – 21– this claim is also ripe and that the trial court had jurisdiction over it. Again, we disagree.",Party Submissions,14.659113,15.434289,17.387566
"For example, in In re Francis, this Court “h[e]ld that when a challenge is made based on facial defects a party chair overlooked and approved when they could have been cured,” courts must “allow the candidate that opportunity.” 186 S.W.3d at 541. There, a judicial candidate filed a signature petition that was defective because it did not state which place the candidate was running for. Id. at 537. The party chairman overlooked the error and notified Francis that his filings were in order. Id. at 537-38. But a rival candidate spotted the error and convinced a trial court to exclude Francis from the ballot. Id. at 538. On mandamus review, this Court directed the trial court to vacate its order and “allow Francis to cure the defect”—despite the already-expired statutory deadline. Id. at 543.",Party Submissions,7.7509475,7.6058345,8.032529
This is the fourth of nine requests for documents which the Claimant contends was seized during the criminal proceedings in Qatar.,Legal Decisions,32.347565,33.35543,41.237015
"To prohibit a drawdown and sale of petroleum products from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve if the President has withdrawn certain land from oil and gas leasing, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.0474434,7.407093,7.379074
"PRA Provident Realty Advisors which formed Rusk at As a condition to advancing a multi-million-dollar debt, Lender obtained from Backes an “irrevocable”, “continuing”, and “unconditional” guaranty of the debt. Borrower defaulted but Backes never paid. The critical issue to the lending industry is whether a guaranty’s eventual sunset termination absolves the guarantor of liability to the lender1 for his breach of the guaranty agreement prior to the sunset termination. Backes refused to pay through litigation until after sunset termination of the guaranty, then argued that he was released from his obligation by the termination.",Party Submissions,12.56735,12.697937,13.305176
"To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to establish a credit for the domestic production of rare earth magnets, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.6828694,4.036473,4.7583213
"Whether or not the trial court could quote statutory language and paraphrase it, this Court has never hesitated to reverse trial judgments where the scales of justice were improperly weighted in favor of one party, especially where the instructions were “surplus.” See In re Estate of Poe, 648 S.W.3d at 286-92 (holding that surplus instructions confused and misled the jury and allowed them to consider an informal-fiduciary-duty theory); Timberwalk Apts., Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 755-56 (Tex. 1998) (holding 48 that surplus instruction used by lawyer to exhort jury to side with his client was harmful and required reversal); see also Acord v. Gen. Motors Corp ., 669 S.W.2d 111, 115-16 (Tex. 1984) (Where Texas Supreme Court had approved language to be used in special issues in a defective-design case, it was harmful error for the trial court to include additional language.).",Party Submissions,7.253304,6.7963524,7.680824
"Henry v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 70 S.W.3d 808 (2002) 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 381 the damages claim without determining whether the claimant was entitled to the benefits, a matter within the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,7.458945,7.8977895,7.930382
"Commercial Automobile Liability -$1,000,000 Limit of Liability McCarthy and the Owner shall be added as additional insureds, together with any other entities required by the Contract Documents. The automobile liability shall contain endorsements waiving all rights of subrogation in favor of the additional insureds where allowable by law.",Party Submissions,8.344867,8.362636,9.36209
Any and all documents based on which the Real Estate Cadaster issued decision No. 952-02-9-31/03 dated 7 December 2003189 permitting inscription of the City of Belgrade as the owner of Obnova’s buildings on land plots Nos. 47 and 39/1 in CM Stari Grad.,Legal Decisions,24.804533,25.340532,25.582508
"HN4 [ ] We review the summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). We take all evidence favorable to Douglas as true and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in her favor. See id.",Party Submissions,3.1301866,6.4579334,5.970419
"B) The Respondent’s position 526. The denial of the existence of any violation of the Treaty leads Respondent to also deny, in general, that Claimant should receive any sum at all on account of damages.",Legal Decisions,21.323265,17.452156,19.358047
"Customers do not own the claims is erroneous. See Pet. at 20, 23-25. In the 2008 assignment, Best Buy assigned its tax refund claims to the individual Customers. Id .",Party Submissions,18.103987,22.607157,24.406454
"To provide that an individual who uses marijuana in compliance with State law may not be denied occupancy of federally assisted housing, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.0431933,6.024899,7.6211166
"COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS This petition for review complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This petition also complies with the word-court limitations of Rule 9.4(i)(2)(D) because it contains 2,389 words, excluding any parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,4.5383153,5.153582,6.0301056
"And in March 2020, the City of Frisco likewise issued its Declaration of Local Disaster for Public Health Emergency. Frisco passed an ordinance stating, “ In accordance with the Guidelines from the President, the Governor and the CDC, people shall avoid eating or drinking at bars [and] restaurants .” Ordinance No. 2020-03-12. That provision was clarified to add: “Restaurants and beverage bars with or without drive in or drive-through services. .. may only provide take out, delivery or drive-through services as allowed by law. ” Ordinance No. 2020-03-13.",Party Submissions,6.9333534,7.2584553,7.6850243
"Quinn, joined by Justices Parker and Doss, unanimously concluded that the Walkers’ experts’ reports were insufficient to comply with section 74.351.",Party Submissions,20.443045,22.400541,26.502293
"In its Motion for Rehearing, Petitioners ask the Court to reverse its holding that there was no evidence to legally support a finding of proximate cause needed for the yield sign claim. On this point, the motion should be denied as the Court correctly held that no evidence on proximate cause existed make the claim legally insufficient. The Court correctly found that the only proffered evidence on causation was conjecture from the expert witness that admitted he could not opine on whether the presence of a yield sign made the collision more likely than not to occur.",Party Submissions,9.144487,10.168868,9.745978
"First Franklin made a special indorsement on the Note directing payment to First Franklin Financial Corporation. CR2:53. First Franklin Financial Corporation made a special indorsement on the Note directing payment to Dreambuilder Investments, LLC. CR2:53. Dreambuilder Investments, LLC executed an Allonge directing payment to RCS Recovery Services, LLC. CR2:54. RCS executed an Allonge directing payment to Yellowfin. CR2:55. Yellowfin has possession of the original Note and all Allonges. CR2:41 (⁋5).",Party Submissions,6.26755,6.2607875,7.1908846
"Enacted by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 269 (H.B. 752), § 1, effective September 1, 1993; am. Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1426 (H.B. 2510), § 11, effective September 1, 1999; am. Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 265 (H.B. 7), § 3.104, effective September 1, 2005; am. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 1153 (H.B. 2089), § 1, effective September 1, 2011.",Party Submissions,2.100206,2.1153781,2.1462216
Change in Control. A Participant will receive his or her entire unpaid vested Account Balance in a single lump sum payment if Separation from Service occurs within twenty-four (24) months following a Change in Control. Payment will be made at the time set forth in Section 6.1(a).,Contract,4.677625,4.7475705,5.486487
"Fleming Defendants made their second Absolute Anti-Collateral Estoppel Agreement with the court after they lost the Kinney trial. Wilson Plaintiffs sought offensive collateral estoppel on the Kinney judgment, and Fleming Defendants responded with an aggressive absolute anti-collateral estoppel position as follows: In Karnes, which preceded Kinney and Wilson, the federal court had denied class certification of breach of fiduciary duty claims precisely because Plaintiffs had failed to show that common questions predominated over the individualized issues. See Karnes v. Fleming No. H-07-0620, 2008 WL 4528223 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2008). Among other things, the court held that “vast numbers of individualized issues are raised by the myriad contractual provisions that bear on the substance of, and the forum for litigating, the breach of fiduciary duty claims in this case.” Id. at *8.",Party Submissions,7.797826,6.9493127,8.1131525
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session; the 1st C.S.; the 2nd C.S.; the 3rd C.S. and the 4th C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the November 7, 2023 election results.",Party Submissions,4.4236245,3.9969761,5.1074567
S EC. 2. Upon adoption of House Resolution 863— (a) House Resolution 995 is hereby adopted; and • HRES 996 EH (b) no other resolution incidental to impeachment relating to House Resolution 863 shall be privileged during the remainder of the One Hundred Eighteenth Congress.,Legislation,13.138287,13.735745,15.150468
The Party invoking confidentiality and/or privilege may respond to these objections no later than 24 November 2023. Both the objections and replies must be set out in the privilege log.,Legal Decisions,18.091553,15.530838,21.243576
"Arbitration Rule 30 15.1. The arbitration shall proceed in accordance with the Procedural Calendar attached hereto as Annex B, except if the Tribunal, upon a showing of good cause by either Party, on the Tribunal’s own initiative, or by mutual agreement of the Parties, decides that this Procedural Timetable requires amendment.",Legal Decisions,7.0373774,7.100563,6.9258537
"Injunctive Relief Galovelho sought injunctive relief in the trial court based on its claims that appellees’ actions violated its rights to equal protection and due process under the Texas constitution. See TEX. CONST. art I, §§ 3, 19. In its third appellate issue, – 18– Galovelho argues that these equitable claims are ripe and are not barred by any jurisdictional issues.",Party Submissions,8.424552,10.559953,10.051931
"Having considered the above documents and the Parties’ views, the Tribunal now issues the present Order: Pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rules 27 and 29, this Procedural Order sets out the Procedural Rules that govern this arbitration. The timetable is attached as Annex B .",Legal Decisions,8.485363,9.5613165,9.708775
"As to the RTP issue, HSMiller has not and cannot point to any legally sufficient evidence that in the underlying trial Flaven would have been submitted in the apportionment question, that Flaven would have been apportioned 100% of the responsibility, or that any failure to timely designate Flaven was the cause-in-fact of HSMiller’s injury.",Party Submissions,14.967164,18.801987,20.474873
"See Tex. Lab. Code § 410.021 (emphasis added). The Section refers to the ""claim"" three times, including to ""the respective parties to a workers' compensation claim,"" apparently contemplating the existence of a pending claim as a predicate to the conference. The section is silent as to the question before us—whether DWC, through a benefit review conference, has jurisdiction to resolve issues anticipated to arise from a potential claim. Silence creates statutory ambiguity. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984) ; In re American Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 490 (Tex. 2001). We therefore turn to agency interpretation for guidance. See Texas Citizens, 336 S.W.3d at 623 .",Party Submissions,4.707472,5.175277,4.9701104
Any and all documents included in the files maintained by the Planning Commission of the Assembly of the City of Belgrade’s with respect to its work on the 2015 DRP. RELEVANCE Claimants hereby incorporate the explanation provided at Request No. 52 above.,Legal Decisions,29.476807,34.74383,36.15494
"In this case, had the court not exercised or retained its jurisdiction, the court would have dismissed R.L.S.'s petition for expunction. It did not. Rather, the trial court ruled on the merits of the petition and denied it.",Party Submissions,7.7693157,9.56017,9.983601
"Convention Article 48(1); Arbitration Rules 10, 11(4), 12, 27 and 35 5.1. Decisions of the Tribunal shall be taken by a majority of the Members of the Tribunal.",Legal Decisions,6.6559,6.534712,7.424344
"Just a few years later, the Austin Court of Appeals considered the characterization of an employment bonus paid to husband shortly after divorce.",Party Submissions,29.875221,31.606842,39.599133
To require the review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States of greenfield investments by the People’s Republic of China.,Legislation,9.757529,5.4053063,7.6750703
"The Amarillo Court correctly concluded the reports failed to state any causal link between the nurses’ alleged failures and the harm. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp. v. Walker, No. 07-22-00032-CV, 2022 WL 17324338 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 29, 2022). Because the reports omitted the causation element, they were deficient and not a good faith effort.",Party Submissions,6.3576484,6.2634974,6.4560843
"Here, as set forth above, there was at least some evidence by Husband as to the lack of donative intent regarding the real property refinance and deed. Likewise, as set forth above, there was at least some evidence a to the mixed character value of husband’s retirement funds. Even if the evidence presented in either instance was circumstantial in nature, it still constitutes more than a scintilla for a sufficiency analysis. If the evidence presented in either issue rises above the scintilla standard for legal sufficiency but, in the opinion of the court of appeals, fails to meet the standard for factual sufficiency, the remedy for such error is remand not render.",Party Submissions,11.354743,11.8951845,12.263207
"None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant or are in the possession of the Claimant. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,12.488874,16.023962,13.31581
"The determination of whether any type of claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission depends on whether the claim is based on a claimant's entitlement to benefits. The issue is not whether a particular type of claim, such as a tort or statutory claim, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. Rather, the determination of whether any type of claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission depends on whether the claim is based on an alleged delay or denial of a workers' compensation benefit.",Party Submissions,3.9725592,3.7095287,4.1785593
"Also in 2017, Stonehenge had investors that needed state tax credits to be issued in 2017. To do so, TX 1111 obtained an advisory determination from NPS that allowed it to prepare a state Part C for QREs incurred in the rehabilitation of the Texaco building through December 31, 2016. This had the effect of dividing the Texaco building rehabilitation into two projects under the Texas program: the first for work done through December 31, 2016, and the second for work on and after January 1, 2017. Without the approval from NPS and THC, TX 1111 would have been allowed only a single submission of the state Part C upon the completion of the Texaco building rehabilitation in its entirety.",Party Submissions,8.592151,7.9980893,8.254432
"In addition, Claimants have not established that the requested documents are relevant to the U.S. preliminary objection or material to its outcome.",Legal Decisions,20.385302,18.134775,22.138533
"This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). When both sides move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the court reviews the summary judgment evidence presented by both sides, determines all questions presented, and renders the judgment the trial court should *9 have rendered. Comm'rs Court of Titus Cnty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1997).",Party Submissions,3.1478648,4.231894,4.0295806
"MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Patricia A. Grant, acting pro se, appeals from a final judgment partitioning real property in Fayette County and from an order requiring payment of court costs. 1 We affirm both decisions.",Party Submissions,7.3434176,8.217943,9.555355
"First, the cases are not distinguishable because there is not, fundamentally, a dispute about which contract is at issue in this matter.",Party Submissions,18.18615,19.840641,27.52691
Any and all minutes and recordings from all meetings of the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade related to the preparation of the 2015 DRP. RELEVANCE The Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade was the holder of the plan development ( in Serbian: nosilac izrade plana ) for the 2015 DRP with responsibilities described at Request 39 above.,Legal Decisions,19.202368,14.4226265,19.069511
The Motion claims the appellate court failed to address whether direct-benefits estoppel applied to Respondents’ claims under the de novo standard.,Party Submissions,19.45255,22.964588,21.847488
"Investment Disputes (“ ICSID ” or the “Centre”) on the basis of the Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Republic of Latvia on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, which entered into force on 1 December 1992 (the “BIT” or “Treaty”), and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, which entered into force for the Kingdom of Norway on 15 September 1967 and for the Republic of Latvia on 7 September 1997 (the “ ICSID Convention ”).",Legal Decisions,2.879286,2.987506,3.096771
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this Agreement to be executed by their respective duly authorized representatives as of the Effective Date.",Contract,2.0936108,2.4438193,3.0839431
"The Court of Appeals’ decision in this case cannot be reconciled with the holdings in Tyler and Hellas, as the factual and procedural differences the court highlighted as “distinguishing” factors simply have no bearing on the jurisdictional analysis. This Court should grant review to clarify the scope of the DWC’s exclusive jurisdiction and to prevent lower courts from overstepping their own authority to determine the issues within the DWC’s exclusive jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,8.404494,8.31779,9.58728
"On appeal, Grant asserts that the order should be reversed because the trial court ignored her, failed to consider evidence, allowed judicial misconduct, and violated her due process and equal protection rights. We review the trial court’s order requiring payment of costs for an abuse of discretion. In re R.J., No. 02-16-00445-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4567, at *3– 4 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth May 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).",Party Submissions,3.828843,4.3637943,4.381625
"By focusing on Thompson, the Seventh Court also erred by failing to read the expert reports together and credit all of the experts’ opinions. Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 517; Van Ness, 461 S.W.3d at 144.",Party Submissions,9.625717,9.438447,11.482796
"Rusk at San Jacinto Building Investors, LP, entity formed by PRA (which was founded by Leon J. Backes) and owner of the Texaco building. Stonehenge Stonehenge Capital Co., the tax credit investor to which TX 1111 sold the state tax credits through Rusk Investor, LLC.",Party Submissions,43.742016,34.967915,45.49756
"On the calculation of damages 518. The Tribunal has found that Respondent has engaged in several violations of the Treaty. Specifically, Respondent has executed an indirect creeping expropriation of Claimant’s investment and has violated the both the FET and the umbrella clauses. The Tribunal has concluded that there has been certain arbitrariness on the part of Respondent in the treatment afforded to Claimant, but that there has been no discrimination. The finding of such Treaty violations by Respondent entails – in principle – that it has to redress any harm caused. The Tribunal should consider the way in which each breach has occurred and their scope in order to quantify such damages. This is what the Tribunal will do in the following paragraphs.",Legal Decisions,7.7113695,8.273689,7.7291317
Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,31.192448,45.665344,56.72801
"Texas Bar No. 10476000 donjackson@warejackson.com Ware, Jackson, Lee, O’Neill, Smith & Barrow, LLP 2929 Allen Parkway, 39th Floor Houston, Texas 77019 (713) 659-6400 (713) 659-6262 (fax) I certify that Rule 9.4(i)(1) portion of this petition contains 2868 words.",Party Submissions,5.882101,6.9728785,7.503247
"To facilitate Serbia’s search for responsive documents, Claimants agree to limit their request to: “ Any and all minutes and recordings from Beoland’s meetings related to the preparation of the 2015 DRP discussing the rezoning of the land plot located across the street from Dunavska 17-19 and 23 for residential purposes, prepared and/or recorded between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2015. ” Claimants respectfully request the Tribunal to order the production of the responsive documents.",Legal Decisions,11.90665,11.275858,13.464645
"This Court has already recognized that removing an individual from the ballot based on technical defects poses serious and difficult “constitutional problems.” In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d at 542. That is reason enough not to construe Section 172.0222(i) as abrogating this Court’s equitable authority to permit candidates to cure technical violations. “Courts decide constitutional questions only when the issue cannot be resolved on non-constitutional grounds.” In re Ginsberg, 630 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. 2018). Multiple non-constitutional grounds for denial are available here, as explained above. But the mandamus petition also must be denied because the Election Code’s prohibition on individuals signing multiple candidates’ petitions is unconstitutional as applied to these circumstances.",Party Submissions,8.152986,7.4647517,8.046346
Texas action in favor of the first-filed Oklahoma case is therefore consistent with principles of comity and conservation of judicial resources. See generally Wyatt v.,Party Submissions,16.893312,24.074566,33.57863
"Further, the trial court's action would deprive Tyler of its right to claim the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 408.001. There is currently a binding appeals panel decision that Reynaldo's death occurred in the course and scope of his employment, and the Gaonas are entitled to death benefits. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 410.205 (providing that appeals panel decision is binding during judicial review); Lopez v. Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund, 11 S.W.3d 490, 495 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) (stating that administrative ruling-whether granting or denying benefits-remains in effect until overturned by final, enforceable judicial decision, and benefits are payable, or not, in accordance with appeals panel decision until final judicial decision rules otherwise). 20 The trial court would controvert that binding decision and, consequently, the exclusive remedy provision by trying the negligence claims while judicial review is pending.",Party Submissions,5.5234084,6.556421,6.0897717
"Lennar respectfully requests that the Court grant its petition for review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, and render judgment ordering the case into arbitration.",Party Submissions,9.875594,16.930246,11.456581
"Alternatively, Petitioners ask the Court to rewrite the Opinion so as to not follow Casteel or rather provide ""guidance"" on Casteel so that the Court may presume that the jury's negligence finding was based on the humped crossing theory and not the yield sign theory. This result, of course, directly conflicts with Casteel and the cases that have since followed it. If the reviewing court cannot determine if a jury's liability finding was based on a legally supported theory or an unsupported one, it must presume error and remand for a new trial. The Opinion adhered to this principle and adhered to each of the precedents that have followed Casteel.",Party Submissions,9.4230995,11.022336,11.006998
"First NBC was closed by the Louisiana Office of Financial Institutions, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was appointed receiver and took possession of First NBC’s assets on April 28, 2017. The bridge loan matured on August 28, 2017, and the principal balance of $30,000,000.00 became due and owing. Both TX 1111 and Backes failed and refused to pay the amounts owing on the note. On October 18, 2017, Osprin purchased the bridge loan as part of a loan pool being auctioned by the FDIC.",Party Submissions,6.852844,6.8475075,7.3480697
"Ross, and reports by the court-appointed attorney/investigators concluding that the accusations by Laura and Ross against Tonya were untrue.",Party Submissions,27.444342,30.913506,35.8209
"The Opinion does not open door for ""granulating a simple negligence question into multiple special issues"" as Amici speculate.31 Rule 277 merely directs the use of broad-form submissions ""whenever feasible."" As the Opinion notes, ""Rule 277 30 As discussed in KCSR's Motion for Rehearing, the charge as to the humped crossing claim was error in part because it never told the jury what facts it must find to determine if ICCTA preemption exists. Of course, if that question should have been answered by the trial court instead of the jury, it never happened in this case, as the only ruling the trial court made was to deny KCSR's motion for summary judgment on the issue. The issue was yet to be decided, but the trial court did not rule on it, nor was it submitted to the jury for determination of the facts as necessary to decide the issue. In light of this failure by the trial court, this Court did not have before it the factual predicate necessary to decide the issue. Nevertheless, the Court has held KCSR to a requirement that it somehow establish federal preemption as a matter of law. Op., p. 29. KCSR's Motion for Rehearing points out that KCSR has thus been denied the opportunity to present its defense of federal preemption because it has not had an opportunity to have the finder-of-fact, applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, make a determination of the facts necessary to decide the issue.",Party Submissions,9.021107,10.069393,9.85821
"The only reason that the finality of a § 1.111(e) agreement will likely ever be before a court is that one party to it latently believes that the agreement was ill advised and probably entered into without requisite or accurate knowledge. If every contract theory of avoidance is available to the party wishing to void the agreement, the specific finality of the agreement dictated in the statute will be seriously weakened and the legislative intent of finality avoided. Courts will defer to the expressed legislative intent of a statute. Texas Lottery Com’n v. First Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010).",Party Submissions,10.57144,11.969609,10.751901
"According to Respondents, Oncor just seeks to change an erroneous “value,” and the Tax Code excludes “a mistake in judgment or reasoning” from the definition of a “clerical error.” See Respondents’ Brief at 19. But Oncor does not seek a substantive reevaluation of market value.3 Oncor seeks to correct an objective error in the allocation of the agreed-upon market value to specific jurisdictions. Specifically, P&A unknowingly used transposed numbers for the total mileage of Sharyland’s 138kV and 345kV transmission lines. The allocation error “results from a mistake ... in writing ... or calculating,” so it falls squarely within the statutory definition of a clerical error. See Tex. Tax Code § 1.04(18)(A).",Party Submissions,9.371038,10.564297,9.92642
"The Program disclosed the following undisputed facts about Barina, all of which establish as true that she exploited Thrash’s estate, but the court of appeals notably—and erroneously—never engaged with them.",Party Submissions,36.053635,35.16772,36.96405
"To the contrary, there are at least two courts of appeals that have held that mutual mistake will not work to set aside an agreement filed under TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e). In a case in which Valerus, the owner, tried to set aside an agreement under § 1.111(e) on the basis of mutual mistake, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held for the appraisal district, stating that Valerus’s argument that mistake, like fraud, should render the agreement void or voidable is misplaced pursuant to § 25.25(d), which allows for a correction to an error, or mistake, in valuation under certain circumstances and which states that an error may not be corrected when “the appraised value of the property was established as a result of a written agreement between the property owner or the owner’s agent and the appraisal district.” Valerus Field Sols., LP v. Matagorda Cty. Appraisal Dist., No. 13-17- 00520-CV, 2018 WL 4924752, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg, Oct. 11, 2018, no pet. ).",Party Submissions,5.078503,5.1996436,5.1168447
"On December 27, 2023—more than six weeks after Justice Devine filed his application—Relator sent a letter to Chairman Rinaldi challenging Justice Devine’s application. Ex.A. This letter argued that signatures on Justice Devine’s petition were invalid. Ex.A. Chairman Rinaldi did not respond to the challenge. Ex.D. Relator waited another week and then followed up on January 5, 2023, asking Chairman Rinaldi to respond within an “hour.” Ex.D. That same day, Relator filed this original emergency mandamus proceeding, skipping over the trial and appellate courts below. Relator asks this Court to compel Chairman Rinaldi to reject Justice Devine’s application and to remove Justice Devine from the list of certified candidates. Pet.14.",Party Submissions,6.790307,7.3502584,7.6949506
"However, contrary to the Claimant’s submissions, the first page of the report does not say that it was issued “in response to [the Respondent’s] request”. Rather, the report provides that it was issued further to “records of [payments], processed through [the MOPC], supposedly ready and awaiting [the Comptroller General’s] approval signature, but [that in the Comptroller General’s] review, irregularities and observations were identified that caught [the Comptroller General’s] attention”. Indeed, the quote invoked by the Claimant is not of the report, but of a communication of 2 August 2022 (i.e., two years after the issuance of the report), whereby the MOPC’s Finance Director forwards the Comptroller General’s report to the MOPC’s General Counsel seemingly pursuant to the latter’s request.",Legal Decisions,8.616547,8.647827,8.772159
"The evidence supports Justice Jewell’s conclusion that “Rafiei has several options to seek a reduced or deferred filing fee, and he has not shown that he has explored any of them.” Dissent, p. 7. Additionally, “Rafiei does not explain why the $7,000 initial filing fee for his $1 million claim will apply to an arbitral determination that is limited only to the unconscionability of the delegation clause.” Id.",Party Submissions,14.545101,15.23638,15.0241785
"What this Court actually held in the context of a settlement agreement was: In the first instance, it is up to a local appraisal board to decide whether there has been more than one protest relating to the same property. While a board has no authority to change a settlement reached by a taxpayer and the chief appraiser, it certainly has the authority to take note of what property was included. (emphasis added). Matagorda at 131. Of course an appraisal review board, or a court for that matter, may examine a settlement agreement to discern its contents. How else would the examiner know what the agreement covered and whether it was precluded from doing what? What this Court actually did was affirm that the ARB could not change a settlement agreement.",Party Submissions,10.039286,11.418312,11.69017
"R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the documentation relating to the Environmental Impact Assessment Report is relevant to the question of Obnova's alleged rights or material to the Tribunal's determination of this question. This is a classic ""fishing expedition"", with Claimants simply casting about for any documents which might contain information they consider helpful in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case. PCC : In any event, the requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants.236 In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".237 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address mentioned authority in order to obtain documents in question.238 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves.",Legal Decisions,11.079899,10.329768,11.7454815
"A Participant shall specify an investment allocation for each of his Accounts in accordance with procedures established by the Committee. Allocation among the investment options must be designated in increments of one percent (1%). The Participant’s investment allocation will become effective on the same Business Day or, in the case of investment allocations received after a time specified by the Committee, the next Business Day.",Contract,6.6277595,7.0762706,8.5369005
"Convention Article 48(1); Arbitration Rules 10, 11(4), 12, 27 and 35 5.1. Decisions of the Tribunal shall be taken by a majority of the Members of the Tribunal.",Legal Decisions,6.6559,6.534712,7.424344
"The heart of the prohibitive arbitration costs analysis resides in the penultimate paragraph and its accompanying footnote. There, the Court elucidates that “ If AutoNation insists on some payment from Shattenkirk, and Shattenkirk resists arbitration on that ground, only then will the court have to address the legal basis for Shattenkirk's obligation to pay and, if so, what amount. And only once that question is answered would an assessment of unconscionability be ripe for judicial consideration.” Id. In the accompanying footnote this Court further elaborates that if AutoNation did insist on some payment the case would would no longer be based on speculation “ but would be grounded on a factual record regarding Shattenkirk's actual obligations.” Id. at n.4.",Party Submissions,12.316971,11.278889,13.493501
"Jaguar ? And if the next case goes to the forthcoming Fifteenth Court of Appeals, how should it treat these authorities? This resulting confusion, too, merits review.",Party Submissions,55.993397,70.50861,77.175186
"A governmental defendant may challenge the existence of jurisdictional facts and support its argument with evidence. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). In such instances, the analysis “mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Lara, 625 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Tex. 2012)). When a governmental entity establishes the absence of a jurisdictional fact, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to resolve; otherwise, the trial court should rule on the jurisdictional question as a matter of law. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. “[I]n evaluating the parties’ evidence, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant ’ s favor. ” City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 528 – 29 (Tex. 2022) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228).",Party Submissions,3.0910192,3.1147983,3.3134563
"ATE .—The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to overpayments of special financial assistance under section 4262 of the Em-ployment Retirement Income Security Act (29 U.S.C. 1104) occurring before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act.",Legislation,5.5190425,6.6643434,7.117274
"Compensation Deferral Agreements. A Participant may elect to defer Compensation by submitting a Compensation Deferral Agreement during the enrollment periods established by the Committee and in the manner specified by the Committee, but in any event, in accordance with Section 4.2. A Compensation Deferral Agreement that is not timely submitted with respect to a service period or component of Compensation shall be considered void and shall have no effect with respect to such service period or Compensation. The Committee may modify any Compensation Deferral Agreement prior to the date the election becomes irrevocable under the rules of Section 4.2 and may limit in its sole discretion the format, timing, components and other elements of any election to defer Compensation under this Article IV, subject to the limitations contained in the Plan.",Contract,4.7473483,4.5645595,5.1657944
"It is unclear what Serbia is actually arguing on this issue. To begin with, Serbia argues that searching for responsive documents would put Serbia “ in the difficult position of searching both physical archives and 160 Article 5(2) of the Law on Free Access to the Information of Public Importance states that everyone has the right to have the information of public importance made available to them, by providing them with an access to a document containing information of public importance, the right to a copy of that document, and the right to have a copy of the document sent to him by mail, fax, by email or otherwise, upon their request. Article 2(1) defines information of public importance as information at the disposal of a State authority, created in the work or in connection with the work of the State authority, contained in a certain document, and refers to everything that the public has a legitimate interest in knowing. See Annex 9. 161 See above para 14. 162 State Attorney Office, representing Serbia in arbitration proceedings, is not in physical possession of the requested documents and thus has to address the relevant state authorities to obtain the documentation, just like Claimants are entitled to do. 163 E.g. Counter-Memorial, ¶ 23.",Legal Decisions,8.548787,9.586636,9.39858
"Christus Spohn Health System Corp. v. High and Rector , 658 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2022, pet. denied).",Party Submissions,6.022725,10.305033,6.2557864
"While Dr. Castillo and BSA raised many objections in the trial court, on appeal they challenged only the trial court ’s ruling on their causation and causation-related qualifications objections. Yet rather than limiting its review to the specific objections raised, the Seventh Court reviewed the causation objection de novo like it would an appeal from a summary judgment.",Party Submissions,12.961496,16.314413,16.003565
The obligation to provide full protection and security requires each Party to provide the level of police protection required under customary international law.,Legal Decisions,10.023672,20.13379,13.543587
"CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This motion complies with the length limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(D) because it has 4,498 words, excluding the parts exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,3.4252737,4.964233,5.6397333
MVP’s filings alone were enough to obtain dismissal of the Texas action. No joinder by McCarthy and Travelers to “request dismissal” was required.,Party Submissions,37.153755,49.093674,50.205055
"T he tenant’s claim in Kemp did not fail because of anything that occurred in the forcible entry and retainer action itself. Thus, there is no conflict between the result in Kemp and Texas law on the division of authority between the district courts and the justice of the peace courts, or the proper dividing line between the matters that can be heard in a forcible entry and detainer action and those that must be heard in a constructive-eviction action. Thus, Kemp cannot be used to rationalize the conflicts created in this case between the basic statutory principles and the court of appeals’ untenable rule.",Party Submissions,9.903068,11.377197,10.272077
The United States objects to Request No. 2.b for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a.,Legal Decisions,7.5524397,12.123148,12.931706
"In its mandamus petition, Sonic seeks relief from the trial court's October 23, 2003 orders of abatement. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3. Sonic argues that the trial court's continued abatement of its contract claims is an abuse of discretion because there is no authority under the law to support continued abatement, and the orders violate the Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution. See TEX. CONST. Art. I, § [**24] 13. In response, TMI asserts that the contract claims are dependent on a final decision in the judicial review case and judicial economy requires they remain abated pending a final ruling on the reimbursement issue.",Party Submissions,5.2038436,6.4979324,5.896205
"Aside from Oncor’s imaginative recasting of the facts in this matter making the error in question seem like entirely the mistake of Wilbarger CAD’s appraisal firm, Oncor suggests again the that agreement in question was really an agreement on total mileage across the state and that “a simple scrivener’s error in a single email resulted in over $7 million in additional tax liability across multiple Texas counties. Some $2.5 million is still at issue.” Petitioner’s Brief at 21. First, note that Oncor makes no cite to the record. The record does not support the argument. There is no “single email” that is the agreement before this Court. The “agreement” in question is found at Appendix A, I C.R. 18. It specifically agrees to values in Wilbarger County and Wilbarger County alone. It is signed by a representative of Sharyland and a representative of Wilbarger CAD. There is no apparent “mistake or failure in writing, copying, transcribing, entering or retrieving computer data, computing, or calculating” as is described in TEX. TAX CODE § 1.04(18)(A) as being the definition of a clerical error. If Oncor now believes the values to which it agreed were erroneous, that represent a “mistake in judgment” on its part which TEX. TAX CODE § 1.04(18)(B) excludes from the definition of clerical error.",Party Submissions,10.015041,10.798358,10.308767
Neither side has conclusively proved its case with regard to the exclusive-remedy defense. The defense remains a question of fact to be decided by the jury.,Party Submissions,10.041157,12.854323,13.781443
"Respondent disputes that Obnova had property rights over the Dunavska Plots and argues that Obnova merely had a right to use the Dunavska Plots pursuant to several lease agreements. Respondent located a number of lease agreements concluded by Obnova and the City of Belgrade and Luka Beograd. However, Respondent was not able to locate the lease agreement from 15 March 1994, referred to in the Agreement on Provision and Use of Transhipment and Warehousing Services between Luka Beograd and Obnova of 25 January 2000 ( R-013 ). This also indicates that there might be other lease agreements that Obnova concluded but that Respondent was not able to locate.",Legal Decisions,7.6995754,7.182027,7.8185396
"Claimants note that Serbia’s objections relate to the lack of a specific time period and the fact that the request was not limited to documents related to the rezoning for residential purposes of the land plot located directly across the street from Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. Claimants have limited the scope of the request accordingly. Requested documents are relevant and material As explained above, the requested documents will show what factors the Secretariat took into account when developing the 2015 DRP, especially the reasons for the decision to rezone for residential purposes a significantly larger land plot, owned by the City of Belgrade, which was already designated and used for traffic infrastructure, located directly across the street from Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23.",Legal Decisions,9.1876545,9.066597,9.264204
"To determine characterization of marital property, it is necessary to follow the flow of the presumptions at play: First, property possessed by either spouse during or upon dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property. TEX. FAM. CODE §3.003(a). This is a rebuttable presumption and the party asserting separate property character maintains the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence through tracing separate property to the asset. TEX. FAM. CODE §3.003(b); Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2005, pet. denied).",Party Submissions,4.6094923,5.348602,4.728341
"A unanimous court of appeals reversed, holding the reports lacked the fundamental explanation of how and why any actions or inactions of the BSA nurses caused H.W.’s injury. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 17324338, at *5. The court also held the reports were insufficient as to Dr. Castillo. Id. The court did not reach BSA’s qualifications, standard of care, or breach arguments.",Party Submissions,9.471805,10.339344,10.852271
"To amend the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to improve the calculation and reduce the taxpayer cost of payment errors under the supplemental nutrition assistance program, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.8137746,4.0325313,4.93228
"In Texas family law, the characterization of an asset as either community or separate property is determined by the character at the moment the party first has the right of claim to property. Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 44 S.W. 281 (1898). In determining whether the property is separate or community, the important question is when the property right was acquired rather than the date possession was acquired.",Party Submissions,7.207574,9.054636,7.396808
"The same analysis applies with equal force to the Program, a quintessential example of the issue-driven, advocacy-oriented journalism that is a standard part of the contemporary media diet in Texas and beyond. See Pet. Br. at 35 n.9 (noting that such reporting has been awarded for over 30 years). Even if the Program’s statements about the “crime of the 21st century” and “textbook guardianship abuse” could be understood to refer to Barina’s conduct rather than to the ingrained inequities of the institution of guardianship (as is actually the case), they are highly subjective, and thus unverifiable, characterizations uttered by individuals on one side of a heated national debate. See Dickson, 662 S.W.3d at 368. Dickinson compels dismissal here.",Party Submissions,12.236168,13.523847,13.388394
"In January, Texas Mutual answered the petition with a one-page general denial and prayed that ""upon final hearing hereof, the Court enter judgment denying all relief requested by [the Martinez Family] and affirming the Decision & Order. .. rendered on October 13, 2020, finding that Pedro Jovany 'Bruno' Martinez sustained a compensable injury in the course and scope of his employment with Hellas Construction, Inc. on July 19, 2019."" On March 10, 2021, the Martinez Family filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asking to dismiss its own suit for judicial review. The plea was predicated on two theories: 1) that DWC's final decision was void ab initio because ""[w]ithout an actual claim for benefits, there can be no 'benefit dispute' for [DWC] to resolve, but only a hypothetical or contingent one,"" and 2) to the extent DWC ever had jurisdiction over the contested issue, the question was rendered moot when ""the possibility of a claim [for benefits] and a dispute over such a claim was forever foreclosed"" when the statute of limitations expired on the Martinez Family's right to file a claim for benefits.",Party Submissions,5.920423,6.6792283,6.6669497
Affected Territory is. Bellpas’s lack of care in defining the Affected Territory was obvious to anyone that cared to look. LISD cared to look and CCISD did not.,Party Submissions,52.3426,43.980347,61.113216
"To prevent anticompetitive conduct through the use of pricing algorithms by prohibiting the use of pricing algorithms that can facilitate collusion through the use of nonpublic competitor data, creating an antitrust law enforcement audit tool, increasing transparency, and enforcing violations through the Sherman Act and Federal Trade Commission Act, and for other purposes.",Legislation,10.62951,9.364967,11.107366
"As of this date, Respondent has not fulfilled his duty to reject Devine’s application as required by law, forcing Relator to file this Petition. Exhibit D.",Party Submissions,22.737307,22.42758,24.977766
"Dunavska 17-19 and 23 were not part the land over which Luka Beograd was granted the right of use under the agreement submitted as R-060. These determinations are, in turn, dire ctly relevant and material to show that Serbia’s assertion that Obnova did not have any permanent rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 because Luka Beograd had the right of use to these premises and Obnova only leased them, is false. DECISION Any and all documents included in the files for the proceedings that led to the issuance of the administrative decisions submitted by Serbia as exhibits R-037, R-038 and R-039 including, but not limited to ( i ) the requests, including all annexes, based on which the decisions were issued; and ( ii ) minutes from meetings referred to in these decisions.",Legal Decisions,11.592744,10.514335,11.730752
"Further, the Plan did not really give HSMiller much incentive to prosecute after the initial $6 million settlement with Diamond State: (i) HSMiller had to fund up front the fees, costs, and expenses related 24 to the litigation; and (ii) HSMiller would not receive any funds from the first $5 million recovered, it would receive only 30% of net proceeds between $5 million and $13 million, and 70% of net proceeds above $13 million. See Plan at 10 (Pet’rs’ Br. PDF at 142). Yet, HSMiller has pursued the case to a second malpractice trial even though the first trial ended in a take nothing judgment because of the Diamond State settlement and because the jury put 40% fault on Defterios and 10% fault on HSMiller.4 Newsom, Terry & Newsom v. Henry S. Miller Comm. Co ., No. 05-20-00379-CV, 2022 WL 3908542, *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 31, 2022, pet. filed). There is still a stick hanging over HSMiller’s head since the $6 million settlement did not fully cover the original $8.9 million judgment entered in 2009. Under the terms of the Plan and the litigation agreement, would HSMiller’s decision not to pursue a second malpractice trial have been considered “best efforts”? One also wonders who benefitted more from the second suit and maybe a third suit — HSMiller or its former adversary who gets 70% of the next $7 million?",Party Submissions,8.843505,8.418051,8.961015
"In ¶ 150 of Procedural Order No. 7, the majority of the Tribunal considered the ancillary claim to be “within the scope of consent of the Parties and within the jurisdiction of ICSID”. In ¶ 157 of the same Order, the majority also confirmed that the “consideration of the ancillary claim [would] be carried out respecting due process for both sides, including at a minimum further written submissions and evidence, and not based on the observations made to date”. Can any of these findings be revised in light of the arguments regarding the USMCA raised by Respondent and by Claimant subsequent to the issuance of Procedural Order No. 7?",Party Submissions,8.85959,9.738926,8.409583
"During the meeting on 3 March 2006, the Assembly adopted Decision No. 350-5/06-c, which constitutes the basis for the later adoption of the 2013 DRP.107 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess the factors that the City of Belgrade took into consideration when it decided to prepare a detailed regulation plan for the area including Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 —including whether Serbia considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 and, if so, what was its contemporaneous understanding of the extent of these rights.",Legal Decisions,11.152655,11.507807,12.479559
"Id., at 535; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.001(a)(10). This Court held that the claims related to professional or administrative services directly related to the healthcare of some patient and thus fell under the TMLA.",Party Submissions,10.144421,11.662151,12.820369
"In addition to the illegal assignment, another reason requires the Court to reverse and render: legally insufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict on malpractice liability. HSMiller attempts to rebut two of the Lawyers’ no-evidence arguments — the timing of moving to designate Flaven as a responsible third party (RTP), and the strategy of stipulating to Defterios’s authority as an agent of HSMiller — but fails to point to any legally sufficient evidence to support 28 liability on either theory. Compare Resp’t’s Br. at 38-52, with Pet’rs’ Br. at 49-65. And still, the true parties in interest, the BNC Sellers, conveniently forget their stance below that Flaven was not a proper RTP.",Party Submissions,17.316805,15.484652,18.999575
"Respondent notes that in principle Claimants do not object to this request, “ with the exception of any documents created in preparation for and/or in connection with the conduct of the present arbitration”. However, Claimants' willingness to produce the documents is made uncertain and is overshadowed by the fact that they have raised the two grounds based on which they in fact object to produce.",Legal Decisions,16.659096,17.38488,16.590742
"Dr. Tappan also described how the BSA nurses caring for Ms. Walker — Sarah Beukelman, R.N., Kristen Yoder, R.N., and Kendra Smith, R.N. — breached the standard of care when they failed to apply a fetal scalp electrode early in the delivery (as required by BSA’s protocols and authorized by Dr. Castillo), failed to record “Montevideo units” at any time (which precluded an objective assessment of contraction strength), and failed to follow BSA’s oxytocin infusion protocol throughout H.W.’s delivery. App. 7, CR 669.",Party Submissions,13.522876,13.821426,15.146014
"Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. The relator must also show that it has no other adequate remedy. Id. A remedy by appeal is not inadequate merely because the party may incur more expense and delay than in obtaining the writ. Id. at 842.",Party Submissions,5.406082,6.1605854,7.2390866
"R. App. P. 9.4(e) because it was prepared with Microsoft Word 365 software, using a proportionally spaced 12-point Times New Roman typeface.",Party Submissions,9.0573845,14.761822,17.3874
"Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to paragraph 6(1) of Annex 14-by November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain Canada’s and Mexico’s consent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect paragraph 6(1) of Annex 14-C of USMCA.",Legal Decisions,6.455896,7.372917,6.9330664
Claimants note Serbia’s representation that Serbia “ has already conducted a reasonable search and has not located any other lease agreements concluded between Serbia or Luka Beograd on one side and Obnova on other side ”. No decision is required. DECISION Request no. Is pov-3/21 of 26 June 2023 based on which Serbia obtained document submitted as Serbia’s exhibit R-043.,Legal Decisions,38.17937,36.51973,37.809586
"HSMiller and its vice president, Defterios, were insureds of Diamond State. The company owed them a duty to provide an effective defense if they were sued.",Party Submissions,28.531466,44.50409,37.613068
"City of Ames Under Texas Water Code Section 13.041 for an Emergency Order to Compel the City of Liberty to Provide Sewer Service, Docket No. 2022-0763-UCR-E (Jun. 29, 2022) (final order) (the “TCEQ Emergency Order”). The reservation of Liberty’s rights and remedies in the Contract does not absolve Liberty of any and all obligation to provide wastewater service to volumes above the TAV, and Ames remains liable for its failure to pay for such service.",Party Submissions,10.427936,10.20926,11.541565
"Claimant is, therefore, entitled to 9(2)(a)). The analysis of a discrimination claim does not require determining whether or not the Respondent State ""personally likes"" certain individuals, and Claimant did not allege this point in its Memorial either. The personal liking or lack of such liking that may exist towards these individuals is totally irrelevant. Therefore, the documents are neither relevant nor material to the outcome of the case.",Legal Decisions,22.14493,19.054178,23.147697
"Instead, OSPrin was left with approximately $5 million (plus the interest and attorney’s fees that continue to accrue) that could not be recovered.",Party Submissions,21.541584,23.208954,24.977034
"Here, Liberty pled that Ames is a “Type A General Law Municipality.” CR 437, ¶ 2. Such a municipality does not have any power or authority other than what the Legislature has provided. A contract with a Type A general law municipality is “properly executed” when “the contract’s execution comports with the authority the legislature granted the [municipality]. .. including the statutory and regulatory requirements placed on [municipalities] entering (or seeking to enter) contractual relationships.” El Paso Education Initiative, Inc., 602 S.W.3d at 532. The statute giving Type A general law municipalities the power to enter into interlocal agreements is Chapter 791 of the Texas Government Code. In order for an interlocal agreement between governmental entities to be “properly” executed, the contract “must: (1) be authorized by the governing body of each party to the contract.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 791.011(d). Liberty was required to plead that the Contract was authorized by the governing body, not merely signed by the mayor. Liberty failed to state in any of its petitions that the Ames city council authorized the Contract, or that the city council delegated authority or approved for the mayor to execute the agreement. Merely pleading that the Contract was “executed” does not establish jurisdiction and does not meet Liberty’s pleading burden.",Party Submissions,6.7689176,6.787283,7.272172
"If a Participant or Beneficiary prevails in a legal proceeding brought under the Plan to enforce the rights of such Participant or any other similarly situated Participant or Beneficiary, in whole or in part, the Participating Employer shall reimburse such Participant or Beneficiary for all legal costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees and such other liabilities incurred as a result of such proceedings. If the legal proceeding is brought in connection with a Change in Control, or a “change in control” as defined in a rabbi trust described in Section 11.2, the Participant or Beneficiary may file a claim directly with the trustee for reimbursement of such costs, expenses and fees. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the amount of the claim shall be treated as if it were an addition to the Participant’s or Beneficiary’s Account Balance and will be included in determining the Participating Employer’s trust funding obligation under Section 11.2.",Contract,4.381789,3.613989,4.4783516
"And, although Dr. Tappan writes that H.W. “would have been born without neurological injury” had he been delivered an hour or so earlier (CR.671), Dr. Null says something different—H.W. “would not have suffered the degree of brain injury that he has” if he had been delivered earlier. (CR.709). In other words, the baby would have suffered some injury without negligence. If it is Dr. Null’s opinion that controls, what degree of brain injury would H.W. have suffered, and how and why is anything beyond that causally tied to Dr. Castillo’s claimed negligence? The report is silent on these issues. ( See id. ).",Party Submissions,11.547852,12.227953,13.3328285
"Beyond this, the jury instruction, commenting on the weight of the evidence and essentially siding with HSMiller on the fact issues related to the RTP issue, undermined the Lawyers’ case and their expert’s testimony. As HSMiller’s counsel argued in closing, the RTP issue “was a game changer.” (11RR258:17-18) The jury instruction defined “negligence” in such a way — using Terry’s name and the facts of the case — that it commented on the weight of the evidence and required the jury to answer “yes.” 7 For the reasons set forth in the Lawyers’ Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, the Court should reverse and render judgment. Alternatively, the Court should uphold the remand for new trial based on the prejudicial jury instructions and other reasons not reached by the court of appeals.",Party Submissions,12.7736,12.2221,13.413206
You are instructed that ordinary care means that degree of care that would be used by a lawyer or law firm of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.,Party Submissions,6.200403,9.48161,8.472572
"Despite these background facts, the parties dispute the exact nature of Mann's activities while he was crossing the road, and whether the nature of those activities removes Mann from course and scope. Our review of the record reveals four possible versions of events. The first three versions are consistent with the course and scope of Mann's employment: (1) that he was gathering water for his workers, as Mann reportedly told his doctors in the hospital on the day of the collision; (2) that he was going to look at an excavation to determine what paperwork he would need to obtain for that day's work, as Mann allegedly told an insurance adjuster sometime after the accident; and (3) that he was preparing for *326 a morning safety meeting, as Mann allegedly told his supervisor just after the accident. In each of these versions, Mann's activities certainly originate in and advance Bay's purpose of performing projects at the refinery. See SeaBright, 465 S.W.3d at 642.",Party Submissions,8.733561,9.526805,9.687354
"To amend the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 to include as a high-priority research and extension area research on microplastics in land-applied biosolids on farmland, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.442904,4.633557,5.0755663
"In Mallios, involving a partial assignment of claims, the assignor was allowed to pursue its claim against its former lawyer. Mallios, 11 S.W.3d at 158-59. But Mallios was in a completely different posture procedurally when the Court considered the assignment. There, a summary judgment had been granted against the assignor and its assignee on the malpractice claims. Id. at 158. No trial had occurred yet — malpractice or otherwise — because, unlike here, Mallios involved a failure to sue the proper party. A remand for the original plaintiff to pursue its malpractice claims would lead to the first trial in the case. Unlike here, the Court was not confronted with a former plaintiffs’ counsel who took legal positions in the malpractice trial diametrically opposed to those he took in the underlying trial. Nor did the Court have to consider the impact of expert testimony that 27 was based on the former plaintiffs’ counsel’s improper position-shifting.",Party Submissions,8.862554,8.571048,9.595913
"Weatherford’s contentions effectively turn the domestic sewage exclusion upside-down. Instead of a categorical carve-out of sewer systems from the SWDA (which the Legislature provided by applying the statute to only “solid waste facilities”), Weatherford would impose a duty on a defendant to prove wrong the bare and unsupported allegations of a plaintiff. Such municipalities would then be burdened with identifying and labeling every molecule of waste entering its sewer system to demonstrate a “mixture” for the ultimate conclusion that a sewer system is, in fact, not a landfill (as landfills are the focus of the “solid waste facility” definition).",Party Submissions,13.374711,13.094265,14.010967
"Predictably, after the episode aired, Tonya received death threats from all over the world accusing her of exploiting her great-uncle Charlie.",Party Submissions,16.06402,20.893661,19.708942
"We appreciate that “engaging in the very conduct disclaimed as a basis for waiver is insufficient as a matter of law to nullify the nonwaiver provision. ” Shields, 526 S.W.3d at 484-85. But in the provision here, Santos waived only “notice of ... demand for payment (subject to any right you may have to cure your default), waiver, delay and all other notices or demands in connection with this Note,” and acknowledged that the lender “may waive or delay the enforcement of our rights under this Note without waiving or otherwise affecting such rights. ” 1CR9 ¶ 13. Yellowfin and its predecessors did not simply delay enforcement of their rights or fail to provide notice of waiver or delay; instead, as a string of different creditors acquired the Note, no creditor even attempted to discover Santos’s addres s or inform her where her payments should be made.",Party Submissions,13.288921,12.857717,15.0823765
"For column 8: Indicate the chosen target population providing accordingly the list of host species/genera and area covered. The target population is defined as the ensemble of inspection units. Its size is defined typically for agricultural areas as hectares, but could be lots, fields, greenhouses etc. Please justify the choice made in the underlying assumptions. Indicate the inspection units surveyed. ‘Inspection unit’ means plants, plant parts, commodities, materials, pest vectors that had been scrutinised for identifying and detecting the pests.",Legislation,30.598206,26.50475,30.388048
"More still, Dr. Null — who explicitly stated that he reviewed Dr. Tappan’s report and agreed with its conclusions— went even further by conducting a differential diagnosis to explain why nothing in the medical records suggested any other potential cause of H.W.’s brain injury: This neonate’s course postdelivery is consistent with an antenatal asphyxia event. His normal fetal heart tracing initially followed by his requirement for resuscitation, need for assisted ventilation, need to be cooled, coagulopathy, seizures, severe acidosis, and no evidence of infection are all consistent with an asphyxia event that occurred late in the course of labor. There was no evidence on MRI of a brain malformation or old injury to explain his condition at birth. More likely than not had [H.W.] been delivered one to one and a half hours sooner he would not have suffered the degree of brain injury that he has.",Party Submissions,9.457452,11.393717,11.25629
"Respondents’ effort to draw support for the decision below from Kemp v. Brenham, No. 05-18-01377-CV, 2020 WL 205313 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) is also unavailing. Respondents claim that Kemp first established their position that “compliance” with the eviction order in the forcible entry and detainer action constitutes “voluntary abandonment of the premises” under all circumstances—meaning that even a tenant who offers “testimony” that it abandoned its challenge to the eviction and surrendered the premises only because of “mistreatment” from its landlord interfering with its right of possession cannot maintain a claim for constructive eviction in district court. (Resp. 16, 30) Of course, such a result would be indefensible. It would be in direct conflict with section 31.004(a), section 24.008, and the many decisions establishing that even the tenant who loses the right to immediate possession in a forcible entry and detainer action can still contest ultimate possession and recover damages in district court. The result Respondents urge also makes no sense: A party’s right to pursue a constructive-eviction claim requires an eviction as an element of the claim. It cannot be defeated by an eviction —or by a party’s compliance with a wrongful eviction order. Otherwise, no constructive-eviction claim could ever lie. It is thus no surprise that Kemp in fact adopted no such rule.",Party Submissions,7.021339,7.542183,7.3300385
The purpose of an expert report under the TMLA is to deter frivolous claims and not to dispose of claims regardless of merit.,Party Submissions,14.282845,17.678877,19.851032
Supporting the values of the Equity or Else quality-of-life platform and acknowledging the need for the House of Representatives to use the platform as a holistic framework for drafting and implementing policy that promotes racial and economic equity for all across various social issues.,Legislation,22.699087,24.64466,25.92411
Executive and the Company agree to cooperate to amend this Agreement from time to time as appropriate to avoid the imposition of any Section 409A Penalty.,Contract,7.6211963,7.6181917,11.340282
"To amend title 38, United States Code, to clarify the organization of the Office of Survivors Assistance of the Department of Veterans Affairs.",Legislation,3.9677348,3.4038005,3.8263805
"The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in Article 1; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality. They shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality to the exercise and practise of all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial enterprises both on land and in the territorial waters, and no monopoly shall be established on any account for any enterprise whatever.",Legal Decisions,7.5981207,9.222209,7.8639593
"Respondents argue that this Court should not intervene because there is no split in authority or conflict on the meaning or application of Chapters 12 and 55. Respondents’ Br. at 8. However, a split in authority is just one of the many factors this Court considers in deciding whether to grant review. TEX. R. APP. P. 56.1(a).",Party Submissions,5.951601,6.467135,6.3212724
Valuation. Deferrals shall be credited to appropriate Accounts on the date such Compensation would have been paid to the Participant absent the Compensation Deferral Agreement. Company Contributions shall be credited to a Participant’s Retirement Account at the time(s) determined by the Committee. Valuation of Accounts shall be performed under procedures approved by the Committee.,Contract,5.954644,6.380954,7.90322
"Husband’s right to the bonus vested when he received it. At that time, he was ano longer married, and Wife was not entitled to any division of the property. See the community owns at the time of. divorce”). In reaching this conclusion, we are unpersuaded by Wife’s reliance on Sprague v. Sprague, 363 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) and Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661', 665—66 (Tex. 1976).",Party Submissions,6.3875055,6.8057747,7.66689
"On February 26, 2020, Yellowfin mailed a Notice of Intent to Accelerate and Right to Cure letter to Santos, advising: (1) Yellowfin purchased the account on August 29, 2019; (2) the amount due as of that date was $21,640.59; (3) Yellowfin waived and forgave the monthly installment payments due through June 1, 2019, and the new post waiver principal balance, as of July 1, 2019, was $21,023.13; (4) the monthly payment amount was $236.97; (5) payments were due beginning July 1, 2019; and (6) Santos had thirty (30) days in which to cure the default or Yellowfin would accelerate the balance of the Note. CR2:82-83. On March 25, 2020, Yellowfin mailed a Notice of Acceleration, advising Santos that the principal balance had been accelerated and was due immediately. CR2:84-85.",Party Submissions,4.085275,4.5128703,4.5285225
"Participant under this Award and such unvested Performance Share Units represented by this Award shall immediately terminate. For purposes of this Award, the termination date shall be the last day of employment or provision of services and shall not be extended by any actual or deemed period of notice of termination, whether under statute, common law, contract or otherwise. For purposes of this Award, the Participant’s employment or provision of services shall be deemed to have terminated if the entity for which the Participant is employed or providing services ceases to be a Subsidiary. In addition, the Participant’s employment or service will be deemed to have terminated for Cause, if after the Participant’s employment or service has terminated, facts and circumstances are discovered that would have justified a termination for Cause (and any Shares that may have been issued upon settlement of vested Performance Share Units after the occurrence of the conduct that would have justified a termination for Cause shall be subject to recoupment by the Company, and if such Shares are no longer held by the Participant, then the Participant shall pay to the Company a sum equal to the Fair Market Value of the Shares at the time such Shares were issued). Any determination of Cause shall be made by the Committee, in its sole discretion. For purposes of this Award Agreement (other than for purposes of determinations made under Article 11 of the Plan), “Cause” shall mean (i) the willful and continued failure by the Participant to substantially perform his or her duties with the Company and its Subsidiaries (other than any such failure resulting from his or her incapacity due to physical or mental illness), (ii) the engaging by the Participant in conduct which is demonstrably and materially injurious to the Company or its Subsidiaries, monetarily or otherwise, (iii) the engaging by the Participant in fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, dishonesty, misappropriation or other actions that cause damage to the property or business of the Company or its Subsidiaries, or (iv) the Participant’s conviction of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, a felony. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Participant’s employment is terminated by the Company without Cause or the Participant voluntarily terminates his or her employment, (i) if the Participant is eligible for Retirement at the time of such termination, this Award shall partially vest, any forfeiture restrictions on such partially vested Award shall lapse on the date of such termination, the Participant shall be entitled to receive a number of Performance Share Units equal to the product of (a) and (b), where (a) is equal to a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of full years (i.e., 365-day periods) of employment from the Date of Grant until the date of such termination, and the denominator of which is three (3), and (b) is the number of Performance Share Units that otherwise would have been earned by the Participant if the Participant’s employment had not terminated prior to the Vesting Date determined in accordance with Section 4, and settlement shall be made as provided in Section 6 or (ii) if the Participant has reached age sixty-five (65) with five (5) years of service at the time of such termination, this Award shall fully vest, any forfeiture restrictions on this Award shall lapse on the date of such termination, the Participant shall be entitled to receive the full number of Performance Share Units that otherwise would have been earned by the Participant if the Participant’s employment or provision of services had not terminated prior to the Vesting Date determined in accordance with Section 4, and settlement shall be made as provided in Section 6.",Contract,2.6289873,2.590824,2.732617
"In Heldenfels Brothers, Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, this Court held that a party may recover for unjust enrichment when they provide another person a benefit, as a result of that person’s “fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue advantage.” See 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992). There are no allegations of fraud or duress against the Diocese. The only issue in this case is undue advantage, which this Court has never defined.",Party Submissions,5.73528,6.5708613,6.1925197
"Several justices at oral argument inquired as to the settlement amount and whether Mendietta was required to make payments beyond the $175,000.00 constitutional lien on his homestead. Here, while there is a judgment for $1.9 million, there simply is no promise to pay $1.9 million. The total settlement amount is $175,000.00 plus interest allocated to the constitutional lien. While the judgment references the injury to the Diocese, the forbearance agreement does not.",Party Submissions,11.134545,12.256593,12.698459
"Accounts are intended to constitute unfunded obligations within the meaning of Sections 201(2), 301(a)(3) and 401(a)(1) of ERISA.",Contract,4.6650305,6.096157,7.7961097
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session; the 1st C.S.; the 2nd C.S.; the 3rd C.S. and the 4th C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the November 7, 2023 election results.",Party Submissions,4.4236245,3.9969761,5.1074567
Tribunal The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,34.110985,43.688766,51.066494
"Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.4, I hereby certify that this Petition for Review contains 1681 words. This is a computer-generated document created in Microsoft Word, using 14-point typeface for all text, except for footnotes which are in 12-point typeface. In making this certificate of compliance, I am relying on the word count provided by the software used to prepare the document.",Party Submissions,5.1049747,6.1947865,6.550956
"Respondent’s alleged breach of the Claimant’s rights under Art. 5 of the Qatar-France BIT and to assess the appropriate remedies that the Claimant is seeking: the restitution and/or indemnification of the assets seized, which are the subject matter of this claim”.",Legal Decisions,9.949411,11.393922,11.212592
"Backes is the founder and CEO of Provident Realty Advisors (PRA), a company in the business of large-scale real estate projects. PRA forms various partnerships and entities dedicated solely to each real estate project. In 2013, PRA decided to purchase and rehabilitate the Texaco building and formed Rusk at San Jacinto Building Investors, LP, whose general partner is TX 1111, to purchase the building. PRA also formed other entities to take advantage of the benefits offered under the federal program. TX 1111 filed Part 2 of the application in the federal program in November 2012 and described the proposed work that included both work involving QREs and work that would not qualify for QREs. Actual work on the project began in 2014. As the work progressed, several amendments were made to Part 2 of TX 1111’s federal program application.",Party Submissions,8.959514,8.673879,9.214284
"S.L.U. acquired a 99.92% interest in Duke Energy Generating S.A. and thus acquired an indirect 90.80% interest in Cerros Colorados in December 2003.469 The Tribunal also finds that the evidence on the record shows that the Claimant has held the investment at all times since its acquisition. The only change in corporate ownership concerns the decrease of the Claimant’s indirect participation in Cerros Colorados from 90.87% to 86.33%, which could have a consequence on the calculation of the claimed damages.470 The Claimant also changed its corporate name but such change does not have any effect on the Claimant’s continued ownership of the investment. 451. The fact that the Claimant’s ultimate parent company acquired the Claimant in 2016 likewise has no bearing on the Claimant’s claim. 452. The Claimant has thus proven that it owned its investment since December 2003.",Legal Decisions,6.8884926,6.659941,7.485263
"Justice John Devine currently holds Place 4 on this Court. Devine first successfully sought the Republican Party nomination to Place 4 in 2012; he ran in the 2012 and 2018 general elections with the Republican Party’s endorsement, garnering millions of votes statewide in each election. See 2018 General Election, TEXAS SECRE-TARY OF STATE (Nov. 6, 2018), https://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist331 _state.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2024); 2012 General Election, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE (Nov. 6, 2012), https://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist164_state.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). Tens of thousands of these votes were cast in the counties within the jurisdiction of the Eighth Court of Appeals. See, e.g., November 2018 Gen-eral Election, EL PASO COUNTY, TEXAS ELECTIONS DEPARTMENT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/TX/El_Paso/92416/Web02.222611/#/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). Before that, Devine successfully sought judicial office with the Republican Party’s endorsement in both 1994 and 1998, winning election to the 190th district court in Harris County both times. See, e.g., “Justice John Phillip Devine,” TEXAS JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.txcourts.gov/supreme/about-the-court/justices/justice-john-phillip-devine/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024).",Party Submissions,3.3185723,3.3108168,3.2679334
"To amend the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 with respect to the definition of biofuels and sustainable aviation fuel, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.5731535,4.004522,4.4587007
"Agreement for providing and using port and warehousing services number 1819 dated 16 March 2006. Serbia may have other agreements allegedly relating to Obnova’s premises that it did not to e xhibit to its Counter-Memorial. The requested documents are relevant and material to fully understand contractual relations between Obnova, Serbia and Luka Beograd with respect to Obnova’s premises in the period preceding Claimants’ investment in Obnova.",Legal Decisions,16.974728,17.550066,17.927958
"Appellant's brief fails to establish these two mandatory threshold matters with any clarity or evidence whatsoever. The appellate rules require an appellant's brief to contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Capstone Healthcare Equipment Servs., Inc. v. Quality Home Health Care, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 696, 698-99 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied); Burke v. Ins. Auto Auctions Corp., 169 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). The trial court and this court, have no duty to brief the issues for the Appellant. See Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). In Briggs, the Fourth Circuit refused to piece together a written agreement for Toyota out of the summary judgment record on appeal. This court should do likewise as the clear language of the statute requires a written agreement between the parties relying upon Tex. Lab Code § 406.123. The record evidence does not contain any of the requirements of Tex. Lab. Code § 406.123 and Bay may not now supplement and rely upon any *20 evidence not previously part of the appellate record. K-Six Television, Inc. v. Santiago, 75 S.W.3d 91, 97 (Tex.App. -San Antonio, 2002, no pet.).",Party Submissions,5.274469,5.7735457,5.968737
"The instruction on responsible third parties was wrong in several respects: First, it assumed HSMiller’s side of the case that the judge in the underlying case denied the designation solely because of timeliness. Second, it also assumed that the judge in the underlying trial would have eventually submitted Flaven over the objection of the same lawyer who testified in the malpractice trial that Terry had erred in not naming Flaven. Third, the instruction called out the Terry defendants by name, which makes this a direct 18 comment on the weight of the evidence. Fourth, it was erroneous. Flaven could not be a responsible third party because he was not a party to the real estate transaction and there was never any evidence that he caused his company not to close, which was the alleged injury. These erroneous comments were harmful in themselves, and the harm is made more manifest by the emphasis put on the instructions in the closing arguments made by opposing counsel.",Party Submissions,16.017948,16.997034,17.730495
"Prior to 2011, this Court had allowed candidates to cure defects in form, content and procedure. E.g., In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 543 (Tex. 2006). “The Legislature has since made clear that candidates may not amend their applications once the filing deadline passes.” In re Anthony, 642 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Tex. 2022), citing TEX. ELEC. CODE § 141.032(g). Similarly, courts have previously held that once the list of candidates is certified, changes were neither required nor permitted to the accepted list. Escobar, 917 S.W.2d at 410. Here too, the Legislature specifically responded by imposing a statutory obligation on the chair to update the list of candidates by omitting those whose applications do not comply with the applicable requirements. See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.029(d) (West 2015) (""The secretary of state shall be notified if a. .. candidate's application is determined not to comply with the applicable requirements.""); see also TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.0222(f) (“A determination under this section that an application complies with the applicable requirements does not preclude a subsequent determination that the application does not comply”). It is also important to note that it was only in 2017, during the 85th Legislature, that S.B. 44 was passed requiring judicial candidates to obtain petition signatures after a two-year hiatus in which ballot petition signatures were not required.",Party Submissions,5.129267,5.1207323,5.3532753
"To amend title 23, United States Code, to require transportation planners to consider projects and strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.4379663,3.3273838,4.387555
"In support of their claims, the Walkers served preliminary expert reports from Dr. James G. Tappan, a board-certified obstetrician, Dr.",Party Submissions,11.546541,16.10805,16.842657
"In Thompson, the parent-claimants’ expert relied on a series of assumptions to conclude that medical-provider negligence caused their daughter to die by suicide. 649 S.W.3d at 162. Not only did the parents’ expert offer no factual support for his assumptions, but he also failed to exclude the defense expert’s alternative possibility: that the girl’s suicide was a spontaneous, impulsive, and unpreventable act. Id. As the parents’ expert had failed to rule out other plausible causes raised by the evidence, his testimony could not prove cause-in-fact. Id. (“[I]f the record contains no evidence supporting an expert’s material factual assumptions, or if such assumptions are contrary to conclusively proven facts, opinion testimony founded on those assumptions is not competent evidence.”).",Party Submissions,7.8221292,8.001982,8.4606
"McCarthy Subcontract -12-01-12-2017 Rev. 8.2 Storage areas, if available, will be allocated by McCarthy for Subcontractor's materials and equipment during the course of the Work. Locations for parking, office trailer(s), marshalling yard(s), etc. shall be submitted to and approved by McCarthy. Subcontractor shall relocate, without additional cost to McCarthy, said storage areas, trailers, marshalling yard(s), etc., as directed by McCarthy.",Party Submissions,7.502678,7.8136015,8.289752
"It should be remembered that acceleration of a real estate note is a harsh remedy which gets close scrutiny from courts. McGowan v. Pasol, 605 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ). Courts have looked with disfavor upon the exercise of optional acceleration, requiring a clear, positive and unequivocal declaration of acceleration, followed by affirmative action towards enforcement. Crow v. Heath, 516 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Attempts to apply silence as a manifestation of intentional waiver in the context of a loan generally requires other circumstances which are evidence of such intention. Self v. Kinder, 474 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Miller v. Sandvick, 921 S.W.2d 517, 524 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied). Given this high bar, it would be inequitable to hold that a lender’s hesitancy to tread upon this path bars recovery under the Note.",Party Submissions,5.6822486,5.9550605,6.0071793
"Oncor also relies on Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Jacob S. McDonald and 1615 Tabor, LLC, upholding a section 1.111(e) agreement and rendering judgment 36 for the appraisal district. The holding in the case is irrelevant to these proceedings.",Party Submissions,21.742878,24.305153,36.84725
"Cornejo v. Hilgers, 446 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied), likewise doesn’t help the Walkers. There, the expert reports contained much more extensive factual explanations as to how and why hypoxia began during labor, how the failure to continuously monitor the baby throughout the night contributed to the injuries, and how and why the defendant’s failure to deliver earlier caused the baby to suffer injuries from hypoxia. Id. at 116-19, 124-26. Further, one expert explained in “great detail” how the effects of hypoxia and asphyxia were cumulative and progressive, the role of fetal heart monitoring, and the medical relationship between the late decelerations on the strip and the baby’s injuries. Id. at 125. The reports here do not contain the factual explanations of causation found in the Cornejo reports.",Party Submissions,5.9899306,6.445379,6.3861403
"Nowhere in its causation discussion does the opinion explain how the trial court’s conclusion was unreasonable or made without reference to guiding principles. Compare Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *3-*5 with Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53 (reversing court of appeals because trial court “could have reasonably determined” report was deficient); see also Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011) (discussing the abuse of discretion standard).",Party Submissions,6.2395988,6.725188,6.852508
Tribunal The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,34.110985,43.688766,51.066494
"Stay Pursuant To Rule 13 of the Rules of Judicial Administration has been served upon all counsel of record via facsimile, email or by electronic filing, on this 27th day of December, 2023.",Party Submissions,8.497188,10.568101,13.912989
"Id (emphasis added). Thus, far from supporting Petitioner, the Wells Fargo opinion supports the maturity date of the Note as the accrual date for limitations, and separates acceleration from foreclosure.",Party Submissions,17.762844,23.569172,26.71538
"Start with the text. Samson’s substitution of “late charges” for “interest” in art. XVII.D wrongly alters the text to push the due date for Late Charges to an indefinite future date. See Respondents’ Oral Argument Exhibit 2. But even if those terms were interchangeable, such substitution would render meaningless the last sentence of the prior provision that makes Late Charges “due and payable” each month.",Party Submissions,17.207794,17.362972,18.509678
Serbia argues in the Counter-Memorial that Claimants did not prove that Obnova built the buildings presently existing at its premises and argue that all Obnova’s buildings at Dunavska 17 -19 had been built before the creation of Obnova’s predecessor Otpad. 58 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess Serbia’s contemporaneous und erstanding of the: ( i ) existence of buildings at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23; and (ii) ownership and other rights to these buildings and the land plots at these premises.,Legal Decisions,12.765978,13.667691,13.25496
"A correct reading of the Court of Appeals’ opinion shows that the SWDA does not apply to a sewer collection system and such a system is not a solid waste facility. Weatherford Int’l, LLC v. City of Midland, 652 S.W.3d 905, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. filed) (“the SWDA’s cost recovery provision does not apply to the allegations and subject matter—i.e., a domestic wastewater collection system. . .”). The opinion found that Weatherford failed to establish a waiver of the City’s immunity under the SWDA, and that such an immunity waiver does not apply to Midland’s facilities regardless of the City’s possible status as a person responsible for solid waste. Id. (“the governmental immunity waiver provisions contained in the SWDA do not apply to the City in this case—regardless of whether the City is characterized as either (1) an ‘owner’ or ‘operator’ of a ‘solid waste facility’ or (2) an ‘arranger’ of ‘solid waste.’”).",Party Submissions,5.682398,5.4565077,5.7148237
Article 5 This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .,Legislation,2.9488707,3.5591257,4.322113
Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .,Legislation,2.7660437,3.2448676,3.9456952
"ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES A. The court of appeals found that this case alleged a departure from accepted standards of medical care, health care or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care.",Party Submissions,17.937872,19.380299,25.038057
"Oncor ’ s argument that the agreement did not purport to resolve the possibility of a clerical error lacks sense. The agreement resolved the property’s value. If Oncor ’ s sole concern was for the accuracy of Mills CAD’s records rather than its move to change values, this matter would have never reached this Court. What Oncor is patently seeking to change, however, is the value of it property on the Mills CAD 2019 appraisal roll, that same value it previously agreed to resolve.",Party Submissions,19.89981,24.072361,21.710121
"Encouraging all schools in the United States to teach students digital literacy and history related to the Holocaust, World War II, and antisemitism.",Legislation,9.066215,9.744819,9.674228
"Such documents are relevant to demonstrate the nature of the treatment and protection accorded by the Respondent to the Claimant and are therefore, notably, material to an assessment of the Respondent’s alleged breach27 of the Claimant’s rights under Art. 328 of the France-Qatar BIT.",Legal Decisions,11.95194,11.946813,13.385822
"Citing to its earlier opinion in Wingfoot, the Texas Supreme Court, in Garza v. Exel Logistics, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. 2005), again observed that an employee can have more than one employer for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act and its exclusive remedy provision. Garza at 477-478. In Garza, an employee hired by a temporary employment agency was injured while performing tasks for the agency's client company. Garza at 473. The Supreme Court ruled that, because the client company failed to come forward with a policy that it obtained for itself, the client company was not entitled to the exclusive remedy provision in Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001(a).",Party Submissions,4.7771964,5.006034,4.932338
"The majority opinion erroneously holds that CKC’s allegations of self-dealing were insufficient because they did not address Alpesh’s subjective thoughts: “Significantly, Condon does not allege that any personal benefit Alpesh has received from the alleged misconduct is of such subjective material significance to him—taking into account his overall economic circumstances—that it is reasonable to question whether he could have objectively considered a litigation demand by Condon.” Condon v. Kadakia, 661 S.W.3d 443, 462 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. filed) (emphasis added).",Party Submissions,8.083781,8.1406145,8.436979
"Unallocated Deferrals and Accounts. If the Participant fails to make an investment allocation with respect to an Account, such Account shall be invested in an investment option, the primary objective of which is the preservation of capital, as determined by the Committee.",Contract,6.6468563,7.7946467,10.118719
"IT IS ORDERED that after the child reaches age seven (7), then the electronic communication shall be for a period of up to thirty (30) minutes.",Party Submissions,11.187113,15.434006,17.169228
"That rule far surpasses the statement in Griggs —the sole statement on which the majority relies—that a district court loses “control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” 459 U.S. at 58, 103 S.Ct. 400; ante, at 1919. Only the arbitrability order is on appeal, not the merits. And those matters are distinct. As this Court recognized (before Congress enacted § 16), “arbitrability” is “easily severable from the merits of the underlying disputes.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 21, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983).",Party Submissions,4.7568293,4.7812247,5.149086
"Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, in the event of a Change in Control during the Performance Period described in Section 2.3 above, then subject to Executive remaining continuously employed with the Company through the date of such Change in Control (except as specified in the following sentence): (a) if the applicable per share consideration for Company stock in such Change in Control is less than $30.00, the First PSU Tranche shall immediately vest in full, and the Second PSU Tranche shall be forfeited and Executive shall not have any further rights with respect thereto; (b) if the applicable per share consideration for Company stock in such Change in Control is between $30.00 and $40.00, the First PSU Tranche shall immediately vest in full, and Executive shall be entitled to a portion of the Second PSU Tranche based on the application of linear interpolation between $30.00 and $40.00 (with the portion of the Second PSU Tranche that does not vest pursuant to such linear interpolation being forfeited); and (c) if the applicable per share consideration for Company stock in such Change in Control is $40.00 or greater, both the First PSU Tranche and the Second PSU Tranche shall immediately vest in full. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event that a Change in Control occurs during the Tail Period described in Section 2.3 above, the One-Time PSU Special Grant shall be eligible to vest pursuant to the preceding sentence, subject to the pro rata reduction described in Section 2.3.",Contract,2.7962735,2.855194,2.9531457
"The term “investment” shall mean every kind of asset invested in the territory of one Contracting Party in accordance with its laws and regulations by an investor of the other Contracting Party [...]. [emphasis added] 238. The Tribunal considers that the passage emphasised means that for an asset to qualify as an investment within the meaning of the BIT it must be made in accordance with the laws and regulations of the host State. Otherwise it is not an “investment” for the purposes of the BIT and a tribunal constituted under Article IX will not have jurisdiction over a dispute which arises out of it. In the view of the Tribunal, this requirement is satisfied if, at the time that the asset is first invested, it is invested in accordance with the laws and regulations of the host State. If those laws and regulations subsequently change, that change will not deprive the asset of its quality as an investment within the meaning of the BIT. To hold otherwise would enable a host State to circumvent the protection of the BIT.",Legal Decisions,4.3211446,4.0189414,4.680042
An appellate court reviews a summary judgment de novo. The appellate court takes all evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true and indulges every reasonable inference and resolves any doubts in her favor.,Party Submissions,4.0168595,5.8568077,5.1643414
"If you are a director, officer or principal shareholder, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) further restricts your ability to sell or otherwise dispose of Shares acquired upon settlement of the Units.",Contract,4.2321515,4.879604,4.953908
"WHEREAS, the Seller desires to transfer and sell to the Buyer 49.5% of the units of membership interest in the Company (the “Transferred Equity Interest”), and the Buyer desires to purchase from the Seller the Transferred Equity Interest such that, after the transfer, the Buyer shall own 99.5% of the units of membership interest in the Company and the Seller shall own 0.5% of the units of membership interest in the Company.",Contract,3.2264934,3.1088343,3.6451883
"To satisfy the causation requirement an expert must explain the basis of his statements and link his conclusions to the facts. Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). But this Court has stressed that a valid expert report need not marshal all of plaintiff ’s proof. Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 223. It need not present evidence as if the plaintiff were actually litigating the merits. Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 223; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879. The report need not use “magic words” or meet the same standards as evidence offered at summary judgment or at trial. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879.",Party Submissions,4.9843426,5.697745,5.6366134
To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for the distribution of additional residency positions to help combat the substance use disorder crisis.,Legislation,10.590259,7.1193557,11.2570305
This is the eighth of nine requests for documents which the Claimant contends was seized during the criminal proceedings in Qatar.,Legal Decisions,28.673092,29.765652,35.154785
"Dr. Tappan then offered that the large subacute infarction seen on MRI and MRA “suggests the possibility” that H.W. “sustained a perinatal arterial ischemic stroke likely due to intrapartum factors including prolonged second-stage labor, fetal heart rate abnormalities, and trauma at the time of delivery.” (CR.670). But, as the Court of Appeals recognized, the mere “possibility” of a link between conduct and eventual harm fails to satisfy the reasonable medical probability standard imposed by the statute. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *4 (citing, among other cases, Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53).",Party Submissions,8.58027,9.976891,10.346593
"Continuing, Dr. Tappan claimed “[H.W.] sustained an in-utero asphyxial injury during the final one to one and a half hours of labor. Had Dr. Castillo decided for cesarean delivery at or about 15:15 and had she atraumatically delivered [H.W.] by 15:45...[he] would have been born without neurological injury.” (CR.671). Again, this was not enough because Dr. Tappan never explained, factually, how or why it is purportedly true. ( Id. ). Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 539-40; see also Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 460-61.",Party Submissions,9.278058,10.911572,11.283834
"In concluding the reports were insufficient as to causation, the Amarillo Court properly relied on this Court’s decision in Zamarripa, which involved a similar set of alleged nursing failures. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 17324338, at *4-5. In Zamarripa, a pregnant patient presented at one hospital but a physician ordered her transferred to another for a higher standard of care. Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 456-57. En route, the placenta detached, and the woman and baby ultimately died. The expert opined that bleeding caused by the detached placenta caused a heart attack due to lack of oxygen carried to the heart for sufficient pumping. This collapse caused her death. Id. at 458. Had she been in a hospital setting, where emergent c-section and hysterectomy surgery were available, the harm would have been prevented.",Party Submissions,8.379682,8.3272705,8.78337
"State accord the investment “ equitable and reasonable [...] protection”. The Tribunal agrees that this is an additional requirement not found in all other BITs. The Claimants rely upon it in support of their argument that Norway should have protected their investment from the effects of the introduction by the Russian Federation of a ban on harvesting snow crab in the Russian sector of the Loop Hole. For the reasons given in paragraphs 492 to 494, above, the Tribunal considers that claim unsustainable.",Legal Decisions,15.319184,15.020408,18.257559
"Dr. Tappan did discuss causation when writing about Dr. Castillo’s duty to deliver atraumatically—saying her alleged failure to do so “proximately caused traumatic extraction, physical craniocerebral deformation, and traumatic injury to the brain.” (CR.669). But he never explains, factually, how or why that is purportedly true, as a result of Dr. Castillo’s alleged breach. Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 539-40. In fact, his statement that an alleged “fail[ure] to deliver baby [H.W.] in an atraumatic fashion...proximately caused traumatic extraction,” etc. (CR.669) is circular reasoning at its finest.",Party Submissions,10.416024,11.642759,11.461641
"This Court should reverse the Fourth Court’s judgment. It should remand to the court of appeals for consideration of the remaining issues, or alternatively address them here in the first instance, and either render judgment for Bay on damages and attorney fees or remand for a new trial on attorney fees.",Party Submissions,11.87872,9.727934,15.221253
Multiple hurdles had to be cleared before Flaven would be submitted on the jury charge. HSMiller argues primarily that a timely filed motion for leave to designate Flaven as an RTP would have been 29 granted. Resp’t’s Br. at 40-42. But this analysis overlooks one of the two reasons the BNC Sellers objected to the RTP designation: Flaven’s “misrepresentations” did not violate any legal duty owed to the BNC Sellers. See 17RR740–45 (PX80).,Party Submissions,19.835888,20.137154,22.68523
"Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 515; ESIS, 908 S.W.2d at 559. However, the party appealing bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX. LAB.CODE ANN.",Party Submissions,4.5785675,6.739332,7.2268395
"Oncor argues in its Petitioner’s Brief for the first time that this Court should remand the case to the trial court to allow Oncor to plead an ultra vires claim against the individual officials of Wilbarger CAD. One must assume that Oncor would claim that the chief appraiser or her agent had no authority to enter the agreement in issue. Aside from the argument being badly tardy, it is impossible to conceive such an argument being raised in good faith. Section 1.111(e) begins, “An agreement between a property owner or the owner’s agent and the chief appraiser is final. . .” Oncor cannot so much as imply with the least shred of credibility that the chief appraiser or her representative had no authority to enter the agreement in dispute. Or perhaps Oncor can conjure some duty on the chief appraiser’s part to divine the mindset and internal mistakes of the property owner prior to entering such an agreement. On the other hand, perhaps the argument makes as much sense as Oncor’s allegation of the implicit repeal of § 1.111(e)’s finality. VI. The Appraisal Review Board should not be a party under the Tax Code.",Party Submissions,9.454936,9.841747,9.437622
"Once again, if every single Wilson case must be individually tried to a jury, then this necessarily precludes any form of collateral estoppel, both offensive and defensive, and since the trial court ruled in favor of Fleming Defendants (VIII CR 4227), they once again achieved mutual assent with the court that collateral estoppel could not apply under circumstance. Using Fleming Defendants’ logic, this constitutes their second Absolute Anti-Collateral Estoppel Agreement.",Party Submissions,23.41907,17.780182,25.219206
"On the basis of the evidence in the record, please summarize the legal options available for CALICA before domestic administrative and/or judicial proceedings against: ... (ii) the execution of such order by officials of SEMARNAT and PROFEPA through a temporary shutdown resulting from an allegedly irregular process.",Party Submissions,38.141876,41.200336,38.040916
"That claim is substantial. While no doubt the Election Code advances a state interest in ensuring that statewide candidates enjoy a certain minimum breadth of support across the State, it does so by imposing an extensive and detailed set of requirements on the Republican Party regarding who it may allow to compete in its primary election. See, e.g., Tex. Elec. Code §§ 141.031, 172.021. Assuming arguendo that such an interest were compelling for First Amendment purposes, it is difficult to see how a 50-signature minimum in a particular judicial district would effectively advance that interest as applied to Justice Devine. After all, Justice Devine has not only earned the Republican nomination to state judicial office no fewer than four times, he has won statewide office in two general elections, most recently garnering tens of thousands of votes from the counties making up the judicial districts that are the subject of Walker’s challenge. See 2018 General Election, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE (Nov. 6, 2018), https://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist331 _state.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2024); November 2018 General Election, EL PASO COUNTY, TEXAS ELECTIONS DEPARTMENT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://results.enr.clarityelec-tions.com/TX/El_Paso/92416/Web02.222611/#/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). It is difficult to see what interest in a statewide base of support would be advanced by demanding technical compliance with a signature minimum on pain of precluding both Justice Devine from seeking, and the Republican Party from conferring, the Re-publican Party nomination for Place 4 on Justice Devine for a third time. And given that long history between the Party and Justice Devine, the associational burdens would be no doubt great: it would effectively end their association and confer the nomination by default on Walker.",Party Submissions,6.9345818,7.0862722,6.686005
"It was not shown that Mrs. Benson participated in, or exercised any control over, the trial in the Porter suit, or that she had any right to do so. She was not shown to have any beneficial interest in the recovery of damages for personal injuries on behalf of the Porters. In our view, the requirements of due process compel the conclusion that a privity relationship which will support application of the rules of res judicata does not exist under these circumstances. Accordingly, we hold that the fact findings and judgment in the Porter suit do not bar Mrs. Benson, and that she is entitled to her day in court in prosecuting this action in her own right.",Party Submissions,7.5693994,7.493457,8.204574
"Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Kai Hui Qi, 402 S.W.3d 374, 389–90 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“[A] state entity’s failure to act does not invoke the [TTCA’s] limited waiver of immunity.”); see, e.g., Dallas Cnty. Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex. 1998) (“The real substance of plaintiffs ’ complaint is that Roger ’ s death was caused, not by the condition or use of property, but by the failure of Hillside ’ s staff to restrain him once they learned he was still suicidal. The [TTCA] does not waive Dallas County MHMR ’ s immunity from such a complaint .”) .",Party Submissions,5.1813707,5.8888583,5.7921586
There is no possible basis on which it could be said that the documents sought are all relevant and material to the claims set out at Request for Arbitration at paras 77 – 92.,Legal Decisions,20.2149,19.936886,25.784813
"A survey of the caselaw nationwide confirms this point. See Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., 917 F.Supp.2d 503, 526 (E.D. N.C. 2012) (“Interest on ‘all amounts’ and on ‘the unpaid balance’ is considered compound interest.”) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Crosby–Miss. Res., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1474, 1488–89 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), and Texon Energy Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 733 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).",Party Submissions,4.248046,4.5375776,4.4257693
Effective Date. A modification election submitted in accordance with this Article VII is irrevocable upon receipt by the Committee and becomes effective twelve (12) months after such date.,Contract,9.703249,10.922905,14.100042
Dr. Tappan’s opinions as to the “chain of command” are likewise insufficient because they are not explained. There is no explanation of what a chain of command is much less an explanation of how to invoke it. This confused the trial court. (RR.32) The report does not adequately set out a standard of care on this point.,Party Submissions,15.487942,19.932646,19.647009
"Dr. Tappan explained that a non-reassuring fetal tracing needs assessment and prompt treatment to avoid fetal hypoxia (decreased oxygen in the tissue) and acidosis (an increase in lactic acid in the blood because of inadequate oxygen delivered to tissues). App. 7, CR 669 ( “ Non-reassuring fetal tracing.. .. requires assessment and prompt treatment to avoid fetal hypoxia and acidosis ” ); see also App. 5, CR 217 (defining metabolic acidosis and hypoxia).",Party Submissions,7.250537,7.1957073,7.7791414
"However, nothing in the termination clause supports Osprin ’s interpre tation. Rather, the plain language of the clause leads us to the opposite conclusion. The clause provides that “ any and all obligations of the Guarantor under this Guaranty shall terminate upon the construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation ” of the Texaco building. “Terminate” means “ to bring to an end. ” Terminate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2006); Terminate, BLACK ’ S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “Obligation” means “ something (as a formal contract, a promise), that obligates one to a course of action,” “a commitment. .. . to pay a particular sum of money; also: an amount owed under such an obliga tion,” Obligation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ’ S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2006), or “ a duty arising by contract, ” Obligation, BLACK ’ S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Under the plain language of the termination clause, upon the completion of the tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco building, any and all of the actions Backes bound himself to perform under the guaranty, including his commitment to pay a particular sum of money and the amount owed under such commitment, were brought to an end.",Party Submissions,4.7209606,4.6695037,4.9527674
Rafiei asserts that he “provided the trial court with evidence that the unreasonably expensive filing expenses and unlimited fee-splitting required by the delegation clause” would “operate to bar him from being able to litigate his claims.” Brief at 23. But the only evidence he points to is his own affidavit: “Rafiei has provided his own affidavit in support of his contention that the delegation provision is unconscionable.” Id. at 30.,Party Submissions,9.590369,9.393578,10.733403
"HSMiller’s purported defenses — waiver and preemption —fail for the reasons explained in the Lawyers’ Petitioners’ Brief and herein. For one, HSMiller cannot seriously argue that the Bankruptcy Judge approved an unstated intent to engage in collusion and position switching in the ensuing litigation. That was not a decision presented to the court.",Party Submissions,20.572205,23.173313,23.847122
"Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that his brief contains 3743 words (excluding the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, statemen of the case, record references, issues presented, signature block, proof of service, and certificate of compliance). This is a computer-generated document created in Microsoft Word using 14-point typeface. In making this certificate of compliance, I am relying ono the word count provided by the software used to prepare the document. The entire document, according to Word, contains 5808 words.",Party Submissions,7.0821657,7.898451,8.477626
"Serbia argues that Obnova’s buildings are allegedly temporary because, amongst other t hings, Obnova (at that time existing under the name “Otpad”) only prepared main designs for some of the buildings, while permanent objects would require also preliminary designs.74 To support this argument, Serbia relies on exhibits R-037 to R-039, which seem to be decisions approving certain main designs submitted by Obnova. However, these decisions ( i ) do not identify the location of the buildings for which the designs were approved, making it impossible to verify whether these buildings correspond to the existing buildings at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23; and ( ii ) do not state whether the main designs were the only designs submitted by Obnova or whether they were preceded by preliminary designs. The requested documents are therefore relevant and material to clarify whether the decisions submitted by Serbia relate to buildings within Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23 and what was Obnova and Serbia’s contemporaneous understanding of the status of these buildings— mainly whether Obnova and Serbia considered them to be temporary or not.",Legal Decisions,8.537197,8.962256,8.687397
"HN2 [ ] When both parties move for summary judgment on the same issues and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, a reviewing court examines the summary [*475] judgment evidence presented by both sides, determines all questions presented, and if reversing, renders such judgment as the trial court should have rendered. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661, 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 671 (Tex. 2005) ; see Johnston v. Crook, 93 S.W.3d 263, 267 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in his favor. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 661 .",Party Submissions,2.890775,3.4029431,3.1584048
"Arbitration Rule 6 13.1. Written communications shall be transmitted by email or other electronic means to the Parties, the Tribunal Secretary, the Tribunal Members, and the Assistant.",Legal Decisions,11.612587,10.942475,12.698648
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the requested documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (which prepared exhibit C-330) in accordance with the applicable regulations101. In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".102 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.103 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves, especially in view of the broad scope of their request. In fact, Claimants obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek. R, M: Claimants do not explain why the requested documents are relevant to the facts in issue or material to their case. The Urban Planning Institute's assessment of the potential costs of compensating for destroyed buildings and land expropriation do not constitute proof of ownership rights or other rights over the land and buildings encompassed by the 2013 DRP. As such, the requested documents would not have a material effect on the Tribunal's determination of issues in dispute.",Legal Decisions,11.250535,11.645891,11.820342
Claimants hereby incorporate their replies from Requests Nos. 15 and 22. DECISION Letter from the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction No. 350.1-35/2007 dated 23 September 2013.,Legal Decisions,15.053648,12.797724,17.473215
To direct the Office for Victims of Crime of the Department of Justice to implement anti-trafficking recommendations of the Government Ac-countability Office.,Legislation,10.641707,9.285733,11.187929
The percentage of the Performance Share Target earned for results between performance levels shall be determined by straight line interpolation with the number of Performance Share Units earned rounded down to the nearest whole number. Any Performance Share Units that are not earned in accordance with this Section 4 shall be forfeited.,Contract,6.6268353,8.466329,8.580984
"In 1999, Sonic filed its contract claims against TMI in a Harris County court and also filed claims against Randy Croix and the Eddie [**4] Croix Insurance Agency, Inc. (the ""Croix defendants""), the parties that sold TMI's policy to Sonic. 2 [**5] In that same year, Cochran filed suit against Sonic in Alabama, under that state's workers' compensation laws. Cochran recovered judgment against Sonic on July 13, 2001. Several days later, on July 17, 2001, Sonic filed a claim with the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission (""TWCC"") seeking reimbursement under section 409.009 of the Labor Code, for $ 78,023.89, the voluntary benefits it paid to Cochran prior to his receipt of the Alabama judgment. 3 Following a hearing on Sonic's reimbursement claim, the hearing officer concluded that Cochran was Sonic's employee at the time of the accident and was entitled to benefits under the TWCA, but because he recovered benefits under Alabama's laws, he was barred by section 406.075 of the Texas Labor Code 4 from recovering benefits and, as Cochran's subclaimant, Sonic's reimbursement claim was likewise barred.",Party Submissions,5.5517216,5.637336,5.647271
"App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.), does not support Petitioners’ argument, yet Respondents fail to recognize that Burton directly supports the holding in 402 Lone Star. Petitioners cited this case as a string cite to support the above analysis of 402 Lone Star. Further, Respondents admit that the issue on appeal in Burton was whether the defendant filed fraudulent liens with intent to injure the plaintiff. Respondents’ Br. at 14. Here, Petitioners make the same argument as it is an element of the Chapter 12 cause of action.",Party Submissions,8.361914,11.121967,12.102006
"Yellowfin also suggests that Santos’s interpretation of Section 51.003 conflicts with Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, which held that “[i]f a note or deed of trust secured by real property contains an optional acceleration clause, ” “ the action accrues only when the holder actually exercises its option to accelerate. ” 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001). But as our opening brief explained (at 30-31), Santos’s interpretation of Section 51.003(a) does not conflict with Holy Cross because the rule espoused there applies only to notes “secured by real property, ” 44 S.W.3d at 566. After foreclosure on Santos’s home, the junior lien on the property was extinguished and the note was no longer secured by real property. Wesley v.",Party Submissions,6.092929,6.8934264,6.757066
"With regard to snow crab, it appears that this species is “unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil” and it thus falls within the definition of “sedentary species” of Article 77(4) of UNCLOS. The fact that snow crab falls within that definition formed the subject matter of an earlier dispute between Canada and the United States about the prosecution of snow-crab fisheries conducted by United States fishing vessels on the Canadian continental shelf at a location where Canada’s continental shelf extended beyond 200 nautical miles in the Northwest Atlantic. At that time, the European Union (then the European Community) considered snow crab to fall within the definition of “sedentary species” and, therefore, did not lodge any protest against Canada.",Legal Decisions,7.1458645,7.4704614,7.4219756
Convention Article 43(a); Arbitration Rules 5 and 36-40 16.1. The Tribunal shall be guided but not bound by the IBA Rules.,Legal Decisions,15.499042,14.249328,19.279718
"Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement to the contrary, this Agreement is intended to be exempt from or, in the alternative, comply with Section 409A and the interpretive guidance in effect thereunder, including the exceptions for short-term deferrals, separation pay arrangements, reimbursements, and in-kind distributions. The Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with such intent.",Contract,3.640836,4.0847983,5.2634044
"Finally, just because Wilson Plaintiffs might have made a long shot attempt at obtaining offensive collateral estoppel if the Harpst plaintiffs had won, that doesn’t mean the Harpst plaintiffs were the formal legal representatives of Wilson Plaintiffs, and nothing in Taylor would suggest otherwise.",Party Submissions,19.164383,17.056599,23.078749
"This is a project where a fishing vessel under the EU flag will land live snow crabs at approved Norwegian reception stations (factories). Please describe or present the process regarding the documents to be sent to the Directorate of Fisheries in this case .741 525. The reply, sent on 25 July 2014, read: Basically this corresponds to matters concerning the regulations of the Fisheries Administration. Regulations issued by other agencies, such as the Norwegian Food Safety Authority, Råfiklaget etc. must be clarified to these agencies.",Legal Decisions,28.483587,25.962906,28.1265
"Carter may have played a part in accounting errors that were later corrected, but that does not establish a fraudulent or criminal intent, which was the gist of the Newspaper’s reporting. Thus, we agree with the court of appeals that the Newspaper was not entitled to summary judgment because it failed to conclusively prove the substantial truth of the Newspaper’s alleged defamatory statements.",Party Submissions,8.286408,9.580489,9.73563
"See Henry, 70 S.W.3d at 809 (citing Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 804 (Tex.2001) and holding trial court could not adjudicate employee's claim for bad faith denial of workers' compensation benefits without determining whether she was entitled to benefits, a matter within the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction); Saenz v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex.1996) (stating Act vests power to award workers' compensation benefits solely in Commission, subject to judicial review). The Commission's exclusive jurisdiction to determine compensability necessarily encompasses exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury or death occurred in the course and scope of employment. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 401.011(10) (Vernon Supp.2003) (defining compensable injury as “an injury that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is payable” under the Act).",Party Submissions,3.4236665,3.7480528,3.767369
The trial courts amended order specifically denies the plaintiff's motion to strike the affidavit of David Carlin and Pamela McShann. Both denials were in error.,Party Submissions,19.620913,24.602627,29.105991
"By its third issue, Bay contends that section 408.001(d) of the labor code does not preclude Bay from asserting the exclusive-remedy defense, as the Manns argued in the trial court. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(d). Section 408.001(d) primarily deals with situations in which an injured employee has willfully removed himself from the justifiable reach of workers' compensation—for instance, where the employee simply fails to file a claim for compensation, or where the injury is due to the employee's horseplay or willful self-harm. See id. (citing statutory sections related to failure to file notice of injury, *328 failure to file compensation claim, and “exceptions” including horseplay, intoxication, etc.). The Act provides that in such situations, the employee may not collect benefits, but the employer retains access to the exclusive-remedy defense. See id. Reasoning by inversion, the Manns assert that if the insurance carrier denies coverage for any reason other than those referred to in section 408.001(d), then the employer loses access to the exclusive-remedy defense.",Party Submissions,6.093814,6.7096376,6.630666
"Administrative and Financial Regulation 28 7.1. The Tribunal Secretary is Ms. Jara Mínguez Almeida, Team Leader/Legal Counsel, ICSID, or such other person as ICSID may notify the Tribunal and the Parties from time to time.",Legal Decisions,14.116641,13.865535,18.017788
"Certificate of Service I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was forwarded to all counsel of record on November 16, 2023, by e-file and/or electronic mail in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.",Party Submissions,3.939425,5.1977143,6.1364326
"Respondents’ concerted actions began as soon as Respondents bought the premises from the previous landlord, continued unabated even after Westwood withdrew its appeal of the eviction ruling, and ended only after Westwood consented to the form of the agreed judgment and left the premises for good. This campaign distracted Westwood’s employees, caused its sales to drop, and forced it to incur enormous attorney’s fees. (8RR103-04) The reasons for Westwood’s departure were manifestly not “voluntary.” But even taken on its own terms, Respondents’ tale makes no sense. Westwood did not “go out of business” or “shut[] down” as part of “a broader strategic decision.” (Resp. 12, 31, 38) It simply changed its name from “Westwood Motorcars, LLC” to “Westwood Motors LLC” and continued selling cars under the new name. (8RR154-55, 159-60) So it had the same need for “warehouse” space after the name-change as before.",Party Submissions,9.214194,8.196637,9.956621
"The First Court wrote: “The elements of mutual mistake are: (1) a mistake of fact; (2) held mutually by the parties; (3) which materially affects the agreed-on exchange. City of The Colony v. N. Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 272 S.W.3d 699, 735 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism'd). A mutual mistake of fact occurs when the parties to an agreement have a common intention, but the written agreement does not accurately reflect that intention due to a mutual mistake. See Smith– Gilbard v. Perry, 332 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.); City of The Colony, 272 S.W.3d at 735. When mutual mistake is alleged, the party seeking relief must show what the parties' true agreement was and that the instrument incorrectly reflects that agreement because of a mutual mistake. Atlantic Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Butler, 137 S.W.3d 199, 213 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004 pet. denied). Under the doctrine of mutual mistake, when parties to an agreement have contracted under a misconception or ignorance of a material fact, the agreement will be voided. Walden v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 97 S.W.3d 303, 326 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). To prove a mutual mistake, the evidence must show that both parties were acting under the same misunderstanding of the same material fact. Id. A unilateral mistake by one party, combined with knowledge of that mistake by the other party, is equivalent to mutual mistake. But, ‘[a] mistake by only one party to an agreement, not known or induced by acts of the other party[,] will not constitute grounds for relief.’. Smith–Gilbard, 332 S.W.3d at 713–14 (Tex. App. –Dallas, 2011-no pet.) “A party challenging the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which that party had the burden of proof at trial must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence conclusively established, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue.” RM Crowe Prop. Servs. Co., L.P. v. Strategic Energy, L.L.C., 348 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.). We consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (Petitioners here), according every reasonable inference in that party's favor and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005); Tricon Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Thumann, 226 S.W.3d 494, 500–01 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). “If there is any evidence of probative force to support the finding, i.e., more than a mere scintilla, we will overrule the issue.” City of Houston v. Hildebrandt, 265 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (citing Haggar Clothing Co. v. Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex.2005)). If no evidence supports the adverse finding, we examine the entire record to determine if the contrary position is established as a matter of law. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex.2001). The issue will be sustained only if the contrary proposition is conclusively established. Id.",Party Submissions,3.3853126,3.783939,3.623535
Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should recognize the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as ‘‘the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda’’.,Legislation,5.1079082,3.847686,4.2432685
"Alternatively, a take-nothing judgment is appropriate because there is no evidence to support the jury’s verdict on liability or damages. At a minimum, the finding of gross negligence should be reversed and rendered, and the remainder of the case remanded for trial, either for the reasons the court of appeals found or because of the failure to submit proportionate liability under Chapter 33.",Party Submissions,8.825792,10.054069,10.133337
"The court of appeals improperly wrote nonexistent words into a statute, depriving the Petitioners of its critical protection, and resurrected a long rejected false-light theory. In urging denial of review, Barina invites this Court to condone the appellate court’s judicial activism. Left undisturbed, the court of appeals’ opinion will sow confusion in the jurisprudence and severely imperil advocacy related journalism, documentaries, and political speech that lie at our Constitution’s core. Petitioners respectfully request that the Court grant their petition for review, reverse the appellate court’s judgment, and render judgment for Petitioners.",Party Submissions,9.767317,10.353165,10.408844
"Instead of claiming the surplus proceeds to which it was entitled after the foreclosure sale, the junior lienholder intentionally chose eventually to sell its rights under the Note, 1CR53-55, and there are now no records of what happened to the excess proceeds, RR24:9-14. Because the junior lienholder “elected not to enforce any rights arising under” the Note at a time when funds were available, it waived its right to enforce those rights at a later time when records of those proceeds were no long available because of its “intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right.” See Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co ., 925 S.W.2d 640, 643-44 (Tex. 1996) (holding that defendants had established waiver where plaintiff “had elected not to enforce any rights arising under” the agreement between the parties).",Party Submissions,8.780221,8.962004,9.030169
"Yellowfin cites a number of decisions from other jurisdictions, but not a single one discusses the statute of limitations to enforce a note after a foreclosure. Collins Asset Grp., L.L.C. v. Alialy, 139 N.E.3d 712 (Ind. 2020), did not involve foreclosure at all. Yellowfin cites City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 237 (Utah 1991), for the unremarkable proposition that a junior creditor can still proceed against a debtor even if its debt becomes unsecured as a result of foreclosure by the senior creditor. Resp. Br. 12. Of course. The junior creditor could have proceeded against Santos, but it had to do so on a timely basis after the triggering event — foreclosure. And Section 51.003 provides the limitations period, which Yellowfin missed by more than ten years.",Party Submissions,7.225182,7.8747754,8.059171
"Synopsis Background: After employee was sexually assaulted while working on employer's premises, and employer submitted a workers' compensation claim, employee brought action against employer for premises liability and gross negligence. The 293rd Judicial District Court, Dimmit County, Ron Carr, J., granted employer's motion to dismiss. Employee appealed.",Party Submissions,9.664727,7.8720465,10.072519
"When DFPS filed its original Petition against Appellant, DFPS only pled the following grounds for termination: D, E, K O, and P of subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. See CR 23-24. Appellate counsel is unaware of any amended pleading by DFPS that alleged the additional grounds of termination that were contained within the jury’s charge. Furthermore, the language of Intervenor’s stated that Intervenors incorporated all allegations and documents filed by the Department.” CR 553. Intervenors did amend their pleadings to include grounds for termination again A.S.; however, because the original suit was filed by DFPS, and the order terminating A.S.’s rights to R.W., this Court should strike termination grounds (F) and (N) that were neither originally pled nor later amended by Petitioner and should not have been considered by the jury.",Party Submissions,9.69773,10.644107,10.208391
"In contrast, Osprin filed suit against TX 1111 and alleged that TX 1111 had breached its representations, covenants, and warranties under the assignment of rights to capital contributions. Further, although Osprin filed a UDJA claim against TX 1111, it only asked that the trial court declare that Osprin was entitled to a perfected security interest in the Contributions and that TX 1111’s statement regarding the value of the Contributions did not impair its right to recover the full value of its perfected security interest in the Contributions. As to these claims, Osprin later asserted that it was undisputed that it held a perfected security interest in the Contributions, and the trial court never made a finding regarding the second requested declaration. Regarding the other claims asserted against TX 1111, the trial court found that TX 1111 did not breach any of its representations, covenants, and warranties under the bridge loan documents and the amended bridge loan documents.",Party Submissions,5.964622,5.773903,6.2454343
"In a scant one page of discussion in his two-page report, Dr. Null concludes that, because H.W. was “significantly depressed at birth,” he must have had an “antenatal asphyxia event,” but “more likely than not” would not have had it had he been delivered an hour to an hour and a half earlier. (CR.709). He never says it was Dr. Castillo’s claimed departures from the standards of care that proximately caused H.W.’s injuries.",Party Submissions,11.391406,15.104685,15.330684
"To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to impose a tax on the purchase of single-family homes by certain large investors, and for other purposes.",Legislation,3.803764,3.8019733,3.952283
"Id. at 829–30. The Court had before it the settlement agreement and the letter from Walker instructing her attorneys to pay her family members from the settlement, but the Court remanded to allow the trial court to consider other evidence of the actual payments received. Id. In this case, the forbearance agreement expressly allocated the settlement payments to the $175,000.00 constitutional lien against Mendietta’s homestead—an injury not involving the Diocese. (2CR915–29). In addition, counsel for Bay, Ltd. submitted an affidavit detailing the allocation of the payments that had been made toward the $175,000.00 constitutional lien on Mendietta’s homestead, explaining that Mendietta was paying less than the yearly post-judgment interest generated only by that amount of the judgment. (3CR968–79). This is precisely the type of evidence the Court approved in Sky View and Utts.",Party Submissions,11.732642,11.230751,12.730467
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 2.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,25.689241,30.791883,37.788612
"In concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Walkers ’ experts drew a direct line from the providers’ negligence to H.W.’s brain injury: In short, Drs. Null and Tappan informed the trial court of an impending birth, defaults in monitoring the child, purported misapplication of medications influencing (directly or indirectly) the fetal heart rate, a medical practitioner leaving the hospital for a short period of time, little progress in a birth unassisted by surgery, delay in ultimately removing the child through surgery, purportedly questionable means by which the baby was removed, and the child ultimately suffering brain trauma. That trauma may have been avoided, according to the experts, if the monitoring was better, the doctor acted sooner, and the doctor removed H by pulling on his feet.",Party Submissions,20.416893,18.93622,21.458904
"Here, what is done truly cannot be undone. The just result is to render. If the Court rules instead that the assignment is void but allows HSMiller to subject the Lawyers to yet another trial, that would be a Pyrrhic victory indeed. Nor would it discourage future assignments of the same nature. If the only result is a retrial without the position shifting, there is no reason for future litigants not to take their chances with a potentially void assignment, get a multi-million-dollar verdict, and see if the law firm and its insurers settle rather than going through the long fight in the appellate courts.",Party Submissions,18.410006,17.246994,21.25502
"Antonio 2010, no pet.) (citing Entergy, 282 S.W.3d at 436). We liberally construe the terms of the Act in favor of coverage in order to effectuate the Act's purposes: lowering costs for employers while assisting injured employees. SeaBright, 465 S.W.3d at 642.",Party Submissions,7.4890075,9.925299,12.411223
"C) The Tribunal’s analysis 298. The Tribunal notes that it has already expressed its opinion, by majority, in the Partial Award regarding the directly related issue of whether the Treaty provided protection to indirect investors.317 None of the allegations made by Respondent in its subsequent submissions—which the Tribunal has carefully analyzed—have been sufficient to change the findings already made by the Tribunal.",Legal Decisions,14.959386,13.309036,14.667702
"As such, both Walker and Devine submitted petitions accompanying their applications. Walker’s petition contained 134 signatures from the 8th Court of Appeals District (El Paso). Exhibit B. Devine’s petition facially contained 73 signatures from the 8 th Court of Appeals District. Exhibit C. However, 28 signatures on Devine’s petition were invalid because they were duplicates, were signed by persons who signed his petition subsequent to signing Walker’s petition, or both. Compare Exhibit B to Exhibit C. An additional 11 persons signed both Walker’s and 6 Devine’s petitions on the same day,1 however because they were signed on the same day it is impossible to determine which petition was signed first, and are not at issue in this Petition today, since Relator is entitled to relief even without considering these signatures. Id.",Party Submissions,8.054143,7.9210067,8.654395
Weatherford also recognizes the determination of which cases present questions “important to the jurisprudence of state” is relative to the Court’s capacity.,Party Submissions,45.6004,45.888412,65.28284
"Convention Article 48(5), Arbitration Rules 62-66, FTC Note of Interpretation of 31 July 2001, Section A: Access to Documents 25.1. The Parties agree that the transparency regime governing these proceedings is dealt with in Procedural Order No. 2.",Legal Decisions,14.684533,13.453491,16.505243
"Relator has established all the prerequisites for mandamus relief. It brought Relator no pleasure to file this proceeding, concerning an incumbent on this Court, no less. But the law is the law, and it must be enforced, no matter the parties involved. Failure to do so risks further gamesmanship, and loss of integrity in our electoral system. Any other action will result in future judicial candidates not being required to get the minimum number of signatures specifically required by law; thwarting the will of the people, as expressed through their Legislature, only 7 years ago.",Party Submissions,11.549302,15.940476,13.985199
"In November, while the Martinez Family's challenge to DWC's jurisdiction was still pending before that agency, the Martinez Family moved the court presiding over the tort suit to lift the abatement, arguing that Bruno's beneficiaries had never filed a claim for benefits, that the statute of limitations to file such a claim had passed, and that ""there is no pending or disputed claim for worker's compensation benefits for [DWC] to resolve so its exclusive jurisdiction is no longer triggered."" The Harper & Associates, L.P., as a defendant. court took the matter under advisement and ultimately granted the motion to lift the abatement. This original proceeding followed, with Hellas arguing that the district court abused its discretion by lifting the abatement when the administrative order was still subject to judicial review and therefore not final. As relief, [*6] Hellas asks this Court to issue a mandamus writ ordering the district court to reinstate the abatement.",Party Submissions,8.375502,8.538051,9.399207
"If the defendant is a workers compensation insurance company and the worker is attempting to circumvent the administrative process to determine any aspect of a benefit claims dispute at the trial court level prior to exhausting his or her administrative remedies first, then Fodge applies to bar the injured claimant's suit and the trial court should dismiss the matter; if the defendant is the employer in a negligence action and the injured person has not made an election of remedies, then course and scope is an affirmative defense at trial and nothing more. If one reviews the plaintiff's live pleadings 1, it is clear Mann is not seeking benefits nor damages related to the wrongful denial of benefits, so Fodge does not bar his case at the trial court.",Party Submissions,13.236688,13.451711,14.144915
"The principal amount of the Loan shall be due and payable on the Maturity Date. The Borrower further promises to pay to the order of the Lender interest on the unpaid principal amount hereof from time to time outstanding at the rate or rates per annum determined pursuant to the terms of the Loan Agreement, payable on the dates set forth therein.",Contract,3.2046592,3.2428472,4.5072923
"JAMES R. EVANS, JR. State Bar No. 06721500 jevans@lsejlaw.com State Bar No. 24062428 ERIC RUIZ State Bar No. 24125845 eruiz@lsejlaw.com E. BARRY GAINES State Bar No. 24042358 bgaines@lsejlaw.com LOW SWINNEY EVANS & JAMES, PLLC 4425 SOUTH MOPAC, BUILDING 3, SUITE 400, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78735 ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER MILLS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT FILED 23-0145 1/11/2024 8:28 PM tex-83349910 SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK This Court has long held that finality of a section 1.111(e) agreement is a jurisdictional issue, and the cases cited by Oncor do not support their contention that finality is a merits issue. Oncor ’ s interpretation of section 1.111(e) ’ s finality as “ eligible for review” contravenes the same cases it cites in support, in addition to the plain language of the statute. The agreement related to the value of Oncor ’ s transmission lines in Mills County, which must necessarily include the individual characteristics affecting such value. The value is settled, the agreement is final, and despite Oncor ’ s attempts to circumvent the tax code ’ s pervasive scheme, the court lacks jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,6.970748,7.261192,7.2130647
"Although Subcontract paragraph 11.1 states for “disputes involving [MVP] described in Paragraph 11.2 herein, venue shall be in the place set forth in the [MCC],” it makes no mention of any waiver-- let alone a clear and specific waiver of Section 272.001 or of any right to object to this venue provision. R.0507. To the extent paragraph 11.2 could be read as incorporating the MCC’s waiver provisions, then it is precisely the type of provision the Texas Legislature gave contractors, like RLB, the right to void through Section 272.001 because it would subject RLB to another state’s laws or litigation in another state’s courts. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 272.001(b). This language is not effective for RLB to knowingly and intentionally waive any rights.",Party Submissions,9.586636,9.583999,9.908527
"The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Husband the February 14, 2020 discretionary bonus as his separate property. We overrule Wife’s second issue.",Party Submissions,5.89634,7.85914,7.605641
Held : A district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. Pp. 1918 – 1923.,Party Submissions,10.902047,10.074705,14.89783
"Finally, as also explained in the Lawyers’ brief, the only evidence that the jury would have put more than 50% of the responsibility on Flaven came from conclusory expert testimony and biased “fact witness” testimony.5 See Pet’rs’ Br. at 56-60.",Party Submissions,18.329798,18.363495,21.878654
"RR 9, 11-12, 23; see 9 RR 97, 236-37, 241. The jury was entitled to re- ject that excuse.",Party Submissions,11.09835,13.624139,17.890903
"This Court held that the evidence was not legally sufficient to establish that the homeowners would be “ actually” charged excessive arbitration fees due to the capped costs of the AAA's commercial arbitration rules. And therefore, there was no legally sufficient evidence that such fees would have prevented the homeowners from effectively pursuing their claim in the arbitral forum Id. at 897. V. Rafiei Presented Sufficient Evidence That the Arbitration In this case, the arbitration agreement, when taken together with the AAA Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, significantly differs from the precedents cited above based on several key points.",Party Submissions,14.207449,13.003666,16.282373
"Respondents first try to steer the lower court’s opinion clear of the prohibitions in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.004(a) and TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.008 by contending that the “sole issue addressed by these statutes” is “ [r]es judicata,” and insisting that “[t]his case was not decided based on res judicata.” (Resp. 18-19, 21) But the first part of that sentence is wrong and the second part does not really matter.",Party Submissions,6.375171,6.7668624,6.726727
"As explained above, the requested documents are relevant and material to assess Serbia’s contemporaneous understanding of the: ( i ) existence of buildings at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23; and ( ii ) ownership and other rights to these buildings and the land plots at these premises. Serbia’s argument that the requested documents “ do not answer the question who built the Objects, i.e., whether Obnova built the Objects, or who is the owner of the Objects ” is contradicted by Serbia’s own exhibits. Specifically, exhibit submitted as R-043 contains excerpts of two sketches that describe Obnova as the “ user” and the “ owner ” of buildings at Dunavska 17 -19.64 This fact shows that Cadaster documents can contain notes about Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23. Serbia’s argument that the only relevant question related to the time when the buildings were constructed is whether they were constructed before 1948 or not is equally incorrect. Knowledge of the exact time when the buildings were built is relevant to assess what rights Obnova acquired to these buildings and the land on which they were built. As Claimants explained in their Memorial,65 Serbian regulation of rights to buildings and land has extensively evolved from 1948 to today. Knowledge of when exactly the buildings were built is therefore directly relevant and material for assessment of Obnova’s rights to these buildings, as well as to the land on which they were built.",Legal Decisions,7.67132,7.7859254,7.7441587
"VerDate Sep 11 2014 18:20 Feb 02, 2024 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7118.IH H7118 ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with BILLS • HR 7118 IH SEC. 2. PROHIBITION.",Legislation,10.125056,4.496975,9.670157
"In light of the many background facts which favor a finding of course and scope, and the further evidence suggesting that Mann's activities were consistent with course and scope, we conclude that summary judgment could not have been granted in the Manns' favor on the basis of this element. See Helix Energy, 522 S.W.3d at 431. Bay's fourth issue is sustained.",Party Submissions,12.367982,17.195208,15.697429
"That the junior lienholder has a right to surplus proceeds after foreclosure means that the loan has been accelerated. Even if a borrower were up to date on installment payments for the junior loan, the junior lender would still receive surplus proceeds up to the entire amount of its debt after foreclosure. That confirms that the entire balance has come due and foreclosure has accelerated the junior loan.",Party Submissions,9.413982,9.699735,10.283242
"I hereby certify that on December 1, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served on Appellee’s counsel, below, through the Texas electronic court filing system.",Party Submissions,7.6749916,8.869751,11.355958
"Respondents continue to argue that this Court’s jurisdictional ruling in Matagorda County, supra, is “undiscernable.” See Respondents’ Brief at 24. But the case clearly says the Court disagrees that the scope and preclusive effect of a tax settlement “is a jurisdictional question.” See Matagorda Cnty., 165 S.W.3d at 331. Respondents argue the Court made this observation about the issue of “whether there were two protests, not whether the settlement agreement under § 1.111(e) was subject to revision.” See Respondents’ Brief at 24. But in the next sentence, Respondents acknowledge there were two protests filed in Matagorda County. Id. There was no dispute about that—the only dispute was whether the settlement of the first protest precluded litigation of the second. The Court recognized it was necessary to construe the settlement to answer that question. See Matagorda Cnty., 165 S.W.3d at 331-32. Respondents’ reading of Matagorda County is nonsensical.",Party Submissions,5.6426105,5.8138165,5.9110403
"Respondents quote instances where Petitioners brief in the court of appeals stated that the liens at issue are not fraudulent. These quotes are used out of context. A complete review of Petitioners’ court of appeals briefing demonstrates that this is simply a linguistic disagreement and nothing more. Petitioners have always maintained that, even if the liens were “facially valid” under Chapter 55, they can still be used fraudulently, which is actionable under Chapter 12. In holding otherwise, the court of appeals erred and established an untenable precedent.",Party Submissions,10.03705,10.052535,10.670716
"This document complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point font for text and 12-point font for footnotes. It complies with the word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1) because it contains 2,060 words.",Party Submissions,3.336612,7.6541343,5.6288095
"However, according to the Manns, the record reflects a fourth version of events that takes Mann outside the course and scope of his employment. According to a report drafted by Mann's supervisor on the date of the accident, Mann reported that he was going to his truck to get out of the rain at the time of the accident.",Party Submissions,10.134325,12.253139,13.285133
"Section 2. Eligibility for Participation. Each person who is customarily employed by the Company as a Vice President, Senior Vice President or Executive Vice President (an “Eligible Associate”) who experiences a “Qualifying Termination” (as defined below) shall be a participant in the Plan, other than any person who is covered by an employment, severance or similar agreement with the Company that provides for payment of severance pay under specified circumstances; provided, however, that for purposes of this Section 2, any agreement, plan or award or similar instrument providing for benefits upon a change in control of the Company shall not be deemed to be such an agreement; provided, further, that there shall be no duplication of comparable benefits under the Plan and any such agreement, plan or award or similar instrument. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any person classified by the Company as an independent consultant, contractor, or temporary worker to the Company will not be eligible for this severance program, even if it is later determined by a court or governmental agency that such person was or is an employee of the Company.",Contract,4.7856774,4.4150114,5.0132546
"The requested Documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute in that they will address whether and if so how Coropi acquired a beneficial interest in Kalemegdan and/or an indirect beneficial interest in Obnova through the payment of consideration. These matters are at the heart of Respondent's objections to the Tribunal's jurisdiction ratione materiae under the Cyprus-Serbia BIT which, if successful, would dispense with the Cypriot Claimants' claims and thus with a substantial part of Claimants' case against Respondent. This is because it is Respondent's case that Coropi never made a contribution or otherwise ""caused"" an investment to be made in Serbia in exchange for a beneficial interest in the Kalemegdan or Obnova shares.",Legal Decisions,8.521353,9.043083,8.908909
"The requested documents were prepared by Serbia in connection with Obnova’s requests for legalization of its buildings at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. As such, the requested documents are relevant and material to assess the reasons for which Serbia failed to legalize Obnova’s buildings.",Legal Decisions,11.20179,13.349111,12.173592
"For column 24: Indicate the design prevalence based on a pre-survey estimate of the likely actual prevalence of the pest in the field. The design prevalence is set as a goal of the survey and corresponds to the compromise the risk managers are making between the risk of having the pest and the resources available for the survey. Typically, for a detection survey a value of 1 % is set.",Legislation,17.00255,16.098001,18.609495
Rafiei has not met his burden of showing that the arbitration provision which is the focus of this case is unconscionable. Lennar’s petition for review should be granted and the majority opinion should be reversed.,Party Submissions,9.68294,11.944878,11.340963
"And as this diagram illustrates, those two spheres of authority do not overlap. Indeed, to reinforce the boundary between those two spheres, Section 31.004(a) and Section 24.008 prohibit the issues related to the award of immediate possession adjudicated in the inferior justice of the peace court from having any effect whatsoever on the different issues reserved to the district court.",Party Submissions,14.214408,12.980834,17.499
"As shown at the Hearing, Mexico conducted multiple inspections and audits of La Rosita between 1993 and 2016 and has thus been aware for decades of CALICA’s activities in that lot and what it now claims is “damage” resulting from operations there.400 Mexico also knew of the purported environmental damage it alleges for El Corchalito by no later than its shutdown of that lot in January 2018.401 Mexico’s counterclaim would have therefore arisen more than three years before Mexico pursued it, in contravention of NAFTA’s three-year limitations period. 402 Mexico provided no answer to this at the Hearing.",Party Submissions,13.298542,14.322157,14.4381075
"While a life jacket is certainly a safety device, we do not agree that a life jacket is a “component” of a pool. See Clark, 923 S.W.2d at 585. Regardless, the integral safety component doctrine is limited to negligent “use of tangible personal property. ” Id.; see, e.g., Robinson, 780 S.W.2d at 169 (providing swimming attire without a life preserver); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex. 1976) (providing a football uniform without a knee brace); Overton Mem’l Hosp. v. McGuire, 518 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. 1975) (per curiam) (providing a hospital bed without bed rails). As the Delapenas acknowledge, Buttercup Pool is real property, not tangible personal property; therefore, its “use” cannot serve as the basis for an integral safety component claim. See Clark, 923 S.W.2d at 585. Stated differently, the Delapenas cannot tie the non-use of the life jacket to the “use” of the premises; to do so would run contrary to the supreme court’s admonition that a claim cannot “be both a premises defect claim and a claim relating to a condition or use of tangible property.” Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 385 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 233).",Party Submissions,5.311726,5.173958,5.636738
"This Eleventh Amendment to the Second Amended and Restated Revolving Loan Agreement (the “Amendment”), effective as of October 1, 2023, is entered into by and between Union Carbide Corporation, a New York corporation (the “Lender”) and The Dow Chemical Company, a Delaware corporation (the “Borrower”).",Contract,3.5778716,2.9766784,3.680671
"The surrounding facts and circumstances support our conclusion that the parties intended that all of Backes’ s obligations under the guaranty would come to an end once the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco building was completed. The evidence showed that First NBC and Backes were sophisticated parties with extensive experience in the funding of historic tax credit rehabilitation projects, including tax credit bridge loans. Both parties were represented by counsel in an arms-length transaction. The bridge loan documents, including the guaranty, were prepared by Firs t NBC’s attorney after negotiations between the parties and their attorneys. Consequently, the surrounding circumstances show that the termination clause in the guaranty was a bargained-for exchange between the parties and clearly expressed their intent. See Barrow-Shaver, 590 S.W.3d at 484.",Party Submissions,8.157656,7.1645308,8.4230995
"TADA’s Letter (Apr. 19, 2023). And it will ultimately affect Texas’s economy and citizens, which the Legislature expressly aimed to protect by regulating in this area. Even Respondents did not deny the importance of the issue.",Party Submissions,18.377193,21.735064,24.324614
"Here, Relator is not challenging the eligibility of Devine; indeed, Devine is an incumbent Justice on the Supreme Court. Rather, Relator is challenging Devine’s application as being noncompliant with the applicable statutory requirements. Section 172.021, Election Code makes clear that candidates for justice, supreme court must have a minimum of 50 valid signatures from each court of appeals district. T EX. E LEC. CODE § 172.021(g). Devine’s application does not contain the requisite number of unique, non-duplicate signatures in the 8 th Court of Appeals District from individuals only signing his petition as required by law. See TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 141.062(a)(2); 141.066(c). While a facial review might have been sufficient initially, once challenged, Respondent was required to review Relator’s challenge, Devine’s petition, and determine that his application be rejected. See TEX. ELEC. C ODE §§ 172.0222(e), (f), and (g); 172.0223(d). Moreover, Respondent is required to withdraw his certification of Devine’s name to the 2024 Republican Primary Ballot by notifying the secretary of state once his “application is determined not to comply with the applicable requirements.” See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.029(d). Again, this is a form, content and procedure challenge, not a challenge to Devine’s 10 eligibility to the office.",Party Submissions,5.9292345,6.1284223,6.3750854
"Limit on Accounts. Notwithstanding the foregoing or anything contained herein to the contrary, unless otherwise determined by the Committee, in no event shall any Participant be permitted to have more than five (5) Separation from Service Accounts and/or Specified Date Accounts in total (in addition to the Retirement Account) with an Account Balance greater than zero, and any new Deferrals made once such limits are reached may only be made to an existing Account.",Contract,6.211445,6.9454513,7.6757584
"S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. 1943). Of course, contractual provisions may be used to accomplish such waivers. See Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 60-61 (Tex.",Party Submissions,4.451937,5.394315,6.804033
"While the issue here is vitally important, it is also sufficiently narrow— and the error is so clear from the statute’s plain language—that the Court should consider a per curiam reversal to correct the errors below.",Party Submissions,15.217904,19.067165,15.966779
"The trial court's abatement orders state as follows: [A]ll further proceedings relating to the Plaintiff's causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade [**26] Practices Act [""DTPA""], breach of contract, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in this cause are hereby ABATED AND STAYED under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction until such time as the Court may lift this abatement by written order rendered after the filing of a motion to revive these causes of action and after the Court has conducted a hearing on said motion.",Party Submissions,5.424958,5.388331,6.237001
"The experts in this case were qualified to opine on standard of care, breach, and causation. Issue No. 4: Chapter 74 unambiguously requires an objection to the sufficiency of an expert report to be made “no later of the 21 st day after the date the report is served or the 21st day after the date the defendant’s answer is filed, failing which all objections are waived.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(a). The court of appeals erred when it failed to limit its review to the providers’ specific objections, failed to distinguish between the providers ’ objections, and raised and sustained objections that the providers themselves had never asserted at any stage of the proceeding.",Party Submissions,6.744108,7.3771706,7.2892385
"But even setting aside Walker’s refusal to pursue judicial relief through the ordinary course, Walker nonetheless lacks a compelling reason to have sought mandamus in this Court initially. As Walker acknowledges (at 3-4), the Election Code confers concurrent jurisdiction on this Court and the courts of appeals to issue mandamus relief to enforce legal duties imposed by the Code. Tex. Elec. Code § 273.061(a). Walker therefore must offer a “compelling reason” for failing to first seek mandamus relief from the appropriate court of appeals. Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(e). Walker’s sole reason is the apparent time pressure surrounding his claim: as he candidly admits (at 2), the electoral process is well underway, and counties throughout Texas 1 Indeed, Walker’s refusal to pursue relief in a trial court highlights another problem with his application for mandamus relief: no court has ever found facts regarding Walker’s immensely fact-specific disqualification claim against Devine. Despite Walker’s bare assertion (at 13-14) that this Court need resolve no factual disputes to grant him relief, the paucity of a factual record resolving any underlying factual issues demonstrates further that mandamus is inappropriate here.",Party Submissions,7.8299637,7.9143476,8.31624
"The agreement's stipulation, making each party individually responsible for all inherent costs, starkly tilts the scales in favor of large, well-funded entities like Lennar, rendering individual claimants like Rafiei vulnerable to disproportionate financial duress. Rafiei's option to alleviate this via the Flexible Fee Schedule is marred by the looming peril of case closure by the AAA, emphasizing the fiscal stranglehold this agreement potentially places on him.",Party Submissions,21.805939,24.01908,22.572872
Claimants agree to conduct a reasonable search for and produce documents responsive to this request that are in the Claimants’ possession and/or control.,Legal Decisions,8.80494,12.352917,11.246558
"DAVID M. MEDINA Texas State Bar No. 00000088 david.medina@chamberlainlaw.com STEVEN J. KNIGHT Texas State Bar No. 24012975 steven.knight@chamberlainlaw.com AMBER ALI Texas State Bar No. 24109573 amber.ali@chamberlainlaw.com 1200 Smith Street, Suite 1400 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 658-1818 The petition for review preserved Issue No. 3 for argument pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 53.2(i). The rule states that the petition need not argue every issue included in the appeal. Id. Any issue not argued can be briefed at a later time if requested by the Court. Id. Petitioners’ motion for rehearing asks the Court to reconsider the petition. Importantly, the rules do not limit the scope of a motion for rehearing to only issues briefed in the petition. Respondents fail to cite any authority supporting their contention that Petitioners’ motion is improper.",Party Submissions,5.0767484,4.7390356,5.2707767
"Petitioner also argues that the foreclosure transformed the Note into a non-real estate note, but there is no law supporting such a “conversion” theory in which the Note should be re-christened based on the borrower’s default. Petitioner would have a real estate note magically lose its contractual provisions for optional acceleration depending on the borrower’s circumstances and behavior, despite it occurring well into the lifespan of the loan. Yet even if the Note were transformed, Respondent still had plenty of time to choose when to accelerate and sue: either four years after maturity or acceleration, or four years after each payment was due (including the final maturity payment where any unpaid amount is then due), because a breach occurs each time an installment payment is missed. Gabriel v. Alhabbal, 618 S.W.2d at 897 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.).",Party Submissions,10.725381,10.275745,11.15941
"Respondent did not breach the RER Contract by rejecting Second Claimant’s Third Extension Request. Neither the RER Contract nor Peruvian law provide an entitlement to an extension of the Actual COS or the Termination Date of the Contract or an obligation on Respondent to grant one. To the contrary, such an extension would have been inconsistent with the terms of the RER Contract and binding provisions of the RER Regulations. 1214. It follows from the Tribunal’s findings on the denial of the Third Extension Request in relation to the RER Contract that this same denial is not a breach of the FET standard. The denial of the Third Extension Request was consistent with, and required by, the applicable legal regime at that time.",Legal Decisions,8.646512,7.3977675,8.625172
"Q: Okay, and using that value did they [Pritchard & Abbott] determine what was the total value of the transmission lines in Texas? A: Of just the lines it was $496,193,596. Q: Okay. And did you guys agree to that as well? A: Yes sir. There is no document in the record reflecting an “agreement” to the “total value of the lines in Texas.” The agreement in question is to the value of Oncor’s property in Wilbarger County, that value that Oncor is by this action trying to renege. I C.R. 18. Furthermore, the testimony is vague as best. When answering affirmatively to the question “did you guys agree to that as well,” did the witness mean that Oncor or Duff & Phelps (Oncor’s agent) concur with the rationale or did one of those parties reach some unrecorded understanding with Pritchard & Abbott? Or was the “agree[d] to” matter something else entirely? Furthermore, the “total value of the transmission lines in Texas” is not the subject of this petition. The agreed upon value on the 2019 Wilbarger CAD roll is the issue. The objected to testimony should be stricken and ignored. TEX. R. APP. P. 53.4.",Party Submissions,11.0263,11.77511,11.566437
"Taking Weatherford’s “mixture” argument the full distance, Weatherford asks the Court to adopt an arbitrary classification system to classify part of Midland’s sewage system as a “solid waste facility” under the jurisdiction of the SWDA, and the remainder of the system as a domestic sewage system, exempted by the SWDA, placing an arbitrary and nonexistent burden upon Midland to show the difference. Simply put, Weatherford would ask the court to create a tangled regulatory scheme treating sewer pipe that hypothetically transports certain wastes as a “solid waste facility” subject to the SWDA, and then sewer pipe conveying mixed contaminants and household sewage as a sewer regulated by Chapter 26 of the TWC. Such a pipe-by-pipe analysis is neither required by R.R. Street, nor would it make any regulatory sense to invent such a burdensome and arbitrary classification system. Midland met its threshold jurisdictional burden by affirmatively showing that a sewage system is not a solid waste facility. Weatherford did not provide any evidence in response, and it cannot cite authority for its novel-proposed rule that sections “ A-C ” of a sewer collection system are, in actuality a “solid waste facility,” but sections “D-Z” of the sewer collection system are actually sewer pipe exempt from the SWDA. Such a distinction is not found in the SWDA statute, it is not found in prior case law, and that is because Weatherford’s desired rule is a product of its own construction as it attempts to ram-rod a landfill statute onto a municipal sewer system for cost-recovery purposes.",Party Submissions,9.975635,10.168,10.211998
"In her summary-judgment response and on appeal, Douglas does not specifically use the term ""unconscionable."" However, Douglas suggests she was precluded from filing a workers' compensation claim based on Moody's initial position that she was not injured in the course and scope of her employment; therefore, she will receive no form of recovery if Moody is allowed to now reverse its position. This reasoning is insufficient to raise a material fact issue on whether it would be unconscionable for Moody to rely on the exclusivity provision of the act as a bar to this suit, despite its earlier inconsistent position.",Party Submissions,8.402556,9.885884,9.814273
"In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., Inc., 107 S.W.3d 832 (2003) LAB.CODE ANN. § 410.303. Therefore, the trial court would controvert that provision by trying the negligence claims while judicial review is pending.",Party Submissions,10.765254,14.812855,13.149391
"Griggs stands for a modest proposition: Two courts should avoid exercising control over the same order or judgment simultaneously. The problem Griggs identifies is the “danger a district court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously analyzing the same judgment.” Id., at 59, 103 S.Ct. 400. The cure Griggs prescribes is that “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal ... divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Id., at 58, 103 S.Ct. 400.",Party Submissions,5.6924543,6.0940742,6.651766
"Relief sought : This Court should deny Relator’s petition and should deny Relator’s motion for temporary relief because (1) Relator seeks to disrupt an ongoing or imminent election; (2) under the equitable principles that control mandamus, Relator’s delay precludes relief; (3) the appropriate remedy for any technical defects is a chance to cure, and (4) removing Justice Devine from the ballot would violate the U.S. and Texas Constitutions.",Party Submissions,8.571257,9.194799,9.9447775
"Account. Account means a bookkeeping account maintained by the Committee to record the payment obligation of a Participating Employer to a Participant as determined under the terms of the Plan (and for clarity, shall include each Retirement Account, each Separation from Service Account and each Specified Date Account). The Committee may maintain an Account to record the total obligation to a Participant and component Accounts to reflect amounts payable at different times and in different forms. Reference to an Account means any such Account established by the Committee, as the context requires.",Contract,8.509339,8.552835,10.265553
"There is no SWDA requirement for the cost-recovery defendant to prove a mixture of household sewage with industrial waste to qualify for the domestic sewage exclusion. Weatherford’s self-serving interpretation of the SWDA statute is not supported in this Court’s R.R. Street precedent, but instead is Weatherford’s attempt to introduce an evidentiary burden where none exists. In essence, Weatherford contends that: (1) any discharge (even an illicit discharge prohibited by law) is governed by the SWDA; unless (2) the recipient can prove a mixture of industrial discharges with household wastes; and (3) barring such a defendant’s proof-of-mixture showing, the domestic sewage exclusion cannot apply. Weatherford does not offer authority for such a burden-shifting obligation under the SWDA when jurisdiction has not been established, and that is because none exists.",Party Submissions,10.100473,9.592002,10.477647
"Accordingly, the trial court's Order Granting Temporary Injunction is hereby reversed and declared void, and the temporary injunction is dissolved. Interfirst, 715 S.W.2d 640.",Party Submissions,7.521184,9.478435,9.45835
"The Delapenas filed a response to the plea and submitted their own jurisdictional evidence, including a copy of a “Texas Health and Human Services Commission Child -Care Licensing Investigation Report. ” Citing multiple acts and omissions, the report concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that the camp’s director breached the duty of care owed to Catiana and that his “ negligence result[ed] in the death of [a] child in his care.” In particular, the report found that the director placed camp counselors in positions where they could not monitor the shallow end of the pool. According to the report, the director then “released” some children, including Catiana, into the shallow end without life jackets, even though these children had not taken swim tests and the Delapenas had informed the camp that Catiana could not swim.",Party Submissions,9.067781,10.264648,9.642705
"FTC Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation dated 7 October 2003; Arbitration Rule 67 29.1. If a request for the submission of an amicus curiae brief is filed by the date indicated in Annex B, the Tribunal will give the appropriate directions in the exercise of its powers under Arbitration Rule 67 and take into consideration the recommendation of the North American Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party participation of 7 October 2003.",Legal Decisions,9.190047,11.32584,10.49035
"HN5 [ ] ""Under the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, the Legislature grants an administrative agency the sole authority to make the initial determination in a dispute."" Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002). If an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute until the party has exhausted all of the administrative remedies within the agency. See In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321-22 (Tex. 2004) ; Subaru of Am., Inc., 84 S.W.3d at 221. Absent subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court must dismiss any claim within the agency's exclusive jurisdiction. See In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d at 322 .",Party Submissions,3.7553675,3.9688756,4.2815905
"We conclude that French v. French, and subsequent cases erred in characterizing nonvested pension rights as expectancies and in denying the trial courts the authority to divide such rights as community property. This mischaracterization of pension rights has, and unless overturned, will continue to result in inequitable division of community assets.. . .",Party Submissions,13.029514,13.415858,15.903581
"That same analysis applies here. By putting up signs reflecting its policy that day camps shall be denied access if a camp has too few staff, the City encouraged visitor’s reliance that its employees were monitoring the number of staff and would either provide adequate warning or deny access to the pool. See id.; SCR79. Crucially, by stating that failure to comply would result in denial of access, the City “attempted to control the conduct of visitors to” Buttercup pool. See id.; SCR79. As this Court has explained, “the party with the power of control or expulsion is in the best position to protect against the harm.” Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1993).",Party Submissions,11.877189,12.5108,12.707477
"Rabbi Trust. A Participating Employer may, in its sole discretion, establish a grantor trust, commonly known as a rabbi trust, as a vehicle for accumulating assets to pay benefits under the Plan. Payments under the Plan may be paid from the general assets of the Participating Employer or from the assets of any such rabbi trust. Payment from any such source shall reduce the obligation owed to the Participant or Beneficiary under the Plan.",Contract,6.1124916,4.892856,6.5321674
"Scott A. Keller I certify that this brief contains 4,497, words excluding the portions of the brief exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,10.42346,15.594685,19.52155
"Each Participant may, pursuant to such procedures as the Committee may specify, designate one or more Beneficiaries in connection with the Plan. If a Participant is married or has a registered domestic partner and names someone other than his or her spouse or domestic partner, as applicable, as a primary Beneficiary with respect to any portion of his or her Accounts, spousal/partner consent shall be required to be provided in a form designated by the Committee, executed by such Participant’s spouse/partner and returned to the Committee. A Participant may change or revoke a Beneficiary designation by delivering to the Committee a new designation (or revocation). Any designation or revocation shall be effective only if it is received in proper form by the Committee. However, when so received, the designation or revocation shall be effective as of the date the notice is executed, but without prejudice to any Employer on account of any payment made before the change is recorded. The last effective designation received by the Committee shall supersede all prior designations. If a Participant dies without having effectively designated a Beneficiary, or if no Beneficiary survives the Participant, the Death Benefit shall be payable (i) to his or her surviving spouse/domestic partner, or (ii) if the Participant is not survived by his or her spouse/domestic partner, to his or her estate. A former spouse/domestic partner shall have no interest under the Plan, as Beneficiary or otherwise, unless the Participant designates such person as a Beneficiary after dissolution of the marriage/partnership, except to the extent provided under the terms of a domestic relations order as described in Code Section 414(p)(1)(B).",Contract,3.606054,3.5695806,3.7544124
"PCC : The requested documents must be in Obnova’s, i.e., Claimants’ possession, custody or control since these agreements were concluded by Obnova. In any event, Agreement no. 1819 dated 16 March 2006 has already been provided as exhibit R-016. Respondent has already conducted a reasonable search and has not located any other lease agreements concluded between Serbia or Luka Beograd on one side and Obnova on other side.",Legal Decisions,17.321898,15.205606,18.699808
"The Lawyers have already been through two malpractice trials; they should not be required to go through another one — and they question whether at this point any trial could occur unaffected by collusion and position shifting. After all, the BNC Sellers and their lawyers weren’t the only ones who shifted positions. So did HSMiller. In the original trial its representatives fully supported its agent Defterios and not once suggested to the Lawyers that it was concerned that he was lying, which would have triggered an inquiry into whether separate counsel should be hired.",Party Submissions,26.990946,25.791895,29.926514
"Your attention is drawn to the particular features of those waters, namely a water column that falls under the international regime of the high seas as reflected in Part VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), on the one hand, but, at the same time, waters superjacent to the extended continental shelves of Norway and the Russian Federation, which fall under part VI of UNCLOS, on the other.",Legal Decisions,7.5657763,7.778674,7.6795645
"It follows from this classification of snow crab as “sedentary species” that only the relevant coastal States, i.e. Norway and the Russian Federation, are entitled to exploit (i.e. to harvest) it by virtue of their sovereign rights under the continental shelf regime of UNCLOS and that, as spelled out in Article 77(2) of UNCLOS, no other state is able to do so unless it has obtained the coastal State’s explicit consent. Moreover, the coastal State’s rights are exclusive in a sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake any such activities without the express consent of the coastal state.",Legal Decisions,6.9223332,6.7132487,6.855674
"To require the Director of the Office of Personnel Management to establish a pilot program to identify and refer veterans for potential employment with Federal land management agencies, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.057346,5.036812,6.5178676
"See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.02, § 3(a) (amended 2011) (""...an agency protesting the expunction may appeal....). Thus, the County's standing is not the issue.",Party Submissions,8.174278,12.384078,11.884094
"When the Legislature created Chapter 91, it left parties the freedom of contract to opt entirely out of that scheme in favor of whatever terms parties agreed to live by. The parties did so here. As a result, their agreement should be construed in light of the common-law understanding that has prevailed since Crider, Roane, and Lewis.",Party Submissions,18.900984,20.048353,20.86465
"This was the background against which Congress enacted § 16. And—importantly— courts understood stays as discretionary with respect to interlocutory appeals concerning arbitrability. Before Congress enacted § 16, parties brought interlocutory arbitrability appeals under other sources of appellate jurisdiction, and courts treated stays as discretionary, not mandatory. 2 Yet, according to the majority, Congress sought to displace that common understanding when it enacted § 16 —without saying anything at all about stays pending appeal.",Party Submissions,9.457827,10.045548,10.800678
"McCarthy's tools or equipment, Subcontractor shall do so at its sole risk and as provided in Paragraph 5.1 hereof shall defend, indemnify and hold McCarthy and the others harmless, as required in Paragraph 5.1 hereof, from any claims (including any claims by or against McCarthy relating to any McCarthy personnel who are used to operate the tools and/or equipment and including any claims against McCarthy by others that McCarthy is obligated to indemnify), loss, damage and/or expenses, including but not limited to attorney's fee and court costs, resulting from the use of such tools and equipment by Subcontractor, regardless of whether or not arising from the use or being caused in part by McCarthy’s negligence or whether McCarthy operated such tools and equipment for Subcontractor.",Party Submissions,6.609516,6.770821,6.88746
"But of these 20,000+ shares granted, only approximately 6,000 shares were found to be community property and divided in the decree. CR:471,474. This meant that over 16,000 shares were deemed to be Heath ’s separate property, and not divided, when they should have been. Based on the recent share price of $118, this deprived the community of over $1 million. This was wrong, and it should have been presented to a jury to determine the community interest, before division. of a jury trial that is contrary to existing law. But the justification for the denial of a jury trial is even more alarming in the Panel’s opinion regarding waiver: “Appellant did not object, did not indicate that appellee had failed to disclose any separate property interest to be decided at trial, and did not bring up her jury request.” Opinion at 5. Here, even though Kacey had perfected a jury request that had been denied on the representation that there were no separate property claims, the Panel’s Opinio n now stands as authority that a jury right can be denied by evidence at the end of trial. That is dangerous.",Party Submissions,14.120398,13.940554,14.851479
"Whereas the US argues that the claims are “inchoate” and therefore not actionable under the BIT, the Claimants maintain that their BIT claims are ripe for resolution.",Legal Decisions,13.334701,11.158972,11.766343
"To amend the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 to permit leave for bone marrow or blood stem cell donation, and for other purposes.",Legislation,3.3449802,3.1129367,3.3393748
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session; the 1st C.S.; the 2nd C.S.; the 3rd C.S. and the 4th C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the November 7, 2023 election results.",Party Submissions,4.4236245,3.9969761,5.1074567
The United States objects to Request No. 2.d for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a.,Legal Decisions,8.135031,12.486814,14.335621
"The Benefits Subsidy will be paid to the Participant in one-lump sum payment on the Company payday specified in the Participant’s Agreement, provided that MSC had previously received from such Participant a fully executed Agreement and any revocation period applicable to the Agreement expired without revocation by the Participant.",Contract,12.531165,9.546967,13.825915
"Memorial at para. 2. As Claimants have observed, Annex 14 C provides that an investment is a legacy investment only if it (1) existed when NAFTA was in force and (2) remained in existence when USMCA entered into force.",Legal Decisions,20.17537,24.03916,22.605331
"Westwood unquestionably was the proper party to bring claims for constructive eviction and breach of contract because it was the party to the lease. (16RR36 (PX7); 10RR273-74) And Westwood was the entity that suffered the brunt of Respondents’ unlawful interference with its right to possess the premises. That made it the proper party to bring claims for breach of contract and constructive eviction. By contrast, Westwood Motors was never a party to this case.",Party Submissions,10.425636,11.011879,11.486851
"To include water supply and water conservation as a primary mission of the Corps of Engineers in planning, designing, constructing, modifying, operating, and maintaining water resources development projects, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.4492607,6.934756,7.391296
"In further objecting to the Amarillo Court’s opinion, the Walkers claim the Court “reviewed the causation objection de novo like it would an appeal from a summary judgment.” (Pet. Br. at 36-39). They suggest comparing the lower court’s opinion with Wright’s holding, which reversed the court of appeals because the trial court “could have reasonably determined” the expert’s report was deficient. (Pet. Br. at 37). Again, the Amarillo Court specifically said otherwise.",Party Submissions,11.2740345,12.187151,12.578537
"There is similarly no explanation of causation with respect to the remaining alleged faults regarding the administration of medication. No expert explained how or why administration or lack of administration of any drug at any point in time contributed to the alleged prolonged second stage labor and fetal heart rate abnormalities. There is no explanation of whether H.W. could have or would have been delivered sooner had different medications been given. The reader is simply left to fill in the blanks as to why different medication administration would have made a difference. Even inferring that there is a correlation between Pitocin and contraction strength, missing was any explanation linking contractions to the alleged asphyxia or stroke. As the lower court noted, it remained a mystery “how or why the variable heart rates experienced by [H.W.] before, during, or after the contractions could or would cause asphyxia in general or to a level sufficient to result in an infarction.” Id. at *5.",Party Submissions,11.115944,12.168305,11.828317
"In performing these duties, the parenting facilitator shall comply with the standard of care that applies to the parenting facilitator's professional license.",Party Submissions,7.979806,10.79834,11.436317
"Decision of the First Municipality Court in Belgrade no. I. n. 6447/64 dated 14 October 1964 referred in Articles 1, 3 and 4 of the agreement submitted by Serbia as its exhibit R-009, together with the complete file for the proceedings in which the decision was issued.",Legal Decisions,12.914248,14.320536,15.8101635
"To amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to reduce the production and use of certain single-use plastic products and packaging, to improve the responsibility of producers in the design, collection, reuse, recycling, and disposal of consumer products and packaging, to prevent pollution from consumer products and packaging from entering into animal and human food chains and waterways, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.0131993,4.1151543,4.8360133
"McCarthy within ten (10) days after receipt by Subcontractor of this Agreement scheduling information, including durations, planned crew sizes, planned procurement dates, planned submission dates of required shop drawings, product data and samples for Subcontractor's Work, (including the activities of its subcontractors, vendors and suppliers). Based upon this information and similar such data from the other Subcontractors, McCarthy shall prepare the schedule of the Work (“Project Schedule”) establishing the sequence and time requirements of all work activities. McCarthy, as may be necessary, may revise such Project Schedule with the cooperation of Subcontractor as the Work progresses. Subcontractor acknowledges that revisions may be made in such Project Schedule and agrees to make no claim for acceleration or delay by reason of such revisions so long as such revisions are of the type normally experienced in Work of this scope and complexity. In the event Subcontractor is unable to maintain progress in accordance with the Project Schedule by reason of events for which extensions of time are permitted in the Contract Documents, Subcontractor's time for completion shall be extended for a reasonable, mutually agreed upon time, provided that a time extension is given by the Owner to McCarthy, and further, provided that notification of delay is given as provided herein. This time extension shall be the sole remedy for such delays. Subcontractor shall not be entitled to recover damages from McCarthy for any delays not solely caused by McCarthy and subject to the provisions of this Paragraph 3.1 if McCarthy is not fully compensated by the Owner.",Party Submissions,7.090631,6.9590244,7.313458
"HN10 [ ] Statute of Limitations, Time Limitations The suit for judicial review will result in a judgment that will, indeed, have a practical legal effect on the controversy. Moreover, while the statute of limitations governing a claim for death benefits generally runs on the one-year anniversary of the date of the employee's death. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 409.007(a). The passing of that anniversary is not an absolute bar to asserting such a claim. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 409.007(a), (b)(2). Failure to file in the time required bars the claim unless good cause exists for the failure to file a claim.",Party Submissions,7.5625873,8.885957,8.607944
"Disability Benefit. Disability Benefit means the benefit payable under the Plan upon the Participant’s Disability, as provided under Section 6.1 of the Plan.",Contract,5.0616894,4.9789762,6.60385
"Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that paraprofessionals and education support staff should have fair compensation, benefits, and working conditions.",Legislation,8.127506,7.4034243,9.052929
"To require the Secretary of Agriculture to convey certain National Forest System land in the Chequamegon-Nicolet National Forest to Tony’s Wabeno Redi-Mix, LLC, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.6859426,7.1893377,6.8809195
WHEREAS: It is imperative that the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources and the Ministry of Public Health intervene in the recovery of the environmental and health situation of the Province of Santo Domingo and the National District as soon as possible by adopting the appropriate environmental and health measures since the degree of the impact caused by the solid waste of this landfill is quite high and can become a cluster for the outbreak of various diseases and pose a serious health problem for the entire population.,Legal Decisions,11.14175,12.058927,12.599241
"The issue of the general exemption as regards any action taken to protect a State’s own national security interests 217. Article XVII(2) of Annex III of the Treaty, relied upon by Respondent, sets forth: ARTICLE XVII(2) GENERAL EXEMPTIONS This Agreement shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the protection of its own national security interests.",Legal Decisions,10.049911,9.186067,10.220433
"These documents were contained in hardcopy or electronic files on computers, phones, hard drives and/or USB keys belonging to the Claimant that were seized by the Respondent either during his arrestation or his detention and not returned to the Claimant since then. The requested information is therefore within the possession of the relevant Qatari governmental entities, agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore the Respondent is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,12.094222,12.84508,12.831432
"Rob Condon is a Texas entrepreneur, who has developed valuable ideas and successful companies based on his knowledge of the energy business. CR454. Alpesh Kadakia is a California-based investor (CR462) who, with his brother Ruchir,2 leveraged his interest in Gladieux Energy LLC into a fiduciary relationship with CKC Partners, LLC. Without disclosing his actions to Condon, Alpesh usurped corporate opportunities and diverted corporate assets—unlawful self- dealing—that transferred the value of CKC Partners to companies controlled by the Kadakia brothers. CR463-65.",Party Submissions,17.235727,18.955658,19.13754
"When the Court has discussed a violation of an applicable legal standard and an RTP designation, the “applicable legal standard” involved either strictly common law duties arising in tort or statutory duties that codified common law tort precepts. For example, in 26 Nabors Well Services, Ltd. v. Romero, the Court held that the then current version of Chapter 33 required courts to submit the contributory negligence of car passengers who claim damages but fail to wear a seat belt. 456 S.W.3d 553, 561-62 (Tex. 2015). The Court reached that conclusion based on the plain language of Chapter 33, on the role of seat belts in reducing injuries, and the criminal penalties associated with not wearing a seat belt. Id. at 564-65.",Party Submissions,8.734484,8.569375,8.983257
The Opinion below held that the language “any and all obligations of the Guarantor. .. shall terminate upon” a termination-triggering event not only terminated the guaranty as an ongoing matter but also vitiated the guarantor’s prior breach of the agreement and all past-due amounts that were already the subject of pending litigation. (Slip Op. 18.) The holding effectively renders any guaranty a nullity.,Party Submissions,10.053451,11.037174,10.900033
"As the tribunal in Commerce Group observed, the waiver provision permits other concurrent or parallel domestic proceedings where claims relating to different measures at issue in such proceedings are “separate and distinct” and the measures can be “teased apart.” 82 106. In this case, the fact that the two proceedings are “separate and distinct” has already been confirmed by the Tribunal, as the measures that are being challenged in each of the two arbitrations are not the same. There is therefore no need for the “teasing apart” of the “enforcement measures” (before this Tribunal) from the “entitlement measures” (for resolution before the VAT Tribunal). However, the position taken by the U.S. Government in Finely Resources, Inc. and Others v. Mexico confirms that a finding of breach of waivers provided requires careful analysis and any determination made should consider other possible outcomes that permit the ongoing arbitration to continue.",Party Submissions,15.994668,13.889006,16.435947
"In short, the bankruptcy proceedings do not preempt action by this Court. No specific laws are at issue here as in Federal Mogul. The Bankruptcy Court was not asked to approve a Plan that would require collusion and position shifting in later litigation outside of bankruptcy. A ruling by this Court that HSMiller and its former opponent cannot collude and switch legal positions in no way interferes with the Bankruptcy Court’s order approving a plan that gave no hint of future collusion and position shifting. And such a ruling is consistent with the Court’s decision in Browning v. Prostok, 19 in which the party was attempting to relitigate issues at the core of the bankruptcy. 165 S.W.3dd 336, 336, 339-40 (Tex. 2008).",Party Submissions,13.887891,11.880361,14.595301
"The trial court was well within its discretion to order matters in the litigation so that jurisdictional issues could be settled as soon as practicable. The Texas Supreme Court has decl ared its “adher[ence] to the fundamental precept that a court must not proceed on the merits of a case until legitimate challenges to its jurisdiction have been decided. ” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.",Party Submissions,9.85206,9.64865,10.852173
"To make improvements to the child tax credit, to provide tax incentives to promote economic growth, to provide special rules for the taxation of certain residents of Tai-wan with income from sources within the United States, to provide tax relief with respect to certain Federal disasters, to make improvements to the low-income housing tax credit, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.9794884,8.317884,7.6307635
"The stability of the legal and business environment is directly linked to the investor’s justified expectations. The Tribunal acknowledges that such expectations are an important element of fair and equitable treatment. At the same time, it is mindful of their limitations. To be protected, the investor’s expectations must be legitimate and reasonable at the time when 718 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, 31 July 2001 (AL RA-302).",Legal Decisions,8.662117,10.955107,8.858411
"For the avoidance of doubt, Claimant notes that its readiness to limit its request in this matter is not to be construed as an acceptance of all of Respondent’s objections regarding the Request. Further the Claimant herein reserves its right to request the production of any such Documents at a later stage after the Respondent has had the opportunity to respond to the allegations.",Legal Decisions,9.796039,9.282198,9.969571
"Jacob Gaslin on behalf of Adam Schiffer Bar No. 17745763 jgaslin@shjlawfirm.com Envelope ID: 80549147 Filing Code Description: Brief on the Merits (all briefs) Filing Description: Real Parties in Interest McCarthy Building Companies, Inc.'s & Travelers Casualty and Surety Company's Brief on the Merits Status as of 10/12/2023 5:13 PM CST MVP, a joint venture between Magellan Midstream Partners, L.P. and an affiliate of Valero Energy Corporation, is a refined-products terminalling company and the owner and operator of a marine terminal located along the Houston Ship Channel. McCarthy Building Companies, Inc. is a construction company. On April 23, 2018, MVP and McCarthy entered into the Major Construction Contract (“MCC”), under which McCarthy agreed to furnish construction and related services for MVP’s Pasadena Terminal Phase 2 Project (the “Project”) on the Houston Ship Channel. The Project included constructing new docks and dredging the basin of the new marine terminal to allow refinery tankers and other large vessels to dock at the terminal.",Party Submissions,7.574271,7.016423,8.128731
"Petitioner UTRGV respectfully requests this Court grant review, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and render judgment dismissing Respondent’s claims with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. UTRGV prays for all other relief to which it may be entitled.",Party Submissions,5.1794944,6.234441,6.36784
"Texas Bar No. 24007951 kweaber@mayfield-lawfirm.com Maxor Building 320 S. Polk, Suite 400 Amarillo, Texas 79101 (806) 242-0152 ATTORNEYS FOR I hereby certify that we prepared this Brief using Microsoft Word 2016, which indicated that the total word count (exclusive of those items listed in rule 9.4(i)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, as amended) is 7,285 words.",Party Submissions,7.3567243,7.310686,9.260454
"Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to paragraph 1 of Annex 14-C of USMCA November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent in good faith, to obtain Canada’s and Mexico’s consent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to paragraph 1 of Annex 14-C of USMCA.",Legal Decisions,6.171955,6.6185813,6.4713397
The United States objects to Request No. 3.g for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.,Legal Decisions,8.672663,13.718232,15.544927
"Two causes are before us, both stemming from a workers' compensation case in which a former employee of Sonic Systems International, Inc., a Texas corporation, was injured on the job while working in Alabama. Texas Mutual Insurance Co. (""TMI""), Sonic's workers' compensation carrier, denied coverage for the injury, and Sonic filed suit against TMI for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and deceptive trade practices claims (the ""contract claims""). Subsequently, Sonic also sought reimbursement under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (""TWCA"") for voluntary payments it made to the injured employee. In October 2003, Sonic's contract claims were abated pending a final resolution of the reimbursement claim.",Party Submissions,4.4398327,5.124658,5.0296826
"Rosenthal was a defamation-by-gist case concerning an article that was solely about the plaintiff herself and found to be not about a matter of public concern.4 The Program at issue here, on the other hand, is not solely, or even primarily, about Barina, but rather about a grave issue of public interest—whether the country’s guardianship system, including the courts, authorizes the financial exploitation of its wards.5 At the heart of Barina’s argument and the appellate court’s decision lies the misguided premise that everything said in the Program, even if it is about a ward in Massachusetts or is an expert opinion unrelated to Thrash, specifically defames Barina. As a matter of law, Texas courts reject such claims where a publication mentions a defamation plaintiff only within a “larger context.” Tatum at 628. A trio of Texas Supreme Court cases has made this clear.",Party Submissions,12.800107,14.829148,13.421585
"Claimants allege that they expected to be able to develop Obnova's premises for residential and commercial purposes, based on the 2003 RP. Claimants' case is that the 2013 DRP breached the Cyprus-Serbia BIT because it changed this designation to the bus loop. At the same time, Claimants admit that already in 2008 Obnova heard about the City of Belgrade's idea to designate the Dunavska Plots for the bus loop and wrote a letter to the City asking for relocation of the bus loop.",Legal Decisions,12.616721,12.6789665,12.61104
"Both parties rely on In re Luby's Cafeterias, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding), to support their positions. In Luby's, we recognized the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction over compensability. In that case, a Luby's employee filed a workers' compensation claim after she was assaulted by a fellow employee. Id. at 814. The carrier originally denied the claim on the grounds the employee did not sustain a compensable injury but later reopened the claim at the employer's urging after new information was revealed.",Party Submissions,4.0115523,4.623625,4.727892
"The Supreme Court, Justice Kavanaugh, held that district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal on the issue of arbitrability is ongoing; abrogating Britton v. Co-op Banking Group, 916 F. 2d 1405 and Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, 661 F.3d 904.",Party Submissions,8.915152,10.118572,10.4403925
"At trial, HSMiller presented no evidence on the objective prong of gross negligence. Here, HSMiller asserts little argument about the RTP decision itself. It focusses instead on evidence it argues shows the “magnitude” of risk (potential verdict exposure) HSMiller faced in the underlying litigation, Resp. Br. at 56, and evidence about Terry’s 37 beliefs about Defterios’s likelihood of fraud liability.7 Resp’t’s Br. at 57. This is not evidence of the objective prong of gross negligence, which looks to the specific alleged acts or omissions from the actor’s perspective “at the time” of the alleged act or omission. E.g., Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d at 137.",Party Submissions,12.151736,11.699335,13.001196
"Synopsis Representatives of estate of deceased employee electrocuted while washing his car at employer's premises sued employer for negligence. The 127th District Court, Harris County, Sharolyn Wood, J., denied employer's motion to abate until related appeal to another court in workers' compensation action was decided, and employer filed petition for writ of mandamus and a request for temporary relief. The Court of Appeals, Eva M. Guzman, J., held that: (1) court in county in which workers' compensation carrier was seeking judicial relief from appeals panel decision had exclusive jurisdiction over issue of whether employee's death occurred during the course and scope of employment; (2) trial court abused its discretion in refusing to abate negligence action; (3) employer did not have an adequate remedy by appeal from trial court's abuse of discretion; and (4) employer could not waive mandamus relief.",Party Submissions,6.2043805,6.096914,6.388916
"Lastly, if the evidence on a point is more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the legal sufficiency standard but less than that required for factual sufficiency, the proper remedy is to remand for a new trial as opposed to render the court of appeals’ own judgment.",Party Submissions,10.511623,11.5635195,12.977415
"That does not mean experts must use the magic words “proximate cause” or “foreseeability”; but, an expert must explain, factually, how proximate cause will be proven. Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P. v. Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d 453, 460 (Tex. 2017). Only when an expert addresses both aspects of proximate cause— foreseeability and cause in fact—will a report be deemed acceptable. Id.",Party Submissions,7.5060716,8.176805,9.012385
"To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to enhance the paid family and medical leave credit, and for other purposes.",Legislation,3.4535143,2.9375255,3.1137698
Dr. Null does not have experience or training in obstetrics or gynecology or labor and delivery. He does not even purport to know the standard of care appliable to the BSA nurses. (CR.804-05) He is not actively practicing health care in these areas. (CR.807) Any opinion on these topics is outside his area of expertise. The Walkers do not argue otherwise.,Party Submissions,13.654052,14.858063,17.65086
"B, U : The request is unduly and overly broad and burdensome as it covers a period of no less than 59 years. Respondent cannot reasonably be requested to produce all existing aerial and/or satellite photos from this time period extending almost to half century that relate to the Dunavska Plots. In the same vein, it would be unreasonably burdensome to require Respondent to identify other authorities, not listed in Claimants' 70 Counter-Memorial, ¶ 63.",Legal Decisions,19.207582,23.986637,20.545841
"Appellants' brief failed to include several significant facts. On October 8, 2015, at about 6:47 a.m., Gernal Randolph Mann (“Mann”), an employee of Berry *4 Contracting, L.P., d/b/a Bay LTD. (“Bay”), was a pedestrian traveling northbound on Up River Road. 2 Juan Tomas Hernandez Alvarez (“Alvarez”), another employee of Bay, was the operator of a motor vehicle traveling westbound on Up River Road, and drove his motor vehicle into and collided with the person of Mann. 3 Bay owned the motor vehicle operated by Alvarez. 4 At the time of the accident, Bay had assigned Mann to a project taking place at Valero's BERRY CONTRACTING, L.P., d/b/a Bay Ltd. And Juan..., 2017 WL 1806766...",Party Submissions,9.932573,8.464476,10.32658
"The other policy was procured by Bay for the general protection of its employees (the “standard policy”). When Bay signed the ROCIP policy, it also executed a document which excluded any work at the refinery from the scope of its standard policy. Thus, according to Bay, any work-related injury to a Bay employee was to be covered under either Valero's ROCIP policy or Bay's standard policy, but not both. Following Mann's injury, Bay submitted notice to the carriers for both policies. Both denied coverage. The agent for the standard-policy carrier asserted that Mann was injured at the refinery, and therefore his injuries were covered by Valero's ROCIP policy and excluded from Bay's standard policy. The agent for the ROCIP carrier took the position that Mann was not in the course and scope of his employment when he was injured, and therefore his injuries were not compensable under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (“the Act”).",Party Submissions,6.6258464,6.28478,6.9017463
"The trial court determined that § 1.111(e) barred any subsequent challenge to the agreement between Oncor and the Appraisal District, and dismissed the action. Oncor appealed this decision to the Third Court of Appeals, which held, inter alia, that the trial court’s order of dismissal did not include the ARB. It also held that an agreement entered into under §§1.111(e) is voidable on the common law defense of mutual mistake. The Court of Appeals did not discuss any of the Appraisal Review Board’s other jurisdictional pleadings, though they were briefed. This Petition for Review challenges the Court of Appeals’ determination that the ARB was not a proper party to the appeal, and asks this Court to remand the matter to the appellate court for such determination, or in the alternative to decide these jurisdictional issues itself.",Party Submissions,7.0076747,6.6195846,6.9843283
"His observations further bolster the argument of unconscionability. Joeckel notes that most arbitration agreements he encounters do not burden the plaintiff with costs beyond the initial filing fee. When they do, they are often challenged as unconscionable. This insight strengthens Rafiei's position, emphasizing the atypical and unconscionable nature of the agreement at hand.",Party Submissions,12.855249,15.0321865,17.07139
"No doubt this Court has time and again “demonstrated its own willingness and ability to act with the same ‘unusual dispatch’ we ask of parties and counsel in such matters.” In re Self, 652, S.W.3d 829, 830 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam). But the Court first requires the parties to act as quickly as possible—particularly in the election context, where “[m]andamus generally ‘aids the diligent and not those who slumber on their rights.’” Id. (quoting Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993)). “Never is adherence to that general rule more important than when candidates seek, at a late hour, to constrain the choices available to voters in an election.” Id. ; see also In re Anthony, 642 S.W.3d at 589.",Party Submissions,7.481247,7.180061,7.369018
Republic of Serbia 12 would be open to considering an application (preferably on agreed terms) for an extension of time for the production of documents and associated consequential revisions to the post-document production schedule.,Legal Decisions,25.41336,31.32935,30.200165
"In cases where the eligibility of an applicant was not confirmed, the aid shall be recovered and sanctions applied in accordance with Article 59(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116.",Legislation,6.0334177,7.1710577,7.363445
"See id. § 141.5 (Tex. Dep't of Ins., Div. of Workers' Comp., Description of the Benefit Review Process). By referring to ""issues"" rather than ""claims,"" these regulations suggest that a pending claim might not be a necessary predicate to invoke the agency's jurisdiction over the dispute. In addition, the agency has now considered this very question, in the context of this dispute, and has made a formal determination, see Texas Citizens, 336 S.W.3d at 625 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30, 121 S. Ct. 2164, 150 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2001) ), that it is jurisdictionally irrelevant that the Martinez Family chose not to file a claim. Because this interpretation is reasonable and does not conflict with the plain language of the statute, we will defer to the agency's interpretation. Id. at 624. Accordingly, we conclude that DWC had exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any question regarding Bruno's eligibility for benefits, including the dispute over his employment status.",Party Submissions,4.9558115,5.219972,5.350979
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the requested documents from the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction in accordance with the applicable regulations.256 In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".257 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Secretariat in order to obtain documents in question.258 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. B, U : The request is overly broad as Claimants seek ""any and all"" documents related to the preparation of the 2015 DRP in general, without specifying the time frame, and not only those addressing the reasons for rezoning the land plot located across the street from Dunavska 17-19 and 23 or addressing Obnova's alleged property rights. As a result, production of the requested documents would be unreasonably burdensome for.",Legal Decisions,11.304924,11.698588,12.473097
"Fleming Defendants have argued extensively that if a litigant makes an agreement with the court relating to collateral estoppel, express or implied, then the litigant is bound by that agreement. Fleming Defendants have battered everyone over the head with this argument since they first asserted it in their Motion for Rehearing to the 14th Court of Appeals in December 2021.",Party Submissions,8.173224,7.9042587,8.811949
"Council, Texas banks held a total of $85,747,200 in commercial and industrial loans as well as $44,551,410 in construction and development real estate loans at that time.",Party Submissions,12.617037,15.771304,15.824822
"Enacted by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 269 (H.B. 752), § 1, effective September 1, 1993; am. Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1456 (H.B. 2600), art. 16, § 16.01, effective June 17, 2001; am. Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 265 (H.B. 7), art. 3, § 3.031, effective September 1, 2005; am. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 1108 (S.B. 1714), § 1, effective September 1, 2011.",Party Submissions,2.2203836,2.3653667,2.306355
Judge Amy Clark Meach um 9/17/2021 2:14 PM This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.,Party Submissions,10.348887,10.768756,11.402682
"Because neither the statute nor any background law states that an interlocutory appeal over arbitrability triggers a mandatory general stay of trial court proceedings, the majority opinion resorts to spinning such a rule from a single sentence in Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (per curiam). But Griggs expresses a far narrower principle, and is thus insufficient to support the majority's mandatory-general-stay rule.",Party Submissions,5.0350885,5.2901235,5.4393063
"The majority's concern is even weaker when a stay would harm the opposing party and the public interest much more than it would protect the party seeking arbitration. Take, for example, a case in which crucial evidence would be lost if discovery is delayed. Say a witness is on her deathbed. Under the majority's rule, if an interlocutory arbitrability appeal under § 16(a) is pending, discovery must be stayed *758 and the evidence must be lost. That is apparently so even if the parties agree they wish to proceed with discovery.",Party Submissions,10.343052,11.377284,11.383505
"Petitioners request the Court to grant their petition for review, reverse the court of appeals’ opinion and remand for further proceedings. The Petitioners additionally request all other relief to which they may be entitled.",Party Submissions,6.579249,5.94945,7.324295
"The mutual covenants only include a $750 per month payment allocated to the $175,000.00 constitutional lien. (2CR916). In exchange, Bay agreed to forebear foreclosure on the constitutional lien and to halt all other collection activities. (Id.). All payments are to be allocated to the constitutional lien first, but there is no requirement to continue paying beyond paying off the constitutional lien. (Id.). The forbearance agreement states: If timely made and received, all payments received shall be first applied to the amounts owed on the constructive trust and constitutional lien on the homestead of Mendietta; if timely made and received and if and when the amounts owed on the constructive trust and constitutional lien portion of the Final Judgment are paid and if no other event of default listed above has occurred, Bay, Ltd. shall release the constructive trust and constitutional lien. Otherwise, all payments received shall be applied to the other amounts owed in the Final Judgment. Nothing in this Agreement shall restrict Mendietta from paying any and all amounts owed under the terms of this Agreement.",Party Submissions,8.005045,7.9696207,8.813924
"Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314 (2018) © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 14 to resolve compensation claims presented to it....”); In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., Inc., 107 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (requiring abatement of a suit in district court in deference to a second proceeding that stemmed from the Division). 5 A premises owner (here, Valero) may qualify as a general contractor. See Entergy Gulf States, Inc.",Party Submissions,6.6716166,6.7304025,7.6979046
"The Walkers also argue that the Amarillo Court took things a step further by requiring “proof that each individual act of each provider was a substantial factor contributing to the outcome.” (Br. at 26) This, again, does not fairly describe what the court did. The court necessarily analyzed the various alleged breaches as to each defendant, ultimately concluding that none were causally linked to the harm. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 17324338, at *5. The analysis was a logical method to determine if any of the alleged faults were causally linked to the harm. It is hard to understand how the court could have determined whether causation was stated without looking at the breaches and determining if any were connected to the injury. See Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, 392 S.W.3d 625, 630-31 (Tex. 2013) (requiring a report to cover at least one alleged liability theory to make the defendant aware of the conduct that is at issue).",Party Submissions,8.543332,8.555795,9.1632
"Respondent argues that Claimants' investment does not deserve protection as it was not made in good faith, in particular because the investment dispute was foreseeable at the time of the alleged investment of Mr Broshko in November 2017. Mr Broshko acted as a liaison to Mr Rand from as early as 2012 and must have been aware of Obnova's situation, including the adoption of the 2013 DRP pre-dating both the entry into force of the Canada-Serbia BIT and Mr Broshko's alleged investment, the Land Directorate's announcement of the planned demolition of the Objects on 24 February 2016, and Obnova's court proceedings to establish its ownership rights in respect of Dunavska 17-19, initiated in November 2016, and legalization requests, still pending in 2017. Respondent also disputes the actual rights held by Obnova and the possibility of conversion or Obnova's entitlement to any compensation.",Legal Decisions,10.785092,9.386442,11.110221
"On June 12, 2020, Yellowfin filed this lawsuit seeking judgment for $21,023.13 and an award of its fees and costs. CR2:4-18. This amount represents the outstanding principal balance as of June 1, 2019, assuming all prior payments had been timely made. CR2:40-41 (⁋4).",Party Submissions,8.691638,10.670509,11.171272
"Furthermore, OSINERGMIN did not respect its obligation to publish the drafts of its resolutions in advance in order to obtain comments from the public. Respondent’s defense that Peruvian law permitted OSINERGMIN to skip that step in an urgent situation like the one it was facing – i.e. the imminent submission of its Declared Costs by Kallpa GSA509 is not convincing. OSINERGMIN had had more than two years to clarify the meaning of PR-22 (which had been published on March 29, 2014). Respondent provides no explanation as to why it waited until June 2016, just before Kallpa GSA was due to file its annual Declared Costs, to do so.",Legal Decisions,10.302531,10.57633,9.882587
"The Walkers also criticize the Amarillo Court’s citation to Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52, for the proposition that Dr. Tappan’s opinion amounted to nothing more than that there was a “mere possibility” that Dr. Castillo’s actions and H.W.’s injuries are related. (Pet. Br. at 31). They note that this Court faulted the Wright experts for saying only that the patient there possibly had a chance at a better outcome, but the expert’s report did not explain the connection between the provider’s conduct and the patient’s injury. ( Id. ). That is precisely the problem with Dr. Null’s opinion.",Party Submissions,10.145438,11.178286,11.606629
The requested documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute as they should demonstrate where Coropi's management and control were exercised. i.e. whether Coropi has seat in Cyprus.,Legal Decisions,23.020798,33.031647,28.663736
"To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act with respect to the scope of national pollutant discharge elimination system permit discharge authorizations and the expression of effluent limitations, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.5913944,5.9878263,5.157165
"Based on the foregoing, Petitioner Appraisal Review Board respectfully request that this Court either with or without oral argument reverse the Third Court of Appeals and uphold the dismissal of this case by the Trial Court.",Party Submissions,10.57328,9.948928,14.968601
"The Delapenas’ proposed claim — that the City created an unsafe condition by placing two, instead of three, lifeguard stands around the pool — is internally inconsistent with the idea that the City was consciously indifferent to the safety of swimmers. At most, the claim concerns an alleged error in judgment, which cannot support a finding of gross negligence. See Lee Lewis Const., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 791 (Tex. 2001) (Hecht, J., concurring) (“‘Gross negligence’ means more than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error of judgment. It means such an entire want of care as to establish that the act or omission in question was the result of actual conscious indifference to the rights, welfare, or safety of the persons affected by it.”) ; see also Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 627 (explaining that “some evidence of simple negligence is not evidence of gross negligence” (quoting Lee Lewis Const., 70 S.W.3d at 785)). Consequently, remanding the case for further pleading would be inappropriate. See Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 840. E. Summation We sympathize with the Delapenas and acknowledge that the lines drawn by the Legislature — waiving immunity in some cases, but not in others—often lead to unjust results for those injured by the malfeasance of government employees. See Hillman v.",Party Submissions,5.6278133,5.7258887,6.0886335
"African swine fever. In particular, in the case of an outbreak of African swine fever in wild porcine animals in a Member State, Article 3, point (b), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594 provides for the establishment of an infected zone by the competent authority of that Member State, in accordance with Article 63 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687.",Legislation,4.145632,4.399143,4.838312
"The Texaco building, which was the former headquarters of Texaco, Inc., f/k/a The 5 Texas Company, is located at 1111 Rusk Street in Houston. It is registered as a historical landmark by both the Texas and Federal governments. In 2013, it was vacant, uninhabitable, and in a state of disrepair.",Party Submissions,7.2043386,8.084587,7.7689695
"Once again, as Fleming Defendants have been saying throughout this appeal, if a litigant makes an agreement with the court relating to collateral estoppel, express or implied, then the litigant is bound by that agreement. Fleming Defendants should be bound by their agreement that every Wilson Plaintiffs’ case must be individually tried to a jury, which necessarily precludes collateral estoppel of any kind, and their motion for summary judgment on collateral estoppel on the Harpst judgment should be denied.",Party Submissions,10.457495,9.475108,11.95286
"Tribunal dismissed the Claimants’ request to have the entire Report designated as confidential and ordered that, subject to the redactions agreed between the Parties and any other redactions which may prove necessary to preserve confidentiality protected by PO 1, the Report shall be treated as a matter of public record.",Legal Decisions,11.736958,13.500439,12.865266
"To prohibit the Environmental Protection Agency from using assessments generated by the Integrated Risk Information System as a tier 1 data source in rulemakings and other regulatory actions, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.167085,6.225279,6.9638186
"Here, the trial court did not specify in its summary-judgment order on which ground it relied in striking Bay's affirmative defense. 25 If a trial court's order does not state why it found the summary judgment meritorious, this court should affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved on appeal are meritorious. Knott at 215-216; Jackson v. Tex. S. Univ.Thurgood Marshall Sch. of Law, 231 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Tex.App. -Houston 14th Dist. 2007, pet. denied). Here, the trial court struck Bays exclusive remedies defense. Therefore, if there is any reason to affirm the trial court's ruling, this court should do so.",Party Submissions,5.5683646,6.8414974,6.6571507
"The THC approved the first Part C and certified that the work was completed on December 31, 2016, which allowed the Texas Comptroller of Accounts to approve state tax credits for that phase of the project. Stonehenge received the state tax credits related to the first project in October 2017. The Contributions generated by those tax credits totaled $23,605,580.00.",Party Submissions,13.371829,11.78501,13.726494
Here the jury had sufficient evidence from which to find each of the elements of gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence.,Party Submissions,7.4529796,12.386576,14.893142
"Such documents are relevant to demonstrate the nature of the treatment and protection accorded by the Respondent to the Claimant and are therefore, notably, material to an assessment of the Respondent’s alleged breach23 of the Claimant’s rights under Art. 324 of the France-Qatar BIT.",Legal Decisions,11.984726,11.807025,13.312947
"Decertifying Justice Devine on these facts would be entirely inequitable. Mandamus relief “is largely controlled by equitable principles,” In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 634 S.W.3d 38, 42 (Tex. 2021) (cleaned up), and “this Court will not issue an original writ of mandamus absent a compelling reason.” Chenault, 914 S.W.2d at 142 (cleaned up). Here, every equitable consideration weighs against the requested mandamus, and each is its own “compelling reason” to deny the petition. Id.",Party Submissions,7.5201945,7.2763247,7.864925
"LIABILITY. If required by Exhibit 6, Subcontractor shall procure and maintain Professional Liability/Errors and Omissions Insurance. Such Professional Liability Policy shall cover all services and operations to complete Subcontractor’s Scope of Work and include a waiver of subrogation in favor of McCarthy and the Owner. McCarthy shall determine in its sole discretion acceptability of such policy and carrier. Flow down of these requirements to sub tiers does not relieve Subcontractor of its obligation to provide the insurance outlined herein.",Party Submissions,9.077836,7.032264,9.4312
"HN7 [ ] Claims, Filing Requirements By its plain language, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.075(a) (2006) bars an injured employee from recovering benefits under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act if he pursues and recovers benefits under the workers' compensation laws of another jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,7.9270372,9.147915,8.540229
"With its Counter-Memorial, Serbia submitted “land book insertion No. 1689 for parcel no. 47” (exhibit R -011). This “ insertion ” only contains information from 1972/1973 and 1997 and only for land plots at Dunavska 17-19. The requested documents contain relevant historical information about all land plots at Dunavska 17-19, Dunavska 23 and the Surrounding Area.",Legal Decisions,14.9065695,17.679516,16.092337
I.A. Does this case present an issue of importance to Texas jurisprudence when Petitioner’s urgency is manufactured by conflating a default with an acceleration? I.B. Does this case present an issue of importance to Texas jurisprudence when stare decisis and every appellate court considering the issues have decided against Petitioner’s arguments? II. Can Texas Property Code § 51.003(a) be interpreted to allow a note secured by real property to be accelerated by a third-party’s foreclosure of a different note? III. Should the doctrine of waiver be applied to a noteholder who does not voluntarily relinquish their rights during the life of the note?,Party Submissions,8.550377,8.549696,8.521966
"Agreement, you acknowledge your receipt of the Plan and agree to be bound by all the terms and conditions of the Plan as it shall be amended from time to time.",Contract,5.3278475,6.438247,8.191589
"In this case, the ARB has exclusive jurisdiction over property tax disputes, and the Texas Property Tax Code provides exclusive remedies for property owners to protest their tax liabilities. See Jim Wells County v. El Paso Prod. Oil & Gas Co ., 189 S.W.3d 861, 871 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (finding that the Property Tax Code is a “classic” example of a pervasive regulatory scheme, evidencing a legislative intent to vest the appraisal review boards with exclusive jurisdiction); Cameron Appraisal Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2006) (stating “There is no question the Legislature intended to do so here.”); Joaquin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Shelby Cty. Appraisal Dist ., No. 12-13-00038-CV, 2014 WL 5511479, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler, Aug. 29, 2014, pet. denied) (considering a suit under the DJA and finding “[t]he tax code's provisions governing appraisal of properties for ad valorem tax purposes, with its procedures for resolving disputes over valuation, create a pervasive regulatory scheme indicating legislative intention that the regulatory process be the exclusive means of remedying the problem to which the regulation is addressed.”) (emphasis added).",Party Submissions,4.826166,4.900045,4.8678794
The determination as to the occurrence of a Change in Control shall be based on objective facts and in accordance with the requirements of Code Section 409A.,Contract,6.3107524,8.243082,9.380858
"You are instructed that proximate cause means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an injury, and without which cause such injury would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a lawyer or law firm using ordinary care would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.",Party Submissions,4.821181,5.9867787,5.914865
"Participant’s Right to Modify. A Participant may modify any or all of the alternative Payment Schedules with respect to an Account, consistent with the permissible Payment Schedules available under the Plan, provided such modification complies with the requirements of this Article VII. For clarity, a modification of the Payment Schedule applicable to a Participant’s Retirement Account shall also apply to all Specified Date Accounts payable under Sections 6.1(a) and 6.2(a).",Contract,7.023593,6.5605626,8.407939
"From the last part of the article, “... or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil,” there is little doubt that the snow crab must be considered an immobile species in contrast to migratory species. The direct meaning of the term “ sedentary ” in biology is “ fixed ”, and it is not. In the “catchable” stage, it moves, but is completely dependent on having contact with the seabed to be able to move. Of course, I am not an expert on the Convention on the Law of the Sea, but the text referred to here is as far as I can see unequivocal. The conclusion is therefore that it must be considered sedentary even if the term itself is not particularly good in the description of the snow crab .698 467. While the Claimants describe this reply, which was sent within an hour of Mr Sundet having received the inquiry, as “ somewhat tentative ”,699 the Tribunal does not see it as such. Mr Sundet points out that the biological concept of “ sedentary ” is something which does not move at all, but he then recognizes that the term has a different meaning in law. While acknowledging that he is not an expert on the law, he states unequivocally that the snow crab, in what Article 77(4) refers to as the “ harvestable stage ”, can move only in contact with the seabed and thus falls within the definition of a sedentary species in the Convention.",Legal Decisions,10.827636,10.589484,10.982022
"Yellowfin responds that it could have continued to demand installment payments under the Note post-foreclosure. Resp. Br. 16. That’s wrong. When there is an “unpaid amount of a debt after the foreclosure sale,” “there is no mechanism available for the lender to collect the deficiency through nonjudicial means.” Marhaba, 457 S.W.3d at 215. If no “non judicial means” are left to collect the deficiency, a lender cannot recover its debt by continuing to demand contractual payments under the Note. True, as Yellowfin points out, Resp. Br. 17, the lender in Marhaba had foreclosed, but that does not change the general principle relied on in Marhaba that a lender must recover any remaining debt through judicial means after foreclosure.",Party Submissions,8.372231,8.155462,8.570554
"To direct the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to conduct collaborative research to advance weather models in the United States, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.3890104,4.9092436,4.5743947
"Indeed, any appeal over the proper forum for a dispute would arguably raise the same question. After all, “an arbitration agreement is ‘a specialized kind of forum-selection clause.’ ” Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U. S. -- , -- , 142 S.Ct. 1906, 1919, 213 L.Ed.2d 179 (2022) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974)). If arbitration appeals require stays of all pretrial and trial proceedings, why not all appeals about forum-selection agreements? And why not appeals over non-contractual disputes over jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, federal-court jurisdiction, and abstention?",Party Submissions,4.0207577,4.249269,4.3441806
"Claimants agree to conduct a reasonable search for and produce documents responsive to this request, with the exception of any documents created in preparation for and/or in connection with the conduct of the present arbitration. Claimants object to production of such documents on two grounds: First, the vast majority, if not all, of the documents related to the present arbitration would be covered by legal privilege (Articles 9(2)(b) and 9(4) of the IBA Rules).",Legal Decisions,6.4121923,7.314221,6.8579874
"A Joint Agreed Motion For Transfer to Pretrial Court and Immediate Stay (“Agreed Motion”) was filed on December 1, 2021 by plaintiffs and principal defendants in 275 lawsuits.1 On December 21, 2012 the movants filed a Notice of Filing of First Supplement to Appendix A (Related Cases) to Motion to Transfer and Immediate Stay and Motion to Clarify December 8, 2021 Stay Order. The supplemental Appendix A lists an additional 177 lawsuits for a total of 387 lawsuits. A response was filed opposing the Agreed Motion, but that opposition has now been withdrawn.",Party Submissions,7.191058,7.4000516,7.7299113
"Respondents’ effort to defend the court of appeals’ decision follows the same misguided playbook as their effort to avoid this Court’s review. Instead of addressing the merits of Westwood’s complaints about the decision below, they misstate the evidence and the basis for that decision—and throw in a meritless and irrelevant side-issue on Westwood’s name change for good measure.",Party Submissions,12.657161,12.647335,13.998329
"Performance-Based Compensation. Performance-Based Compensation means Compensation where the amount of, or entitlement to, the Compensation is contingent on the satisfaction of pre-established organizational or individual performance criteria relating to a performance period of at least twelve (12) consecutive months. Organizational or individual performance criteria are considered pre-established if established in writing by not later than ninety (90) days after the commencement of the period of service to which the criteria relate, provided that the outcome is substantially uncertain at the time the criteria are established. The determination of whether Compensation qualifies as “Performance-Based Compensation” will be made in accordance with Treas. Reg. §1.409A-1(e) and subsequent guidance.",Contract,3.3534596,3.3988287,3.7679172
"Second, Rafiei would be able to afford the delegation arbitration. The AAA fee schedule includes a fee schedule for “Nonmonetary Claims” that totals $5,750: $3,250 payable at filing, $2,500 as a final fee. SCR111. Since the arbitration over the delegation provision would not be one over a monetary claim, Rafiei would be able to afford it even if the Court credited his assertion that he can only pay “$6,000 in fees and expenses up front[.]” Id .",Party Submissions,11.7500305,13.458525,13.679918
"Relator, Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Company, Inc., seeks a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, the Honorable Sharolyn Woods, to abate the underlying suit. We conditionally grant the writ.",Party Submissions,7.8864737,12.065792,14.562714
Any and all documents representing “ Analysis of the location for the new trolleybus turnout including part of the new route of the trolleybus network to the new turnout ” as referred to on page 3 (pdf) of Serbia’s exhibit R-100.,Legal Decisions,33.73358,31.320848,36.743217
"This standard contrasts with the standard for eligibility determinations, the other category of ballot application challenges under Texas law. Cf. In re Green Party, 630 S.W.3d 36, 39 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam); see TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 141.034(b), 172.0222 (h), 171.0223(c) (all distinguishing eligibility challenges from form, content and procedure challenges); see also Texas House Republican Caucus PAC, 630 S.W.3d at 32 (noting the distinction). The two are “electoral apples and oranges.” Escobar v. Sutherland, 917 S.W.2d 399, 409 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, 9 orig. proceeding) (challenge to requirements of form, content, and procedure for application is ""distinctly different and completely separate"" from challenge to candidate's eligibility for office).",Party Submissions,6.022404,6.606672,6.2652936
"Missing from HSMiller’s Brief and from the record is any evidence that, at the 60-days-before trial mark, standing in Terry’s shoes, the decision to wait to seek leave to designate Flaven as an RTP involved an extreme degree of risk to HSMiller. Certainly no evidence supports a finding that waiting to designate Flaven presented a more extreme degree of risk of liability to HSMiller than HSMiller’s and Defterios’ own actions had already created.8 See Waldrip, 137 S.W.3d at 137.",Party Submissions,17.495712,16.471561,20.546263
"Bestor's theory has some logic to it, but it nevertheless must yield to the requirement that he have exhausted his claim administratively.",Party Submissions,27.463482,43.93654,55.25272
A spouse’s interest in a retirement or pension plan is regarded as a mode of employee compensation earned over the length of a given period of employment.,Party Submissions,24.752575,19.201054,25.472736
"In the recently decided case of Houston AN USA, LLC v. Shattenkirk, this Court addressed and applied the jurisprudence related to prohibitive arbitration costs. See Shattenkirk, 669 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. 2023). In Shattenkirk, the plaintiff argued that the arbitration agreement “w as unconscionable, and thus invalid, because excessive arbitration costs [would] likely preclude him from effectively vindicating his statutory rights.” Id. at 394. Nevertheless, this Court held that Shattenkirk failed to establish that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Id. at 399.",Party Submissions,5.553665,6.146584,6.0588403
"The expert faulted the nurses for not investigating the woman’s clinical presentations more fully, not reporting the patient’s pain more often, and not stopping the transfer. However, the report did not explain how additional measurements or assessment could have affected the doctor’s course of treatment or the ultimate outcome. The expert did not explain how the nurses could have stopped the transfer or even if they had authority to stop it. Id. at 460-61. The Court held that without a factual explanation of what should have been done differently and how that would have changed the outcome, the report was nothing more than the “clearly insufficient” ipse dixit of the expert. Id. at 461.",Party Submissions,7.2284904,7.2870736,8.769319
"Therefore, World Car failed to show that the sales efficiency metric requires it to meet an unreasonable sales standard. Pet. App. B at 20–21 (emphases added). The ALJ never analyzed whether HMA’s standard was reasonable.",Party Submissions,26.397322,29.351768,34.776302
The Committee specifically reserves the right to determine whether a sale or other disposition of substantial assets to an unrelated party constitutes a Separation from Service with respect to a Participant providing services to the seller immediately prior to the transaction and providing services to the buyer after the transaction. Such determination shall be made in accordance with the requirements of Code Section 409A.,Contract,6.3385205,6.205241,7.39535
"And Respondents do even less to square the court of appeals’ decision with the decisions of this Court and other Texas courts interpreting the statutes that control this case, except to ignore those interpretations and attempt to tease out factual distinctions in those decisions. Respondents try to recruit Marshall v. Housing Authority of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. 2006) to their side by holding it up as an example of how a “tenant’s voluntary choices have consequences in litigation with a landlord.” (Resp. 40) But that is feeble support indeed, given Westwood’s proof that its own “choices” were in no way voluntary. And Respondents’ argument should not serve to distract from Marshall’s true importance, which establishes that a judgment in a forcible entry and detainer action is limited to a final determination only “of the right to immediate possession” of the property—reserving all other issues for the district court. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. That holding is fatal to the court of appeals’ effort to convert the agreed judgment of immediate possession into a determination of the right of ultimate possession to the property.",Party Submissions,8.041996,8.508623,8.470023
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (which prepared exhibit R-101) in accordance with the applicable regulations.97 In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".98 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.99 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek.",Legal Decisions,11.937943,13.066602,12.906988
"Tyler contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to abate the underlying suit until the statutory workers' compensation process for determining the course and scope issue is complete. It contends that process includes judicial review; thus, the Smith County court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the course and scope issue because Reynaldo lived in Smith County at the time of his death. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 410.252(b)(1) (Vernon 1996) (requiring judicial review in county of employee's residence at time of death). The Gaonas respond that the statutory process was complete when the appeals panel issued its decision; thus, the Harris County court has dominant jurisdiction because the underlying suit was filed before the Smith County suit.",Party Submissions,6.729353,8.113133,7.6105523
"But as the chief justice wrote in dissent in Prappas: The court’s opinion rests on two assumptions. The major premise is that an absolute privilege attends judicial proceedings; the minor premise is that filing of a notice of lis pendens constitutes a judicial proceeding. Hence, the court concludes, an absolute privilege goes along with the filing of a notice of lis pendens. I do not share this conclusion, because I disagree with the court’s minor premise. In my view the filing of a notice of lis pendens fails to qualify as a judicial proceeding. This view seems entirely sensible, when one recognizes the rationale for the absolute privilege that goes along with judicial proceedings: the hands-on administration of justice in a courtroom by a live judge. Lis pendens is not a judicial proceeding in that sense. This approach allows us to reach a just result on the basis of sound legal principles. In any event, I cannot abide the notion that the deliberate act at bar deserves judicial protection. It walks like a tort, talks like a tort, and quacks like a tort. We should treat it accordingly. I say we should reverse and remand the unjust judgment below. 795 S.W.2d at 800 (Brown, C.J., dissenting). Wrongfully filing an abstract of judgment or refusing to withdraw one when there was no valid judgment at the time is not a judicial proceeding that deserves the protection of absolute privilege. See also Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1269, n.12 (5th Cir. 1991).",Party Submissions,6.367881,5.8634,6.7346625
"NATURE OF THE CASE: Financial retribution and explicit bias obstruction in the expose of extrajudicial misconduct in the theft of Uniformed Partition of Heirs Property Act (UPHPA) protected land, active mineral leases, and producing mineral estate protected.",Party Submissions,50.49768,56.38293,52.146057
"Accounts Taxable Under Code Section 409A. The Plan is intended to constitute a plan of deferred compensation that meets the requirements for deferral of income taxation under Code Section 409A. The Committee, pursuant to its authority to interpret the Plan, may sever from the Plan or any Compensation Deferral Agreement any provision or exercise of a right that otherwise would result in a violation of Code Section 409A.",Contract,5.2326193,4.9304385,5.7955375
"Because of these burdens on constitutional rights, this prohibition must be supported by a “sufficiently weighty” and important governmental interest. 4 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); see also Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, Sw., & Texoma Regions, 610 S.W.3d 911, 922 (Tex. 2020) (requiring an “important” governmental interest). It is not. The prohibition does not serve the public interest in keeping “frivolous candidates” off the ballot. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9. After all, these signatures from otherwise-qualified signers demonstrate that the candidate has (or had) the signer’s support to be on the ballot.",Party Submissions,5.868379,5.9527187,6.7336674
"Finally, the Court should reject Respondents’ continued effort to complicate this case, confuse the issues, and obfuscate the problems with the court of appeals’ decision by injecting additional “substantive issues” into the analysis of the single question presented. In their response to Westwood’s petition, Respondents hinted at the existence of several issues that might impede this Court’s review of that question. (Resp. to Pet. 11-13) But they have bothered to brief only one of those supposed complicating issues—relating to the fact that Westwood had to change its name from Westwood Motorcars LLC to Westwood Motors, LLC to remove the taint it experienced from Respondents’ wrongful eviction. (8RR154) Respondents’ failure to brief any other such issues waives them, or at least counsels that they should be left for consideration on remand.",Party Submissions,9.700794,10.381491,10.586266
"This is the central lesson of this Court’s decision in Dickson, a case Barina tellingly declines to address. The Dickson Court held that the defendant abortion opponent’s characterization of abortion as “the murder [of] innocent unborn children” was not an allegation of criminal conduct but rather a “moral judgment ... that abortion is an unjust killing that ought to be criminalized and that plaintiffs are complicit in advancing such conduct.” Id. at 359, 368. The context in which the defendant made his claims was critical—because the defendant made them “on public-discourse sites regularly used for such advocacy,” a reasonable reader would have understood them to be invoking a “moral premise” rather than verifiable facts. Id. And the Court emphasized the importance of the target of the defendant’s speech: “Perhaps no speech more deserves and requires protection from governmental censure than that critical of the government and its decisions.” Id. at 362.",Party Submissions,10.046977,10.838743,10.445688
"Declaring support and gratitude by the House of Representatives to food banks, food pantries, and other community-based organizations working to end food insecurity and providing other essential services in the United States.",Legislation,10.735312,10.6319685,13.921439
"In its analysis, this Court underscores two significant aspects of the arbitration agreement. Id. First, the agreement did not “specify any arbitration rules — such as American Arbitration Association (AAA) or JAMS rules — that would apply to a proceeding.. . [or] designate a particular arbitration organization to conduct the arbitration.” Id. And second, the agreement was silent “on the arbitration costs or how they would be allocated between the parties. ” Id. at 339 –339. These two aspects were particularly important to this Court because without clear terms, [the] nature of the costs Shattenkirk might incur were speculative, making it difficult to determine if enforcing the agreement would unjustly prevent him from pursuing his claims. Id. For example, this Court explained that AAA and JAMS have rules for employment arbitration that allocate costs to the employer, not the employee. Id. The ambiguities in the agreement thus contributed to this Court's conclusion that, “the ‘risk’ that [Shattenkirk] will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of [the] arbitration agreement.” Id. at 399 (quoting Poly-Am., 262 S.W.3d at 356).",Party Submissions,7.1564364,7.640059,7.4490833
"I certify that a true and correct copy of this Petition was served electronically on the following counsel of record on December 21, 2023, in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5.",Party Submissions,4.196077,6.099691,6.7200475
"The report must establish “a logical, complete chain between a negligent act and the plaintiff’s injury...and...[give] the trial court sufficient medical details to allow the court to decide if the case [is] frivolous.” Golucke v. Lopez, 658 S.W.3d 686, 698 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.). Both physicians’ reports offered by the Walkers failed to meet these standards.",Party Submissions,8.947382,10.344346,9.57434
TDCC does not assume patent responsibility for the use by a UCC Member of product delivered hereunder. The use of product may or may not constitute an infringement of patents. A UCC Member receiving product hereunder assumes full responsibility and liability for patent infringement in connection with any use of such product by such UCC Member.,Contract,9.986582,8.087914,10.486346
"House Bill 1887, the bill prohibiting a petition against an appraisal review board, was enacted in 2011. See Act of May 20, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 771, § 15, 2011 Tex. Gen Laws (codified at TEX. TAX CODE § 42.21(b)). Section 42.21(b) clearly prohibits a cause of action against an appraisal review board. To the extent there is a conflict between that section and TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25(g), section 42.21(b), the later-enacted statute, controls. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.025(a). Since TEX. TAX CODE 25.25(g) was enacted in 1991, section 42.21(b), enacted in 2011, controls. See, Act of May 22, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 393, § 2, 1991 General Laws (codified in TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25(g)). As stated in TEX. TAX CODE § 42.21(b) the ARB should not be a party.",Party Submissions,2.8264914,2.911371,2.7648573
"Q. So can we agree that as of 1995, among other things, the Court listed Windemere Road as traversing your – what was then awarded to your parents as property.",Party Submissions,39.639706,49.214077,72.06633
Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction No. 350-244/13 dated 20 August 2013; and 24. Letter from the Public Urban Planning Company “Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade” to the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction No. 350-244/13 dated 21 October 2013.,Legal Decisions,5.5608,5.542068,6.8204722
"HN12 [ ] Judges, Discretionary Powers A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to abate is within the court's discretion. There are exceptions, however, to this general rule.",Party Submissions,10.325939,11.002382,11.82918
"If a settling defendant’s debt is discharged in bankruptcy, prohibiting further collection of the judgment,2 then there would be no risk of a double recovery 2 11 U.S.C. § 524.",Party Submissions,8.522191,8.598055,9.85269
"S.W.3d at 79; Briggs, 337 S.W.3d at 283. Accordingly, Bay has failed to carry its burden to conclusively prove all elements of its affirmative defense, as Bay would be required to prove in order to be entitled to summary judgment disposing of the Manns' claims. We therefore need not consider whether Bay has conclusively proved the other elements of its affirmative defense, because the failure to conclusively prove this element prevents Bay from winning a summary judgment of its own. See KCM Fin., 457 S.W.3d at 79. Rather, Bay has simply proved that neither party is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the employer element.",Party Submissions,6.964442,8.205242,8.474548
"The procedures that govern the filing of permissive appeals are provided for by the civil practice and remedies code, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 168, and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d), (e), (f); TEX. R. CIV. P. 168; TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3. Specifically, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 168 states: On a party's motion or on its own initiative, a trial court may permit an appeal from an interlocutory order that is not otherwise appealable, as provided by statute.",Party Submissions,2.8365989,3.023697,3.11032
"Tribunal will set out in further detail in its analysis of the merits, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that Cerros Colorados voluntarily participated in the FONINVEMEM scheme and that this matters for the assessment of whether the Respondent has breached its obligations under the BIT.",Legal Decisions,21.318945,21.614029,29.220472
"Dr. Castillo and BSA challenged the amended reports and moved to dismiss. CR 649-860. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss. App. 1, CR 1332; App. 2, Supp. CR 4. On appeal, the providers limited their objections to causation and causation-related qualifications. See Dr. Castillo ’ s Appellant’s Br.; BSA Appellant’s Br.",Party Submissions,13.549492,14.248349,14.860251
"Because his guardian is spending far in excess of his monthly income, she has decided he can’t afford to keep all of his automobiles or even his house.",Party Submissions,21.301386,20.076805,22.963465
"Atrial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary or. unreasonable manner or when it acts without reference to any guiding principles. Sink, 364 S.W.3d at 343 (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 24l— 42 (Tex. 1985)). We must indulge every reasonable presumption in favor ofthe trial court’s proper eXerc'ise of its discretion in dividing marital property. Id. We will reverse the trial court’s ruling only if the record demonstrates that the trial court clearly abused its discretion, and the error materially affected the just and right division of the community estate. Id.",Party Submissions,4.475219,6.3450556,6.018139
"To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act with respect to the procedure for the development of water quality criteria, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.559195,5.3540816,5.1678777
"It has long been recognized that “After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the Supreme Court, as the highest court of the state having jurisdiction of the particular case, the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties. Wallace v Burson, 132 Tex. 15, 17-18, 120 S.W. 443, 444 (emphasis added). (Comm’n App. 1938) Willacy does fit this definition: the question decided by Willacy is not before the Court in this one. The specific issue addressed in that case was simply whether a Section 1.111(e) agreement procured by fraud could be avoided. No other common-law grounds for avoidance were implicated. Neither was the question framed broadly in terms of the application of common law defenses in avoidance to §1.111) e) agreements. In fact, outside of the opinion, which is the subject of this appeal, there is no authority for the proposition that mutual mistake will void a S1.111(e) is the only one that actually addresses the question of whether a mutual mistake of fact will void an agreement formed under §1.111(e). There are numerous appellate court cases that deal with this question, and other than the opinion on appeal here, none of them contain such a holding, either on the specific facts of the case or as a general conclusion. Willacy, for all its virtues, will not carry the weight laid on it by the Respondent.",Party Submissions,9.34606,9.6046,9.653724
"There is no statutory deadline for exercising rights under Section 272.001. Thus, MVP’s contention that RLB did not act timely to void the forum-selection clause lacks any basis under Section 272.001’s plain terms. MVP’s Brief at 56.",Party Submissions,9.472517,10.415793,11.323065
"Co ., 241 S.W.3d 514, 518 (Tex. 2007). Nevertheless, the court held that the Division did not have exclusive jurisdiction for two reasons.",Party Submissions,6.5483837,7.2594385,8.757986
"The Craigo declaration provided evidence that Midland, after a diligent search, found no discharge licenses for either Hy-Bon Engineering Co. or its predecessor EndDevices. (CR 54.) Moreover, Midland had never previously identified either entity as a discharger in its wastewater collection system. Id. Weatherford argues that Midland’s jurisdictional plea was sustained before Weatherford “had a meaningful opportunity to conduct discovery.” Brief at 59. However, even if granted additional discovery, there is no additional evidence that would supply Weatherford any information that would cure its jurisdictional deficiencies, as Weatherford already had its opportunity to connect Midland to its SWDA claim and failed to do so. Weatherford’s plea for additional discovery without first establishing that the underlying statute even applies amounts to a jurisdictional fishing expedition that is improper and contrary to the purposes of governmental immunity that shields municipal defendants like Midland from the costs of litigation when a plaintiff cannot clear baseline jurisdictional hurdles. See Nazari v. State, 561 S.W.3d 495, 508 (Tex. 2018).",Party Submissions,11.691556,11.705842,12.415864
"When the Texas Supreme Court reviewed the case, it focused on the statutory preclusion of contributory negligence in the TWCA. Keng II, 23 S.W.3d at 352. And the Court expressly did not determine whether a suit under Section 406.033 is ""an action to collect workers' compensation benefits under the workers' compensation laws of this state."" Id.",Party Submissions,8.14633,8.37062,8.962699
"Recognizing the importance of Tribal colleges and universities to the United States and expressing support for designating the week beginning Feb-ruary 5, 2024, as ‘‘National Tribal Colleges and Universities Week’’.",Legislation,6.368695,6.008142,6.7525053
"To amend title 46, United States Code, to require a State to enter into a data sharing agreement with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Transportation in order to be eligible for the port security grant program and the port infrastructure development program.",Legislation,4.0901,3.906048,3.9166067
"Respondents first try to steer the lower court’s opinion clear of the prohibitions in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.004(a) and TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.008 by contending that the “sole issue addressed by these statutes” is “[r]es judicata,” and insisting that “[t]his case was not decided based on res judicata.” (Resp. 18-19, 21) But the first part of that sentence is wrong and the second part does not really matter.",Party Submissions,6.0572486,6.395868,6.3272705
"Any and all minutes and recordings from meetings of the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction related to the preparation of the 2015 DRP The Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction is the authority that was responsible for the preparation of the 2015 DRP. The requested documents are relevant and material for evaluating the factors that the Secretariat took into account when developing the 2015 DRP, especially the reasons for the decision to rezone for residential purposes a significantly larger land plot, owned by the City of Belgrade, which was already designated and used for traffic infrastructure, located directly across the street from Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23.",Legal Decisions,10.462106,9.696717,10.79489
"For the foregoing reasons, the Mills Central Appraisal District respectfully requests the Court grant this petition, reverse the judgment of the Third Court of Appeals, and affirm the trial court ’ s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,9.026854,8.3160095,9.873828
"But that is the point of such a default rule: “the default rule requires opting out, not the other way around.” Perthuis v. Baylor Miraca Genetics Labs., LLC, 645 S.W.3d 228, 241 (Tex. 2022). “As with other default rules, parties are free to contract around this one, even if doing so creates odd or inadvisable results. Boozer v. Fischer, 674 S.W.3d 314, 326 (Tex. 2023). “This contractual freedom is especially applicable when the parties involved are sophisticated, well-counseled, and not subject to domination by the other side.” Id.",Party Submissions,7.7913938,7.3150315,7.5182633
"Appellant employee challenged a summary judgment entered by the County Court No. 3, Galveston County, Texas, in favor of appellee employer. In its motion for summary judgment, the employer contended that the employee's personal injury suit was barred by Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001(a) (2006), the exclusivity provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, because she was injured in the course and scope of her employment.",Party Submissions,4.053202,3.7623127,3.8335555
"For purposes of these vesting conditions, the stock prices above are without the effect of any extraordinary Company transactions such as tender offers or recapitalizations, which, if effected, the Board shall adjust the stock price targets. The terms and conditions of the equity grants shall be further governed by the Long-Term Incentive Plan and a customary award agreement.",Contract,13.040883,13.398451,14.327317
"Respondent’s Action: On July 19, 2021, MVP filed a mandamus petition challenging the trial court’s orders declining to abate or dismiss the Texas case. The court of appeals conditionally granted the petition, instructing the trial court to vacate its orders and dismiss the Texas suit. (App. C. to Pet. at 16-17). In re MVP Terminalling, LLC, No. 14-21-00399-CV, 2022 WL 3592303 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 23, 2022, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (Wise, Jewell, and Spain, JJ.) (App. A). The court of appeals also denied RLB’s motions for rehearing and for reconsideration en banc. (App. B to Mandamus Pet.). RLB has now filed a further petition for writ of mandamus in this Court, challenging the Court of Appeals’ rulings.",Party Submissions,4.3247223,4.4971795,4.6870284
"Texas Occupations Code, Chapter 2301 In addition to HMA’s recognition that its Agreement is governed and construed according to Texas law, which provides that an OEM’s franchise is subject to Texas law and an inconsistent provision is unenforceable, the Texas Legislature also takes a broad view of what is a franchise or agreement.",Party Submissions,16.495224,15.673912,17.403185
"To prohibit the Federal Government from taking any action to regain control of, access, or otherwise interfere in activities carried out by the State of Texas in the vicinity of Shelby Park in Eagle Pass, Texas, without the consent of the State of Texas.",Legislation,9.908629,8.593358,10.284596
The requested documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute in that they demonstrate whether Kalemegdan has seat in Cyprus (seat in Cyprus requires exercise of control as confirmed by Mr Ioannides).,Legal Decisions,27.025345,42.331028,31.942284
"This Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation Agreement (the “Agreement”) is made by and between OneSpan North America, Inc, a Delaware corporation (hereinafter referred to collectively with its parent and subsidiaries as the “Company”), and the undersigned employee (“you”).",Contract,3.756408,3.484108,3.7439868
"Are encephalopathy and stroke identical? Are they causally connected? Did something else unforeseeable happen to H.W. that was unrelated to Dr. Castillo’s actions? Or is it Dr. Tappan’s opinion that H.W. was “at risk” for one injury but sustained another? The reader does not know because Dr. Tappan did not include these answers in his report, and courts are not permitted to guess or infer what he meant. Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 556; see also Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *4-*5.",Party Submissions,9.813717,11.966279,11.413783
"Any and all available geodetic surveys, situational backgrounds ( in Serbian: situacione podloge ) prepared for Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 between 1945 and 1995.",Legal Decisions,20.034813,23.352102,18.405819
"The Court is mindful that issues of jurisdiction and immunity should be determined as soon as practicable. Thus, in order to foster judicial economy, afford [appellees] their right to swift determination of jurisdictional immunity issues, and minimize costs and delays to all of the parties, the Court ORDERS that [Galovelho] shall not file any further amended pleadings without written leave of this Court. The Court will consider the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition to be the live pleading for jurisdictional immunity challenges and will address same at a subsequent hearing based on further briefing and argument. Contrary to Ga lovelho’s characterization, this order does not ban its ability to amend its pleadings. Instead, it requires only that it seek leave of court before it amends them. And while Galovelho contends that its complaints about this limitation “fell on deaf ears and the trial court refused to res cind its unconstitutional order,” the record contains no attempt by Galovelho to seek leave to amend, let alone any refusal to grant that leave.",Party Submissions,8.693586,8.841973,9.073887
"McCarthy sent notice to MVP on November 4, 2020, that it was voiding the forum-selection clause. On November 17, 2020, McCarthy filed an original crossclaim in the Texas case against MVP for, among other claims, breach of contract based on MVP’s failure to pay the additional costs. McCarthy also filed an original counterclaim against RLB in the Texas case, alleging causes of action related to RLB’s claim for additional costs.",Party Submissions,5.444544,5.7180614,5.8273616
"Because this suit is not based on Mann's entitlement to worker's compensation benefits, and because this appeal concerns the exclusive-remedy defense, it is not subject to the Division's exclusive jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,9.536224,14.55749,14.114904
La Demandada entiende que es razonable que existan documentos que reflejen la toma de decisiones y negociación entre Intercaribe y Sargeant respecto de la revocación de las cesiones de créditos referidas.,Legal Decisions,13.789348,28.086714,20.84089
"Dr. Null opined a bit differently – that H.W.’s “course postdelivery is consistent with an antenatal asphyxia event. .. that occurred late in the course of labor.” (CR.805) Dr. Null concluded that had H.W. been delivered 1-1.5 hours sooner “he would not have suffered the degree of brain injury that he has.” (CR.805) Again, Dr. Null did not explain what caused the alleged event, only that it may have happened. See Walgreen Co. v. Hieger, 243 S.W.3d 183, 186 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (report insufficient that stated symptoms were consistent with known side effects was not the same as saying the symptoms were in fact caused by the medication); Mooring v. Britton, No. 07-20-00253-CV, 2021 WL 537205, at *3 (Tex. App.— Amarillo Feb. 12, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op) (finding an expert report insufficient on causation when it did not explain why and when the bleeding began). Crucially, neither expert linked anything that happened with H.W. to nursing actions or inactions.",Party Submissions,6.2989845,7.2518716,7.223647
"If any remedy is required, it should allow Justice Devine to cure the alleged technical defects—as he is well-prepared to do. As the Appendix to this Response demonstrates, Justice Devine collected additional signatures in October 2023, and these signatures are more than enough to cure the alleged technical defects. This Court has consistently allowed for cure as a remedy when a candidate’s good-faith and timely petition contains technical defects that are discovered only after the filing deadline. Relator argues that the Legislature abrogated these cases in 2011. Pet.10. That is incorrect. The Legislature instructed candidates as to when they may amend a petition; it did not address courts ordering cure as an equitable remedy.",Party Submissions,11.783648,12.20136,13.087573
"In fact, the Lease itself contemplated that third parties might provide materials and services in Mendietta’s performance of the Lessee’s obligations to improve the Ranch as requested/required by the Diocese, and that Mendietta might not pay for the services of the third party: • “Section III. 16. Lessee agrees to protect, defend, indemnify and hold Lessor harmless from any and all claims, loss, demands, damages, actions, suits, liability, costs and expenses including, but not limited to reasonable attorney’s fees for the defense thereof, arising from Lessee’s or Lessee’s agents, employees, servants, licensees or invitees use or occupancy of, or the conduct, operation or management of Lessee’s activities in, on or about the Premises.” (9RRPX15).",Party Submissions,7.9163475,7.1445155,9.016829
"Section 15. Nonalienation of Benefits. Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, neither the rights nor any amounts payable under the Plan shall not be subject to any manner of anticipation, alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, pledge, encumbrance, charge, garnishment, execution or levy of any kind, either voluntary or involuntary, including any liability which is for alimony of other payments for the support of a spouse or former spouse, or for any other relative of a Participant, prior to actually being received by the person entitled to payment under the terms of the Plan. Any attempt to anticipate, alienate, sell, transfer, assign, pledge, encumber, charge, garnish, execute, levy upon or otherwise dispose of any right to amounts payable hereunder, shall be null and void.",Contract,3.7446804,3.396054,4.124508
"Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 7160) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the limitation on the amount certain married individuals can deduct for State and local taxes, and providing for consideration of the resolution (H.Res. 987) denouncing the harmful, anti-American energy policies of the Biden administration, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.816661,4.3361654,4.519471
"Serbia’s exhibit R -009 is an undated “ Agreement ” between Obnova and Luka Beograd according to which Obnova supposedly agreed to vacate certain premises in Belgrade —defined only as “the open warehousing area on the cadastre plots no. 47, 49 and 50 CM-1 amounting to surface area of 9,565 m2. ”16 According to Article 1 of the Agreement, Obnova was allegedly ordered to vacate the premises by the decision of the First Municipality Court in Belgrade no. I. n. 6447/64 dated 14 October 1964.17 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess: ( i ) exactly which premises Obnova was apparently supposed to vacate; ( ii ) whether such premises correspond, in full or at least in part, to Obnova’s current premises at Dunavska 17-19 or 23; and ( iii ) the reasons for the First Municipa lity Court’s decision.",Legal Decisions,10.655566,11.2182455,11.014563
"None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant at the time of the seizure of the assets or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,13.483333,15.683864,14.543471
"Russia signalled during the last meeting of the mixed commission that they considered that the snow crab is a sedentary species, and that in this case it means that it is the continental shelf jurisdiction that applies to the management of the crab. It cannot be ruled out that they will raise this issue at this meeting. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in the process of investigating the legal aspects and consequences for the management of snow crab as a potential sedentary species. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has asked us to “lie low” in this case until the case is better clarified on the Norwegian side. Completely new information from KV also indicates that there is currently no fishing for snow crab on the Norwegian shelf outside NØS (only on the Russian shelf).",Legal Decisions,13.796461,12.305746,13.634778
Tribunal finds that the Claimant has its actual place of management in Spain. 439. The Tribunal therefore concludes that the Claimant is a protected investor under the BIT and that it has jurisdiction ratione personae.,Legal Decisions,8.35833,10.366595,12.363306
A Participant or Beneficiary receiving installment payments when a Change in Control occurs will receive his or her remaining Account Balance in a single lump sum within ninety (90) days following the Change in Control with the actual payment date determined in the sole discretion of the Committee.,Contract,5.176697,6.9236364,7.5499754
"Procedural Order No. 3 includes directions for the production of responsive documents in line with Article 9(2)(b) of the IBA Rules which, contrary to the Respondent’s submissions, does proceeding.",Legal Decisions,14.780377,15.4312935,17.653736
"To affirm the State of Texas’s right to implement operational protections along the southern border, to authorize the State to construct a physical border wall in areas where the international border is not adequately protected with physical barriers, and to allow reimbursement from the Federal Government.",Legislation,14.20398,12.040446,11.6138735
"We direct the clerk of this court to send a notice of this order to the attorneys of record, the trial-court judge, and the trial-court clerk.",Party Submissions,5.417119,7.0351152,9.012263
"Based on a word count run in Microsoft Word, this brief contains 9, 033 words, excluding the portions of the brief exempt from the word count under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,6.2416015,10.161399,11.202417
"Cuando el Tribunal decida acerca de la objeción de un demandado de conformidad con los párrafos 4 ó 5, deberá, si se justifica, conceder a la parte contendiente vencedora, costas y honorarios de abogado razonables en que se haya incurrido al presentar la objeción u oponerse a ésta. Al determinar si dicho laudo se justifica, el Tribunal considerará si la reclamación del demandante o la objeción del demandado eran frívolas, y concederá a las partes contendientes oportunidad razonable para presentar sus comentarios. En caso de una reclamación frívola el Tribunal deberá condenar en costas a la parte demandante.",Legal Decisions,6.1208673,8.404506,7.649955
"This brief was prepared using Microsoft Word. Relying on the word count function in that software, I certify that this motion contains 2,241 words (exclusive of the caption, statement of issues, signature, proof of service, certificate of compliance, certificate of conference and certificate of service). I also certify that the size font complies with TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 (e).",Party Submissions,7.5695505,11.386389,10.736395
"In Engelman Irrigation Dist. v Shields Bros., Inc., 514 S.W.3d 746, 754-55 (Tex. 2017), this Court held that “Requiring a party to comply with its contractual obligations, under the law prevailing at the time” did not “demand an abdication of the ordinary rules of finality’” Similarly, given the history, tortuous path, and intricate dance between the Hooks case and this case for over eighteen years, no exception should apply that would prevent collateral estoppel from precluding Samson from litigating yet again how to compute Late Charges under the Hooks/Bordages Leases.",Party Submissions,14.435245,15.114671,15.308086
"Kemp ’s true holding is far narrower and has nothing to do with any categorical rule that a tenant’s compliance with the result in a forcible entry and detainer proceeding categorically bars the tenant from pursuing a claim for damages in district court. As Respondents eventually admit (Resp. 34), Kemp turned on whether a particular tenant had offered sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of a constructive-eviction claim that simply happened to arise after the tenant dismissed an appeal of a forcible entry and detainer order and left the premises, 2020 WL 205313, at *1. And while some of the facts in Kemp therefore bear some superficial resemblance to the facts of this case, the dispositive facts are nonetheless very different.",Party Submissions,9.370942,10.48947,11.252418
"Letter from the Secretariat for Environmental Protection with reference number 501.3 – 45/2013-V-04 dated 10 October 2013, addressed to the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction.",Legal Decisions,12.450416,9.046289,12.435227
"COVERAGE. If required by Exhibit 6, or when Subcontractor’s operations include the use of a Small Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (sUAV), Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) or Drone, Subcontractor shall provide Owned/Non-Owned Aviation Liability Coverage, or equivalent policy covering the use of sUAV’s, sUAS’s or Drones, with minimum limits of $2,000,000 per occurrence. The policy shall name McCarthy and the Owner as additional insureds, provide a waiver of subrogation in favor of McCarthy and the Owner and include coverage for Personal and Advertising Injury. If the sUAV, sUAS or Drone will be operated indoors the policy shall not exclude or restrict coverage for indoor use. Subcontractor shall only operate such sUAV, sUAS or Drone after receiving prior written approval from McCarthy, including approval of Subcontractor’s written safety plan related to the operation of the sUAV, sUAS or Drone. Subcontractor shall comply with all McCarthy requirements regarding the operation of the sUAV, sUAS or Drone, including all FAA regulations pertaining to the commercial operation of sUAV’s, sUAS’s or Drones.",Party Submissions,3.4895792,3.622415,3.535348
"This is an interlocutory appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. This Court reviews the denial of a motion to compel arbitration under the abuse of discretion standard. Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115. In its review, this Court defers to the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by evidence. Id. Specifically, this Court must defer to the trial court’s factual resolutions, including any credibility determinations that may have affected those resolutions, and this C ourt’s judgment on these factual issues may not be substituted for the of the trial court. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 – 40 (Tex. 1992). But the trial court’s legal conclusions receive no deference and are reviewed de novo. Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115. Those legal conclusions include whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable when formed. See In re PolyAm., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 349 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). A trial court has no ""discretion"" in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Its opinion may only be overturned if the trial court clearly failed to apply the law correctly. In re Walker, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (citing Joachim v. Chambers, 815 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. 1991)).",Party Submissions,3.25263,3.674708,3.4348855
"Synopsis Background: Injured employee and his wife brought personal injury claim against subcontractor employer following injury while crossing road at general contractor's refinery and workers' compensation policies denial of claim. The County Court at Law, Nueces County, Deeanne Galvan, J., denied subcontractor's motion for summary judgment and granted employee's motion for partial summary judgment. Subcontractor appealed.",Party Submissions,11.417073,12.251323,12.632747
"To be sufficient, the expert cannot link various events in an alleged causal chain together with speculation or surmise. Bowie Mem’l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 53. A “missing link” renders the report insufficient as a matter of law. Id.; Humble Surgical Hosp., LLC v. Davis, 542 S.W.3d 12, 23 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Such a report would be “nothing more than the ipse dixit of the expert[], which [is] clearly insufficient.” Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 461; see also Humble Surgical Hosp., 542 S.W.3d at 23, 25-26 (while report stated additional care would have saved patient’s leg, it did not explain why and was therefore insufficient); Tenet Hosps. Ltd. v. Love, 347 S.W.3d 743, 755 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (expert opinion that if defendant hospital “had a pulmonologist or critical care specialist on call and available to see and treat this patient or had transferred this patient before her condition worsened, [patient] would more likely than not be alive today” was impermissibly conclusory); Estorque v. Schafer, 302 S.W.3d 19, 28 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (failure to explain how consult with urologist would have changed outcome); Costello v. Christus Santa Rosa Health Care Corp., 141 S.W.3d 245, 249 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (report did not explain causal relationship between patient’s death and alleged omissions by hospital, including whether treatment would have or could have been effective); Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Davidson, No. 14-15-00643-CV, 2016 WL 2935715, at *2-5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 17, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (no explanation of how additional communications between nurses and physicians would have affected patient care).",Party Submissions,4.1408873,4.516094,4.3872237
"B, V, U : Claimants' request is unduly burdensome. It follows from Article 7 of the agreement, submitted as Exhibit R-060, that the requested documents were created by Luka Beograd, which is a private company, not a state authority. Accordingly, Respondent cannot be bound to obtain the documents in question. Further, Claimants' request is unduly broad and vague as Claimants have failed to specify the State authority which could be in possession of these documents. Respondent cannot reasonably be required to identify the relevant State authority.",Legal Decisions,11.478079,12.383738,12.617612
This Court’s review is especially warranted because the El Paso court’s ruling conflicts with the Austin court’s decision interpreting the same word “require” in the same statutory provision.,Party Submissions,10.836923,10.632899,11.373175
"The same fee order quoted above describes what the Bankruptcy Judge believed the Plan accomplished: “[P]resumably, some affiliates and insiders of the Debtor have been spared from lawsuits by the Judgment Creditors, for so long as the Debtor pursues 18 its claims against its insurer and former counsel pursuant to the Debtor’s Plan.” See In re Henry S. Miller Comm., LLC, 2010 WL 4638882, at *5 (emphasis added). In short, the Bankruptcy Court did not assume or hold the proceeds assignment was valid.",Party Submissions,13.607262,14.953474,14.900991
"HN7 [ ] Section 409.003 of the Labor Code provides that a ""claim"" may be initiated by ""[a]n employee or a person acting on the employee's behalf. .. not later than one year after the date on which. .. the injury occurred."" Here, it is undisputed that Hellas—not the Martinez Family—requested burial reimbursement from Texas Mutual, which then remitted that sum to Hellas. It is also undisputed that Texas Mutual was the one to request the [*15] benefit review conference. The question thus becomes whether either of these parties could be construed as ""a person acting on the employee's behalf"" such that, per the statutory definition, that party could initiate a claim. Under the circumstances of this case, it is difficult to characterize Texas Mutual as having acted on Bruno's behalf given that its stated goal in requesting the benefit review conference was to take a position contrary to that of Bruno's beneficiaries. See Behalf, Black's Law Dictionary (referring to actions taken ""in the interest, support, or defense of"" or ""in the name of, on the part of, [or] as the agent or representative of""); Baker v. Travelers Ins., 483 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ) (referring to beneficiaries as standing ""in the shoes of a deceased workman""). Hellas similarly adopted a position materially adverse to the legal arguments raised by Bruno's beneficiaries. Thus, because no one was acting on behalf of Bruno or his beneficiaries in initiating this ""claim,"" it seems unlikely that there was anything more than a potential claim for benefits at the time of the proceedings before the administrative law judge and the appeals panel. However, we need not resolve that question to dispose of this case, as we [*16] conclude that DWC had exclusive jurisdiction over the question of eligibility regardless of whether there was, in fact, a pending claim or merely a potential claim.",Party Submissions,6.0697985,6.1769,6.215943
"Yellowfin also emphasizes Holy Cross’s reasoning that no “affirmative action towards foreclosure” is required to accelerate “a note secured by real property” because that would “mean the foreclosure posting or sale would be the triggering event bringing about the right to hold a foreclosure sale.” 44 S.W.3d at 570; see Resp. Br. 9. Once again, though, that reasoning does not apply post -foreclosure. Before foreclosure, no affirmative steps toward foreclosure are required beyond “(1) notice of intent to accelerate, and (2) notice of acceleration” to accelerate the loan. Holy Cross, 44 S.W.3d at 566. Holy Cross ’s point was that the loan had been accelerated prior to foreclosure once those two requirements were met. Id. at 570. That observation says nothing about what happens to the loan after foreclosure, which is the relevant question here. As explained earlier, see Opening Br. 26-27, foreclosure in fact accelerated the junior loan.",Party Submissions,9.338558,9.597974,10.092752
"A restricted stock grant of 1,585 shares of common stock on January 12, 2024, under the Company’s Amended and Restated 1997 Stock Award and Incentive Plan. Such shares vest over a period from March 31, 2024 to March 31, 2027.",Contract,4.3019247,4.278101,4.535248
"To amend the Small Business Act to require Federal agencies to testify and report on scores received under the scorecard program for evaluating Federal agency compliance with small business contracting goals, to testify for failure to meet Governmentwide contracting goals, and for other purposes.",Legislation,9.407908,8.189923,8.783127
All pleadings and accompanying documentation shall indicate the LANGUAGE in which they are submitted (e.g. SPA=Spanish; FR=French; ENG= English). Such indication should be reflected both i) in the name used to identify each individual electronic file and ii) in the Consolidated Hyperlinked Index (which shall be attached to each submission).,Legal Decisions,11.452225,12.279235,12.973431
"In re Luby's Cafeterias, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 813 (1998) In April 1995, Gaetjen, who is mildly retarded, was employed as a bus person at a Luby's Cafeteria in Houston, Texas. At that time, Gaetjen was sexually assaulted over the course of three days by a fellow employee, Antonio Aguirre. Following the incidents, Gaetjen filed a complaint with the Houston Police Department and a workers' compensation claim. On May 15, 1995, Luby's workers' compensation carrier, TIG Premier Insurance Company (“TIG”), denied the claim on the ground that Gaetjen did not sustain a compensable injury. Gaetjen did not seek review of this determination. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. Ch. 410 (Vernon 1996). In August 1996, Aguirre was convicted of sexually *815 assaulting Gaetjen and sentenced to five years in the Texas Penitentiary.",Party Submissions,3.9856799,3.9672472,4.171512
"B. Royalties on production shall be paid on a calendar month basis. The royalty for the month in which production is first marketed shall be paid on or before the first day of the calendar month next following the expiration of sixty (60) days from the execution date of the completion report or potential test for the well that is filed with the Railroad Commission of Texas, and the respective royalty payments for each subsequent calendar month of production shall be made on or before the first day of each successive calendar month following the calendar month in which the first payment is due.",Party Submissions,6.47251,6.6539392,7.447229
"To amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to clarify ican Rescue Plan Act of 2021, including amounts paid on behalf of a deceased participant or beneficiary, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.692601,6.227986,6.3090982
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session, the 1st C.S. and the 2nd C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the 2023 ballot proposition contingencies to date.",Party Submissions,8.685042,7.9217057,8.740299
No claim or right arising out of a breach of this Agreement can be discharged in whole or in part unless agreed to in writing executed by TDCC and UCC. Any such waiver shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any subsequent breach.,Contract,6.203993,5.8751783,8.301369
"HN3 [ ] Breach, Breach of Contract Actions A workers' compensation insurance policy is a three-party contract between the carrier, the employer, and the employee. The carrier owes the employee a duty of good faith and fair dealing: a duty on the part of the carrier to deal fairly and in good faith with an injured employee in the processing of a worker's compensation claim. Accompanying every contract is a common law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort as well as a breach of contract.",Party Submissions,7.3784504,7.3916073,8.021379
"The Walkers rely heavily on this Court’s decision in E.D. by & through B.O. v. Texas Health Care, P.L.L.C., 644 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2022), analogizing that obstetrical malpractice case with this one to urge the same result. ( See, e.g. Pet. Br. at 29-30). On the surface it’s a fair comparison. But analyzing the Fort Worth Court’s opinion in E.D., as compared with the Amarillo Court’s opinion here, shows why this Court’s focus is more appropriately directed elsewhere.",Party Submissions,8.136167,8.648595,8.544417
"To justify its new mandatory-general-stay rule, the majority ultimately rests on its assessment of what is “sensible.” Ante, at 1920 – 1921. But even the majority's policy concerns do not support its rule.",Party Submissions,11.278501,14.405491,14.957464
"To amend the John D. Dingell, Jr. Conservation, Management, and Recre- ation Act to permanently authorize the Every Kid Outdoors program, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.840455,3.880777,4.913226
"Taking into account Respondent’s objections that the Request is not for a “narrow and specific category of documents”, Claimant is prepared to limit its Request No.",Legal Decisions,16.295687,17.04863,18.152084
"This AGREEMENT (“Agreement”), entered into as of November 1, 2023, between Union Carbide Corporation (“UCC”), a New York corporation, and The Dow Chemical Company (“TDCC”), a Delaware corporation. TDCC agrees to supply the UCC Group (as defined below) with certain products and services under the terms and conditions set forth below.",Contract,4.4548917,3.8026307,4.830467
"We grant the motion to transfer, and we will appoint the MDL Pretrial Judge and designate an MDL Pretrial Court by a separate order. Existing stays will remain in place until appointment of the MDL Pretrial Judge.",Party Submissions,9.594477,16.646864,12.20176
"This was a fact issue for which a jury could have decided that the vesting period for determination under Tex. Fam. Code § 3.007(d) should have been something less than the 3 years used, and most likely just 6 months. This would have had a great effect on the amount of community.",Party Submissions,16.65206,17.652948,17.287216
"The Lawyers then filed a petition for review with this Court asking it, among other things, to reverse the Fifth Court’s legal-malpractice-assignment holding. See Newsom, Terry & Newsom, L.L.P ., No. 16-0875. The parties also filed briefs on the merits on all issues raised, including the assignment issue, before the Court denied review. Id.",Party Submissions,12.602456,10.610556,12.286983
"Once a responsible third party has been designated, and after an adequate time for discovery has passed, a party may move to strike the designation on the ground that there is no evidence that the designated person is responsible for any portion of the claimant's alleged injury or damage. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(l). The court shall grant the motion to strike unless a defendant produces sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the designated person's responsibility for the claimant's injury or damage. Thus, the question for the trial court is whether the defendant produced sufficient evidence, more than a scintilla, for a reasonable jury to find the responsible third party responsible for a portion of the claimant's injury or damages.",Party Submissions,3.8600006,4.3699336,4.241274
"Respondents also emphasize that both Westwood and the tenant in Kemp complained they had suffered “mistreatment” from their landlo rds that occurred in the aftermath of losing a forcible entry and detainer action in a justice of the peace court — and yet the tenant in Kemp could not maintain a constructive-eviction claim in district court. (Resp. 30) But the result in Kemp did not flow from any hard-and-fast rule that constructive-eviction claims are categorically unavailable to the evicted tenant, that compliance with an eviction order co nclusively establishes “voluntary abandonment” or disproves damages, or that “testimony” about “perceived mistreatment” simply “doesn’t matter” in a constructive eviction action. ( Id .) Instead, t he tenant’s claim failed simply because of the absence of causation: She could not carry her burden of establishing “that the premises was abandoned because of the complained-of condition.” (Resp. 23, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *3) (emphasis in original) Specifically, the tenant had no “evidence demonstrat[ing]” that she “abandoned the property as a direct consequence of the [landlord’s] triggering acts” because she merely “vacated only after being lawfully evicted.” (Id. 24, 34, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *4) That is why the tenant’s ad mission that she “moved out of the premises” immediately after the “writ of possession was issued”— rather than after any supposed acts of interference by the landlord — was considered dispositive. (Resp. 29, quoting Kemp, 2020 WL 205313, at *3) But none of that can be said about Westwood, because the record here is replete with evidence that Westwood decided to leave only because of Responde nts’ repeated wrongful acts, and did not merely abandon the property after receiving an eviction order.",Party Submissions,7.0215144,7.445715,7.286269
"This Court has never formally adopted the two-prong analysis that originated in the Lindsey case. The recitation by Justice Hecht in Bradshaw seems to state that only a legal sufficiency analysis of the evidence would apply to the abuse of discretion standard, not a factual sufficiency review. Possibly Justice Hecht used this language as a reflection of this Court’s jurisdictional limitation to only questions of law, leaving questions of factual sufficiency to the courts of appeals. Unfortunately, the lack of clarity from this Court as to the abuse of discretion standard of review creates uncertainty in the law, particularly in family law appeals. 1. The standard for legal sufficiency is whether there is more When there is zero evidence on a vital fact or the evidence amounts to no more than a scintilla, a legal sufficiency challenge will succeed.",Party Submissions,10.025597,9.370071,11.010935
Subcontractor's Work as required by McCarthy including the progress of materials or equipment to be provided under this Agreement that may be in the course of preparation or manufacture.,Party Submissions,23.818138,28.057566,34.492542
"A parent-child relationship may be terminated if a trial court finds that parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engage in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). “Endanger” under subsection E “means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize.” In the Interest of D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 811 (Tex. App. —Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). As well, “there must be evidence of endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well -being as the direct result of the parent’s conduct.” Id. at 811-12. Courts consider “what the parent did both before and after the child’s birth to determine whether termination is necessary.” Id. at 812. As well, “termination ... m ust be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.” Id.",Party Submissions,3.5314064,4.1891346,4.3370347
"Thus, under Osprin’ s interpretation the termination clause only applies before there is a default by the borrower and ceases to apply to the two primary obligations at the moment those obligations are activated. Yet, the termination clause provides that any and all of Backes ’ s obligations under the guaranty shall terminate and does not limit the scope of the obligations or except any obligations, whether mature or not. Further, the termination clause provides that termination occurs when the tax credit rehabilitation is completed, again with no limitation that the completion must be accomplished before the note matures or before default by the borrower.",Party Submissions,18.975834,16.241829,20.577208
"To promote space situational awareness and space traffic coordination and to modify the functions and leadership of the Office of Space Commerce, and for other purposes.",Legislation,12.065433,10.662614,13.563283
"McCarthy Subcontract -13-01-12-2017 Rev. payment to McCarthy of the entire cost of Subcontractor’s default and termination from the balance of the Subcontract Amount and the amounts paid, as provided above, to McCarthy by Subcontractor, or its surety if Subcontractor has provided Bonds per Article 6 of this Agreement, shall be paid without interest to Subcontractor by McCarthy.",Party Submissions,14.444918,12.240916,15.472301
"On the one hand, Respondents insist that because the agreed judgment functions as a “Rule 11 agreement,” it must be interpreted as a contract and cannot be contradicted by any evidence “outside the bound” of the agreed judgment itself— including the otherwise-undisputed evidence of Respondents’ interference with Westwood’s right to possess the premises underlying its constructive-eviction claim. (Resp. 28-29, quoting Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 651 n.58 (Tex. 2007)) Yet on the other, Respondents insist that Westwood’s supposedly “voluntary” “Rule 11 agreement” only matters “as evidence that [Westwood] left voluntarily.” (Resp. 33-34) But either way, this supposed “agreement” does not mitigate the plain violation of Texas law that the court of appeals committed in this case.",Party Submissions,8.588604,8.449175,9.140861
"Similar language in other reported cases – such as interest on an outstanding sum or an unpaid balance, especially if combined with periodic interest accrual – have been found to “unambiguously” require compounding. See, e.g., Bair Chase Prop. Co., v. S & K Dev. Co., 260 S.W.3d 133, 142 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied); Crosby-Mississippi, 40 F.3d at 1489 (Miss. law).3 The Bordages Leases’ provision for Late Charges based on the “amount due,” moreover, is distinguishable from instruments that impose only simple interest with language that imposes only “interest on interest.” See, e.g., Spiller v. Spiller, 901 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (“matured unpaid principal and interest shall bear interest at [] 10% per annum”).",Party Submissions,8.721947,8.972737,9.583032
"Statement of Facts Freedom of speech means you can say whatever you want. What you can’t do is lie, and then expect not to be held accountable for it.",Party Submissions,8.513682,7.7610917,8.998544
"Trust : By reference to these provisions, case-law and academic literature largely endorse the view that, save for fringe cases, pursuant to Article 41 of the ICSID Convention, tribunals must address jurisdictional objections irrespective of when they were raised.",Party Submissions,14.964366,16.630268,17.263664
The determination of quantity and quality of product purchased by a UCC Member from TDCC hereunder shall be made in accordance with the customary procedures and practices of the industry.,Contract,26.617085,22.618446,34.5213
"Spring I.S.D., 736 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1987). And the ultimate goal in any statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature to the greatest degree possible. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021, 311.023 (West 2013). We cannot ignore the Legislature's direction that the proportionate responsibility chapter does not apply to certain actions. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.002(c). HN13 [ ] Furthermore, we recognize that designation of a responsible third party is not listed in the TWCA as a prohibited defense for nonsubscribers. See Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 406.033(a). However, under the express terms of the TWCA, an employee must still prove that her employer was negligent to prevail at trial. Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 406.033(d). If a third party was ultimately responsible, an employer may [*12] still be able to defeat an employee's negligence claim.",Party Submissions,4.5190077,4.8622994,5.0912724
"Request No. 18: The Request is denied. The Claimant is requesting access to documents relating to certain conferences, meetings or political events organized by the Claimant for the Respondent, the number of such events having been reduced by the Claimant in his Application, compared to his initial request. Again, such documents are not material to assess the Claimant’s investment in Qatar for the purpose of preparing his forthcoming Memorial, nor are they relevant as an input for a quantum expert evaluating such investment before any submissions have been exchanged on the merits of the instant case, as this is argued in the Claimant’s rubric on the “Relevance and Materiality according to the Requesting Party”. Moreover, the large majority of the requested documents relate to events organized in the public field and which were documented in the public domain. Although the Claimant is also requesting “internal communications”, he did not specify in any way the documents or their nature he is looking for.",Legal Decisions,15.009274,13.031782,14.134088
"At oral argument, Justices Bland and Huddle inquired whether Bay, Ltd. met its burden to prove an allocation of the settlement amount and what sort of evidence meets the settling party’s burden under Sky View. This Court has held that the allocation can be made in the settlement documents or can be proven by extrinsic evidence. If an allocation different than stated in the settlement documents actually occurred, the trial court can consider that proof. Bay, Ltd. presented precisely the type of evidence this Court has authorized, and the trial court properly held that no settlement credit was required to avoid a double recovery.",Party Submissions,15.171063,16.629217,16.144924
"Viewed from the required perspective, Oncor’s pleadings and evidence show the motions Oncor filed under section 25.25(c) were not an attempt to “avoid” the agreement that Sharyland and P&A reached. Oncor accepts the matters the settlement did address (P&A’s total market valuation of Sharyland’s transmission line and the comparative equality of that valuation). Oncor seeks only to enforce the agreement the parties actually made, by correcting P&A’s undisputedly erroneous allocation of the agreed-upon market value to property in Wilbarger County (and the other counties in which the parties have not been able to rectify the error by agreement). Sharyland and P&A did not know the clerical error existed when they settled Sharyland’s protests, so their agreement could not logically have addressed that unknown error.",Party Submissions,12.010565,12.489377,13.217523
Nutrition Act of 1966 to prohibit the use of cell-cultivated meat under the school lunch program and the school breakfast program.,Legislation,10.617097,8.777073,12.047289
"For eligible applicants for which administrative checks are completed, aid can be paid without waiting for all checks being made, notably those on applicants selected for on-the-spot checks. Nevertheless, all the on-the-spot checks shall be made not later than 6 months after the payments.",Legislation,19.764214,20.86398,26.723135
"Appellees argue that these equitable claims have been mooted by subsequent government orders. GA-34 provided that “there are no C ovid-19-related operating limits for any business or other establishment.” Similarly, all Collin County limitations on restaurants were rescinded, and all Frisco ordinances have expired. There are no longer any limitations on indoor dining in Texas. Thus, the regulations that were allegedly harming Galovelho no longer exist.",Party Submissions,20.787182,22.647814,19.720434
"Ironically, HSMiller, as a surrogate for BNC, argues that Flaven should have been an RPT in the underlying trial, but that none of these parties should have been submitted to the jury in the malpractice trial. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to submit their negligence and the decision was reversible error.",Party Submissions,18.540583,22.60255,22.305841
"Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 7160) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the limitation on the amount certain married individuals can deduct for State and local taxes, and providing for consideration of the resolution (H.Res. 987) denouncing the harmful, anti-American energy policies of the Biden administration, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.816661,4.3361654,4.519471
"The language of the statute indicates the Legislature’s desire to compare responsibility for injuries rather than bar recovery, even if the claimant was partly at fault or violated some legal standard. Id. at 832. Thus, once again the Court considered an applicable legal standard that was violated — ingesting harmful, illegal drugs — that contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. Once again, the act itself was a tortious act and should be considered in the comparative responsibility question.",Party Submissions,15.462343,15.420621,16.567411
"Adopting Employer. Adopting Employer means an Affiliate who, with the consent of the Company, has adopted the Plan for the benefit of its eligible employees.",Contract,5.9218564,5.485047,7.1166086
"The court’s holding was case specific. The Walkers’ experts simply provided no causal link between the nurses’ action or inaction and the ultimate harm. Dr. Tappan, the obstetrician, alleged five breaches of the nursing standard of care: 1. The nurses should have discontinued Pitocin at 09:21; 2. The nurses should have applied a fetal scalp electrode at 09:25 and should have recorded “Montevideo units”; 3. The nurses did not “go up the nursing chain of command” at 12:52 when Dr. Castillo announced that she was leaving the hospital; 4. The nurses should not have continued to increase the dose of oxytocin at 15:25 when Dr. Castillo shortened the interval between oxytocin infusion rate increases; and 5. The nurses failed to administer terbutaline at 15:52 when Dr. Castillo made the decision to perform a cesarean delivery. (CR.793-94) No expert explained how or why any of these alleged nursing failures caused harm to the baby.",Party Submissions,7.741981,6.720995,7.989366
"In reply, Sonic argues that there is no issue of exclusive jurisdiction in this case and therefore, Tyler does not apply. Sonic asserts that its contract claims do not rest on a final determination of the issue in the judicial review case, and thus, there is no jurisdictional impediment to [**31] its contract claims going forward. Applying the analysis used by the Fodge court, we examine Sonic's contract claims in relation to the [*481] judicial review claims. See Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 803 .",Party Submissions,11.020103,11.194765,12.207234
"Section 16(a) does not say whether the district court proceedings must be stayed. But Congress enacted § 16(a) against a clear background principle prescribed by this Court's precedents: An appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982). That Griggs principle reflects a longstanding tenet of American procedure. See Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150, 157, 3 S.Ct. 136, 27 L.Ed. 888 (1883); see also Price v. Dunn, 587 U. S. -- , -- , 139 S.Ct. 1533, 1537, 204 L.Ed.2d 238 (2019) (THOMAS, J., joined by ALITO and GORSUCH, JJ., concurring in denial of certiorari) (describing Griggs principle as “well settled”); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985) (“In general, filing of a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal”).",Party Submissions,2.5288775,2.5170422,2.7232823
"The Court today expands Griggs beyond what the Congress that enacted § 16 could have foreseen, let alone silently incorporated. Indeed, the majority can identify no other time this Court wielded Griggs to mandate a stay of all merits proceedings just because a distinct procedural question was on appeal.",Party Submissions,22.620462,24.030645,31.156212
"An event constitutes a Change in Control with respect to a Participant only if the Participant performs services for the Participating Employer that has experienced the Change in Control, or the Participant’s relationship to the affected Participating Employer otherwise satisfies the requirements of Treasury Regulation Section 1.409A-3(i)(5)(ii).",Contract,4.6519375,4.400768,5.1207952
"Claimants allege that Obnova had the right of use (property right) over the Dunavska Plots, which was later expropriated by the adoption of the 2013 DRP.",Legal Decisions,26.44517,23.608929,26.692486
"Westwood unquestionably was the proper party to bring claims for constructive eviction and breach of contract because it was the party to the lease. (16RR36 (PX7); 10RR273-74) And Westwood was the entity that suffered the brunt of Respondents’ unlawful interference with its right to possess the premises. That made it the proper party to bring claims for breach of contract and constructive eviction. By contrast, Westwood Motors was never a party to this case.",Party Submissions,10.425636,11.011879,11.486851
"R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the documentation relating to the Report on the Strategic Environmental Assessment is relevant to the question of Obnova's alleged property rights or material to the Tribunal's determination of this question. This is a classic ""fishing expedition"", with Claimants simply casting about for any documents containing information which Claimants consider to be helpful in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case.",Legal Decisions,13.126842,11.598525,14.36812
"Nor did the Court of Appeals ignore precedent suggesting expert reports should be read together. (Pet. Br. at 23). In fact, exactly the opposite is true. The Court of Appeals consistently referred to both experts’ reports, ultimately concluding that “the experts do not provide factual explanation of how or why [H.W.] would not have suffered the eventual infarction” even if the C-section commenced earlier. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *4, *5 (emphasis added).",Party Submissions,11.718047,11.564785,14.14743
"Moreover, the district clerk can only issue execution for “the sum actually due when [the execution] is issued and the rate of interest upon the sum due.” TEX. R. C IV. P. 630; see also Yale v. Heard, 26 Tex. 639, 641 (1863) (“If there be evidence of payments brought to the knowledge of the clerk of the district court, he must credit them upon the execution, and as well the damages awarded upon the sum paid as the principal if the payment was made before the appeal or the suing out of the writ of error.”). If Bay, Ltd. attempted to collect more than was actually owed from either the Diocese or from Mendietta, injunctive relief would be available to stop the collection efforts. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.013. Other types of judgment collection tools also contain methods to determine the actual amount due on the judgment, taking into accounts payment made thereon. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 664a; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 50(2).",Party Submissions,8.558245,9.224577,8.774175
"Because Bay moved for summary judgment on the exact same issue as Plaintiffs, Bay had the burden of establishing every element of its affirmative defense both in response and in its own motion. By failing to do so in either its own Motion for Summary Judgment or in its Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Bay failed to establish an element of its affirmative defense as a matter of law. Regardless of whether Mann filed a traditional or no-evidence motion for summary judgment, Bay had the burden to prove that it met the mandatory requirements of Tex. Lab. Code § 406.123 to support its defense and because Bay failed to establish standing to assert the affirmative defense, the trial courts' ruling striking the affirmative defense of “exclusive remedies should be affirmed.",Party Submissions,6.96283,7.0496325,8.294311
"Section 51.003(a) ’s plain language covers actions brought by a junior creditor to recover post-foreclosure debt. Although Yellowfin accuses Santos of “seeking to rewrite the statute,” Resp. Br. 14, it never even discusses Section 51.003(a) ’s text. The reason for Yellowfin’s failure to do business with the statute’s words is clear: Section 51.003(a) unquestionably encompasses suits brought by the junior creditor after the senior creditor’s foreclosure.",Party Submissions,7.9658685,8.114684,8.688095
Tribunal is not at this point expressing any view as to whether USMCA Chapter 14 is ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.,Legal Decisions,11.071085,12.109906,13.786517
"Furthermore, the absence of a cost ceiling also paves the way for strategic manipulations. Without a clear boundary on expenses, there looms the very real possibility of abuse. Consider a scenario wherein one party, perhaps a larger corporation or entity with considerable financial leverage, intentionally prolongs or complicates the arbitration process. This would be a tactical move to inflate costs, further deterring the other party from seeking justice. Such manipulative strategies strike at the heart of arbitration's core philosophy, which champions efficiency and cost-effectiveness as its premier alternatives to traditional litigation.",Party Submissions,12.649383,11.005607,12.916721
"HN6 [ ] Under the quasi-estoppel principle, a party is precluded from asserting, [*10] to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by the party. Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Tex. 2000) ; Steubner Realty 19, Ltd. v. Cravens Road 88, Ltd., 817 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a party to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which it acquiesced, or of which it accepted a benefit. Lopez, 22 S.W.3d at 864 ; Steubner Realty 19, Ltd., 817 S.W.2d at 164 .",Party Submissions,4.3099413,4.5472164,4.573161
"This motion complies with the requirements of Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) and 9.4(i)(2)(B) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using “Microsoft Word 2010” in fourteen (14) point “Times New Roman” style font, and it contains 994 words, excluding the parts exempted by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.",Party Submissions,4.6757827,5.162318,6.55956
"Texas law clearly sets forth specific legal predicates for the affirmative defense of “exhaustion of remedies.” Oral argument will assist the court to focus on the evidence and authorities that demonstrate Bay lacks standing to raise the affirmative defense of “exhaustion of remedies” under the specific facts of this case. Due to the complex nature of this case, Appellees respectfully requests the court to consider granting additional time for oral argument.",Party Submissions,9.503414,9.420986,10.367281
"Nor does the 1997 amendment to Section 16.035, the statute of limitations for a suit for foreclosure or for the recovery of real property under a real-property lien, require a different result. That amendment just reworded “lien debt” as “real property lien” to clarify that all liens were governed by the more specific statute of limitations for liens, Section 16.035, rather than the more general statute of limitations to enforce a negotiable instrument, Section 3.118. See Texas Legis. Council, Summary of Enactments 75th Legislature 38 (1997). As the State Bar Committee comments on Section 3.118 observe, “because of their particular nature, the statute of limitations provisions of section 16.035 and 16.036 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, relating to actions with respect to debts secured by liens on real property, and section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code, relating to actions to recover deficiencies after nonjudicial foreclosures, should be interpreted to control, in appropriate circumstances, over the provisions of section 3.118.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 3.118 cmt. (West Supp. 2021). The Legislature thus made clear that the more specific statute of limitations for real-property liens controlled over the more general statute of limitations for liens, just as Section 51.003(a)’s more specific limitations period for post foreclosure deficiencies controls here instead of more general limitations periods. See Opening Br. 23-24. And by enacting shorter statutes of limitations in Sections 16.035 and 51.003, the Legislature decided that actions related to foreclosure should be commenced sooner than should general, non-foreclosure-related actions for debt recovery.",Party Submissions,4.8701425,4.8043475,4.95645
"According to the Claimant, the contours of the concept are unclear and the Respondent has failed to show its relevance in the case at hand. In particular, in the Wena v. Egypt case cited by the Respondent, the tribunal rejected the argument based on repose as the respondent had had “ ample notice of the ongoing dispute ,” just like in the case at hand. The Claimant argues that the Respondent could not have reasonably believed that the claims had been abandoned and that it was aware of its breach of the rights of power generators and their investors. 349. The Claimant is of the view that it is also not estopped from bringing its claims.",Legal Decisions,10.72791,10.881919,10.790804
"Given the Respondent’s objections regarding the lack of specific mention in the Request for Arbitration, and for the sake of efficiency, the Claimant is prepared to withdraw the Request.",Legal Decisions,14.538063,10.749494,13.81025
"The Request is overly broad and hence producing responsive documents would impose an unreasonable burden on the Respondent. Indeed, the Request refers to all documents “between and/or among the Respondent”. This formulation potentially includes countless unidentified State entities. Despite the Claimant’s assertion to the contrary, it is reasonable to expect that a foreign investor has a foundational understanding of the host-State's legal structure and the core functions of its entities, which would allow it to tailor its document production requests accordingly at least to some extent. Yet, the Claimant has made no attempt to narrow down the relevant State entities, unlike with Requests 15 and 17 infra.",Legal Decisions,10.294473,12.334429,10.974443
"Nonetheless, Bay still doesn't qualify as a subclaimant. “A person qualifies as a sub-claimant if he has provided compensation, directly or indirectly, to or for an employee or legal beneficiary; if he has sought and been refused reimbursement from the insurance carrier; and if he has filed a written claim with the Division.” Texas Mutual at 75 (citing Tex. Lab. Code § 409.009).",Party Submissions,9.224008,8.554522,10.748561
"None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant at the time of his arrest or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,14.367309,17.40334,14.598733
"The purpose of the Plan is to attract and retain key employees by providing each Participant with an opportunity to defer receipt of a portion of their salary, bonus, commission, and other specified compensation (if any). The Plan is not intended to meet the qualification requirements of Code Section 401(a) but is intended to meet the requirements of Code Section 409A and shall be operated and interpreted consistent with that intent.",Contract,3.6858363,3.9472036,4.764504
"Ifyou have answered “Yes"" t0 Question Number 30r Question Number 4. then answer Question Number 5. Otherwise, d0 not answer Question Number 5.",Party Submissions,21.039232,32.305992,28.889244
"To require the National Small Business Development Center Advisory Board to submit an annual report on the activities of the Board and other information, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.0603857,6.959288,7.3553476
"To the extent the majority concludes the court's instruction was a direct comment “on the weight of the evidence or advises the jury of the effect of their answers,” I disagree. To be a direct comment on the weight of the evidence, the issue submitted must suggest to the jury the trial court's opinion on the matter. H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. 1998). An impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence occurs when “after examining the entire charge, it is determined that the judge assumed the truth of a material controverted fact, or exaggerates, minimizes, or withdraws some pertinent evidence from the jury's consideration.” Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427, 434 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ). Similarly, to directly advise the jury of the legal effect of its answers, the issue submitted must instruct the jury how to answer each question in order for the plaintiff or defendant to prevail. Id. (citing Pope & Lowerre, The State of the Special Verdict—1979, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 43 (1979)). The instruction does none of these things.",Party Submissions,5.407687,6.087701,5.928456
"Section 17. Overpayment. If, due to mistake or any other reason, a person receives Severance Benefits under the Plan in excess of what the Plan provides, that person shall repay the overpayment to the Company in a lump sum within 30 days of the Company providing notice to such person of the amount of overpayment. If such person fails to so repay the overpayment, then without limiting any other remedies available to the Company, the Company may deduct the amount of the overpayment from any other amounts which become payable to that person under the Plan or otherwise.",Contract,4.205263,4.2975307,4.3427067
"Finally, Judge Rosenthal held that fee-splitting was unconscionable as a matter of law in James v. Conceptus, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (S.D. Tex. 2021). But that case was decided under California law, id. at 1033, which is evidently inconsistent with Texas law.",Party Submissions,6.9038277,7.6484556,7.9369693
"In addition to its failure to show that Midland owns or operates a solid waste facility as defined under the SWDA, Weatherford also failed to provide evidence showing Midland meets the SWDA requirement for an “arranger or acceptor” of solid waste. This Court has maintained that statutory requirement connecting solid waste to a defendant’s action: in order to be liable as an arranger or acceptor of solid waste, there must be a “ causal nexus. .. between the defendant’s conduct and the disposal of the solid waste.” R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 232, 242 (emphasis added). R.R. Street further pointed to “some actual involvement in the decision to dispose of waste” as well as asking “whether the party assumed responsibility for determining [hazardous substances’] fate.” R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 242 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992) and CPC Int’l Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp ., 759 F.Supp. 1269, 1278 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). As provided in support of Midland’s evidentiary Plea to the Jurisdiction, there is no actual involvement between the City and the alleged disposal, and there is no assumption of responsibility for the disposal. On the question of arranger/acceptor status under the SWDA, Midland is at most a passive recipient, but it certainly has demonstrated it had no agreement to accept illicit wastes expressly prohibited by City ordinance.",Party Submissions,6.3645525,6.2004633,6.690442
"Fifth, Rafiei’s evidence that he cannot afford the delegation arbitration is conclusory and speculative. A simple assertion that “I do not have that kind of money” does not satisfy the requirement of specific evidence.",Party Submissions,17.994556,20.931227,21.060904
"If Subcontractor fails to take any of the above actions within twenty-four (24) hours after receiving notice from McCarthy, McCarthy may take action to attempt to put Subcontractor's Work back on schedule, and deduct the entire cost of such actions from the amounts due or to become due Subcontractor.",Party Submissions,5.9834485,7.7348466,7.437875
"As Mr Broshko claims to have "" believed "" that Obnova would obtain compensation, the requested documents (serving as a basis for such belief) are in Claimants' possession, custody or control.",Legal Decisions,40.153553,45.166943,53.05408
"That loss of value is distinct from the loss suffered by North Star, because Sea & Coast and North Star are two different businesses with different business models.",Legal Decisions,34.66493,34.676582,43.781956
"This letter contains an opinion of the competent authority on a draft of the 2013 DRP provided pursuant to Article 44 of the Regulation on the Content, Method, and Procedure for the Preparation of Planning Documents (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia,” No. 31/2010, 69/2010, and 16/2011). The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the competent authorities, in this case the Institute for the Protection of Nat ure of Serbia, considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP, and if so, what was its contemporaneous understanding of these rights.",Legal Decisions,9.910708,9.715619,8.920854
"The Federal Arbitration Act governs arbitration agreements. In 1988, Congress passed and President Reagan signed an amendment to the Act; the amendment is codified at 9 U.S.C. § 16(a). Under § 16(a), when a district court denies a party's motion to compel arbitration, that party may take an interlocutory appeal. Section 16(a) creates a rare statutory exception to the usual rule that parties may not appeal before final judgment. See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108–109, 130 S.Ct. 599, 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009). Notably, Congress provided for immediate interlocutory appeals of orders denying —but not of orders granting —motions to compel arbitration.",Party Submissions,2.6963995,2.7725275,2.7175834
"Cockerham case The Cockerham case is the controlling authority regarding the presumption of gift and rebuttal thereof when an asset is titled in both spouses’ names. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d at 162. There, the husband owned real property with his brother before marriage. During the marriage the brother wanted to divest his ownership. The husband and wife purchased the entire property from the brother, and it was titled in both husband and wife’s name.",Party Submissions,7.314647,8.352853,7.902235
Argument Suppose you picked up this morning’s newspaper and your life was a front-page headline ... And everything they said was accurate ... But none of it was true?,Party Submissions,35.139442,30.694273,34.567757
"As there is currently activity from vessels from other countries in the area, I consider it expedient that Norway and Russia will continue to act in a coordinated manner in the further work to gain acceptance for this. I would also consider it expedient if, at the forthcoming session of the joint Norwegian Russian Fisheries Commission, we discuss how the snow crab is to be managed in the future.",Legal Decisions,12.778909,16.177784,13.813412
"The rule is recognized that one cause of action may, by amendment, be substituted for another. Ballard v. Carmichael, 83 Tex. 355, 18 S.W.",Party Submissions,7.257859,9.9269285,9.959656
"Unless the Plan Administrator determines otherwise, a transfer of employment or services between or among the Company and its Subsidiaries shall not be considered a termination of employment. Further, unless the Plan Administrator determines otherwise, including through policies it may adopt from time to time regarding part-time work arrangements or reduced work schedules, and except as otherwise required by local law, for purposes of this Award only, any reduction in your regular hours of employment to less than thirty hours per week is deemed a termination of your employment with the Company or any Subsidiary. In case of termination of your employment for Cause or for a violation of the Company’s code of business conduct and ethics, the Award shall automatically terminate upon first notification to you of such termination, unless the Plan Administrator determines otherwise. If your employment is suspended pending an investigation of whether you should be terminated for Cause or for a violation of the Company’s code of business conduct and ethics, all of your rights under the Award likewise may be suspended during the period of investigation. The Plan Administrator, the Vice President of Human Resources, the Associate General Counsel, Labor and Employment, or any other officer of the Company delegated such authority by the Plan Administrator shall have the exclusive discretion to determine when you are no longer actively providing services to the Company or any Subsidiary or when your rights under the Award may be suspended pending an investigation of whether you should be terminated for Cause or a violation of the Company’s code of business conduct and ethics.",Contract,3.9561145,3.8522012,4.1795597
"Perhaps CCISD had no reason to question the numbers. After all, CCISD and Bellpas were both represented by the same law firm.",Party Submissions,32.843998,38.524696,43.433662
"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. Generally, a writ of mandamus will issue only when the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal and the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion. The relator has the burden of establishing these prerequisites, and this burden is a heavy one.",Party Submissions,3.268627,3.7808294,4.2242045
Filing a Claim. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the Plan shall be filed in writing with the Committee which shall make all determinations concerning such claim. Any claim filed with the Committee and any decision by the Committee denying such claim shall be in writing and shall be delivered to the Claimant.,Contract,4.868149,5.4410515,6.2048388
"Permissive interlocutory appeals are provided by statute in section 51.014(d) of the civil practice and remedies code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). This statute has been strictly construed as a “narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable.” City of Houston v. Estate of Jones, 388 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted).",Party Submissions,2.56439,2.875708,2.83505
"Claimant confirms that I Squared Capital acquired an indirect interest in Cerros Colorados from Duke Energy through a newly created vehicle, Orazul Energía Holdings LLC.",Legal Decisions,31.670872,37.477352,27.433933
"January 20, 2017 to the present, National Archives (to the extent that documents in the National Archives originated from USTR or the State Document Request No.",Legal Decisions,23.641958,26.736044,35.41306
"Disabled or Disability. Disabled or Disability means that a Participant is, by reason of any medically-determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months: (a) unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity, or (b) receiving income replacement benefits for a period of not less than three months under an accident and health plan covering employees of the Participant’s Employer. The Committee shall determine whether a Participant is Disabled in accordance with Code Section 409A, provided, however, that a Participant shall be deemed to be Disabled if determined to be totally disabled by the Social Security Administration. The determination of whether a Participant is Disabled shall be made in compliance with Treas. Reg. §1.409A-3(i)(4).",Contract,2.075344,2.3868372,2.5765603
"On the basis of the evidence in the record, please summarize the legal options available for CALICA before domestic administrative and/or judicial proceedings against: (i) the alleged order of the President of Mexico to shut down La Rosita.",Party Submissions,40.84147,37.97446,41.03864
"This is the same sleight-of-hand that drove the holdings in Zuniga and Gandy. This Court should respond as it did in those cases and prohibit the assignment. If the Court concludes HSMiller still can pursue its claim, the only question remaining is whether a fair trial can be had after two trials based on collusion and position shifting.",Party Submissions,27.698315,29.652739,33.412273
"No evidence supports a finding that the Lawyers breached a duty of care to HSMiller by stipulating to Defatrios’s authority rather than fighting a losing battle. Nor does HSMiller offer any. The arguments in its Response Brief go to imagined, unpleaded, and 32 untried breaches: the alleged failure to object to the BNC Sellers’ counsel’s violations of the joint agreement about the stipulation (Resp’t’s Br. at 49) or agreeing to the stipulation when HSMiller was not, itself, negligent (which is irrelevant to whether it could have been liable based on actual or apparent authority). Resp’t’s Br. at 49-50. “[E]xpert testimony of an attorney is necessary to establish this standard of skill and care ordinarily exercised by an attorney.” Border Demolition & Envt’l, Inc. v. Pineda, 535 S.W.3d 140, 156 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2017, no pet.) (quoting Hall v. Rutherford, 911 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied)) (alteration in original)).",Party Submissions,9.165831,9.744043,10.079952
"Separation from Service Benefit. Upon the Participant’s Separation from Service for reasons other than death, he or she shall be entitled to a Separation from Service Benefit. The Separation from Service Benefit shall be equal to the vested portion (as applicable) of (i) the Participant’s Retirement Account, (ii) any Separation from Service Account(s), and (iii) any Specified Date Accounts with respect to which payments have not yet commenced, based on the value of such Account(s) as of the end of the calendar month immediately preceding the calendar month of distribution, payable in accordance with Section 6.2(a) below. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a Participant is a Specified Employee on the date of such Participant’s Separation from Service, the distribution from such Accounts will be made or begin on the first (1st) day of the seventh (7th) calendar month following the calendar month in which the Separation from Service occurs, to the extent necessary to avoid a “prohibited distribution” under §409A(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Code (with any amounts otherwise payable prior to such seventh calendar month instead paid on the first (1st) day of such seventh (7th) calendar month). If the Separation from Service Benefit is to be paid in the form of installments, any subsequent installment payments will be paid on the anniversary of the first (1st) day of the seventh (7th) month.",Contract,3.1433613,3.1707208,3.3632236
"Claimants’ Closing Statement, Transcript (Day 9), 18 March 2022, 1969:5-12. See also Tribunal Question 18A: “The Tribunal understands that the Amparo Action was initiated on 13 September 2016 by a private citizen, P. J. Begazo López, against various authorities of Respondent. In those proceedings, Claimants argue that some of the defendant authorities took positions in support of the validity of the environmental permits on which Claimants rely ( see Reply ¶ 293), and that authorities of Respondent continued to take that position on appeal, but were ultimately overruled in 2020 and 2021 ( see CD-01, Claimants’ Opening Presentation, Slides 48-49, C-305/R-070, C-295).",Legal Decisions,12.314228,11.557486,13.052308
"Claimants note Serbia’s agreement to produce the responsive documents. Claimants also note that Serbia has produced some of the responsive documents. However, Serbia has not produced a Site plan at a scale of 1:2500 that should be attached to the list of construction land on which the Preduzece luka I skladista “Beograd” transfers the right of use to the City of Belgrade with (see description of document No. 2 in the Claimants’ request). In addition, the documents produced by Serbia do not seem to be complete as they do not include certain annexes. Claimants will approach Serbia to resolve these issues but reserve their right to approach the Tribunal in case Serbia’s refuses to produce complete versions of all responsive documents.",Legal Decisions,11.369938,11.373541,10.948086
"Spatial Development Program, Construction Land Development Program and Port Program referred to in Article 7 of the agreement submitted by Serbia as exhibit R-060.",Legal Decisions,45.371555,49.867607,70.830025
"Respondent disputes this. Respondent points to Article 1(3)(b) of the Cyprus-Serbia BIT, which requires the investor to prove its seat is in the territory of Cyprus and argues that regardless of whether the Tribunal applies international law or Cyprus law to determine what ""seat"" means under the BIT, the term ""seat"" requires effective management by the Cyprus entity, which the Cypriot Claimants failed to prove.",Legal Decisions,7.111317,8.6900425,7.8641295
"C. All past due royalties (including any compensatory royalties payable under Paragraph VI.B) shall be subject to a Late Charge based on the amount due and calculated at the maximum rate allowed by law commencing on the day after the last day on which such monthly royalty payment could have been timely made and for every calendar month and/or fraction thereof from the due date until paid, plus attorney’s fees, court costs, and other costs in connection with the collection of the unpaid amounts. Any Late Charge that may become applicable shall be due and payable on the last day of each month when this provision becomes applicable.",Party Submissions,7.6346855,7.7630224,8.385379
"In his testimony, referred to: estimated extraction rates as referred to at pp. 47-49 of the Investment Agreement (Exh. C-10), with “an increasing curve that goes beyond Please explain the basis for these statements by reference to the evidence in the record. 126. was referring to the estimated initial production forecast contained in the environmental impact statement attached as Annex 2 to the 1986 Investment Agreement.335 As shown by the numbers on the bars toward the right-hand side of the graph that appears on the left in Figure 14 below, the 1986 Investment Agreement anticipated that extraction volumes could surpass six million tons per year.",Party Submissions,17.533041,14.601854,18.168974
"As stated in § 2, vessels that are to fish in waters outside any state’s fisheries jurisdiction must be registered through notification to the Directorate of Fisheries. Attached is the registration form that can be used. [...] The registration notification will be processed and information about the vessel will be sent to the NEAFC Secretariat in London.",Legal Decisions,13.3089,14.145903,12.440787
"App.—El Paso 1990, writ denied)). So it makes little difference whether Respondents “disclaimed any appellate issue about res judicata,” whether the court of appeals insisted “it was not ruling on res judicata,” or whether the “opinion cites no case about res judicata.” (Resp. 16) The opinion’s underpinning logic is more akin to collateral estoppel anyway, because the court of appeals treated “the issue” of Westwood’s abandonment of the premises as having been “decided” in the forcible entry and detainer proceeding, and therefore preventing “relitigation” of the issue in district court. Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am ., 845 S.W.2d 794, 802 (Tex. 1992). In any event, the fact that the court held that the forcible entry and detainer proceeding’s result “precluded [Westwood] from recovering damages,” and prevented Westwood from being able to satisfy “at least one element” of its “constructive eviction and breach of contract claims,” showed the court’s belief that the result in an eviction proceeding will control the different proceedings in district court. (Op. 2, 6) And that violates Texas statutes defining the boundaries between the jurisdiction of Texas district courts and lower courts in eviction cases regardless of the particular reason for that preclusion. Respondents do nothing to prove otherwise except to insist those boundaries pertain only to “res judicata” when they plainly do not.",Party Submissions,8.647799,9.084266,9.416718
"Deep within Texas law, and indeed the legal fabric of many jurisdictions, lies a wariness of unconscionable contracts or clauses. Such contracts, perceived as lopsided or oppressive, are often deemed unenforceable. An arbitration clause that leaves a party vulnerable to unfettered costs, especially when there's a stark financial disparity between the two parties, can easily be painted with the brush of unconscionability. To enforce such clauses would be to flout public policy, which guards against the enforcement of inequitable agreements.",Party Submissions,9.337794,9.304716,9.740095
"The Manns argue that Bay has produced no evidence of a written agreement, and therefore summary judgment was proper. However, contrary to the Manns' assertion, Bay's record evidence supports the existence of a fact issue concerning whether a “written agreement” exists. See Briggs, 337 S.W.3d at 283. This evidence includes a policy manual from Valero which sets out the terms by which Valero will supply ROCIP coverage to subcontractors such as Bay, and which provides that the manual's terms were mandatorily “incorporated by reference into” the subcontractor's contract with Valero. The ROCIP policy itself is also probative of the existence of a written agreement, especially given that the policy was signed by Bay and makes multiple references to binding both Bay and the policy “sponsor” Valero, and it refers to Bay's execution of a “written contract” with Valero “to provide workers compensation insurance in connection with the designated premises.” Finally, Bay submitted an affidavit from Bay's vice-president of safety and human resources which attests that there was a written agreement called the “Alliance Services Agreement.” Viewed in the light most favorable to Bay, see SeaBright, 465 S.W.3d at 641, this evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ concerning the existence of a written agreement to provide ROCIP coverage. See Helix Energy, 522 S.W.3d at 431. Thus, Bay has successfully created a fact issue on the existence of a written agreement. This fact issue prevents the Manns from conclusively negating the employer element. See id. The trial court's summary judgment disposing of Bay's affirmative defense cannot be affirmed on the basis of this element. See id.; see also Toal, 2001 WL 1382513, at *2.",Party Submissions,6.8563757,6.987265,7.138884
"In describing the pervasive regulatory scheme created by the Property Tax Code, the court in Appraisal Review Bd. of Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. O'Connor & Assocs ., 267 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet. ) stated the following: The Tax Code sets forth administrative procedures for aggrieved property owners to protest their tax liabilities. A property owner may protest to the Board the appraised value of the owner's property, the inclusion of the property on the appraisal records, a failure by the chief appraiser or the Board to provide the property owner with any notice to which the owner is entitled, and any other action by the chief appraiser, appraisal district, or Board that applies to and adversely affects the property owner. The Board must schedule a hearing on the property owner's protest. .. Review in the district court is by trial de novo, and the district court may enter any order necessary to preserve rights protected by and impose duties required by the law. Therefore, the Board has exclusive jurisdiction over property tax disputes, and property owners generally must exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.",Party Submissions,4.839163,5.40361,5.1649966
"Finally, this Court should address whether the Legislature through HHSC has legislatively imposed duties for all owners, managers, operators, or other attendants in charge of Class A or Class B public swimming pools. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 341.0645 (requiring compliance with rules adopted by commissioner to prevent drowning); see also TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 25, § 265.191 (requiring all Class A and Class B public pools to provide lifeguards). See also Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985) (holding city ordinance imposed duty of care on property owner). Other jurisdictions that have analyzed this issue have found these types of regulations impose a duty on the owner or operator. See, e.g., Coleman v. Shaw, 314 S.E.2d 154, 158 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (violation of health and safety regulation requiring lifeguards was negligence per se); Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company v. McGivern, 208 S.E.2d 258, 261 (Ga. 1974) (acknowledging violation of ordinance requiring lifeguard or attendant can constitute negligence per se); Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 471 (Cal. 1970) (statutory obligation to have a lifeguard imposed a duty).",Party Submissions,3.9825473,4.250672,4.2108555
"The parties' arguments in the judicial review case have evolved somewhat over the course of the proceedings. However, HN3 [ ] section 410.302 of the Labor Code [**13] provides that a trial court is limited to reviewing only those issues decided by the appeals panel. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.302(b) (Vernon 2006); Ins. Co. of Pa. v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 164 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Further, a delineation of the matters at issue in the judicial review case facilitates our disposition of Sonic's mandamus petition. Therefore, we set out the issues addressed in the TWCC proceedings.",Party Submissions,5.1705556,5.8699594,5.8939323
"For the above reasons, Claimant respectfully requests the T Respondent to produce the documents requested here Request No. 16: The Request is denied. The Claimant is requesting access to documents mostly prepared by the Claimant himself and relating in whole or in part to the encounter organized by the Claimant between Qatar representatives, including Dr Ali bin Smikh Al Marri and the company DENNYS in May and June 2019 for the purpose of developing infrastructure in Qatar. Such documents are not material to assess the Claimant’s investment in Qatar for the purpose of preparing his forthcoming Memorial, nor are they relevant as an input for a quantum expert evaluating such investment before any submissions have been exchanged on the merits of the instant case, as this is “Relevance and Materiality according to the Requesting Party”.",Legal Decisions,18.912764,17.540846,20.107515
"S.W.3d 52, 63 (Tex. 2013) (citing Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. 2000)).",Party Submissions,3.0997887,3.8762133,4.856197
"Overview”, ASA Bulletin 22, (2/2004), p. 273. 1550 C-CS ¶ 10; see C-CS Annex A, Table B(1)(b); citing CL-280, Hydro S.r.l. and others v. Republic of Albania, counsel and case management. Even so, the Tribunal considers First Claimant’s costs to exceed what is reasonable in this case.",Legal Decisions,21.630566,24.321976,25.078623
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Cadastre, in accordance with the applicable regulations.178 In other words, the requested documents are “in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties”. 179 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Cadastre in order to obtain documents in question.180 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents, so it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants already obtained the Cadastre excerpts related to the land plots at Dunavska 17-19 (exhibits C-162 to C-164) as well as excerpts related to the plots located nearby (for example, exhibits C-323 to C-325), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek. U, B : The request is unduly and overly broad and burdensome as it relates to all land book excerpts for land plots at Dunavska 17-19 and 23, which are not even specified, and to the Surrounding Area, which is also unspecified. The request potentially covers a large number of documents, which are very hard to identify. Also, Claimants’ request covers period of at least 56 years, even before the establishment of Obnova. 181 Respondent cannot reasonably be bound to produce all these documents.",Legal Decisions,8.715206,9.280084,8.907555
"Alternatively, the Court should reverse and render a take-nothing judgment because there is no evidence to support the jury’s verdict in the malpractice trial on liability or damages. At a minimum, 58 the finding of gross negligence should be reversed and rendered, and the remainder of the case remanded for trial, either for the reasons the court of appeals found or because of the failure to submit proportionate liability under Chapter 33.",Party Submissions,9.468039,10.430973,10.858213
"Significantly, Backes’ s obligations under those two sections are not activated until the borrower defaults on the bridge loan note, whether by failure to pay the note in full upon maturity or by some other event of default, at which point, according to Osprin, they become matured and fixed.",Party Submissions,24.56348,21.676565,32.04291
"On the other hand, Rafiei's situation is dictated by the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, which lack similar cost caps. This stark difference in applicable rules directly affects the financial implications for the parties involved, setting Rafiei's case apart from the scenario in In re Olshan.",Party Submissions,19.878445,21.141548,26.314808
"The Walkers’ case law on this point is distinguishable. In Livingston v. Montgomery, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that an obstetrician was qualified to offer opinions about the cause of a newborn’s neurological injuries. Livingston v. Montgomery, 279 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). But that was because he explained in his report how he had the requisite knowledge and expertise to “recognize the perinatal progression of hypoxia due to inadequate oxygenation...” and “knowledge and experience on the subject of hypoxia as it relates to the associated buildup of carbon dioxide (hypercapnia) that complicates ischemia....” Id. at 874. Dr. Tappan did not do the same.",Party Submissions,6.848273,6.7880087,7.509448
"Upon consideration of this issue, we have concluded that French v. French should be overruled and the subsequent decisions which rely on that precedent should be disapproved. As we shall explain, the French rule cannot stand because nonvested pension rights are not an expectancy but a contingent interest in property; furthermore, the French rule compels an inequitable division of the rights acquired through community effort. Pension rights, whether or not vested, represent a property interest to the extent that such rights derive from employment during coverture, they comprise a community asset subject to division in a dissolution proceeding.",Party Submissions,8.702558,9.071101,8.663078
"The requested documents are further relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute, as they would serve to corroborate Respondent's objections to the admissibility of the Cypriot Claimants' claims, specifically Respondent's objection that Kalemegdan's acquisition of the Obnova shares was an abuse of process.",Legal Decisions,11.060468,13.9649515,13.562616
"IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................................................ i Nature of the Case : This is an action by Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp. to enforce a promissory Note. Deysi R. Santos (“Santos”) executed the second lien Note at issue on April 28, 2005. The first lien was foreclosed on November 6, 2007, rendering the second lien Note unsecured. Yellowfin purchased the Note on August 29, 2019, and is the holder and payee of the Note. With all necessary conditions met, Yellowfin filed this lawsuit on June 12, 2020, seeking judgment for $21,023.13 and an award of its fees and costs. On July 23, 2020, Santos counterclaimed for fraud and violation of the Texas Debt Collection Act. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Yellowfin as to all claims and counterclaims on December 22, 2020. This appeal followed.",Party Submissions,5.742276,5.6074986,6.1256647
"Contents of Notice. If a benefits claim is completely or partially denied on review, notice of such denial shall be in writing and shall set forth the reasons for denial in plain language.",Contract,8.1959715,12.249744,12.17826
Nothing in this Agreement is intended to conflict with 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) or create liability for disclosures of trade secrets that are expressly allowed by 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b).,Contract,2.5503757,3.0400941,3.0446386
"None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant. The requested information is not at Claimant’s disposal because it is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,15.314683,17.08176,15.799723
"Lastly, a core concern in assessing the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is whether the costs associated with arbitration would preclude a party from effectively vindicating their rights. In In re Olshan, this Court found no legally sufficient evidence that the homeowners would face arbitration fees that would deter them from accessing the arbitral forum, thanks to the cost protections offered by the AAA's commercial arbitration rules. Id. at 897.",Party Submissions,8.583846,9.163167,10.972971
"Additionally, Devine fails to provide the context of his Reed citation. Ironically, the Reed Court delineates that “the State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process” overrides Appellant’s (in Reed) spurious 10 challenges. Reed, 561 U.S. at 197. The Supreme Court further explains that the State’s interest is particularly strong “with respect to efforts to root out fraud... but the State’s interest is not limited to combating fraud; it extends to efforts to ferret out invalid signatures caused not by fraud but by simple mistake, such as duplicate signatures or signatures of individuals who are not registered to vote in the State.” Id. The Reed Court goes on to opine that “the State’s interest also extends more generally to promoting transparency and accountability in the electoral process.” Id. at 198.",Party Submissions,7.5583377,7.1515393,8.565219
"Compound interest has become overwhelming as the modern trend. Delaware courts have called it the trend, precisely because modern participants in a market economy think in terms of compounding. See ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 926 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that, “[i]t is simply not credible in today’s financial markets that a person sophisticated enough to perfect his or her appraisal rights would be unsophisticated enough to make an investment at simple interest—in fact, even passbook savings accounts now compound their interest daily”) (footnote omitted).",Party Submissions,12.399896,11.367022,12.709004
Disability Benefit. A Participant who is entitled to receive a Disability Benefit shall receive payment of such benefit in a single lump sum.,Contract,4.9684534,5.8369284,8.917373
"The request seeks “[a]ll documents” that any agency, official, or employee of any of the three USMCA Parties “prepared, proposed, or exchanged. .. or that otherwise pertain to positions considered or taken by any of them” in connection with the specified topics.",Legal Decisions,14.794007,20.236681,19.234863
FAILURE OF A PARTY TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT DOES NOT JUSTIFY DENYING THAT PARTY COURT-ORDERED POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD. REFUSAL BY A PARTY TO ALLOW POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD DOES NOT JUSTIFY FAILURE TO PAY COURT-ORDERED CHILD SUPPORT TO THAT PARTY.,Party Submissions,2.7741315,3.0125146,3.1517794
"The language in the charge, however, incorporates the passive receipt doctrine acknowledged by numerous courts both before and after Heldenfels, including an opinion authored by Justice Bland while serving on the First Court of Appeals. See Cristobal v. Allen, No. 01-09-00126-CV, 2010 WL 2873502, at *6 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] July 22, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Unjust enrichment occurs when the defendant wrongfully secures a benefit or passively receives a benefit which would be unconscionable to retain.”). In fact, in the Diocese’s requested jury question and proposed instructions, the Diocese included an instruction that stated: “A party ‘takes an undue advantage’ when it wrongfully secures a benefit or passively receives a benefit which it would be unconscionable to retain.” (2CR855-56). Thus, even if the trial court had given the Diocese’s proposed charge, we would arrive at the same place—applying the passive receipts doctrine.",Party Submissions,6.0954185,6.525109,6.608241
"Nor is it accurate that Dr. Castillo and Baptist failed to challenge foreseeability. ( See Pet. Br. at 38). As the Walkers acknowledge, this appeal is about, among other things, the sufficiency of their experts’ causation opinions. And “proximate cause has two components: (1) foreseeability and (2) cause-in-fact.” Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 460. If, as the Walkers concede (see id.), Dr. Castillo challenged the lack of proximate cause opinions, and foreseeability is an element of proximate cause, how did she fail to challenge foreseeability?",Party Submissions,8.196876,8.385833,8.502043
"Subcontractor shall procure and maintain in force, Aviation Liability insurance covering all aircraft used in connection with the Project. Such insurance shall include coverage for bodily injury and property damage. All such insurance shall contain a breach of warranty endorsement in favor McCarthy.",Party Submissions,9.400261,7.952462,12.178612
"Sargeant’s 2013 Contract. See Respondent’s Memorial ¶ 111. Claimant is entitled to such Cargo Manifests and Declarations to evidence that Respondent ignored identical provisions in the contracts of State and Dominican-owned AC-30 suppliers, but is using such a provision to target Sargeant and avoid honoring the 2013 Contract.",Legal Decisions,26.055016,26.03838,31.207808
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.,Party Submissions,8.470454,9.081414,9.365897
Subcontractor's Work or submittals shall not relieve Subcontractor from its obligation to perform the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents.,Party Submissions,5.7637835,8.487578,11.6945505
"In this case, Carol Ann Henry sought payment of workers' compensation medical benefits related to a back injury allegedly sustained while working at a Dillard's store. Dillard, which was self-insured, denied Henry's claim because it was not job-related and notified the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission of its decision. Nevertheless, Dillard paid Henry benefits without admitting the validity of the claim. The dispute over the compensability of Henry's claim has never been resolved before the Commission.",Party Submissions,6.7967834,7.3702445,7.2644057
"As a preliminary matter, mandamus may have been unnecessary from either this Court or the court of appeals had Walker elected to file a petition in an appropriate district court. District courts have the authority to entertain challenges to whether a candidate’s application for the ballot complies with the Election Code’s requirements. See, e.g., Tex. Elec. Code § 273.081 (empowering courts to grant injunction to prevent “a violation or threatened violation of this code”); In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 537-38 (Tex. 2006) (reviewing district court’s issuance of temporary injunction directing removal of candidate from ballot). Given that Devine’s application became public information on November 13, Walker had all the information he needed to allege that Devine’s application did not satisfy statutory requirements by mid-November. At that point, Walker could have availed himself of several ordinary mechanisms for seeking accelerated relief, from asking the trial court for an expedited hearing to applying for a temporary restraining order to seeking a temporary injunction.1 Any of these might have sufficed to resolve Walker’s dispute, at least on a preliminary basis, well before last-minute mandamus relief might have become necessary. And if Walker failed before the district court, he likewise could have sought an expedited appeal, Rule 29.3 relief from the court of appeals, or then—if nothing else proved adequate—he could have sought mandamus relief from the appropriate court of appeals. Tex. Elec. Code § 273.061(a). These willingly foregone options foreclose any argument that Walker pursued mandamus relief because he lacked any other adequate options to press his claim.",Party Submissions,6.5185366,6.140085,6.72
"On February 11, 2021, the Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”) filed suit seeking the protection of child, for conservatorship, and for termination in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, against Appellant — A.S. CR 16-27. Within its Petition, DFPS pled the following grounds for 1 removal: grounds D, E, K, O, and P of subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. CR 23-24. A.S. was served with the Petition on February 16, 2022. CR 78. After the Adversary Hearing that occurred on March 16, 2022, DFPS was made the Temporary Managing Conservator of R.W. CR 162-74. The Family Plan of Service was filed on April 5, 2022. CR 176. Intervenors — the paternal grandparents of R.W. — filed a Petition of Intervention on October 4, 2022. CR 351. Within the petition to intervene, Intervenors incorporated all “allegations and documents filed by the Department.” CR 354. Intervenors filed their First Amended Petition on March 1, 2023. CR 553. Within the First Amended Petition, Intervenors expanded — beyond what DFPS had previously pled in its original Petititon — the grounds for termination against A.S. CR 559-61. 1. Trial Testimony 1 The suit was also filed against, alleged father, C.W. However, he is not a party to the instant appeal.",Party Submissions,5.074185,5.2380867,5.553676
"Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III Galovelho, LLC appeals the trial court’s September 21, 2021 Order and Final Judgment, which dismissed all of Galovelho’s claims with prejudice after granting appellees’ original and supplemental pleas t o the jurisdiction. In seven issues, Galovelho challenges the trial court’s jurisdictional rulings on its claims for takings and for equitable relief and the trial court’s earlier order requiring leave of court – 2– before Galovelho further amended its pleadings. W e affirm the trial court’s Order and Final Judgment.",Party Submissions,8.197265,9.070206,10.055224
"The trial court granted the parties’ divorce on December 9, 2019 but did not rule on characterization and division of the marital estate. Id.",Party Submissions,8.720673,10.676879,9.510406
"TMI argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Sonic on the reimbursement claim because section 406.075 bars Cochran's recovery of benefits under the TWCA and, as Cochran's subclaimant, Sonic is likewise barred from recovering under that statute. In response, [*474] Sonic contends that section 406.075 does not apply in this case because the compensation payments to Cochran were voluntary and were made prior to his receipt of the Alabama judgment. Sonic asserts it is entitled to recover the benefits from TMI because it satisfied the provisions of section 409.009 .",Party Submissions,7.0272727,7.4128013,8.492975
"This computer-generated document complies with the word-count limitations set forth in TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i) because it contains 5214 words, excluding the parts of this document exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1). In making this certification, I have relied on the word-count program contained within Microsoft Word.",Party Submissions,3.834777,5.665005,6.2626176
"Appellant workers' compensation carrier challenged a judgment of the 157th District Court, Harris County, Texas, in favor of appellee employer on the employer's reimbursement claim that had been denied under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA). The employer sought a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to lift abatement of its contract claims against the carrier. The court consolidated the cases for purposes of its opinion.",Party Submissions,6.9506536,6.0051365,6.796401
"Serbia relies on certain agreements submitted as exhibits R-007 to R-010, R-012 to R-017 and RJ-011 to argue that Obnova allegedly did not have the right of use over its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23.14 According to their respective wording, most of these agreements were supposed to include, at minimum, a “ scheme ” or “ outline ” depicting premises that were object of these agreements. However, the copies of the agreements submitted by Serbia do not include any annexes. As a result, the agreements submitted by Serbia are incomplete and do not make it clear to which land plots and/or buildings these agreements relate. For example, the agreement submitted as R-008 merely r efers to “the land-warehousing area in the cargo port zone on the Danube in Belgrade with a surface area of 7630 m2. ”15 This description is clearly insufficient to identify the exact location of the land in question and thus to assess whether it relates to Obnova’s current premises. The requested documents are therefore relevant and material to assess whether the agreements submitted by Serbia: ( i ) relate to Obnova’s current premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23 in the first place and, if so; ( ii ) what was the exact extent of rights and obligations that Obnova had under each of these agreements with respect to its current premises.",Legal Decisions,7.5325494,7.8669353,7.5026584
"Relevant and material to whether other AC-30 suppliers were similarly situated to Claimant, had contracts with similar terms to the 2013 Contract, and/or had contracts that suffered from the same alleged “irregularities” as the 2013 Contract.",Legal Decisions,14.277042,13.585109,15.762631
"Yellowfin complains that applying this statute of limitations to all lienholders would require it to monitor actions on the property securing its interests and prove the fairness of a foreclosure it did not conduct. Resp. Br. 7, 14. But Yellowfin’s extratextual concerns cannot override Section 51.003’s plain text. In any case, t his “carefully crafted deficiency judgment statute with its two-year limitations period and other protections for borrowers and creditors” “adds balance to the mortgagor -mortgagee relationship regarding deficiency judgments ... by circumscribing mortgagees’ rights to seek deficiency judgments and specifying rights that borrowers have regarding alleged deficiencies.” PlainsCapital Bank v. Martin, 459 S.W.3d 550, 554-55 (Tex. 2015). Section 51.003 thus “is intended to protect borrowers and guarantors,” Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Tex. 2014); see Opening Br. 15-16, not debt buyers like Yellowfin.",Party Submissions,8.588546,8.232665,8.998863
"Respondent has conducted a reasonable search for the category of documents requested, and does not have in its possession, custody or control the documents identified in the request.",Legal Decisions,6.933465,13.208681,9.727286
"Id. The Jaguar incentive program, which expected the dealer to deliver vehicles directly to end users to receive incentive payments, was distinct from the dealer agreement.",Party Submissions,32.96945,25.535255,44.739075
"So, because Yellowfin ’s predecessor (the original holder of the junior indebtedness) was entitled to seek the full amount remaining on the accelerated junior loan at foreclosure, that is when its cause of action accrued. See Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990). Recall that Section 16.004(a)(3) provides that a suit on a “debt” must be brought “not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004(a)(3). Yellowfin brought suit twelve years after its cause of action accrued at foreclosure, so its suit is untimely under Section 16.004’s four -year limitations period. Alternatively, Section 3.118 provides that a suit on a negotiable instrument must be brought six years after the note’s accelerated due date. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 3.118. Because the accelerated due date here was at foreclosure, Yellowfin’s suit is untimely under that section, too.",Party Submissions,4.704043,4.917105,4.8917093
"However, “i nformation ” within the City’s pool safety policy “is not tangible personal property, since it is an abstract concept that lacks corporeal, physical, or palpable qualiti es.” See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Tex. 2001) (citing Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex. 1994)).",Party Submissions,5.481241,6.3650727,6.0385747
"Rafiei then focuses on Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044 (Vt. 2011). Response at 14-15. Glassford is not on point. The home inspection contract involved in that case was held to be unconscionable. The contract had a $285 limitation of liability provision. Id. at 1046. In contrast, the contract referred to, but did not contain, an arbitration provision that required the customer to pay an arbitration fee that would be at least $1350. Id. at 1046-47. The contract also provided that the inspection company could recover costs, attorney’s fees, and insurance policy deductibles if the company prevailed, but had no equivalent provision for the customer. Id. at 1047. Unsurprisingly, the court found for the homeowner. Id. at 1046.",Party Submissions,6.056764,5.8201046,6.1973934
"PCC : According to Respondent’s best knowledge, the requested court files from 1964 are no longer in Respondent's possession, custody or control due to the passage of time.18 In addition, Claimants have not explained why the requested documents are not already in its possession, custody or control since Obnova was a party to this court proceeding.",Legal Decisions,12.848707,13.680482,15.780134
"As each franchised location is dependent upon their manufacturer or distributor (hereinafter referred to as an ""OEM,"" original equipment manufacturer) for their supply of motor vehicles, it is incumbent upon each OEM to adequately apportion and make available a sufficient allocation of product to each franchisee.",Party Submissions,11.630808,11.882395,12.199765
"Even if Section 51.003(a) doesn’t apply, Yellowfin’s suit remains untimely under any other statute of limitations. That is because Yellowfin’s cause of action accrued at foreclosure — when the loan was accelerated. No relevant limitations period permits a lender to wait for twelve years to recover a debt remaining after a foreclosure sale, as Yellowfin seeks to do here.",Party Submissions,10.278259,10.007907,11.393099
"Cornejo v. Hilgers, 446 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied), is like the others. The obstetrician expert there wrote in his expert report that he was “familiar with the probable causes of...hypoxic-ischemic injuries in babies generally and with the probable causes of the injuries to [Cornejo’s baby] in this case.” Id. at 122.",Party Submissions,7.0233116,6.7261896,7.352986
"To start, Dr. Tappan noted that Ms. Walker was in second-stage arrested labor by 15:15, when she had been pushing for four hours, H.W.’s head was not descending in the birth canal, and the fetal monitoring strip was non-reassuring, with minimal variability, inadequate accelerations, and recurring decelerations. App. 7, CR 668.",Party Submissions,12.7610855,13.963502,15.050114
"As each dealer competes with many lines and models besides other dealers, the OEM can sell all of its product to its franchisees; however, it must do so in a fair and reasonable manner so that each dealer is adequately supplied and able to meet the demands of their market. Whether an OEM rises to the “fair and reasonable” and adequate supply requirement14 is only determined on a case-by-case basis.",Party Submissions,14.308881,12.793194,15.004851
Whether an expert witness is qualified to offer an expert opinion under the relevant statutes and rules lies within the trial court ’ s sound discretion.,Party Submissions,12.089217,15.211013,14.93285
The Respondent understands that this Request has been withdrawn. The Respondent reserves the right to object to any further request for these documents in due course.,Legal Decisions,12.391204,10.437552,13.697888
"To reauthorize the Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002, the Educational Technical Assistance Act of 2002, and the National Assessment of Edu-cational Progress Authorization Act, and for other purposes.",Legislation,3.4098802,3.1750493,3.5531213
"Invalid or Unenforceable Provisions. If any provision of this Plan shall be held invalid or unenforceable, such invalidity or unenforceability shall not affect any other provisions hereof and the Committee may elect in its sole discretion to construe such invalid or unenforceable provisions in a manner that conforms to applicable law or as if such provisions, to the extent invalid or unenforceable, had not been included.",Contract,3.2624385,2.9912543,3.602068
"Lessor shall be a third-party beneficiary of any gas purchase contract and/or transportation agreement entered into between Lessee and any purchaser and/or transporter or pipeline company of Lessor's gas, irrespective of any provision of said contracts to the contrary. Further, Lessor shall be entitled to Twenty-Five percent (25%) of the value of any benefits obtained by or granted to Lessee from any gas purchaser and/or transporter for the amendment, modification, extension, alteration, consolidation, transfer, cancellation or settlement of any gas purchase contract and/or transportation agreement.",Party Submissions,5.735617,6.179997,6.635365
"While a trial court must instruct the jury on the law, the trial court should neither misstate the law nor comment on the weight of the evidence. Here, the jury instruction incorrectly stated the law on a crucial issue at trial — harmful error as a matter of law. Importantly, HSMiller does not argue “harmless error,” apparently conceding that the instruction was harmful if the Court agrees it was wrong. HSMiller’s query on how a trial judge can prevent or correct incorrect legal testimony with instructions is an issue for another day.",Party Submissions,14.980212,13.771852,15.821487
Respondent has raised the question of whether Claimants seek documents prepared by the Canadian or Mexican governments that were not shared with the U.S.,Legal Decisions,18.948206,23.626316,25.266848
"The San Antonio court of appeals has followed the Cockerham rule as well. Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Bahr involved a creditors rights suit where a creditor sued husband and wife for fraudulent transfer of an asset to avoid a debt. Id. at 725. Wife claimed the property was her separate property as a result of a deed executed by husband as grantor to wife as grantee. Id. The issue involved whether parol evidence was admissible to contradict the deed recitations. Id. at 726. The San Antonio court of appeals agreed that parol evidence is admissible when a deed does not expressly recite the character and use of the property conveyed. Id. at 727.",Party Submissions,4.5541644,5.5226665,4.8432026
"Subcontractor binds itself to McCarthy in performing its obligations hereunder to all terms and conditions of the Contract Documents, including, but not limited to, McCarthy's Contract with the Owner. McCarthy's Contract with the Owner (hereinafter “Owner Contract”), excluding financial data, and all other Contract Documents listed in Exhibit 2 will be made available to Subcontractor upon Subcontractor's written request. In the case of conflict between this Agreement and the other Contract Documents, Subcontractor shall be bound by the more stringent requirement as determined by McCarthy. If the Owner Contract has not been finalized with the Owner, McCarthy reserves the right to modify this Agreement based upon the finalized Owner Contract and Subcontractor consents to such modifications and agrees to be bound to the finalized Owner Contract.",Party Submissions,4.792527,4.260226,4.9457927
"This section, like the others immediately preceding it, remains unnecessary to the Court’s decision on Weatherford’s Petition, as Midland has demonstrated its immunity from suit. Nonetheless, Midland addresses the statute of limitations issue, as Weatherford raised it in its Petition. Statutes of limitation exist to give plaintiffs a reasonable time to present their claims as well as to protect defendants and courts from having to deal with stale claims. Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990) (stating that claims that are not brought in a timely manner can result in the loss of evidence, through the “death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, [and the] disappearance of documents or otherwise.”).",Party Submissions,6.5053554,7.0171075,7.3915215
"FERGUSON BRASWELL FRASER KUBASTA, PC 2500 Dallas Parkway, Suite 600 Plano, Texas 75093 Telephone: (972) 378-9111 Facsimile: (972) 392-8901 This brief was prepared using Microsoft Word. Relying on the word count function in that software, I certify that this motion contains 1,695 words (exclusive of the caption, statement of issues, signature, proof of service, certificate of compliance, and certificate service). I also certify that the size font complies with TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 (e).",Party Submissions,5.4875436,6.8768277,6.7814503
"Here, Oncor argues that it discovered it was mistaken after it made its section 1.111(e) agreement. But that does not change the fact that there was harmony of opinion as to the value according to the agreement at the time of agreement. Because that final value was a matter on which a protest could have been filed, and indeed was filed and then denied, the agreement is final as to value.",Party Submissions,17.664728,19.558615,19.831448
"First, under section 10, “[a] person who improves the real or personal property of another, acting by mistake, has a claim in restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 (2011). This Court, in Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, cited this provision to support its holding that “[t]he principle is well established in equity that a person who in good faith makes improvements upon property owned by another is entitled to compensation therefor.” 282 S.W.3d 419, 425 & n.28 (Tex. 2008). While this Court’s statement in Wagner & Brown and the Restatement include a requirement of good faith on the party making the improvements, the Diocese neither requested an instruction on Bay, Ltd.’s good faith nor objected to its omission from the charge. (6RR57–60; 2CR855-56).",Party Submissions,6.8977,7.247463,7.4771724
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 2.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,25.689241,30.791883,37.788612
"A party may not argue a theory on appeal that is different from that presented in the trial court. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Murphy, 458 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex.",Party Submissions,3.9503486,4.77253,4.6903796
"As successor-in-interest, OSPrin stepped into Lender’s shoes and is entitled to enforce Lender’s rights. Notwithstanding the adverse parties’ attempts to confuscate the matter, the critical issue is whether Texas 1 OSPrin anticipates that the Texas Bankers Association will file an amicus curiae brief in support of rehearing OSPrin’s Petition for Review and appropriately enforcing guaranties upon default by borrowers because it is a material concern for Texas banks.",Party Submissions,15.753764,17.35644,18.415989
"The only question before the Court of Appeals was “whether [the Walker s’] expert reports provided enough information for the trial court to conclude they constituted a good-faith effort.” See Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 516. If a reasonable gatekeeper is satisfied, so is the Legislature.",Party Submissions,14.293046,13.957618,14.954872
"Appendix Page 2 D. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, upon the failure of Lessee to pay Lessor the royalty payments as provided herein, the Lessor may, at Lessor's option, elect to terminate said Lease by serving written notice on Lessee at the address shown herein, of Lessor’s intention to terminate said Lease within not less than thirty (30) days of receipt, or any time thereafter. Should Lessee pay Lessor all royalty payments past due during said period, with interest as provided herein, this Lease shall not terminate. However, upon the failure of Lessee to pay Lessor said past due royalty payments during said notice period, Lessor may elect to terminate this Lease, and title to said land shall revert to Lessor. Lessor may elect to terminate said Lease, after the expiration of said notice period, by serving notice of termination, filing a copy of said notice with the County Clerk in which said land is located. The effective date of said termination shall be the date said termination is filed with the said County Clerk. In the event of the termination of said Lease in this manner, Lessee shall not remove any of Lessee's equipment, fixtures, or personal property located on said land, unless so instructed by Lessor, and if so instructed, such property shall be removed within thirty (30) days of notice to Lessee. In the event Lessor prohibits the removal of such property from the leased premises, then it shall become the property of Lessor, at the option of Lessor.",Party Submissions,4.213658,4.1972404,4.2879367
"Arbitration Rule 31 20.1. A pre-hearing organizational meeting shall be held at a date determined by the Tribunal after consultation with the Parties. It shall comprise a videoconference between the Tribunal and the Parties and address any outstanding procedural, administrative, and logistical matters (including modality of interpretation and transcription) in preparation for the hearing.",Legal Decisions,8.427768,9.357902,9.410773
"Q.. .. is what constitutes the roadway easement called Windemere Road today any different than it was, to your recollection, in 1995?",Party Submissions,31.424406,46.697018,49.00155
"Guidance is also needed from this Court on the legal ramifications of the Hospitals improperly encumbering a specific piece of real property (that was not the subject of the sanctions case) belonging not only to Dr. Nath, but also to Usha Nath (who was not a party to the sanctions case), before the Hospitals even had a final judgment in the sanctions case. The court of appeals held there are no legal consequences based on the “judicial-proceeding privilege.” Id. at *11. As the Naths explained in their petition, the Hospitals manipulated the system, will continue to do so, and only this Court can restore even a modicum of fairness to these proceedings—and help move these parties’ disputes toward resolution.",Party Submissions,11.374618,11.192673,11.903916
"HSMiller also does not respond to the Lawyers’ legal sufficiency arguments about two other alleged breaches: presenting a “substandard defense,” and inadequate communication by the Lawyers. Compare Resp’t’s Br. at 38-52, with Pet’rs’ Br. at 65-70. These will not be addressed further.",Party Submissions,13.408894,12.290124,17.057291
"HSMiller’s additional claims that the Bankruptcy Plan and everything related to it are sacrosanct and that the Lawyers are collaterally attacking the Plan also blinks at reality. The Bankruptcy Plan simply approved an assignment of proceeds from the debtor to its very limited creditors and approved the Debtor’s agreement that it would pursue its claims against its former lawyers. See Plan at 10-11, 26 (Pet’rs’ Br. at App. B, Tab 1 (PDF 142-43, 158)).",Party Submissions,16.509682,16.171122,18.38307
"The Committee shall have power to designate employees and other persons (other than non-employee directors of the Company) who provide services to the Company as eligible participants in this Plan (“Participants”). If an individual is hired after the Performance Period commences, the individual may become a Participant in the Plan, and the amount of his or her Bonus may be pro-rated to reflect the portion of the Performance Period worked. The Committee shall have the authority at any time to remove Participants from this Plan for that Performance Period.",Contract,5.855161,5.473876,6.244022
Note there is no case from this Court that disavows the express holding of Cockerham permitting the admission of parol evidence regarding the intent of the parties to a real property deed under dispute.,Party Submissions,20.178852,27.94724,30.580046
"Respondent’s possession, custody, or control because they are part of the documents that were confiscated by the Respondent or they are of the type typically generated in the course of conducting business with the Claimant.",Legal Decisions,11.95053,14.110325,17.334902
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Directorate for Construction Land and Urban Development of Belgrade in accordance with the applicable regulations.209 In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".210 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Directorate in order to obtain documents in question.211 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants, to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves.",Legal Decisions,12.209973,13.563525,13.676836
H. The provisions of this Article XVII. shall not apply where Lessor has elected to take Lessor's royalty in kind or market separately Lessor’s royalty share of production under the terms of this Lease.,Party Submissions,17.933712,19.454702,21.06457
"Based on the above, we hold that Bestor's claim for attorney's fees-- whether grounded in contract or tort-- is based on Service Lloyds' dispute of Bestor's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits and is thus within the Division's exclusive jurisdiction. Furthermore, a Division of Workers' Compensation administrative rule governs the procedure for contesting the award of attorney's fees in workers' compensation administrative proceedings. Rule 152.3 provides in part: HN8 [ ] (d) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, an attorney, claimant, or carrier who contests the fee fixed and approved by the commission shall request a benefit contested case hearing. The request shall be made by personal delivery or first class mail and be filed with the commission field office handling the claim or the central office of the commission no later than the 15th day after receipt of the commission's order. A claimant may request a hearing by contacting the commission in any manner no later than the 15th day after [**10] receipt of the commission's order. The contesting party other than a claimant [*554] shall send a copy of the request by personal delivery or first class mail to the carrier and the other parties, including the claimant and attorney.",Party Submissions,7.266112,6.6372666,7.259853
"Construing the Election Code in any other manner would run into substantial constitutional problems. Texas’s law prohibiting individuals from signing multiple ballot petitions for the same office and then invalidating the later signature, Tex. Elec. Code §141.066, infringes core First Amendment rights of candidates and signers. No sufficient governmental interest justifies this prohibition, and it certainly cannot be constitutionally applied on these facts to remove Justice Devine from the ballot.",Party Submissions,12.346062,12.296478,12.649964
"This letter contains an opinion of the competent authority on the Report on the Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment of the 2013 DRP. The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Spatial Planning considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP, and if so, what was its contemporaneous understanding of these rights.",Legal Decisions,16.794525,13.59372,16.255219
"To direct the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to submit to Congress a report on the amount of waste collected on certain Federal land along the southern border of the United States, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.1016145,5.363321,5.6333337
"Likewise, in the present case, merely conducting pre-trial together does not create privity between the Wilson and Harpst plaintiffs. Fleming Defendants cite some pre-trial motions and responses as alleged proof of Wilson Plaintiffs being in privity with the Harpst plaintiffs, but they fail to prove privity. All the Wilson Plaintiffs were focused on their own cases. Although they would have liked to get offensive collateral estoppel, that weren ’ t likely to get it, and they were all preparing for their own individual trials. All the pre-trial motions, such as when Fleming sought to strike an expert or vice versa, were handled under the assumption that each individual Wilson Plaintiff would eventually be held to those rulings when their individual trial came up, and they were each acting on behalf of themselves and no one else.",Party Submissions,12.284332,11.979133,12.880581
Any and all documents included in the files maintained by the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction with respect to its work on the 2015 DRP. RELEVANCE Claimants hereby incorporate the explanation provided at Request 47 above.,Legal Decisions,28.291052,31.59176,37.9029
"In any event, “we look to the true nature of the dispute” rather than the plaintiff’ s characterization of the claims. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d 506, 513 (Tex. 2019). Here, the true nature of the Delapenas’ claim is that City employees failed to act when, instead of enforcing the City’s policy and denying the camp admission, they granted the camp access to the premises without ensuring campers would be adequately supervised by camp counselors.",Party Submissions,6.5222826,7.9604063,7.6443663
"Beoland was the plan commissioner for the 2013 DRP141 and was responsible for, among other things, financing of the 2013 DRP and participating in the plan development. The requested documents are relevant and material to assess the factors Beoland took into consideration when working on the 2013 DRP —including whether it considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 and if so, Beoland’s contemporaneous understanding of the extent of these rights.",Legal Decisions,17.779812,16.197906,15.85466
"For column 1: Indicate the name of the geographical area, outbreak number or any information that allows identification of this demarcated area (DA) and the date when it was established.",Legislation,30.178488,28.160543,30.835316
"Special exceptions must be decided on the face of the pleadings. Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex. 1994). Alpesh’s declaration was filed in conjunction with his verified plea in abatement and his special exceptions in response to the First Amended Petition. CR160. While this declaration may have been proper as support for his plea in abatement, it is inadmissible in relation to his special exceptions.",Party Submissions,7.3260245,8.462611,7.972325
"After the Texas Supreme Court resolves the aforementioned cases, we ORDER the parties to promptly file a motion to reinstate this appeal.",Party Submissions,13.846282,21.519403,20.819134
"Discretion of Appeals Committee. All interpretations, determinations and decisions of the Appeals Committee with respect to any claim shall be made in its sole discretion and shall be final and conclusive.",Contract,5.0195155,5.2329073,6.0218215
"Collin Creek Assisted Living, Inc. v. Faber , 671 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tex. 2023). This case involves the second element.",Party Submissions,8.100645,10.963045,13.319608
"The evidence is conclusive that there was a mistake in the deed. At the time of the refinance, Wife was not a titled owner of the property and should not have been listed as a grantor in the deed. (6RR D 754–760). That evidence alone is sufficient to discredit any presumptive effect of the deed. Further, the circumstantial evidence regarding the purpose of the transaction to refinance the mortgage, the clear mistake made in the deed, Wife being in charge of the refinance process, and the fact that neither party was an attorney with knowledge of gift presumptions, combined with the trial court’s observation of the credibility of the witnesses is sufficient to draw the required inference that Husband did not intend to convey ownership to Wife as a grantee. (5RR 40:15–23, 41:12–25, 43:3–25, 44:1-4).",Party Submissions,7.7895308,8.053782,8.414558
"Oncor has failed to point to any express waiver of immunity in the DJA that would permit the instant action. It is settled in Texas that for the Legislature to waive immunity against the state and its political subdivisions, a statute or resolution must contain a clear and unambiguous expression of the Legislature's waiver of immunity. Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011). The Legislature went on to codify this in the Code Construction Act, providing that “In order to preserve the legislature's interest in managing state fiscal matters through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034.",Party Submissions,4.885605,4.984387,5.3582625
In cases of self-dealing—when directors or managers engage in conduct that usurps corporate opportunities or diverts corporate assets—their subjective motive is irrelevant.,Party Submissions,12.795937,11.569451,14.27025
"According to ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 106, women with high-risk conditions should be followed in labor with continuous FHR monitoring. Mrs. Walker’s pregnancy and labor had several high risk factors, including prematurity, use of Pitocin, and a Category II-III FHR tracing with minimal variability, absent accelerations, and recurrent decelerations. Dr. Castillo fell below the standard of care at or shortly after 09:25, when she failed to apply, or direct to be applied, a fetal scalp electrode (FSE) to assess fetal wellbeing, or lack thereof, as well as fetal oxygenation. This was required because the FHR strip was frequently indeterminate and inadequate for interpretation due to a doppler “signal intermittent,” as documented in the Detail Notes Log by Nurse Beukelman. App. 7, CR 668.",Party Submissions,10.475237,11.827869,11.071977
"Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to the USMCA Protocol by November 27, 2023.",Legal Decisions,11.87265,12.78868,13.174138
"In the Spring of 2020, when the Covid-19 virus spread throughout the State of Texas, appellant Galovelho was operating EG Steak, a dine-in full-service restaurant in Frisco, Texas. On March 13, 2020, due to the imminent threat posed by Covid-19, appellee Governor Greg Abbott declared a state of disaster pursuant to the Texas Disaster Act. Days later, on March 19, Abbott issued executive order GA-08, which in relevant part stated: In accordance with the Guidelines from the President and the CDC, people shall avoid eating or drinking at bars, restaurants, and food courts,. .. provided, however, that the use of drive-thru, pickup, or delivery options is allowed and highly encouraged throughout the limited duration of this executive order. GA-08. During the course of the disaster declaration, Abbott issued a series of additional executive orders that permitted indoor dining in varying percentages of a restaurant’s capacity. None of these or ders required restaurants to close; none prohibited owners from using their property.",Party Submissions,4.731867,5.733704,4.960335
"There's another significant requirement that Bay has failed to conclusively establish and it was also an issue in Briggs: there is no evidence that Bay filed any written agreement as required by the statute under subsection (f). The Briggs court observed: “Moreover, there is no evidence the OCIP Manual, or any other written agreement for that matter, was filed with the insurance carrier for purposes of complying with the requirements of the TWCA. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.123(f) (requiring the general contractor to file a copy of the agreement to provide workers' compensation coverage with its workers' compensation carrier or, if self-insured, the Workers' Compensation Division); Id. at § 406.123(g) (making the failure to file a copy of the written agreement in accordance with subsection (f) an administrative violation).“ Briggs at 284.",Party Submissions,6.7394557,6.2435894,7.0990973
"West Headnotes (13) [1] Mandamus Acts and proceedings of courts, judges, and judicial officers Mandamus Matters of discretion Mandamus relief is available if the trial court violates a duty imposed by law or clearly abuses its discretion, either in resolving factual issues or in determining legal issues, when there is no other adequate remedy by law.",Party Submissions,10.363136,11.267138,12.222853
"The injured employee obtained a judgment in Alabama. Prior to that judgment, the employer had not pursued an action for reimbursement. The employer received credit in the Alabama judgment for payments it had made to the employee. By its arguments on appeal, the employer conceded that the receipt of the Alabama judgment was the employee's election to recover benefits under Alabama's laws for purposes of Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.075. The court concluded that the employer's right to recovery under Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 409.009 was derivative of the employee's. Although § 409.009 did not expressly state that a subclaimant's reimbursement claim was derivative of a claimant's, the court construed the provision as a whole in relation to the entire Texas Workers' Compensation Act and held that, where a claimant was barred from recovering benefits, a subclaimant was similarly barred.",Party Submissions,5.2858076,5.5913863,5.3547745
"Whether attorneys (TREC licensed or nonlicensed) are exempted from REC’s state consumer real estate contract protection allows Attorney usage to violate UPHPA, Bus. & Com. Code 26 – Fraud, 27 – Fraudulent Transfers, Gov. Code Sec 51.903 – Action on Fraudulent Lien on Property, Penal Code 31 – Theft, 32 – ‘Considerations’, and other violations; granting Appellee default ‘Title’ and complete ownership of Appellant’s inherited real estate (surface, mineral), mineral leases, real property developments, and other unlawful gains (personal, financial, business, political, other) are State and Federal Penal Code (State, Federal) offenses (theft, civil rights violations, other), granting Court Orders Cancellations, Change of Venue, Change of Venue Hearings.",Party Submissions,22.509901,18.355015,20.90009
"Separation from Service Benefit is paid, the payment commencement date for the installment form of payment will be the first (1st) anniversary of the payment of the lump sum.",Contract,11.643551,13.923022,20.403341
"Brief of Appellee. On September 13, 2021, Appellant’s Reply Brief was filed. Judgment and Opinion of the court of appeals was issued on June 9, 2022, with Justices Carlyle, Smith and Garcia participating in the decision and Justice Smith authoring the opinion. Husband filed a Motion for Rehearing En Banc, which the court denied on July 27, 2022. The citation for the court of appeals opinion is In re J.Y.O., 2022 WL 2071113 (Tex.App. – Dallas 2022).",Party Submissions,4.9076204,4.7409782,5.0593433
"Sargeant did not clearly explain how it would have occurred in its Memorial, nor was it argued therein in the terms of the present request.",Legal Decisions,40.387688,58.2207,64.93644
III. The Parties shall assign exhibit numbers to these documents and upload them to the Box folder by 30 November 2023.,Legal Decisions,23.710905,23.796778,35.16769
"Matt Marsenison’s relationship with Integrity Aviation goes back a long way. Donna Ross testified that what Turbine Engine and Matt Marsenison were to do was to collect money from Victor Farias to turn around and locate airplane engines that were for sale and determine whether or not they were worth the money, then bring them to Marsenison’s facility, refurbish them and lease them back out to commercial airlines. Marsenison was supposed to collect the lease payments from the airlines. (RR Vol. 1, p. 13) There was evidence that at least $800,000.00 was wire transferred from Integrity’s account to Turbine. (RR Vol. 1, p. 29) In discussing the various wire transfers from the account of Integrity Aviation to Turbine Engine, Mr. Marsenison testified that he does not know what happened to that money. (RR Vol. 1, p. 42) In addition, Donna Ross testified that when she and her husband went to Florida to meet with Matt Marsenison, that Victor Farias was in the room when they met, and that Matt knew what Victor was telling them, because they talked about it. Also, on Integrity Aviation’s website, there was a link to Turbine Engines and Matthew Marsenison. (RR Vol. 1, p. 16-17) In addition, Ms. Ross was asked about the relationship between Marsenison and Turbine Engine Center, and her response was: “So he was, on the websites, president and CEO, so one in the same.” This is evidence of alter ego and of contracting with a Texas resident. She additionally testified that Turbine Engines is what they called it. (RR Vol. 1, p. 20) Ms. Ross also testified that without the Respondent, there was no investment. (RR Vol. 1, p. 21) Donna Ross also testified that, “...without Matt and this facility being valid, there was absolutely nothing to invest in.” (RR Vol. 1, p. 13) This is evidence of alter ego, conversion and false representation by Marsenison.",Party Submissions,7.0491834,7.0741625,7.439772
The Bordages owners should not be deemed “non-parties” to the Hooks case for purposes of Restatement 29(7). Collateral estoppel should apply.,Party Submissions,28.15234,30.377674,37.64207
"As to fair comment, Barina contends the privilege does not apply to “a comment ... based on a substantially false statement of fact the defendant asserts or conveys as true.” Resp. Br. at 39 (quoting Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 70 (Tex. 2013)). But Barina has failed to identify a single false fact about her in the Program. Barina did, as Petitioners reported, offer to withdraw as Thrash’s guardian if she was paid $500,000, expressing a willingness to leave Thrash in the care of a family Barina believed had exploited him for her own financial gain. CR1:710. Barina did, as Petitioners reported, shut down Thrash’s business and sold many of his assets without notifying him. E.g., CR1:1090:6-8; CR1:1048; CR1:1331:20-1332:15. And Barina did, as Petitioners reported, make enough money working as Thrash’s guardian that she no longer required full-time employment. CR1:629:4-15. Because the Program reports on truthful facts in a court proceeding, its conclusions, even if critical of Barina, are protected by the fair-comment privilege. In fact, it is critical to democracy that documentaries like the Program are allowed to comment on contentious social issues like the guardianship system to facilitate meaningful discussions about societal change.",Party Submissions,7.4852896,8.347474,7.6748857
"ETMC Athens also points us to a case from our sister court in Dallas, Russell v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 219 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. dism'd). This case is distinguishable from the facts presented herein. In Russell, the Dallas Court had to determine whether a claim of an employee against a nonsubscribing employer is barred by the running of the two-year statute of limitations or whether the savings provision of the responsible third party statute permitted him to pursue his claims. Id. at 631. Russell, the employee, sought to join his employer, Wendy's, to the suit after the statute of limitations had run after a different defendant brought a third-party action against Wendy's. Id. at 632. After analyzing both Keng I and [*11] Keng II, the Russell court determined that the issue before it, ""respecting the statute of limitations and the 'saving' clause in § 33.004(e),"" was distinct from the issue presented in the Keng cases. Id. at 640. It declined to adopt our reasoning in Keng I because it ""is not the issue we address today."" Id. at 641. And it ultimately concluded that the Keng decisions ""do not preclude application of the 'saving' provision of § 33.004(e)"" to the employee's claims against his employer. Id. at 642 .",Party Submissions,5.2952347,5.429187,5.827951
"The annual surveys shall be carried out in accordance with Article 2(3) and (4) in the buffer zones to detect the presence of the specified pest, and in the infested zones to monitor its presence there.",Legislation,13.071856,12.374148,15.925345
"As the Walkers acknowledge, the Court of Appeals ruled only on the causation objections and, thus, did not address Dr. Castillo’s objections to the two experts’ lack of qualifications to opine on causation. (Pet. Br. at 39). If this Court chooses to address the qualifications objections, Dr. Castillo offers the following arguments in support of her objections.",Party Submissions,8.272399,8.76633,9.646421
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,26.068045,30.948666,38.062782
"First, the vast majority, if not all, of the documents related to the present arbitration would be covered by legal privilege (Articles 9(2)(b) and 9(4) of the IBA Rules).",Legal Decisions,8.399979,9.100479,9.771777
"Affirming the trial court’s order dismissing the case, the Amarillo Court of Appeals offers a roadmap for how to treat Dr. Tappan’s report. Noting that the expert’s obstetric, gynecologic, and surgical qualifications were impeccable, the Court nevertheless concluded his qualifications were insufficient to opine about the cause of brain injuries. Id. (“Nowhere [] does [the expert’s] curriculum vitae indicate he has any experience, training or education in the field of neurology or, more specifically, brain injuries.”).",Party Submissions,7.8845825,7.6281376,8.636035
"The Walkers greatly embellish the court’s opinion, adding reasoning that simply is not there. The court did not rely on Thompson to apply an “elevated” causation standard. Instead, the court merely cited that case for the same general causation principle this Court has long held applies to expert report cases. A simple application of law to facts was all that was needed for the intermediate court to conclude the causation element was missing. The Court should not grant the petition, but if it does, it should affirm.",Party Submissions,14.287364,14.706564,15.727484
"For vectors, it is the effectiveness of the method to capture a positive vector when it is present in the survey area. For soil, it is the effectiveness of selecting a soil sample containing the pest when the pest is present in the survey area.",Legislation,15.050626,13.385333,16.19529
"Also, on January 14, 2021, MVP advised the trial court that the Oklahoma court had denied McCarthy’s motion to dismiss. McCarthy and RLB each filed a response to MVP’s plea in abatement, contending that the forum-selection clause is voidable under section 272.001, they had voided the forum-selection clause, and principles of comity did not require abatement of the Texas case.",Party Submissions,8.614538,9.173281,11.114591
"Furthermore, waiver requires proof of the actual intent to relinquish the right or intentional conduct inconsistent with the right. Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n., 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008). Neither was demonstrated by Petitioner. All of the cases cited by Petitioner to support their claim that silence or inaction demonstrated waiver are inapplicable, because none dealt with an optional acceleration clause, or even a waiver that is alleged to occur before maturity of the obligation. Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1996)(right of refusal on stock sale); Vinewood Cap., LLC v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP, 735 F.Supp.2d 503, 518-19 (N.D. Texas)(breach of fiduciary duty claim); Trelltex, Inc. v. Intecx, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 781, 791 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.)(underpayments of commissions); Williams v. Moores, 5 S.W.3d 334, 336-37 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied)(inheritance of real property).",Party Submissions,4.996403,5.2883964,5.264844
"After reviewing the “litany of allegedly deficient conduct” by Dr. Castillo and Baptist, the Court concluded that the experts failed to satisfy the decades-old criteria of explaining how and why any of the alleged breaches caused H.W.’s injury. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *5; see Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53 (expert report failing to link an alleged breach to conclusion that injury would have been avoided is conclusory and insufficient). The cases are hardly analogous.",Party Submissions,11.856218,11.790588,13.588789
"I have read, understand and agree to abide by the terms of this Agreement, the Plan and the most recently executed Associate Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Non-Competition Agreement that I entered into with the Company (the “Associate Agreement”). By checking the box labeled “I Agree,” or by otherwise electronically indicating my acceptance of this Agreement, I hereby acknowledge that the grant of the RSUs pursuant to this Agreement is consideration for my entering into and complying with the Associate Agreement. I understand this Agreement, the Plan and the Associate Agreement in all respects and the terms and conditions of the RSUs granted to me.",Contract,4.596859,4.001458,5.0777555
Each Party shall abide by the maritime delimitation line as defined in Article 1 and shall not claim or exercise any sovereign rights or coastal State jurisdiction in maritime areas beyond this line .349 264. The Tribunal concludes that the only part of the Loop Hole which constitutes Norwegian territory for the purposes of the BIT is the 10.81% of the continental shelf which lies on the Norwegian side of the 2010 demarcation line. It is therefore necessary to consider where North Star’s four vessels harvested snow crab.,Legal Decisions,12.283556,13.186903,11.889351
"Moreover, the timing, purpose, and effect of a lis pendens are significantly different than an abstract of judgment. A lis pendens is filed during litigation to constructively provide “notice to the world” that a particular property is the subject of litigation. In re Collins, 172 S.W.3d 287, 292-93 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, orig. proceeding). A lis pendens may be filed “during the pendency of an action involving (1) title to real property, (2) the establishment of an interest in real property, or (3) the enforcement of an encumbrance against real property”—because the general public has the right to know that a property is the subject of litigation before transacting business related to the property. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE § 12.007(a)).",Party Submissions,3.9284937,4.032112,4.093088
"The appellate court brushed aside Dr. Monga’s complaint that the expert was unqualified to offer an opinion about ultrasound interpretation and use, holding that the expert demonstrated he was familiar with the continuum of the standard of care for managing pregnancies. The expert was therefore “qualified to render an opinion as to whether Dr. Monga breached the standard of care in failing to order the type of procedure that he has extensive experience performing.” Id. at *8.",Party Submissions,9.492544,9.426973,10.609455
Respondents argue Alpesh did not engage in self-dealing when he used his position as President of CKC Partners to enrich himself at CKC’s expense. Resp. 17-19. These arguments are based on an erroneous definition of self-dealing.,Party Submissions,9.674428,10.793419,11.213713
"Synopsis Background: User of online platform, which allowed users to buy and sell cryptocurrencies and government-issued currencies, brought putative class action against platform operator, alleging that operator failed to replace funds fraudulently taken from users' accounts. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, William H. Alsup, J., 2022 WL 1062049, denied operator's motion to compel arbitration based on operator's user agreement. Operator filed interlocutory appeal and moved to stay district court proceedings pending resolution of arbitrability issue on appeal. The District Court denied motion to stay, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2022 WL 3095991, denied motion to stay. Certiorari was granted.",Party Submissions,4.692795,4.9011106,5.1976857
"The Trial Court sustained Midland’s objection/motion to strike the hearsay-upon-hearsay portion of the Ramboll Report; the evidence was properly stricken from the record by the Trial Court and should not considered by this Court. (CR 385–86.)2 In contrast, in Midland’s Brief in Support of its Plea to the Jurisdiction, Midland submitted the affidavit of Carl Craigo, the City’s Director of Utilities. Such affidavit affirmatively established that Midland owns and operates a domestic wastewater treatment plant, and it never permitted the alleged disposers to discharge into Midland’s sewer collection system after looking to the only location where such permissions exist – Midland’s pretreatment records. (CR 54.) After Midland’s evidentiary Plea to the Jurisdiction, the burden shifted to Weatherford to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and Weatherford failed to do so. Instead, Weatherford continues to lean on inadmissible evidence— properly excluded by the Trial Court—in a desperate attempt to tie Midland to the disposal of the Contaminants. The stricken hearsay was the only “evidence” Weatherford offered that could even remotely tie Midland to the disposal, and such failure to affirmatively connect Midland to the disposal is fatal to Weatherford’s SWDA claim.",Party Submissions,8.205871,8.3239355,9.157521
"These documents were co ntained in hardcopy or electronic files on computers, phones, hard drives and/or USB keys belonging to the Claimant that were seized by the Respondent either during his arrestation or his detention and not returned to the Claimant since then. The requested information is therefore within the possession of the relevant Qatari governmental entities, agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore the Respondent is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,13.390581,13.452183,14.155488
"In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and RENDERED in part, and REVERSED and REMANDED in part. We REVERSE that portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding appellee H A O a one hundred percent separate property interest in the marital residence and RENDER judgment awarding the marital residence to appellee H A O and appellant L M O as tenants in common with each owning an undivided one-half interest in the marital residence as their separate property.",Party Submissions,3.6233683,4.464078,4.091454
"If the district court does not have jurisdiction under the Tax Code to determine the validity and scope of the 2019 agreement, the court does under the UDJA. This is what the First Court of Appeals held in MHCB (USA), 249 S.W.3d at 86 (This suit “is, at its core, a suit to determine the meaning of section 1.111(e). A suit seeking an interpretation of a governmental unit’s or administrative agency’s statutory authority, and the related determination of whether that unit or agency is acting outside of that authority, is not a suit against the State (as long as money damages are not sought) and is thus not precluded by immunity from suit.”). Oncor seeks some of this same type of relief under its alternative claim under the UDJA. Oncor specifically pled for determinations of “the meaning of the relevant Tax Code provisions” and “the scope, validity, and effect of” the 2019 agreement. See CR.31. Respondents do not mention, much less refute, this holding in MHCB (USA). See Respondents’ Brief at 36-43. No court has yet overruled that case.",Party Submissions,8.333644,8.822885,9.462098
"There is no dispute that the Texas constitution’s takings provision is different from the United States Constitution’s provision. The Fifth Amendment provides: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,” while the Texas counterpart provides: “[n]o person’ s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a).",Party Submissions,3.0162728,3.0866954,3.2073476
"The TCCA sets the standard of care in premises liability cases, but duties arise from common law. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 622-23. As this Court articulated in Shumake, courts apply several factors and common law principles to determine a premise owner’s duties. See id. (citing Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 286–87). This Court should grant this petition and address whether a City has a duty to enforce its mandatory safety rules where the magnitude of the risk to patrons reached the level of an unreasonable risk of harm, the risk was apparent to the property owner, and the risk arose in circumstances where the property owner had readily available opportunities to reduce it.",Party Submissions,9.588535,9.866046,10.218265
"The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable. 447. In the present case, it is common ground that there is no agreement of the kind envisaged by the first sentence, so that it is the second sentence of Article 42(1) which is applicable. It is also common ground that the Tribunal must apply the BIT which, as a treaty, must be interpreted and applied in accordance with the international law of treaties. While the VCLT is not in force between Latvia and Norway, the rules and principles of treaty interpretation contained in Articles 31 to 33 are generally regarded as declaratory of customary international law and will therefore be applied as such.",Legal Decisions,3.718021,4.0680704,3.6049309
"Documents including communications and e-mails exchanged between Mr Obradović or his advisors and representatives, Mr Rand or his advisors or representatives, the Ahola Family Trust, the directors of Coropi, and/or the directors of Kalemegdan during the time period between 23 March and 12 August 2012, concerning Coropi's purported acquisition of a beneficial interest in Kalemegdan.",Legal Decisions,12.017107,11.8598175,13.124641
"Court then explained that this Court has held that whether the injury occurred in the course and scope of employment is an issue that regards compensability, citing Morales v. Liberty Mut. Ins.",Party Submissions,13.407804,17.06698,18.73859
"Petitioner respectfully prays that this Court reverse the judgement of the court of appeals, and remand this case to the trial court for additional proceedings.",Party Submissions,5.351603,5.708413,6.8940296
"B. POTENTIAL FOR CONFUSION AND CONFLICTING JUDGMENTS While Tyler's statutory arguments are most persuasive, we also agree with its practical arguments regarding the potential for confusion and conflicting judgments *845 if the underlying suit were tried first. In Luby's, we recognized that a judgment in the negligence suit before the Commission's compensability determination would “inject needless uncertainty and confusion” due to the potential for conflicting rulings and a waste of resources. Luby's, 979 S.W.2d at 816–17. 21 Here, the carrier is not a party to the Harris County suit, and not necessarily bound by its decision.",Party Submissions,10.017513,10.157742,10.793095
Bellpas can make no representations about “the 335” and is left to provide another artistic rendering of the Affected Territory to meet its need of the moment.,Party Submissions,109.06043,109.38501,130.54855
"Building on Bustamante’ s holding, Windrum v. Karah confirmed that while some negligent conduct may be “too attenuated” to be the proximate cause of a patient ’ s injury, a negligent act must only be a “substantial factor” in causing the ultimate harm ; it need not be the “immediate cause.” 581 S.W.3d 761, 778 (Tex. 2019) (“Never have we adopted an “immediate cause” standard as the court of appeals did here.”). Negligence is a “substantial factor” when there is a “direct link” in the causal chain of a patient’s injury. Id. at 781.",Party Submissions,6.721464,7.1691236,7.2984447
"McCarthy and Subcontractor waive all rights and claims against each other and against the Owner, all subcontractors and others as required in the Contract Documents for damages to the extent reimbursed by Builder's Risk except such rights as they may have to the proceeds of such insurance and responsibility for the cost of deductibles, which Subcontractor will pay when responsible for such damage.",Party Submissions,12.356667,11.296619,13.117127
"Finally, Monga v. Perez, No. 14-16-00961-CV, 2018 WL 505263 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], Jan. 23, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.), is distinguishable. There, plaintiff claimed her doctor caused a brachial plexus and brain injuries when he tried to deliver a macrosomic baby vaginally and the baby became stuck in the birth canal for nearly half an hour. Id. at *1. Plaintiff served an expert report from an expert in obstetrics and maternal-fetal medicine to discuss Dr. Monga’s improper interpretation and use of an ultrasound and the cause of the baby’s injuries.",Party Submissions,4.7354817,5.0852537,4.998759
"The majority’s lead case dealt with the value of a disinterested director’s compensation: “The mere fact that a director receives compensation for his services as a board member does not demonstrate demand futility. Connolly and Molinari have failed to allege with factual particularity that the compensation received by the non-employee board members was material to each director or outside of the norm.” Connolly v. Gasmire, 257 S.W.3d at 845–46. This conclusion was sound. Connolly and Molinari were disinterested directors who were entitled to compensation. Without a specific allegation that their compensation was outside the norm, the plaintiff could not establish demand futility.",Party Submissions,9.564787,9.29541,9.641818
"Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital , 462 S.W.3d 496, 505 (Tex. 2015). However, when claims based upon professional or administrative claims should be held to trigger the TMLA is not so clear.",Party Submissions,9.03568,10.57835,11.563465
"Here, Husband testied he bought the marital residence five years before marriage and renanced it twice: 2008 and during the marriage in 2016. Although Wife was listed as grantor and grantee on the 2016 deed, Husband testied she was never an owner and he thought it was “strange” she was listed as agrantor. He did not know how she was listed on the deed, and it caused him concern that there may have been confusion at the title ofce. While Husband expressed reservations about the deed, he never testied that he did not intend to gi Wife an interest in the marital property.",Party Submissions,9.683109,11.016202,10.263001
An audio recording of the session was made and deposited in the archives of ICSID. The recording was distributed to the Members of the Tribunal and the Parties.,Legal Decisions,9.273673,7.693136,11.04318
"MVP has not identified—and cannot identify—any language in the Subcontract where RLB clearly, specifically, voluntarily, and knowingly agreed to waive its Section 272.001 rights. Instead, MVP relies on Subcontract paragraphs 1.2, 11.1, and 11.2 for its proposition that MCC paragraph 47.7’s waiver provisions were incorporated into the Subcontract. MVP’s Brief at 41-42. But nowhere in any of these paragraphs is waiver, Section 272.001, or MCC paragraph 47.7 even mentioned. Thus, MVP is left to tepidly claim these “flow-down provisions demonstrate the parties’ intent to incorporate paragraph 47.7 into the Subcontract.” Id. The language of these paragraphs shows otherwise.",Party Submissions,7.0763326,7.355196,7.779904
"The Commission would underline that the EU, as a Contracting Party to UNCLOS, is under an obligation to respect Article 77(2) of UNCLOS. Similarly, upon its ratification by the Union, UNCLOS forms part of the legal order of the Union pursuant to the provisions of Article 216 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, such that also the Member States are bound to respect it.",Legal Decisions,5.5428185,5.640986,5.8616366
"Oncor’s argument necessarily implies that § 25.25(c-1) and (d-1) repeal §1.111(e)(2), at least in part, without so much as mentioning the repeal. Courts will not interpret one statute as repealing another absent a clear intent of the Legislature to do so. Hegar v. Health Care Service Corp., 652 S.W.3d 39, 45-46 (Tex. 2022). Rather, the statutes should be read in harmony with each other. Gordon v. Lake, 356 S.W.2d 138, 139 (Tex. 1962); Brightbill v. State, 734 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1987, no writ) .",Party Submissions,5.0608253,5.5015035,5.229188
"Awardee understands that the Company’s Confidential Information includes not only the individual categories of information identified in this Section, but also the compilation and/or aggregation of the Company’s information, which is and has been compiled/aggregated via significant effort and expense and which has value to the Company and to the Company’s employees as used in furtherance of the Company’s business.",Contract,8.969471,8.739056,9.243515
"Under the plain language of the City’s Mandatory Safety Policy, High Hopes should have been denied access to the pool. SCR79.",Party Submissions,36.65801,48.162037,57.98769
"If any time during the term of the Loan, any applicable tax law is changed in such a manner that it increases the Lender’s cost of maintaining the Loan, the Borrower agrees to reimburse the Lender for all such additional costs; provided, however, that if the Borrower is prevented or unable for any reason to reimburse the Lender for such additional costs of maintaining the Loan, then the unpaid principal amount of the Loan, together with interest on the Loan, shall be immediately repaid.",Contract,4.5143156,4.167851,4.877175
"An order of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel was previously entered staying all trial court proceedings in the cases listed in Appendix A to the Agreed Motion to Transfer to Pretrial Court and Immediate Stay. That stay is hereby continued in force until further order of the MDL Panel, and the stay is modified to extend to (1) all cases listed in the said Motion or any attachments to said Motion, (2) all cases listed in the Notice of Filing of First Supplement to Appendix A (Related Cases) to Motion to Transfer and Immediate Stay and Motion to Clarify December 8, 2021 Stay Order and (3) all tag-along1 cases that have been or may be filed.",Party Submissions,8.558678,7.604259,8.9523535
"There’s a difference between pre -trial and trial. Participation in pre-trial is not participation in trial. There is no evidence that Wilson Plaintiffs participated in, or exercised any control over, the Harpst trial, or had any right to do so, and they had no beneficial interest in the recovery of damages in the Harpst trial.",Party Submissions,10.081753,10.281121,11.320716
The United States objects to Request No. 2.e for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a.,Legal Decisions,8.330242,13.055233,14.585659
"Participant’s fraud, misappropriation, misconduct or dishonesty in connection with his or her duties; (b) any act or omission which is, or is reasonably likely to be, materially adverse or injurious (financially, reputationally or otherwise) to the Company or any of its affiliates; (c) the Participant’s breach of any material obligations contained the Participant’s employment agreement or offer letter with the Company or any equity award agreement, including, but not limited to, any restrictive covenants or obligations of confidentiality contained therein; (d) conduct by the Participant that is in material competition with the Company or any affiliate of the Company; or (e) conduct by the Participant that breaches Participant’s duty of loyalty to the Company or any affiliate of the Company.",Contract,3.6321573,3.4085748,4.2130833
"Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. 2005); Texas Workers' Compensation Com ‘n v Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504 9 (Tex. 1995) (Open court's challenge to “new law” workers' compensation law explaining the quid pro quo of common law remedies in exchange for certain, but limited benefits).",Party Submissions,9.412881,11.73229,11.205772
"Section III of Rafiei’s brief concerns the standards for finding arbitration agreements unconscionable. Brief at 11-14. Given the mature status of the Texas law on unconscionability, it is odd that this section cites only one Texas decision, Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1992).",Party Submissions,6.4165125,7.4190564,7.3812523
The requested document is already submitted as exhibit R-067. Respondent confirms that there are no other documents responsive to this request.,Legal Decisions,14.843608,17.58267,20.215126
"Rather, the Delapenas only contend that the City failed to take an additional step to protect swimmers from the natural perils of swimming at its pool. See Mullens v. Binsky, 130 Ohio App.3d 64, 719 N.E.2d 599, 604 (10th Dist. 1998) (concluding that the risk of drowning at a pool “is an open and obvious condition”); cf. Suarez, 465 S.W.3d at 634 (acknowledging that there are “risks inherently associated with open water swimming”). Even if we assume such a duty existed, the record affirmatively negates a finding that the City was consciously indifferent to swimmer safety.",Party Submissions,6.793251,6.981577,6.984125
"This Court has spent considerable energy in recent years emphasizing the role of stare decisis. One example appears in Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. 2022). Justice Young’s concurrence in American National is another. Given the overwhelming trend toward compound interest in the twentieth century, and given the work already done in Crider and Lewis, the Court’s recent teachings about stare decisis would sound hollow indeed if a litigant can brush aside generations of Texas law by pointing to a pre-Erie opinion from a federal court.",Party Submissions,15.521921,13.532468,16.90668
"WEM or MEM Wholesale Electricity Market 1. This Award is rendered in a dispute submitted to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ( ICSID or the Centre ) pursuant to the “Agreement Between Argentina and the Kingdom of Spain on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments ” dated 3 October 1991 ( Argentina-Spain BIT or the BIT or the Treaty) and the “ Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States ”, which entered into force on 14 October 1966 and became binding on Spain on 17 September 1994 and on Argentina on 18 November 1994 (the ICSID Convention).",Legal Decisions,3.9376926,4.039494,3.9450963
"ICSID arbitration claims.539 While the wording of the waivers includes wide-ranging terms such as “ any rights ” and “ any actions and/or claims,” the Tribunal finds that such wording is not sufficiently unequivocal, clear and specific so as to include international investment law claims. For a waiver to operate at a treaty claim level the waiver must be clear and explicit.540 In this regard, the ILC has explained by reference to the ICJ’s Nauru case that for a waiver to exist “the conduct or statement must be unequivocal.”541 Had the Respondent wished for the Claimant’s shareholders to waive their rights to ICSID arbitration, the Respondent could have included specific language in that respect.",Legal Decisions,8.567624,9.794041,8.806723
"The jurisdictional limits on the justice of the peace courts’ powers in eviction cases serve to prevent other courts from drawing the impermissible inference that abandoning immediate possession in an eviction action equates to abandoning any right of possession or claim of damages in a district court action. (See Pet. Br. 30-31) The court of appeals’ decision transgresses all these legal boundaries, notwithstanding Respondents’ misguided efforts to recast the decision as entirely fact-based.",Party Submissions,15.386459,16.353298,15.37103
"This court further urged the parties to address Morales v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 241 S.W.3d 514,518 (Tex. 2007). Morales was a mandatory venue case. The *2 deceased's surviving spouse filed two suits, one in El Paso County and one in Travis County. The issue in Morales was whether a judicial review that had gone through the Division should be filed in the county of the deceased claimant's county of residence under TEX. LAB. CODE § 410.252, or under TEX. LAB. CODE § 410.255 in Travis County. Because the appeal was from an ongoing compensability determination, the court held that the proper venue for the continuation of the appellate process for the workers' compensation case was the county of the deceased's residence at the time of injury. As will be seen further below, Bay's reliance on In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co. Inc., 107 S.W.3d 832 (Tex. App. -Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding), which is also a mandatory venue case, is not applicable to the present case because Mann has not pursued benefits at the Texas Department of Insurance, Workers' Compensation Division (the “Division”). Morales is not on point for any issues in the present case.",Party Submissions,6.388856,6.286807,6.568831
"To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to enhance the paid family and medical leave credit, and for other purposes.",Legislation,3.4535143,2.9375255,3.1137698
"Wife’s Retirement Account Wife argues the trial court abused its discretion by valuing and awarding her aCity of Dallas 401(k) because the uncontroverted evidence established that the account did not exist at the time of divorce, and there was insufcient evidence to support the value ofthe retirement account on the date ofdivorce. Husband responds the evidence was legally and factually sufcient to support the trial court’s nding that Wife contributed $64,683.69 to ve ”retirement accounts during the marriage.",Party Submissions,8.344152,9.531439,9.446746
"Relator Justice Brian Walker and Real Party in Interest Justice John Devine both filed applications for a place on the 2024 Republican General Primary ballot for the office of Justice, Texas Supreme Court, Place 4, both choosing to pay the required filing fee of $3,750. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.024(a)(2); Exhibit B, Exhibit C.",Party Submissions,7.133709,8.970489,8.769683
"Unlike the doctor in De La Riva, however, Dr. Tappan specifically addressed his qualifications and experience on the relevant issues. App. 7, CR 663. Because “ [Dr. Tappan] is an expert in managing labor and delivery ” he is qualified to opine “ on the causal relationship between labor and delivery and the complications that stem from labor and delivery, including a newborn ’ s neurological injuries.” Livingston, 279 S.W.3d at 877.",Party Submissions,12.940216,14.4016485,15.535476
West Headnotes (25) [1] Workers' Compensation Exclusiveness Texas Workers' Compensation Act vests the Division of Worker's Compensation at the Texas Department of Insurance with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ultimate question of whether the claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq.,Party Submissions,5.409254,6.7095976,6.3908978
"In attempting to determine whether the proportionate responsibility statute in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.001 conflicts with the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA), when an employee files suit against a nonsubscribing employer, that suit is an action to collect benefits and damages under the workers' compensation laws determination. First, under the TWCA, an employee has a statutory burden to prove the employer's negligence. Therefore, under the statute, if the employee is the sole cause of the injury, he cannot recover pursuant to the statute even without the defense of contributory negligence. Consequently, an employee's negligence action against his nonsubscribing employer is brought under the workers' compensation laws of Texas, not only common law. Second, a nonsubscriber is statutorily prohibited from asserting certain common law defenses in a personal injury action brought by an employee. It is by the terms of Texas Workers' Compensation law that an employer is deprived of the defenses of contributory negligence, assumed risk, and fellow servant negligence.",Party Submissions,5.234085,5.239829,5.335726
YOU MAY CHALLENGE THIS ORDER BY FILING A MOTION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN 10 DAYS AFTER THE DATE THIS ORDER IS SIGNED. SEE TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 145.,Party Submissions,2.9799247,3.4899187,3.3571634
"MVP also ignores that, in the trial court, McCarthy—the only other party to the Subcontract besides RLB—protested MVP’s attempts to enforce the MCC’s forum-selection/choice-of-law and waiver provisions against both McCarthy and RLB. R.0361-392, 689-701. MVP’s only legal explanation for how it can essentially jump over its general contractor, who made no attempt to enforce the Subcontract’s “flow-down” provisions against RLB, is that RLB’s claims are “dependent” on the MCC. MVP’s Brief at 49-52.",Party Submissions,10.1453905,9.849895,10.331884
"Moreover, Respondents continue to conflate jurisdiction with the merits of Oncor’s claims. Oncor in this appeal seeks only the opportunity to litigate the merits of its claim. And Oncor does not assert that jurisdiction exists only because unit appraisals are “complex.” See Respondents’ Brief at 29. Rather, Oncor asserts that courts have jurisdiction to determine whether any section 1.111(e) agreement expressly addresses an issue later raised under section 25.25(c). This type of dispute will not likely arise often in simple appraisals of single-jurisdiction properties. But when such a dispute does arise, the mere exercise of jurisdiction over such a dispute does not implicate the policy of “highly favoring” settlements. Merely acknowledging that the district court has jurisdiction to consider claims like Oncor’s (the issue before this Court) does not mean property owners will always prevail on them.",Party Submissions,10.321883,10.213302,10.5357275
"The majority’s third case concerned a director who was paid more than $500,000 for her service on the Oracle board of directors. She was challenged for being insufficiently independent from the self-dealing director, not for her own self-dealing. The Delaware Chancery Court held that her receipt of more than $500,000, in addition to other allegations that she was not sufficiently independent, established demand futility. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 2018 WL 1381331, at *18.",Party Submissions,6.0816216,6.2717648,6.217657
"In most legal malpractice cases, the jury cannot discern for itself 18 Alexander v. Turtur & Associates, Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 119-20 (Tex. 2004).",Party Submissions,6.860459,8.321864,8.876521
"To amend the Federal Credit Union Act to modify requirements relating to the regulation and examination of credit union organizations and service providers, to provide the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency with the authority to regulate the provision of services provided to the Government-sponsored enterprises and Federal Home Loan Banks, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.94352,4.6277742,4.9476247
"Because the evidence clearly and convincingly established that Husband obtained his Bank of America 401(k) before the marriage and that he contributed $62,042.77 to that 401(k) during the marriage, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and this Court should affirm the trial court’s ruling.",Party Submissions,6.0717287,6.3540077,7.363453
"DÉCIMA SEGUNDA -El incumplimiento de cualquiera de las obligaciones que la Empresa contrae en este Acuerdo, así como de las que a su cargo deriven de los documentos anexos al mismo, dará lugar a la rescisión del Acuerdo. Las faltas y omisiones de la EMPRESA serán sancionadas por las autoridades competentes, con arreglo a las disposiciones legales aplicables. La empresa no solamente se obliga a lo expresamente pactado en este Acuerdo y sus anexos, sino también a las consecuencias que, según su naturaleza son conformes a la buena fe, el uso o la Ley. [Énfasis añadido] 113. Conforme a esta Cláusula, como se explicó en los párrafos 236 y 237 del Memorial de Contestación Subordinada, en caso de cualquier incumplimiento de CALICA con las obligaciones descritas en el Acuerdo de 1986 y sus anexos, así como las derivadas de la buena fe, el uso o la Ley (obligaciones subsecuentes), las dependencias involucradas en el Acuerdo de 1986 podrían desligarse del contenido del mismo y dejarlo sin efecto de manera unilateral. 114. Asimismo, las Cláusulas 11a y 13a establecen que la duración del Acuerdo de 1986 dependería de los permisos, licencias y autorizaciones que fueran necesarias antes de iniciar la ejecución del Proyecto. Al no haber cumplido con la Cláusula 11a, el Acuerdo nunca alcanzó a perfeccionarse y tener una vigencia para las actividades de explotación.",Party Submissions,5.3010564,7.5496583,6.162572
"The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the Delapenas failed to allege a valid waiver of immunity under the TTCA. The City also submitted jurisdictional evidence, including copies of the City’s written rules and policies concerning the operation of Buttercup Pool and a document the City referred to as the “Cedar Park Aquatics Safety Plan, ” which is a report authored by a risk management consultant prior to the incident. The City also submitted evidence from the Cedar Park Police Department’s investigation, including reports, diagrams, witness statements, and bodycam video taken by responding officers.",Party Submissions,9.130194,9.90162,10.28557
"Wa s it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Appellant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration when: 1) Appellee introduced legally sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to the conscionability of the delegation and the arbitration agreement, and; 2) the trial court resolved those questions of fact in favor of Appellee?",Party Submissions,6.317588,6.8762813,6.8095427
"To authorize the Secretary of State to provide additional assistance to Ukraine using assets confiscated from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and other sovereign assets of the Russian Federation, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.3086953,8.139388,6.1755905
"Notwithstanding any rules relating to coasting trade which may be enforced in Norway, ships of the High Contracting Parties going to or coming from the territories specified in Article 1 shall have the right to put into Norwegian ports on their outward or homeward voyage for the purpose of taking on board or disembarking passengers or cargo going to or coming from the said territories, or for any other purpose.",Legal Decisions,6.291745,6.6452208,6.5404806
The United States objects to Request No. 3.j for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.,Legal Decisions,9.173362,14.129761,16.077465
"Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 230 (Tex. 2010). The last case in this Court’s trilogy was decided in 2010. Deciding the issue now under the newer TCPA statute and Rule 91a would not only reaffirm this framework, but also contribute to the robust dialogue about the fundamental jury right that has rightfully been encouraged recently by several members of the Court. See Nath III, 660 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Devine, J., joined by Busby, J., dissenting to denial of petition for review) (given “the historic importance of the constitutional guarantees of a trial by jury,” this Court should take this opportunity to “clarify our jurisprudence and safeguard this fundamental right”); see also Matter of Troy S. Poe Tr., 646 S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tex. 2022) (Busby, J., concurring, joined by Devine, Young, JJ.) (observing the framers’ use of “sweeping and emphatic language to guarantee it not once, but twice” in the current Texas Constitution).",Party Submissions,7.674196,7.6278424,7.9044075
"The Walkers filed their Original Petition in December 2020, claiming that Dr. Castillo and Baptist deviated from accepted standards of care in managing H.W.’s delivery. (CR.7-21). As to Baptist, the Walkers further claimed that nurses caring for Mrs. Walker departed from accepted standards of nursing practice. (CR.11-12).",Party Submissions,11.323956,10.317442,12.274211
"In Hall, the defendant published a series of articles about misconduct by compounding pharmacies, which specifically discussed the plaintiff compounding pharmacy and mentioned it was “under investigation.” 579 S.W.3d at 380-81. As in Tatum, the plaintiff argued that the articles’ gist, about fraud at compounding pharmacies, pertained to him specifically. Id. at 377. And as in Tatum, this Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, noting that the article merely “places the accusations against [the plaintiff] in the context of the greater controversy facing the compounding industry, but that's it.” Id. at 381 (emphasis added). The Court also concluded that no “objectively reasonable reader” could infer that allegations about other companies—or about the industry more generally—implied anything about the plaintiff specifically. Id. at 377-378, 381. As the Court noted, the plaintiff “[did] not cite, nor can we find, any statements in [defendant’s] articles implying [plaintiff] is actually guilty of anything.” Id. at 381. While the report was “not flattering, ... not flattering is not defamatory.” Id.",Party Submissions,6.1657786,6.0718164,6.490126
"If you are a director, officer or principal shareholder, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) further restricts your ability to sell or otherwise dispose of Shares acquired upon settlement of the Units.",Contract,4.2321515,4.879604,4.953908
"It was not. The Court of Appeals instead concluded both that: (1) “[b]ecause Weatherford failed to raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the City’s jurisdictional challenge, we agree with the City that neither its actions nor the allegations in Weatherford’s pleadings subject the City to the. .. SWDA. .. .”; and (2) “[b]ecause the statutory definitions of ‘solid waste facility’ and ‘solid waste’ are fatal to Weatherford’s cost-recovery claim against the City, we hold that the governmental immunity waiver provisions contained in the SWDA do not apply to the City in this case. . .” Weatherford Int’l, LLC v. City of Midland, 652 S.W.3d 905, 915 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2022, pet. filed). The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Trial Court’s determination as to lack of jurisdiction. Weatherford’s focus upon the domestic sewage exclusion mischaracterizes the Court of Appeals’ opinion in an attempt to circumvent the actual basis for the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of the Trial Court—Weatherford’s failure to overcome Midland’s jurisdictional challenge and the fact that Midland’s sewer system is not a “solid waste facility,” as such term is defined under the SWDA.",Party Submissions,4.966738,5.1505866,5.431674
"SuppCR8-9 (emphasis added). In September 2007, the trial court severed the cases as Samson requested, separating the Hooks into their own case and the other Tract 4/14 owners into this Bordages case. SuppCR40-42; 1CR208-210. But 2023 Samson disagrees with 2007 Samson, insisting this case can contradict the companion Hooks case, though they were once united before being rendered asunder.",Party Submissions,25.209532,28.611156,32.183125
"Under the TTCA, “if a claim arises from a premise defect, the governmental unit owes to the claimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private pro perty, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(a). But when a premises defect claim involves a recreational activity, such as swimming, the Recreational Use Statute further limits the premises owner’s liability by imposing a specialized duty to “refrain from gross negligence, or from acting with malicious intent or in bad faith.” See id. §§ 75.001(3)(C) (defining “recreation” to include swimming), 75.002(d) (establishing duty of care); City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. 2009) (“[A]lthough the recreational use statute references a trespasser standard, it actually creates a specialized standard of care, one not exactly consistent with the common-law trespasser standard.” (citing State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 286 –87 (Tex. 2006))). Gross negligence is defined as “an act or omission involving subjective awareness of an extreme degree of risk, indicating conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.” Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 623 (quoting Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 287). “[W]hat separates ordinary negligence from gross negligence is the defendant ’ s state of mind; in other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrate that he did not care. ” La.–Pac. Corp. v. Andrade, 19 S.W.3d 245, 246–47 (Tex. 1999) (first citing Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex. 1985); and then citing Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex. 1981)).",Party Submissions,3.6850064,3.9378185,3.8877125
"Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Article 14.2(1), (3), and (4) of USMCA ( i.e., the provisions identified in Request No. 1.b) by November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain Canada’s and Mexico’s consent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Article 14.2(1), (3), and (4) of USMCA.",Legal Decisions,5.429821,5.7486167,5.86153
"The definition of “self-dealing” is not so narrow. Self-dealing is defined as “an occurrence in which the fiduciary uses the advantage of his position to gain a benefit at the expense of those to whom he owes a fiduciary duty.” Mims-Brown v. Brown, 428 S.W.3d 366, 374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Parsons v. Trichter & LeGrand, P.C., No. 14-21-00284-CV, 2022 WL 17099869, at *7 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 22, 2022, no pet.) (citing KMC Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 83 (Tex. 2015)).",Party Submissions,3.5050905,3.8583775,3.5427992
"In Abshire, for example, the court of appeals found the preliminary expert report deficient because “in the face of several possible conclusions regarding when in the chain of events” Abshire’s back injury occurred, the expert had apparently failed to explain how his conclusions were “medically preferable to competing inferences that [were] equally consistent with the known facts.” HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. of Beaumont, LLC v. Abshire, 561 S.W.3d 193, 215 (Tex. App. — Beaumont 2017), rev’d sub nom., Abshire v. Christus Health Se. Tex., 563 S.W.3d 219 (Tex. 2018).",Party Submissions,6.1698194,6.2239475,6.672222
"The Response argues that Delaware has adopted a narrow definition of self-dealing that protects Alpesh from liability. Resp. 10-19. It posits that the highest priority of Delaware law is to protect the “power and autonomy” of Alpesh to control CKC Partners, unimpeded by a derivative lawsuit filed by Mr. Condon. Resp. 11. The response spins a web of technicalities to prevent the meritorious claims of Mr. Condon and CKC Partners from seeing their day in court.",Party Submissions,12.295578,13.225101,12.501482
"Capítulo 12 del Tratado y (ii) las pérdidas o daños sufridos, en tanto que el segundo corresponde a la fecha en la que el inversionista somete su reclamación a arbitraje y, como consecuencia de ello, finaliza el cómputo del término de prescripción. De conformidad con el Artículo 12.30 del Tratado, esta corresponde al día en que “la solicitud de arbitraje ... del demandante: (a) ha sido recibida por el Secretario General de conformidad con el párrafo 1 del Artículo 36 del Convenio del CIADI ...”.",Legal Decisions,5.898611,8.40541,7.2915845
The United States objects to Request No. 1.g for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.,Legal Decisions,8.811079,13.460091,14.848947
"On March 4, 2020, the court presiding over the tort suit [*19] issued an order abating that case until, inter alia, the resolution of any matters properly before DWC. At the time that order issued, the statute of limitations had not yet run on the Martinez Family's potential claim. After that statute of limitations had run, the Martinez Family sought to lift the abatement of the tort suit so they might pursue any common-law remedies. But when the trial court granted that motion and lifted the abatement on February 11, 2021, Texas Mutual's suit for judicial review was still pending, and there was therefore no final administrative determination that might allow the court to lift the abatement. See Tyler Asphalt, 107 S.W.3d at 843-44 .",Party Submissions,7.029891,7.4872284,8.093491
"If the Court concludes that the delegation provision is not unconscionable, it can proceed no further. It should vacate the order of the trial court and remand this case with instructions to refer the dispute into arbitration so that the issue of whether the arbitration agreement as a whole is unconscionable can be decided.",Party Submissions,6.949979,7.9368296,8.10771
"Even if Barina’s interpretation of the gist were correct (it is not), and the Program accused her of exploiting Thrash’s estate, Barina has not shown that claim to be materially false. To the contrary, Petitioners’ substantial and irrefutable evidence, set forth above, supports the allegation that Barina legally exploited Thrash’s estate, and did so for personal gain.9 See Pet. Br. at 22.",Party Submissions,12.396952,14.670716,14.745838
"See supra Part I.A. The ruling is so flatly wrong that Respondents’ only merits-based defense is a policy argument that itself conflicts with the statute. Respondents try to muddy the issue presented, but to no avail. And their suggestion that the same outcome might happen under the proper legal standard is wrong but at least should not preclude review—and certainly should not deter the Court from summarily reversing on just the narrow legal question presented here. Even putting aside the importance of the issue or the conflicting decisions, the legal errors below are so glaring that the Court should correct them through a per curiam opinion resolving the meaning of “require” and leaving other issues for remand. And by doing so, the Court can avoid the confusion that courts, litigants, and members of the auto industry will suffer from the decisions below. With or without oral argument, the Court should reverse.",Party Submissions,14.421264,14.739919,14.511287
"The issue is not just that the medical bills and liens are excessive. The additional issue is that the Respondents attempted to and did actually collect on the excessive amounts. The court of appeals should have taken as true the below evidence when ruling on the summary judgment on Petitioners’ Chapter 12 claim:  The medical bills were anchored to the liens;  The Texas PricePoint records list the reasonable charges that Petitioners should have been charged; and  The affidavit of all 47 patients that are in evidence are true in that Respondents actually collected the grossly excessive amounts repeatedly over the course of several years. If the court of appeals had properly followed the summary judgment standard, it would have found that:  The liens were grossly excessive;  Respondents were filing each lien with knowledge that they were grossly excessive, and therefore, fraudulent; and  Respondents knowingly caused Petitioners financial injury because they actually intended to and did collect on the grossly excessive liens repeatedly. Or, at the very least, the court of appeals should have found these are fact issued to be decided by a jury. By dismissing the reasonableness claim without conducting a proper factual analysis and/or submitting the question to the jury, the court of appeals committed error. Thus, summary judgment was improper on this issue.",Party Submissions,9.3462305,8.563638,9.719483
"Respondents repeat their mantra that an agreement to the “value” of unidentified “transmission lines” necessarily constitutes an agreement to the objective characteristics of the lines, including their length and voltage capacity in Wilbarger County. See Respondents’ Brief at 11-15. This argument is a red herring. The incorrect mileage at issue is not the number of miles of Sharyland’s 345kV transmission line taxed in Wilbarger County—it is the number of miles of Sharyland’s 345kV transmission line in Texas.",Party Submissions,8.789935,9.9639635,9.645626
"Therefore, without the express consent of the relevant coastal States (namely Norway and the Russian Federation in the present instance), these fisheries are illegal as they would be in contravention of Article 77(2) of UNCLOS.",Legal Decisions,10.457943,11.216683,13.169766
"Citing Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, the Seventh Court nonetheless faulted Dr. Tappan for offering only that there was a “mere possibility” of a link between the providers ’ conduct and the eventual harm. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *4 (citing Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52).",Party Submissions,10.055576,13.195913,14.877593
"The answer to this question is yes, there is a distinct claim in respect of the alleged damage to Sea & Coast or rather to Mr Pildegovics’ investment in Sea & Coast. That claim exists because Mr Pildegovics’ shares in Sea & Coast, which are part of the investment, have lost value due to Norway’s breaches of the BIT.",Legal Decisions,17.403372,15.05368,16.16883
Allowing the Court of Appeals’ ruling in this case to stand would endanger all manner of documentary storytelling and other types of investigative reporting.,Party Submissions,17.371658,12.6632185,17.028181
"Arbitration Rule 33 4.1. The participation of all the members of the Tribunal by any appropriate means of communications is required at the first session, case management conferences, hearings and deliberations, except as otherwise provided in the Arbitration Rules or unless the Parties agree otherwise.",Legal Decisions,8.991719,9.42044,9.38015
"The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and resolved the case on the ground that the MSA partitioned to the husband future income and earnings, which included the bonus. 526 S.W.3d at 45 1. The supreme court stated that whether the bonus qualied as community preperty did not affect its determination.",Party Submissions,16.42045,17.746496,18.205286
"This document sets forth the terms and conditions of the MSC Executive Severance Plan (the “Plan”), which is hereby adopted by MSC Industrial Direct Co., Inc. (“MSC”) for the benefit of the eligible employees of MSC and its subsidiaries to this document. MSC and all such designated subsidiaries hereinafter are referred to, individually and collectively, as the “Company.” This document sets forth the terms of the Plan and is applicable to such eligible employees of the Company who participate in the Plan in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 below.",Contract,4.4827266,4.0491233,4.622688
"HN2 [ ] Whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Texas Natural Resources Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002). The plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively establish the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Texas Ass'n Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993) .",Party Submissions,3.0394478,3.6515117,4.188739
"Notwithstanding the well-settled jurisprudence indicating that DWC has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any dispute over eligibility, including questions of employment status, in the context of a pending claim, the Martinez Family asks this Court to hold that DWC has no jurisdiction to resolve the question of employment in the context of an unfiled potential claim.",Party Submissions,8.317866,9.222805,9.651085
"Lastly, in Shattenkirk this Court found guidance in In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., LLC, 328 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. 2010). In In re Olshan the homeowners who sued Olshan for improper foundation repairs had signed contracts requiring arbitration of disputes to be administered by the AAA and in accordance with the AAA's commercial arbitration rules. 328 S.W.3d at 886 –87. In arguing that the prohibitive cost of arbitration rendered the agreement unenforceable, the homeowners provided AAA invoices for other arbitrations in allegedly similar cases. Id. at 897. According to the AAA's commercial arbitration rules, this Court found that the “most a consumer will have to pay under these rules is $375 for the arbitrator.” Id. at 896.",Party Submissions,5.693697,6.229386,6.407931
"Respondents’ argument about the name change is therefore restricted to only two isolated portions of the jury’s a ward. The first is the $23,331.37 the jury awarded to Westwood in “relocation expenses.” (2CR2906) These damages compensated Westwood for Respondents’ destruction of its security surveillance system (8RR116-17;16RR100-06 (PX148A)); for the locksmith Westwood had to hire to gain re-entry to the leased premises (8RR136-36, 152;16RR99 (PX148)); and for a sign that Respondents removed and refused to return (8RR203-04;16RR114). These expenses were “paid” by Westwood Motors. (Resp. 31 n.88 ) But despite what Respondents insist ( id .), those same expenses were “incurred” by Westwood, and thus the award compensated Westwood for its own losses. And under the collateral source rule, Respondents cannot prohibit Westwood from recovering for these losses simply because they were paid by another entity. See Big Bird Tree Service v. Gallegos, 365 S.W.3d 173, 176-77 (Tex. App. —Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (holding collateral source rule precludes any reduction in a tortfeasor’s liability because of benefits plaintiff received from someone else).",Party Submissions,8.649182,7.9290543,9.111493
"In this case, Sonic's evidence shows it is suffering financial burdens due to the Alabama judgment, the cost of which cannot be remedied by appeal. Also, as Sonic argues, its ability to prosecute the contract claims is hindered by continued abatement, because witnesses will disappear and memories will become impaired. These are ramifications of continued abatement that [**36] are not remedied by appeal. See Gebhardt, 891 S.W.2d at 332. Finally, it is impossible to determine when abatement will end in this case. Because abatement appears indefinite, it violates the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. Id. We conclude that the benefits of mandamus review of the trial court's abatement orders in this case outweighs its detriments, and Sonic lacks an adequate remedy by appeal.",Party Submissions,7.631748,9.174042,8.744376
"Grant did not appear at the January 20 hearing. The trial court found that Grant did not offer evidence of her inability to afford costs. It further found that Grant’s most recent statement of inability to afford costs, which was filed in January of 2023, reflected that (1) Grant has $5,053.95 in monthly income; (2) Grant stated the total value of her property was $70.00, but the attachments showed Grant owns (i) a home purchased in April of 2022 with an undisclosed equity and value, (ii) a 2021 Toyota Highlander purchased in August of 2021 with an undisclosed equity and value, and (iii) personal property which Grant pays $504 monthly to store; and (3) Grant failed to disclose her ownership of an undivided 3.334 percent interest in the 53.524-acre tract at issue, which the commissioners valued at $30,000 per acre. The trial court determined that Grant has the ability to pay court costs and granted Heo’s request.",Party Submissions,6.7061815,6.9100885,7.1659026
"In case the documents responsive to this request include communications with the advisors of Claimants in relation to Mr Broshko's decision to acquire shares in Obnova, such communications are relevant and material to the outcome of the case, as explained by Respondent above.",Legal Decisions,23.85564,23.385504,33.296402
"Arbitration Rule 21 2.1. The Tribunal was constituted on 8 September 2023, in accordance with the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules. The Parties confirmed that the Tribunal was properly constituted and that no Party has any objection to the appointment of any Member of the Tribunal.",Legal Decisions,4.643333,5.4625597,5.155256
"Id., at 537. But this Court offered no further explanation or test to make this determination in future cases. Administrative or professional services seem more likely to involve services unrelated to the actual administration of medical care or treatment. So it would seem doubtful that every administrative or professional service rendered in a health care facility would trigger the TMLA. It would be helpful if this Court would articulate the factors or set forth a test to make that decision.",Party Submissions,16.442513,18.917124,19.792559
"Compounding has continued to spread across the country. See, e.g., Moose Agric. LLC v. Layn USA, Inc ., 639 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1157 (D. Colo. 2022) (“Because the parties here are sophisticated corporations engaged in an industrial-scale contract, and because plaintiffs have produced substantial evidence demonstrating the inequitable impacts of the delay in payment, compound interest is appropriate.”); Cent. Water Dist. Associates v. Cedar Meadow Lake Watershed Dist ., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 474, 954 N.E.2d 38, 44 (2011) (citing numerous cases) (“In so holding, we align ourselves with those courts who have recognized” that compounding reflects economic reality).",Party Submissions,8.694283,7.871425,8.323161
"Mr. Luis Gulano, General Manager of such company, requesting the Dominican President an appointment for Mr. Michael Lee-Chin and Mr. Asilis where “[t]he topics to be addressed are foreign investment and the [D]uquesa Landfill.” [Prof. Kohen’s Translation] As stated above, Mr. Lee-Chin was then introduced as “Minister of the Government of Jamaica Economic Growth Council.”17 [Prof. Kohen’s Translation] A package of Lajun documents dated “November 9, 2016” (same date as the alleged meeting) the first page of which reads “Information for the President” was also submitted as purported evidence of the meeting with the President.18 [Prof. Kohen’s Translation] 15. The majority asserts that “[t]he Tribunal fails to see any element that could lead to the conclusion that said meeting did not take place, as Respondent seems to suggest.”19 In other words, by reversing the burden of proof, my colleagues expected Respondent to submit negative evidence, i.e., to prove something that it states did not exist. That is not all. Even assuming that said meeting existed, the mere presence of Mr. Lee-Chin, introduced as a Jamaican minister and accompanying his son and Lajun’s Dominican investor, is not evidence of any ownership. That is compounded by the information transmitted to the Vice President of the Dominican Republic that introduced Claimant as an agent, not an investor.",Legal Decisions,11.994579,11.980627,12.450334
"Finally, Respondents’ effort to minimize the adverse consequences for tenants flowing from the court of appeals’ ruling—which the court itself entirely ignored— is likewise unavailing. If the law is as Respondents say it is, and any effort by a tenant to comply with an eviction order by departing the premises conclusively demonstrates “voluntary abandonment” of every right the tenant ever had to claim damages for wrongful eviction or breach of contract, then tenants must waste time, expend resources, and risk sanctions pursuing appeals from justice court which they know will likely to be fruitless simply to preserve their ability to maintain a claim in district court. (See Pet. Br. 23-24) The law should not require such futile and wasteful acts.",Party Submissions,10.66622,10.505423,11.356714
"Generally, “[a]n indemnity provision does not apply to claims between the parties to the agreement; instead, it obligates the indemnitor to protect the indemnitee against claims brought by a person not a party to the agreement. ” Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 20 S.W.3d 119, 130 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (citing Wallerstein v. Spirt, 8 S.W.3d 774, 780 (Tex. App. —Austin 1999, no pet.); Derr Const. Co. v. City of Houston, 846 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ)). Nevertheless, an indemnity provision may be written such that the parties “agree to indemnify one another against claims they later assert against each other. ” Claybar v. Samson Expl., LLC, No. 09-16-00435-CV, 2018 WL 651258, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 1, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Ganske v. Spence, 129 S.W.3d 701, 708 (Tex. App. — Waco 2004, no pet.)). However, in order to show “ that an indemnity provision applies, the plaintiff must show that a third party has filed a claim against him or that the indemnity agreement contains language indicating that it applies to claims between the parties .” Id. (citing MG Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Moses Lopez Custom Homes, Inc., 179 S.W.3d 51, 63 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied); Ganske, 129 S.W.3d at 708; Coastal Transp. Co., 20 S.W.3d at 130).",Party Submissions,3.160627,3.2493541,3.2080152
"Read in context, Dr. Tappan ’ s opinions were more like the report in Miller v. JSC Lake Highlands Operations stating that “the failure to timely remove the foreign body “can” lead to aspiration, which “can” be deadly. Miller, LP, 536 S.W.3d at 515 (“Read in context, Dr. Naeger opined that aspiration can be deadly and that it was deadly in this case.”).",Party Submissions,20.504154,20.839058,25.052544
"Because the Court of Appeals employed an erroneous standard of review, leading to an erroneous review of the evidence, the Petitioners, who were cheated out of millions of dollars, were denied redress against Matt Marsenison, against whom there is clearly more than a scintilla of evidence that he did business in Texas, committed torts in Texas and had an ongoing and continual relationship with Texas.",Party Submissions,14.645884,15.475264,16.159616
"Or as then-Justice Hecht said in Prudential, “[p] ublic policy that permits parties to waive trial altogether surely does not forbid waiver of [the right to a] trial” in Texas.",Party Submissions,20.651243,24.398884,25.658918
In addition — and perhaps more relevant here —“p arties can agree to opt out of the civil justice system altogether and submit future disputes to arbitration.” Id .,Party Submissions,28.955303,41.145054,37.81951
"In no way can the order approving the Plan or any other ruling from the Bankruptcy Court be viewed as that court’s approval of subsequent litigation decisions — made outside of bankruptcy after the Plan was approved — to collude and switch legal positions taken in the original trial. In fact, based on that Court’s own writings conveying its skepticism about the case, one must believe the Plan would not have been approved if this were the stated goal.",Party Submissions,19.022337,18.560112,22.79101
"Name, permanent mailing addresses, and work and home telephone numbers of each person accompanying the child or information about the group trip and its sponsor: Please sign and return to me the attached Consent for Child to Travel Outside the United States together with the child's original passports within ten days after you receive this notice and consent form, same being ______________________________, 20____.",Party Submissions,18.411003,17.098919,19.315594
"Furthermore, the court should look at the relationship between the witnesses and the matters upon which they testify. If uncontroverted evidence is from an interested witness, it does nothing more than raise a fact issue unless it is clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted. TEX.",Party Submissions,11.561601,14.62204,14.728818
"The court of appeals’ opinion is at odds with this Court’s jurisprudence on premises liability as articulated in Del Lago. The opinion is also in conflict with administrative rules from the Health and Human Services Department, which mandate that owners and operators of public pools provide lifeguards and meet minimum safety standards to prevent drownings. The City undertook a duty to make the pool safe and was grossly negligent in failing to adhere to its own safety standards. This Court should address these important matters of first impression, which affect millions of Texans across the state who operate, own, or use public pools.",Party Submissions,7.9689364,8.306317,8.776556
"In addition, Misti Ducharme testified that she had an additional meeting with Marsenison in Florida in 2018 regarding forming a new company, and she knew, at that time, Marsenison was no longer involved with Turbine. (RR Vol. 1, p. 6) This is direct evidence of Marsenison, individually, in no relation to Turbine, contemplating doing business with a Texas Company in Texas.",Party Submissions,17.495554,19.936073,21.323153
"None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant at the time of his arrest or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,14.367309,17.40334,14.598733
"Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court did not err in dismissing Berrelez's claims based on her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Act. Berrelez's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, mandating dismissal of Berrelez's claims against Mesquite Logistics. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.",Party Submissions,3.8347328,4.624466,4.8212585
"Perhaps more importantly, however, Respondents’ effort to explain away the court of appeals’ opinion as merely enforcing some “voluntary agreement” between Westwood and Virtuolotry is irreconcilable with the opinion itself. In that opinion, the court of appeals never even looked for such an agreement because it would have been irrelevant under the court’s analysis, which focused solely and impermissibly on the “preclusive” legal effect of Westwood’s decision to withdraw its appeal in the county court and enter into the agreed judgment. Indeed, the court of appeals concluded that it would take an agreement to vary the judgment’s otherwise applicable legal effect. It contended that to preserve its claims in the district court, Westwood would have had to force Respondents into including a concession in the agreed judgment that an “act of Virtuolotry or Boyd” was “the cause for its decision to abandon its appeal” (Op. 5) or “qualifying” the abandonment to clarify its intention to assert a continuing “right to possession” (Op. on Rehr’g 2). Westwood, however, did not have to do either. Respondents’ effort to rewrite the opinion shows how scant its arguments really are. II. The actual reasons behind the court of appeals’ decision are indefensible.",Party Submissions,12.25825,12.904956,12.655799
"This is a suit for damages. The trial judge who signed the Order in this case is The Honorable Judge Norma Gonzales, sitting in the 73rd Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas. The Order in question denied a Special Appearance on behalf Mark Marsenison. The parties to this appeal are Petitioners, Charles & Donna Ross, Stephen Brown, Doug Butler, Jep & Judy Canon, Pete Carlsson, Teresa & Joe Coldewey, Jessica Curry, Angela Eaton, Ronny & Stephanie Fikes, John & Margaret Gallagher, Gary & Mary Griffin, Chase James, Mike Kelley, John LaMaestra, Nunzio & Marcella LaMaestra, Ed Long, Patrick McNamara, Jules Morris, Lawrence Neil, Andrea & Denis Pantel, Mike Saenz, John Sconiers, Lynsie Shaw, Terrah Shaw, Randall Shirley, Corina Southers, Cynthia Strunk, Ted & Cecelia Tencza, Jr., Ted Tencza, Mary Beth Tindell, Richard & Bonnie Urbanek, Thomas Valdez and Peter Velasquez, and Defendant, Mark Marsenison. The appeal was to the Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas. The Opinion of the Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas was authored by The Honorable Luz Elena D. Chapa. Motion for Rehearing en Banc was denied by The Honorable Luz Elena D. Chapa. Citation of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals is Mark Marsenison v. Charles & Donna Ross, et al.; In the Fourth Court of Appeals -San Antonio, Texas, No. 04-22-00098-CV, from the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2019-CI-02392, Honorable Norma Gonzales, Judge Presiding. The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the Special Appearance of Mark Marsenison. No Findings of Facts or Conclusions of Law were filed.",Party Submissions,8.188069,8.3598385,8.60623
"In August 2018, RLB commenced its dredging work. R.403 ¶62. But RLB failed to achieve the average daily production rates set in the Subcontract. R.398 ¶28.",Party Submissions,12.035483,16.624846,18.554462
"Id. at *1. And the consequence for violating that personal-delivery standard was not franchise termination; instead, the distributor would charge back the payments it had made to the dealer under the program.",Party Submissions,23.310266,27.482946,29.546804
"Unlike the expert in Wright, Dr. Tappan did not conclude that adhering to the standard of care would have resulted in only the possibility of a better outcome. Compare Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52–53 (noting that expert opined that “if the x -rays would have been correctly read and the appropriate medical personnel acted upon those findings then Wright would have had the possibility of a better outcome. ”) with App. 7, CR 671. Rather, Dr. Tappan was unequivocal that “ had Dr. Castillo decided for cesarian delivery at or about 15:15 and had she atraumatically delivered Baby [H.W.] by 15:45 ...H.W. would have been born without neurological injury.” App. 7, CR 671. Based on the fetal heart tracings and H.W.’s condition at birth, then, Dr. Tappan believed that Dr. Castillo could have avoided neurological injury had she only delivered by cesarian section (or operative vaginal delivery) at 15:15 as the standard of care required. App. 7, CR 668; 670-71.",Party Submissions,7.189766,8.202454,7.962814
"Finally, the Diocese has a remedy if it pays Bay, Ltd.’s damages: it has a contractual right of indemnity against Mendietta. In the ranch lease, the Diocese and Mendietta agreed: (10RRDX1). While the Diocese nonsuited its claims against Mendietta, it did so without prejudice to refiling those claims, (1CR402–04), and the claims have likely not even accrued.",Party Submissions,16.575823,17.415491,21.220636
"Microsoft Word 365 reports it to contain 3623 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,9.034343,16.982807,21.33491
"THE DUTY TO FURNISH THIS INFORMATION TO EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY CONTINUES AS LONG AS ANY PERSON, BY VIRTUE OF THIS ORDER, IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT OR ENTITLED TO POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD.",Party Submissions,4.884803,4.6559086,5.0881886
"Payment Bond (collectively “Bonds”) shall be furnished in the full amount of this Agreement on the forms in Exhibit 4, attached hereto. The Bonds are to be executed by a surety company or companies authorized to execute such Bonds in the State of the location of the Project, which are on the Department of Treasury’s Listing of Approved Sureties, Department Circular 570 (“Treasury List”), have an A.M. Best rating of A- or higher, and are acceptable to McCarthy and be written in favor of McCarthy and others, if so listed on Exhibit 4. The Bonds furnished shall require the attorney-in-fact who executes the Bonds on behalf of the surety to affix thereto a certified and current copy of their power of attorney. In the event of a claim under the Bonds, McCarthy shall be paid, as and when incurred, by the surety the entire cost incurred, as provided in Article 9 below, including, but not limited to, any support, administrative, legal and court costs McCarthy incurs in the enforcement of its rights under the Bonds. The cost of the Bonds is included in the Subcontract Amount, and upon McCarthy’s request, the surety shall furnish to McCarthy an affidavit executed by the surety’s attorney-in-fact stating the actual cost (net of any rebates, discounts or refunds) to the Subcontractor of the Bonds. If the Subcontract Amount increases by Change Order, McCarthy reserves the right to request that Subcontractor require its surety provide a rider to the bonds increasing the penal sum to the then current Subcontract Amount.",Party Submissions,5.8677945,5.053901,5.4602256
,Legal Decisions,nan,nan,nan
To establish in U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security an EB–5 Regional Center Program Advisory Com-mittee.,Legislation,7.4993443,7.4160223,9.446797
"After Dr. Castillo and Baptist answered (CR.22-44), the Walkers served initial expert reports from James Tappan, M.D. (CR.57-65) and Donald Null, M.D. (CR.453-54) in an effort to support their claims against Dr. Castillo.1 Dr. Castillo objected to the reports and moved to dismiss. (CR.45-56).2 She objected: (i) neither Dr. Tappan nor Dr. Null were qualified to offer the opinions they did (CR.48-50); (ii) their reports were too vague and conclusory about standard of care and Dr. Castillo’s claimed breach (CR.50-51); and (iii) their opinions about causation failed because neither explained how or why any alleged breach of the standard of care by Dr. Castillo purportedly caused H.W.’s injuries. (CR.51-54).",Party Submissions,6.883466,7.60753,7.4273643
"This First Amendment to the Employment Agreement (this “Amendment”), between United Rentals, Inc. (the “Company”) and Matthew J. Flannery (“Executive”), is made effective as of November 9, 2023.",Contract,4.433069,3.482464,4.231847
"ANYTHING HEREIN TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING, and in lieu of the terms and provisions contained in Sections 91.401 through 91.406 of the Texas Natural Resources Code, the parties hereto specifically agree that the following provisions shall apply to this Lease and all royalty payments made hereunder or any other rights as provided in the above listed sections, and that such provisions of the Texas Natural Resources Code shall not be applicable; such parties further, by their signatures below, waive any and all rights which might be claimed or asserted under such Sections 91.401 and 91.406 of the Texas Natural Resources Code; thus it is specifically provided that:... B. Royalties on production shall be paid on a calendar month basis. The royalty for the month in which production is first marketed shall be paid on or before the first day of the calendar month next following the expiration of sixty (60) days from the execution date of the completion report or potential test for the well that is filed with the Railroad Commission of Texas, and the respective royalty payments for each subsequent calendar month of production shall be made on or before the first day of each successive calendar month following the calendar month in which the first payment is due.",Party Submissions,5.749214,5.516983,5.8778887
"In contrast, Rafiei's case is not built on speculative assertions or hypothetical scenarios. The sales contract he entered into clearly defines the costs associated with the arbitration process under the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. The detailed fee structure, combined with additional expenses such as the cost of a hearing room and arbitrator compensation, offers concrete evidence of the costs Rafiei would incur, which differentiates his case from the speculations presented in In re Olshan .",Party Submissions,13.117801,14.440115,14.415653
"With respect to the potential costs of a complete arbitration on the merits, Rafiei ignores the Texas jurisprudence on unconscionability. This can be seen on the very first page of his brief when he suggests that he is “ at risk of bearing exorbitant fees without any ceiling or limit.” Respondent’s Amended Brief, p. 5 (emphasis added). But being “at risk” is not the test— this Court has specifically held that “evidence of the ‘risk’ of possible costs of arbitration is insufficient evidence of the prohibitive cost of the arbitration forum.” In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 833, 895 (Tex. 2010)).",Party Submissions,9.352122,9.210826,10.309733
No Employment Contract. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to constitute a contract of employment between an Employee and a Participating Employer.,Contract,5.712207,7.085813,9.6850395
"Contrary to the Walkers’ assertion, nothing in the Amarillo Court’s opinion reflects that the “real reason” it reversed the trial court’s decision was because it did not “believe” the experts’ opinions. (Pet. Br. at 35). To the contrary, the Court accepted all the statements made by the experts but ultimately recognized the glaring omission by both: failing to explain how and why Dr. Castillo’s alleged breaches proximately caused what Dr. Tappan contends was the injury-causing event, the perinatal arterial ischemic stroke/subacute infarction before birth and revealed on the MRI and MRA. (CR.670).",Party Submissions,12.752666,13.675023,14.399115
"HN7 [ ] The determination of whether any type of claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission depends on whether the claim is based on a claimant's entitlement to benefits. See In re Texas Mut. Ins. Co., 157 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. App.-- Austin 2004, no pet.) (citing Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 805 ). The issue is not whether a particular type of claim, such as a tort or statutory claim, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. Rather, the determination of whether any type of claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission depends [**9] on whether the claim is based on an alleged delay or denial of a workers' compensation benefit.",Party Submissions,4.929937,5.2671633,5.3856673
"Liberty completely fails to address the prohibitions in the Contract for exceeding the TAV, and simply contends that Ames is responsible for the amount “due and owed” that Ames agreed to pay in the Contract. Just because a damages provision is stated in a contract does not make it automatically “due and owed” and enforceable. Every liquidated damages provision that has been found by a Texas court to be an unreasonable penalty was agreed to and stated in the contract. Failure to pay an unreasonable penalty does not waive Ames’s immunity.",Party Submissions,13.109425,13.646404,14.07795
"Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell , 505 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. 2016). The professional or administrative services also must be directly related to healthcare.",Party Submissions,10.732622,9.665577,16.960901
"If this Court agrees that RLB voided any potentially applicable forum-selection/choice-of-law, venue, or waiver provisions in the MCC and Subcontract when it filed this suit in a Texas court, the Court need not reach any other issue raised in the parties’ briefing. Agreeing with RLB on this statutory construction issue should result in this Court vacating the court of appeals’ opinion and instruction to dismiss the Texas lawsuit. But even if the Court disagrees, it should conclude that the MCC’s forum-selection/choice-of-law and waiver provisions did not govern RLB’s claims in the first place—since RLB is not a party to the MCC and MVP did not meet its burden to prove that the applicable MCC provisions “flowed down” to the Subcontract. The court of appeals erred in assuming these provisions apply and declining to reach this issue. Opinion at 10.",Party Submissions,7.6579523,6.935221,8.079427
"Authority in February 2014. On 5 February 2014, Mr Sofus Olsen of the Authority responded to an inquiry from Mr Ankipov which Mr Olsen summarised as “ whether EU-registered boats are free to deliver crab to approved crab receptions in accordance with our regulations ” and answered “ EU-registered fishing boats can deliver crab freely to Norwegian crab receptions. If the fishing is quota-regulated (king crab, for example), the boats must have a quota”.740 This exchange relates to the landing of crabs and says nothing about their harvesting.",Legal Decisions,16.352802,14.691946,17.737844
"Norway expects everyone to follow applicable regulations in Norwegian maritime areas, and we want to leave no doubt that such regulations will be enforced consistently as conveyed in the above mentioned note to the EU, and in accordance with international law.",Legal Decisions,24.134708,19.018532,25.465946
"In the event that, in its discretion, the Company purchases an insurance policy or policies insuring the life of a Participant or any other property, to allow the Company to recover or meet the cost of providing benefits, in whole or in part, hereunder, no Participant or Beneficiary shall have any rights whatsoever therein or in the proceeds therefrom. The Company shall be the sole owner and beneficiary of any such insurance policy or property and shall possess and may exercise all incidents of ownership therein.",Contract,5.56857,5.5942044,6.3381085
"To redesignate the Richard H. Poff Federal Building located at 210 Franklin Road Southwest in Roanoke, Virginia, as the ‘‘Reuben E. Lawson Fed-eral Building’’, and for other purposes.",Legislation,10.281235,7.88706,9.4243965
Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .,Legislation,2.7660437,3.2448676,3.9456952
"Except in the case of an Employee on a bona fide leave of absence as provided below, an Employee is deemed to have incurred a Separation from Service if the Employer and the Employee reasonably anticipated that the level of services to be performed by the Employee after a date certain would be reduced to twenty percent (20%) or less of the average services rendered by the Employee during the immediately preceding thirty-six (36) month period (or the total period of employment, if less than thirty-six (36) months), disregarding periods during which the Employee was on a bona fide leave of absence.",Contract,2.9689372,3.385877,3.2626696
"On January 20, 2021, Santos filed a Motion for New Trial. CR1:178-187. That same day, Santos also filed a second Plea to the Jurisdiction. CR1:188-213. On March 18, 2021, the Court denied Santos’ Motion for New Trial. CR1:249. That same day, the Court denied Santos’ second Plea to the Jurisdiction. CR1:250. On March 19, 2021, Santos filed her Notice of Appeal. CR1:254. On July 12, 2022, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in favor of Yellowfin.",Party Submissions,3.0672302,3.3539805,3.4370859
"This requirement helps ensure that potentially viable claims are not improperly dismissed when a report is deficient but curable. See Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 556 (explaining that the TMLA allows a claimant a thirty-day period to cure deficiencies before the trial court finally determines that the report is inadequate and the claim must be dismissed).",Party Submissions,8.240006,8.96574,10.880461
"Title The union of all elements (as ownership, possession, and custody) constituting the legal right to control and dispose of property; the legal link between a person who owns property and the property itself.",Party Submissions,18.465446,19.408531,18.7928
"Claimants agree to conduct a reasonable search for and produce documents responsive to this request that are in the Claimants’ possession and/or control, with the exception of any documents created in preparation for and/or in connection with the conduct of the present arbitration. Claimants object to production of such documents on two grounds: First, the vast majority, if not all, of the documents related to the present arbitration would be covered by legal privilege (Articles 9(2)(b) and 9(4) of the IBA Rules).",Legal Decisions,6.202608,6.709038,6.506791
"Thompson itself reiterated the law requiring substantial factor and but-for causation. The intermediate court in that case had only applied substantial factor causation (and not but-for causation) on the theory that the negligent acts of multiple defendants had concurrently caused the injury. Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson, 638 S.W.3d 218, 232 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021). This Court explained that was error: a plaintiff must prove but-for causation even when the negligence of multiple providers is at issue. Thompson, 649 S.W.3d at 160. The court of appeals here made no such error. Instead, the court correctly required the expert reports to explain proximate cause for each defendant.",Party Submissions,6.9181128,7.737842,7.813419
"For these reasons, Petitioners ask the Court to request full briefing, grant this petition for review, reverse the court of appeals, and reinstate the trial court’s judgment denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, allowing them to replead as necessary. Alternatively, Petitioners ask the Court to reverse and remand to the court of appeals to reconsider the arguments raised in Petitioners motions for rehearing. Petitioners ask for any further relief to which they might be entitled.",Party Submissions,5.5663924,5.995114,6.5290003
"Fax. (940) 553-2305 ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT WILBARGER COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD As required by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3), I certify that, according to the word count of the computer program used to prepare this brief, the brief contains 10,688 words.",Party Submissions,5.6388917,6.5353928,7.279499
"First, a “covenant not to execute” is a “covenant in which a party who has won a judgment agrees not to enforce it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 458 (11th ed. 2019). The forbearance agreement contains a specific covenant not to execute on the judgment unless Mendietta defaults under the agreement: “Bay, Ltd. shall not take any further or other action to collect on said Final Judgment unless Mendietta fails to timely perform the terms of this Agreement.” (2CR916). Thus, so long as Mendietta owns the property, is alive, is not in foreclosure, does not allow any other claims against the property, and is making payments toward the constitutional lien on his homestead, Bay, Ltd. cannot take action to enforce the judgment. (Id.). If Mendietta somehow won the lottery or obtained sufficient assets to pay the judgment, Bay, Ltd. would still be unable to collect more than the $750/month payments toward the constitutional lien on the homestead, so long as Mendietta complies with the forbearance agreement. (Id.). If Mendietta won the lottery and then voluntarily paid the judgment, it would not be a secret that the Diocese would be unable to discover. The same is true for Mendietta if the Court reinstates the judgment against the Diocese, the Diocese pays toward the judgment, and Bay later is able to collect against Mendietta. Established judgment collection rules provide many methods by which the Diocese and/or Mendietta would learn about payments toward the judgment. If Mendietta voluntarily satisfies the $1.9 million judgment in full, Bay, Ltd.’s judgment and any judgment lien would be extinguished. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 52.006(b) (“A properly filed abstract of the judgment continues to constitute a lien under Section 52.001 until the earlier of the 20th anniversary of the date the abstract is recorded and indexed or the date the judgment is satisfied or the lien is released.”). If all or a portion of the judgment is satisfied through payment, release, or execution, Texas Property Code section 52.005 allows for proof of judgment satisfaction in the form of returns on execution by the officer making the return, as well as a receipt, acknowledgment, or release signed by the judgment creditor, all of which must be filed in the county property records. TEX. PROP. CODE § 52.005. Indeed, before seeking any sort of execution, Bay, Ltd. would be required to file an abstract of judgment that discloses the amount of any payments made toward the judgment. Id. § 52.003(a)(8).",Party Submissions,6.258959,6.272266,6.4508004
"Galovelho does not attempt to fit its claim within the Steele understanding of a compensable claim for damage of property short of an actual taking. Instead, relying largely on two recent concurring opinions by supreme court justices, he simply equates the damages he alleges from temporary restrictions to an actual taking. We do not read either of the concurring opinions to make that same equation. See Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 182–88 (J. Young concurring); Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 777–82 (Tex. 2021) (J. Busby concurring). And each of the majority opinions in those cases addresses the taking alleged under established federal jurisprudence. See Schrock, 645 S.W.3d at 181 (applying Penn Central factors); Jim Olive Photography, 624 S.W.3d at 771-74 (applying Lucas progeny to takings claim).",Party Submissions,7.841754,8.534709,7.9994893
"Recognizing February 4, 2024, as ‘‘World Cancer Day’’, and its theme ‘‘Close the Care Gap’’, to raise awareness about and launch efforts to eliminate racial and ethnic inequities and disparities in cancer care both in the United States and globally.",Legislation,7.385587,5.054706,7.7962623
Separation from Service Account. Separation from Service Account means an Account established pursuant to a Participant’s Compensation Deferral Agreement that becomes effective and irrevocable on or after the Second Restatement Date and shall be payable as part of a Participant’s Separation from Service Benefit under Sections 6.1(a) and 6.2(a) and as otherwise provided under the terms of this Plan. The Participant’s Compensation Deferral Agreement that establishes a Separation from Service Account shall also designate a Payment Schedule that applies only to the Account Balance of such Account.,Contract,5.3668,4.7507424,6.026758
"Oncor claims that forcing refund of taxes for prior years poses no hardship for the taxing units since it only paid the sums not in dispute. The argument fails to comprehend how property taxes work. By July 25 of each year, appraisal districts are charged with certifying values to taxing units. TEX. TAX CODE § 26.01. Appraisal districts enter settlement agreements such as the one in question in order to reach certainty on the values they certify to the taxing units. Taxing units calculate their no new tax rate, voter approval rate, notices and ultimate tax rate to adopt based on those values and set their budgets accordingly. TEX. TAX CODE §§ 26.04, 26.05, 26.06, 26.07, 26.08 et al. The revenue is allocated and budgeted, and is an element of the tax rate regardless whether the property owner pays it.",Party Submissions,8.967955,9.16436,8.920112
"An Employee is a key employee if he or she meets the requirements of Code Section 416(i)(1)(A)(i), (ii), or (iii) (applied in accordance with applicable regulations thereunder and without regard to Code Section 416(i)(5)) at any time during the twelve (12) month period ending on the Specified Employee Identification Date. Such Employee shall be treated as a key employee for the entire twelve (12) month period beginning on the Specified Employee Effective Date.",Contract,3.7040198,3.8884842,4.579448
"Jurisdictional basis for this Petition is found in V.T.C.A., §22.001(a), because this appeal presents a question of law that is important to the jurisprudence of the state concerning jurisdiction over non-residents to answer for torts committed in Texas.",Party Submissions,7.577463,9.178124,9.225088
"Nor can Respondents reframe the court of appeals’ decision as the mere enforcement of a “voluntary agreement” by which Westwood abandoned its ultimate right to possess the premises or gave up its claims in district court (Resp. 21-22, 33)—because Westwood did no such thing. Respondents place great weight on the fact that Westwood did not merely dismiss its appeal in the forcible entry and detainer action, but further “affirmatively agree[d]” to the agreed judgment (Resp. 16). To Respondents, this makes the dismissal effective as a “Rule 11 agreement” ( id. 21, 28). They also insist that this supposed “agree[ment]” in the agreed judgment is far more critical to understanding the lower court’s decision of the court below than the agreed judgment’s legal effect as a “judgment.” (Resp. 20) But Westwood’s previous counsel agreed to that judgment only “AS TO FORM.” (DX43) Indeed, Respondents have taken inconsistent positions on whether this “Rule 11 agreement” actually exists (Resp. 33) and what it is supposed to do.",Party Submissions,10.263586,10.375755,10.491441
Payment Schedule. Payment Schedule means the date as of which payment of an Account under the Plan will commence and the form in which payment of such Account will be made.,Contract,14.43383,12.30903,20.35854
"McCarthy, the Owner and others as required by the Contract Documents shall be added as additional insureds for on-going and Completed Operations under Subcontractor's Commercial General Liability Policy. Coverage afforded to these additional insureds will be primary to and non-contributory with, any other insurance available to such additional insureds. The Commercial General Liability Policy additional insured coverage shall be provided on the combination of ISO Endorsement Form CG 20 10 04 13 and CG 20 37 04 13 or equivalent as determined and approved by McCarthy, and a copy of such endorsement shall be attached to the required Certificate of Insurance. Additional Insured Endorsements that limit coverage to less than what is required by this Subcontract will not be accepted unless otherwise limited by applicable law. Subcontractor will provide additional insured coverage to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law for the longer of ten (10) years after Substantial Completion of the Project or the statute of repose in the state in which the Project is located. Commercial General Liability policies shall contain endorsements waiving all rights of subrogation against all additional insureds.",Party Submissions,5.396879,4.8044395,5.6404705
To express the sense of the Senate regarding the constitu- tional right of State Governors to repel the dangerous ongoing invasion across the United States southern border.,Legislation,23.375212,19.989065,29.18889
"The Response does not make a serious attempt to defend the majority’s “subjectivity” analysis. Resp. 15-16. Instead, it falls back on its mistaken arguments that this case does not involve self-dealing. Resp. 16-18. Those arguments are unavailing. Supra 5-8.",Party Submissions,10.714651,11.722144,11.692843
"Convention Article 43(a); Arbitration Rule 38 18.1. Any person may present evidence as a witness, including a Party or a Party’s officer, employee, or other representative.",Legal Decisions,14.951795,15.951349,18.053286
"However, the Court notes that this presumption can be rebutted with evidence establishing a lack of intent to make a gift. Id. In other words, the Court permitted the admission of parol evidence to rebut the specific terms of the deed transferring title to the property. The evidence showed that the husband relied on his lawyer to draft the paperwork to buy out the brother’s interest in the land. Id. Further, the trial court found that the method of transfer was a means of convenience to complete the purchase. Husband testified that no intent to make a gift was intended. Id. Therefore, the presumption of gift was rebutted. Id.",Party Submissions,7.5522413,7.928222,8.126716
"Finally, in the alternative, the Delapenas ask for an opportunity to amend their pleadings to allege a premises defect claim based on evidence “ that the City has [since] placed a lifeguard chair directly over where Catiana drowned.” We address each theory of liability and whether it fits within the TTCA’s waiver of immunity.",Party Submissions,19.385036,23.708954,25.706182
"Although the TWCA's waiver of defenses is intended to encourage employers to subscribe to the workers' compensation system, the ""especially punitive litigation regime for non-subscribing employers."" HN9 [ ] Absent intentional misconduct, employees still must prove all the elements of a common law negligence claim to prevail against nonsubscribing employers. ""In other words,"" as the Fifth Circuit observed in this [*8] case, TWCA ""section 406.033(a)(1)-(3) may limit an employer's defenses, but it does not eliminate an employee's burden to establish his common law claim."" This burden, of course, includes the burden to prove that a defendant had a duty to the plaintiff, which is the issue that our general rule and exceptions address.",Party Submissions,9.082793,9.021298,9.581368
"TDCC warrants that all product purchased from TDCC by a UCC Member hereunder shall meet the specifications set forth in Exhibit A. THE FOREGOING IS TDCC'S SOLE WARRANTY REGARDING PRODUCTS AND SERVICES SUPPLIED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, AND IS MADE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF AND EXCLUDES ANY AND ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND ALL OTHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION THOSE PROVIDED BY STATUTE OR COMMON LAW. TDCC MAKES NO OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH RESPECT TO THE PRODUCTS OR SERVICES SUPPLIED HEREUNDER. EACH UCC MEMBER, WITH RESPECT TO ANY PRODUCT RECEIVED BY SUCH UCC MEMBER HEREUNDER, ASSUMES ALL RISK, RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY RESULTING FROM THE USE OR APPLICATION OF SUCH PRODUCT, AND TDCC SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY OR RESPONSIBILITY WHATSOEVER FOR THE USE OR APPLICATION OF ANY SUCH PRODUCT.",Contract,2.9983282,2.1582632,3.1593964
"For the avoidance of doubt, Claimant notes that its readiness to limit its request in this matter is not to be construed as an acceptance of all of Respondent’s objections regarding the Request. Further the Claimant herein reserves its right to request the production of any such Documents at a later stage after the Respondent has had the opportunity to respond to the allegations.",Legal Decisions,9.796039,9.282198,9.969571
"Here, under the fourth version of events, Mann was walking to his vehicle to avoid the discomfort of being soaked by rain, which was incident to his work out of doors at the refinery. See Lujan v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Tex. 1988) (finding, as a matter of law, that where an employee was soaked in gas and paint due to his job and was injured when he went to take a bath to resolve his “personal discomfort,” the injured employee remained within course and scope at the time of his injury). Even assuming the fourth version to be true, the personal comfort doctrine favors the conclusion that Mann is not excluded from course and scope for simply trying to escape the rain. See id.",Party Submissions,10.16484,11.004011,12.191678
"To begin, “incidental” is generally understood to refer to something that is not the major issue or primary part of something. As one dictionary explains, incidental can mean “accompanying but not a major part of something,” or “occurring by chance in connection with something else,” or, in reference to expenses, “an incidental detail, expense, event, etc.: an allowance to cover meals, taxis, and other incidentals .” Incidental, New Oxford American Dictionary 878 (Stevenson & Lindberg, 3d ed. 2010) In the last example, the trip itself and maybe a conference or meeting is the major, primary event; expenses related to food and travel are incidental, in that they occur only because the conference or meeting is occurring and are insignificant in relation to the main event.",Party Submissions,8.928418,8.880831,9.278782
"In re Holcomb, a companion case, held that a candidate for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was “entitled to an opportunity to cure and be included on the primary ballot” where his petition included duplicative signatures that the candidate could have remedied. 186 S.W.3d 553, 554-55 (Tex. 2006). As this Court explained, duplicative signatures made the petition invalid, “but the Election Code”—then as now—“does not mandate that the candidate therefore be punished by exclusion from the ballot.” Id. at 555; see also In re Sharp, 186 S.W.3d 556, 557 (Tex. 2006) (similar).",Party Submissions,4.8555675,5.426916,5.1068606
"B.The trial court lacked jurisdiction because Oncor failed to exhaust administrative remedies Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, and failure to do so deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. Webb County Appraisal Dist. v. New Laredo Hotel, 792 S.W.2d 952, 954–55 (Tex.1990). Where protests or motions before the ARB are dismissed without hearing the merits. Under Tex. Tax Code §41.45(f), which provides that where a property owner is denied a hearing before an Appraisal Review Board to which it is otherwise entitled may sue that ARB directly for an order compelling it to provide that hearing. This would have been the proper avenue for Oncor to follow, but it did not. Such suits, moreover, must be brought within 60 days of receiving notice of the ARB’s action. Unified Housing of Parkside Crossing, LLC v. Appraisal Rev. Bd. of Williamson Cnty., No.",Party Submissions,6.646244,6.8041005,6.640498
Arbitration Rule 38 19.1. A Party may be called upon by the opposing Party to produce at the hearing for cross-examination any factual or expert witness whose written testimony has been advanced with the Pleadings.,Legal Decisions,14.010366,13.572097,15.588551
"To require the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to establish procedures and reporting requirements for incidents relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.4081383,6.8053503,6.756167
"Petitioners misread the Romero opinion. In Romero, plaintiff sued a hospital, two physicians, and a nurse for injuries caused by a negligently delayed blood transfusion. 10 The liability theories against the hospital included both (i) negligence and (ii) malice in credentialing a surgeon. The jury found all parties at fault and were required to apportion fault between all parties. 11 On appeal, it was determined that no evidence supported the credentialing claim.12 The hospital argued that harmful error mandated reversal under Casteel because the jury was allowed to consider the legally unsupported credentialing facts when determining how much fault to apportion to the hospital.13 This Court in Romero agreed and held that 7 Mot., p. 7. 8 Mot., p. 7-8. 9 Id. 10 166 S.W.3d at 219. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 220. 13 Id. at 225-26.",Party Submissions,6.415319,6.48199,6.8870163
"One of the excerpts presented in exhibit R-043 is an excerpt from a sketch ( in Serbian: skica ) allegedly prepared based “ upon request 952-02-6-74/2004 ”. This excerpt includes a note “ Owner of the Buildings: ‘Obnova’JSC, Belgrade Dunavska St., 17 -19.”54 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess which authority prepared the sketch and determined that Obnova is the owner of the buildings depicted therein.",Legal Decisions,27.610098,25.299742,24.733244
Any and all minutes and recordings from all meetings of the Planning Commission of the Assembly of the City of Belgrade during which the 2015 DRP was discussed by the Commission.,Legal Decisions,21.929739,19.905577,22.024895
"The Court ultimately awarded Husband the bonus he received for his work performed in 2019, but paid in February 2020, as his separate property. Id.",Party Submissions,10.639098,15.490044,17.978922
The District Court denied Coinbase's motion to compel arbitration. Coinbase then filed an interlocutory appeal to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a).1 Section 16(a) authorizes **1919 an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration.,Party Submissions,3.2752922,3.7715788,3.4874806
"Instead of engaging directly with these arguments, Barina takes the nonexistent “endorsement” ball and runs with it. Petitioners’ opening Brief emphasizes that the Program’s alleged defamatory sting—that Barina “exploited” Thrash’s estate—is made principally during interviews with Ross and Martinez (in fact, the word “exploit” comes from Ross himself) and that is why the third-party-allegation rule applies. Pet. Br. at 24. Barina ignores Petitioners’ arguments, instead spending four pages discussing the ways in which the Program endorsed, or at a minimum “never challenged,” statements by Ross and Martinez, by citing nebulously the “editing” of the report, the name of the entire sixteen-episode series (Dirty Money), the song in the credits of the entire series, and even the commentary from an expert who is not referencing Barina in any way. Resp. Br. at 20, 25, 33. All of those arguments are designed to bolster an endorsement rule that simply does not exist. There is no rule that requires Petitioners to evaluate or comment on Ross and Martinez’s allegations at all. That is the whole point of the third-party-allegation rule—that Petitioners need not decide whether Ross and Martinez are correct, they just need to accurately report what they said. Gallaher v. Denton Media Co., Inc., No. 02-21-00164-CV, 2022 WL 2071779, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 9, 2022, no pet.) (holding that media defendants seeking rule’s protections only have to prove accurate reporting of allegations, not allegations’ underlying truth). The core concept behind the rule is that oftentimes it is the fact of the allegation being made that makes it newsworthy. Because Barina has not even attempted to contest whether Ross and Martinez’s allegations were accurately portrayed, the third-party-allegation rule applies without qualification.",Party Submissions,8.010653,8.256886,8.305729
"An Employee who is absent from work due to military leave, sick leave, or other bona fide leave of absence shall incur a Separation from Service on the first (1st) date immediately following the later of: (i) the six (6) month anniversary of the commencement of the leave; or (ii) the expiration of the Employee’s right, if any, to reemployment under statute or contract. Notwithstanding the preceding, however, an Employee who is absent from work due to a physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of at least six (6) months and that prevents the Employee from performing the duties of his position of employment or a similar position shall incur a Separation from Service on the first (1st) date immediately following the twenty-ninth (29) month anniversary of the commencement of the leave.",Contract,2.9861095,3.5035832,3.4616125
"For the avoidance of any doubt, Claimants also reiterate their general objection to production of any documents covered by privilege under the legal or ethical rules.",Legal Decisions,15.151161,16.802433,21.443403
"Nonetheless, a course and scope determination would not rob the trial court of jurisdiction under these facts, it would simply determine whether Bay is a non-subscriber under the Act and whether it waives its common-law defenses pursuant to section 406.033 of the Texas Labor Code, at trial.",Party Submissions,11.949555,16.352787,13.705525
"Appellant benefits claimant challenged a decision from the 272nd District Court, Brazos County, Texas, which granted appellee carrier's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in a case involving the payment of attorney's fees in a workers' compensation case.",Party Submissions,7.3420587,6.0237503,6.525552
"Division's administrative scheme for the award of attorney's fees to a claimant's attorney, and it provides in pertinent part: HN9 [ ] (a) An attorney's fee, including a contingency fee, for representing a claimant before the division or court under this subtitle must be approved by the commissioner or court.",Party Submissions,9.951337,11.209262,13.879774
This Promissory Note shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York without regard to its provisions concerning conflicts of law that would require the application of the laws of any other jurisdiction.,Contract,2.965151,2.971143,3.3830206
Article 10 This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.,Legislation,2.4029808,2.4638128,2.9856083
"Trinity East Energy, LLC (Trinity) held leases for mineral rights under approximately 2,000 acres of land in the City of Dallas (Dallas), along with surface rights to three areas (Surface Tracts) for potential mineral extraction. At the time of these leases, Dallas required a special use permit (SUP) for drilling. In addition to the Surface Tracts in Dallas, Trinity also held ownership or possessory interests in other properties in Farmers Branch and Irving which were properly entitled to extract minerals beneath Trinity’s leased areas. Trinity applied for but was denied the SUPs to drill from the Surface Tracts. Consequently, Trinity filed a lawsuit, arguing among other things that Dallas’ refusal to grant the SUPs for the Surface Tracts amounted to a regulatory taking of its property, including the entire 2,000-acre mineral estate.",Party Submissions,6.1545386,5.8373466,6.1908126
"Texas’ jurisprudence is also currently in line with other states – deviating from it absent express Legislative intent is not necessary. See, e.g., Collins Asset Group, LLC v. Alialy, 139 N.E.3d 712 (Ind. 2020)(multiple accrual dates for cause of action with optional acceleration clause); City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 237 (Utah 1991) (“when a junior becomes unsecured due to foreclosure by the senior lienor, the junior is not barred by the one-action rule from proceeding against the debtor on the note”); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Holden, 60 N.E.3d 1243 (Ohio 2016)(action on note and action on mortgage are separate and distinct remedies); Kepler v. Slade, 896 P.2d 482, 485 (New Mex. 1995)(in the absence of a “one action” rule statute, suit on note and foreclosure action may be filed separately at mortgagee’s option).",Party Submissions,7.5598493,7.4838815,7.688345
"Dr. Tappan likewise failed to explain factually any link between the claimed “asphyxia event” Dr. Null identified and the eventual subacute infarction. (CR.670). These omissions also may not be supplied by inference. Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 556. As the Court of Appeals appropriately noted, Dr. Tappan said nothing specific about how claimed breaches by Dr. Castillo proximately caused H.W. to suffer a large subacute infarction involving the majority of his left cerebral hemisphere—the event Dr. Tappan indicated caused H.W’s long-term impairments. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *4. (CR.670).",Party Submissions,10.585629,13.982692,12.77737
"Relator, East Texas Medical Center Athens (ETMC Athens), filed this original proceeding to challenge Respondent's order striking its designation of responsible third parties.1 We deny the writ.",Party Submissions,11.408374,21.217108,22.754026
"The Walkers classify the Court of Appeals’ criticisms of Dr. Tappan’s and Dr. Null’s reports as an inappropriate extension of Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson. It’s not. The Court of Appeals wrote that, although both experts “proffered a litany of allegedly deficient conduct, they failed to explain how and why each caused, within reasonable medical probability, [H.W.’s] eventual subacute infarction before birth.” Walker, 2022 WL 17324388 at *5. The Walkers interpret that sentence as a new requirement that experts opine that each individual act of each provider proximately caused the outcome. (Pet. Br. at 26). Not so.",Party Submissions,12.715606,13.053191,13.689559
"TADA respectfully requests the Court to grant the Petitioner’s motion for rehearing and petition for review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, and remand for further proceedings.",Party Submissions,8.065119,8.811913,9.592224
"This document complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of Rule 9.4(i)(2)(B) because it contains 2775 words, excluding any parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,3.6234827,4.789708,5.360325
"Arbitrators’ fees and expenses Prof. Diego P. Fernández Arroyo USD 432,615.92 Mr. Christian Leathley USD 228,049.60 Prof. Marcelo Kohen USD 276,243.74 ICSID’s administrative fees USD 262,000.00 Direct expenses USD 214,385.12 Total 584. The above arbitration costs have been paid out of the advances made by the Parties in equal parts.",Legal Decisions,9.788629,8.992416,10.475242
"Section 10. Funding. The Plan, as a “severance pay arrangement” within the meaning of Section 3(2)(B)(i) of ERISA, is intended to be, and shall be administered and maintained as, an unfunded welfare benefit plan within the meaning of Section 3(1) of ERISA. This Plan is a “top hat” plan that is available to a select group of management. The Plan shall not be funded through a trust, an insurance contract or otherwise, and all benefit payments under the Plan shall be made from the general assets of the Company. Accordingly, a Participant shall not have any claim against specific assets of Company, and shall be only a general creditor, with respect to any rights the Participant may have under the Plan. All expenses and costs in connection with the operation of the Plan shall be borne by Company.",Contract,4.2233467,4.556908,4.636999
This Court ultimately held that the appellate court erred in upholding the denial of Richmont’s motion to compel on a ground that was not presented to the trial court.,Party Submissions,8.750015,9.309787,9.663838
"In any event, to the extent the Court of Appeals did require the experts to address each of the litany of alleged departures, that was nothing new or improper in a case with multiple defendants. See, e.g., Intra-Op Monitoring Svcs., LLC v. Causey, No. 09-12-00050-CV, 2012 WL 2849281 at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, July 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]hen a plaintiff sues more than one defendant, the expert report must set forth the standard of care applicable to each defendant and explain the causal relationship between each defendant’s individual acts and the injury.”) (emphasis added); and Conner v. Patrick, No. 12-10-00405-CV, 2012 WL 1264464 at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler, Apr. 30, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same).",Party Submissions,4.059992,4.2437687,4.0913196
"I acknowledge that the subject matter of the protest filed on the above date concerning the property described above has been settled. I hereby withdraw my protest and waive my right to any further proceedings in this matter. Describe actions to be taken: 2019 Total Value for Wilbarger Co. for 2019 -$55,068,090. As Oncor has acknowledged, the subject of the protest was the value of Oncor’s transmission lines. What might be ambiguous about the § 1.111(e) agreement defies imagination.",Party Submissions,15.792122,16.067892,17.228489
"Korean Government should fail to comply with any court order as Lone Star asserts, the Korean judiciary will no doubt be able to address such non-compliance.",Legal Decisions,21.098526,30.237154,36.403706
"Legal Action. A Claimant may not bring any legal action, including commencement of any arbitration, relating to a claim for benefits under the Plan unless and until the Claimant has followed the claims procedures under the Plan and exhausted his or her administrative remedies under such claims procedures.",Contract,5.3741817,6.2396417,7.119724
"That passage perfectly encapsulates the court of appeals’ fundamental error— and the confusion that Respondents continue to sew before this Court: Both erroneously equate Westwood’s decision to turn over immediate possession of the premises with the abandonment of any right of possession Westwood ever had in the premises—regardless of Westwood’s reasons for leaving. But the reasons are everything in a constructive-eviction action. After all, a claim of wrongful eviction requires an “eviction”—indeed, Respondents admit that the tenant must “abandon[] the property within a reasonable time” to maintain such a claim. (Resp. 22, quoting Op. 5 n.3) But as Westwood has explained, and Respondents again ignore, it is the reason behind the abandonment that determines the viability of a claim for wrongful eviction: The tenant who simply abandons the leased premises because it wants to, or because it recognizes it has no claim of right to stay there, has no claim. See Kemp v. Brenham, No. 05-18-01377-CV, 2020 WL 205313 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).",Party Submissions,7.3380847,7.834111,7.8347297
"Petitioner respectfully prays that its petition for review be granted, that the court of appeals’ judgment be reversed, and that the case be remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings.",Party Submissions,3.7722483,3.8047037,4.0952764
"Account paid in annual installments, determined and paid in accordance with Section 6.2(f), over a period of two (2) to five (5) years, as elected by the Participant.",Contract,9.418993,9.984229,12.479781
"We REVERSE the trial court’s judgment awarding appellee H A O $311,788.24 as his separate property interest in his Bank of America 401(k) retirement account. We REMAND to the trial court for reconsideration of a just and right division in accordance with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED .",Party Submissions,6.2194195,7.9045997,7.5007215
"Petitioner argues that Respondent’s case was time -barred because 1) the plain language of Section 51.003(a) renders it applicable to Respondent; 2) the Mandarino and Hays decisions were incorrect, or at least distinguishable; and 3) the foreclosure was the date that Respondent’s cause of action accrued. The Court of Appeals correctly rejected each of these arguments.",Party Submissions,8.048824,7.6490135,8.431603
"In General. Notice of a denial of benefits (other than Disability Benefits) will be provided within ninety (90) days of the Committee’s receipt of the Claimant’s claim for benefits. If the Committee determines that it needs additional time to review the claim, the Committee will provide the Claimant with a notice of the extension before the end of the initial ninety (90) day period. The extension will not be more than ninety (90) days from the end of the initial ninety (90) day period and the notice of extension will explain the special circumstances that require the extension and the date by which the Committee expects to make a decision.",Contract,2.7940164,3.2034814,3.1164021
Weatherford claims that it satisfied this advance notice requirement as its ‘notice’ was issued before filing this claim. This is a misinterpretation of the court’s holding—a cost-recovery plaintiff should notify the defendant prior to initiation of remediation. A demand letter sent two decades after the initial remedial action began is not reasonable notice.,Party Submissions,19.68542,20.15677,20.402782
"WHEREAS, the Company has agreed to grant to the Participant an Award of Performance Share Units (each, as defined below), subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this Award Agreement.",Contract,4.996859,4.712044,6.1704855
"I refer to the agreed minutes from the meeting between you and the Minister of Fisheries Elisabeth Aspaker on 17 July in Malta, and the agreement between us that sedentary species in the Barents Sea, including snow crab, are subject Norwegian and Russian management competence in accordance with Article 77 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.",Legal Decisions,10.397361,13.920267,10.170718
"Section 9. Administration. The Severance Committee of MSC, shall be the plan administrator (the “Plan Administrator”). The Plan Administrator shall be responsible for the overall operation and administration of the Plan. The Plan Administrator may appoint or employ such persons as it, he or she may deem necessary to render advice with respect to any responsibility of the Company or the Plan Administrator under the Plan. The Plan Administrator shall have the exclusive discretionary power and authority to interpret the terms of the Plan and to decide all questions concerning the operation and administration of the Plan including, without limitation, the eligibility of any person to participate in the Plan, the determination whether a Qualifying Termination under the Plan has occurred, the right to and amount of any benefit payable under the Plan to any individual and the date on which any individual ceases to be a Plan Participant. The Plan Administrator’s decisions hereunder shall be final and binding on all Participants and all other persons interested or claiming any interest under the Plan. The Plan Administrator may allocate to any one or more of the Company’s associates any responsibility it may have under the Plan and may designate any other person or persons to carry out any of its responsibilities under the Plan; provided, however, that the Plan Administrator shall not allocate or designate any responsibility with respect to a Participant who is an “officer” of the Company, within the meaning of Section 16(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Section 16”), who is subject to the filing requirements of Section 16.",Contract,3.581001,3.6491914,3.58984
"As noted in the introduction, this case primarily revolves around Terry’s decision not to designate a person an RTP until Terry could gather more information about him. In fact, this is the only alleged negligent act at issue in HSMiller’s Cross-Petition and Brief.1 The potential RTP was James Flaven, whose company contracted to buy commercial real estate from a real estate consortium (the “BNC Sellers”). (6RR198; 17RR55, 90, 125, 160, 195, 230, 270, 300 (PX5-11)) While HSMiller’s statement of facts presents this RTP decision as a straightforward, “no brainer” determination, the decision was a complex strategy call for Terry and his firm.",Party Submissions,16.891296,15.6364765,17.4898
Under the family code there is a presumption that property possessed by either spouse at the dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be community property.,Party Submissions,6.356832,7.971587,7.9302225
"In the first place, the facts in Willacy are egregious in the extreme. Therein, Willacy County Appraisal District (Willacy CAD) appraised a quantity of grain in the name of Sebastian. Sebastian protested, contending that the grain was really owned by DeBruce, and signed a §1.111(e) agreement with Willacy CAD to the effect that Sebastian was not the owner. Ultimately, it was determined that Sebastian really did own the grain, not DeBruce. When Willacy CAD again appraised the grain in Sebastian’s name, Sebastian used its fraudulently obtained § 1.111(e) agreement to assert that Willacy CAD was barred from contested the agreed upon ownership. Willacy at 33-34. In other words, Sebastian was using its own fraud as shield and sword to facilitate its further fraud.",Party Submissions,8.6570015,7.7990007,8.814203
B) The Claimant’s position 228. Claimant rejects Respondent’s interpretation of Article XVII(2) of Annex III of the Treaty.,Legal Decisions,18.173883,12.994412,13.653541
"After a hearing on the motions (RR.1-42), the trial court signed a written order denying defendants’ motions. (CR.1318).",Party Submissions,14.386812,17.827847,20.566465
"Ninguna reclamación puede someterse a arbitraje conforme a esta Sección a menos que: (a) el demandante consienta por escrito someterse al arbitraje, de conformidad con los procedimientos previstos en este Tratado; y (b) la solicitud de arbitraje esté acompañada: (i) de la renuncia por escrito del demandante a las reclamaciones sometidas a arbitraje en virtud de este Artículo; y (ii) de las renuncias por escrito del demandante y de la empresa a las reclamaciones sometidas a arbitraje en virtud de este Artículo; de cualquier derecho a iniciar ante cualquier tribunal judicial o administrativo conforme a la ley de cualquier Parte, u otros procedimientos de solución de controversias, cualquier actuación respecto de cualquier medida que se alegue haber constituido una violación a las que se refiere este Artículo.",Legal Decisions,4.2782907,5.30199,4.983181
"To amend title 18, United States Code, to revise recidivist penalty provisions for child sexual exploitation offenses to uniformly account for prior military convictions, thereby ensuring parity among Federal, State, and military convictions, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.203044,6.1857295,6.3001966
"Code Section 409A. Code Section 409A means section 409A of the Code, and regulations and other guidance issued by the Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service thereunder.",Contract,3.5312395,3.3463566,5.052058
"On October 22, 2020, MVP sued McCarthy in the District Court for Tulsa County, Oklahoma, pursuant to a forum-selection clause in the MCC, asserting, among other claims, that McCarthy is liable for RLB’s additional costs. Five days later, RLB filed its original petition, in Harris County, against MVP, alleging MVP is liable for RLB’s additional costs. RLB amended its petition in the Texas case by adding McCarthy and Travelers as defendants on October 30, 2022.",Party Submissions,5.4437475,5.64004,6.0240703
The court of appeals correctly applied Section 74.351 and this Court’s precedent in determining the expert reports were insufficient as to BSA.,Party Submissions,15.418786,16.048035,23.10323
"To extend the authorization of certain grants to the governments of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.860284,4.412792,5.367593
"Date of Payment under Modified Payment Schedule. Except with respect to modifications that relate to the payment of a Death Benefit or a Disability Benefit, the date payments are to commence under the modified Payment Schedule must be no earlier than five (5) years after the date payment would have commenced under the original Payment Schedule. Under no circumstances may a modification election result in an acceleration of payments in violation of Code Section 409A.",Contract,6.915722,5.6688337,8.793459
"After providing an extensive case history, Dr. Tappan detailed Dr. Castillo’s multiple deviations from the applicable standard of care during H.W .’s delivery. These criticisms fell in into three main categories: (1) Dr. Castillo’s failure to perform a cesarian section or consider an operative vaginal delivery when Mrs. Walker’s labor arrested in the second stage at 15:15; (2) Dr. Castillo’s failure to recognize the signs that H.W. had low oxygen induced brain injury, which led her to mismanage labor and delay delivery even after she realized labor was not progressing at 15:52; and (3) Dr. Castillo’s failure to use the correct procedure when she ultimately delivered H.W. at 17.01.",Party Submissions,7.6321177,8.244308,8.161913
"The City of Midland (“Midland” or the “City”) generally agrees with Weatherford’s statement of the case, with the exception of Weatherford International, LLC and Weatherford U.S., L.P.’s (collectively, “Weatherford’s”) mischaracterization of the Trial Court’s grant of Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction. Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction was properly granted because Midland offered dispositive evidence that Weatherford failed to rebut, and thus Weatherford could not show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. As such, the Trial Court appropriately concluded that Midland retains its governmental immunity, and the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (the “SWDA”) does not waive such governmental immunity. The domestic sewage exclusion was a secondary and additional basis for the Trial Court’s granting of Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, but it was not the exclusive basis for such ruling. Thus, there was no need to determine whether an exception to a statute applied when Weatherford failed to trigger the Trial Court’s threshold jurisdictional requirements under that very statute.",Party Submissions,5.3072453,5.327261,5.4571204
"Following Orazul’s investment in Cerros Colorados, the Government adopted additional Measures that were inconsistent with the Electricity Law and increasingly interfered with Cerros Colorado. Throughout its adoption of these Measures, however, the Government continued reassuring power generators that the original market-based rules would be restored.",Legal Decisions,26.389832,29.338287,30.135815
"Weatherford states that the City cannot “naively claim it expected 100% compliance with its limitations on sewer discharges,” but fails to acknowledge that violations of ordinances by a third party are hardly foreseeable. Compare Brief at 50 with Nguyen v. SXSW Holdings, Inc., 580 S.W.3d 774, 785 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (”Defendants could negate the existence of a duty by conclusively establishing that the Plaintiffs’ injuries arose from criminal conduct and that the criminal conduct was not foreseeable.”). To analogize this to another common municipal function, regulation and control of traffic,15 a city that installs and maintains traffic lights and prohibits by ordinance the running of red lights is not liable for damages that occur from drivers who run the red lights. To require a strict liability standard for the simple ownership of traffic lights, or the ownership of a sewer system, would create an unnecessarily burdensome liability scheme for regularly-immune governmental entities. The operation and maintenance of a sewer system by a city is a well-established governmental function, and to hold such city liable for third party actions which are prohibited by law would improperly expand the scope of the SWDA and go beyond the intent of the Texas Legislature for this statute.",Party Submissions,8.380456,8.707783,8.677266
"WHEREAS, the Agent and the Borrower wish to amend Section 13.2(a) of the Credit Agreement pursuant to Section 13.1(c).",Contract,5.088223,5.0083065,7.521907
"Article 9 Member States shall, by 30 April of each year, submit to the Commission and the other Member States a report on the measures taken during the preceding calendar year, and on their results, pursuant to Articles 2 to 8.",Legislation,4.037453,5.1986485,4.7245216
"The common law operates very differently than statute law. It is, as is universally recognized, is a living thing. It changes over time, as different applications are considered by different courts in the light of particular conditions. The ability of the courts to tailor common law principles to changes in the circumstances in which they are applied is one of its great strengths. But statute law is different. Statutes generally concern themselves with specific situations, where what’s needed is a clearly stated rule that doesn’t stretch, not to be changed until the Legislature changes it. That is the great strength of statute law. In other words, common law is fluid: statute law is stiff.",Party Submissions,10.832346,10.182214,10.535069
"On the one hand, Respondents insist that because the agreed judgment functions as a “Rule 11 agreement, ” it must be interpreted as a contract and cannot be contradicted by any evidence “outside the bound s ” of the agreed judgment itself — including the otherwise-undisputed evidence of Respondents’ interference with Westwood’s right to possess the premises underlying its constructive-eviction claim. (Resp. 28-29, quoting Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 651 n.58 (Tex. 2007)) Yet on th e other, Respondents insist that Westwood’s supposedly “voluntary” “Rule 11 agreement ” only matters “as evidence that [Westwood] left voluntarily.” (Resp. 33 -34) But either way, this supposed “agreement” does not mitigate the plain violation of Texas law that the court of appeals committed in this case.",Party Submissions,9.790456,9.614259,10.167829
"This Court held in Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 SW2d 61 (Tex. 1983), that: When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence. ...The test for the application of this no evidence/scintilla rule is that if reasonable minds cannot differ from the conclusion that the evidence offered to support the existence of a vital fact lacks probative force, it will be held to be the legal equivalent of no evidence. However, there is some evidence, more than a scintilla, if the evidence furnishes some reasonable basis for differing conclusions by reasonable minds as to the existence of the vital fact. At 63. That is clearly the case here.",Party Submissions,4.291165,6.8723164,5.7047863
To amend the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act to use funds in the lump sum catch-up payment reserve fund to make payments to Iran hostages and their families.,Legislation,12.061365,8.673066,10.866058
"Like the intermediate opinions in Abshire and E.D., then, the intermediate opinion here improperly relied on common-law legal sufficiency standards when it demanded that the Walkers’ experts preemptively explain “why an act transpiring some six or more hours before the occurrence of harm was not too attenuated to the eventual harm.” Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *4.",Party Submissions,18.760935,20.204212,20.059929
"The description of a benefit review conference is set forth in Section 410.021 of the Workers' Compensation Act. The Section reads, in its entirety: A benefit review conference is a nonadversarial, informal dispute resolution proceeding designed to: (1) explain, orally and in writing, the rights of the respective parties to a workers' compensation claim and the procedures necessary to protect those rights; (2) discuss the facts of the claim, review available information in order to evaluate the claim, and delineate the disputed issues; and (3) mediate and resolve disputed issues by agreement of the parties in [*17] accordance with this subtitle and the policies of the division.",Party Submissions,5.901993,6.7698565,6.2821646
"R: No se ha emitido, es correcto, porque se encuentran en valoración todas las pruebas que ha presentado la empresa CALICA. P: ¿Por 15 meses? ¿Es muy difícil de evaluar esa prueba, señor Vilchis? R: Debido a la extensión, en este caso más de 900 hectáreas; debido al cambio de uso de suelo, a las especies que se ha afectado y sobre todo al tipo de ecosistema y a la cantidad de arbolado que se removió, sí requiere ese tiempo para poder analizar las pruebas.",Party Submissions,10.595067,16.804115,12.332723
"Finally, there was no negligence here, much less gross negligence. And the “evidence” HSMiller presented to support both negligence and gross negligence is nothing more than conclusory testimony.",Party Submissions,13.492542,15.585028,17.734394
"Request No. 7 is granted insofar as the Respondent shall provide the Claimant with the document(s) regarding the decision(s) to place and maintain the Claimant under house arrest between July 1, 2020 and October 31, 2020. The Request is dismissed in all other parts, which are unspecific and not substantiated for the purpose of preparing the Claimant’s forthcoming Memorial, and for the determination of the allegations contained therein in support of the Claimant’s claims. The Tribunal further notes that some of these other parts appear to relate to other matters, such as “detention”, “sentences”, and “travel documentation”.",Legal Decisions,9.653388,8.63717,8.267734
"In contrast, Rafiei's sales contract unambiguously adopts the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, specifying a detailed fee structure. Such explicit terms offer a clear picture of Rafiei's financial obligation, making it distinguishable from the ambiguity presented in Shattenkirk .",Party Submissions,23.283638,23.940525,30.532764
"In the event that Bay is relying on the policies themselves to constitute the required written agreement, it should “go without saying” that the policies themselves don't qualify as the “written agreement” because they are contracts between an insurance company and its insured and not an agreement between general contractors and subcontractors as required under a plain reading of Tex. Lab. Code § 406.123.",Party Submissions,10.926159,12.434513,14.115459
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. The plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively establish the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction.,Party Submissions,2.938983,3.3197114,3.7098002
"A report that states the expert’s opinion in a conclusory manner is not a good faith effort to comply with the TMLA. Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P. v. Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d 453, 459-60 (Tex. 2017); Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). A conclusory report is one that offers no basis, or whose basis is unsupported by the facts. Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 536 (Tex. 2010) (quoting City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. 2009)). Courts are precluded from filling gaps in a report by drawing inferences or guessing as to what the expert likely meant or intended. See Bowie Mem’l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 53; Austin Heart, P.A. v. Webb, 228 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (holding the court may not “draw[] inferences or guess[] as to what the expert likely meant or intended”). The expert must do more than “provide[] insight” about the plaintiff’s claims and should instead provide a basis for his statements and tie his conclusions to the facts. Bowie Mem’l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 52. Causation must be clearly stated and cannot be inferred. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878.",Party Submissions,3.7792032,4.066425,4.304108
"Any and all responses to the objections submitted during the public insight period for the 2013 DRP, which were provided by the Public Urban Planning Company “Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade” to the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction, including but not limited to the revised responses provided in accordance with the conclusions of the City Assembly of Belgrade’s Planning Commission from the 251st session held on 7 February 2013.",Legal Decisions,11.589536,10.267289,11.094985
Claimants have conducted a reasonable search for any responsive documents and confirm that no responsive documents are in their possession and control.,Legal Decisions,12.076639,17.141665,18.657537
"The court of appeals dismissed Petitioners’ claims, denying them a chance to plead a premises defect claim. Relying on Sampson, the court held the TTCA permitted claims for physical defects only. The court then went further and held that, notwithstanding the TTCA, the City could not be liable for failing to protect patrons from the natural perils of swimming at its pool by enforcing its own safety rules.",Party Submissions,10.407818,9.875175,11.166386
"Four, the merits of RLB’s bond and prompt-payment claims need not be determined by a Texas court. Cf. Matl Constr. Co. v. Jim Connelly Masonry, Inc., No.",Party Submissions,23.38335,33.26668,35.533184
"In concluding its opinion, the Court held the experts’ reports were deficient because “they failed to explain how and why each [defendant] caused, within reasonabl[e] medical probability, [H.W.’s] eventual subacute infarction....” Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *5. The Court then stated, “[t]o the extent that the trial court held otherwise, it abused its discretion.” Id. (emphasis added). Although E.D. holds that “[c]lose calls go to the trial court” in reviews under an abuse of discretion standard,6 this was not a close call; both experts either provided only conclusory, ipse dixit opinions, or they failed to provide causation opinions (both cause in fact and foreseeability) for any alleged standard-of-care breach. To the extent the trial court thought these types of opinions satisfied the statute, respectfully, it did fail to follow guiding rules and principles and did abuse its discretion.",Party Submissions,9.5749655,10.003742,10.274121
"On February 12, 2020, the trial court held ahearing in which Wife asked the trial court to order Husband to tender to the court’s registry any bonus money he \ recejved pending the court’s ruling on the characterization of the bonus. Wife anticipated Husband would receive abonus, if any, on February 15, 2020.",Party Submissions,9.492978,11.276161,10.61007
"The other cases cited by the Walkers are readily distinguishable because the reports in those cases provided significantly more causal explanation than the reports do here. In Miller v. JSC Lake Highland Operations, LP, the health care provider did not notice a dental bridge in the patient’s airway shown on an x-ray. 536 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. 2017). This finding on the x-ray was readily tied to “foreign body aspiration,” the cause of death listed on the autopsy report. Id. There was a direct connection between the aspiration due to a foreign body and the x-ray showing a foreign body in the airway. In Abshire v. Christus Health Southeast Texas, the expert faulted the providers for not noting the patient’s brittle bone disease in her medical history. 563 S.W.3d 219, 224-25 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam). This failure was problematic because had it been provided, the patient would have been placed on bed rest in such a way to alleviate pressure of the spine such that her compression fracture would not have progressed, which would have prevented paraplegia. Id. Unlike here, the expert explained what would have happened had the nurses reported clinically relevant information and why it would have made a difference.5 Id. at 224.",Party Submissions,7.386289,7.555255,7.822325
"The Martinez Family insists that Bruno was not yet a Hellas employee at the time of his injury, arguing that Bruno had applied for a position but had not yet been hired and emphasizing that Hellas itself initially denied Bruno's status as an employee when it learned of the injury. Notwithstanding the status of Bruno's employment application and its early statements on the subject, Hellas now characterizes Bruno as an employee when he sustained the fatal injuries.",Party Submissions,12.699787,11.726915,13.808269
"Alternatively, and only after this court deems coverage available somehow, *8 and if this court then deems the several versions of Mann's activities on the morning of his accident as constituting admissible summary judgement evidence, then and only then is the court presented with a bona fide fact question regarding course and scope as an affirmative defense. Several versions of course and scope fail to conclusively establish anything. Bay seems to argue that since a majority of the factual accounts place Mann in course and scope, that it is conclusively established.",Party Submissions,21.252188,26.058445,23.836401
"Berrelez resigned from Mesquite Logistics and never contacted the insurance carrier. Rather, counsel for Berrelez sent a demand letter to Mesquite Logistics. Thereafter, Berrelez filed suit against Mesquite Logistics and Mascorro. As to Mesquite Logistics, Berrelez asserted a premises liability claim, alleging Mesquite Logistics “had actual or constructive knowledge that the premises were unsafe, that these conditions posed an unreasonable risk, and that it did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk of harm, and that such failure proximately caused injuries to Berrelez who was, then and there, an invitee on the premises.” Berrelez also asserted Mesquite Logistics committed numerous acts of gross negligence. As is pertinent to this appeal, Berrelez alleged in her live pleading that she was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the assault. She alleged her injuries were the result of an intentional act by Mascorro, who acted upon personal reasons that were not based on Berrelez's status as an employee of Mesquite Logistics.",Party Submissions,4.9147997,5.0419903,5.5676494
"During the marriage, Husband worked for Bank of America, and Wife worked for the City of Dallas. Both contributed to retirement plans during their employment.",Party Submissions,8.290945,9.60462,9.309558
"Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc., 562 S.W.3d 69 (2018) Berrelez was employed by Mesquite Logistics as a housekeeper at Mesquite Lodge. According to Berrelez, Mesquite Lodge provides housing for oil field workers. Berrelez claims her duties as housekeeper included cleaning rooms, removing trash, and providing clean linens and bedding for the guests. One day, when Berrelez was on duty, a Mesquite Lodge guest, Manuel Hugo Mascorro, sexually assaulted her. Mascorro ultimately pled guilty to indecent exposure.",Party Submissions,5.896354,6.1714664,5.900058
"The Texas Election Code contains specific requirements that an application 8 for a place on the ballot must meet. See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 141.031; In re Tex. House Republican Caucus PAC, 630 S.W.3d 28, 32 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (""Section 141.031 contains requirements for '[a] candidate's application for a place on the ballot that is required by this code.'"") ( citing TEX. ELEC. CODE § 141.031(a)). In addition to the requirements of Section 141.031, candidates for justice of the supreme court must additionally include a petition containing a minimum of 50 signatures from each court of appeals district. See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.021(g). “A candidate for public office must comply with all statutory requirements to be entitled to have his or her name included on the ballot."" In re Armendariz, 245 S.W.3d 92, 94 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, orig. proceeding); see T EX. E LEC. CODE § 172.021; Wallace v. Howell, 707 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding) (stating that ""statutory requirements concerning candidacy for political office are mandatory and are to be strictly enforced).",Party Submissions,3.31445,3.4802217,3.535648
"Oncor debunked this argument at length in its initial brief (see Oncor’s Brief at 16-33). Respondents continue to assert it, though, citing three cases. Oncor addressed two of them— Houston Cement Co. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. 14-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 3243281 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jun. 25, 2013, no pet.) and Bastrop Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Acme Brick Co., 428 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.)—in its initial brief. See Oncor’s Brief at 20 n.10 and 31-33.",Party Submissions,3.596101,3.8150604,3.9993627
"If trial had taken place on either the first or second setting, the termination date would not yet have triggered and OSPrin would have recovered the full amount due. But after Guarantor repeatedly delayed trial, he argued that the Sunset Termination Provision had been triggered—after the initial trial date, but before the trial finally took place. Because the trial court accepted this argument, the Guarantor successfully avoided making any payment towards his guaranty and was not held liable for any of the damages caused by his contractual breach.",Party Submissions,14.891697,17.745941,16.775246
"To strike the balance, a preliminary expert report must “represen t an objective good faith effort” to provide a fair summary of the expert’ s opinions on the applicable standards of care, how the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed. E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(l), (r)(6)).",Party Submissions,5.7603188,6.8606377,7.775129
This case concerns a putative class action filed against Coinbase in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Abraham Bielski sued on behalf of Coinbase users who allege that Coinbase failed to replace funds fraudulently taken from the users’ accounts.,Party Submissions,7.2577233,6.644572,7.0701256
"To amend the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 to improve mapping under the National Flood Insurance Program, and for other purposes.",Legislation,2.8184433,2.4819255,2.835608
"I, Thomas C. Hall, hereby certify that I have reviewed this Petition and have concluded that every factual statement in this Petition is supported by competent evidence included in the appendix or record.",Party Submissions,8.509526,11.020111,12.07621
"Unsurprisingly, this Court agreed that fee-splitting provisions that operate to prohibit the full and effective vindication of statutory rights are not enforceable. Id. at 356 (citing Halliburton, 80 S.W.3d at 572). Still, while this Court recognized the same policy concerns articulated by courts holding fee-splitting arrangements per se unconscionable, it required “ some evidence” that a complaining party will likely incur arbitration costs in such an amount as to deter enforcement of statutory rights in the arbitral forum. Id.",Party Submissions,9.232444,8.424198,9.872847
"If the matter had been briefed by the parties, it is unlikely the majority would have reached this erroneous conclusion. The cases the majority cited do not deal with self-dealing in any of its forms— transactional, usurpation, or other misconduct. They were not cases like this one, in which Alpesh secretly arranged to cancel management fees that Manticore was paying to CKC, so he could receive $1.1 million in salary over a two-year period. CR462, ¶ 35 and CR467, ¶ 44.",Party Submissions,14.523575,16.038265,16.418978
Also please inform us – do we have the right to catch the snow crab less than 12 nautical miles from Svalbard and islands around Svalbard.,Legal Decisions,19.800423,21.032545,21.767492
"Page 4 of Addendas 1 and 2 for the first time by instituting the Lima Arbitration on 27 December 2018;12 or (iv) the decision to declare the RER-Contract automatically terminated for not reaching the POC on the specified date, and without any right to compensation whatsoever for CHM, even though CHM had not caused the termination and had made millionaire investments as from the execution of the RER-Contract in February 2014.",Legal Decisions,19.227884,21.203342,21.8503
"On December 22, 2020, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of Yellowfin on all claims, awarding Yellowfin $21,023.13 in damages and $5,160.00 in attorney’s fees plus costs, interest, and conditional fees should Santos seek a new trial or appeal. CR2:269-270. Implicit in the Court’s judgment is a finding that Yellowfin has standing to pursue its claims and that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,7.2082615,7.032326,7.7399616
"To be clear, the Claimant is not seeking to have the freezing of PEM’s bank accounts undone including the funds that were on deposit at the time of the seizure, which could be viewed as directed at a measure being challenged in this arbitration.",Legal Decisions,19.67512,19.484333,22.936523
"After a trial on the merits, the trial court entered its final order that Osprin take nothing on its claims against TX 1111 and Backes and entered a declaratory judgment that any and all obligations of Backes under the guaranty were terminated and discharged by virtue of completing the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the project; that Backes recover from Osprin his attorney fees and expenses after February 12, 2020, in the amount of $736,330.51; that Osprin recover from Backes its attorney fees and expenses from March 2018 through February 12, 2020, in the amount of $861,760.76; and that Backes recover his appellate attorney 14 Stonehenge and Rusk Investor had previously been dismissed from the lawsuit.",Party Submissions,8.291565,8.572432,9.645915
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.302 provides that a trial court is limited to reviewing only those issues decided by the appeals panel. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.302(b) (2006).,Party Submissions,3.9326503,5.163854,4.5730267
"Subcontractor’s operations include the transportation of any hazardous material, Automobile Liability policy shall contain coverage for transportation of hazardous materials by endorsement CA 99 48 or its equivalent. The Automobile policy will attach a MCS-90 endorsement.",Party Submissions,14.408185,13.096359,17.473606
"In the 2022 memorandum opinion from City of Dallas v. Trinity East Energy, LLC ( Trinity II ), the Dallas Court of Appeals inappropriately applied Lucas taking analysis to this case, potentially broadening its scope beyond established boundaries.2 Despite memorandum opinions lacking formal precedential value, they are still influential, and without Supreme Court reconsideration, this ruling could lead to confusion in future takings jurisprudence.",Party Submissions,15.027962,14.690703,16.031082
"If the court of appeals opinion stands, any party who has ever been in litigation will have an absolute privilege permitting the filing of any abstract of judgment— even if filed harassingly or maliciously and expressly intended to prevent a property sale solely to protect the party’s own pocketbook—and apparently even if the party never had a judgment against a property owner (as with Mrs. Nath) supporting interference with the owners’ property rights. The Court should take the opportunity to answer this open question that directly affects the property rights of even nonlitigants, such as Usha Nath.",Party Submissions,21.642761,16.86532,23.49833
"The 1615 Tabor, LLC opinion was first concerned with whether there was a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity from a suit for correction of the appraisal roll. It concluded that “without an express waiver of sovereign immunity or governmental immunity, courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over suits against the State or its political subdivisions. Id at *3, citing State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tex. 2006). The court confirmed that an appraisal district is a political subdivision and, “as such, appraisal districts generally are immune from suit.” Id, citing see Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003). However, the Court was ultimately concerned with the narrowness of the limit to a statutory waiver of immunity. Oncor may attempt to frame the Houston Court’s application of Houston Cement as favorable to its position when it concluded that “the Texas Tax Code provides a limited statutory waiver of immunity that allows property owners to seek judicial review of an appraisal review board’s determination of a motion to correct filed under TEX. TAX CODE section 25.25.” Id, citing Houston Cement Co. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., No.14-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 3243281, *2 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2013, no pet. ) (mem. op.). However, the 1615 Tabor, LLC court immediately qualifies: “ But this statutory waiver does not extend to judicial review of an agreement between a property owner or the owner’s agent and an appraisal district ‘which may be protested to the appraisal review board or ... ‘which may be corrected under [Texas Tax Code] [s]ection 25.25 ... An agreement under Texas Tax Code section 1.111(e) is final, and thus does not come within the statutory waiver of immunity allowing judicial review.” Id. (emphasis added) citing TEX.",Party Submissions,4.9615088,5.0626926,4.926907
"Whereas: (1) On 19 December 2013, UPL Europe Limited submitted an application for the approval of the active substance asulam-sodium to the United Kingdom, the rapporteur Member State, pursuant to Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009.",Legislation,5.186306,4.9629536,5.3804526
"Appellee Sonic Systems International, Inc. filed a motion for rehearing in the referenced cause, which is denied. We issue this supplemental opinion, however, to address the issues raised by Sonic.",Party Submissions,11.241617,9.62725,14.453511
"This Court, too, has recognized the potential constitutional implications of dismissing cases with no opportunity for a hearing on the merits. See Hebner v. Reddy, 498 S.W.3d 37, 41 (Tex. 2016).",Party Submissions,7.2059455,8.618442,8.2526865
Convention Article 60; Administrative and Financial Regulation 14; ICSID Schedule of Fees; Memorandum on Fees and Expenses 3.1. The fees and expenses of each Tribunal Member shall be determined and paid in accordance with the ICSID Schedule of Fees and the Memorandum on Fees and Expenses in force at the time the fees and expenses are incurred.,Legal Decisions,5.1702466,4.7727222,5.999746
"This Court need look no further than the Program’s repeated emphasis on and discussion of the importance of the state’s role in general, and the court system’s in particular, in establishing and maintaining guardianships. Throughout the Program, interviewees assert that guardianship exploitation is uniquely pernicious because a guardian’s power is derived from, and guaranteed by, the state—for which the guardian is the court-appointed representative. Interviewees consistently emphasize that, once under the control of a guardian, a ward’s estate effectively belongs to the state, because guardianships are expressions of a “state’s power.” CR1:911 at 02:34; see also id. at 02:19 (ward describing losing his home and money “to the state”).",Party Submissions,9.419618,10.267823,10.213521
The court of appeals erred in judging the evidence as legally insufficient instead of factually insufficient and thus erred in rendering judgment on both issues against Husband.,Party Submissions,14.510526,12.4986,19.203836
Walker’s delay in his attempt to remove a two-term incumbent statewide officer from the primary ballot is neither excused nor excusable. The people of Texas deserve the opportunity to elect the candidates of their choosing. Walker cannot place himself under duress by deadline and then complain of the result. Equity requires that mandamus relief be denied under the principles of Purcell and Khanoyan.,Party Submissions,24.391005,26.089924,28.282255
Oncor contends that the agreement it made was the result of a mutual mistake and is therefore not binding. Such a defense is not available under the Texas Tax Code. The remedies and procedures provided in the Tax Code for claims under § 42.01 are exclusive. TEX. TAX CODE § 42.09(a)(2). Claims that an agreement between Wilbarger CAD and a taxpayer are void or voidable due to mutual mistake are contrary to the comprehensive scheme of the Texas Tax Code and are not available to avoid such an agreement.,Party Submissions,7.5913124,8.705884,8.701981
"Tex. 28, 6 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1928). Texas Courts have uniformly held that such benefits are community property provided they are acquired during marriage.",Party Submissions,8.648436,12.733204,12.19611
"Compounding this is the absence of definitive cost caps in the arbitration agreement, coupled with the vagueness enveloping arbitrator and administrative fee allocations in any award. This places Rafiei in a volatile situation, risking unforeseen expenses with no clear foresight on the cumulative costs until the arbitration's culmination — demonstrating the lack of transparency and fairness.",Party Submissions,24.451113,21.788395,25.652212
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 2.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,25.689241,30.791883,37.788612
"An expert report under the TMLA must, as to each defendant, “provide[] a fair summary of the expert’s opinions. .. regarding applicable standards of care, the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(r)(6); Jernigan v. Langley, 195 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). An expert report is sufficient only if it satisfies the statute’s dual purpose of “inform[ing] the defendant of the specific conduct the plaintiff has called into question” and “provid[ing] a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit.” Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Tex. 2001). The trial court should grant the motion to dismiss if the report does not meet the elements of the statute. Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tex. 2012) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(l)).",Party Submissions,3.046978,4.0498075,4.0604277
"Second, given the vague wording of Serbia’s request, potential responsive documents would cover, for example, any forms of communication between Kalemegdan’s shareholders and/or Kalemegdan’s directors and Claimants’ legal or other advisors. There are potentially hundreds of such responsive documents. A search for all such documents and their potential production, or even their inclusion in a privilege log, would be unreasonably burdensome (Article 9(2)(c) of the IBA Rules).",Legal Decisions,11.853497,11.300313,13.130178
"Deferrals shall be calculated with respect to the gross cash Compensation payable to the Participant prior to any deductions or withholdings but shall be reduced by the Committee as necessary so that it does not exceed one hundred percent 100% of the cash Compensation of the Participant remaining after deduction of all required income and employment taxes, 401(k) and other employee benefit deductions, and other deductions required by law. Changes to payroll withholdings that affect the amount of Compensation being deferred to the Plan shall be allowed only to the extent permissible under Code Section 409A.",Contract,6.3780665,5.399415,6.6165895
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction in accordance with the applicable regulations121. In other words, requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".122 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Secretariat in order to obtain documents in question.123 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants, to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. U : Claimants' request for ""any and all minutes or recordings"" of internal meetings concerning the 2013 DRP would put Respondent in the difficult position of searching both physical archives and electronic files (including emails) of the Urban Planning Institute dating back more than a decade. In yet another example of a classic ""fishing expedition"", Claimants are seeking production of a time-unlimited category of documents, which may or may not contain information concerning Obnova's purported rights and the decision to locate the bus loop at the Dunavska Plots.",Legal Decisions,12.948035,13.329084,13.953679
This is a drowning case where a six-year-old girl died because the City of Cedar Park consciously refused to enforce its mandatory safety rule. The rule required the City to deny access to the pool based on the number of attendees and lifeguards. The court of appeals erred when it held that the City’s failure to enforce the mandatory safety rule did not constitute a “use” of real property and Petitioners could not plead a premises defect claim against the City because the risks associated with swimming are open and obvious.,Party Submissions,8.844458,8.511263,9.171589
"Retirement Account. Retirement Account means an Account established in the Participant’s initial Compensation Deferral Agreement upon his or her initial participation in the Plan in order to record such Participant’s Deferrals allocated to such Account (and any discretionary Company Contributions described in Article V, if any) and payable as part of a Participant’s Separation from Service Benefit under Sections 6.1(a) and 6.2(a) and as otherwise provided under the terms of this Plan (for clarity, and to the extent permitted by the Committee, a Participant may establish one or more Separation from Service Accounts under any Compensation Deferral Agreement, such Account to have a different Payment Schedule from his or her Retirement Account and may allocate Deferrals to such Separation from Service Account, subject to the limits, terms and conditions described herein). Each “Separation from Service Account” (for clarity, including such accounts referred to as “Retirement/Termination Accounts” under applicable Compensation Deferral Agreements) established under a Compensation Deferral Agreement that became effective and irrevocable prior to the Second Restatement Date is redesignated as a Retirement Account as of the Second Restatement Date.",Contract,5.781631,5.0959897,5.9613404
"While Houston Cement Co. was decided in favor of the appraisal district, § 1.111(e) binds appraisal districts as well as property owners. In Bastrop Cent.",Party Submissions,19.20504,17.771238,18.510101
"But in reviewing the denial of a motion to compel arbitration5 or enforce a forum-selection clause, courts are limited to the grounds advanced in the trial court.",Party Submissions,11.764741,14.843368,17.265562
"Next, the Walkers claim Dr. Tappan connected labor stress, fetal heart rate abnormalities, and external manipulation of H.W.’s head as causing a “perinatal arterial ischemic stroke.” (Pet. Br. at 18). The problems with that theory are: (i) Dr. Tappan never actually makes that statement (i.e., he writes that the MRI and MRA results “suggested the possibility” of stroke) (CR.670), and (ii) Dr. Tappan believed only that H.W. was “at risk” for hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy because of Dr. Castillo’s actions. (CR.669).",Party Submissions,8.97597,10.034721,9.896027
"Claimants do not allege a direct expropriation of First Claimant’s investments, but an indirect expropriation.1411 Pursuant to Annex 10-B of the Treaty (see ¶ 1010 above), an indirect expropriation takes place where “an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.” As such, whether under Claimants’ primary or alternative arguments set out at ¶¶ 1229 and 1230 above, the relevant criteria of an indirect expropriation in Annex 10-B, paragraph 3 of the TPA apply (see ¶ 1010 above).",Legal Decisions,5.796921,5.6774364,5.527373
"To amend the Public Health Service Act to reauthorize and improve the National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program for fiscal years 2024 through 2028, and for other purposes.",Legislation,2.684099,2.47574,2.564798
"Obviously, no court should allow such blatant mis-deeds to succeed. This Court held that to allow Sebastian to so utilize § 1.111(e) would thwart the Legislative intent behind the statute, not further it. Willacy at 51. This Court further noted that § 1.111(e) agreements are made between the appraisal district and the property owner. Sebastian disclaimed its own capacity to enter the agreement by contending that it was not the property owner. Willacy at 48-49.",Party Submissions,13.007853,12.279381,14.948879
"Most importantly, Petitioner waived her waiver defense in the Note, which states that “You agree that:... (d) we may waive or delay the enforcement of our rights under this Note without waiving or otherwise affecting such rights;... (f) you waive... waiver, dela y and all other notices or demands in connection with this Note.” 1CR9, at para. 13. The Note makes it very clear that Petitioner’s obligations to pay continued until the very end of the Note, stating that “If on May 1, 2025, you still owe amounts under this Note, you will pay those amounts in full on that date.” 1CR8, at para. 3. Petitioner did not allege in the trial court that she did not sign or understand these provisions of the Note. She contractually waived her defense of waiver, and has provided no argument that she is not contractually obligated to abide by the cited terms.",Party Submissions,8.426753,9.104826,8.890747
HOLDINGS: [1]-The district court abused its discretion by lifting the stay on litigation of the tort suit because a suit for judicial review filed by employee's family in the district court was still pending and there was therefore no final administrative determination that allowed the court to lift the abatement.,Party Submissions,15.3891115,12.209332,14.977748
"An insurance carrier is liable for compensation for an employee's injury with regard to fault or negligence if at the time of injury, the employee is subject to this subtitle and the injury arises out of and in the course and scope of employment.",Party Submissions,6.978499,7.0205207,8.011101
"Letter from the Luka “Beograd” dated 12 October 2001 is already in the c ase files as Exhibit R-061. As to other two documents, Respondent agrees to produce the requested documents as they are already in its possession, custody or control.",Legal Decisions,19.63188,19.934544,26.9828
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction in accordance with the applicable regulations128. In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".129 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Secretariat in order to obtain documents in question.130 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants, to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. U : Claimants' request for ""any and all documents"" concerning the 2013 DRP which are in the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction's files would put Respondent in the difficult position of searching both physical archives and electronic files (including emails) of the Secretariat dating back more than a decade. In yet another example of a classic ""fishing expedition"", Claimants are seeking production of a broad and time-unlimited category of documents, which may or may not contain information concerning Obnova's purported rights and the decision to locate the bus loop at the Dunavska Plots.",Legal Decisions,10.940871,11.625365,11.736238
"This marked the end of North Star’s snow crab fishing activities in the NEAFC area, since Russia almost simultaneously closed its continental shelf that same month as advocated by Norway.",Legal Decisions,48.810566,43.888317,51.11005
"The President: [...] [Y]esterday, counsel for the Respondent said that, if I remember rightly, 98% of the snow crab harvested by your ships in 2015 and 2016 was taken from the Russian part of the Loop Hole, is that correct ?",Legal Decisions,14.527897,17.517,15.88496
"Nonetheless, the established case law holds that the significance of Mann being in or out of the course and scope of employment only determines the defenses available to Bay in a negligence case. If Mann was not in the course and scope of employment, then Bay retains its common-law defenses. If Mann was in the course and scope of his employment then Bay loses its common-law defenses. Either way, the trial court retains jurisdiction based upon the facts in this record. Course and scope merely determines what defenses are available to Bay at common law.",Party Submissions,8.2922325,8.247852,9.578068
"C) The Tribunal’s analysis 499. The Tribunal notes from the outset that, in order to decide on Claimant’s request, it must decide on three different issues: first, whether the absence of a contractual relationship (privity) with Claimant renders the umbrella clause inapplicable; second, whether the existence of a dispute settlement clause in the Concession Agreement precludes the application of the umbrella clause; and, lastly, whether the contractual obligations raised by Claimant have indeed been breached. It is understood that the Tribunal can only arrive at the final question if it concludes that the arguments raised by Respondent in relation to the other two issues should be rejected.",Legal Decisions,6.434037,7.1051207,6.325866
"For example, while the Seventh Court faulted the experts for failing to provide an “ adequate explanation ” linking H.W. ’ s “ asphyxia event ” to his stroke, neither expert claimed that an “asphyxia event,” standing alone, caused H.W.’s stroke and resulting brain injury. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *4 with App. 7, CR 670-671. Rather, Dr. Tappan explained that the prolonged second stage labor, the resulting fetal heart rate abnormalities, and the forceful external manipulation of H.W.’s head during delivery combined to cause the stroke sometime during the last hour to hour and a half of labor and delivery. App. 7, CR 670-671.",Party Submissions,9.357306,10.206023,9.934072
"Protective caps like the ones in In re Poly-America ensure that arbitration remains an accessible forum. In In re Poly-America, the Court was confronted with an arbitration agreement that, while containing a fee-splitting provision, incorporated protective mechanisms by capping the employee's share of the costs. 262 S.W.3d at 344. Such measures ensured that arbitration remained a viable and accessible avenue for dispute resolution.",Party Submissions,9.694006,10.934675,13.103524
Miller resulted from gross negligence by the Terry Defendants in not timely seeking to designate James Flaven a responsible third party?,Party Submissions,62.250755,113.03547,99.879395
"Grant did not appear at the January 20 hearing. The trial court found that Grant did not offer evidence of her inability to afford costs. It further found that Grant’s most recent statement of inability to afford costs, which was filed in January of 2023, reflected that (1) Grant has $5,053.95 in monthly income; (2) Grant stated the total value of her property was $70.00, but the attachments showed Grant owns (i) a home purchased in April of 2022 with an undisclosed equity and value, (ii) a 2021 Toyota Highlander purchased in August of 2021 with an undisclosed equity and value, and (iii) personal property which Grant pays $504 monthly to store; and (3) Grant failed to disclose her ownership of an undivided 3.334 percent interest in the 53.524-acre tract at issue, which the commissioners valued at $30,000 per acre. The trial court determined that Grant has the ability to pay court costs and granted Heo’s request.",Party Submissions,6.7061815,6.9100885,7.1659026
The court noted that trial courts often decide disputes about whether the TWCA’s exclusive remedy provision applies as a defense to an injured worker’s personal injury suit. Id.,Party Submissions,12.475899,14.143283,16.101576
"To amend section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act relating to judicial review of a permit issued under such section, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.0906196,4.5290723,5.1413217
"Petitioners and those interviewed in the Program repeatedly highlight the courts’ critical role in establishing, maintaining, and legitimizing a guardian’s control over a ward’s person and finances. CR1:911 at 00:36, 04:55, 13:36. The Program argues that it is a court’s involvement in a guardian’s affairs—just as much as a particular guardian’s actions—that makes the guardianship experience so Kafkaesque. E.g. id. at 20:45 (noting that Thrash ended up in a permanent guardianship only after “the courts got involved”); id. at 25:00 (describing how courts are responsible for instituting guardianships and appointing guardians, and criticizing the extreme brevity of the related hearings). As John Savanovich, the other ward featured in the program, succinctly puts it at the end of the Program, the financial exploitation of wards is especially harmful because, “according to the courts, it’s all legal.” Id. at 51:35 (emphasis added).",Party Submissions,9.178853,8.966433,9.076822
"A MENDMENT .— 1 The table of sections for chapter 1 of title 36, United 2 States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to 3 the second section 146 and inserting the following: 4 ‘‘147. Choose Respect Day. ‘‘148. African Diaspora Heritage Month.’’.",Legislation,10.869328,9.540802,11.128107
"Respondents’ effort to defend the court of appeals’ decision follows the same misguided playbook as their effort to avoid this Court’s review. Instead of addressing the merits of Westwood’s complaints about the decision below, they misstate the evidence and the basis for that decision — and throw in a meritless and irrelevant side-issue on Westwood’s name change for good measure.",Party Submissions,12.981053,12.903673,14.327745
What is the proper analysis to determine whether alleged departures involving professional or administrative services trigger the application of the TMLA?,Party Submissions,43.377785,59.645683,66.76252
"The same is true of Abilene Regional Medical Center v. Allen, 387 S.W.3d 914 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, pet. denied). Again, the Court allowed an obstetrician to offer an opinion about the cause of a newborn’s neurological injuries only because “he stated that he is familiar with the biological mechanism by which a fetus suffers brain injury when deprived of oxygen.” Id. at 923.",Party Submissions,5.687854,5.8703012,6.2755113
The declarant ignored there was no possibility that the contaminants that leaked from Midland’s sewer system could have ever been mixed with household sewage. In R.R.,Party Submissions,30.990856,31.884441,36.72088
"For the reasons below, the Court should take another look at the issues presented in this case and should grant review.",Party Submissions,15.276963,13.951676,17.478153
"By: /s/ David M. Gunn David M. Gunn State Bar No. 08621600 dgunn@beckredden.com Attorney for Petitioners I hereby certify that on October 26, 2023 a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been electronically filed and served on all counsel below. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(c)(1), 9.5(b)(1).",Party Submissions,4.233804,5.7643175,7.3958964
"Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex.1992). Generally, appellate courts lack jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to supervise or correct incidental rulings of a trial judge when there is an adequate remedy by appeal.",Party Submissions,4.3265357,4.99712,5.9287434
"Rules Applicable to Installment Payments. If a Payment Schedule specifies installment payments, annual payments will be made beginning as of the payment commencement date for such installments and shall continue on each anniversary thereof until the number of installment payments specified in the Payment Schedule has been paid. The amount of each installment payment shall be determined by dividing (a) by (b), where (a) equals the Account Balance as of the Valuation Date and (b) equals the remaining number of installment payments.",Contract,5.4801474,4.8624797,6.594262
"B, U : Claimants’ request is insufficiently narrow and specific as it does not specify the time period in which these unspecified decisions were issued or to whom were they issued (i.e. who was obliged to pay the fee for the use of urban construction land). For the same reason the request is overly burdensome because it requires Respondent to search the decisions of the City of Belgrade over a decades-long period of time. R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how the requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the decisions of the City of Belgrade are relevant to the question of Obnova's alleged property rights or material to the Tribunal's 249 Memorial, ¶¶ 222-224.",Legal Decisions,12.363438,11.792789,12.377034
"To the extent that the trial court simply took the value ofthe account on the date of divorce, subtracted Husband’s contributions during the marriage and then awarded the remaining $31 1,778.24 as his separate property, the trial court abused its discretion in its characterization and division of the property. See, e.g., Sanchez, 2022 WL 1055373,-at *8. We further conclude that the trial court’s abuse of discretion affected the just and right division of the community estate and remand is necessary' for the trial court to reconsider division of the community estate. We sustain Wife’s third issue.",Party Submissions,7.749883,8.574055,9.134311
"In August 2018, RLB started its dredging work under the Subcontract. When RLB reached minus 38 feet below sea level, it encountered substantially harder material. RLB began to have equipment problems and difficulty excavating the harder material. RLB believed that the subsurface condition it had encountered varied greatly from the information provided by MVP and McCarthy in the Phase 1 report. On July 22, 2019, RLB advised McCarthy that it had encountered a differing site condition as defined in the MCC and the Subcontract, entitling RLB to change orders for additional time and compensation. was entitled to the relief from MVP under the MCC, RLB also requested that McCarthy seek a similar change order from MVP. After McCarthy advised RLB that it was required to continue its work during the dispute and McCarthy would take action to achieve completion, RLB retained its own geotechnical engineer, which found that the material RLB encountered at minus 38-foot elevation was substantially different than the subsurface conditions represented in the Phase 1 report. On August 10, 2019, MVP denied the request for a change order.",Party Submissions,6.486056,6.71529,7.1592255
"Dr. Joseph Burns is the Superintendent of Schools for Copperas Cove ISD, a position he has held throughout the pendency of this dispute.",Party Submissions,7.635394,10.925101,9.058633
"A “fair summary” does not require a full statement of the applicable standard of care and how it was breached. Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 880 (Tex. 2001). Instead, the report must simply set out what care was expected, but not given. Id.",Party Submissions,5.5457,7.6732607,6.8563776
"On June 1, 2017, Wife filed an original petition for divorce indicating the marriage was insupportable, in part, because of discord or conflict of personalities.",Party Submissions,5.2162986,7.187021,5.943598
"But the Court of Appeals still faulted the experts for supposedly failing to provide an “ adequate explanation ” tying the “ purported asphyxia event” to H.W.’s “ large subacute infarction involving the majority of his left cerebral cortex. ” 2022 WL 17324338, at *3. In the Seventh Court ’ s view, the reports were deficient because they “left to inference and speculation” whether “asphyxia, in general, or the extent allegedly encountered by the unborn child, in particular, can lead to such a brain injury.” 2022 WL 17324338, at *3.",Party Submissions,9.144082,9.971724,10.0221405
"To amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to clarify ican Rescue Plan Act of 2021, including amounts paid on behalf of a deceased participant or beneficiary, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.692601,6.227986,6.3090982
"As Rafiei explained to the trial court in this case, the arbitration of his claims would require three arbitrators under the arbitration agreement. Thus, Rafiei would be liable for half of the three arbitrators’ fees, as well as half of all other costs of arbitration, including room rental fees, abeyance fees, and other filing fees. Although billed rates vary among arbitrators, the average rate reasonably expected in a case like this is $450/hour. Additionally, a hearing to determine unconscionability could reasonably be expected to last for approximately one hour. Thus, the arbitrator fees alone would likely cost Appellee $675.00. Supplementing this further is the AAA’s Administrative Fee Schedules, which provide that a claimant like Rafiei would be solely responsible for the Initial Filing Fee, which under the current “Standard Fee Schedule” would be no less than $7,000.00.",Party Submissions,8.743323,8.098689,9.194709
"To enhance the Federal Government’s planning and preparation for extreme weather and the Federal Government’s dissemination of best practices to respond to extreme weather, thereby increasing resilience, improving regional coordination, and mitigating the financial risk to the Federal Government from such extreme weather, and for other purposes.",Legislation,8.732777,8.195639,10.245343
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the requested documents from the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction in accordance with the applicable regulations251. In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".252 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Secretariat in order to obtain documents in question.253 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants, to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. B, U : The request is overly broad as Claimants seek ""any and all"" meeting minutes and recordings related to the preparation of the 2015 DRP in general, without specifying the time frame, and not only those dealing specifically with the rezoning of the land plot located across the street from Dunavska 17-19 and 23 (in particular, the reasons therefor). As a result, production of the requested documents would be unreasonably burdensome for Respondent.",Legal Decisions,10.964424,11.33816,11.879593
"Upon cessation of the cause or causes for any such failure or delay, performance hereof shall be resumed as soon as practicable. Such failure or delay shall not operate to extend the duration of this Agreement nor obligate either TDCC or any UCC Member to make up deliveries or receipts of product. If, by reason of any such circumstances, TDCC's supply of product shall be insufficient to meet all of its requirements, TDCC shall apportion among any and all existing contract purchasers, including without limitation its Affiliates, in an equitable manner so that all parties share the product in proportion to their take prior to the circumstance reducing availability.",Contract,10.867037,10.607958,11.987103
"Respondent does not voluntarily produce these documents by October 26, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce them by November 27, 2023.",Legal Decisions,8.872431,11.805756,12.102904
"The Parties’ positions A) The Claimant’s position 522. To begin with, Claimant asserts that, as the material damages that he sustained were caused by Respondent in breach of the Treaty and international law, Respondent must make full reparation for such harm.678 Claimant further seeks reparation for the moral damage caused by Respondent.",Legal Decisions,10.057759,9.2252655,9.413273
"The DWC has exclusive jurisdiction to determine compensability because the Act vests the power to determine whether a *74 claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits solely in the DWC, subject to judicial review.",Party Submissions,8.063659,8.958947,9.821647
"Corrective Distribution Equivalent Deferrals. A deferral election shall also indicate whether a Participant elects to defer an additional amount of Compensation equal in amount to any Corrective Distribution received during the Plan Year to which the deferral election refers (“Corrective Distribution Equivalent Deferral”). Unless otherwise determined by the Committee, in the event that a Participant elects a Corrective Distribution Equivalent Deferral, the total amount of such Deferral will be divided by the number of pay periods remaining in the Plan Year following the receipt by the Participant of the Corrective Distribution, and the resulting amount will be added to the percentage of base salary deferred by such Participant.",Contract,4.76467,4.9433074,5.015377
"Petitioner’s most tenuous argument is that Respondent waived its contractual acceleration rights by waiting twelve years to accelerate. But absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The collection attempts of Respondent and the prior holders of the note are not in the record for the simple reason that they are irrelevant to the “technical and exacting process” of acceleration. See, e.g., Tapia v. Collins Asset Group, LLC, No. 02-20-00129-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 836 at *14 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Feb. 3, 2022, no pet.)(mem. op.)(collection attempts ten years before acceleration did not constitute acceleration). Any attempt to read more into the record is unsupported by the record.",Party Submissions,6.359321,7.525557,6.523527
TBA respectfully requests that this Court grant Osprin’s petition for review and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals regarding the Guaranty.,Party Submissions,20.176552,22.122707,32.166546
"The Norwegian Coast Guard is prepared to enforce Norwegian law, and vessels starting fishing activity after snow crab without expressed consent from Norway will be arrested and prosecuted .771 578. The Senator was arrested the following day (see paragraph 113, above). The Norwegian courts, up to the level of the Supreme Court, upheld the penalties imposed on North Star and the captain of the Senator (see paragraphs 118 to 121, above).",Legal Decisions,18.048471,18.34217,19.154142
"US$ 915,263.19, the Tribunal orders that Respondent shall bear 70% thereof, i.e. US$ 640,684.23 and accordingly shall pay to Claimants US$ 640,684.23.",Legal Decisions,5.3177443,6.594438,7.0441475
"The mootness exception for an issue “capable of repetition, yet evading review” applies only in rare circumstances. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). A plaintiff invoking this exception must establish that: (1) the challenged action was too short in duration to be litigated fully before the action ceased or expired; and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. Id. We acknowledge that no one can predict with certainty that a world-wide pandemic will never again occur and cause restrictions on the public like those that were in place temporarily in Texas. But we have held that a mere theoretical possibility that a party may be subjected to the same action again is insufficient to satisfy the test. City of Dallas v. Woodfield, 305 S.W.3d 412, 419 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2010, no pet.). Despite the fact that Covid-19 has not disappeared completely, none of the appellees has ordered similar restrictions for more than two years. Like our sister court, “[W]e see that as a powerful signal that whatever course the Covid – 19 pandemic takes, a return to restrictions like those challenged here is highly unlikely.” Stand for Something Group Live, LLC, 2022 WL 11485464, at *4 (citing Eden, LLC v. Justice, 36 F.4th 166, 171 (4th Cir. 2022)).",Party Submissions,5.8239303,5.669742,6.0587306
"But you would not know that from reading the Response Brief (“Resp. Br.”) of Tonya Barina (“Barina”). Despite containing enough quotes from fictional characters to fill a “quotes about defamation” page on brainyquotes.com, Barina’s brief utterly fails to engage with these important principles. Instead, Barina simply parrots the appellate court’s erroneous analysis without once addressing Petitioners’ legal challenges.",Party Submissions,11.7786,12.955293,13.153722
"Second, Walker’s delay and the fact the primary election process is already well underway preclude this Court from granting relief. As this Court has observed, “avoidable delays, in particular, may be fatal to the courts’ ability to proceed” with election-related litigation. In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 764. Walker has not even attempted to identify the “practical consequences of [his] requested judicial action,” as he was obligated to do, and for good reason: to grant him relief would be essentially to award him the Republican Party’s endorsement for the general election by default. This Court does not grant such intrusive relief on a split-second basis—let alone to one who has delayed acting until his opponent’s mistake, if so, might be incurable. As this Court has repeatedly cautioned, mandamus relief is “controlled largely by equitable principles,” In re Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc., 274 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding), which required Walker to act diligently. He did not.",Party Submissions,9.008528,9.832858,9.547358
"To amend the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 to expand permissible uses of assistance to firefighters grant funds relating to behavioral and mental health, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.449681,5.624119,5.9320874
"Relator’s own delay in bringing this proceeding—which forced him to file in this Court rather than a trial court with fact-finding capabilities— precludes Justice Devine from obtaining additional declarations, preparing evidence, and otherwise developing a full factual record in the single business day given to respond. That is why this Court’s precedent places the burden on Relator to clearly show that the relief he seeks would not cause these types of problems. Here, Relator has shown only that, as in Khanoyan, “[o]rdering the requested relief on the paltry record before this Court would be an irresponsible shot in the dark.” 637 S.W.3d at 766; see id. at 766 n.4 (citing the same declarations discussed above).",Party Submissions,12.758247,14.434491,14.268944
"S.W.3d 614, 617-18 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (quoting Lenger v. Physician’s Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. 1970) (“The proof must establish causal connection beyond the point of conjecture. It must show more than a possibility .”) (emphasis added).",Party Submissions,4.509729,5.158882,5.304708
"Even read in conjunction with Dr. Tappan’s report, Dr. Null does not explain, factually, how and why Dr. Castillo’s alleged breaches caused an injury. The reader is asked to draw inferences because, simply, Dr. Null never explains the basis for his opinions or links his conclusions to the facts of Dr. Castillo’s care. See Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 460. Therefore, his report also was deficient under section 74.351, and the Court of Appeals correctly decided it was conclusory and lacking as to the required element of proximate cause.",Party Submissions,9.173456,11.292521,11.419158
"States have had the right to regulate the “times, places, and manner of holding elections” since the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. ART. I, SEC. 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Elections Clause expansively, enabling states to regulate “not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.” Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). The Court has further recognized the states’ ability to regulate political party primaries. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941). Saying that the State cannot disallow a single voter from signing the petition of more than one candidate in the same election is tantamount to saying that the State cannot restrict a voter from voting for more than one candidate in the same election. Ballot petition signatures are an expression 11 of an individual’s candidate preference in a specific primary. Like elections, the State has the right to legislate this form of restriction. The First Amendment is not “extended to a voter’s every desire at the ballot box” and if it was, “it ceases to be of any analytic use.” Clingman, 544 U.S. at 589 (2005). Like Respondent’s constitutional assertions, Devine’s is another red herring, designed to distract this Court from the real, uncontroverted issue in this case—whether Respondent can choose to ignore Texas law requiring him to reject Devine’s application.",Party Submissions,5.8507085,5.289695,5.854778
"In Sprague,‘ the Fourteenth Court of Appeals remanded the case based on its conclusion that issues of fact were required to be resolved to determine how the bonus should be characterized. 363 S.W.3d at 802. The appellate court did not determine whether the bonus was community or separate pr0perty. Id.",Party Submissions,10.093381,10.907216,13.27329
"The ground assigned for the motion is want of jurisdiction, in this court, of appeals from the judgments of inferior courts in cases of habeas corpus .",Party Submissions,10.421286,15.41194,15.231924
The decision below transgresses the boundary between those separate spheres. And Respondents barely attempt to argue otherwise. They simply try to make the decision mean something other than what it actually says.,Party Submissions,20.476015,24.643051,29.213772
"The Lender hereby expressly waives presentment, demand, notice, protest and all other demands and notices in connection with the delivery, acceptance, performance, default or enforcement of this Promissory Note and the Loan Agreement.",Contract,3.408132,4.60129,6.6966867
"Harvesting of snow crab on the Norwegian continental shelf is prohibited unless an exemption has been granted. No such exemption has been granted to vessels flying the flag of an EU Member State. Therefore your vessels are not authorized to fish on the Norwegian continental shelf. This includes the whole Norwegian continental shelf, including the areas around Svalbard.",Legal Decisions,5.961978,5.946973,6.5821366
"The trial court duly noted that it had denied the request for a jury trial (CR:759), which it conditioned solely on the absence of any claim for separate property. This is wrong, and such a narrow construction of Section 6.703 should not be upheld or condoned. From this point forward, based on an improperly restrictive reading of Section 6.703, Kacey was denied the right to a jury trial. This is a significant issue of the Court to address. There was a fact issue—the vesting period for a senior employee like Heath.",Party Submissions,18.567911,20.333965,19.646132
"MVP next contends it is not “unreasonable or unjust” to dismiss RLB’s claims against McCarthy and Travelers. For all of MVP’s talk about “waiver,” MVP (and McCarthy) ignore that McCarthy and Travelers never sought dismissal of RLB’s claims in the trial court—or even in the court of appeals until RLB moved for rehearing. In fact, in the trial court, McCarthy fought against litigating in Oklahoma. It never requested that RLB’s Texas claims against it be dismissed and litigated in Oklahoma. R.0361-75, 0689-96, 0707-10. MVP and McCarthy do not explain why dismissal of RLB’s claims against McCarthy and Travelers would be appropriate or subject to MCC paragraph 47.7 when McCarthy and Travelers never asked for that relief.",Party Submissions,7.5853295,7.8866825,8.163366
"Finally, the Court should reject Respondents’ continued effort to complicate this case, confuse the issues, and obfuscate the problems with the court of appeals’ decision by injecting additional “substantive issues” into the analysis of the single question presented. In their response to Westwood’s petition, Respondents hinted at the existence of several issues that might impede this Court’s review of that question. (Resp. to Pet. 11-13) But they bothered to brief only one of those supposed complicating issues — relating to the fact that Westwood had to change its name from Westwood Motorcars LLC to Westwood Motors, LLC to remove the taint it experienced from Respondents’ wrongful eviction. (8RR154) Respondents’ failure to brief any other such issues waives them, or at least counsels that they should be left for consideration on remand.",Party Submissions,10.032359,10.485844,10.868278
"At the preliminary stage, however, there is no evidence, much less evidence that could demonstrate other plausible causes of a claimant’s injury. As a result, this Court’s preliminary expert report jurisprudence— which developed in tandem with Bustamante, Windrum, and Thompson— has uniformly rejected provider’s efforts to elevate their own speculation about possible alternative causes of as claimant’s injury to the status of “evidence” that an expert must preemptively address for a medical negligence claim to proceed.",Party Submissions,16.786612,16.647505,18.167147
"First, unlike in Rosenthal, Barina’s denial is made on camera, in the Program.10 And not only is it true that Barina made that offer, but when Thrash’s former attorney ad litem informed the probate judge of the offer, she did not deny having made it and instead complained that the lawyer had divulged privileged statements made during settlement negotiations. CR1:697. Barina’s willingness to keep Thrash in Martinez’s care (despite her asserted belief that Martinez was taking advantage of Thrash) in exchange for over $500,000 unquestionably evinces an intent to use her court-appointed position for her own personal benefit.",Party Submissions,14.315951,13.083517,14.612132
"It is also noteworthy that respondents’ argument is internally inconsistent. They contend the UDJA does not authorize the district court to consider Oncor’s claim because a different statute—the Texas Tax Code—sets out a comprehensive regulatory scheme that vests appraisal review boards with exclusive jurisdiction over property tax disputes. They concede that this scheme gives a property owner a process by which to challenge “the appraised value of the owner’s property, the inclusion of the property on the appraisal records, a failure by the chief appraiser or the Board to provide the property owner with any notice to which the owner is entitled, and any other action by the chief appraiser, appraisal district, or Board that applies to and adversely affects the property owner.” See Respondents’ Brief at 40 (citing Appraisal Review Bd. of Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. O’Connor & Assocs., 267 S.W.3d 413, 416-17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (emphasis added)). But elsewhere, Respondents insist that the Texas Tax Code does not confer jurisdiction on the district court to consider challenges like Oncor’s. Respondents cannot have it both ways.",Party Submissions,4.286574,4.8036876,4.7042246
"The Manns filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, attempting to defeat Bay's exclusive-remedy defense. The trial court granted the Manns' motion and struck Bay's exclusive-remedy defense. The trial court then gave Bay leave to seek a permissive appeal in this Court concerning four questions, which Bay raises as its issues on appeal: 1. Under Valero's Rolling Owner Controlled Insurance Program (“ROCIP”) and section 406.123 of the Labor Code, was Bay an employer of Randy Mann for purposes of the exclusive remedy defense?",Party Submissions,9.439899,8.431343,10.197369
"Given the Respondent’s objections regarding the lack of specific mention in the Request for Arbitration, and for the sake of efficiency, the Claimant is prepared to withdraw the Request.",Legal Decisions,14.538063,10.749494,13.81025
"WATERCRAFT ARE USED TO PERFORM WORK) If required by Exhibit 6, Subcontractor shall procure and maintain in force Protection and Indemnity Liability covering all vessels used subject to not less than the terms and conditions of the P&I SP-23 (Revised 1/56) form of policy or its equivalent including Collision and Tower’s Liability, Crew Liability (Jones Act), Contractual Liability and Pollution Buy-Back Endorsement.",Party Submissions,17.866537,14.00535,18.86496
"And, in Matagorda Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, L.L.C. v. Brooks, No. 13-16-00266-CV, 2017 WL 127867 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi, Feb. 9, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.), the appellate court considered whether a well-credentialed pathologist was qualified to offer an opinion about the cause of injuries and death of a nursing home patient. Plaintiff’s Petition alleged, among other things, that the nursing facility failed to protect the decedent from avoidable injury and failed to assess his risk for falls. Matagorda, 2017 WL 127867 at *6.",Party Submissions,3.871852,4.0306463,4.2315702
"Weatherford’s next contention incorrectly asks the Court to recharacterize sewer systems as “solid waste facilities” on the grounds that sewer systems sometimes leak, and therefore, under a separate and inapplicable federal CERCLA 11 standard, strict liability should apply to a sewer system. As such, Weatherford requests the Court do something that the Texas Legislature has declined to do—impose a CERLCA-based “status-based strict liability.” Brief at 38–39. Tellingly, the cases Weatherford cites for this proposition are federal CERLCA or RCRA12 cases, not Texas SWDA cases, as Weatherford cannot cite to Texas law or precedent (either by case or statute) that has imposed CERCLA-based strict liability on an “owner-operator” entity. Weatherford’s strict liability contentions also assume as a baseline once again that Midland’s sewer system is a “solid waste facility.” Such a conclusory and unsupported claim is apparent in its statement that “[i]nsufficient or non-existent oversight of the sewage system is enough to make the City a person responsible. .. .” Brief at 40. As noted above, the SWDA is a responsibility statute—it is not a strict liability statute, as the SWDA requires more than a showing that a contaminant was found in a certain location; it mandates responsibility (i.e., an act) between such contaminant and its disposal—neither of which was shown, despite Weatherford having the opportunity to do so. Weatherford’s entreaty to this Court to graft CERCLA strict liability standards onto a statute that does not set such a liability standard is better addressed to the Texas Legislature than to the courts that interpret state law as actually written.",Party Submissions,9.092978,9.597277,9.789591
"Subcontractor shall be responsible for providing insurance for all its property, tools and equipment used on the site or away from the site.",Party Submissions,12.026348,13.734248,16.460592
"Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc., 562 S.W.3d 69 (2018) the alleged injury. In sum, we hold Berrelez had to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Act before filing suit in district court. We therefore overrule her appellate complaints.",Party Submissions,10.423174,10.5958805,12.07079
"The issues presented are whether this Court should reject Relator’s emergency petition for writ of mandamus for any of the following independent reasons: 1. Relator seeks relief that would disrupt an ongoing or imminent election in violation of this Court’s precedent; 2. The relief Relator seeks—removing Justice Devine from the ballot— is inequitable not only because Justice Devine submitted his ballot petition in good faith with every reason to believe the signatures on it were valid, but because the emergency posture of this proceeding is entirely the product of Relator’s own avoidable delay in bringing the matter to the courts several weeks after the statutory deadline and six full weeks after Relator could have known about the purported defects; 3. The relief Relator seeks is contrary to this Court’s precedent allowing candidates to cure technical defects related to their petition signatures when the defects are not apparent from the face of the petition and the candidate filed the petition before the statutory deadline; and 4. Although the Court need not reach the issue, the prohibition on individuals signing multiple ballot petitions for candidates in the same election burdens First Amendment rights of both candidates and signers without advancing any sufficient governmental interest, and this prohibition cannot be constitutionally applied on these facts to exclude Justice Devine from the ballot where he is not at fault and an opportunity to cure would serve any possibly sufficient governmental interest in election administration.",Party Submissions,7.160004,7.1100826,7.2075233
"The uncontroverted affidavit testimony of Laura V. Yeager, an attorney with Defendant Fleming & Associates, L.L.P., states that the majority of the Fen-Phen clients were referred to Defendants by 120 different attorneys located in 38 different states, 110 of whom used “separate and distinct client retainer contracts when signing up diet drug clients.” Document No. 45, Affidavit of Laura V. Yaeger (“Yaeger Aff.”), at 2. Ms. Yaegar also cites significant differences in the retainer contracts with respect to the charging of litigation expenses. Id. At 2-3. Indeed, the differences in expense provisions are manifest in the contracts themselves, some of which were submitted by Karnes. (VII CR 4136-37).",Party Submissions,10.87018,9.891729,10.709157
"To complicate the instant case, Dallas served not just as a regulator but also as the lessor in Trinity’s lease of the mineral interests and Surface Tracts. In addition to other benefits, as part of this lease, Dallas received a bonus payment of over $19 million. While not extensively covered in Trinity II, the jury and trial court also held Dallas liable for fraud and negligence related to the leases, awarding damages exceeding $23 million, plus interest. The amici curiae refrain from commenting on the fraud or negligence aspects of the case. Although the takings analysis should not be influenced by Dallas’ role as a market participant, one might question if perceptions of fairness or “unclean hands” influenced the jury’s damage findings or the court’s regulatory takings analysis. Consider hypothetically if Dallas did not own the disputed mineral rights and had not received a 17 City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 772 n.2 (Tex. 2006). 18 Texas Cities by Population, https://www.texas-demographics.com/cities_by_population (December 12, 2023).",Party Submissions,9.121534,8.867011,9.464849
"Just as with the objective prong, the analysis focuses on the alleged act or omission, from the actor’s perspective, at the time the act occurred. Reviewing “courts focus on the defendant’s state of mind, examining whether the defendant knew about the peril caused by his conduct but acted in a way that demonstrates he did not care about the consequences to others.” Reeder v. Wood Cnty. Energy, LLC, 395 S.W.3d 789, 796 (Tex. 2012).",Party Submissions,6.8700476,7.663441,7.424004
"At its core, the purposeful availment analysis seeks to determine whether a nonresident’s conduct and connection to a forum are such that it could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. At 152. It is important to note that the alle g atio n that a defendant committed a tort in Texas is sufficient to justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction over said defendant, Morris v. Kohls-York, 164 SW3d 686 (Tex. App. -Austin, 2005, rev dism’d) at 694. “When dealing with a plea to the jurisdiction, ‘we take the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s petition as true.’” Gonzales v. Texas Parks and Wildlife, 87 Sw 3d 563 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1988, rev. den’d).",Party Submissions,6.797325,7.634473,7.4513464
"Disposition: The Court of Appeals (Chief Justice Quinn, joined by Justices Parker and Doss) unanimously concluded that the Walkers’ expert reports were insufficient under Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The Court issued a memorandum opinion reversing the trial court’s order and dismissed the Walkers’ claims. See Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp. v. Walker, No. 07-22-00032-CV, 2022 WL 17324338 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, Nov. 29, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.).",Party Submissions,4.630643,4.802552,4.7085085
"Roskey v. Continental Cas. Co., 190 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Tex. App.-- Dallas 2006, pet. denied) ; see also American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 804-05 (Tex. 2001) ; In re Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 233 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.-- Waco 2007, orig. proceeding) .",Party Submissions,2.9897401,3.5616345,3.442428
"WHEREAS, the Company desires to continue to employ the Executive, and Executive desires to continue to be employed by the Company, as the Company’s President and Chief Executive Officer, on the terms set forth in this Agreement.",Contract,3.6674538,4.193292,4.812273
"First, Yellowfin emphasizes that “[w]here there is a debt secured by a note, which is in turn, secured by a lien, the note and the lien constitute separate obligations.” Resp. Br. 8 (quoting Aguero v. Ramirez, 70 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied)). We do not disagree, but that is beside the point. The note and the lien do constitute separate obligations. So, we acknowledge that the junior lienholder may seek to recover the remaining debt on a note even after foreclosure extinguishes its lien. Santos simply argues that the lender must bring that action within the limitations period. See Opening Br. 25-26. Similarly, we do not contest that a lender may sue to recover a debt on a note without first foreclosing. See Resp. Br. 18 (citing Carter v. Gray, 81 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Tex. 1935)). Our point is only that when a foreclosure does occur, the foreclosure triggers the limitations period because at foreclosure, the full amount of the debt becomes due. See Opening Br. 28-29.",Party Submissions,5.3994327,5.787012,5.9015675
"MVP does not dispute that RLB filed the lawsuit well within the statute of limitations. Sanders v. Hathaway, No. 01-18-00661-CV, 2019 WL 2932847, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The right to disaffirm is subject to a four-year statute of limitations.”). Thus, RLB does not claim it had “unlimited” time to void the forum-selection clause: the statute of limitations provides a time limitation.",Party Submissions,5.0673885,5.5814247,5.2793756
"In order to adequately sell and service the motor vehicle buyer, each franchised dealer location must have a sufficient supply of new motor vehicles so as to continue to remain operational.",Party Submissions,16.740227,16.293503,18.944548
"HN12 [ ] Common Law Writs, Mandamus A writ of mandamus will issue when a trial court does not abate a tort suit while a suit for judicial review of a Department of Insurance Division of Workers Compensation decision is pending. Mandamus relief is afforded where a trial court fails to abate tort litigation while suit for judicial review of Workers' Compensation Commission decision remained pending.",Party Submissions,10.489432,11.241903,11.970759
"As Fleming Defendants have been saying all throughout this appeal, if a litigant makes an agreement with the court relating to collateral estoppel, express or implied, then the litigant is bound by that agreement. They should be bound by their agreement that individual issues predominate over common issues, which necessarily precludes collateral estoppel of any kind, and their motion for summary judgment on collateral estoppel on the Harpst judgment should be denied.",Party Submissions,10.837518,11.869658,12.989908
"Christus Spohn Health System Corp. v. High and Rector , 658 S.W.3d 375, 381 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 2022, pet. denied).1 As such, this would fall under the professional or administrative services component of the second element of a medical liability claim. Christus stated that patient identification involves professional or administrative services in its response to the petition for review. (Christus Rsp. 20).",Party Submissions,10.375767,13.166787,12.903166
"All of this ended with Dr. Castillo’s failure to properly perform the delivery itself. By 15:50, Dr. Castillo noted that H.W.’s head was at a +2 station with “large caput”— that is, a swelling of the scalp that occurs after prolonged engagement of the fetal head in the birth canal. App. 7, CR 666. When Dr. Castillo made her first surgical incision at 16:56, she also observed that “the head was very low in pelvis” and that she “could not reach it into the pelvis at all.” App. 7, CR 666.",Party Submissions,7.583006,9.436166,8.104341
"WHEREAS, reference is made to the agreements set forth on Exhibit A hereto (the “Specified Agreements”, and each a “Specified Agreement”), each entered into between Dow and Dow Hydrocarbons and Resources LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“DHRL”).",Contract,8.045815,5.038997,7.728262
"In the absence of a showing of subterfuge, the agreement was disposi- tive of Defterios’s independent-contractor status. E.g., Newspapers, Inc.",Party Submissions,19.228617,22.562944,24.008682
"B) The damages regarding the failure to adjust the tipping fees 536. Upon the Tribunal’s finding that Respondent violated the FET by failing to revise the tipping fees – as provided for in the Concession Agreement697 – the consistency of the damage suffered in this regard is reflected in the maintenance of the tipping fees during the landfill operation period, which, necessarily, has an impact on the calculation of the cash flows considered for the valuation of the expropriation, calculated using the DCF method.",Legal Decisions,18.27104,14.471882,16.354877
The court reversed the trial court's judgment in the employer's favor and rendered judgment affirming the appeals panel's decision that denied the employer's reimbursement claim. The court conditionally granted the employer's mandamus petition.,Party Submissions,5.3470325,5.736198,6.2136846
"Intervenor further questioned A.S. about October 2021, when law enforcement was called due to a domestic issue between A.S and C.W. 3 RR 120-21.",Party Submissions,14.604191,17.59086,25.64918
"To affirm the State of Texas’s right to implement operational protections along the southern border, to authorize the State to construct a physical border wall in areas where the international border is not adequately protected with physical barriers, and to allow reimbursement from the Federal Government.",Legislation,14.20398,12.040446,11.6138735
"Amendment, each reference in the Employment Agreement to “this Agreement,” “hereunder,” or words of like import shall mean and be a reference to the Employment Agreement, as amended by this Amendment.",Contract,3.308368,3.5401185,4.9501524
"It is the section’s preliminary assessment that there are good reasons for considering the snow crab as a sedentary species which is thus subject to shelf jurisdiction. This means that the snow crab in this case is regulated by the relevant shelf state (s). We have understood that the snow crab at the moment is mainly located on the Russian shelf. However, we have been informed by IMR that it will be able to move over to the Norwegian shelf.",Legal Decisions,13.986667,13.248114,14.299116
"III. Bay Does Not Meet the Statutory Requirements of Section 406.123 Therefore, the Trial Courts Order Striking Bay's Exclusive Remedy Defense Should be Affirmed.",Party Submissions,10.566083,10.296051,13.829829
"In Fodge, a workers' compensation claimant brought suit against an insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, fraud, and violations of the Insurance Code and the DTPA. 63 S.W.3d at 802-03. The trial court granted the insurer's motion to dismiss, based on the insurer's argument that the claimant's causes of action were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the TWCC because they were all based on a denial of compensation benefits. The appellate court reversed, however, holding that the claimant's extra-contractual claims were unrelated to the compensation claims. Id. at 803. On review, the supreme court parsed the claimant's causes of action into three claims: (1) for compensation benefits due under the insurance policy, (2) for damages caused by the insurer's bad faith denial of benefits, and (3) for damages caused by the insurer's bad faith delay in handling the claim and in making payments. Id. The supreme court concluded that the first two claims involved issues within the exclusive jurisdiction of the TWCC because both required [**30] a determination that benefits were in fact due to the claimant. Id. at 804. However, the court concluded that the claims related to the temporary income benefits-- delays in communication with the claimant and in payment of the benefits, and an improper investigation-- were properly before the trial court and should not have been dismissed. Id. at 805 .",Party Submissions,4.1560535,4.3318954,4.4904046
"At any time after the institution of the proceedings, a party may request that provisional measures for the preservation of its rights be recommended by the Tribunal. The request shall specify the rights to be preserved, the measures the recommendation of which is requested, and the circumstances that require such measures.",Legal Decisions,6.6799994,6.828592,6.7961626
"Here, by contrast, Dr. Tappan set out the facts — Mrs. Walker ’ s arrested labor and H.W. ’ s heartrate abnormalities — that put H.W. at risk of “ hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy” and how H.W.’s condition at birth suggested the possibility that he in fact suffered such an injury. App. 7, CR 668-69 (¶¶ 4-5); see also id. at CR 670.",Party Submissions,11.082279,14.30537,14.236885
"After notice and hearing and considering the evidence on the record, the trial court correctly struck Bay's affirmative defense of “exclusive remedies” because *10 Bay failed to prove that it had standing to assert the defense as a matter of law.",Party Submissions,13.184805,13.622154,16.403963
"I hereby certify that this Reply Brief on the Merits (when excluding the caption, table of contents, index of authorities, signature, certificate of compliance, and certificate of service) contains 7,496 words.",Party Submissions,7.343671,9.003813,9.293414
"Oncor asserts that “[t]he only time a section 1.111(e) agreement bars subsequent correction of a clerical error is when the agreement expressly addresses the clerical error .” 7 In support, Oncor states that Houston Cement and Bastrop do not say otherwise. Oncor ’ s characterization carefully avoids the fact that the cases cited do not stand for the “express” requirement that Oncor has read into the statute.",Party Submissions,16.089802,15.959558,19.427357
"In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the September 21, 2021 Order and Final Judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.",Party Submissions,5.4774227,6.589803,6.794682
"Change in Control. Change in Control, with respect to a Participating Employer that is organized as a corporation, occurs on the date on which any of the following events occur: (i) a change in the ownership of the Participating Employer; (ii) a change in the effective control of the Participating Employer; or (iii) a change in the ownership of a substantial portion of the assets of the Participating Employer.",Contract,2.4441774,2.6237166,2.7157412
"Additionally, evidence about whether Terry considered naming Flaven as an RTP or thought HSMiller would benefit from submitting Flaven in the proportionate responsibility jury question also is irrelevant. See id. at 58. The proper inquiry concerns Terry’s decision to wait to seek leave to designate Flaven as an RTP until he knew more about Flaven, even if that meant designating Flaven late, and whether that decision was subjectively reckless and made with conscious indifference. See Reeder, 395 S.W.3d at 796. There is no evidence that Terry had “actual awareness” that a motion for leave to designate an RTP filed less than 60 days would definitely be denied or that he himself acted with conscious indifference to the risk to 41 HSMiller in making this strategy call. See Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d at 138-39.",Party Submissions,13.224515,13.169638,14.385221
"PRAYER Because Bay does not have standing to assert an exclusive remedies affirmative defense, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. This suit *37 should be remanded to the trial court so that Mann may pursue his negligence case against Bay either as a non-employee pedestrian or as an employee against his non-subscribing employer.",Party Submissions,13.758009,16.084404,17.818039
"Respondents seek to create a misleading impression about the financial state of Manticore Fuels LLC, a company conceived by petitioner Rob Condon. CR454. Respondents also improperly cite ProPetro’s online 10-K filing from 2020, “reporting a deterioration of its financial position.” Resp. 7 n.2.4 This evidence also goes outside the face of the pleadings and offers a misleading snapshot.",Party Submissions,20.595274,22.334185,22.80965
"On December 22, 2020, MVP filed a plea in abatement in the Texas case. MVP contended that RLB’s and McCarthy’s claims against MVP in the Texas case should be abated in favor of the Oklahoma case because (1) the Oklahoma court had dominant jurisdiction because the Oklahoma case was the first-filed; and (2) the forum-selection clause in the MCC required that suit be filed in the District Court in Tulsa, Oklahoma.",Party Submissions,5.515479,6.4004617,6.6460705
"As Sonic acknowledges in its rehearing motion, the issue [**2] in this case is one of first impression. For that reason, our opinion cites to several cases dealing with subrogation issues rather than subclaimants, but this does not mean the two concepts were conflated. The issue we address in the opinion is whether Sonic's right to reimbursement under the TWCA is greater than Cochran's, not whether its rights are greater than a subrogee's. There was no dispute that Sonic was seeking reimbursement as Cochran's subclaimant, and the opinion does not attempt to define the parameters of that designation. As we note in footnote 13 of the opinion, ""neither party raised any issues in the TWCC proceedings regarding Sonic's pursuit of benefits as a 'subclaimant' or the import of that designation."" The opinion concludes that Sonic did not establish, as a matter of law, that it can recover under the TWCA as Cochran's subclaimant if Cochran was, in fact, barred from recovery under the statute.",Party Submissions,6.9771214,7.5847635,7.0502167
"Then in January 2011, the taxpayer filed a motion to correct the 2009 and 2010 values of its property under TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25(c) (as Oncor did), arguing that, due to clerical errors, both valuations included inventory that had been in transit and not yet located in Harris County on January 1 of each respective year. Id. The appraisal review board dismissed the taxpayer’s motion with respect to both years for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the taxpayer’s lawsuit, holding that “[b]ecause those final values were matters on which protests either could have been filed or had been filed but not yet determined by the board, the agreements are final as to those values.” Id. at *2. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly granted the appraisal district’s plea to the jurisdiction. Id. at *3.",Party Submissions,6.239271,6.0369606,6.449687
"Liberty has affirmatively demonstrated a valid waiver of governmental immunity under Texas Local Government Code, Section 271.152, by which certain contracts with a governmental entity are subject to such waiver. Texas Local Government Code, Section 271, provides that a “‘[c]ontract subject to this subchapter ’” means: (A) a written contract stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental entity that is properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity[.] ” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.151(2)(A). The central purpose of the Contract here is to provide wastewater treatment service to Ames, specifically to “provide for the treatment and disposal of waste from such system by LIBERTY’S wastewater plant.” (CR 32, 43.) Such wastewater treatment and disposal services are services that invoke the immunity waiver, as courts have consistently held. Partners Dewatering Int’l, L.C. v. City of Hondo, No. 13-13-00340-CV, 2015 WL 3637853, at *5 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2015, pet. denied) (holding that “collecting, hauling, and disposing of all sludge generated by the WWTP constituted a service under [Chapter 271]” for which immunity was waive d) (alteration in original); W. Travis Cnty. Pub. Util. Agency v. Travis Cnty. Mun. Util. Dist. No. 12, 537 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied) (noting that water treatment and delivery is a service that was provided by one of the contracting parties). Accordingly, Liberty’s service to Ames— wastewater treatment and disposal — is a service for which immunity is waived.",Party Submissions,5.3492656,5.4864974,5.582953
"Laporta explained that Husband’s incentive plan indicated that disbursement of the bonus was at the sole discretion of Bank of America. It was not tied to any commissioned work, and until the bonus was received, it was an “expectancy,” not an entitlement. The court ultimately awarded the February 14, 2020 bonus as. Husband’s separate property.",Party Submissions,13.422267,15.564,17.249903
"Suarez v. City of Texas City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. 2015) (collecting cases). For example, in Shumake, the plaintiffs alleged that a hidden man-made culvert created a powerful undertow that caused their nine-year-old daughter to drown in a state park. 199 S.W.3d at 281. The supreme court concluded that the plaintiffs had stated a claim for gross negligence under the Recreational Statute, in part, because the powerful undertow created by the hidden man-made culvert represented a latent defect that was not open and obvious. Id. at 288.",Party Submissions,4.513784,4.851662,5.110028
"To be sure, this Court has said that when the Legislature does decide to prohibit waiver of statutory rights, it must “speak clearly.” Moayedi, 438 S.W.3d at 6.",Party Submissions,8.771312,10.783719,10.799262
"The Amarillo Court of Appeals agreed that “no doubt, something happened leaving child and parent to suffer the consequences. ” App. 3, Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *5. But relying on this Court’s recent opinion in Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson, 649 S.W.3d 152, 179 (Tex. 2022), the Court of Appeals found the expert reports deficient as to causation, reversed the trial court, and dismissed the case. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *3-5.",Party Submissions,6.581045,7.1793184,7.062749
"Here, in support of their negligence claims, petitioners alleged that the hospital “had a duty to correctly and securely identify each infant in the hospital and to ensure that discharge of each infant be with his or her parent of family.” (CR1 8). This duty not only does not mention record keeping, it does not implicate it either. In fact, as the petition so aptly stated, “There is no other plausible explanation for this occurrence other than Defendant’s negligence.” (CR1 9). Petitioners were correct. This case should have been treated as a simple negligence case. There was no reason to try to strain to fit it into the TMLA. E. An expert report would serve no function under these facts or in most other switched at birth cases – it should be obvious that a claim that infants were switched at birth has merit and is not frivolous, so there is no need to deter these claims.",Party Submissions,12.68718,14.734775,13.7196455
"Trinity II potentially turns community-first land use governance on its head and elevates a landowner’s economic objectives above the community’s interest in public health, safety, and welfare as expressed through the zoning process. When the Dallas community, acting via statutorily-defined public processes, deemed the Surface Tracts’ drill sites incompatible with its standards, it faced a near $44 million judgment, including interest, payable from public funds. If upheld, Trinity II could shift discretionary zoning decisions from community-focused local governance to a process influenced by the fear of costly litigation and damages based on a particular landowner’s hopes and dreams. This may not matter as much in cities with sufficient funding and legal staff to fight cases as they come up; however, of the approximately 1,799 cities in Texas, only about 129 have a population in excess of 25,000.18 In fact more than a third of the population of Texas resides in just 20 cities, with the bulk of cities having fewer than 5,000 people. 19 It is imperative to consider the disproportionate impact the Trinity II decision could have on smaller Texas cities with limited financial and legal resources. These municipalities often lack the robust legal defenses and financial cushions necessary to withstand the pressures of protracted litigation or the threat of substantial damages arising from Lucas claims. This vulnerability could lead to a chilling effect on the essential zoning and regulatory actions these cities undertake to protect public interests. Consequently, there is a risk that smaller cities may become overly cautious or inclined to make concessions unfavorable to community interests, simply to avoid the potential financial burdens of litigation. Therefore, we urge this Court to recognize the unique challenges faced by these smaller municipalities in its consideration of the Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing. The decision in this case should not inadvertently create an environment where the fear of regulatory takings claims unduly constrains the ability of cities, especially those with limited resources, to effectively govern and protect the welfare of their communities.",Party Submissions,8.224952,8.232853,8.549101
"This Court followed Cockerham in its decision in Fellows. Fellows v. Fellows, 2000 EL 1073609 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.). This Court followed the Cockerham rule, stating: When a spouse uses separate property to acquire property during marriage and takes title to that property in the name of both spouses, a presumption arises that the purchasing spouse intended to make a gift of one-half of the separate funds to the other spouse.... However, the presumption can be rebutted by evidence of the absence of intent to make a gift.",Party Submissions,5.513059,5.979543,5.8840475
"The Lucas Takings Claim Gal ovelho’s first claim alleged a categorical or per se taking, which occurs “ when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle. ” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court identified this categorical taking claim in Lucas, but limited it to “ the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted .” Id. at 1017 (emphasis in original). The Lucas C ourt’s use of emphasis underscores that a categorical taking occurs only when the government’s action destroys all economic value of the property at issue.6 That principle was – 8– subsequently confirmed, when the Court wrote that “[a]nything less than a ‘complete elimination of value, ’ or a ‘ total loss ’” would prevent such a taking claim. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 330.",Party Submissions,8.034753,9.163756,8.452898
This Court cites generally to the presumption that taking title to property in both spouses’ names which was previously the separate property of one spouse gives way to a presumption of gift of one-half of the spouse’s separate property interest to the other spouse. Id. at 168.,Party Submissions,10.357803,12.297053,10.823388
"Balancing jurisprudential considerations, both public and private, in determining whether an adequate remedy by appeal exists, while a reviewing court is mindful that abatement orders are incidental rulings of the trial court and lost profits do not establish an inadequate appellate remedy, it is also true that whether an appellate remedy is adequate should be guided by general principles rather than simple rules; it is not an abstract or formulaic determination and depends heavily on the circumstances presented. Mandamus review may be essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss.",Party Submissions,12.650589,12.0671215,15.149854
"Their second claim is based on the City’s failure to provide Catiana with a life jacket even though these safety devices were available for her use. The Delapenas contend that this claim falls within the integral safety component doctrine articulated in cases like Robinson v. Central Texas MHMR Center, 780 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1989).",Party Submissions,13.860177,14.543515,14.430113
"Sales Commissions. Sales commissions (as defined in Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-2(a)(12)(i)) are considered to be earned by the Participant in the taxable year of the Participant in which the sale occurs. The Compensation Deferral Agreement applicable to any sales commissions, [if permitted by the Committee,] must be filed before the last day of the year preceding the year in which the sales commissions are earned, and becomes irrevocable after that date.",Contract,5.9781384,6.0738525,6.882515
"The MSC Industrial Direct Co., Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan for Non-Executive Directors and Consultants (the “Plan”) is adopted effective as of November 1, 2023 by MSC Industrial Direct Co., Inc. (“the Company”). The Company intends that the Plan shall at all times be administered and interpreted in such a manner as to constitute an unfunded plan maintained primarily for the benefit of non-executive members of the Company’s Board of Directors and to fulfill the applicable requirements of Section 409A.",Contract,3.552259,3.6037319,3.7544856
"Bay submitted proof that at the time of the accident, Mann was employed as Bay's foreman for a project at the Bill Greehey Refinery owned by Valero (“the refinery”). The refinery is located on Up River Road and is relatively close to the site of the accident.",Party Submissions,14.5142355,14.63544,19.813097
"On rehearing, Sonic asserts that this court's opinion contains two ""substantial"" analytical errors, as follows: (1) ""it conflates [Sonic's] status as a subclaimant with that of a subrogee,"" and (2) it construes "" [s]ection 406.075 [of the TWCA] to bar [Sonic's] reimbursement claim that does not depend on any 'election'"" made by Cochran, Sonic's employee. Specifically, Sonic argues that the opinion holds there is no distinction between a subclaimant and a subrogee and asserts its claim for reimbursement under section 409.009 is greater than that of a subrogee. Sonic also argues that a reimbursement claim is independent and not derivative of the employee's right to recover.",Party Submissions,6.07416,6.5762477,6.818998
"To amend part A of title IV of the Social Security Act to clarify the longstanding authority of States to use funds made available under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program to fund life-affirming services to empower pregnant women to choose life for their babies instead of abortion, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.322397,3.9901106,4.3298635
"HN2 [ ] A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or, stated differently, when it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles. See In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. 1998). When a trial court fails ""to analyze or apply [*4] the law correctly,"" it has clearly abused its discretion. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). ""The trial court has no discretion in determining the law or applying the law to the facts."" In re Sherwin-Williams Co., 668 S.W.3d 368, 370 (Tex. 2023). However, when considering a writ of mandamus, ""we court rather than its reasons."" In re Stevens, 971 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, orig. proceeding). If the trial court expresses an incorrect legal reason for its ruling, we will nevertheless uphold the order on any other grounds supported by the record. Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 141-42 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding).",Party Submissions,3.7595239,4.358823,4.1631775
"Diverging from its sister courts, the Seventh Court mistakenly relied on this Court’s recent opinion in Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson to reverse. See Baptist St. Anthony ’ s Hosp. v. Walker, No. 07-22-00032-CV, 2022 WL 17324338, at *3,*5 (Tex. App. — Amarillo Nov. 29, 2022, pet filed) (citing Thompson, 649 S.W.3d 152, 179 (Tex. 2022)). Even though Thompson involved a legal sufficiency review following final judgment, the Seventh Court misunderstood the opinion to impose a higher standard for preliminary expert reports — a standard that requires experts to preemptively explain why negligent acts that do not immediately precede an injury are not “ to attenuated ” to the harm. See Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *2 ,*5.",Party Submissions,7.782347,7.3687563,8.007264
"Third, enforcing the Election Code’s signature requirements through mandamus directed to Chairman Rinaldi would violate the First Amendment. While the State has a legitimate interest in ensuring that candidates for statewide office enjoy statewide support, that interest in general must be balanced in each specific case against the Republican Party’s First Amendment associational rights to allow candidates to seek its endorsement as it sees fit. In the distinct case of a statewide elected official who has repeatedly sought and received that nomination and who has repeatedly received tens of thousands of votes from voters in the judicial district in question, that state interest is too attenuated to justify the First Amendment burden on the Republican Party’s associational rights. And at a minimum, adjudicating the Re-publican Party’s free-association claim would require this Court to resolve complex disputed facts—precisely that it cannot do in an original mandamus proceeding.",Party Submissions,9.1822,8.737582,9.557367
"The main subject of this appeal is Bay's exclusive-remedy defense. In the Manns' motion for summary judgment, they asserted that Bay did not qualify for two elements of the defense: Bay was not Mann's “employer,” as that term is used in the Act, and Mann was not injured while in the “course and scope” of his employment. The trial court summarily dispensed with Bay's exclusive-remedy defense, ruling in favor of the Manns.",Party Submissions,6.703914,7.313452,7.2727103
"By its first and fourth issues, Bay asserts that it satisfied both elements of the exclusive-remedy defense which were challenged in the trial court: that Bay was Mann's “employer or an agent or employee of the employer” and that Mann's injury *322 occurred in the “course and scope” of his employment. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a). Bay asserts that it has conclusively proved these elements or, in the alternative, that there is at least a fact issue which prevents the summary disposal of this defense.",Party Submissions,6.782917,8.4825735,8.731544
"Only if MVP met its initial burden would it then fall on RLB “to raise an affirmative defense to enforcing” the agreement. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003). Until then, RLB had no burden to affirmatively assert that its claims were not within the forum-selection clause’s scope or present competing evidence. Id. Contrary to MVP’s claims otherwise, it was not undisputed that MVP satisfied this initial burden.",Party Submissions,8.001932,8.13045,9.350537
"Finally, as a conditional issue, a remand (at least) is required because the trial court refused to allow the jury to consider the responsibility of three other parties: HSMiller, the claimant; Defterios, the HSMiller agent involved; and Diamond State, the insurance carrier for HSMiller who negligently failed to settle the underlying case and paid money to settle the case below. This issue was not reached by the court of appeals, but if this Court gets to the issue, it should either affirm the remand on these grounds or ask the court of appeals to consider the issue.",Party Submissions,15.562935,13.857365,16.137405
Raymond case Wife herein relies solely and summarily upon the decisions in Raymond to support her claim that the refinance deed involving husband and wife containing wife’s name as co-grantee creates an irrebuttable presumption of a gift of one-half of husband’s separate property asset to her.,Party Submissions,19.930351,20.60582,24.004957
"True, both this case and E.D. are obstetrical malpractice cases. But that is where the similarities end, at least insofar as the lower courts’ criticisms of the expert reports in each. In E.D., this Court faulted the Fort Worth Court of Appeals for its failure to consider the entirety of the expert report, and that focusing on only a small portion was unduly restrictive and tantamount to assessing credibility or believability. E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 665-66, 667.",Party Submissions,7.0918727,7.688422,7.5967565
"Unforeseeable Emergency. An Unforeseeable Emergency means a severe financial hardship to the Participant resulting from an illness or accident of the Participant, the Participant’s spouse, the Participant’s dependent (as defined in Code section 152, without regard to section 152(b)(1), (b)(2), and (d)(1)(B)), or a Beneficiary; loss of the Participant’s property due to casualty (including the need to rebuild a home following damage to a home not otherwise covered by insurance, for example, as a result of a natural disaster); or other similar extraordinary and unforeseeable circumstances arising as a result of events beyond the control of the Participant. The types of events which may qualify as an Unforeseeable Emergency may be limited by the Committee.",Contract,2.6652012,1.9644336,3.2034564
"ATE .—The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to overpayments of special financial assistance under section 4262 of the Em-ployment Retirement Income Security Act (29 U.S.C. 1104) occurring before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act.",Legislation,5.5190425,6.6643434,7.117274
"Any notice or filing required or permitted to be given to a Participant under this Plan shall be sufficient if in writing or hand-delivered, or sent by mail to the last known address of the Participant.",Contract,4.5580764,4.5355577,5.4117203
"For purposes of this Section 7, capitalized terms not otherwise defined in the Plan shall have the meanings prescribed under the applicable Omnibus Plan. Except as provided in this Section 7, the terms of the Omnibus Plans and the applicable Award Agreements will continue to apply.",Contract,4.777856,5.654748,5.6335588
"Because the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to abate the trial until the Commission makes its final decision, Luby's is entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, the trial court should vacate is September 4, 1998 order denying abatement and enter the appropriate order. Writ will issue if the trial court fails to comply.",Party Submissions,7.2117934,9.053349,9.3867445
"As this Court summarized in yet another case, the rule is that the trial court has “authority” during an interlocutory appeal “to take further proceedings in the cause, unless in its discretion it orders them to be stayed, pending the appeal.” Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525, 17 S.Ct. 407, 41 L.Ed. 810 (1897). That authority is “recognized” by the 1891 Act but existed already as a traditional matter, “often exercised by other courts of chancery.” Ibid.",Party Submissions,6.726599,6.578113,6.7974677
"Complete version of any and all sketches ( in Serbian: skice), excerpts of which are included in Serbia’s exhibit R-043. Where the requested documents cover a large area, it is sufficient to produce only the part of the document showing Dunavska 17-19, Dunavska 23 and the Surrounding Area plus the legend and any textual part of the document.",Legal Decisions,22.931957,32.70225,29.103716
"Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. at 663-664. The Party has no Rule that allows Respondent to accept ballot applications that are noncompliant with Texas law. By the same token, he cannot choose to reject his political enemies’ ballot applications just because he asserts the Party does not want to associate with them. Respondent is the party chair, not the Party. The Party has not imbued him with the power to refuse to comply with state law. Respondents’ assertion of a First Amendment right to pick and choose what laws he wants to follow falls flat. Respondent cites Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Dem. Ctrl. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1989) for the proposition that the Party, and ostensibly himself as Chair, generally has a First Amendment right to determine who gets to run in a primary election. But that is not what Eu was about. Eu concerned state laws restricting the ability of a political party to issue endorsements in primary elections, and regulating internal party governance. Eu, 489 U.S. at 219. Indeed, the Eu Court expressly upheld the ability of a state to preserve the integrity of its election process by regulating the primary election process. Eu, 489 U.S. at 231, citing e.g. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 785-786 (1974) (upholding Texas petition law). Rather, the 8 Supreme Court has consistently taken the opposite of Respondent’s position. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (upholding Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system statute as not infringing on the associational rights of parties); Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 892 F.3d 1066, 1076 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1290, 203 L.Ed.2d 414 (2019) (upholding state regulation of nominating general election candidates). Respondent’s assertion of a First Amendment right to defeat mandamus must be rejected by this Court.",Party Submissions,4.5985847,4.407025,4.683736
"Nor can Respondents avoid review by supplying their own version of the analysis they think the Board and court silently did. The specifics of how the proper legal standard would apply to these facts is no reason to deny review because the legal errors about what § 2301.467(a)(1) means need correction regardless, and application of the proper standard can be left for remand. But Respondents are also wrong about what the evidence shows, as a differently-composed Board initially concluded in this case. Pet. App. C.",Party Submissions,22.6031,23.530098,23.808247
"This Twenty-Seconded Amendment to the Amended and Restated Revolving Credit Agreement (this “Amendment”) is made effective as of October 1, 2023, and is entered into among Union Carbide Corporation, as Borrower (“Borrower”) and The Dow Chemical Company, as Lender (“Lender”) (together, the “Parties”).",Contract,5.011242,3.5621328,5.153553
"This Court has said the standard is “lenient;” a claimant has a “fair opportunity to show his claim is not frivolous.” Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 549. Still, an expert must “explain, to a reasonable degree, how and why the breach caused the injury based on the facts presented.” Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 539-40 (Tex. 2010).",Party Submissions,7.3817453,7.8232465,8.042579
"To be entitled to the requested mandamus relief, a party must show that a trial court's order is a clear abuse of discretion and that it has no adequate remedy by appeal. A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law, or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. To determine whether a party has an adequate remedy by appeal, an appellate court balances jurisprudential considerations implicating both public and private interests. When the benefits of mandamus review outweigh the detriments, appellate courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is adequate.",Party Submissions,3.6556585,4.445942,4.519157
"Jurisdiction (“ Rejoinder ”) together with the Second Witness Statement of Mr. Severo Buenalaya (“RWS-Buenalaya II”); the Second Legal Opinion of Mr. Ricardo Leyva (“ RER-Leyva II""); the Expert Report of Mr. Richard Tabors (“RER-Tabors”); the Second Expert Report of Mr. César Gutiérrez (“RER-Gutiérrez II”); the Second Expert Report of Compass Lexecon (“ RER-CLEX II ”) and its respective Exhibits; Exhibits R-060bis, R-109 to R-216; and Legal Authorities RL-23bis, RL-028 to RL-059. 55. On September 24, 2021, Claimants requested that the Tribunal strike from the record the PSR Report, RER-Tabors, and all passages of Peru’s Rejoinder submission (and accompanying documents) in which either of the two reports were cited.",Legal Decisions,10.2841835,8.893886,10.307838
"The court of appeals correctly described the nature of the case. Daniel and Kristin Walker sued Dr. Rhodesia Castillo, Kristen Walker’s obstetrician, and Baptist St. Anthony, the Hospital where Mrs. Walker delivered, when the providers ’ collective negligence caused baby H.W. to suffer a significant brain injury during labor and delivery. CR 7-17.",Party Submissions,20.737232,22.796488,23.088919
"Thus, unlike an abstract of judgment, a lis pendens is a communication made during the course of a judicial proceeding that accomplishes the goal of informing and protecting the rights of the general public. See Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 771; James, 637 S.W.2d at 916; Reagan, 166 S.W.2d at 913. But the privilege should not be extended to cover an abstract of judgment that does not accomplish the privilege’s central purpose. See Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 49 (“The judicial-proceedings privilege[’s] ... purpose is to facilitate open and vigorous litigation of matters inside the courtroom.”). As the dissenting chief justice urged in Prappas and the dissenting justice in Bayou Terrace noted: “we should not apply its protection to a deliberate, ex parte act done after the trial had been concluded,” “with the explicit intention of stopping [a property] sale.” Prappas, 795 S.W.2d at 800 (Brown, C.J., dissenting); see also Bayou Terrace, 881 S.W.2d at 818 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). This caution should be heeded even more so here as the Hospitals expressed that was their sole purpose filing the abstracts when no judgment was in place against Dr. Nath.",Party Submissions,8.954234,8.275663,8.741454
"Our opening brief explains (at 32-36) that if even the applicable statute of limitations does not bar Yellowfin’s claim, Yellowfin and its predecessors -in-interest waived any acceleration rights by waiting over twelve years to assert those rights. Yellowfin responds by pointing to provisions in the Note that permitted the lender to waive or delay enforcement of its rights under the Note. That argument runs headlong into this Court’s precedent, which recognizes that “a party’s rights under a nonwaiver provis ion may indeed be waived expressly or impliedly.” Shields Ltd. v. Boo Nathaniel Bradberry & 40/40 Enters., 526 S.W.3d 471, 482-83 (Tex. 2017). A party waives a right notwithstanding a nonwaiver provision when it “intentionally engage[s] in conduct inconsistent with claiming the right to enforce the nonwaiver agreement.” Id. at 485.",Party Submissions,8.035195,7.9193134,8.74487
"It also substantially harms lenders by impeding their ability to enforce guaranty agreements. Guaranty agreements regularly include termination provisions, and a lender that cannot enforce a guaranty without a substantial risk of the termination provision eliminating the guarantor’s liability for a past breach will be less likely to operate in Texas. Texas law’s emphasis on enforcing contracts makes it an attractive place for business investment, and this Court should not permit any departure from those values.",Party Submissions,10.696897,9.544827,11.872925
"Rusk at San Jacinto also sought to participate in the Texas program to help fund the Texaco building project. Once received, the state tax credits would be allocated to TX 1111. TX 1111 would then monetize the tax credits by selling them to Stonehenge Capital Co., a tax credit investor, through an affiliated entity, Rusk Investor, LLC. Rusk Investor’s cash payments for the state tax credits were referred to as either “contributions” or “capital contributions” (hereinafter Contributions). TX 1111 filed its original Part B in the Texas program on August 25, 2015, which matched its federal program Part 2 as it existed at that time. At that time, the Texas program was set up as a single rehabilitation project.",Party Submissions,11.818494,9.541009,12.430979
"The Stantons do not have this issue here since they are not seeking any benefit from the Subcontract, but rather from Petitioner’s contract with 4415 W. Lovers. The Subcontract containing the arbitration provision could have never been created in this case, and Respondents would still be able to pursue their third-party breach of contract claim against Petitioner because that Subcontract has absolutely no bearing on this claim, and Respondents derived no benefit from its existence.",Party Submissions,12.370302,13.731263,14.6970415
Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should recognize the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as ‘‘the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda’’.,Legislation,5.1079082,3.847686,4.2432685
"Except as indicated above on this Exhibit A, I have no Prior Developments to disclose pursuant to Section 3(a) of this Agreement and no agreements to disclose pursuant to Section 4 of this Agreement.",Contract,8.077254,7.96996,10.325438
"Designation of a responsible third party is not listed in the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA) as a prohibited defense for nonsubscribers. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033(a). However, under the express terms of the TWCA, an employee must still prove that her employer was negligent to prevail at trial. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033(d).",Party Submissions,4.592887,5.1889873,5.0006123
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, in the event of a payment to be made, or a benefit to be provided, pursuant to this Agreement based upon Executive’s “separation from service” (as defined below) for a reason other than death at a time when Executive is a Specified Employee (as defined below) and such payment or provision of such benefit is not exempt or otherwise permitted under Section 409A without the imposition of any Section 409A Penalty (as defined below), such payment shall not be made, and such benefit shall not be provided, before the earlier of the date which is the first day of the seventh month after Executive’s separation from service or 30 days after Executive’s death. All payments or benefits delayed pursuant to this Section 3.8 shall be aggregated into one lump sum payment to be made as of the Company’s first business day following the first day of the seventh month after Executive’s separation from service (or if earlier, as of 30 days after Executive’s death).",Contract,3.1650565,3.4918513,3.3551207
"Fisheries” where “a fishing vessel under the EU flag will land live snow crabs at approved Norwegian reception stations” was that: 1. In principle, EU vessels can land fish, including snow crab to Norway on an equal footing with Norwegian fishing vessels [...] .",Legal Decisions,30.976452,35.16503,39.77216
"And finally, to whatever extent the Martinez Family might raise additional arguments that the agency's order is void, we would also reject those arguments as a basis for mandamus relief. HN11 [ ] We have held that an agency order may be subject to collateral attack as a void order on just two grounds: because ""the order shows on its face that the agency exceeded its authority"" or because ""a complainant shows the order was obtained by extrinsic fraud."" Chocolate Bayou Water Co. & Sand Supply v. Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n, 124 S.W.3d 844, 853 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2003, pet. denied). Here, the Martinez Family has not shown how the face of the DWC order indicates that the agency exceeded its authority. Nor has the Martinez Family alleged that the DWC order resulted from fraud.",Party Submissions,6.3524175,6.4539113,7.0004835
RLB now disputes whether and under what conditions section 272.001 may be contractually waived. But RLB offers three contradictory arguments.,Party Submissions,21.791147,25.929428,29.58321
"This case involves seven oil and gas leases. 4CR5086-87; 6CR8176-83. Hooks involved three leases. 4CR5458-59. Different owners of undivided interests in one tract (Tract 4) granted Samson four different “Tract 4/14” Leases that covered their interests. Three leases were from Bordages case owners: Leases H, I, and K (1CR1202-35, 1236-67, 1289-1314). The fourth was from the Hooks interests: Lease J (1CR1268-88).",Party Submissions,12.99321,12.932473,13.776738
"In Signal Int’l Texas L.P. v. Orange Cty., Texas, No. 09-13-00412-CV, 2014 WL 7183667, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 18, 2014, pet. denied), the Ninth Court of Appeals declined to apply the contract-law principle of mutual mistake to an agreement under § 1.111(e).",Party Submissions,4.675292,5.4228344,5.0342474
"To provide that an individual who uses marijuana in compliance with State law may not be denied occupancy of federally assisted housing, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.0431933,6.024899,7.6211166
To require the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the United States Executive Directors at the international financial institutions to advocate opposition to projects that make use of forced labor.,Legislation,7.4482217,6.3628964,11.699367
"Samson asserted in rebuttal that it is not collaterally estopped because this case involves a question of law, then agreed with Justice Young that an exception for a case with “a non-party” applies here – apparently under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §29(7) (1982). Though this Court has not specifically cited that section, it has generally cited Section 29. See Sysco Food Services, Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 802 (Tex. 1994).",Party Submissions,9.420141,9.557825,10.189544
"At trial, trial counsel for Intervenors began questioning and called A.S., mother of R.W., to testify. 3 RR 14. A.S. agreed that she had other children but did not have custody of them. 3 RR 14-18. When asked, A.S. agreed that in December 2021, she had tested positive on a hair follicle test for methamphetamines and opiates. 3 RR 18. A.S. also tested for prescribed oxycodone. 3 RR 19. A.S. was questioned about the family plan of service—I-1. 3 RR 23. A.S. was asked to take a parenting class, provide a prescription for oxycodone, complete a psychological, an ETCADA assessment, and random drug testing. 3 RR 24-28. A.S.’s psychological was admitted as I-2. 3 RR 29. The psychological, was from a previous CPS case, not the current case, and included why A.S.’s older children were removed and DFPS concerns in a previous case. 3 RR 30. No motion in limine prevented the jury from hearing this.",Party Submissions,7.618813,7.0045757,7.8047523
"She also offers a vague statement about going up the chain of command but does not state any corresponding breach. (CR.844) The statement is wholly unexplained, rendering it insufficient. Similarly, the generic sentence, “life-threatening situations, such as cardiac and respiratory distress must be prevented” does not set a standard of care or breach and is not based on or related to any facts in this case. (CR.844) See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880 (opinion that hospital should have monitored patient more closely was conclusory).",Party Submissions,13.082039,15.59869,14.278969
"In Briggs, Toyota relied upon the affidavit of a regional claims manager, Dale Wimer. Wimer's affidavit referenced an agreement along with a slew of conclusory statements, but no actual agreement, just as Bay has done in this case. Id at 284-85. *18 Thus, David Carlin's affidavit likewise fails to satisfy the statute's “written agreement” requirement.",Party Submissions,16.064358,17.300142,18.653433
The sole question before this Court is whether a district court must stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing. The answer is yes.,Party Submissions,10.690025,11.079373,12.2260065
"In sum, only after the party seeking to enforce a forum-selection clause meets its burden on the threshold issues—including the clause’s applicability to the claims at issue—does the burden then shift to the other party to demonstrate a reason why the clause should not be enforced. E.g., Harris Corp., 2013 WL 2631700, at *2. MVP did not meet its initial burden to prove the MCC’s forum-selection/choice-of-law and waiver provisions were incorporated into the Subcontract, RLB was bound by them, and they governed RLB’s claims. RLB has never conceded that it was bound by MCC paragraph 47.7 or that it governed RLB’s claims. And the MCC and Subcontract were before the trial court for its review—and the contract language supports the court’s decision denying MVP’s motions. This Court should conclude the court of appeals erred in refusing to reach this issue and instead assuming MCC paragraph 47.7 applies to RLB and its claims.",Party Submissions,7.3129992,7.3213058,7.6686487
"While not reached by the intermediate court, the reports also failed to adequately set out standard of care and breach. “Identifying the standard of care is critical: Whether a defendant breached his or her duty to a patient cannot be determined absent specific information about what the defendant should have done differently.” Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880.",Party Submissions,10.301192,13.963936,12.843745
"I hereby certify that on November 6, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing letter has been electronically filed and served on all counsel below. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(c)(1), 9.5(b)(1).",Party Submissions,4.6665845,6.764343,7.0783834
"Tribunal does not have to review all of the measures in dispute in this arbitration, when assessing the existence of the “ same measures. ” 81 104. The Respondent’s “all or nothing approach” is therefore inapplicable in the present circumstances, given t he Respondent’s acknowledgment that this Tribunal has several more measures for adjudication than the two measures related to blocking of the bank account and deposit of VAT refunds into the blocked accounts by the SAT. Simply stated, the Respondent itself has resiled from its position that the breach of the waiver in relation to the entitlement and recovery of the VAT refunds, based on the initiation of the VAT Arbitration, means that the Tribunal has no ability to proceed on the several other measures in dispute in this ongoing arbitration.",Party Submissions,15.321881,14.148737,16.04149
"Specified Date Benefit. If the Participant has established one or more Specified Date Accounts, he or she shall be entitled to a Specified Date Benefit with respect to each such Specified Date Account. The Specified Date Benefit shall be equal to the vested portion of the Specified Date Account, based on the value of that Account as of the end of the month designated by the Participant in the applicable Compensation Deferral Agreement. Payment of the Specified Date Benefit will be made or begin no later than the end of the month following the designated month, with the actual payment or commencement date determined in the sole discretion of the Committee.",Contract,4.1691246,3.9282072,4.7675185
"There are two appellate decisions on essentially the same facts: The first is the decision below, Wilbarger Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Oncor Electric Delivery Co. NTU, LLC, 660 S.W.3d 760 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2022, pet. pending), which in all respects holds for Wilbarger CAD’s position. Unfortunately, the other, Oncor v. Mills Cty. Appraisal Dist., 660 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App. – Austin 2022, pet. pending) disagrees and holds for Oncor’s position by application of the contract theory of mutual mistake of fact. The Seventh Court of Appeals’ decision is correct. This Court should deny the petition in this case and grant the petition in the Mills case.",Party Submissions,5.751312,5.670272,6.014197
"It simply could not be clearer. If the Legislature cannot limit the power of an agency with this language that is this positive and direct, then it simply cannot be done.",Party Submissions,18.80605,21.160524,23.784378
"Trial Court Disposition: The 125th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas; the Honorable Kyle Carter, presiding, denied MVP’s plea in abatement as well as a later-filed motion for reconsideration. R.0725, R.05802 (App. C to Relator’s Pet.).",Party Submissions,10.103093,12.860038,12.112569
"In arguing otherwise, Dr. Castillo and BSA relied exclusively on the only outlier, Tenet Hospitals, Ltd. V. De La Riva, 351 S.W.3d 398, 406-07 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2011, no pet.). De La Riva, like this case, involved a birth injury claim against a hospital and obstetrician. 351 S.W.3d 398. The plaintiff offered expert reports from a nurse, an obstetrician, and a pediatric neurologist. 351 S.W.3d 398. The hospital defendants objected in the trial court that the pediatric neurologist did not address the nurses ’ conduct. De La Riva, 351 S.W.3d at 405-406. The court of appeals agreed that the neurologist ’ s causation opinion was lacking as to the nurses and that the nurse expert could not fill the gap. Id. at 405. The court also held that the obstetrician/gynecologist was not qualified to opine as to causation because his report did not even try to establish his qualifications to do so. Id. at 407.",Party Submissions,4.038028,4.467937,4.281235
"According to Fleming Defendants’ analysis, a party can impliedly consent to be bound by an agreement relating to collateral estoppel through statements made to the court in a motion or response, and according to Texas law, to make such an implied agreement, the party must obtain mutual assent with the trial court, which can include the court ruling in the party’s favor.",Party Submissions,15.002705,13.433231,16.38239
"The issue of the umbrella clause 477. Article V of Annex III of the Treaty, once again invoked by Claimant, sets forth: COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS Each Party shall comply with its commitments regarding investment and shall, in no way, impair, through the adoption of arbitrary and discriminatory measures, the management, development, maintenance, utilisation, usufruct, acquisition, expansion or transfer of said investments.",Legal Decisions,13.847005,13.48274,16.162163
"All of the Dow factors contemplate some form of control over solid waste. See id. As shown below, Midland not only lacked control over the alleged Contaminants, it had no knowledge that the waste even existed. Midland did not come into contact with the waste, did not make any decisions regarding the disposal of the waste nor did it have the authority or obligation to do so, and it did not actually dispose of the waste. (CR 54.) Midland satisfied none of the Dow factors, and without some concrete causal nexus, Midland cannot be a “person responsible” for the alleged Contaminants at issue.",Party Submissions,10.625692,13.043784,12.592944
"Several other jurisdictions do recognize such a common law duty. See, e.g., Cummings v. Nazareth Borough, 427 Pa. 14, 18, 233 A.2d 874, 877 (1967) (“[w]herever people publicly congregate to swim, dive and divert themselves in the water, a lifeguard is a compelling necessity”); Pickett v. City of Jacksonville, 155 Fla. 439, 442, 20 So. 2d 484, 485 (1945) (same); Page v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-13, 2005 WL 1106893, at *4 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (recognizing limited duty of reasonable care to supervise minors at pools under Michigan law). The Court should address whether Texas law recognizes such a common law right.",Party Submissions,5.113198,5.1322227,5.2905087
"The Payment Schedule that the Participant has designated for the Participant’s Retirement Account applies to amounts paid from the Retirement Account and any Specified Date Accounts included in the Separation from Service Benefit. For the avoidance of doubt, the Payment Schedule designated by a Participant for the Retirement Account shall not apply to any Separation from Service Account, and the Payment Schedule designated by a Participant for any Separation from Service Account shall not apply to the Retirement Account, any Specified Date Account or any other Separation from Service Account. The payment of a lump sum or the initial payment of annual installments from any Account as provided under this Section 6.2(a) shall be subject to the payment delay for Specified Employees set forth in Section 6.1(a).",Contract,5.055868,4.5471525,5.430689
"Galovelho does not dispute the fact that the restrictions on restaurant operations that he complained of no longer exist. However, he relies on exceptions to the mootness doctrine for matters that are capable of repetition but evading review – 19– and for matters voluntarily abandoned by the defendant. We disagree that either exception should apply in this case.",Party Submissions,14.4241905,18.392694,16.802637
"Even if the 2019 settlement agreement were otherwise a bar to Oncor’s claim under one of respondents’ theories, the district court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the settlement under the mutual-mistake doctrine. The Third Court of Appeals recently agreed with Oncor in the parallel appeal of the Mills County proceeding, based upon this Court’s decision in Willacy County, supra. See Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. NTU LLC v. Mills Cent. Appraisal Dist., 660 S.W.3d 288, 297-300 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, pet. requested). That court got it right, for the reasons already stated in Oncor’s initial brief. See Oncor’s Brief at 37-40.",Party Submissions,7.3948226,7.3508344,8.689643
"Given the Respondent’s objections regarding the lack of specific mention in the Request for Arbitration, and for the sake of efficiency, the Claimant is prepared to withdraw the Request.",Legal Decisions,14.538063,10.749494,13.81025
McCarthy Subcontract -3-01-12-2017 Rev. on behalf of Subcontractor’s subcontractors and suppliers (at any tier) jointly payable to Subcontractor and such lower tier subcontractors and suppliers. Subcontractor and such lower tier subcontractors and suppliers shall be responsible for the allocation and disbursement of funds included as part of any such joint payment. In no event shall any joint payment be construed to create any (1) contract between McCarthy and Subcontractor’s lower tier subcontractors and suppliers; (2) obligations from McCarthy to such lower tier subcontractors and suppliers; or (3) rights in such lower tier subcontractors and suppliers against McCarthy.,Party Submissions,5.6051745,5.041706,5.913452
"HN12 [ ] When construing a statute, courts use the ordinary meaning of terms unless the Legislature provided a definition. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 (West 2013); Hopkins v.",Party Submissions,5.937854,9.491259,8.048897
"Properly understood and applied here, Griggs divests the district court of control over only a narrow slice of the case. The interlocutory appeal addresses an order declining to compel arbitration. Griggs merely prevents the district court from modifying that order— i.e., Griggs prevents the district judge from revisiting whether to compel arbitration while the appeal is pending. Griggs does not stop the district court from proceeding on matters other than arbitrability.",Party Submissions,7.777042,9.502467,10.009873
"Being part of the management team of a Texas Corporation is an obvious availment of the Respondent’s right to do business in Texas, and clearly embraces the possibility that he may be haled into Texas Courts.",Party Submissions,17.88425,18.220797,19.169212
"The foregoing statements from the Karnes court order denying class certification prove mutual assent between Fleming Defendants and the Karnes court on the principle that the individual issues predominated over the common issues for the Wilson Plaintiffs’ cases. That position necessarily precludes any form of collateral estoppel, including offensive and defensive, because one of the essential elements of collateral estoppel, both offensive and defensive, is that the legal issues sought to be litigated in the second action must be identical to those in the first action. (XXII CR 13815) see also Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979) (“Collateral estoppel...has the...purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy...”) (emphasis added). Thus, the foregoing constituted an Absolute Anti-Collateral Estoppel Agreement between Fleming Defendants and the court.",Party Submissions,5.600673,5.116178,5.955275
"After offering his review of Mrs. Walker’s medical records, Dr. Tappan lists several claimed departures by Dr. Castillo and says one—an alleged failure to recognize recurrent decelerations and minimal variability—put H.W. at risk for (but never says this caused ) “hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy.” (CR.669 [Standard of Care ¶5]). He then guesses H.W. may have sustained an “arterial ischemic stroke.” (CR.670). Dr. Tappan never explains whether “hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy” is the same as “arterial ischemic stroke,” or if they even are related.",Party Submissions,10.664271,12.756373,12.461574
"Statement of Interest and Purpose TADA represents the interests of the Texas franchised motor vehicle and heavy-duty truck dealers before federal and state legislative bodies, administrative agencies, and federal and state courts. TADA's concerns encompass its members, the franchised dealers, as well as the residents whom the Texas dealers serve through the sale and service of new and used motor vehicles.",Party Submissions,8.202899,7.908811,8.482851
The arbitration agreement coupled with the AAA Construction Industry Rules incontrovertibly underscores the agreement's unilateral nature and unconscionability. The absence of expenditure ceilings is particularly alarming. Such frameworks compel homebuyers like Rafiei to navigate a gauntlet of prohibitive fees — effectively a deterrent to those without immediate expansive financial means. Rafiei's predicament of contemplating substantial sums for merely initializing the arbitration process exemplifies this.,Party Submissions,20.028605,19.495104,20.27989
"The Respondent’s objection is threefold: (i) the request lacks specificity and is overbroad, (ii) lack of relevance, and (iii) confidentiality based on the Agreement on Confidentiality signed by the Negotiating Parties20.",Legal Decisions,9.123764,7.6495824,9.712234
"The Committee shall designate the periods (each, a “Performance Period”) with respect to which a Participant may be granted the opportunity to earn one or more payouts. The first Performance Period shall commence January 1, 2019. Unless otherwise determined by the Committee, the Performance Period shall be United Rentals’ fiscal year.",Contract,7.0174813,6.365444,7.8109026
"Arbitration Rules contain a presumption in favour of an award of costs to the successful Party. The Tribunal thus has a discretion regarding whether to make an award of costs and, if so, on what terms. Costs fall into two distinct categories: the costs of the arbitration, including the fees and expenses of the Members of the Tribunal, and the costs incurred by the Parties for their legal representation, for retaining the services of experts and for incidental expenses (“ Costs of Representation ”).",Legal Decisions,6.1655354,5.1803493,6.494623
"Respondents point to Tax Code section 42.21(b) as authority for their argument that the Board is not a proper party to this lawsuit. See Respondents’ Brief at 43-44. According to respondents, because Chapter 42 of the Tax Code authorizes a property owner to appeal an appraisal review board’s determination of a motion filed under section 25.25, and section 42.21(b) was enacted after section 25.25(g), the bar in section 42.21(b) applies and prohibits Oncor from naming the Board as a defendant. Oncor addressed this argument in its initial brief. See Oncor’s Brief at 48-50.",Party Submissions,4.7563486,4.996605,5.010975
"A.S. was then questioned about her relationship with C.W., father of R.W., who had relinquished his rights. 3 RR 68. The exchange alluded to law 2 At the time of trial, A.S. was serving a 300-day sentence in the Smith County Jail.",Party Submissions,13.695278,13.825585,16.354591
"Commenting on Oncor ’ s argument on the point, the court in Wilbarger held: Had the legislature intended an agreement under section 1.111 to only preclude challenges asserted under section 25.25(d), it could have easily so specified. We cannot interpret the absence of language in a statute in a manner contrary to express language contained elsewhere in the code.",Party Submissions,14.966664,17.941576,18.573742
"In this case, the ARB has exclusive jurisdiction over property tax disputes, and the Texas Property Tax Code provides exclusive remedies for property owners to protest their tax liabilities.",Party Submissions,10.144066,11.950746,10.977351
"And the attempt to bypass Zuniga and Gandy by assigning “only” proceeds is nothing more than a mirage. The assignment of proceeds here did not prevent the collusion and position-shifting that this Court prohibited in Zuniga and Gandy. In any event, one Texas 21 court of appeals has barred an assignment of proceeds for the same reasons that assignments of claims are barred in Texas. See Tate v. Goins, Underkofler, Crawford & Langdon, 24 S.W.3d 627, 633-34 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied). There, the terms of the settlement agreement between the former plaintiff and the original defendant gave 90% of the recovery of funds from the malpractice litigation against the original defendant’s lawyer, absolute control over the litigation, and the unfettered right to settle to the former plaintiff. Id. The court held that the agreement constituted an assignment of claims that violated public policy. Id. at 634.",Party Submissions,8.176903,8.584207,8.746405
"Respondent makes the argument that the preclusive effect of a 1.111(e) agreement is limited to the substance of the Agreement as expressed therein. Therefore, Respondent argues, because the Agreement did not expressly address the possibility of mistake it left such questions open to challenge. The key to this argument is the assumption that the Agreement as set forth does not itself implicitly express agreement as to the absence of mistake. The substance of the Agreement is quite simply the appraised value of the power lines. This perforce includes the calculations that produced it, along with everything else that went into negotiating the final number. Respondent argues that in order for the Agreement to be effective in barring its suit, it would have had to include some reference to the actual data and calculations. The Agreement as to value implicitly assents to the way it was calculated. Were this not sufficient, the actual Agreement includes an express waiver of the right to “any future proceeding in this matter.” The subject of the Agreement is described as “2019 Total County Appraisal Value $78,801,960.00” (RR 322). The argument, if any, is what “matter” was contemplated by the parties. Respondent argues that it is limited to the substance of the protest that was filed by Sharyland, which claimed that the value of the property was over market and unequal. (RR 319-320). It seems fairly obvious that this would cover any issues concerning the appraised value agreed to. The language used is inclusive, and not, as Respondent contends, exclusive. V. RESPONDENT’S SUIT IS BARRED BY WAIVER.",Party Submissions,10.761701,10.026316,10.788294
"HN3 [ ] Because the erroneous denial of a motion for leave to designate a responsible third party skews the proceedings, potentially affects the litigation's outcome, and compromises the defense in ways unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record, such an error ordinarily renders the appellate remedy inadequate. In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 509-10 (Tex. 2017). The same problems arise when a trial court erroneously grants a motion to strike a responsible third party designation. In re Molina, 575 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, orig. proceeding). Thus, we conclude, the appellate remedy is also ordinarily inadequate when a trial court commits such an error.",Party Submissions,5.542262,6.335403,6.1460915
"Walker reiterated his demand that Rinaldi reject Devine’s ballot on January 5, 2024. Pet. Ex. D. Rinaldi responded that same day, refusing to remove Devine from the ballot. Despite not having sought judicial relief in the interim either in an appropriate district court or court of appeals, Walker sought mandamus relief later that day—fifty-three days after Devine submitted his application. See Pet. at 16.",Party Submissions,11.452048,13.114567,13.582864
"On May 22, 2020, Galovelho filed suit against Abbott, Collin County, and Frisco. He alleged that the Emergency Orders had effected a taking of its property, and he sought $2 million in damages. In June 2020, all three defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the takings claims. Galovelho filed an omnibus response, clarifying that its claims for regulatory takings should be analyzed as categorical takings under Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992), or alternatively, as traditional takings pursuant to Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).",Party Submissions,4.1885524,4.200246,4.5214295
"Cancellation of Deferrals. The Committee may cancel a Participant’s Deferrals: (i) for the balance of the Plan Year in which an Unforeseeable Emergency occurs; or (ii) during periods in which the Participant is unable to perform the duties of his or her position or any substantially similar position due to a mental or physical impairment that can be expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of at least six months, provided cancellation occurs by the later of the end of the taxable year of the Participant or the fifteenth (15th ) day of the third (3rd) month following the date the Participant incurs the disability (as defined in this clause (ii)).",Contract,4.132273,3.882211,4.784317
Annexes I and II to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/594 are replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Regulation.,Legislation,3.3496592,3.7652867,6.02622
"She went to Baptist in May 2015, when she was approximately thirty-seven weeks pregnant, to deliver her baby. (CR.665). After more than twelve hours of labor, H.W. was born via cesarean delivery. (CR.666). He required resuscitation at three minutes of age and was eventually transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit. (CR.666-67). H.W. was discharged home eighteen days later. (CR.667).",Party Submissions,4.7432346,6.015458,5.393896
Request No. 1.a Agreement on Confidentiality and that neither the Claimants nor the Arbitral Tribunal’s members qualify as individuals allowed to have access to the same.,Legal Decisions,30.869387,24.44077,35.63436
"During the divorce hearing, Wife asked the court to award her half of Husband’s anticipated bonus as community property. Husband obj ected that he had yet to receive the bonus, and the court “cannot divest separate property money he received in years aer the divorce.” Other than stating that Husband typically received ayearly bonus in February, neither party provided additional evidence about the anticipated bonus. The trial court did not rule on its characterization and division.",Party Submissions,16.57434,18.37117,18.292253
"At minimum, the Election Code’s prohibition on individuals signing multiple candidates’ petitions is unconstitutional as applied to these facts. This prohibition cannot be constitutionally applied if the candidate has no opportunity to cure his petition and the penalty is decertification from the ballot. Cf. State v. Hodges, 92 S.W.3d 489, 497, 500 (Tex. 2002) (considering whether ballot requirement was reasonable “as applied to” the candidate). There is no question that Justice Devine has ample support to be on the ballot and is not a “frivolous candidate[].” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9. Justice Devine could not have known of the alleged defects until after his application was accepted, and there is no dispute that he could have corrected the defects. Any possible state interest in enforcing statutory deadlines and ballot access requirements to avoid “chaos” that would otherwise “accompany the democratic process,” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (cleaned up), is not advanced here. Relator has caused chaos by delaying for weeks, skipping the lower courts, and demanding that this Court grant mandamus in an original proceeding within three business days during an imminent election.",Party Submissions,8.053302,8.07535,8.402516
"Matured (as in Matured Claim) “A claim based on a debt that is due for payment.” Claim, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).",Party Submissions,11.125611,11.895051,14.576327
The United States objects to Request No. 2.j for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a.,Legal Decisions,9.11884,13.763,15.672507
"Any and all aerial and/or satellite photos of Belgrade, which include any part of Dunavska 17-19, Dunavska 23 and/or the Surrounding Area, made, commissioned and/or otherwise acquired or possessed by Serbian authorities, including but not limited to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Construction, Infrastructure and Transportation and/or the Republic Geodetic Authority (and their legal predecessors) between 1946 and 2005.",Legal Decisions,8.191093,7.625408,8.401377
"Company Contribution. Company Contribution means a credit by a Participating Employer to a Participant’s Account(s) in accordance with the provisions of Article V of the Plan. Company Contributions are credited at the sole discretion of the Participating Employer and the fact that a Company Contribution is credited in one year shall not obligate the Participating Employer to continue to make such Company Contribution in subsequent years. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, a reference to Company Contribution shall include Earnings attributable to such contribution.",Contract,4.5604568,4.0877795,4.9625635
"Tiffany Harry, a former CVS worker for DFPS, testified next for Intervenor. 4 RR 96. Harry’s testimony concerned visits between A.S. and R.W. 4 RR 97. Harry testified that A.S. took care of R.W. at visits compared to C.W., but visits often had to be rescheduled and A.S. did not provide items for R.W. 4 RR 97-100. Harry further testified to other inflammatory behavior by A.S. such as her inability to hold a young R.W. and her use of the “F” in front of her other children. 4 RR 100. During cross-examination, Harry agreed that ETCADA made no further recommendations for A.S. in her service plan. 4 RR 108. Harry further agreed with Petitioner that A.S. was unwilling to test and admit drug use. 4 RR 112. F. Alisha Santiago Thomas Caseworker, Alisha Santiago Thomas, testified next for Intervenor. 4 RR 113. Thomas testified that when she took over the case from Harry, there were drug use and domestic violence concerns. 4 RR 115. Thomas further testified to failed compliance to drug test by A.S. in November of 2022, December of 2022 and January 2023, and such request was communicated by phone call and then a text message. 4 RR 118-120. Although ordered to provide support at a December 7th hearing, Thomas testified A.S. did not pay anything financial to R.W. 4 RR 125. Thomas further told the jury she followed up at the testing facility in December 2022, but A.S. and C.W. had not presented to test at the facility. 4 RR 127. Thomas further testified that she reached out to A.S. later in the month regarding drug testing to reschedule visitations. 4 RR 131. Thomas relayed that A.S. said she tested on December 7, but no results were ever received. 4 RR 135.",Party Submissions,6.492653,6.82737,7.2094507
"Now they claim Flaven was a shoo-in as a responsible third party, yet in the original case, the plaintiff’s lawyer argued Flaven was not a proper RTP; now the former plaintiff’s lawyer claims the entire case was so weak he could not have won it absent “malpractice,” yet on appeal in the original case, he pointed to HSMiller’s and its agent’s “numerous and continuous misrepresentations and lies” that “led in a natural and continuous sequence” to the financial losses that would not have occurred “but for [HSMiller’s and its agents] misrepresentations.” Br. of Appellees at 1, 11, Defterios v. Dall. Bayou Bend, 350 S.W.3d 659 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (No. 05-08-01726-CV), 2009 WL 2565846, at *1, *11.",Party Submissions,9.323582,10.289303,9.602793
"The Property was also encumbered by a Deed of Trust in favor of First Franklin (the “deed of trust”). CR2:211 -222. The first lien was foreclosed on November 6, 2007, and conveyed by the substitute trustee to National City Bank. CR2:80-81.",Party Submissions,8.363399,9.530001,9.864097
"The case before this Court is nearly identical to Houston Cement Co. As in Houston Cement Co., Oncor’s predecessor, Sharyland, reached an agreement with Wilbarger CAD regarding the value of its property for tax year 2019 “thereby resolving the dispute.” Houston Cement Co. at *1; I C.R. 18. As in Houston Cement, Oncor filed a § 25.25 motion under several theories, including a § 25.25(c) motion for correction on the basis of clerical error. The Wilbarger ARB denied the motion. The Houston Cement case held that Cement and HCAD “clearly expressed harmony of opinion as to the final values of Cement’s combined business personal property and of its inventory in the signed, specifically written agreements. .. [b]ecause those final values were matters on which protests either could have been filed or had been filed but not yet determined by the board, the agreements are final as to those values.” Id. at *2. Here, Oncor and Wilbarger CAD clearly expressed the harmony of opinion, mistaken or not, that the value of inventory (transmission lines) in Wilbarger County was $55,068,090. I C.R. 18. Finally, in Houston Cement, Cement objected that it had evidence that showed that Cement did not discover the inventory errors until after the agreement was executed. Id. at *3. The court held that testimony and evidence regarding a mistake of fact was irrelevant because it was not relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. Id .",Party Submissions,10.712352,10.743516,10.850729
"Even if Bay had shown compliance with the written agreement requirement, it has not addressed the proper filing requirement nor placed any evidence in the record to demonstrate compliance with this mandatory requirement, so it is waived *19 and Bay is not entitled to the exclusive remedies protection as a matter of law. Once Plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to establish the right to summary judgment on the exclusive remedy issue (which Plaintiffs have clearly done), Bay should have presented evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue, which it simply failed to do. ‘‘Moore” Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 936-37 (Tex. 1972).",Party Submissions,10.783094,10.577339,11.805043
"Claimant cannot properly substantiate such relevance and materiality precisely because of the breadth of its request. Claimant is not requesting specific or precisely identified documents, but rather engaging in an unreasonably burdensome and disproportionate fishing expedition, in the search for arguments to build a case Claimant does not have and failed to prove.",Legal Decisions,14.246589,16.414448,15.512968
"If jurisdiction exists to litigate the intention of parties on such settlement agreements, a good deal of the purpose of entering them is negated. Parties enter settlement agreements to avoid litigation, not to spawn new subjects of litigation.",Party Submissions,19.137695,18.34012,21.460014
"The recent case of Stearns v. Martens follows the Cockerham authority and disregards contrary conflicting opinions. Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). In Stearns, the controversy involved the characterization of certain shares of stock as wife’s separate property. Id. The stock originated from a pool company started by husband before marriage. Id. at 545. During the marriage, the pool business sold and stock was issued to husband and to wife individually in the new entity. Id. Thereafter, husband transferred his stock to wife with a written agreement. Id. The agreement is silent as to any characterization of the consideration, the stock, or whether the transfer was a purchase or a gift. Id. at 547.",Party Submissions,6.5346556,6.9457293,6.573627
The United States objects to Request No. 2.c for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a.,Legal Decisions,8.064806,12.094721,13.66326
"En realidad, el medio, el gran medio, el gran mecanismo de control jurisdiccional de este acto está en el juicio de amparo. Es el juicio de amparo el medio de impugnación, digamos, por excelencia en materia administrativa, es el recurso efectivo al que se refiere el artículo 25 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Es, digamos, el mecanismo que en México utilizamos cuando no vemos otra manera de arreglar las cosas: es el juicio de amparo. Y el juicio de amparo es perfectamente procedente en esta situación.",Party Submissions,6.456569,7.853212,7.0225325
"If an amount to be paid under this Plan is payable in two or more installments, each installment shall be treated as a separate payment for purposes of Section 409A. To the extent any expense reimbursement or in-kind benefit to which a Participant is or may be entitled to receive under the Plan constitutes non-exempt “deferred compensation” for purposes of Section 409A of the Code, then (i) such reimbursement shall be paid to the Participant as soon as administratively practicable after the Participant submits a valid claim for reimbursement, but in no event later than the last day of the Participant’s taxable year following the taxable year in which the expense was incurred, (ii) the amount of expenses eligible for reimbursement, or in-kind benefits provided, during any taxable year of the Participant shall not affect the expenses eligible for reimbursement, or in-kind benefits to be provided, in any other taxable year of the Participant, and (iii) the Participant’s right to reimbursement or in-kind benefits shall not be subject to liquidation or exchange for another benefit. A termination of employment shall not be deemed to have occurred for purposes of any provision of this Plan providing for the payment of any amounts or benefits subject to Code Section 409A upon or following a termination of employment unless such termination is also a “separation from service” within the meaning of Code Section 409A and, for purposes of any such provision of this Plan, references to a “termination,” “termination of employment” or like terms shall mean “separation from service.” Nothing in this Plan shall operate or be construed to cause the Plan to fail to comply with the requirements of Code Section 409A and, to the extent applicable, it is intended that the Plan comply with the provisions of Code Section 409A and shall be administered in a manner consistent with that intent. Any provision of this Plan that would cause the Plan or any payment made hereunder to fail to satisfy Code Section 409A shall have no force and effect until amended by the Company to comply with Code Section 409A (which amendment may be retroactive to the extent permitted by Code Section 409A) and may be made by the Company without the consent of any Participant.",Contract,1.8044887,1.9946814,1.8678269
"MVP asserts that McCarthy and RLB irrevocably waived all “objections” to the forum-selection clause, including on the basis of section 272.001. Although McCarthy and RLB both argue that they have not waived their right to void the forum selection clause under section 272.001, each has different arguments, which we address below.",Party Submissions,8.540363,9.270439,9.154922
"December 2014 and entered into force on 2 January 2015. The Regulations on the Prohibition of Catching Snow Crabs (the “ 2014 Regulations”)21 were adopted under the Marine Resources Act 2008.22 The Regulations provided: § 1 General prohibition It is prohibited for Norwegian and foreign vessels to catch snow crabs in the territorial waters of Norway (Norges territorialfarvann), including the territorial waters at Svalbard, the economic zone and the fishery protection zone at Svalbard. For Norwegian vessels, the prohibition also applies to international waters.",Legal Decisions,6.349913,6.4537964,6.9707847
"And Defterios’s decision to lie to his own lawyer undermined Terry’s ability to properly perform his job. See Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co ., 20 S.W.3d 692, 695-96, 701-03 (Tex. 2000) (holding that insurance company’s negligence in disrupting or harming the insured’s defense was relevant in suit).",Party Submissions,8.294915,11.002068,9.926602
"Most obviously, World Car was prejudiced by the decisions below. It is entitled to a decision properly applying the plain language of § 2301.467(a)(1), especially to protect it from future actions by HMA.",Party Submissions,24.976206,32.3189,46.08509
"Sonic did not provide the trial court, or this Court, with authority to support its contention that its ability to recover benefits under the TWCA as a subclaimant survived Cochran's election and recovery of benefits under Alabama's laws. In the trial court, Sonic argued [**19] it is entitled to reimbursement simply because the requirements of section 409.009 have been satisfied, suggesting its ability to recover reimbursement under the TWCA is independent of Cochran's ability to recover benefits. However, HN8 [ ] a derivative claim under the TWCA is not independent of the employee's claim. See Franks v. Sematech, Inc., 936 S.W.2d 959, 960, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 227 (Tex. 1997) (examining a carrier's subrogation claim, stating ""[t]here is but one cause of action for an employee's injuries, and it belongs to the employee.""). It follows that, as a subclaimant, Sonic's ability to recover reimbursement under the TWCA should be coextensive with Cochran's ability to recover benefits. 13 Cf. id. (reasoning that a carrier who asserts a subrogation claim asserts a claim that belongs to the employee).",Party Submissions,6.1462517,6.1061344,6.419238
"Request No. 2 is denied. The Claimant is requesting access to documents allegedly relating to the seizure of his assets on January 13, 2020, which would allow him “to effectively substantiate his arguments in its Memorial concerning the existence and ultimately the validity of the seizure and in turn effectively demonstrate an illegal expropriation in breach of the France-Qatar BIT”. The assets concerned are those of the Claimant before the alleged seizure. The Claimant cannot, at the present stage, search for the production of evidence to be submitted together with his forthcoming Memorial or thereafter. This denial may not be understood as preventing him from introducing or pleading the relevant allegations in his Memorial.",Legal Decisions,14.851542,12.945689,14.8286495
"In re Luby's Cafeterias, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 813 (1998) Administrative Law and Procedure Primary Jurisdiction When the legislature has committed a matter to an agency, the agency's primary jurisdiction is exclusive.",Party Submissions,7.1621885,7.788914,7.8282685
"Indeed, a waiver provision such as this one may be more descriptive. .. than a waiver referencing [Business and Commerce] Code section numbers.” Id.",Party Submissions,26.531778,48.749954,42.15466
"Assuming arguendo, that there is an applicable policy that would entitle Bay *26 to the Affirmative Defense of Exhaustion of Remedies, there is a bona fide question as to whether Mann was in the course and scope of employment at the time of his injuries.",Party Submissions,12.34615,12.7251215,15.236391
"Two key legal principles should govern this Court’s construction of the Subcontract’s “flow-down” provisions. First, courts “may neither rewrite the parties’ contract nor add to its language.” Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. 2016) (citations omitted). Second, even if this Court were to conclude that a party may contractually waive its Section 272.001 rights, a party only contractually waives its constitutional or statutory rights “by intelligently, voluntarily, and knowingly relinquishing a known right” and “[t]o be effective, a waiver must be clear and specific .” Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2014) (emphasis added); Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831, 844 (Tex. 2000) (emphasis added).",Party Submissions,4.942788,4.9330854,4.975208
"RLB must be determined in the same court in the same place — Tulsa County, Oklahoma — under the same claims and dispute-resolution procedures.",Party Submissions,31.85565,33.903694,40.128727
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this Petition under TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.001(a) because this appeal presents questions of law that are important to the jurisprudence of the state. The Supreme Court should consider granting this petition for review as it involves at least: 1) conflicting court of appeals’ decisions on two important point of law1 and 2) the construction of a statute. TEX. R. APP. P. 56.1(A).,Party Submissions,6.301753,7.322776,7.079438
"This proceeding was filed directly with the Texas Supreme Court because time is of the essence. Sears v. Bayoud, 786 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding). Due to the short schedule for obtaining relief as a result of ballot deadlines, and the inability to preserve the Supreme Court’s appellate review jurisdiction in the event this case would be first-filed at the Court of Appeals, this proceeding is properly first filed in this Court. Id ; Fitch v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 834 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Tex. 1992) (enjoining effect of the court of appeals' order removing candidate from primary ballot in order to protect supreme court's jurisdiction to review appellate court's mandamus order); In re Angelini, 186 S.W.3d 4 558, 561 (Tex. 2006); The Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 93-94 (Tex. 1997). Given that the issue presented is of “statewide importance” and “the urgency of the time constraints” requires immediate intervention, this proceeding is properly first-filed in this Court. Sears, 786 S.W.2d at 249-250.",Party Submissions,5.586633,5.134583,5.474946
For column 11: Indicate an estimation of the sampling effectiveness. Sampling effectiveness means the probability of selecting infected plant parts from an infected plant.,Legislation,37.432934,29.492203,53.360504
"The court of appeals accepted Christus’ argument that High and Rector’s claims were “premised on allegations of noncompliance with practices set forth in Chapter 133 of the Texas Administrative Code which ‘provides procedures for obtaining a hospital license; minimum standards for hospital functions and services; [and] patient rights Id., at 383 n.4.",Party Submissions,18.390831,17.372152,18.714884
"Joeckel’s “routine case expenses” are $30,000. CR109. That may be about right for employment and non-subscriber cases, but it is not shown to be comparable to large personal injury products liability cases.",Party Submissions,27.273026,23.868599,32.985836
"The Note was secured by a Deed of Trust (Secondary Lien) (the “Deed of Trust”) in favor of First Franklin encumbering real property and improvements located at 8806 Stonefair Lane, Houston, Texas 77075 (the “Property”). CR2:60-76.",Party Submissions,8.678266,10.969798,11.92813
"Respondent has conducted a reasonable search for the category of documents requested, and provides Claimant with the documents identified in the request that are in its possession, custody or control, as resulting from that search.",Legal Decisions,12.293462,19.341578,15.236405
"To amend title 31, United States Code, to provide small businesses with additional time to file beneficial ownership information, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.204429,5.042259,5.809672
Parties in Court of Appeals: Appellant is Oncor Electric Delivery Company NTU LLC. Appellees are Mills Central Appraisal District and Mills County Appraisal Review Board.,Party Submissions,12.146823,12.474775,15.046529
"Subcontractor shall procure and maintain in force Commercial Automobile Liability insurance. Such Automobile Liability insurance must include coverage equivalent to Symbol 1 (Any Auto) to include all owned, non-owned and hired automobiles.",Party Submissions,12.506843,9.580023,15.526222
"S.W.2d 208, 212 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1936, writ ref'd). That function lies solely with this Court. Id.",Party Submissions,4.3508387,6.523192,9.732332
"The Walkers claim that that the court of appeals erred in addressing components of proximate cause based on a novel theory that the defendants did not use the words “foreseeability” in their objections. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the party must make only a timely request, objection, or motion with sufficient specificity to apprise the trial court of the complaint and obtain an adverse ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). The Walkers cite no case law supporting the argument that BSA’s 9 pages of briefed objections were not specific enough as to causation. (CR.763-86) The few cases they do cite are entirely different. See Pepper v. Wilson, No. 02-22-00107-CV, 2023 WL 2534626 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 16, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (defendant did not list order overruling objections in notice of appeal); Thompson v. Fong, 650 S.W.3d 164, 168 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied) (defendant argued for the first time on appeal reports were “no report at all” so plaintiff was not entitled to 30 days to cure); Williams v. Mora, 264 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App.— Waco 2008, no pet.) (issue on whether objection to speculation was same as to conclusory).",Party Submissions,6.0488663,6.227358,6.569046
"The dispute here turns on a subset of cases— those in which a stay is not warranted under the usual discretionary standard. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749. All agree that an interlocutory appeal should trigger a stay if that standard is met. But the majority goes further and requires a stay in all cases. Indeed, the majority mandates a stay even if none of the traditional stay prerequisites are present: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, favorable balance of equities, and alignment with the public interest. See ibid.",Party Submissions,5.749182,6.1204414,6.268127
"DWC promulgated Rule 141.1, et seq., in part to clarify the process governing benefit review conferences. HN8 [ ] Rule 141.1 provides, ""A request for a benefit review conference may be made by an injured employee, a subclaimant, or an insurance carrier."" See 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 141.1. It continues, ""An employer may request a benefit review conference to contest compensability when the insurance carrier has accepted the claim as compensable."" See id.",Party Submissions,5.9205475,7.5802417,6.4744997
"Explaining that he has extensive experience with newborns who require cooling, neonatal respiratory problems, and management of patients with birth asphyxia, Dr. Null also concludes he is “qualified to discuss the etiology of [H.W.’s] condition at birth.” (CR.708). What Dr. Null does not say is that he has education, training, or experience in diagnosing the cause of birth asphyxia or perinatal brain injuries. Because he also failed to establish his qualifications to opine on the causes of the particular condition at issue, this renders his opinion insufficient, too. See Alonzo, 2013 WL 6073431 at *4.",Party Submissions,9.064087,10.719642,11.0455
"These regulations apply to Norwegian citizens and persons resident in Norway who fish with Norwegian vessels in waters outside any state’s fisheries jurisdiction that are not regulated by regional or subregional fisheries management organizations or entities with their own reporting provisions. The regulations also applies to NEAFC’s regulatory area.738 522. The Tribunal considers that the response refers only to catching of snow crab by Norwegian vessels; the attached regulations are applicable only to Norwegian vessels. It is true that, as the Claimants maintain, the response did not make clear that foreign vessels had no right to harvest crab on the Norwegian continental shelf without Norwegian authorization,739 but that was not the question raised and the response simply does not address that question. The response speaks of fishing and of waters outside the jurisdiction of a State and the Tribunal agrees with the Claimants that this was how Norwegian officials saw the matter at the time, but this was a technical exchange relating to registration requirements and it would be wrong to read much into it.",Legal Decisions,13.492886,12.377398,12.966522
"Husband challenged the admissibility of parol evidence and cited to the Raymond irrebuttable presumption as to the deed recitations. Id. at 709. Husband argued that the terms of an unambiguous deed cannot be varied by parol evidence absent evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake. Id. at 709.",Party Submissions,8.150727,10.413854,10.556174
"The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court. Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Geter, 620 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Tex. 2021). If a contract has a certain and definite meaning, the contract is unambiguous, and we will construe it as a matter of law. Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC, 639 S.W.3d 682, 690 (Tex. 2022). The fact that parties may advance different interpretations of a contract does not make the contract ambiguous. Id.",Party Submissions,4.2251287,5.1488023,4.7630415
"The jury instruction provided the basis for all these arguments. This Court has held that an awkward wording of a question was at most an incidental comment on the weight of the evidence. Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem’l Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex. 1987) (jury question ended with “which was a proximate cause of her blindness?”). The instruction here, however, was more akin to that in Gulf Coast State Bank v. Emenhiser, 562 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1978), 42 where the Court concluded an instruction that marshaled the facts for one party was a violation of Rule 277 and more than an incidental comment on the weight of the evidence. 562 S.W.2d at 453.",Party Submissions,7.104186,7.727789,7.432447
"The election process is well underway. The application period to run in the Re-publican primary has been closed for nearly a month. See Important Election Dates 2023-2024, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elec-tions/voter/important-election-dates.shtml#2024 (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). As Walker acknowledges, Pet. at 2, mail ballots for the Republican Primary will be sent to primary voters beginning 12 days from now, on January 20, 2024. Indeed, as Walker likewise admits, election authorities in the various counties across this State must begin printing these ballots imminently. By Walker’s estimate—which the Republican Party of Texas has no reason to dispute—this printing will begin in the next few days. Pet. at 2.",Party Submissions,6.1424723,7.1357284,6.772571
McCarthy Subcontract -7-01-12-2017 Rev. matters in question between McCarthy and Subcontractor not relating to claims included in 4.3 shall be resolved in the manner provided in Article 11 herein.,Party Submissions,21.71623,20.601143,25.348177
"The trial court’s instruction that the Lawyers “could rely on evidence of the proposed transaction, its failure, and the identity of a responsible third party as the defaulting buyer in resisting a motion to strike a designation of a responsible third party” (App. A (CR587)) is contrary to Chapter 33 and this Court’s decisions. Chapter 33 specifies that it applies to “any cause of action based on tort in which a defendant, settling person, or responsible third party is found responsible for a percentage of the harm for which relief is sought.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.002(a)(1).",Party Submissions,9.829014,10.446411,10.132224
The United States objects to Request No. 1.c for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.,Legal Decisions,8.146792,12.026213,13.331881
"As to the expert’s opinion about causation, the court concluded he sufficiently established his expertise in determining how shoulder dystocia can occur during delivery and injuries that can result from dystocia. Id. at *9. True, the court also said there is no “per se requirement that an expert be a pediatric neurologist to opine on causes of fetal brain injury occurring labor and delivery.” Id. at *9. But that doesn’t mean an expert like Dr. Tappan can entirely omit any discussion about his qualifications on that particular topic, yet offer the opinions anyway.",Party Submissions,11.72873,11.850173,12.816414
You are instructed that clear and convincing evidence means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.,Party Submissions,4.0473156,5.6413035,6.279291
Plan and any other nonqualified deferred compensation plan or portion thereof that is treated as a single plan under such section.,Contract,10.106173,13.378137,22.527489
"App. – San Antonio 2017, pet denied). Under this method of review, it is generally accepted by the courts of appeals that factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence are weighed in the first prong and overall harm in the division is weighed in the second.",Party Submissions,13.516629,24.860632,27.006067
"Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered ""Yes"" to Question No. 1. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.",Party Submissions,10.57395,9.929672,12.078883
"And so, in each of the cases relied on by the Walkers, the experts established within the four corners of their report and/or CV their specific experience, knowledge, or training to support their opinions. Dr. Tappan has not. His report is limited to explaining his familiarity and experience with pregnancy and delivery management, and neither his report nor his CV says anything about his familiarity and experience with diagnosing or determining the cause of fetal brain injury or perinatal subacute infarctions. (CR.787-88, 796-803). Thus, he was not qualified to opine on the medical cause and the proximate cause of H.W.’s brain injuries, and this provides an alternative basis to affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment.",Party Submissions,11.124906,11.774936,11.883845
"If the agreed value of a section 1.111(e) agreement is so frail that it can be altered or destroyed by a challenge on some of the component parts of the value, then a section 1.111(e) agreement can never be enforced. By Oncor ’ s reasoning, to ever be enforceable, a section 1.111(e) agreement regarding, say, a building, would have to explicitly state agreement toward each individual building component taken into account for valuation. What Oncor is proposing is that a court may look behind the appraisal roll to start altering aspects of the appraisal process. Looking behind 26 TEX. TAX. CODE § 23.01(b).",Party Submissions,11.958208,14.072278,13.676796
"On appeal, BSA challenged the reports’ adequacy as to causation, standard of care, and breach. See Appellant BSA Hospital’s Brief in Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp. v. Walker, No. 07-22-00032-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo). BSA also argued that the experts were not qualified to give opinions in all of the areas that they each did. Id. at p. 35-37, 45.",Party Submissions,6.823982,7.487378,7.963727
"Letter from the Public Utility Company “Zelenilo Beograd” to the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction No. 3325/2 dated 17 April 2008, together with all accompanying attachments. RELEVANCE Claimants hereby incorporate explanation from Request No. 34 above.",Legal Decisions,19.478285,19.591845,20.201712
"B. Striking Affidavits [22] In the same vein, the Manns object to an affidavit drawn up by Pamela McShann, a representative of the insurance carrier who issued Bay's standard workers' compensation policy. But the basis of the Manns' argument is that the insurance carriers are agents of Bay, a theory we have already rejected. See id.",Party Submissions,14.230485,17.787754,19.5336
"To amend the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 to permit leave for bone marrow or blood stem cell donation, and for other purposes.",Legislation,3.3449802,3.1129367,3.3393748
"Tex.Civ.Prac.&Rem. Code §17.042 mandates that a non-resident does business in Texas if the non-resident: (1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state; (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; or (3) recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in this state, for employment inside or outside this state.",Party Submissions,3.7908947,4.9749107,4.506609
The trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Bestor's claim for [**12] attorney's fees and properly granted Service Lloyd's motion to dismiss. We overrule Bestor's first issue and need not address his second issue relating to the trial court's alternative grant of summary judgment. The trial court's order dismissing Bestor's case is affirmed.,Party Submissions,6.427404,7.195922,8.0723295
General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the European Commission (“ DG Mare ”) on 5 August 2015. The letter stated: The Commission writes to refer to the discussions in the Fishery Attaches meeting of 30 July last in relation to snow crab fisheries in the so-called “Loop Hole” of the NEAFC Regulatory Area.,Legal Decisions,13.234419,14.945276,16.01802
"Based on a word count run in Microsoft Word, this Brief on the Merits contains 6,231 words, excluding the portions of the motion exempt from the word count under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i).",Party Submissions,7.0054865,10.489087,13.09981
In no event shall the Company be required to provide a tax gross-up payment to Executive with respect to any Section 409A Penalty.,Contract,6.007609,7.663803,9.709028
"In September 2020, after RLB and McCarthy had issued multiple reports regarding the issue of the differing site conditions, MVP again denied RLB’s claim based on McCarthy’s denial of the existence of a differing site condition, denial of liability for RLB’s claim, and purported failure to pursue timely RLB’s pass-through claim.",Party Submissions,8.813634,11.317582,10.051705
"Neither this Court’s rules nor longstanding equitable principles tolerate this sort of gamesmanship. A litigant may not bypass the ordinary judicial process and seek relief initially in this court absent a “compelling reason” to do so. Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(e). An imminent deadline in the election context cannot serve as such a reason when a relator manufactures time pressure through weeks of unilateral delay. And that imminent deadline itself supplies an independent reason to deny relator’s petition: this Court “decline[s] to implement even ‘seemingly innocuous’ alterations to election laws on the eve of an election,” lest “partisan adversaries. .. lie in wait with lawsuits that create chaos.” In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. 2022).",Party Submissions,9.600545,10.189792,10.466414
"If this court were to conclude Sonic was entitled to recover reimbursement under the circumstances of this case, we must conclude that Sonic's rights as a subclaimant [**5] survived Cochran's rights as a claimant. Sonic's argument proposes that this conclusion is evidenced in the plain language of the provisions, but construing the statute as a whole, we disagree. Sonic failed to establish that its right to reimbursement under the statute as a ""subclaimant"" survived or exceeded Cochran's ability to recover benefits, as a matter of law.",Party Submissions,8.854478,8.957616,9.313655
"Components that contribute to the value of Oncor’s property in Wilbarger County include the size and length of its electrical lines and their voltages. Even if the previous owner made a mistake about the individual characteristics of its transmission lines in Wilbarger County, its mistake would be one of value since those components are subsumed into the value. However, Oncor’s predecessor made an agreement with Wilbarger CAD over value, and Oncor should not be allowed to renege on its agreement. The length, size, and capacity of its lines, each of them individual characteristics of value, were resolved in the form of the dollar amount of value to which Oncor’s predecessor agreed. The burden was on Oncor’s predecessor to be more diligent in ascertaining what it actually owned in Wilbarger County before executing the agreement that it did, and Oncor’s remorse that its predecessor did not do so does not now make that agreement voidable. The 2019 agreement, executed under TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e), precludes any consideration of the merits of Oncor’s claims under § 25.25 of the Texas Tax Code.",Party Submissions,8.487876,9.911081,8.794939
"ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/432/oj 1/4 (4) The Income Tax Act, as amended by the Budget Implementation Act, 2023, No 1, applies provisions of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2020 Model Rules for Reporting by Platform Operators with respect to Sellers in the Sharing and Gig Economy (), supplemented by the OECD 2021 Model 6 Reporting Rules for Digital Platforms: International Exchange Framework and Optional Module for sale of goods ( ).",Legislation,9.322319,9.711471,9.409625
"Commenting on Oncor’s argument on the point, the court in Wilbarger held: The problem with this argument is that the legislature has expressly stated otherwise.",Party Submissions,17.454462,24.693825,22.3712
"The J.J. Johns Trust owns a non-participating royalty interest under a tract covered by four “Tract 4/14” Leases: three from Bordages owners (Leases H, I, and K) and a fourth from the Hooks interests (Lease J). The severance put all of that trust’s Tract 4 interests into Bordages. See Bordages Oral Argument Exhibit 6. And the Hooks, who held the executive rights for the J.J. Johns Trust under Lease J, were of course placed into the Hooks case.",Party Submissions,16.101864,17.214392,18.455389
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Plan to be executed by its duly authorized officers on this 7th day of November, 2023.",Contract,2.9373348,4.003196,4.4028225
"In May, the district court held a hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction. At the end of [*9] the hearing, the district court issued an order overruling the plea to the jurisdiction. The Martinez Family then filed its original proceeding in this Court, arguing that the district court abused its discretion because it has no jurisdiction to review an agency order that, as the Martinez Family characterizes it, is void or moot. The Martinez Family seeks mandamus relief ordering the district court to grant the plea to the jurisdiction and a writ of prohibition ""to prohibit Respondent and the district court from considering the merits of the void [agency] Order."" HN1 [ ] ""The standards generally applied in a mandamus proceeding are well established."" In re Turner, 500 S.W.3d 641, 642 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, orig. proceeding) (cleaned up). ""[M]andamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law"" and only where the petitioning party lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. Id. (quoting In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding)). A trial court has no discretion to misapply the law. Id. (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) ). In the two competing petitions for mandamus relief, each petitioner alleges that one of the trial courts misconstrued the governing statutes and existing precedent in evaluating its jurisdiction over this dispute.",Party Submissions,3.9142482,4.517748,4.3956413
"Respondent adopts Petitioner’s Statement of Jurisdiction, save that Respondent does not concede that the appeal presents an important question of law or that failing to resolve the dispute will have any wide-ranging effect.",Party Submissions,10.938396,10.676979,12.493083
"Furthermore, nothing in the majority's decision today “materially advance[s] the ultimate termination of the litigation.” To the contrary, the majority concludes that neither side “conclusively proved its case with regard to the exclusive-remedy defense,” leaving the question to be decided by a jury and remanded the case for trial. This type of protracted litigation should be discouraged and not serve as a basis for permissive appeals.",Party Submissions,9.31099,10.295435,11.301984
The parties’ intent is to be construed from the text. That this provision imposes compounded Late Charges is evident from the words.,Party Submissions,33.472454,40.998325,44.36752
"For 2023 and each year of employment thereafter, Executive shall receive a grant of at least $2,500,000 annually, or higher at the Board’s discretion.",Contract,8.613704,8.624916,9.931394
"AA CHILD WATER SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN ORGANIZATIONS. (a) In this section: (1) AA ""Body of water"" means an artificial or natural body of water, including a swimming pool, lake, or river, typically used for recreational swimming, bathing, or play. The term does not include a wading pool.",Party Submissions,5.551442,5.280877,5.8595176
"By contrast, the court of appeals here reasoned that because the termination clause did not expressly except prior breaches, past-due obligations were terminated. (Slip Op. at 16.) But that holding conflicts with this Court’s holding that a breach-of-contract claim accrues when the contract is breached. Cosgrove, 468 S.W.3d at 39. It also conflicts with other courts that have held that terminating a contract does not terminate liability for prior breaches. See, e.g., Anadarko Petrol. Corp. v. Williams Alaska Petrol., Inc., 737 F.3d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 2013); Gulf Liquids New River Project, LLC v. Gulsby Eng’g, Inc., 365 S.W.3d 54, 66 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). II. Correcting This Error And Resolving The Split Among The The lower court’s holding is not only wrong on the law but also leads to absurd results and perverse incentives for guarantors. This Court should grant this Motion for Rehearing to avoid confusion among parties and the courts of appeal.",Party Submissions,6.1116886,6.293786,6.2798424
"McCarthy Subcontract -10-01-12-2017 Rev. 5.6.2 Claims Made Requirements. If Professional Liability/Errors and Omissions coverage is written on a Claims Made basis, the Certificate of Insurance will clearly so state. In addition to the coverage specifications listed above, such policy shall provide, and the Certificate of Insurance will list, that the retroactive date coincides with or precedes Subcontractors commencement of Work under this Agreement, including any design or testing services related to the Project. If insurance is terminated for any reason, Subcontractor shall purchase an extended reporting provision of at least five (5) years to report claims in connection with this Agreement .",Party Submissions,10.0984335,9.264741,10.658172
"Rafiei’s case is more analogous to AOF Servs., LLC v. Santorsola. No. 13-14-00641-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2975, at *7-8 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi Mar. 24, 2016). In that case, an individual entered into an arbitration agreement with a company which contained a fee-splitting provision. When the individual later filed suit against the company and the company moved to compel arbitration, the individual argued the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it would place too heavy a financial burden on him and effectively make his legal remedy unavailable. The fee-splitting arrangement required the individual to pay 20% of the arbitrator's compensation and the company to pay the remaining 80%. There was no explicit cap on the amount the individual would be obligated to pay.",Party Submissions,4.353004,4.832874,4.720268
"Delaware courts thus use the phrase economic reality: “The trend in this Court has been to award compound interest because it better comports with ‘fundamental economic reality.’” Henke v. Trilithic Inc., No. CIV.A. 13155, 2005 WL 2899677, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2005) (quoting Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc ., 2005 WL 1074364, at *26 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005)); see Williams Cos. v. Energy Transfer LP, 2022 WL 3650176, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2022) (“compound interest more accurately reflects the ‘fundamental economic reality’ that ‘[c]ompound interest is “the standard form of interest in the financial market.’”) (quoting ONTI, 751 A.2d 904 at 926 & n.88.",Party Submissions,5.786127,5.9664874,5.82927
"Any and all documents representing the objection discussed as item 5 “ JKP Gradsko-saobraćajno preduzeće ""Belgrade"", Belgrade, 29 Kneginje Ljubice Str. (case file IX-03 No. 350.12-308/2014 as of 22/12/2014) ” at the 74th session of the Planning Committee of the Belgrade City Assembly, held on 18 June 2015, and referred to on page 2 (pdf) of exhibit R-103.",Legal Decisions,20.13634,19.016745,16.531494
"TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a); see Henry v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 70 S.W.3d 808, 809 (Tex.",Party Submissions,3.193718,4.709157,3.9366386
"This Court should deny the mandamus petition for all the reasons explained above. But even if the Court were to consider the petition, the appropriate remedy, at most, is an opportunity for Justice Devine to cure the alleged signature defects. A. This Court’s precedents require providing Justice Devine an On mandamus, this Court has consistently declined to remove candidates from ballots for technical Election Code violations and has instead provided candidates opportunities to cure facial signature defects.",Party Submissions,13.984695,12.310846,15.382769
We conclude that no live controversy exists based on Ga lovelho’s claims f or injunctive relief. It sought through these claims to be free of the limitations placed by the Emergency Orders; it has been freed by the rescission and expiration of those orders. We conclude the trial court correctly determined that Ga lovelho’s injunctive claims were moot and should be dismissed. We overrule its third issue.,Party Submissions,15.06725,18.433506,21.953672
"In any event, this Court has said more than once that analysis of expert reports must be confined to the reports’ four corners. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878; Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52. Consequently, the Walkers’ attempt to read more into Dr. Null’s report than he actually stated should be rejected.",Party Submissions,8.626308,10.364612,9.88349
"Having overruled each of Grant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court ordering partition and the order requiring Grant to pay costs.",Party Submissions,12.009193,19.84321,25.23186
"To require the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study on the impacts of seasonal and nonresident homeownership on data collected by the Bureau of the Census, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.4083657,5.4194174,5.2057905
"Barina’s attempt to distinguish Johnson v. Phillips, and to argue that it supports her rather than Petitioners, is likewise meritless. Johnson supports Petitioners’ argument that the Program contained opinion because a reasonable viewer, like a reasonable reader of the book at issue in Johnson, would understand it to be a recounting of one side of a debated topic. Pet. Br. at 32-33, citing 526 S.W.3d 529, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Barina attempts to undercut that by noting, correctly, that the Court held that the book as a whole actually painted the plaintiffs as “honest and virtuous.” That conclusion, however, was about whether the book’s overarching depiction of the plaintiffs was “as a whole ... defamatory”—that is, whether the publication was susceptible to a defamatory meaning. Johnson, 526 S.W.3d at 536. It did not relate to the issue of whether the complained of statements were opinion. In fact, the Johnson Court looked to the context to determine that even if the book could be said to be defamatory, it contained nonactionable opinion. Id. at 539.",Party Submissions,6.685098,6.6487055,7.0646544
Our vessels are ready for their voyage to SVALBARD zone in order to catch Snow crab. Our vessels all have appropriate Certificates and Licenses.,Legal Decisions,41.62979,32.72115,41.8884
"Russian sector of the Loop Hole. At that stage, for the reasons already given, any investment represented by the two vessels would not have been an investment in the territory of Norway. Thereafter, if it was intended that they would take crab off Svalbard, then this would not have been an investment in accordance with the laws and regulations of Norway.",Legal Decisions,17.55101,17.308039,23.112072
"This same analysis applies here. Petitioners’ claim is that the City failed to remedy an unreasonably dangerous condition (over 112 inadequately monitored children at a public po0l) and failed to promptly react once one of its employees became subjectively aware that the Mandatory Safety Policy was violated. CR34; CR139-40. This Court has generally affirmed analyzing these types of cases under a premises liability theory. See, e.g., Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1983) (affirming premises liability theory for injuries arising from “usage of a self-service display of goods”).",Party Submissions,11.620245,11.006717,11.829116
"First, Barina repeats the legally unfounded premise of her defamation claim— that Petitioners “endorsed” allegations made by Ross and Martinez in the Program (throwing in an equally unfounded “attribution” exception to the third-party-allegation rule). But tellingly, Barina wholly ignores Petitioners’ overarching point that Section 73.005(b)’s plain text contains no endorsement exception (or attribution requirement) at all. The precise issue over which Petitioners seek review is the court of appeals’ improper engrafting of such an exception out of whole cloth, writing words into the statute that do not exist. The third-party-allegation rule unequivocally bars Barina’s claim because the Program accurately quotes from third parties concerning matters of public concern. This Court should review and reverse the appellate court’s erroneous application of this important statute. The last time this Court sought to limit the rule in Neely v. Wilson,1 the Legislature reacted by statutorily enshrining, in broadly-phrased language, the rule’s critical protections. The appellate court’s efforts to limit the third-party-allegation rule’s reach by creating an endorsement exception (and an attribution requirement) should be checked before these judicially-imposed conditions swallow the legislative rule.",Party Submissions,9.050477,9.704456,9.434121
"Committee. Committee means the Employees of the Company appointed by the Board of Directors of the Company (or the appropriate committee of such board), and their replacements as authorized by the Board of Directors, to administer the Plan.",Contract,7.5036564,7.564351,10.08349
"The Subcontract Amount will be paid subject to the terms of this Agreement in monthly payments of 100(%) percent of the work performed in any preceding month, in accordance with applications for payment prepared by Subcontractor (“Subcontractor’s Application for Payment”) and approved by McCarthy, the Owner and any other party whose approval is required by the Contract Documents and in accordance with the conditions set forth below, including, but not limited to, the condition precedent as set forth below of receipt by McCarthy of payment from the Owner. Subcontractor's Application for Payment shall be submitted on the form attached hereto in Exhibit 3 and acceptable to McCarthy, and in accordance with the approved Schedule of Values with such additional detailed or substantiating information as may be requested by McCarthy. Payments made on account of materials not incorporated in the work, but delivered and suitably stored at the site, or at some other location agreed upon in writing, shall be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Contract Documents. Subcontractor will provide monthly completed lien and claim waivers and affidavits from Subcontractor, sub-subcontractors and suppliers on the forms attached hereto in Exhibit 3, amounting to 100% of the partial payment that was paid to Subcontractor for the previous month. Failure to provide such forms will delay payment to Subcontractor. If requested by McCarthy, Subcontractor shall also provide evidence satisfactory to McCarthy that Subcontractor has paid for all labor, including fringe benefits and payments due under collective bargaining agreements. Payments to Subcontractor are conditioned upon the timely and strict compliance of Subcontractor’s Work with the Contract Documents, as determined by McCarthy in its sole discretion. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Subcontractor agrees that the approval and payment of Subcontractor’s Application for Payment does not constitute or imply acceptance by McCarthy or Owner of any portion of Subcontractor’s Work. Receipt by McCarthy of payment from the Owner is a condition precedent to McCarthy’s obligation to make payment of Subcontractor’s Application for Payment, in whole or in part, as approved by McCarthy, and as provided in this paragraph 2.1 and extra compensation as provided in paragraph 4.5 below.",Party Submissions,4.7311687,4.3277874,4.7912946
"In the further alternative, the Court should affirm the remand of the case for a new trial for the reasons stated by the court of appeals, or for the further reasons not addressed by that court, discussed above. As HSMiller points out, the case has been tried twice already, as the unfortunate consequence of the BNC Sellers’ relentless pursuit of liquidity to satisfy the damages found in the underlying dispute. The waste of judicial resources is no fault of the Lawyers.",Party Submissions,21.517178,20.09631,22.67585
"Q.2. Was Defendant negligent as to brakes? Q.3. Was Defendant negligent as to lookout? Q.4. Was Plaintiff negligent? Q.5. Apportion considering brakes. Q.6. Apportion considering speed. Q.7. Apportion considering lookout. Q.8. Apportion considering brakes and speed. Q.9. Apportion considering brakes and lookout. Q.10. Apportion considering speed and lookout. Q.11 Apportion considering brakes, speed, and lookout.",Party Submissions,2.7732806,2.8857465,3.0995667
"Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.3 and 9.5(b) the undersigned certifies that on December 14, 2023, I served this document upon counsel for all parties via email and the court’s e-filing system.",Party Submissions,5.390062,6.622493,6.968561
"When we apply this accepted definition of incidental here, it is clear that the RTP issue was a major issue at trial. The RTP issue was the first of four alleged malpractice acts. HSMiller submitted a gross-negligence question based solely on Terry’s actions relating to the RTP issue. And the RTP issue took up much of the testimony and closing arguments, as illustrated below.",Party Submissions,19.8871,20.183384,23.589764
"The issue of fair and equitable treatment 367. Article IV of Annex III of the Treaty, providing for the obligation to accord Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET” or “FET Standard”), sets forth: FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT Each Party shall ensure, at all times, fair and equitable treatment for investments and returns, which shall thus enjoy full protection and security, and shall not receive a treatment less favourable than established under international law.",Legal Decisions,9.702886,8.756871,9.477433
"Only if Bay has met the statutory requirements of TEX. LAB. CODE § 406.123 (a) and (f) does the court need to reach the issue of “course and scope of employment.” However, because the only reliable evidence in the record demonstrates that Bay will never be able to conclusively prove course and scope of employment at the time of Mann's injury, the court should affirm the trial court's order denying Bay's summary judgment by the trial court.",Party Submissions,8.740591,9.989889,10.355951
"As explained in the Lawyers’ Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, this Court should grant review and solidify its unwavering stance against the degradation of the legal profession and the litigation process by holding the proceeds assignment here void. The Court should reverse the portion of the court of appeals’ decision holding to the contrary and render a take-nothing judgment on that basis.",Party Submissions,12.783059,15.822751,15.099572
"Whether a statutory exception or exclusion applies to a claim cannot be considered unless and until it is established that there is jurisdiction for a claim pursuant to the underlying statute in the first place. See State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (stating that before a court can address the merits of a case, it must first establish jurisdiction). As such, the Court should reject an invitation to issue an advisory opinion based on the false premise upon which Weatherford’s Petition relies—that the landfill-focused SWDA has any application whatsoever to a domestic sewer system.",Party Submissions,7.7419977,7.6154804,8.013584
"In 2011, the Legislature revised the Election Code, adding, among other things, a provision stating: “After the filing deadline. .. a candidate may not amend an application filed under Section 141.031.” Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 254 (H.B. 1135), §1, eff. Sept. 1, 2011 (codified at Tex. Elec. Code §141.032(g)).3 The plain text of Section 141.032(g), however, states merely that “a candidate” lacks the ability to unilaterally “amend[]” an application after the statutory deadline expires. Id. (emphasis added). This Court’s decisions never once mention the word “amendment,” and instead discuss the equitable judicial remedy of “curing” a deficiency. E.g., In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d at 543 (directing trial court to “abate the underlying proceeding to allow Francis to cure the defect”).",Party Submissions,5.0042386,4.786088,5.0579886
"In this case, Osprin sued Backes to enforce the guaranty after Backes refused to pay the sums owed under the bridge loan after TX 1111 defaulted. Backes filed counterclaims under the UDJA asking, among other things, that the trial court declare that Backes’s obligat ions under the guaranty agreement were discharged upon Osprin’s receipt of the $23,823,193.05 in Contributions generated by the state tax credits related to the first state rehabilitation project. However, the tria l court determined that Backes’s obligati ons did not terminate until Osprin also received the Contributions generated by the state tax credits related to the second state rehabilitation project, which occurred on February 11, 2020. Since Osprin partially prevailed in its defense of Backes ’s UDJA claims and recovered the Contributions through the litigation, the trial court in its discretion awarded it attorney fees, costs, and expenses against Backes.",Party Submissions,8.299175,7.4608674,8.948712
"R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF R ESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49(3) (2011). “If the value of an unrequested benefit exceeds its cost to the claimant, an innocent recipient will be liable only for the cost.” Id. cmt. e. “‘Cost or value, whichever is less’” is thus the standard recovery in cases of mistaken improvement, if restitution is available at all from an owner not at fault.” Id. “Conversely, where the measurable value of a benefit is less than the cost of conferring it, a recipient who is at fault in the transaction creating unjust enrichment may be liable to make restitution in the amount of the claimant’s costs.” Id. “By contrast, benefits conferred at the defendant’s request are presumed to have value to the recipient equal to the lesser of market value and a price the defendant has expressed a willingness to pay, unless the circumstances of the transaction make this valuation inappropriate.” Id. In this case, Diocese requested the materials and services, albeit not from Bay, Ltd. (9RRPX15). The lease between the Diocese and Mendietta required him to make specified improvements and repairs to the property. (Id.). The stated consideration to Mendietta for the requested improvements was the ability to use the property for 25 years. (Id. Section IV Special Provisions). The Diocese knew that the required improvements had value—Cy Richards’ memo to Bishop Mulvey that referenced “guaranteed improvements....amounting to Three to Four Hundred Thousand Dollars.” (9RRPX17).",Party Submissions,11.205145,11.736473,11.529166
ICKER ) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to Commending Blue Mountain Christian University for 150 years of service to the State of Mississippi and the United States.,Legislation,24.104288,20.825626,31.990335
"It is intended that the Plan shall conform with all applicable Section 409A Requirements. Accordingly, in interpreting, construing or applying any of the foregoing definitions or any of the terms, conditions or provisions of the Plan, the same shall be construed in such manner as shall meet and comply with Section 409A Requirements then applicable thereto, and in the event of any inconsistency with any Section 409A Requirements, the same shall be reformed so as to meet such Section 409A Requirements to the fullest extent then permitted without penalty (and without imposition or accrual of interest or additional taxes) under Section 409A.",Contract,4.8111434,5.030209,5.1378407
"Laura Beam, CASA Supervisor, testified for Appellant, A.S. 5 RR 73. Beam testified that she was present for A.S.’s probation hearing in Smith County. 5 RR 76. On cross-examination, Beam explained that she went to hearing because A.S. had not recently drug tested in the instant case. 5 RR 77. K. Alisha Santiago Thomas Thomas testified generally DFPS removal policies. 5 RR 82. On cross-examination, Thomas testified that positive drug tests were a contributing factor in a removal. 5 RR 85. L. A.S.",Party Submissions,10.231877,10.928889,11.3933325
"Pursuant to its erroneous statement of the standard of review, the Court did not examine the evidence to determine if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the findings of personal jurisdiction. Instead, the Court embarked on a “sufficiency of the evidence inquiry” which is totally improper. An example, with regard to (Tab 3), the Opinion examines that exhibit de novo, and refers to the private placement as quote, “undated...” (Op. p. 5) The Court then goes on to examine Marsenison’s testimony, not with regard to whether it presents a scintilla of evidence to support the denial of the Special Appearance, noted that Marsenison denied that he had any business dealings with Integrity, that he hadn’t entered into any agreements with them, and denied having any Integrity management role and had no explanation why a photo appeared in the investor presentation. (Op. p. 7) This is clearly an examination of the evidence de novo and not to determine whether or not there is a scintilla of evidence. The Opinion goes on to examine the evidence, noting that Marsenison denied that he had any business dealings with Integrity, that he hadn’t entered into any agreements with Integrity, and denied having any Integrity management role, and had no explanation why a photo appeared in the investor presentation. (Op. p. 7) The Court goes on to note that Marsenison denied having business dealings Farias, Integrity or other business dealings with Victor Farias. (Op. p. 7) Another example of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, based upon an erroneous standard of review, reviewing the evidence de novo, instead of trying to determine whether or not a scintilla supports the Opinion of the trial court.",Party Submissions,6.697153,6.7335114,6.7876487
"This Court should grant the petition for review, reverse the decision below, hold Yellowfin’s claim time -barred, and remand the case for any necessary proceedings in the trial court.",Party Submissions,13.227166,13.688773,15.378577
"Appeal of Denied Claims. A Claimant whose claim has been completely or partially denied shall be entitled to appeal the claim denial by filing a written appeal with a committee designated by the Committee to hear such appeals (the “Appeals Committee”). A Claimant who timely requests a review of the denied claim (or his or her authorized representative) may review, upon request and free of charge, copies of all documents, records and other information relevant to the denial and may submit written comments, documents, records and other information relevant to the claim to the Appeals Committee. All written comments, documents, records, and other information shall be considered “relevant” if the information: (i) was relied upon in making a benefits determination; (ii) was submitted, considered or generated in the course of making a benefits decision regardless of whether it was relied upon to make the decision; or (iii) demonstrates compliance with administrative processes and safeguards established for making benefit decisions. The Appeals Committee may, in its sole discretion and if it deems appropriate or necessary, decide to hold a hearing with respect to the claim appeal.",Contract,4.0596,4.3973274,4.44588
The party who seeks to assert that propexty is his separate property must prove its'separate character by clear and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.,Party Submissions,12.016437,21.694614,18.821106
"S.W.3d at 406—07. Adened contribution plan is one in which the employer and/or employee make contributions to an individual account set up for the employee. Boyd, 67 S.W.3d at 407 n.4.",Party Submissions,9.130664,11.609237,13.349361
"The episode intersperses dramatic animations to illustrate or visually interpret the guardianship narratives. When [Tonya] speaks, the camera zooms in on her hands and feet to show fidgeting but does not give the same visual treatment to Ross, Laura, Brittany, or Ross’s assistant, Jo Ann Rivera. When the camera cuts away from [Tonya], the viewer is shown highlighted documents or statistics or general commentary from guardianship critics to suggest inconsistency, but the segment does not similarly treat Ross, Laura, Brittany, or Rivera.",Party Submissions,18.687342,17.79341,20.628439
"And Respondents do even less to square the court of appeals’ decision with the decisions of this Court and other Texas courts interpreting the statutes that control this case, except to ignore those interpretations and attempt to tease out factual distinctions in those decisions. Respondents try to recruit Marshall v. Housing Authority of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. 2006) to their side by holding it up as an example of how a “tenant’s voluntary choices have consequences in litigation with a landlord.” (Resp. 40) But that is feeble support indeed, given Westwood ’s proof that its own “choices” were in no way voluntary. And Respondents’ argument should not serve to distract from Marshall’s true importance, which establishes that a judgment in a forcible entry and detainer action is limited to a final determination only “of the right to immediate possession” of the property — reserving all other issues for the district court. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. T hat holding is fatal to the court of appeals’ effort to convert the agreed judgment of immediate possession into a determination of the right of ultimate possession to the property.",Party Submissions,8.856877,9.219127,9.28937
"If courts judicially broaden the legislatively dictated finality of § 1.111(e) agreements the effect will be to nullify the explicit finality of § 1.111(e) agreements. For example, if the mutual mistake theory of contract invalidity is applicable to § 1.111(e) agreements, the doctrine of want of consideration may equally be available. It is highly tenuous that any § 1.111(e) agreement has consideration. No money is exchanged; the parties just agree on a value.",Party Submissions,8.649589,9.210258,9.5948305
"If required by Exhibit 6, U.S. Longshore and Harborworkers (USL&H) Act coverage endorsement shall be required as part of the Subcontractor’s Worker’s Compensation Insurance.",Party Submissions,9.803562,9.5547085,11.940983
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session, the 1st C.S. and the 2nd C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the 2023 ballot proposition contingencies to date.",Party Submissions,8.685042,7.9217057,8.740299
"This conclusion rests on at least three fundamental errors. To begin, rather than applying this Court ’s Chapter 74 preliminary expert report jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on the sufficiency analysis in Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson, to elevate the scope of review. 649 S.W.3d at 179 At the same time, the Court of Appeals ignored authorities requiring it to read the expert reports together and to credit all of the experts’ opinions. See Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 517; Van Ness v. ETMC First Physicians, 461 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tex. 2015) (noting discretion of trial court to fully credit all the expert ’ s statements and opinions, rather than viewing them in isolation). Finally, the Court of Appeals compounded the error when it failed to tether its analysis the providers ’ specific objections as Chapter 74 requires.",Party Submissions,10.923351,10.27689,11.680935
"Disposition in the Court of Appeals: The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and dismissed all of Petitioners’ claims. City of Cedar Park v. Delapena, No. 13-21-00341-CV, 2022 WL 16993493 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2022, pet. filed.). Justice Benavides delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Contreras and Justice Tijerina.",Party Submissions,4.066242,4.4670963,4.170969
"In other words, there is no “chain of events” to tie any claimed fault to the alleged hypoxic event, stroke, or whatever the experts think happened (which is not clear). Dr. Tappan instead points to three intrapartum factors that may have led to a “possibl[e]” perinatal arterial ischemic stroke: (1) prolonged second-stage labor, (2) fetal heart rate abnormalities, and (3) trauma at the time of delivery. (CR.794) Even if this was sufficient to explain causation (it was not) none of these are linked to nurses’ conduct. Instead, Dr. Tappan opines that had Dr. Castillo delivered the baby by reverse breech extraction, the baby would “not likely have suffered these complications and injuries.” (CR.793) Dr. Null also opined that “had [H.W.] been delivered one to one and a half hours sooner he would not have suffered the degree of brain injury that he has.” (CR.805) If anything this is a doctor issue – not a nursing one.",Party Submissions,9.710636,9.981476,10.662642
"In Respondents’ telling, Westwood merely decided to leave the location where it had sold cars for more than four years as part of a “broader strategic decision to shut ” down its business, “leave the warehouse space that it no longer needed,” “and make a fresh start with a new entity.” (Resp. 12, 31, 38) And, according to Respondents, upon losing the forcible entry and detainer action, Westwood simply “announced its intention” to “vacate the premises” and “withdraw its appeal” in an exchange of letters. (Resp. 11-12, 28, citing 16RR307(DX42)) Nothing could be further from the truth.",Party Submissions,12.700077,12.760084,14.243478
"Automated Collection, 156 S.W.3d at 559. The burden shifted to RLB to provide reasons why the forum-selection clause should not be enforced.",Party Submissions,10.06961,12.227053,14.901758
"McCarthy, the Owner and others as required by the Contract Documents shall be added as additional insureds to the Subcontractor’s Pollution Liability policy. Coverage afforded to these additional insureds will be primary to and noncontributory with, any other insurance available to such additional insureds. Subcontractor’s Contractors Pollution Liability policies shall contain endorsements waiving all rights of subrogation against all additional insureds.",Party Submissions,5.67316,5.470745,6.5248966
"Nicaragua invokes, i.e., the prospect of an unpaid costs award, is hypothetical and, in any event, reparable through the courts of enforcement.",Party Submissions,25.178755,33.223953,33.83823
Respondent takes note of Claimants' agreement to conduct a search for and to produce non-privileged documents that are responsive to this request. Respondent requests Claimants to provide a privilege log as explained in Respondent’s general c omments above.,Legal Decisions,12.588654,12.775115,14.910369
"This case concerns a written agreement entered into by co-Petitioner Mills County Appraisal District and Respondent Oncor Electric’s predecessor in title establishing the appraised value of certain electric power transmission lines belonging to Oncor and located in Mills County. Oncor subsequently filed a motion under ex. Tax Code §25.25(c) to correct the appraisal roll, seeking to avoid the agreement, on the ground that it was based on a mutual mistake of fact. The motion was heard by Petitioner Mills County Appraisal Review Board, which determined that it lacked jurisdiction because the provisions of §1.111(e) the agreement was final. The ARB dismissed the motion. Respondent appealed this dismissal to the District Court under Tex. Tax Code §42.01 et seq. and in the alternative under §25.25(g) of the Code, joining both the Appraisal District and the Appraisal Review Board. The ARB pleaded lack of jurisdiction under §1.111(e) and also under §42.21(b), which prohibits joinder of appraisal review boards to petitions for review of their decisions. In addition, the ARB pleaded that 25.25(g), which permits suits filed against an ARB for review of its determinations of motions made under §25.25 of the Tax Code, had been subsumed into Chapter 42, by amendment of §42.01, and made subject to that chapter’s bar on joinder of appraisal review boards. Finally, the ARB pleaded that the Tax Code provided a taxpayer remedy for the ARB’s dismissal of its protest, and that Oncor’s failure to exhaust it deprived the Court of jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,5.986669,6.030665,5.8328075
"On appeal, Berrelez contends the trial court erred in dismissing her suit against Mesquite Logistics. Relying on the “personal animosity” exception, she claims it was unnecessary for her to exhaust her administrative remedies because she was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the assault. Thus, she argues her claims are “exempted” from the Act. Mesquite disagrees, arguing that whether Berrelez was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the assault was an issue within the exclusive province of the DWC, mandating that she first exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit.",Party Submissions,5.6898503,5.474995,5.9814577
"The Raymond decision has been unduly criticized for its lack of analysis explaining the conflicts with Cockerham. Professor Pamela George analyzed the possible reasoning for Raymond’s departure from the long-standing precedent of Cockerham. Pamela E. George, “Not Everybody Loves Raymond: How The Case Of Raymond V. Raymond Made A Shambles Of Interspousal Gift Presumptions And The Parol Evidence Rule In Matters Of Texas Community Property,” 50 St. Mary’s L.J. 809 (2019). “Although not an entirely renegade opinion, the Raymond analysis is so precariously founded as to be contrary to well-set Texas Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 813. First, the Raymond court may have applied an interspousal transfer theory, highlighting a distinction between spouse-to-spouse transfers as opposed to transfers involving a spouse and a third party. Under this theory the Raymond court appears to hold that a spouse-to spouse transfer results in a presumptive gift absent the high burden of proving accident, fraud, or mistake. This seems to imply an irrebuttable presumption that an interspousal conveyance itself establishes separate property character absent a threshold showing of accident, fraud or mistake. Such analysis is directly contrary to Cockerham.",Party Submissions,10.451779,10.339114,10.606724
"G) Summary 578. On the basis of the arguments raised in the foregoing chapters, the Tribunal finds that Respondent must compensate Claimant for the damages it actually caused as a result of violating its obligations under the terms of the Treaty. This compensation must fully cover both the income that Claimant should have received if reasonable tipping fees had been applied and the loss of 90% of the value of Lajun’s capital stock. The requirement to provide full reparation entails the application of interest on the aforementioned sum under the terms determined supra.",Legal Decisions,13.982129,13.505138,14.201502
"Respondents argue 402 Lone Star does not support the Petitioners’ argument because the issue on appeal was “whether the defendant knew that the amount was overstated.” Respondents’ Br. at 14. However, 402 Lone Star’s significance here is that the HOA used the lien’s enforcement power to foreclose on the property based on the overinflated redemption statement. See 402 Lone Star Prop., LLC v. Bradford, 04-16-00721-CV, 2017 WL 5759379, at *1-2, 5-6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 29, 2017), opinion withdrawn and superseded sub nom., 402 Lone Star Prop., LLC v. Bradford, 04-16-00721-CV, 2018 WL 1935576 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 25, 2018). Similarly, Respondents use their Chapter 55 lien and its enforcement powers to collect overinflated hospital bills with the intent to cause financial injury to the patients. 402 Lone Star is also significant because the court recognized that the intent element is inherently a question for the jury. Id. at *5. Here, it is up to the jury to decide if Respondents’ use of their liens was fraudulent.",Party Submissions,4.647211,4.7674723,4.796106
"Without Written Notice by April 1 -If L M O does not give H A O written notice by April 1 of a year specifying an extended period or periods of summer possession for that year, L M O shall have possession of the child for forty-two consecutive days beginning at 6:00 p.m. on June 15 and ending at 6:00 p.m. on July 27 of that year. dismissed from school for the Christmas school vacation and ending at noon on December 28, and H A O shall have the right to possession of the child beginning at noon on December 28 and ending at the time school resumes after that Christmas school vacation.",Party Submissions,7.4290237,8.246437,8.2549925
"In addition, in connection with his commencing employment with the Company, Executive was awarded a special one-time grant of 500,000 RSU’s/PSU’s vesting as outlined below (“One-Time Special Grant”).",Contract,9.393433,8.980666,8.602507
ARTICLE III(I) GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING TREATMENT Each Party shall admit and treat investments in a manner not less favourable than the treatment granted in similar situations to investments of its investors except for investments in areas to be identified in the Appendix to this Annex .,Legal Decisions,12.723448,11.770416,16.361885
SUBPART C. Mark Marsenison is subject to jurisdiction in Texas as a result of committing a tort in Texas against a Texas resident.,Party Submissions,47.797104,37.116367,56.960247
"The trial court’s decision to deny UTRGV’s plea to the jurisdiction was based on this simple fact, and that decision was upheld by the court below. No basis to disturb that decision exists here.",Party Submissions,10.062933,11.632308,13.256629
"To amend the Water Resources Development Act of 1992 and the Flood Control Act of 1968 to provide for provisions relating to collection and retention of user fees at recreation facilities, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.70512,4.4873495,5.4182076
"CR:436. No community award was given here, either. Finally, the statutory formula hinged on when the “ grant could be exercised.” Tex. Fam. Code § 3.007(d)(2)(A),(B). It was very relevant, and a fact issue, that the company could decide to relax the grant dates to a lesser period, including for performance payment — Exhibit 26, page A-7. This was a fact issue repeated raised at trial, with Phillips 66 hardly ever waiting the full 3 years before vesting.",Party Submissions,37.442165,40.168144,39.4533
It is unreasonable for an OEM to require a specific new motor vehicle sales number for a franchisee to fulfill when that OEM does not make the inventory available and franchise termination is in the offing.,Party Submissions,26.263624,19.915854,24.777061
The dealer is an OEM’s captive buyer for the OEM’s vehicles and parts. This symbiotic relationship gives the OEM additional control for the distribution of its vehicles and parts. The dealer has no such captive buyer for the sale of its new motor vehicles as the dealer’s buyer has hundreds of models and lines and locations to choose from for purchase at any given time.,Party Submissions,15.040561,11.771576,15.788294
"As to the fair-report privilege, Barina claims the Program is not privileged as a report of the guardianship proceedings because it includes information “from outside those proceedings while ignoring critical information and reports within the proceedings.” Resp. Br. at 41. But this argument is specious at best.",Party Submissions,19.982237,21.95196,23.41678
"Thus, based on the Opinion guarantors for bank loans and in any lending transaction can unilaterally avoid complying with their obligations by strategically delaying payment until a termination clause becomes effective. This precedent further incentivizes guarantors with termination clauses to draw out litigation until their breach is moot. The Court should grant this Motion for Rehearing to prevent such gamesman that unreasonably and unnecessarily strains judicial and party resources.",Party Submissions,16.64526,18.879932,21.00521
"Accordingly, Tyler has no adequate remedy by appeal from the trial court's abuse of discretion in refusing to abate the underlying *846 suit until judicial review is complete. We sustain Tyler's first issue.",Party Submissions,11.162261,11.730105,18.350426
"An appraisal review board or court must necessarily examine a settlement agreement to discern what the agreement covered and what the parties are precluded from protesting further. In fact, this Court noted that the appraisal review board could not change a settlement agreement. The language which Oncor quotes out of the opinion to the effect that “we disagree that this is a jurisdictional question” is taken out of context. What the Court said was not jurisdictional was whether there were two protests, not whether the settlement agreement under section 1.111(e) was subject to revision. In that case, the property owner and lessee both filed protests. The appraisal district and owner settled. Then the lessee, Coastal, filed protests. The appraisal district argued the settlement with the owner precluded the protest by the lessee pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 41.413(b). The trial court had to examine the prior protest to determine whether it concerned the same matters as Coastal ’ s protest. In other words, which party — lessee or owner — was entitled to appeal under Texas Tax Code Chapter 42. The holding does not make the prior agreement subject to review and interpretation; it simply recognizes that, prior to determining whether the prior agreement precluded latter protest, the finder of fact had to determine what the prior protest covered. To hold otherwise would not make much sense. But this Court did not address the jurisdictional finality of an agreement made under section 1.111(e) .",Party Submissions,9.844883,9.586862,10.019233
"See Pet. App. B at 26–27. For example, the Board’s final finding on § 2301.467(a)(1)—that “[m]easuring sales efficiency does not require adherence to unreasonable sales or service standards”—simply concluded the Board’s (incorrect) analysis in the prior findings that the standard here was not “require[d].” Pet. App. B. at 26–27. The only § 2301.467(a)(1) issue decided below, and before this Court, is whether HMA “require[d]” the sales-efficiency standard.",Party Submissions,9.032315,9.201073,9.478613
"McCarthy Subcontract -4-01-12-2017 Rev. take some or all of the following actions at no additional cost to McCarthy: .1 Increase manpower in such quantities as will substantially eliminate the backlog of work and put Subcontractor's Work back on schedule. .2 Increase the number of working hours per shift, shifts per working day, working days per week, or the amount of equipment, or any combination of the foregoing which will substantially eliminate the backlog of work and put Subcontractor's Work back on schedule. .3 Reschedule activities to achieve maximum practical concurrency of accomplishment of activities and put Subcontractor's Work back on schedule.",Party Submissions,7.5735345,7.7910113,8.187329
"HSMiller then argues that the instructions did not instruct on facts but on the law, ( id. at 19-24) so they could not be a comment on the weight of the evidence. Terry has already discussed at length why the instruction incorrectly states the law on RTPs. Beyond that, the record does not support this argument. The second non-statutory instruction and the first non-statutory instruction went further than they should have by nudging the jury in favor of one party and directly commenting on evidence, and directly favoring one side’s evidence over the other’s. See Newsom, 2022 WL 3908542, at *9 (“By expanding the RTP instruction to specifically state what Terry could 37 have done, the trial court necessarily implied what it believed Terry should have done.”).",Party Submissions,13.622602,13.130262,14.295027
For column 12: ‘Method sensitivity’ means the probability of a method to correctly detect pest presence. The method sensitivity is defined as the probability that a truly positive host tests positive. It is the multiplication of the sampling effectiveness (i.e. probability of selecting infected plant parts from an infected plant) by the diagnostic sensitivity (characterised by the visual inspection and/or laboratory test used in the identification process).,Legislation,16.366194,14.272653,18.651459
"Oncor ’ s argument necessarily implies that sections 25.25(c-1) and (d-1) repeal section 1.111(e)(2), at least in part, without so much as mentioning the repeal. Courts will not interpret one statute as repealing another absent a clear intent of the Legislature to do so. Rather, the statutes should be read in harmony with each 29 other.",Party Submissions,9.694184,10.477864,11.109295
"Recently this Court has reaffirmed that “[c]harge error is generally considered harmful if it relates to a contested, critical issue.” In re Estate of Poe, 648 S.W.3d 277, 285-93 (Tex. 2022). The court of appeals correctly held that the second non-statutory instruction went too far, and the harm from the improper second non-statutory instruction only buttresses that court’s decision.",Party Submissions,10.125228,9.339448,10.494385
"In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., Inc., 107 S.W.3d 832 (2003) [8] Administrative Law and Procedure Exclusive or original jurisdiction Whether an agency has exclusive jurisdiction depends on statutory interpretation.",Party Submissions,10.043101,10.329432,10.444305
"To amend the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 to provide for continuous improvement of organic standards, and for other purposes.",Legislation,3.7225113,3.9121811,3.7649345
"Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.003(a). But the Legislature deliberately excluded that language from section 272.001. E.g., Hogan, 627 S.W.3d at 169.",Party Submissions,7.8922853,9.189388,13.040886
The designation of a person as a vice president does not by itself have a standardized or customary meaning associating particular functions or authority with the position.,Party Submissions,17.83128,17.603174,18.018602
"That passage perfectly encapsulates the court of appeals’ fundamental error— and the confusion that Respondents continue to sew before this Court: Both erroneously equate Westwood’s decision to turn over immediate possession of the premises with the abandonment of any right of possession Westwood ever had in the premises —regardless of Westwood’s reasons for leaving. But the reasons are everything in a constructive-eviction action. After all, a claim of wrongful eviction requires an “eviction”—indeed, Respondents admit that the tenant must “abandon[] the property within a reasonable time” to maintain such a claim. (Resp. 22, quoting Op. 5 n.3) But as Westwood has explained, and Respondents again ignore, it is the reason behind the abandonment that determines the viability of a claim for wrongful eviction: The tenant who simply abandons the leased premises because it wants to, or because it recognizes it has no claim of right to stay there, has no claim. See Kemp v. Brenham, No. 05-18-01377-CV, 2020 WL 205313 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).",Party Submissions,7.489019,8.009151,7.9856277
"Alternate Weekend Possession -In lieu of the weekend possession described in the foregoing paragraph, L M O shall have the right to possession of the child not more than one weekend per month of L M O choice beginning at 6 :0 0 p.m. on the day school recesses for the weekend and ending at 6:00 p.m. on the day before school resumes after the weekend. L M O may elect an option for this alternative period of weekend possession by giving written notice to H A O within ninety days after the parties begin to reside more than 100 miles apart. If L M O makes this election, L M O shall give H A O fourteen days' written or telephonic notice preceding a designated weekend. The weekends chosen shall not conflict with the provisions regarding Christmas, Thanksgiving, the child's birthday, and Father's Day possession below.",Party Submissions,6.6328893,6.7877417,6.9890547
"They also ignore that Bastrop Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Acme Brick Co., 428 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.) is materially distinguishable from this case for the same reason. In Acme Brick, the settlement agreement expressly addressed the applicability of a tax exemption. Acme Brick, 428 S.W.3d at 916. The court said the district was bound to apply the exemption because “[t]he document plainly reflects an agreement between the District and Acme about the value of Acme’s property, including the application of the pollution-control exemption to the Property .” Id. (emphasis added). The court reiterated that “[t]he document signed by Capitol and Acme specifically states that the proper values ( including the application of the exemption ) have been agreed upon by the District’s representative and Acme. .. .” Id. (emphasis added). Further, the court noted that “[t]he District does not dispute that it reached an agreement with Acme that Acme’s Property qualified for the pollution-control exemption in the tax years 2004 through 2007 or that the agreement constitutes a Section 1.111(e) agreement between the parties on the value of the Property.” Id. at 917. The court held that section 1.111(e) barred the district from taking “subsequent action that is contrary to that agreement. .. .” Id. at 918 (emphasis added). That is why the court of appeals in that case determined that the agreement barred subsequent litigation of the applicability of the exemption. Id. at 919. Even more important to this case, the Acme Brick court confirmed that district courts do have jurisdiction to determine the scope and effect of an agreement under section 1.111(e) to resolve disputes like this one. Id. at 915 n.3. The District and Board simply ignore these aspects of Acme Brick .",Party Submissions,4.5047016,4.8461666,4.512728
"Amendments. The Company, by action taken by its Board of Directors, may amend the Plan at any time and for any reason, provided that any such amendment shall not reduce the vested Account Balances of any Participant accrued as of the date of any such amendment or restatement (as if the Participant had incurred a voluntary Separation from Service on such date) or reduce any rights of a Participant under the Plan or other Plan features with respect to Deferrals made prior to the date of any such amendment or restatement without the consent of the Participant. The Board of Directors of the Company may delegate to the Committee the authority to amend the Plan without the consent of the Board of Directors for the purpose of: (i) conforming the Plan to the requirements of law; (ii) facilitating the administration of the Plan; (iii) clarifying provisions based on the Committee’s interpretation of the document; and (iv) making such other amendments as the Board of Directors may authorize.",Contract,3.912193,3.6522813,4.1439924
"Second, Stanley, the BNC Sellers’ lawyer in the underlying trial, admitted arguing in the underlying trial that HSMiller perpetrated a fraud on the public by making it look like Defterios was a corporate officer and by giving him the title of vice president. (6RR192-94, 253) His change of course in the malpractice trial is one of the reasons assignments of control and interest should be void as against public policy.",Party Submissions,35.1533,31.450354,38.523197
"And Section 51.003(a) defines “deficiency” as the difference between “the price at which real property is sold at a foreclosure sale” and “the indebtedness secured by the real property.” As our opening brief explains (at 13-16), Yellowfin’s suit falls squarely within that definition. Yellowfin seeks to recover the indebtedness that was secured by Deysi Santos’s home before it was sold at a foreclosure sale. Yellowfin’s suit is thus for “the amount remaining on a debt after applying the proceeds realized at a foreclosure sale ,” which is “one of the very definitions of ‘deficiency.’” Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2014) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 514 (10th ed. 2014)). Courts have also referred to a junior lender’s post foreclosure debt in particular as “a deficiency” and its suit to recover that debt as seeking a “deficiency judgment.” See Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97, 99, 102 (Cal. 1963).",Party Submissions,6.3326397,5.531913,6.325998
"Is Respondent’s counterclaim directed against Claimant’s original claim and/or against Claimant’s ancillary claim? Was it brought timely with respect to each, as applicable?",Party Submissions,12.41796,11.957367,13.855667
"A negligence case against a nonsubscribing employer is an action for workers' compensation benefits under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. party in interest: Mr. Collen A. Clark, Mr. Jon L. Anderson, Mr. R. Connor Barbe, Ms. Linda Le Jones. For East Texas Medical Center Athens, Relator: Casey Campbell, Mr. William O. Ashcraft, Ms. Christina Gratke Nason, Mr. David M. Walsh IV.",Party Submissions,20.8028,26.586977,23.995703
"This document serves as a basis for discussion at the Working Party on Fisheries Policy. It cannot in any circumstances be regarded as the official position of the Commission. It is intended solely for those to whom it is addressed. In these circumstances, the Tribunal considers that it cannot attach any weight to this document. Even if it could, however, the draft Note does no more than reiterate that the EU takes a different view of the Svalbard Treaty from the Norwegian Government and the Supreme Court. For the reasons already given the Tribunal cannot rule on that difference. Neither the EU draft nor the article by Justice Skoghøy afford any support to the Claimants’ argument that they suffered a denial of justice.",Legal Decisions,10.927832,11.351213,11.108026
"Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Footnote 20 of Annex 14-C of USMCA November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain Canada’s and Mexico’s consent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Footnote 20 of Annex 14-C of USMCA.",Legal Decisions,5.9357953,6.258969,6.269201
"Samson even asserted in T.S. Reed that a holding it perceived in Hooks on the legal issue of whether overlapping pooled units could coexist “controls” the severed case: Samson’s Appellant’s Brief filed January 6, 2014, in T.S. Reed at 46, located at: https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=3660681b-414e-4201-8236-5556e611eedd&coa=coa09&DT=Brief&MediaID=f87ea8a4-6125- 4514-b749-457e5b1e1bf5.",Party Submissions,18.41855,12.492108,18.908466
"Debra Kirby, with CASA, testified next for Intervenors. 4 RR 176. Kirby told the jury she was on A.S.’s previous CPS case. 4 RR 182. Kirby described for the jury an incident where she went to A.S.’s home, but A.S. was not there due to having a tire replaced. 4 RR 185. Kirby had a tire replaced at the same time, but A.S. was not there. Kirby further agreed to previous drug use by A.S. in the other CPS case. 4 RR 193. Kirby testified that termination was in the best interest of R.W. 4 RR 197. Kirby then told the jury the Holley factors and how they applied to R.W. and A.S. 4 RR 198-99. If the jury terminated A.S.’s rights to R.W., Kirby testified that she would like to see R.W. adopted by the Intervenors. 4 RR 202.",Party Submissions,5.3569365,5.997455,5.9070177
Section 4.07. Termination. This Agreement shall terminate and thereafter be of no further force and effect for all Parties at such time as Penske Corporation ceases to Beneficially Own 30% or more of the Voting Securities then outstanding.,Contract,7.2383103,6.290192,8.291701
Certificate of Compliance I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Word Perfect and contains 1960 words as determined by the computer’s software word count function.,Party Submissions,11.108248,15.182954,14.670412
"If Texas Property Code § 51.003(a) were to toss aside these well-established doctrines, it would introduce tremendous uncertainty into an intensely important area of finance. Lenders would have to scour the real property records constantly to avoid an acceleration they played no part in, and risk foregoing all of their rights due to a foreclosure in which they neither participated nor benefited. The borrower would no longer have the option of keeping current on less onerous obligations; their entire financial situation must crumble without hope of salvage. It belies reason that the Legislature intended such things when it passed Section 51.003(a). A more rational interpretation is that the Legislature intended to force a timely disposition of matters related to the fair market value of the real property soon after the property was foreclosed, as to the parties who conducted and were subject to the foreclosure. Less rational is the concept that the Legislature intended to effect a sweeping change to long-standing jurisprudence.",Party Submissions,11.407332,12.599104,12.414192
"Delapenas have failed to identify any condition, artificial or otherwise, at Buttercup Pool that was not open or inherent to swimming.",Party Submissions,94.115456,82.082855,126.0468
"In categorically resolving these conflicts in favor of the pro-arbitration party, the majority's analysis comes down to this: Because the proarbitration party gets an interlocutory appeal, it should also get an automatic stay. Ibid. ; see L. Numeroff, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie (1985). But Congress *759 was entitled to give one without the other. And the right to interlocutory appeal is valuable on its own. It is, as the majority explains, “a rare statutory exception to the usual rule that parties may not appeal before final judgment.” Ante, at 1919. Even without a stay, if the interlocutory appeal succeeds, the pro-arbitration party gets its wish and the dispute goes to arbitration.",Party Submissions,8.908724,9.535014,8.087907
"Before the trial court heard the defendants’ objections, the parties reached an agreement that the Walkers could have thirty days to serve supplemental or amended reports, and that the Walkers would not request a thirty-day extension from the trial court. (CR.650). The Walkers then timely served updated reports from Dr. Tappan (CR.663-71) and Dr. Null (CR.708-09), and Dr. Castillo again objected and moved to dismiss. (CR.649-62).",Party Submissions,10.148432,11.807512,11.310703
"The act of zoning divides property within a city into classifications such as residential, commercial, industrial, and mixed-use based on community needs determined by elected and appointed city officials. While each city’s zoning ordinance is distinct, they usually establish classifications and define permitted uses within those classifications, either by right or through special permits where needed. Special use permits (SUPs), which can also be known by other names, allow certain uses within classifications, if the property meets defined criteria, subject to community approval. For instance, in Georgetown, Texas, using property for “fuel sales” (i.e. a gas station) is not permitted at all in Georgetown’s RE and RL residential zones; however, fuel sales are permitted in Georgetown’s C-1 and C-3 commercial zones and only with an SUP.14 Hotels, on the other hand, are a use that is permitted by right in any area in Georgetown zoned C-1 and C-3.15 Crucially, eligibility for an SUP does not guarantee its approval, differentiating an SUP from which is a potential use contingent on receiving a permit from an inherent right to use property for a certain purpose.",Party Submissions,7.581092,7.938105,7.5947065
"Weatherford claims that the possibility of additional discovery would somehow allow it to uncover evidence in support of Midland’s connection to the off-Site Contaminants. However, and as discussed more fully in Section D of the Argument, Weatherford had the opportunity to connect Midland to its SWDA claim, and it failed to do so. Midland presented evidence in Carl Craigo’s affidavit that established that the only evidence that could show that Midland permitted the alleged disposals would be through its discharge permitting/licensing program, and no such permit or license exists for the alleged disposers. Proceeding through additional discovery to seek evidence that Midland already established does not exist would undercut the very purpose of governmental immunity—to prevent governmental entities from being erroneously and improperly dragged into timely and costly litigation efforts.",Party Submissions,15.032466,17.311117,17.218346
"If contractors and subcontractors may waive their right to have a dispute heard in court, then they also may waive their right to have a dispute heard in a Texas court.",Party Submissions,7.786779,8.222411,8.471938
"Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Husband one hundred percent of the marital residence as his separate property. We sustain Wife’s first issue.",Party Submissions,5.85653,7.06578,7.922903
"Sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine that protects the State and its agencies from lawsuits for money damages and deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 & n.2 (Tex. 2008). Governmental immunity offers the same protections for the State’s political subdivisions, including its cities. Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex. 2022) (first citing Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tex. 2019); and then citing Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003)). By design, immunity shields public treasuries from mistakes made by government officials and employees. Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). “[I] mmunity thus protects the public as a whole by preventing potential disruptions of key government services that could occur when government funds are unexpectedly and substantially diverted by litigation. ” Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. 2015).",Party Submissions,3.7810931,4.3114514,3.9663577
"High and Rector filed a Petition for Review on December 28, 2022, to which this Court requested a response. On September 29, 2023, this Court denied the petition. Thereafter, this Court granted a one-week extension of time within which to file a motion for rehearing from that denial which was granted. Petitioners now file this motion for rehearing.",Party Submissions,6.1600914,7.2473426,7.522081
"WARNINGS TO PARTIES: FAILURE TO OBEY A COURT ORDER FOR CHILD SUPPORT OR FOR POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD MAY RESULT IN FURTHER LITIGATION TO ENFORCE THE ORDER, INCLUDING CONTEMPT OF COURT. A FINDING OF CONTEMPT MAY BE PUNISHED BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR UP TO SIX MONTHS, A FINE OF UP TO $500 FOR EACH VIOLATION, AND A MONEY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS.",Party Submissions,2.706836,2.9342182,2.9283435
"See supra pp. 1–3, 11; Pet. 10, 17–20. That is why the TADA has weighed in here, urging this Court’s review.",Party Submissions,12.143404,22.169739,17.726353
"HSMiller’s Merits Brief repeatedly suggests that the testimony given at this trial was a legal error, as when an attorney mistakenly testifies that the statute of limitations is four years when it is actually two years, which the trial court had to correct for the jury. (Cross Pet’r’s Br. at 14-15, 19-20) This analogy has no merit here. To begin, as shown above, the court’s instruction was wrong on the law. Also, the expert testimony here addressed mixed questions of strategy and law; that is a far cry from misstating the proper statute of limitations for a cause of action.",Party Submissions,12.976459,12.325516,14.419198
"The very essence of public policy strives to ensure that all individuals, irrespective of their financial stature, enjoy equitable access to justice. Within the framework of this arbitration agreement, a clause that places potentially limitless costs on a party, without any defined cap or limitation, poses a palpable threat to this foundational objective. Such a clause could very well dissuade many individuals from advancing their legitimate claims, paralyzed by the looming shadow of prohibitive expenses. In this context, the disparity between a Rafiei and Lennar — a titan in the housing industry — becomes painfully evident. Lennar, as of 2022, stood as the second-largest home construction company in the United States based on revenue.",Party Submissions,10.479141,10.82998,10.830616
"Payment Schedule applicable to such Account(s) to which Deferrals have been allocated in accordance with Section 4.1(b) above shall be a payment on the commencement date specified in Section 6.1 for such Account and the form of payment specified in Section 6.2 for such Account. For clarity, a Participant’s Compensation Deferral Agreement may establish one or more Separation from Service Accounts and/or Specified Date Accounts with different Payment Schedules from any such Accounts established under prior Compensation Deferral Agreements, subject to the limitation on the number of Accounts set forth in Section 4.1(d) below.",Contract,5.9906855,6.1018147,7.731985
"The term of this Agreement shall commence on the Effective Date and shall extend until October 31, 2024, and shall continue from year-to-year thereafter, unless earlier terminated in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement (the “Term”). Either UCC or TDCC may elect at any time to terminate this Agreement by providing the other with at least six (6) months' advance written notice of termination.",Contract,3.9096882,3.7171214,4.3114967
"The facts of this case are highly analogous to Wilson where this Court permitted a claim that “the Department undertook a duty to make it safe for park visitors to use the river, and that it breached such a duty.” Wilson, 8 S.W.3d at 636. As the Plaintiffs explained, “by putting up signs about its flood warning systems, the Department encouraged visitors’ reliance that the park rangers were monitoring the river and would provide adequate warning if dangerous conditions developed. Id. at 635-36. And as this Court noted “there is evidence that [the Department] attempted to control the conduct of visitors to the park.” Id.",Party Submissions,9.608873,10.262509,10.1838255
"Should this Court issue a Writ of Mandamus compelling Respondent to reject the ballot application of John Devine, and withdraw his certification to the Secretary of State of John Devine for Texas Supreme Court, Place 4, on the 2024 Republican General Primary Ballot?",Party Submissions,12.2732315,11.90568,13.95003
"To amend title 23, United States Code, to require transportation planners to consider projects and strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.4379663,3.3273838,4.387555
"None of these documents were provided to the Claimant at the time of his arrest or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,16.452517,16.52025,17.389772
"This case also involves an open question in a context the Court has written about recently: the judicial-proceedings privilege. The heart of the Naths’ claims are that the Hospitals wrongfully filed abstracts of judgment—that caused a real-estate contract to fall through—on property owned by both of the Naths even though the Hospitals had no final judgment against Dr. Nath in the sanctions case, and had never even sued Usha Nath. In an acknowledged question of first impression, the court of appeals incorrectly extended the privilege to abstracts of judgment and upheld the trial court’s improper dismissal of the Naths’ claims under the TCPA and Rule 91a. 2022 WL 1038372, at *7, 11.",Party Submissions,11.330795,11.534462,12.174765
Parties on 2 November 2023 acknowledging the Parties’ agreement regarding the due dates for the filing of the Request and the Claimants’ Opposition to the Respondent’s Request for a Stay of Enforcement (the “ Response ”).,Legal Decisions,12.342756,14.189304,16.198072
"Clause 12 of the Investment Agreement (Exh. C-010) provides: “The failure to comply with any of the obligations undertaken by that the (sic.) COMPANY under this Agreement, as well as with those deriving from the documents attached hereto, shall give rise to the termination of the Agreement.” (a) Has the Investment Agreement been terminated by Respondent on the basis of Clause 12 or on any other basis? (b) If so, when and how, with reference to the record in this proceeding?",Party Submissions,7.859564,6.221598,8.015174
"Barina’s claim that the Program includes ‘outside information’ is without legal basis.13 Barina suggests that this Court held in KBMT that the fair-report privilege only applies when a publication “confine[s] itself to information from ... court proceedings.” Resp. Br. at 41 (citing KBMT, 492 S.W.3d at 715). Barina fundamentally misunderstands the Court’s reasoning in KBMT. In highlighting that the defendant’s broadcast was a “simple, accurate, fair, and brief restatement of the [official proceeding at issue],” this Court was merely emphasizing that a report may lose the protections of the privilege if it misstates or mischaracterizes an official report’s contents, as the defendant broadcaster did in Neely v. Wilson,14 which KBMT cited. Id. This Court was not suggesting that the privilege was lost if additional, truthful material from outside the official report was included for context.",Party Submissions,9.57726,9.167212,9.814351
"For example, the question arises with characterization of real property where an earnest money contract is executed prior to marriage in one party’s name, then the parties marry and take title in both names. The long-standing rule is that where property is purchased by contract for deed, the inception of title doctrine relates back to the inception of the contract. Welder, 44 S.W. at 281; Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ.). “It is well- established that a claim to real property can arise before the legal title or evidence of title has been attained.” Welder, 44 S.W. at 281.",Party Submissions,6.907898,7.412284,6.915822
"Donald J. Trump did not engage in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or give aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.",Legislation,4.8582573,4.560072,6.449912
"To require the Secretary of Defense to establish a pilot program for evidence- based perinatal mental health prevention for pregnant and postpartum members of the Armed Forces and dependents, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.590031,5.018051,6.8640995
"In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it temporarily enjoined Appellant Travis Evans (""Evans"") from competing with Appellee C. Woods, Inc.",Party Submissions,6.011387,6.859349,7.546878
"Section 11. Amendment and Termination. The Plan may be amended or terminated, in whole or in part, at any time by the Plan Administrator, subject to approval, as appropriate, by the Company’s Board of Directors. Except as provided below, any such Plan amendment or termination may apply to all, or any designated class or classes of employees (including, without limitation, former employees). Except as provided below, upon termination of the Plan, the Company shall have no further obligations or liabilities hereunder, and all Plan benefits and all Company and Plan Administrator obligations under the Plan shall cease. Notwithstanding the above, except with a Participant’s consent, no such amendment or termination shall impair the rights of a Participant with respect to benefits payable hereunder if such Participant ceased to be an Eligible Associate and became entitled to payment of a Severance Benefit under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 hereof prior to the date such amendment or termination was adopted.",Contract,3.9687345,4.0876718,4.0879207
"In the Wierzchula case, the appellee acquired a claim to the property at the time the purchase money contract was entered. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d at 732. The earnest money date being prior to the marriage of the parties, the appellee's right of claim to the property preceded the marriage, and the character of the property as separate property was established and the community property presumption was rebutted. Id.",Party Submissions,7.3429923,9.409154,8.811455
"Accordingly, Weatherford lacks both pieces of the proverbial puzzle for arranger/acceptor status: it cannot show Midland acted to accept or arrange for a disposal of this waste, and it cannot even demonstrate that there was a disposal in the first place. In its analysis of “arranger” status, this Court in R.R. Street adopted the totality of the circumstances test as described in Mathews v. Dow Chemical Company, 947 F.Supp. 1517, 1525 (D. Col. 1996). In this test, the Court considers the following factors in determining arranger or acceptor status: whether the entity (1) owned or possessed the solid waste in question; (2) had the authority to make disposal decisions; (3) had the obligation to make disposal decisions; (4) exercised control over decisions regarding the waste’s disposal; or (5) actually disposed of the solid waste. R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 242. Weatherford misapplies each of these factors in an attempt to show that Midland had knowledge of the activities of an intervening third party. But even as such, this Court in R.R. Street showed that knowledge is not enough to establish “acceptor” or “arranger” status, stating that “[a]dditional factors include ‘a party’s knowledge (or lack thereof) of the disposal.’” Id. Thus, by this Court’s own precedent, even accepting as true Weatherford’s unsupported (and factually disproven) allegations that Midland knew of a disposal, that knowledge alone would not be enough to trigger arranger or acceptor status.",Party Submissions,6.0945354,6.550449,6.349036
To direct the Office for Victims of Crime of the Department of Justice to implement anti-trafficking recommendations of the Government Ac-countability Office.,Legislation,10.641707,9.285733,11.187929
"The only evidence HSMiller describes that goes to the RTP-designation decision is testimony that the jury would have put “85% to 100%” responsibility on Flaven. See Resp’t’s Br. at 56-57. The Lawyers have already cited law holding that conclusory statements 38 from expert witnesses and testimony from biased legal “fact witnesses” amounts to no evidence of the objective prong in a legal malpractice gross negligence claim. See Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009). Regardless, evidence about what may have ultimately happened had an RTP designation been permitted and a motion to strike denied is irrelevant.",Party Submissions,15.6802225,14.935886,16.274849
Raising awareness and encouraging the prevention of stalking by expressing support for the designation of January 2024 as ‘‘National Stalking Awareness Month’’.,Legislation,6.57179,5.6077785,9.21346
"In Dr. Tappan’s view, Dr. Castillo should have realized that the non-reassuring tracing at 15:15 suggested that baby H.W. would be acidotic and thus at risk of hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy (a brain injury caused by insufficient oxygen); App. 7, CR 669 ( “ Dr. Castillo failed to recognize that recurrent decelerations, minimal variability, and absent accelerations, suggest that the baby would likely be acidotic and therefore would be at risk for hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy. ”); see also App. 5, CR 217 (defining metabolic acidosis and hypoxia ischemia); id. at CR 437 (defining hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy).",Party Submissions,6.417648,7.072728,6.7507634
Serbia argues in the Counter-Memorial that Claimants did not prove that Obnova built the buildings presently existing at its premises and argue that all Obnova’s buildings at Dunavska 17 -19 had been built before the creation of Obnova ’s predecessor Otpad. 68 Requested documents are documents prepared by the authorities maintaining Cadastral Plans for other public authorities in connection with urban planning projects. The requested documents are relevant and material to assess Serbia’s c ontemporaneous understanding of the: ( i ) existence of buildings at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23; and (ii) ownership and other rights to these buildings and the land plots at these premises.,Legal Decisions,15.061023,15.071633,15.5855665
"I certify that this brief complies with the typeface and word-count requirements set forth in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. This brief has been prepared using Microsoft Word in 14-point Times New Roman font for the text and 12-point Times New Roman font for any footnotes. This brief contains 1,150 words, as determined by Microsoft Word’s word-count feature, excluding those portions exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,3.0730488,4.009615,4.5753284
"Whether attorneys (TREC licensed or nonlicensed) are exempted from REC’s state consumer real estate contract protection allows Attorney usage to violate UPHPA, Bus. & Com. Code 26 – Fraud, 27 – Fraudulent Transfers, Gov. Code Sec 51.903 – Action on Fraudulent Lien on Property, Penal Code 31 – Theft, 32 – ‘Considerations’, and other violations; granting Appellee default ‘Title’ and complete ownership of Appellant’s inherited real estate (surface, mineral), mineral leases, real property developments, and other unlawful gains (personal, financial, business, political, other) are State and Federal Penal Code (State, Federal) offenses (theft, civil rights violations, other), granting Court Orders Cancellations, Change of Venue, Change of Venue Hearings.",Party Submissions,22.509901,18.355015,20.90009
"The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction, and this interlocutory appeal ensued. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 51.014(a)(8).",Party Submissions,2.7880812,3.2429063,4.062979
"The first opinion in this trilogy was Bustamante v. Ponte, which rejected “a stringent but for causation test” for an individual actor when the evidence shows that multiple providers’ concurrent negligent acts combine to cause an injury. 529 S.W.3d 447, 457 (Tex. 2017). Bustamante confirmed that to satisfy a legal sufficiency review in such cases, claimants are required to adduce evidence of a ‘reasonable medical probability’ that their injuries were caused by the negligence of one or more defendants. Id. (citing Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 532–33 (Tex. 2010) (quoting, in turn, Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 399–400 (Tex. 1993)).",Party Submissions,5.354751,5.5113406,5.7274194
"In addition, at trial, Osprin segregated its attorney fees, costs, and expenses incurred in the realization of the Contributions from those incurred in prosecuting its other claims against TX 1111 and Backes. Those attorney fees, costs, and expenses totaled over $1.1 million, of 25 which the trial court only awarded those incurred from March 2018 through February 12, 2020.",Party Submissions,12.552676,11.334738,14.577213
"In his conclusions of law, the hearing officer determined that (1) Cochran sustained a compensable injury while working in Alabama, (2) he was Sonic's employee at that time, (3) Cochran was entitled to all rights and remedies under the TWCA, (4) Sonic timely filed notice of Cochran's injury under the Labor Code, but (5) because Cochran elected to ""pursue a remedy and 10 Sonic had filed a no-evidence summary judgment motion, which the trial court also denied in its order. There are no issues raised concerning the court's denial of that summary judgment motion. recover compensation"" under Alabama's workers' compensation laws, he was barred from recovery under the TWCA; consequently, (6) Sonic was not entitled to reimbursement from TMI under the TWCA for compensation and medical payments made to Cochran. Sonic appealed only the last two determinations: Cochran's election [**14] of remedies and its right to reimbursement. Because the hearing officer's remaining conclusions were not appealed, they are final and establish that Cochran was Sonic's employee at the time of the accident and he suffered a compensable injury. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.169 ( HN4 [ ] ""A decision of a hearing officer regarding benefits is final in the absence of a timely appeal by a party. .. .""). In affirming the hearing officer's decision, the appeals panel noted that it was undisputed Cochran did in fact receive workers' compensation benefits under Alabama's workers' compensation laws and, as a subrogation claim, Sonic was not entitled to reimbursement.",Party Submissions,5.4130363,5.5921903,5.903292
"Expressing support for the designation of January 30, 2024, as CTE (chronic traumatic encephalopathy) and RHI (repeated head impacts) Awareness Day.",Legislation,6.468268,5.735739,6.810324
"TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 91.403(a) (emphasis added).4 But that Natural Resources Code interest rate provided does not apply if the parties specify a rate of interest in their written agreement. Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Properties, Inc., 521 S.W.3d 26, 55 (Tex. App. 2015), aff’d, 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017) (parties specified a different rate).",Party Submissions,6.897209,7.257219,7.033501
"The Republican Party of Texas accepted applications to seek its nomination to Place 4 on this Court between November 11 and December 11, 2023. See Important Election Dates 2023-2024, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/important-election-dates.shtml#2024 (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). With the 2024 elections upcoming, Devine has again sought the Republican Party’s endorsement for Place 4 on this Court. JOHN DEVINE CAMPAIGN, https://justicedevinetx.com/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). Devine submitted his application to the Republican Party for that endorsement on November 13, 2023. See, e.g., 2024 Primary Filing Information, REPUBLICAN PARTY OF TEXAS, https://texasgop.org/filing-information-24/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). That application and its contents became public information on filing, and Chairman Matthew Rinaldi, head of the Republican Party of Texas, accepted Devine’s application on December 1. See, e.g., Candidate Information, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, https://candidate.texas-election.com/Elections/getQualifiedCandidatesInfo.do (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). By accepting Devine’s application, Rinaldi determined that the application facially complied with Texas law; as of December 1, neither Devine nor Rinaldi had notice of any potential duplicate or ineligible signatures in Devine’s application.",Party Submissions,3.910147,4.0103617,3.9876266
"Thus, neither expert offered sufficient evidence of his education, training, or experience to offer opinions about the medical cause and/or the proximate cause of H.W.’s neurological injuries. This provides an alternative basis to affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment.",Party Submissions,10.489542,16.02692,13.38867
"Meanwhile, proceedings continued in the trial court. Bay filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Manns' claims. Bay maintained that because Mann sustained a work-related injury and was covered by a workers' compensation policy, the exclusive-remedy defense prevented the Manns from filing a personal injury suit against Bay. The trial court denied Bay's motion.",Party Submissions,6.5204577,5.8389516,8.025624
"Braun factors to the record in this case, a new opinion from this Court can affirm the vitality of the “reasonable-certainty standard” and demonstrate the ease with which it can—and must—be applied in this case and future cases. But by failing to explain clearly how Romero can be applied properly, the Court will only create further confusion on an obviously consequential issue in every civil trial.",Party Submissions,24.423967,28.756582,26.566517
"LAW, AND EXCEPT AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 5.1(b), SUBCONTRACTOR SHALL INDEMNIFY, DEFEND AND HOLD HARMLESS MCCARTHY, THE OWNER, THE ARCHITECT AND ALL OF THEIR PARENTS, SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES, AGENTS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES FROM AND AGAINST ALL CLAIMS, DAMAGES, LOSSES, PENALTIES, AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS, ARISING OUT OF, OR RESULTING FROM THE PERFORMANCE, OR FAILURE IN PERFORMANCE, OF SUBCONTRACTOR’S WORK AND OBLIGATIONS AS PROVIDED IN THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING EXTRA WORK, AND FROM ANY CLAIM, DAMAGE, LOSS OR EXPENSE WHICH IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO BODILY INJURY, SICKNESS, DISEASE, DEATH, INJURY TO OR DESTRUCTION OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY INCLUDING THE LOSS OF USE RESULTING THEREFROM, ARISING OR ALLEGED TO ARISE OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT OR SUBCONTRACTOR’S PERFORMANCE OF SUBCONTRACTOR’S WORK OR OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SUBCONTRACTOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER SUCH INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS SHALL ONLY APPLY TO THE EXTENT CAUSED IN WHOLE OR IN PART BY THE NEGLIGENCE OR FAULT, THE BREACH OR VIOLATION OF A STATUTE, ORDINANCE, GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION, STANDARD, OR RULE, OR BREACH OF CONTRACT BY SUBCONTRACTOR OR ANYONE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY EMPLOYED BY SUB-CONTRACTOR OR ANYONE FOR WHOSE ACTS SUBCONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE, SUCH OBLIGATIONS SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED TO NEGATE, ABRIDGE, OR OTHERWISE REDUCE ANY OTHER RIGHT OR OBLIGATION OF INDEMNITY WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE EXIST AS TO ANY PARTY OR PERSON DESCRIBED IN THIS PARAGRAPH 5.1. (b) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, SUBCONTRACTOR SHALL INDEMNIFY, DEFEND AND HOLD HARMLESS MCCARTHY, THE OWNER, THE ARCHITECT AND ALL OF THEIR PARENTS, SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES, AGENTS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES FROM AND AGAINST ALL CLAIMS, DAMAGES, LOSSES, AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COURT COSTS, ARISING OUT OF, OR RESULTING FROM BODILY INJURY, SICKNESS, DISEASE, DEATH, OR INJURY TO ANY EMPLOYEE, AGENT OR REPRESENTATIVE OF SUBCONTRACTOR OR ANY OF ITS SUBCONTRACTORS OF ANY TIER, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SUCH CLAIM, DAMAGES, LOSS OR EXPENSE IS CAUSED IN PART BY THE NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT OF A PARTY INDEMNIFIED HEREUNDER. SUBCONTRACTOR SHALL PROCURE LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERING ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS PARAGRAPH 5.1. (c) TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, SUBCONTRACTOR SHALL INDEMNIFY, DEFEND AND HOLD HARMLESS MCCARTHY, THE OWNER, THE ARCHITECT AND ALL OF THEIR PARENTS, SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES, AGENTS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES FROM AND AGAINST ALL CLAIMS, DAMAGES, LOSSES, AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COURT COSTS, ARISING OUT OF, OR RESULTING FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW VIOLATIONS ARISING OR ALLEGED TO ARISE OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT OR SUBCONTRACTOR’S PERFORMANCE OF SUBCONTRACTOR’S WORK.",Party Submissions,2.0135357,1.8361036,2.0213747
"On pages 14 of the brief, several federal courts that have held fee-splitting provisions to be per se unconscionable are mentioned.3 The first is Gray v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., 314 Fed. App’x 15 (9th Cir. 2008), but that opinion was vacated slightly a month after it was decided. Gray v. Rent-A-Center West, 295 Fed. App’x 155 (9th Cir. 2008). Consequently, it adds little to the discussion. is going to have to pay the expenses of his lawsuit at all, nor does he suggest that he has requested the AAA to waive its costs and fees.",Party Submissions,7.578088,8.275366,8.540001
"Request No. 3: Withdrawn. The Claimant states that he is prepared to withdraw the Request regarding the lack of specific mention in the Request for arbitration. Without ruling on the pertinence of this argument, the Tribunal notes that the Claimant accepts not to be provided the docume nts referred to although he declares that they “are relevant and material to demonstrate the Respondent’s breach of the Claimant’s rights” under the BIT. In other words, in respect of this and other requests that were withdrawn, the evidentiary value of th documents does not prevent the Claimant from preparing his forthcoming Memorial where he will “assess the appropriate remedies that the Claimant is seeking”. Order accordingly.",Legal Decisions,14.541911,13.452988,14.198858
The United States objects to Request No. 3.d for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.,Legal Decisions,8.219722,12.76708,14.6315775
"Specifically, the Court determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendants’ motions to dismiss because the Walkers’ experts’ reports failed to address causation as to certain alleged breaches, opined on causation only in terms of possibilities, and, on other alleged breaches, lacked adequate factual explanations about how and why Dr. Castillo’s alleged negligence proximately caused H.W. to suffer a large perinatal subacute infarction (or stroke) involving the majority of his left cerebral hemisphere. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *1-5. It therefore issued a memorandum opinion reversing the trial court’s order, dismissing the Walkers’ claims with prejudice, and remanding for a determination of defendants’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at *5.",Party Submissions,6.9296803,6.7560744,7.635732
"This Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 273.061, Texas Election Code, which permits the Texas Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in order to ensure compliance with the state’s election laws. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 273.061.",Party Submissions,4.5273986,4.4627137,4.733819
"Demonstrated expertise is particularly necessary in health care liability claims. As the Court has noted, “given the increasingly specialized and technical nature of medicine, there is no validity, if there ever was, to the notion that every licensed medical doctor should be automatically qualified to testify as an expert on every medical question.” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 463 (quoting Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. 1996)). The statute also recognizes this necessity, requiring the expert to be certified in the subject matter of testimony or have other “substantial training or experience, in the area of health care relevant to the claim” and be “actively practicing health care in rendering health care services relevant to the claim.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.402(c) (emphasis added). A trial court abuses its discretion by holding an unqualified expert to be qualified. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 463.",Party Submissions,4.840861,4.802997,5.2184863
"Arbitration Rule 30 15.1. The arbitration shall proceed in accordance with the Procedural Timetable attached hereto as Annex B, except if the Tribunal, upon a showing of good cause by either Party or on its own initiative, decides to amend the timetable.",Legal Decisions,6.4090366,6.460973,6.8770614
"Moody filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, contending that this suit is barred by the exclusivity provision of the act because Douglas was injured in the course and scope of her employment. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001(a) (Vernon 2006) (providing, HN1[ ] recovery of workers' compensation benefits is the 1 Apparently, Moody filed the required employer's notice of injury, and its workers' compensation carrier disputed that the injury was compensable. Although Douglas did not timely file a workers' compensation claim, she requested an administrative decision on whether her injury was compensable. During the proceeding, she apparently urged [*3] the somewhat unusual position that her injury was not compensable, hoping to prevent a subsequent bar to this negligence suit against Moody. 2 Moody did not attach the decisions of the hearing officer or appeals panel to its motion for summary judgment, but these decisions were attached to the carrier's motion for summary judgment. and referenced in Moody's motion. Further, the history of the workers' compensation proceeding in this case is undisputed because, in her live petition, Douglas recited the pertinent facts. exclusive remedy for work-related injury of employee covered by workers' compensation insurance); see also Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.034 (Vernon 2006) (providing, subject to certain exceptions, an employee of workers' compensation subscriber waives common-law right to recover damages for injuries sustained in course and scope of employment). 3 The trial court signed [*4] an interlocutory order, followed by a final order, granting Moody's motion and ruling that Douglas take nothing.",Party Submissions,5.8537474,6.252175,6.2752576
"Instead, there was evidence Husband opened a401(k) in 2015 with a $124,323.36 deposit. The record contains no evidence indicating whether the deposit was from community prOperty or separate property. Husband provided no evidence tracing the character of the funds deposited in 2015. At the time of the divorce, the value of the 401(k) had increased through adiversied portfolio, including employer contributions, to $353,091.43. He provided no evidence-considering the growth of the account through these diversied investments. Thus, all those earnings belonged to the community estate at the time of the divorce. 1d.",Party Submissions,11.624554,12.384842,13.465413
"On behalf of the Texas Automobile Dealers Association (""TADA""), a non-profit organization that represents the franchised motor vehicle dealers in Texas, this Amicus Curiae Letter is submitted in connection with the above-cited cause.",Party Submissions,5.2655063,4.7512784,5.909396
"R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how the requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the opinion of a public utility company is relevant to the question of Obnova's alleged property rights or material to the Tribunal's determination of this question. This is a classic ""fishing expedition"", with Claimants simply casting about for any documents which might contain information they consider helpful in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case.",Legal Decisions,13.49372,12.744462,14.78311
"Specified Employee Identification Date. Specified Employee Identification Date means December 31, unless the Employer has elected a different date through action that is legally binding with respect to all nonqualified deferred compensation plans maintained by the Employer.",Contract,6.2221875,7.382544,7.8371058
"Article 6 The demarcation may be lifted when, based on the surveys referred to in Article 5, the specified pest is not detected in the demarcated area for at least four consecutive years.",Legislation,14.073754,14.758454,14.934572
"IRECTOR .—’’ before ‘‘The 2 term’’; and 3 (4) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by in-4 serting ‘‘S TATE .—’’ before ‘‘The term’’. 5 SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 6 Section 305(a) (20 U.S.C. 9624(a)) is amended to 7 read as follows: 8 ‘‘(a) I N G ENERAL .—There are authorized to be ap-9 propriated— 10 ‘‘(1) for fiscal year 2024— 11 ‘‘(A) such sums as may be necessary to 12 carry out section 302; and 13 ‘‘(B) such sums as may be necessary to 14 carry out section 303; and 15 ‘‘(2) for each of the 5 succeeding fiscal years, 16 such sums as may be necessary to carry out sections 17 302 and 303.’’. 18 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 19 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Advancing Research in 20 Education Act’’ or the ‘‘AREA Act’’. 21 SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS. 22 The table of contents for this Act is as follows: 23 Sec. 1. Short title. Sec. 2. Table of contents. Sec. 3. Short title; table of contents for public law.",Legislation,3.124542,2.7655056,3.2532449
"That remains true in 2024. The primary has already begun. As Walker concedes, ballots are about to be printed. Texans have been able to apply for ballots by mail since New Year’s Day, see Important Election Dates 2023-2024, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/important-election-dates.shtml#2024 (last visited Jan. 8, 2024), and early voting is set to begin in mere weeks. Indeed, the Texas Secretary of State “recommends completing your ballots not later than the 60th day before election day, which is Friday, January 5, 2024.” Election Advisory No. 2023-27, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE (Dec. 23, 2023), available at https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/advisory2023-27.shtml (last visited Jan. 8, 2024) (emphasis omitted). Local officials following the Secretary of State’s recommended best practices therefore already completed their ballots before Walker filed his mandamus petition. And in order to comply with federal law, local election officials must “mail ballot[s] to military and overseas voters not later than Saturday, January 20, 2024.” Id. ; see also 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8) (state responsibilities under the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (“MOVE”) Act). It is already too late to change the March primary ballot without massive upheaval.",Party Submissions,3.9689975,4.172995,4.1034427
"The rule against considering extraneous evidence in construing an unambiguous contract “ does not, however, prohibit courts from considering extrinsic evidence of the facts and circ umstances surrounding the contract’s execution as ‘an aid in the construction of the contract’s language.’” URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cnty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 765 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Sun Oil Co. (Del.) v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. 1981)). “When construing an unambiguous instrument, we may consult facts and circumstances surrounding its execution to aid our interpretation. ” Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC, 639 S.W.3d 682, 690 (Tex. 2022) (citing URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 757). N evertheless, “[w ]e cannot employ surrounding facts and circumstances to make contract language say something it unambiguously does not or to determine ‘ that the parties probably meant, or could have meant, something other than what their agreement stated. ’” Id. (quoting URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 757). “ Rather, the ‘ facts and circumstances can only provide context that elucidates the meaning of the words employed, and nothing else, ’ and they can only give contract language a meaning to which it is ‘ reasonably susceptible. ’” Id. (quoting URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 765). “ In other words, such evidence may not be ‘ used to add, alter, or change the contract ’ s agreed-to terms. ’” Id. (quoting Barrow-Shaver, 590 S.W.3d at 485 (citing URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 758)). Such extraneous evidence includes “consist ent collateral agreements. .. between parties concerning the relationship of several distinct obligat ions between them.” ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 875 (Tex. 2010) (citing Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 317 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tex. 1958)).",Party Submissions,5.2174835,5.0587134,5.1859164
"Because this suit is based on allegations that Defendants improperly charged, as expenses, the costs of the echocardiogram screening program, the differing expense provisions in the attorney-client contracts would require individualized consideration of the charges about which Karnes complains in this case. This is particularly true of those provisions that confer broad discretion on the attorneys in the charging of expenses to clients. (VII CR 4137-38).",Party Submissions,17.731503,13.700213,20.27336
"KCSR’s discussion of Harris County v. Smith is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, KCSR fails to acknowledge that Smith was decided three years before this Court decided Romero and, therefore, cannot be the controlling authority on how to apply the “reasonable-certainty standard” that the Court had not yet articulated. But even if it could, Smith addresses damages, not liability.",Party Submissions,10.113406,10.067163,12.742327
"To amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to establish nonvisual accessibility standards for certain devices with digital interfaces, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.203694,5.2408223,6.2182193
"Further, Dr. Tappan’s extensive teaching and supervisory experience, as detailed in his report, shows that he has the knowledge and experience necessary to opine on the causation of diverse neonatal injuries, including infant hypoxia. App. 7, CR 663.",Party Submissions,16.771461,15.755023,21.19511
"Pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rules 27 and 29, this Procedural Order sets out the Procedural Rules that govern this arbitration. The timetable is attached as Annex B .",Legal Decisions,6.806923,6.9710894,7.1073933
"HSMiller takes issue with statements in the Lawyers’ briefing suggesting that the BNC Sellers (the judgment creditors) and their counsel in the original suit control this litigation (Resp’t’s Br. at 25-26), but the Lawyers’ statements are accurate. HSMiller was 23 restricted in its ability to settle the case. It had to have the consent of the judgment creditor’s law firm, Stanley Iola, LLP, to settle any litigation up to the amount of $5 million. See Plan at 13, Art. VII (Pet’rs’ Br. at App. B, Tab 1 (PDF 145)). After that, it was required to use its best efforts to continue to pursue the claims against Terry. HSMiller argues it had full control over the litigation above $5 million. Although theoretically it did have full discretion to settle above $5 million, id., the idea that it also fully controlled the litigation does not ring true. The judgment creditors — the BNC Sellers — chose trial and appellate counsel for HSMiller in the malpractice trials and appeals, including one attorney who represented HSMiller in the earlier real estate litigation appeal as co-counsel with the Lawyers. Even the Bankruptcy Judge noted that HSMiller has “been spared from lawsuits by the Judgment Creditors, for so long as the Debtor pursues its claims against its insurer and former counsel pursuant to the Debtor’s Plan.” In re Henry S. Miller Comm., LLC, 2010 WL 4638882, at * 5 (emphasis added).",Party Submissions,10.255503,10.417658,11.300022
"Second, Relator does not even attempt to account for the other tasks that election officials must perform besides printing ballots. For example, in a case concerning the March 2022 primary election, the Collin County Elections Administrator explained that his office would both “design and proof the ballots,” which “can take several days,” and “conduct logic and accuracy testing to ensure that there are no errors,” which “could take ten to fourteen days.” Decl. of Bruce Sherbet ⁋⁋ 10-11 (Dec. 10, 2021).2 Moreover, there is a substantial risk that some ballots have already been mailed. In a previous case, the Director of Elections for the Secretary of State noted his “understanding that the Travis County Clerk Dana DeBouvoir seeks to have ballots in the mail sixty days before the election day.” Decl. of Brian Keith Ingram ⁋ 17 (Dec. 13, 2021). This year, that date would be January 5—the same day Relator filed this lawsuit. Indeed, for this primary election cycle, 2 This Court relied on this declaration and the declaration of Brian Keith Ingram (cited below) in Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 766 n.4, even though the declarations were originally filed in MALC v. Abbott, No. D-1-GN-21-006515 (250th Dist., Travis County).",Party Submissions,8.290268,8.210475,8.4708805
"If, before the award is rendered, the parties agree on a settlement of the dispute or otherwise to discontinue the proceeding, the Tribunal, or the Secretary-General if the Tribunal has not yet been constituted, shall, at their written request, in an order take note of the discontinuance of the proceeding.",Legal Decisions,6.068268,7.432027,6.536598
"The issue presented in this case was the need for two separate liability questions, not the speculated multitude of questions for each element of a claim. The trial court dealt with only two claims: (i) a humped crossing claim that involved a unique legal defense that required analysis of federal preemption law 30 and (ii) a Yield sign claim applying standard principles of negligence that, as held here, failed as a matter of law. The trial court's failure to submit separate questions as requested by KCSR allowed the jury to make a liability finding that was based on facts relevant only the legally insufficient yield sign claim.",Party Submissions,19.129658,19.202078,21.203789
"Anti-assignment Rule. No interest of any Participant, spouse or Beneficiary under this Plan and no benefit payable hereunder shall be assigned as security for a loan, and any such purported assignment shall be null, void and of no effect, nor shall any such interest or any such benefit be subject in any manner, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to anticipation, sale, transfer, assignment or encumbrance by or through any Participant, spouse or Beneficiary. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, however, the Committee has the discretion to make payments to an alternate payee in accordance with the terms of a domestic relations order (as defined in Code Section 414(p)(1)(B)).",Contract,3.6094794,3.4571307,4.1365952
"Before turning to the Joeckel affidavit, we note that Rafiei’s briefing in this Court suggests that Rafiei himself would be paying fees and expenses in arbitration. If that is the case, presumably he would also be paying the expenses for litigating his case in the trial court. In fact, part of his burden of proof to show excessive costs is a comparison of the costs of arbitration with the cost of litigation. Olshan, 328 S.W.3d at 893-94.",Party Submissions,10.423842,9.646835,11.974989
"Conversely, in Rafiei's case, the agreement's detailed fee structure, combined with the lack of expenditure ceilings and the obligation for each party to bear its full costs, raises “specific” evidence of unconscionability. Without any protective measures or cost limitations in place, Rafiei will be discouraged (as he states in his affidavit) from pursuing arbitration, thereby undermining his ability to effectively vindicate his rights.",Party Submissions,14.907785,13.759094,17.02432
"The unilateral nature of Rafiei's agreement exacerbates the risk of prohibitive costs. Beyond the absence of expenditure ceilings, Rafiei's agreement mandates that each party bear its own costs in full. Such a requirement, particularly when combined with the potential for high arbitration costs, risks placing a disproportionate financial burden on one party, especially if that party lacks the resources of the opposing side.",Party Submissions,8.858217,9.260315,9.770745
"Facility of Payment to a Minor. If a distribution is to be made to a minor, or to a person who is otherwise incompetent, then the Committee may, in its discretion, make such distribution: (i) to the legal guardian, or if none, to a parent of a minor payee with whom the payee maintains his or her residence; or (ii) to the conservator or committee or, if none, to the person having custody of an incompetent payee. Any such distribution shall fully discharge the Committee, the Company, and the Plan from further liability on account thereof.",Contract,4.554132,4.5551796,5.328943
"Appellant’s trial counsel last called A.S. to testify. 5 RR 87. A.S. testified to Respondent’s 1, a collection of drug tests for A.S. 5 RR 89. A.S. testified that R.W. was born prematurely due to a severe urinary tract infection which caused A.S.’s placenta to rupture. 5 RR 91. A.S. told the jury she never stopped to purchase cigarettes on the way to the hospital to deliver R.W. 5 RR 92. A.S. told the jury her plan was to live at her residence in Yantis once she was released from incarceration. 5 RR 97. A.S. indicated that of the 30 or 40 visits she had with R.W. almost all had gone well despite other testimony. 5 RR 104. A.S. explained that she was defensive during the case due to DFPS wanting to take her child away. 5 RR 107. On cross-examination, A.S. agreed to testing positive for methamphetamines in December of 2021 and again in October of 2022. 5 RR 121-22. A.S. admitted to using when Smith County Probation drug tested her in early 2023. 5 RR 134. After testimony concluded, the trial court held the charge conference, and the trial court read the charge to the jury. 5 RR 139-161. Intervenor’s, trial counsel for A.S, and Petitioner gave closing arguments to the jury. 5 RR 162-75. The jury then received the charge, and eleven jurors agreed to Questions 1 through 6 and named Intervenors as permanent managing conservators. CR 791-803.",Party Submissions,5.8577557,5.96025,6.026542
"Relying on the word count function of the computer software used to prepare this document, the undersigned certifies that this document contains 900 words (excluding the sections excepted under TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1)(B) and was typed in 14-point font with footnotes in 12-point font.",Party Submissions,5.9092607,9.185355,8.947674
"For column B: Indicate the details of the survey, depending on the specific legal requirements for each pest. Indicate with N/A when the information of certain column is not applicable. The information to be provided in these columns is related to the information included in the column 10 ‘Detection methods’.",Legislation,23.184439,23.222178,26.246685
"On weekends that do not occur during the regular school term, beginning at 6:00 p.m., on the first, third, and fifth Friday of each month and ending at 6:00 p.m. on the following Sunday.",Party Submissions,4.7575593,5.0861325,5.138338
"Third, Relator’s ungrounded speculation about how much “lead time” county officials need, Pet.2, does nothing to allay the concerns that this Court has frequently expressed about disruption. See Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 766; Hotze, 627 S.W.3d at 645-46. “At a bare minimum, a party who asks a court to take action that could disrupt the election calendar after the election process has begun has the duty to explain the practical consequences of the requested judicial action.” Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 764-65 (emphasis added). Relator’s best-case scenarios are fanciful, and he has not shown how the razor-thin margins he proposes will avoid disruptions in each of the State’s 254 counties. On that basis alone, this Court should deny relief.",Party Submissions,7.5670404,7.9670444,8.075877
"To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to apply a 6 percent excise tax on large endowments of certain private colleges and universities, and for other purposes.",Legislation,3.762401,3.230662,3.635787
"Art. XVII.C (emphasis, carriage returns, and indents added). When triggered by a past due royalty, a Late Charge is based on the “amount due.” It commences on the day after the past due royalty could have been timely made. It continues every calendar month thereafter, until paid. The last sentence dictates that each Late Charge becomes due and payable on the last day of each month. The next month, the “amount due” includes whatever was previously due that is unpaid, plus the prior month’s Late Charge (and any other amounts that came due).",Party Submissions,11.9565,13.6595545,12.492915
"The trial court correctly struck Bay's exclusive remedies affirmative defense. Bay's legal right to raise the defense rests on two necessarily sequential issues which Bay has failed to prove: 1) that Bay met the legal requirements of a written agreement and proper filing requirement under TEX. LAB. CODE § 406.123(a) and (f) respectively; and 2) the legal availability of the “exclusive remedies” defense to shield Bay from common law liability for the acts of an employee (Alvarez) who was outside of the class of people protected from common law suit under any purported workers' compensation policy. Since Bay has failed to prove either, the trial court correctly struck Bay's exclusive remedies defense.",Party Submissions,9.2051325,9.346477,9.614739
"Annual installment payments are determined and paid in accordance with Section 6.2(f), over a period of two (2) to fifteen (15) years, as elected by the Participant in his or her initial Compensation Deferral Agreement establishing the Account. The Retirement Account shall be established automatically in a Participant’s initial Compensation Deferral Agreement following his or her entry into the Plan. If for any reason a Retirement Account is not established or the payment schedule not designated, the Participant shall be deemed to have established a Retirement Account that pays in a lump sum.",Contract,6.7498584,5.8508596,7.3416147
"Rafiei does not indicate how his affidavit shows that the delegation provision is unconscionable. But when the Court examines Rafiei’s affidavit, CR115-116, several aspects of it become apparent.",Party Submissions,15.92691,20.625912,19.247936
Authorizing the use of the Capitol Grounds for the National Peace Officers Memorial Service and the National Honor Guard and Pipe Band Exhibition.,Legislation,8.076576,3.8353307,9.615246
"Executive agrees and acknowledges that any annual or long-term cash, equity or equity-based incentive or bonus compensation paid, provided or awarded to the Executive is subject to the terms and conditions of the Company’s clawback policies, which may be amended from time to time, and may be subject to the requirement that such compensation be repaid to the Company or its affiliates after it has been distributed to Executive.",Contract,6.320039,5.8326735,7.40736
"Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). Moreover, when deciding if termination is in the best interest of the child, appellate courts are to “strictly scrutinize termination proceedings in favor of the parent.” In the Interest of N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet). Specifically, “termination ‘can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.” Id. At the time of trial, R.W. was not old enough to communicate his wishes. Thomas, Kirby and Susan Shirley provided testimony that termination was in the best interest of R.W. However, the jury heard testimony that A.S. had attended many visits during the life of the case and was undoubtedly bonded to R.W. There was discretion to make A.S. a possessory conservator of R.W. with no visitation. A.S., having resolved her criminal charges, had plans to live in her home in Yantis. This C ourt should strictly scrutinize the jury’s decision that termination of A.S.’s rights was in the best interest of R.W. See id.",Party Submissions,6.6243925,6.8640046,7.298413
"When Pitocin was finally discontinued at 15:48, moreover, Dr. Castillo again breached the standard of care and defied the BSA oxytocin infusion policy by failing to administer terbutaline, a drug that would have stopped contractions and helped to restore oxygenated blood flow: According to the BSAH Women’s Center Oxytocin Infusion Protocol, signed by Dr. Castillo, terbutaline 0.25 mg was to be administered subcutaneously for a Category II or III FHR pattern that does not respond to discontinuance of oxytocin infusion. Dr. Castillo was present at 15:48 when the Pitocin was discontinued, and witnessed the persistence of contractions as close as 1.5 minutes apart, lasting 60-90 seconds, with intensity up to 100 mmHg, in association with an elevated FHR baseline, decelerations, minimal variability, but without accelerations. Yet Dr. Castillo failed to follow the hospital’s protocol or to meet the ACOG standards by assuring that her patient received terbutaline, a drug that would have arrested contractions and helped to restore oxygenated blood to the baby. App. 7, CR 669.",Party Submissions,6.486918,7.834491,6.608537
"For the avoidance of doubt, Claimant notes that its readiness to limit its request in this matter is not to be construed as an acceptance of all of Respondent’s objections regarding the Request. Further the Claimant herein reserves its right to request the production of any such Documents at a later stage.",Legal Decisions,11.485278,10.376781,11.849436
"On June 4, 2019, Catiana Delapena visited Buttercup Pool as part of an outing with her day camp High Hopes Summer Camp (High Hopes). CR32. Catiana was six (6) years old and had Down Syndrome. CR31. As Catiana’s parents explained to High Hopes, because of her condition, she could not swim, and she needed to wear a lifejacket at all times when near a pool. CR32.",Party Submissions,9.680205,12.658554,10.235848
"Petitioner cites to several cases in support of her claim that the unpaid portion of a real estate loan becomes an unsecured debt after foreclosure, for which a lender has no other recourse than to seek a money judgment. But Petitioner’s cases simply do not say what she claims. Petitioner claims that a junior creditor cannot continue demanding monthly payments under the former installment agreement, and cites to Marhaba Partners Ltd., P’ship v. Kindron Holdings, LLC, 457 S.W.3d 208, 215 (Tex.App-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) – but the case itself never mentions such a concept. Instead, it recites numerous scenarios – such as notes secured by multiple sources of collateral – and clearly presupposes that the loan has already been accelerated in order to support the foreclosure sale. Id. Similarly, while Respondent agrees that the Wesley case stands for the proposition that a junior lienholder’s foreclosure is a nullity when attempted after the senior lienholder forecloses, nevertheless the opinion specifically held that the junior lienholder was still allowed to recover the amount owed. Wesley v. Amerigo, Inc., No. 10-05-00041-CV, 2006 WL 22213, at *2 (Tex.App.-Waco Jan. 4, 2006, no pet.)(mem. op.). Far from supporting Petitioner, the Wesley court reaffirms that the extinguishment of a junior lien does not affect the borrower’s obligation to pay the Note.",Party Submissions,6.4438944,6.344068,6.520571
"Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding) (nonsignatory held entitled to enforce contract against signatory); Cornerstone, 348 S.W.3d at 544-45 (same).",Party Submissions,9.04437,15.995823,20.568544
"B, U : the request is unduly and overly broad and burdensome as it covers a time period of five decades, going back to 1946 (prior to the establishment of Obnova). Respondent cannot reasonably be requested to produce all documents from this time period extending almost to half century that relate to Dunavska Plots. Obviously, Claimants’ request is nothing else but a fishing expedition as they are casting about for documents, the existence of which they can only surmise (as evidenced by the fact that Claimants are unable to identify a specific document or date on which the document was prepared), which they hope will support their case.",Legal Decisions,15.234993,16.149618,15.445229
This is a personal injury dual-employer case where coverage and course and scope have been challenged by the respective parties. Both Mann and Bay filed opposing motions for summary judgment and their respective responses. Mann's motions and responses have challenged Bay's legal standing to assert the “exclusive remedies” doctrine. Bay's motions and responses focused on its available coverage and the fact question of “course and scope” as the determining factor.,Party Submissions,18.191332,16.998306,19.130249
"Here, the petition advised: “Attempts by Plaintiffs to identify how the switch happened were made. However, Plaintiffs’ medical birth records were destroyed in a fire at the hospital.” (CR 1 3). This fact was also noted at the hearing before the trial court, where counsel advised that the medical records had been destroyed. (RR 23). So, even were petitioners to try and produce an expert report on the adequacy of the medical records, it would not be possible in this case. G. This Court should take the opportunity to articulate a test for determining whether a claim relating to professional or administrative services relating to health care falls under the TMLA.",Party Submissions,16.905062,15.350075,19.505127
"C) The Tribunal’s analysis 181. The Tribunal considers that, in the case at hand, it should first determine the legal consequence of a declaration of illegality. Respondent claims that investments acquired through an illegal scheme are not protected under investment treaties, while Claimant alleges that only certain “gross and severe” violations of local law could ultimately deprive an investment of treaty protection.",Legal Decisions,14.587727,11.8382225,13.693051
"In accordance with Article 77 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS), the two Coastal States, the Russian Federation and Norway, exercise their sovereign rights in respect of the continental shelf of the Barents Sea for its exploration and development of its natural resources.",Legal Decisions,4.4970393,4.5993686,4.484434
"First, and perhaps most importantly, the affidavit does not at any point provide evidence that Rafiei is actually paying his own expenses. What Rafiei states is “[i]f it is determined that. .. arbitration will require me to pay more than $6,000.00 in fees and expenses up front, I do not expect to continue with my claim because I do not have that kind of money.” CR115. But he does not state that he is responsible for paying expenses.",Party Submissions,10.56268,11.15413,12.773846
"Further negating Weatherford’s complaints regarding insufficient discovery time, the primary purpose of governmental immunity is to protect public entities and their officials from lawsuits, and specifically protecting the public fisc. See Nazari, 561 S.W.3d at 508; see also Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 417 (Tex. 1997) (“The modern justification for sovereign immunity is that suits against the state would deplete resources of treasury and tax funds necessary to operate the government.”). Governmental immunity aims to protect public entities from the unnecessary and costly endeavor that is discovery. Further, courts should determine “at its earliest opportunity whether it has the. .. statutory authority to decide the case before allowing litigation to proceed.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. The Trial Court correctly granted Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction on October 28, 2020. Midland was immune from suit, and proceeding through additional discovery in the hopes of finding a basis for its claim, as Weatherford urges, would be burdensome to Midland, and an insult to the jurisdictional gate-keeping function that precludes such a request for hail-mary jurisdictional discovery.",Party Submissions,7.995615,8.0526705,8.826083
"To establish the Commission on National Agricultural Statistics Service Mod- ernization to modernize the data collection and reporting processes of the National Agricultural Statistics Service, and for other purposes.",Legislation,11.859444,10.650517,10.370264
"Not every licensed medical doctor is qualified to opine on all medical matters. See id. at 152 – 53. But the Act’s criteria are expressly nonexclusive, and the qualifications test should not be too narrowly drawn or rigidly applied. Benge v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 466, 472 (Tex. 2018). The critical inquiry is whether the expert ’ s expertise goes to the very matter on which he is to give an opinion. Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153 (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 702).",Party Submissions,7.207585,7.0157943,7.9271092
The Company’s independent non-employee directors may elect to defer all or any portion of the fees above in accordance with the Company’s deferred compensation plan for its directors.,Contract,7.8081713,5.889999,9.940236
"El inversionista no podrá presentar una reclamación si han transcurrido más de tres (3) años a partir de la fecha en la cual tuvo conocimiento o debió haber tenido conocimiento de la presunta violación a este Capítulo, así como de las pérdidas o daños sufridos.",Legal Decisions,3.5965054,9.244168,6.1953974
"To direct the Secretary of Agriculture to periodically assess cybersecurity threats to, and vulnerabilities in, the agriculture and food critical infrastructure sector and to provide recommendations to enhance their security and resilience, to require the Secretary of Agriculture to conduct an annual cross-sector simulation exercise relating to a food-related emergency or disruption, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.4226127,5.843222,6.387313
"Qatar BIT. The request is therefore intended to put the Tribunal but also the Claimant in a position to fully understand the context of the arrest but more generally the case or, as the Respondent itself admits, “to enable a fairer picture to be put before the Tribunal of what [the Claimant’s] misconceived claim is really about”4.",Legal Decisions,19.738596,18.49987,21.373655
"According to an eyewitness, three lifeguards were on duty, and although there was a bin full of lifejackets available for campers to use, none of the campers were wearing lifejackets. According to one of the campers, Catiana entered the pool while camp staff had their backs turned to the campers. A lifeguard noticed Catiana in distress, but by the time Catiana was pulled from the water, she was unresponsive. Catiana died the next day.",Party Submissions,6.5621004,7.1470056,7.3573723
Specified Date Account. A Specified Date Account means an Account established by the Committee to record the amounts payable at a future date as specified in the Participant’s applicable Compensation Deferral Agreement.,Contract,12.55341,11.684443,14.536083
"Appellate Court Determination:, Trial court’s dismissal of Oncor’s cause of action against the Mills Central Appraisal District and Appraisal Review Board reversed and remanded to trial court for further proceedings. Central Appraisal District’s and Appraisal Review Board’s Motions for En Banc Reconsideration Motion were denied.",Party Submissions,8.6387005,8.319009,8.417942
Section 161.001(b)(1) (O) of the Texas Family Code permits a court to terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds that a parent has: failed to comply with the provisions of court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse and neglect of a child.,Party Submissions,3.6878445,4.7962327,5.2094083
"This correspondence is in response to your December 27, 2023 and January 5, 2024 letters (the “Letters”) challenging the application of Justice John Devine as a candidate for Supreme Court, Place 4 (the “Application”).",Party Submissions,9.792653,9.975951,10.32675
"HN6 [ ] The Texas Workers' Compensation Act provides that the recovery of workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers' compensation insurance for a work-related injury. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a) (Vernon 2006). ""The [**8] Workers' Compensation Act vests the power to award compensation benefits solely in the Workers' Compensation Commission, subject to judicial review."" Am. Motorists Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Tex. 2001) (citing Saenz v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex. 1996)). See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 408.001(a), 410.168-.169, .203-.205, .208 (Vernon 2006).",Party Submissions,2.9608464,3.2806704,3.265277
"The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming sovereign immunity barred all claims. The City argued that any claim by Petitioners that it did not enforce its Mandatory Safety Policy was only a claim that it failed to adequately supervise its patrons, which is not actionable. CR48 (citing Henry v. City of Angleton, 01-13-00976-CV, 2014 WL 5465704, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 28, 2014, no pet)). The City also submitted evidence to the trial court challenging the existence of jurisdictional facts necessary to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. SCR44-400.",Party Submissions,6.175644,6.9621763,6.6233397
"Which brings me to my last point about what this case, our merits case, is not about. It’s not about harm caused by Russian measures that Norway was powerless to prevent. It’s not about that at all. It’s an attractive temptation perhaps, in this day and age, to blame the world’s ills on the Russian Federation, but that’s just not the evidence at all.",Legal Decisions,10.895044,13.1809025,12.176672
"Moreover, the Claimant evidently can already provide considerable detail regarding his allegations about this meeting, and these documents; and he positively contends that he has knowledge of the investments he made, noting that it would be “absurd” if he did not do so. Document production is not needed for him to be able to advance whatever case it is that he wishes to advance that this alleged partnership, or his work in relation to it, allegedly constituted an “investment”.",Legal Decisions,22.298498,21.10185,20.820862
"KCSR’s arguments in its response articulates the flaw in the Court’s harmful-error analysis, perhaps even better than Petitioners did in their motion. According to KCSR, because the Court stated that it is “unable to discern whether the jury found it negligent based on the yield-sign theory,” the Court cannot—as a matter of law—determine with “reasonable certainty” that the jury’s liability finding was based on Petitioners’ other theory of negligence.",Party Submissions,9.961363,10.696356,11.665864
"The interest in the benefits hereunder of a spouse of a Participant who predeceases the Participant shall automatically pass to the Participant and shall not be transferable by such spouse in any manner, including but not limited to such spouse’s will, nor shall such interest pass under the laws of intestate succession.",Contract,5.280144,6.7550187,7.7379265
"To require institutions of higher education to designate at least one employee to coordinate compliance with title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.145612,3.6748924,4.6117096
"Finally, Respondents argue that “Petitioner’s jurisdictional theory would leave Respondents with no ability to address Petitioner’s actions in any jurisdiction because none would have jurisdiction if the location of the accident was a requirement for 32 establishing jurisdiction.” Respondents’ Brief at 16 (emphasis in original). This is yet another strawman argument. At a minimum, Respondents could have sued Petitioner MCI in two States that have general jurisdiction over it—Delaware and Illinois. Instead, Respondents chose to add their claims against MCI to their claims against the other Defendants in the case because it was more convenient for Respondents’ counsel—not because their claims against Petitioner MCI have a “substantial” or “strong” connection to MCI’s contacts with Texas.",Party Submissions,8.14527,8.147999,8.710116
"Samson’s “law-of-the-case” rationale was off base, but its conclusion about the effect of Hooks legal decisions hit the mark in this case, with identical contractual provisions as in Hooks. That 2023 Samson now disagrees with both 2007 Samson and 2013 Samson does not justify its position. The judgment should be affirmed.",Party Submissions,18.11891,20.978413,19.716576
"Respondent has conducted a reasonable search for the category of documents requested, and provides Claimant with the documents identified in the request that are in its possession, custody or control, as resulting from that search.",Legal Decisions,12.293462,19.341578,15.236405
Death Benefit. Death Benefit means the benefit payable under the Plan to a Participant’s Beneficiary(ies) upon the Participant’s death as provided in Section 6.1 of the Plan.,Contract,3.5612013,3.5512385,3.943249
"Serbia does not seem to dispute that the requested documents are not in Claimants’ possession, custody or control. Serbia only asserts that the requested documents are “ in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties. ” This assertion is incorrect for the same reasons that Claimants already explained in paragraphs 30 to 47 above and in their response to Serbia’s objections to Request No. 6. Claimants hereby incorporate all those arguments.207 Furthermore, as explained above, even i f the requested documents had been “equally and effectively available to both parties ” ( quod non ), Serbia would still be obliged to allow Claimants access to the responsive documents — as long as the Tribunal concluded that the documents are relevant and material and thus should be produced.208 DECISION 83 NO.",Legal Decisions,8.95553,9.761185,9.617686
"State Bar No. 03323015 jdb@all-lawfirm.com Scott A. Cummings State Bar No. 00793573 sc@all-lawfirm.com 3950 State Highway 360 Grapevine, TX 76051 (817) 552-7742 (817) 328-2942 (Fax) COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS I certify that the foregoing Reply to the Response to Motion for Rehearing of Petition for Review is in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4 because it: (1) contains 1,151 words, excluding the parts of the motion exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1); and (2) has been prepared in a proportionally-spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point Times New Roman font for text and 12-point Times New Roman font for footnotes, which meets the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e).",Party Submissions,3.6936927,4.1381516,4.927612
"The Walkers attempt to re-write Dr. Tappan’s report, arguing that his conclusions first connect Dr. Castillo’s alleged failure to perform a C-section earlier with H.W.’s neurologic injury. (Pet. Br. at 18). True, he says that, if Dr. Castillo had delivered earlier, H.W. would not have had a neurological injury. (CR.671). But, as Jelinek requires courts to ask, how and why? Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 539-40.",Party Submissions,13.297099,14.437407,15.22042
"Q. .. when Joseph Tostado took the property from his parents we can see that by then there was on record in the real property records the City’s annexation, including the assertion that Windamere [sic.] Road existed over the Tostado property, right?",Party Submissions,36.44103,52.99234,52.728157
"HN13 [ ] Balancing jurisprudential considerations, both public and private, in determining whether an adequate remedy by appeal exists, while we are mindful that abatement orders are incidental rulings of the trial court and lost profits do not establish an inadequate appellate remedy, it is also true that whether an appellate remedy is adequate should be guided by general principles rather than simple rules; it is not an abstract or formulaic determination and ""depends heavily on the circumstances presented."" In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136. Mandamus review may be essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss. Id.",Party Submissions,12.104349,12.096494,14.558413
"The purpose of the United Rentals, Inc. 2019 Annual Incentive Compensation Plan (this “Plan”) is to attract, retain and motivate selected executive officers and employees of United Rentals, Inc. (“United Rentals”) and its subsidiaries and affiliates (together with United Rentals, and their and its successors and assigns, the “Company”) in order to promote the Company’s growth and profitability. This Plan replaces the United Rentals, Inc. 2014 Annual Incentive Compensation Plan beginning with the Performance Period (as defined in Section 4) from January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019.",Contract,2.6116498,2.6270075,2.6358552
"Making emergency supplemental appropriations in line with the President’s request in response to the ongoing attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty by Russia and in response to the attacks in Israel for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.3609805,7.334461,7.1539254
"While the original Request concerned the Respondent’s AC-30 contract (and related documents) with “General Asphalt”, the Claimant now clarifies that General Asphalt is the colloquial industry name of an entity formally known as “General Supply Corporation S.R.L.”.",Legal Decisions,21.306795,24.489725,23.911392
"The only ground for setting aside an agreement on valuation is fraud because an appraisal procured by fraud is void ab initio. See Beck & Masten Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 830 S.W. 2d 291, 295 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). (“With fraud established, the assessment became void and, thus, all of appellees’ business personal property escaped taxation.”) But Oncor did not assert fraud in its pleadings before the trial court, and has cited no authority for its claim that a mutual mistake will negate an agreement made final by the Legislature.",Party Submissions,9.022256,8.822745,9.500047
"Article 36. The Energy Secretariat shall issue a resolution with the economic dispatch rules to be applied by the DNDC [CAMMESA] to the energy and capacity transactions provided in Article 35(b) above. This rule shall provide that all generation companies shall receive a uniform price for the electricity they sell at each point of delivery to be defined by the DNDC, based on the economic cost of the system. In calculating such price, the cost that the unsupplied electricity represents for the community shall be taken into account.",Legal Decisions,14.891809,16.074814,17.475632
"West Headnotes (26) [1] Mandamus Acts and proceedings of courts, judges, and judicial officers Mandamus Matters of discretion Mandamus relief is available if the trial court clearly abuses its discretion, either in resolving factual issues or determining legal principles, when there is no other adequate remedy at law. [2] Mandamus Matters of discretion A trial court clearly abuses its discretion, for purposes of a petition for a writ of mandamus, if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.",Party Submissions,5.421366,6.5191464,6.4098773
"Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. 2023) (“A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to issue a binding judgment.”).",Party Submissions,5.0358057,5.314539,7.3247776
"The requested documents should also serve to establish whether Coropi engaged in managing the investment activities of Kalemegdan with respect to Obnova, which is relevant and material for the decision on Tribunal's jurisdiction, since, as pointed out by Respondent (Counter-Memorial, paras. 387-396), Coropi's disputed beneficial ownership of Kalemegdan, and its disputed indirect beneficial ownership of the Obnova shares, does not suffice to qualify as an ""investment"" under Article 1(1) of the Cyprus-Serbia BIT and Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.",Legal Decisions,9.595716,9.388303,9.452874
When did the alleged requirement to obtain a CUSTF (Authorisation for Soil-Use Change in Forested Terrains / Autorización de Cambio de Uso del Suelo en Terrenos Forestales) come into effect for La Rosita?,Party Submissions,18.611576,23.750118,20.21791
SUBPART A. Mark Marsenison was doing business in Texas. SUBPART B. Mark Marsenison purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in Texas.,Party Submissions,23.757463,17.794655,26.246555
"As discussed previously, Oncor’s predecessor Sharyland and Wilbarger CAD entered into a signed agreement regarding the value of Oncor’s property in Wilbarger County. Different components make up market value including the size, age, location, and condition of the property being appraised, the existence of arm’s length sales, rental data, construction costs, and the relevance of the market data to the property. The physical components affect value, and the types of data needed in any appraisal assignment can be as diverse as the many influences on value in the marketplace. The Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal Of Real Estate 96 (14th Edition 2013). A property’s individual characteristics affect its value. TEX. TAX. CODE § 23.01(b).",Party Submissions,10.41969,11.167584,11.4021225
"Samson gets the lease language completely wrong. There are two main problems with Samson’s new argument. First, the phrase “late charges” is not in art. XVII.D. Second, this argument still requires substituting distinct terms in the leases.",Party Submissions,25.64185,33.292503,27.874008
"Natalie A. Anderson SBOT: 24079007 Attorney for Petitioner I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served on all counsel of record by Electronic Filing System in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on November 10, 2023.",Party Submissions,6.275953,7.0226426,10.706631
"None of these cases, arising from the majority’s independent research rather than the parties’ briefing, is on point. In fact, the majority’s fourth case citation, Orman v. Cullman, makes clear that the majority opinion’s test has no place in a case dealing with self-dealing: “As for the fourth element, whenever a director stands on both sides of the challenged transaction he is deemed interested and allegations of materiality have not been required.” 794 A.2d at 25 n.50.",Party Submissions,13.566468,14.02139,14.038875
"The requested documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute as they will shed much-needed light on the circumstances in which Mr Obradović's in -kind contribution was made, including who directed or initiated the decision to transfer the Obnova shares to Kalemegdan and whether Kalemegdan has made any contributions in respect of the Obnova shares. These matters are at the heart of Respondent's objections to the Tribunal's jurisdiction ratione materiae under the Cyprus-Serbia BIT which, if successful, would dispense with the Cypriot Claimants' claims and thus with a substantial part of Claimants' case against Respondent.",Legal Decisions,8.731556,10.347832,9.415682
IT IS ORDERED that H A O shall maintain sole management of the 529 plan(s) for the benefit of the child.,Party Submissions,28.43738,38.618523,38.860912
S.W.3d at 406–07. A defined contribution plan is one in which the employer and/or employee make contributions to an individual account set up for the employee.,Party Submissions,5.2573576,6.7082825,8.742631
"In its first, second, and fifth issues, Osprin contends that the trial court erred in entering a take-nothing judgement in favor of Backes, in determining that the termination clause was ambiguous, and in determining that the termination clause discharged Backes of his matured obligations. While we agree that the trial court erred in determining that the termination clause was ambiguous, we also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that all of Backes ’s obli gations under the guaranty were terminated when the conditions of the termination clause were met. Because this construction of the termination clause supports the take-nothing judgment of the trial court, and because the parties do not challenge the trial court ’s finding that the conditions of the termination clause were met, we will affirm the take-nothing judgment.",Party Submissions,5.1497836,5.6458488,5.675324
"A Compensation Deferral Agreement becomes irrevocable with respect to Performance-Based Compensation as of the day immediately following the latest date for filing such election. Any election to defer Performance-Based Compensation that is made in accordance with this paragraph and that becomes payable as a result of the Participant’s death or disability (as defined in Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-1(e)) or upon a change in control (as defined in Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-3(i)(5)) prior to the satisfaction of the performance criteria, will be void.",Contract,4.393862,4.090428,4.7442107
"The language of the Decision on Bifurcated Preliminary Objections is clearly that of a final ruling, therefore, the Tribunal concludes that it constitutes res judicata. The Tribunal does not consider that this conclusion is altered by the fact that the jurisdictional objections now asserted by the Respondent were not asserted or addressed in the preliminary phase of this arbitration. In the Tribunal’s view, the doctrine of res judicata applies to claims or objections that could have been raised or asserted in an earlier proceeding, but were not. Here, there is no question but that the Respondent’s present jurisdictional objections could have been asserted previously. The fact that they were not does not alter application of the doctrine of res judicata.294 102. In PO No. 7, the majority of the Tribunal correctly and definitively determined that the “ancillary claim [is] within the scope of the consent of the Parties and within the jurisdiction of ICSID,”295 and that Mexico had consented under NAFTA to arbitrate the ancillary claim.296 Because Mexico was obviously aware of the USMCA when it presented its jurisdictional objections to the ancillary claim in May and June 2022, there is no “new” fact that would justify reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision. Because the Tribunal’s findings in PO No. 7 regarding jurisdiction over the ancillary claim are correct and no exceptional circumstances exist that would justify reconsideration of that decision, PO No. 7 should not be revised.",Party Submissions,5.1716385,5.575274,5.400202
"Email: alan.bonfiglio@economia.gob.mx; luis.munoz@economia.gob.mx; rafael.arteaga@economia.gob.mx; sofia.hernandez@economia.gob.mx; alejandro.rebollo@economia.gob.mx; jorge.escalona@economia.gob.mx; marco.vazquez@economia.gob.mx; oscar.rosado@economia.gob.mx; stephan.becker@pillsburylaw.com; gary.shaw@pillsburylaw.com; gtereposky@tradeisds.com; abarragan@tradeisds.com 9.2. Following the date of signature of this Procedural Order, any intended change or addition by a Party to the above legal representatives shall be notified promptly in writing to the other Party, the Tribunal, and the Tribunal Secretary. Any such intended change or addition shall only take effect in the arbitration subject to the approval of the Tribunal. The Tribunal may withhold approval of any intended change or addition to a P arty’s legal representatives where such change or addition could compromise the composition of the Tribunal or the finality of any decision, order, or award (on the grounds of possible conflict or other like impediment).",Legal Decisions,5.7679877,6.2786283,5.988273
"Finally, HSMiller’s argument fails because the harm in a tort case is different from pure contractual harm. In a tort case the nature of the plaintiff’s harm dictates who is an RTP. A person is an RTP if they have caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which the plaintiff has sued. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6). The harm in tort cases, including this one, arises from alleged 28 tortious acts. A simple breach of contract does not cause harm based in tort. See DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d at 494-95.",Party Submissions,8.168623,9.584933,9.369573
"Contemporaneous documents concerning any due diligence or inquiry into the rights of Obnova as regards the Objects and the Dunavska Plots until 26 April 2012, the date of alleged investment, including any communications, e-mails, analyses, notes, or memoranda on this issue, in particular exchanged between (i) Mr Rand or his advisors or representatives, and/or the Ahola Family Trust and/or Coropi and/or Kalemegdan or their advisors or representatives on the one hand, and (ii) Mr Obradović and/or his advisors or representatives, and/or Obnova and/or its advisors or representatives on the other hand.",Legal Decisions,11.445115,11.397073,12.3516
"In particular, Dr. Tappan explained that under the BSA oxytocin protocol the nurses had to titrate oxytocin infusion to the maternal-fetal response. App. 7, CR 669. Dr. Tappan believed the nurses breached the standard of care when they ignored this policy during Mrs. Walker’s labor, initially by failing to discontinue Pitocin in response to H.W.’s condition at 9:21 and next by continuing to increase the drug at 15:25 when the fetal monitoring strip was consistent with hypoxia and acidosis. App. 7, CR 669.",Party Submissions,9.86353,11.53039,11.182009
"McCarthy Subcontract -5-01-12-2017 Rev. 3.10 Subcontractor will be responsible for supplying its own crew with drinking water, ice and cups.",Party Submissions,20.740103,22.528488,22.936617
Nature of the case: This is an interlocutory appeal concerning the sufficiency of expert reports under the Texas Medical Liability Act (“TMLA”).,Party Submissions,7.1651754,6.0030003,7.986195
"In his testimony, referred to: “the Agreement that was executed with President De la Madrid”, referring to an (see Transcript Day 1 (Eng), 237:2-12). Please explain the basis for these statements by reference to the evidence in the record.",Party Submissions,31.12402,37.416054,42.390293
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2016 software in Times New Roman 14-point font in text and Times New Roman 12-point font in footnotes.,Party Submissions,4.147785,4.813586,6.416481
"Finally, Thompson confirmed that neither Bustamante nor Windrum eliminated but-for causation in medical negligence cases. 649 S.W.3d at 159-60. Rather, when the negligent acts of multiple providers are so concurrent that they cannot be examined in isolation, the correct approach is to consider (1) whether each provider’s individual negligence was a substantial factor in the claimant’s injury; and (2) whether the providers’ combined negligence was a but-for cause of the injury. Id. at 160 (“If the negligent acts of each provider are so concurrent that they cannot be examined in isolation, the correct approach is to consider whether each provider’s individual negligence was a substantial factor in [the patient’s death] and whether the providers’ combined negligence was a but -for cause of [the patient’s] death. ”) .",Party Submissions,4.8808384,4.7096725,5.215546
"Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)); see also id. at 632 (instructing courts to be mindful not to “exert too great a ‘chilling effect’ on First Amendment activities.”).",Party Submissions,6.441404,7.3551884,9.554525
"In Utts v. Short, the Court addressed a situation where one plaintiff (Walker) settled with a joint tortfeasor (HCA) for $200,000, but other plaintiffs were alleged to have benefitted from the settlement. 81 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tex. 2002). The HCA settlement agreement stated that out of the $200,000, Walker would receive $50,000 and $150,000 would be paid to her attorneys, but the entire amount actually went into Walker’s attorneys’ IOLTA account. Id. In a separate document signed the same day, Walker instructed her attorneys to pay each of the four other individual plaintiffs $10,000.00. Id. Those family members, and the estate plaintiff, then settled with HCA for $10 each. Id. Walker nonsuited her claims against Dr. Utts, and the remaining plaintiffs proceeded to trial against him. Id. Dr. Utts filed an election of a dollar-for-dollar credit, asserting he was entitled to a $200,040 settlement credit. Id. The remaining plaintiffs argued that they were the only claimants left in the case, and “HCA’s settlement with them was only $10 each. Therefore, they argued that Dr. Utts was entitled to a $10 per plaintiff credit.” Id.",Party Submissions,4.9531555,5.2370005,5.2141147
"Coinbase operates an online platform on which users can buy and sell cryptocurrencies and government-issued currencies. When creating a Coinbase account, individuals agree to the terms in Coinbase's User Agreement. As relevant *739 here, the User Agreement that disputes arising under the agreement be resolved through binding arbitration.",Party Submissions,6.9914427,8.676726,9.156124
"Yellowfin cites cases for the undisputed principle, see supra at 3-4, that actions on notes and foreclosure actions are separate and distinct remedies. Resp. Br. 12. W e don’t disagree that a mortgagee can file both a suit on the note and a foreclosure action. See Kepler v. Slade, 896 P.2d 482, 485-86 (N.M. 1995). And it’s irrelevant that the holder of a mortgage had standing to file a foreclosure action on a mortgage securing a note that had been discharged in bankruptcy. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Holden, 60 N.E.3d 1243, 1245 (Ohio 2016). The question here is not whether these actions can be brought, but when .",Party Submissions,6.697727,6.6117253,7.457245
Amendment and Termination. The Company may at any time and from time to time amend the Plan or may terminate the Plan as provided in this Article X. Each Participating Employer may also terminate its participation in the Plan.,Contract,5.0072494,5.670927,5.938714
"Where, as here, there is an interested director, the presumption of the business judgment rule is inapplicable. “Certainly, if this is an ‘interested’ director transaction, such that the business judgment rule is inapplicable to the board majority approving the transaction, then the inquiry ceases. In that event futility of demand has been established by any objective or subjective standard .” Id. at 469 (Zimmerer, J. dissenting) (citation omitted). Even if the defalcating principals are so wealthy that their theft is “immaterial” to their fortune, their wrongdoing remains unlawful.",Party Submissions,11.30989,12.478568,12.585023
"In fact, Dr. Null’s report doesn’t even mention Dr. Castillo. (CR.708-09). True, he says H.W.’s postpartum course is “consistent with an antenatal asphyxia event.” (CR.709). But he never connects that with any claimed negligence by Dr. Castillo. ( See id. ).",Party Submissions,12.428923,15.362842,15.811393
"Finally, Petitioners cite Hawley27 and Benge28 as cases where the trial court mistakenly allowed the plaintiff to argue theories to the jury that had not been properly pled. This, of course, is not at issue here and KCSR has not made that argument. The opinions are, however, consistent with the holdings in Ca steel and 23 96 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2002). 24 Id. at 231-32. 25 Id. 26 Id. at 236. 27 Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 861-62 (Tex. 2009). 28 Benge v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 466, 476 (Tex. 2018).",Party Submissions,5.0999722,5.362337,5.7982893
"Third, Barina mischaracterizes the test for determining whether a statement is protected opinion or a statement of fact. She asserts that omitted material can transform a clear expression of rhetorical hyperbole into a statement of fact, but she ignores that it is the context in which that statement appears, rather than whatever the underlying publication includes or omits, that determines whether it is protected opinion. And she ignores clear precedent holding that, where a publication discloses the facts upon which a conclusion is based, that conclusion—however critical—is not actionable as defamation.",Party Submissions,9.137649,10.069994,10.110655
"For the avoidance of any doubt, Claimants reiterate their general objection to production of any documents covered by privilege under the legal or ethical rules.",Legal Decisions,15.440399,16.272959,20.018091
"Convention Article 44; Arbitration Rules 51 23.1. In consultation with the Parties, the Tribunal will determine at the end of the hearing whether there shall be post-hearing briefs. If so, the Tribunal will address the time limits for, and the length, format, and content of the post-hearing briefs. No new evidence may be produced together with the post-hearing briefs, except with leave or on request of the Tribunal.",Legal Decisions,7.289355,7.7126384,8.024178
"Fleming Defendants are pretending like it is the Wilson Plaintiffs that had the pro-collateral estoppel agreement, when according to their analysis they are the ones that had the obvious anti-collateral estoppel agreements. Fleming Defendants have shamelessly complained to this Court about how long this litigation is taking, but it could have probably ended about 10 -15 years ago if Fleming Defendants hadn’t aggressively asserted an anti-collateral estoppel position from the very beginning. This dispute could have been tried once in the Karnes case, and it would be a distant memory by now. It’s not right, and it’s not just or fair for Fleming Defendants to be rewarded for their judicial gamesmanship, and for their blatantly contradictory positions on collateral estoppel. Fleming Defendants should be held to their Absolute Anti-Collateral Estoppel Agreements that they have been forcing on everyone else for the last 15 years.",Party Submissions,7.741752,7.3522496,8.265286
"Earnings Credit. Each Account will be credited with Earnings on each Business Day, based upon the Participant’s investment allocation among a menu of investment options selected in advance by the Committee, in accordance with the provisions of this Article VIII (“investment allocation”).",Contract,11.040908,10.139495,18.07925
"The requested documents are relevant and material to assess whether the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction and/or the Public Urban Planning Company “Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade” considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP, and if so, what was their contemporaneous understanding of these rights.",Legal Decisions,17.703758,16.755117,17.735653
"Forty-five percent (45%) or 112,500 shares of the One-Time PSU Special Grant (the “First PSU Tranche”) shall vest upon the Company’s stock (NASDAQ: OSPN) having a 45 trading day average closing price of at least $30.00; and the remaining fifty-five percent (55%) or 137,500 of the One-Time PSU Special Grant (the “Second PSU Tranche”) shall vest upon the Company’s stock (NASDAQ: OSPN) having a 45 trading day average closing price of at least $40.00 or higher. However, if the First PSU Tranche shall have vested and the Performance Period has not expired but the closing price target of $40.00 is not reached, then Executive shall be entitled to a portion of the Second PSU Tranche based on a linear interpolation between $30.00 and $40.00 for the highest 45 trading day average closing price achieved before the end of the Performance Period. Further, in the case of a termination without Cause or for Good Reason in accordance with Section 3.3 below prior to the expiration of the Performance Period where not all of the One-Time PSU Special Grant have vested, then there shall be an additional 18 month vesting period extension (“Tail Period”). During the Tail Period, Executive shall continue to be eligible to vest in the One-Time PSU Special Grant at the same performance measures except that the number of PSU’s delivered shall be reduced for the ratio of the number of days between termination and four years over four years plus 18-months.",Contract,4.0739226,4.233105,4.3307953
"Almost ten years ago to the day, this Court denied a mandamus petition substantially similar to this one. In re Joe Pool, No. 14-0040 (Tex. Jan. 17, 2014). There, another opportunistic candidate engaged in dilatory litigation seeking to exclude an election opponent—former Justice and now U.S. District Judge Jeff Brown—from the primary ballot at the last minute based on technical signature defects. This Court denied that mandamus petition in a single sentence. Id. The Court should likewise deny Relator’s mandamus petition.",Party Submissions,8.118644,8.796516,9.173942
ASEY ) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to Supporting the contributions of Catholic schools in the United States and celebrating the 50th annual National Catholic Schools Week.,Legislation,17.661077,14.959908,24.350405
"The Walkers’ attempt to add context to their experts’ reports by claiming Dr. Null conducted a “differential diagnosis” to explain H.W.’s injury does not advance their position. (Pet. Br. at 33-34). To begin with, as Dr. Castillo explained above, saying that H.W.’s post-delivery course is “consistent with an antenatal asphyxia event” (CR.709) is no different than the Wright expert’s opinion that the patient there possibly had a chance at a better outcome. Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53 (possibility of a better outcome, without explaining how the claimed negligent conduct caused injury, not enough to satisfy expert report requirements).",Party Submissions,14.586621,16.913815,16.28881
"TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS: The Motion seeks the Court’s reconsideration of its Petition for Review by misrepresenting key facts related to prior determinations of this issue to fabricate an illusory split of authority. This dispute is not ripe for review as the appellate c ourt’s ruling was properly based on the determination that Respondent’s claims were not derived from a contract with an applicable arbitration provision. The appellate court applied the proper standards of review at all stages of its analysis, and its ultimate opinion is not in conflict with this Court’s opinions cited by Petitioner.",Party Submissions,9.211557,9.584904,9.2403555
"This text-based conclusion is further supported by existing Texas law. Absent the Late Charge provision, there would be a low statutory, likely simple, interest rate. Since 1983, the Texas Natural Resources Code has provided a default interest rate on late-paid royalties if the parties do not agree otherwise, but does not specify simple or compound interest, or if the rate is fixed at the beginning or fluctuates month to month: If payment has not been made for any reason in the time limits specified in Section 91.402 of this code, the payor must pay interest to a payee beginning at the expiration of those time limits at two percentage points above the percentage rate charged on loans to depository institutions by the New York Federal Reserve Bank, unless a different rate of interest is specified in a written agreement between payor and payee.",Party Submissions,9.231074,9.512229,10.287436
"Beyond this case, the El Paso court’s decision would gut the protections in § 2301.467(a)(1), threatening harm to all Texas dealers and ultimately Texans—whose interests the Legislature sought to protect by regulating in this area—by inviting manufacturers/distributors to skirt the statutory limits imposed on them.",Party Submissions,15.445115,14.796371,18.302732
"EACH PERSON WHO IS A PARTY TO THIS ORDER IS ORDERED TO NOTIFY EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY OF ANY CHANGE IN THE PARTY'S CURRENT RESIDENCE ADDRESS, MAILING ADDRESS, HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER, NAME OF EMPLOYER, ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT, DRIVER'S LICENSE NUMBER, AND WORK TELEPHONE NUMBER. THE PARTY IS ORDERED TO GIVE NOTICE OF AN INTENDED CHANGE IN ANY OF THE REQUIRED INFORMATION TO EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY ON OR BEFORE THE 60TH DAY BEFORE THE INTENDED CHANGE. IF THE PARTY DOES NOT KNOW OR COULD NOT HAVE KNOWN OF THE CHANGE IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO PROVIDE 60-DAY NOTICE, THE PARTY IS ORDERED TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE CHANGE ON OR BEFORE THE FIFTH DAY AFTER THE DATE THAT THE PARTY KNOWS OF THE CHANGE.",Party Submissions,2.62641,2.576188,2.6661577
"Did the negligence, if any, of the Terry Defendants proximately cause the injury complained of by HenryS. Miller in this lawsuit?",Party Submissions,15.905113,24.324759,32.823982
"McCarthy for review and approval prior to submitting its first application for payment. The Schedule shall be itemized as directed by McCarthy by general areas, specific large pieces of equipment, and/or another similar method which shall accurately indicate the value of work performed or services rendered.",Party Submissions,29.368752,25.220455,30.857622
"This issue may at first seem narrow in impact, but in reality, it is critical. The issue directly impacts the entire auto industry in Texas, which is why the Texas Automobile Dealers Association (TADA)—the largest trade association representing Texas dealers—has urged review.",Party Submissions,11.493285,11.571051,13.20652
How is Rafiei affording the expense of hiring experts and paying for depositions now if he could not afford the expense involved in arbitrating the merits of the litigation?,Party Submissions,25.913187,20.403473,35.69726
"Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined in full, and in which Justice Thomas joined in part.",Party Submissions,5.0915713,4.7991886,4.337735
Corrective Distribution. Corrective Distribution means the amount of any 401(k) plan excess contribution (within the meaning of Code Section 401(k)(8)) which is distributed to a Participant during any Plan Year.,Contract,6.1694417,6.285892,6.3569207
"Justice Devine also stands ready and able to cure the alleged defects. As the Appendix to this Response shows, he collected an additional 23 non-duplicative signatures from the Eighth Court of Appeals District in October. These signatures are non-duplicative and are sufficient to cure the issues Relator alleges. B. This Court’s precedents requiring an opportunity to cure There is no daylight between this Court’s precedents requiring an opportunity to cure signature defects and the facts presented by this mandamus petition. Relator never suggests otherwise. He instead argues only that these decisions have been superseded by statute. Pet.10. Not so.",Party Submissions,14.22639,14.025877,15.5411
"TEX. R. CIV. P. 168. Among other filing requirements, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3 states that a petition for permissive appeal in a civil case must: (1) contain the information required by Rule 25.1(d) to be included in a notice of appeal; (2) attach a copy of the order from which appeal is sought; (3) contain a table of contents, index of authorities, issues presented, *329 and a statement of facts; and (4) argue clearly and concisely why the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and how an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e); see id. R. 25.1(d).",Party Submissions,3.4130795,3.9039228,4.0283294
"I agree with that hesitation—even one step further down this path is much too far. The mandatory-general-stay rule that the Court manufactures is unmoored from Congress's commands and this Court's precedent. And the windfall that the Court gives to defendants seeking arbitration, preferencing their interests over all others, is entirely unwarranted. The Court now mandates that result no matter how unjust that outcome is, according to traditional equitable standards, in a given case. This endeavor is unfounded, unwise, and—most fundamentally—not our role.",Party Submissions,16.22333,20.663763,18.970835
"See Respondent’s Memorial at para. 59. Claimants have shown that this assertion misconstrues the meaning of, and draws incorrect inferences from, Article 34.1.",Legal Decisions,15.724683,16.459814,15.321329
"Texas Bar No. 24007951 kweaber@mayfield-lawfirm.com MAYFIELDLAWFIRM 320 S. Polk St., Suite 400 Amarillo, Texas 79101 806-242-0152 806-242-0159 (fax) ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT RHODESIA CASTILLO, M.D.",Party Submissions,5.4283752,5.5503674,6.7897186
"Small Account Balances. The Committee shall pay the value of the Participant’s Accounts upon a Separation from Service in a single lump sum if the balance of such Accounts is not greater than the applicable dollar amount under Code Section 402(g)(1)(B), provided the payment represents the complete liquidation of the Participant’s interest in the Plan.",Contract,5.535523,6.9781036,7.48648
"Most Texans would assume that owners and operators of public pools, even if they are municipalities, have a duty to provide a certain number of lifeguards. Most Texans would also assume that when posted, mandatory safety rules prescribe owners will enforce those rules, that owners have an enforceable duty to do so. In this case, most Texans would be wrong.",Party Submissions,12.043656,10.557297,12.781029
"Further, the impact would extend beyond § 2301.467(a)(1) because it is only one of several provisions in Chapter 2301 of the Texas Occupations Code stating that manufacturers/distributors “may not require” specified dealer conduct.",Party Submissions,15.516642,12.1274185,16.432018
The requested documents will show over which land plots and buildings Luka Beograd had the right of use prior and subsequent to the conclusion of the agreement between Luka Beograd and Serbia dated 6 March 1975 submitted as R-060. The requested documents are therefore relevant and material to demonstrate that Luka Beograd did not have the right of use over Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 — as Serbia incorrectly argues in this arbitration.,Legal Decisions,14.159326,14.9832115,15.133223
"Because the erroneous denial of a motion for leave to designate a responsible third party skews the proceedings, potentially affects the litigation's outcome, and compromises the defense in ways unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record, such an error ordinarily renders the appellate remedy inadequate. The same problems arise when a trial court erroneously grants a motion to strike a responsible third party designation. Thus the appellate remedy is also ordinarily inadequate when a trial court commits such an error.",Party Submissions,7.187741,8.230549,8.341481
"So, although his OB-GYN credentials are impressive, standing alone they do not qualify him to offer opinions about the medical cause or the proximate cause of H.W.’s claimed neurological injuries. Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d at 304-05. Nonetheless, Dr. Tappan does just that—offers his opinion that H.W. “possib[ly]...sustained a perinatal arterial ischemic stroke likely due to intrapartum factors...” (CR.670); “sustained an in-utero asphyxia injury during the final one to one and a half hours of labor...” (CR.671); and “would have been born without neurologic injury” had he been delivered sooner. (CR.671).",Party Submissions,7.282974,9.114426,9.234694
"By this letter, the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction submitted: 1. the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of the 2013 DRP with a Report on the participation of the public, interested authorities and organizations in the public inspection of the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of the 2013 DRP; 2. the Amendment and Supplement to the Report on the participation of the public, interested authorities and organizations in the public inspection of the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of the 2013 DRP; 3. the Report on public inspection; and 4. the Amendment and Supplement to the Report on public inspection. The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the Secretariat for Environmental Protection considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP, and if so, what was its contemporaneous understanding of these rights.",Legal Decisions,6.532683,5.653275,6.9536753
Any and all documents referred to on page 14 (pdf) of exhibit R-052 based on which Luka Beograd’ right of use over land plot No. 47 in the CM Stari grad was registered in the land book. RELEVANCE Claimants position in this arbitration is that Obnova has a right of use over land plot No. 47 ever since it constructed its buildings on this land plot. The requested documents will show the basis on which Serbia registered Luka Beograd as the user of this land plot No. 47 and that the inscription was incorrect.,Legal Decisions,19.768847,18.632395,19.217669
"IBA Rules, Respondent must show that the requested documents are subject to that privilege within the scope of Article 9.2(b).",Legal Decisions,24.15409,25.673378,35.007572
"The record clearly establishes that Deegear “knowingly treated his limited knowledge of the facts surrounding the mistake as sufficient” at the time Attaway questioned his figures. At that point, Deegear could have easily contacted someone at Sharyland and checked his numbers. But instead of following up, he simply told Attaway that everything was fine, and Sharyland assumed the risk that he was wrong by signing the agreement, In Smith v Lagerstam No. 03-05-00275-CV, 2007 WL 2066298, at *1 (Tex. App. July 19, 2007 mem. op. not reported) (Appendix B hereto) a case very much like this one on its facts, the seller of certain gas production royalty interests claimed mistake as to the number of wells involved, which had increased over time and affected the consideration agreed to. However, the evidence showed that “despite the fact that her royalty payments had increased significantly in recent years [she] failed to ascertain or investigate the value of her interest prior to selling it.” The opinion of the Third Court of Appeals in Lagerstam is well and carefully reasoned and stands for the proposition that once becoming aware of a possible mistake, a party who could but does not investigate that mistake before entering into a contract affected by it may not later avoid the contract on the basis of that mistake.",Party Submissions,10.347205,12.378545,11.11868
"A.S. was further questioned about the day of R.W.’s birth. 3 RR 84. A.S. went to the hospital for an emergency and was questioned about stopping before the hospital to purchase cigarettes. 3 RR 85. The jury heard that R.W. was “exposed to opiates and methamphetamines while in utero,” was five weeks early, and was treated for withdrawals and breathing issues. 3 RR 104. A.S. was then questioned regarding her Facebook posts beginning in early 2021. 3 RR 88. The content of the posts indicated a desire to give up drug use, seek sobriety and healthy relationships. 3 RR 88-90. The trial court suspended A.S.’s visitation in December of 2022. 3 RR 111. Through Intervenor’s further questioning, the jury was made aware that A.S. had a strained relationship with the Intervenor’s and had cursed at them. 3 RR 116.",Party Submissions,6.8377037,6.4823084,6.9380107
"RLB has not shown an abuse of discretion by the court of appeals, and thus RLB is not entitled to mandamus relief.",Party Submissions,6.611777,10.873347,12.178267
"Further amplifying the problems with the reports was each physician’s lack of qualifications to offer opinions about causation. It’s not surprising Dr. Tappan’s causation opinion was full of difficult-to-comprehend medical jargon; as an obstetrician, he failed to offer any facts establishing his qualifications to opine about what caused an infant’s claimed brain injury, and nothing in his report or CV suggests otherwise. Hiding behind confusing strings of unexplained medical-ese persuaded the trial court; it should not carry the day here.",Party Submissions,14.142517,15.322761,17.420168
Withholding. The Participating Employer shall have the right to withhold from any payment due under the Plan (or with respect to any amounts credited to the Plan) any taxes required by law to be withheld in respect of such payment (or credit). Withholdings with respect to amounts credited to the Plan shall be deducted from Compensation that has not been deferred to the Plan.,Contract,4.756946,5.4240937,5.9706907
"If Dr. Tappan wanted to explain how and why Dr. Castillo’s alleged negligence caused H.W.’s injuries, he had a final opportunity in his “Conclusion” section. Alas, he fared no better there. First, he made the conclusory statement that the departures from the standard of care were “a substantial factor in causing the injuries suffered by baby [H.W.]....” (CR.670, listing injuries). That was plainly insufficient to comprise an objective good faith effort to comply with section 74.351. See Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 460 (“merely incanting words will not suffice” to establish claim’s merit).",Party Submissions,10.336426,12.13622,12.221211
"Wife denied having any retirement accounts with the City of Dallas despite the paystubs Husband introduced into evidence. She contended the paystubs were from before J.Y.O.’s birthin 2014. However, the rst paystub was dated September 24, 2010 and the last one was dated October 25, 2019. The paystubs showed Wife’s contributions to the accounts. She did not provide any documentatiOn contradicting the paystubs. Instead, she testied that the “confusion” regarding the status of any . retirement contributions occurred because when she returned to work in 2017, the City “mistakenly reenrolled” her for her prior benefits. She noticed the mistake in 2018, brought it to the payroll department’s attention, and was allegedly reimbursed approximately $2,000.",Party Submissions,8.989675,9.794995,9.537643
"First, RLB’s stance in the trial court was that none of its claims should be abated in favor of the pending Oklahoma lawsuit between MVP and McCarthy. R.0333-359, 681-87. It had no obligation to dissect its claims as MVP suggests. Second, MVP did not even seek dismissal initially in the trial court. Instead, in its initial filing (i.e., the plea in abatement), MVP sought “an Order ... abating McCarthy’s and RLB’s claims until such time as the Oklahoma Action is resolved[.]” R.0201; see also R.0251, 0518, 0580-81 (emphasis added). Not until after the trial court denied the plea in abatement did MVP seek, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration, for the trial court to “dismiss this lawsuit in favor of the first-filed Oklahoma Action.” R.0631. RLB responded to that motion, arguing there was no basis for the court to reconsider its decision. R.0681-82, 685. As the prevailing party, RLB had neither the obligation to respond to the motion for reconsideration nor the obligation to answer MVP’s new post-denial argument that the trial court should have dismissed the case. See City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 789 (Tex. 2012). Third, as explained, MVP had the burden to demonstrate that some or all of RLB’s claims were within the scope of the MCC’s forum-selection/choice-of-law clause—it was not RLB’s burden to refute it. See Section II, supra. Thus, MVP’s contention that RLB “waived” its right to ask this Court for the alternative relief it seeks is unavailing.",Party Submissions,5.6737165,5.5353355,6.061355
"Bestor was required to have exhausted administratively his attempt to have his administrative attorney's fees paid by Service Lloyds, rather than having them deducted from his recovery. See Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 804-05 ; Pickett, 239 S.W.3d at 835-36, 838; Roskey, 190 S.W.3d at 880-81 ; see also Duenez, 201 S.W.3d at 675-76 (holding that claimant was required but failed to exhaust administrative remedies for declaratory judgment claim and attorney's fees over state employee's insurance coverage because that action and the injunction sought directly related to ""payment of a claim"").",Party Submissions,9.121502,8.659778,10.292159
Ships and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters.,Legal Decisions,9.281955,12.851211,10.8369665
"Insurance coverage required to be provided by Subcontractor pursuant to this Article shall not include deductibles or SIRs in excess of $100,000. McCarthy reserves the right to request documentation which supports the Subcontractor’s ability to fund applicable deductibles or SIRs. Any applicable deductible or SIR associated with the Subcontractor’s insurance policies shall be the sole responsibility of the Subcontractor. Failure to satisfy any SIR does not relieve Subcontractor from its obligations and responsibilities with this Agreement. All deductibles and SIRs must be evidenced on the required Certificate of Insurance.",Party Submissions,5.765486,4.981209,6.030341
"Second, Barina does not meaningfully dispute that she has profited from her role. While she now claims that she only receives a “small” percentage of the sale of Thrash’s assets, she does not contest that her compensation allowed her to leave two full-time jobs once she became guardian. See Pet. Br. at 22-23. And she does not dispute, because she cannot, that prior to being placed under her authority, Thrash had a thriving business and an estate worth millions, but that once she took control, that business was closed and his home sold. CR1:377-78.",Party Submissions,12.744408,14.9103365,14.762241
"To allow holders of certain grazing permits to make minor range improvements and to require that the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior respond to requests for range improvements within 30 days, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.7410855,9.164432,8.418524
"Respondents’ argument about the name change is therefore restricted to only two isolated portions of the jury’s award. The first is the $23,331.37 the jury awarded to Westwood in “relocation expenses.” (2CR2906) These damages compensated Westwood for Respondents’ destruction of its security surveillance system (8RR116-17;16RR100-06 (PX148A)); for the locksmith Westwood had to hire to gain re-entry to the leased premises (8RR136-36, 152;16RR99 (PX148)); and for a sign that Respondents removed and refused to return (8RR203-04;16RR114). These expenses were “paid” by Westwood Motors. (Resp. 31 n.88) But despite what Respondents insist ( id .), those same expenses were “incurred” by Westwood, and thus the award compensated Westwood for its own losses. And under the collateral source rule, Respondents cannot prohibit Westwood from recovering for these losses simply because they were paid by another entity. See Big Bird Tree Service v. Gallegos, 365 S.W.3d 173, 176-77 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (holding collateral source rule precludes any reduction in a tortfeasor’s liability because of benefits plaintiff received from someone else).",Party Submissions,8.056851,7.493635,8.318688
"The third case Respondents cite, MHCB (USA) Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 249 S.W.3d 68, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied), does not help them either. In that case, the appraisal district and property owner settled a protest concerning the market value of a refinery. MHCB (USA), 249 S.W.3d at 73. The appraisal district later attempted to value the property at $100 million more. Id. The property owner challenged the second valuation as outside the appraisal district’s authority because the second valuation was inconsistent with the settlement agreement. The district argued the court had no jurisdiction to consider that claim on the theory that an agreement under section 1.111(e) is not reviewable. The court of appeals held that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to decide whether section 1.111(e) barred the district’s second valuation. Id. at 87. The court was careful to note it was not deciding the merits of the dispute, and remanded the case to the district court for merits proceedings addressing, among other things, the validity of the agreement under section 1.111(e). Id. at 89-90.",Party Submissions,4.161874,4.2512116,4.2790027
Any and all documents included in the files maintained by the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade’s with respect to its work on the 2015 DRP. RELEVANCE Claimants hereby incorporate the explanation provided at Request No. 48 above.,Legal Decisions,29.28831,31.341688,40.86366
"VI. Alternatively, there is a bona fide question as to whether Mann was in the course and scope of employment at the time of his injuries.",Party Submissions,8.662281,11.640286,12.69584
"The City and the court of appeals interpret Sampson for the proposition that only claims arising from physical defects in property are actionable as premises liability claims. But this conflicts with this Court’s holding in Del Lago. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 776. After full briefing, this Court should grant this petition and clarify whether it meant to foreclose premises liability claims for a “use” of real property.",Party Submissions,11.091771,11.359855,11.372318
"IOLATIONS .—Multiple violations of this section that are part of the same scheme or continuing course of conduct may be charged, at the election of the Government, in a single count in an indictment or information.’’. SEC. 6. ILLEGAL MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES.",Legislation,8.178405,7.83742,9.88971
"Matt Marsenison was doing business pursuant to §17.042 in Texas by entering into a contract with Integrity as indicated by Exhibit 7 (RR Vol. 2, Ex. 7 and Appendix, Tab 3), and committing numerous torts in Texas. Therefore, the only question is whether or not it is unconstitutional to exert personal jurisdiction over it.",Party Submissions,21.899708,23.74152,28.922539
"Samson urged the Ninth Court of Appeals to apply holdings by the First Court of Appeals in Hooks to the case severed from Hooks, on grounds that the doctrine “applies to severed actions,” even though decided by another court of appeals: Samson’s Appellant’s Brief filed January 6, 2014, in Samson Exploration, LLC, v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2015), aff’d, 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017), Case No. 09-13-00366-CV, at 19, located at: https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=3660681b-414e-4201-8236-5556e611eedd&coa=coa09&DT=Brief&MediaID=f87ea8a4-6125- 4514-b749-457e5b1e1bf5.",Party Submissions,8.116422,6.3380933,7.975226
"At the time Rafiei signed this contract, the effect of this oppressive language was such that it left Rafiei with no possible alternatives. Rafiei would have to pay a potentially unlimited amount of money – at a minimum, $7,675.00 up front – just to obtain a ruling on whether the Arbitration Agreement itself was unconscionable. Such egregious costs would, in effect, operate as a financial penalty on Appellee that would bar him from exercising his rights.",Party Submissions,11.247888,12.234873,12.505342
"I certify that this petition for review was served on the following counsel of record via electronic service pursuant to Rule 9.5(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on November 30, 2023.",Party Submissions,4.528948,5.4833565,5.6129775
To prohibit the Federal Insurance Office of the Department of the Treasury and other financial regulators from collecting data directly from an insurance company.,Legislation,11.697155,7.8839884,11.455623
Samson would insert “late charges” into art XVII.D to change the meaning of the last sentence of the prior (Late Charge) provision. That last sentence specifies that Late Charges become “due and payable” at the end of each month. But Samson conjures a scenario in which that sentence specifies that paying a Late Charge at some future date will prevent lease termination.,Party Submissions,23.282866,22.11543,23.5185
"Letter from the Institute for the Protection of Nature of Serbia to the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction No. 03-853/2 dated 14 April 2008, together with all accompanying attachments.",Legal Decisions,10.186834,9.305783,10.304575
"After the sexual assault, Mesquite Logistics, a subscriber to workers' compensation under the Act, submitted a workers' compensation claim to its insurance carrier. The carrier electronically filed an “Employer's First Report of Injury” with the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation (“the DWC”), reporting a “mental trauma injury” sustained by Berrelez. The DWC assigned the matter a claim number. An adjustor with the insurance carrier contacted Berrelez by letter, asking that she contact the carrier to discuss the workers' compensation claim. The carrier determined Berrelez had a compensable injury for mental trauma and set medical reserves of $2,000.00.",Party Submissions,6.9360876,6.123063,7.4433703
"Rosenthal also presented clear and specific evidence that the article’s gist is not substantially true; specifically, she presented evidence that the Commission conducted an investigation and concluded that she engaged in no wrongdoing in obtaining SNAP benefits.",Party Submissions,17.249449,22.738602,19.918404
The consolidated cases present the following issues: (1) whether Cochran's election to recover benefits under Alabama's workers' compensation laws bars Sonic's recovery as Cochran's subclaimant under the TWCA; and (2) whether the trial court acted appropriately by continuing to abate Sonic's contract claims pending a final determination of the reimbursement claim.,Party Submissions,9.888934,10.674179,11.714042
"For the above reasons, Claimant respectfully requests the Tribunal to order Respondent to produce the documents requested here Request No. 6 is granted insofar as the Respondent shall provide the Claimant with the document(s) regarding the decision(s) to incarcerate the Claimant in the Salwa Road prison and to maintain his detention in this prison until July 1, 2020. The Request is dismissed in all other parts, which are unspecific and not substantiated for the purpose of preparing the Claimant’s forthcoming Memorial, and for the determination of the allegations contained therein in support of the Claimant’s claims. Moreover, the Request is moot in respect of the document the Respondent provided, as reported in the Summary presented by the Claimant.",Legal Decisions,9.608666,9.3564825,9.840865
"This Chapter cited in 28 TAC § 19.2005, (relating to General Standards of Utilization Review); 28 TAC § 133.206, (relating to Spinal Surgery Second Opinion Process).",Party Submissions,12.619537,11.251518,11.079087
"Weatherford urges this Court to look solely at its pleadings, arguing that its pleadings alone were “sufficient to show governmental immunity has been waived.” Brief at 56. This misstates the burden in an evidentiary Plea to the Jurisdiction. In Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, the court differentiates between a Plea to the Jurisdiction that challenges jurisdiction based on the pleadings, and a Plea to the Jurisdiction that challenges jurisdiction by showing jurisdictional facts. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. Midland’s plea was the latter. Midland presented evidence challenging Weatherford’s factual allegations, and Weatherford failed to offer admissible evidence to raise a fact issue to overcome Midland’s challenge. Miranda clearly states that the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, and “to avoid dismissal plaintiffs must raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to the [T]rial [C]ourt's subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 221. The Court should reject Weatherford’s contention that pleadings alone, without review of the underlying Plea to the Jurisdiction evidence offered and admitted (and in Weatherford’s case, excluded as improper hearsay), are sufficient to confer jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,5.463461,5.910241,6.033662
"The majority opinion, however, transmogrifies Griggs into a sweeping stay of “pre-trial and trial proceedings” on not just arbitrability, but also the merits. Ante, at 1918. According to the majority, if the question on appeal is “whether the litigation may go forward in the district court,” then the district court loses control over “ the entire case.” Ante, at 1919 – 1920 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).",Party Submissions,7.5613003,8.11007,8.4676695
"Bay does not have a workers' compensation policy that protects it from suit for the negligent acts of its employee Defendant Alvarez, so it lacks standing to assert the exclusive remedies defense for his acts. 34 Bay cleverly brushes past this critical fact and instead asks the court to assume that Mann is covered by Valero's ROCIP, and that the actions of Bay, through Defendant Alvarez, are protected. This is a legal non-sequitur. Mann's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment challenged Bay's standing to raise the affirmative defense of exhaustion of remedies by producing a relevant policy to demonstrate that Bay was protected from common *23 law suit for the acts of its non-ROCIP employee who struck and injured Mann. To date, Bay has not shown that Defendant Alvarez was within the scope of people covered under Valero's ROCIP. Therefore, the trial court's decision to strike Bay's exclusive remedies defense should be affirmed.",Party Submissions,10.620838,10.698406,11.932684
"The first Dow factor considers ownership or possession of the pollutant. Midland did not own or possess the solid waste in question. See (CR 54.) Weatherford hypothesizes that such waste was generated and disposed of at off-site electronics manufacturing facilities. Brief at 7–11. Through its own petition, Weatherford places the ownership/possession in the hands of an unnamed third party. (CR 17.) If Weatherford’s allegations were true, such third party disposals would constitute illegal acts and would be in direct violation of Midland’s ordinances. Midland did not voluntarily accept such wastes, and Weatherford is unable to show that Midland had any connection whatsoever with the alleged disposal. (CR 54.) More importantly, Midland did not own the Contaminant at issue, meaning that the first prong of the Dow factors was not met. Thus, the very first element of the Dow factors fails when considering that—even under Weatherford’s set of facts—a third party, not Midland, owned or possessed the alleged pollutants.",Party Submissions,10.298887,10.160231,10.768736
"Respondents’ effort to draw support for the decision below from Kemp v. Brenham, No. 05-18-01377-CV, 2020 WL 205313 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) is also unavailing. Respondents claim that Kemp first established their position that “compliance” with the eviction order in the forcible entry and detainer action constitutes “voluntary abandonment of the premises” under all circumstances—meaning that even a tenant who offers “testimony” that it abandoned its challenge to the eviction and surrendered the premises only because of “mistreatment” from its landlord interfering with its right of possession cannot maintain a claim for constructive eviction in district court. (Resp. 16, 30) Of course, such a result would be indefensible. It would be in direct conflict with section 31.004(a) and section 24.008, and the many decisions establishing that even the tenant who loses the right to immediate possession in a forcible entry and detainer action can still contest ultimate possession and recover damages in district court. The result Respondents urge also makes no sense: A party’s right to pursue a constructive-eviction claim requires an eviction as an element of the claim. It cannot be defeated by an eviction—or by a party’s compliance with a wrongful eviction order. Otherwise, no constructive-eviction claim could ever lie. It is thus no surprise that Kemp in fact adopted no such rule.",Party Submissions,6.947544,7.4006486,7.262673
"Respondents completely ignore this passage from the court’s order on rehearing, instead emphasizing two carefully curated snippets from the main opinion—one suggesting that Westwood did not “identify any act” by Respondents as the cause “for its decision to abandon the appeal” and vacate the premises, and another noting that Westwood vacated “without qualification.” (Resp. 22 quoting Op. 5, 6) But the full context of these passages makes clear that the court of appeals was not speaking about any absence of evidence that Respondents had constructively evicted Westwood, or that Westwood had failed to complain of that constructive eviction. And no such contention could have been maintained, because the record is replete with evidence of Respondents’ acts of interference with Westwood’s right of possession that forced it to leave—and Westwood’s repeated complaints about that interference. The court was instead speaking about the contents of the agreed judgment and Westwood’s supposed failure to indicate its continued “protest” against Respondents’ harassment, which the court deemed fatal to Westwood’s claims in the district court, regardless of Westwood’s evidence of constructive eviction. ( See Pet. Br. 22) Accordingly, the passage on which Respondents rely in trying to prove the court of appeals’ opinion rested on the evidence actually proves the opposite—that it rested entirely on the purported legal effect of the agreed judgment.",Party Submissions,8.652053,9.48258,9.429806
"A second presumption arises when a conveyance from one spouse as the sole grantor in a real property deed is made to the other spouse as the grantee. In that event, there is a presumption that a gift was intended. See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975). The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that a gift was not intended in the transaction or that the conveyance was procured by fraud, accident, or mistake. Id.",Party Submissions,4.2994976,4.7184873,5.072167
In order not to have any problems with the allowed area for catching we kindly ask you to inform us about the coordinates of conservancy areas where we have not the right to catch.,Legal Decisions,27.165035,27.682966,27.904016
"HN6 [ ] Standards of Review, Abuse of Discretion The trial court's ruling on a motion to strike presents a legal question. Thus, an appellate court's review, even under the abuse of discretion mandamus standard, is de novo. Under an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court defers to the trial court's factual determinations if they are supported by evidence, but an appellate court reviews the trial court's legal determinations de novo.",Party Submissions,5.1264706,5.415519,5.172745
"Luby's will forever lose the benefit of that bargain if forced to trial and then the Commission subsequently decides Gaetjen's claim is compensable. Cf. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272–73 (Tex.1992) (holding that a party who is erroneously deprived of the benefits of an arbitration contract under the Federal Arbitration Act is without adequate remedy by appeal and entitled to mandamus relief). Such a result would nullify the very purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act. Cf. In Re Bruce Terminix Co., 41. Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 941 (June 5, 1998) (there is no adequate remedy by appeal for denial of the right to arbitration because the very purpose of arbitration is to avoid the time and expense of trial and appeal).",Party Submissions,6.3483076,7.833521,7.7683764
"Review Board possessed jurisdiction to review the agreement entered into between Oncor and the Mills County Appraisal District under Tex, Tax Code §1.111(e) or in the alternative (3) To reverse and render its determination on the Appraisal Review Board’s pleas to the jurisdiction not heard by the Third Court of Appeals., or to remand the same to the Court of Appeals.",Party Submissions,15.200879,16.316715,19.858067
"Respondents argue for the first time in their brief to this Court that the error Oncor seeks to correct is not a “clerical error” as defined in the Tax Code. See Respondents’ Brief at 18-19. This is a merits issue not properly before the Court, so the Court should not address it. But even if the Court were inclined to address this issue, Respondents are wrong.",Party Submissions,6.2630587,7.4792585,6.9650965
"Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.001(a) (2006) provides that recovery of workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy for a work-related injury of an employee covered by workers' compensation insurance. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.034 (2006) provides that, subject to certain exceptions, an employee of a workers' compensation subscriber waives the common-law right to recover damages for injuries sustained in the course and scope of employment.",Party Submissions,2.9898562,3.7783906,3.2170646
"To amend Public Law 88–657 to require greater transparency in the consider- ation of projects for the Forest Service Legacy Road and Trail Remedi-ation Program, and for other purposes.",Legislation,11.552882,12.648239,11.851303
"The requested documents are relevant and material because they will show the reasons for which JKP Gradsko-saobraćajno preduzeće ""Belgrade"" proposed to rezone for residential purposes a significantly larger land plot, owned by the City of Belgrade, which was already designated and used for traffic infrastructure, located directly across the street from Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23.",Legal Decisions,19.41814,22.855433,19.303457
"B) The Respondent’s position 401. Respondent alleges that it did not violate the applicable FET standard. First, Respondent notes that Claimant submits that the FET standard contained in the Treaty is broad and flexible, and that the dominant approach by investment tribunals has been to interpret fair and equitable treatment as an independent standard with an autonomous meaning.",Legal Decisions,11.50526,10.708162,9.375915
"The meager default interest rate on overdue royalties may be fixed at the start or fluctuate month to month, and may be computed as simple interest – the Code does not specify either. (Before that statute was adopted, this Court had approved simple interest for unpaid royalties. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480, 488 & n.8 (Tex. 1978).) The rest of Texas Natural Resources Code Sections 91.401 to 91.406 provide other default rules for royalty payments, timing, and interest on overdue royalties.",Party Submissions,8.821522,8.891147,9.043819
"Disability Benefit. In the event that a Participant becomes Disabled, he or she shall be entitled to a Disability Benefit. The Disability Benefit shall be equal to the vested portion of the Participant’s entire unpaid Account Balance for all Accounts. The payment date for the Disability Benefit shall be no later than the end of the month following the calendar month in which the Committee determined that the Participant has become Disabled, with the actual payment date determined in the sole discretion of the Committee, and the Disability Benefit shall be based on the value of the vested (and, as applicable, unpaid) portion of the Accounts as of the last day of the calendar month in which the Committee makes a determination as to the Participant’s Disability.",Contract,3.7377362,3.4715536,3.999118
"Respondent does not voluntarily produce these documents by October 26, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce them by November 27, 2023.",Legal Decisions,8.872431,11.805756,12.102904
"Again, Riverside produced whatever INAGROSA documents that it could locate and always did so to the best of the corporation’s ability.",Party Submissions,90.39583,87.16672,113.749405
"Petitioner HAKAN ALI OKSUZLER requests this Court to grant review in this case on matters that are important to the jurisprudence of the state of Texas. First, while the standard of review in family law cases is the abuse of discretion standard, clarification is needed as to the parameters of that standard and specifically whether the abuse of discretion standard includes or excludes a factual sufficiency review of the evidence.",Party Submissions,9.443156,9.353784,11.122731
"An Alabama resident injured his back while working for the employer in that state. The carrier argued that the Alabama employee's election to recover benefits under Alabama's workers' compensation laws barred the employer's recovery as the employee's subclaimant under the TWCA. The court found that because the employee recovered benefits under Alabama's workers' compensation laws, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.075(a) (2006) applied to bar him from receiving benefits under the TWCA. As the employer's claim for reimbursement was as the employee's subclaimant, once the employee was barred from receiving benefits under the TWCA, the employer was similarly barred. The employer did not prove, as a matter of law, it was entitled to receive reimbursement benefits under the TWCA as a subclaimant though the employee, its claimant, was barred. The court concluded that the trial court's decision to continue abatement of the employer's contract claims was improper and that the employer lacked an adequate remedy by appeal should abatement continue. Continued abatement unnecessarily denied the employer the opportunity to pursue its remedies against real parties for an indeterminable period of time.",Party Submissions,5.842906,5.8162913,6.101606
"According to Article 46 of the Decision on city administration (“Official Gazette of the City of Belgrade,” No. 36/2004, 1/2005 -corr., 18/2006), the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction is the authority that was responsible for the preparation of the 2013 DRP.120 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess the factors that the Secretariat took into consideration when working on the 2013 DRP —including whether it considered Obnova’s rights to its 54 premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 and if so, the Secretariat’s contemporaneous understanding of the extent of these rights.",Legal Decisions,9.38072,10.382443,9.635035
Should a claim that infants were misidentified and switched at birth be held to fall under the TMLA based upon a duty to keep accurate medical records or be treated as a simple negligence case?,Party Submissions,19.051428,26.963043,22.257647
"You acknowledge that the Company from time to time may have agreements with other persons or with the United States Government, or agencies thereof, which impose obligations or restrictions on the Company regarding inventions made during the course of work under such agreements or regarding the confidential nature of such work. You agree to be bound by all such obligations and restrictions which are made known to you and to discharge the obligations of the Company under such agreements.",Contract,6.080136,5.354652,8.316043
"Regulation no. 1836 of 19 December 2014, as amended by Regulation no. 1833 of 22 December 2015, prohibiting catches of snow crab is fully consistent with Norway’s rights, jurisdiction and obligations as a coastal State under international law. The regulation also establishes the prohibition of harvesting snow crab within 12 nautical miles for all vessels that are granted exemption to harvest.",Legal Decisions,7.6092896,6.8060446,7.6408367
"In addition, for each of the majority's concerns favoring a mandatory stay, there are countervailing considerations. The majority professes interest in “efficiency.” Ibid. But forcing district court proceedings to a halt— for months or years while the appeal runs its course—is itself inefficient. The majority also fears losing other “asserted benefits of arbitration” without a stay. Ibid. But with a stay, the party opposing arbitration loses the benefits of immediate litigation. A plaintiff's request for injunctive protection against imminent harm, for example, goes unanswered under the majority's rule. Similarly, while the majority laments settlement pressure on parties seeking arbitration, ibid., the rule it announces imposes settlement pressure in the opposite direction. With justice delayed while the case is on hold, parties “could be forced to settle,” ibid., because they do not wish—or cannot afford— to leave their claims in limbo. Incongruously, the majority inflicts these burdens on the party that won the arbitrability issue before the district court (the party opposing arbitration).",Party Submissions,9.26393,9.366104,9.354009
"This post-argument letter on behalf of the respondents is to supply additional information in answer to the Court’s questions in oral argument and matters raised by Petitioners in their post-submission letter dated October 26, 2023.",Party Submissions,10.030523,11.936455,12.67326
"The fact that Executive’s right to payments or benefits may be reduced by reason of the limitations contained in this Section 3.9 will not of itself limit or otherwise affect any other rights of Executive other than pursuant to this Agreement. In the event that any payment or benefit intended to be provided under this Agreement or otherwise is required to be reduced pursuant to this Section 3.9, the Company will effect such reduction by first reducing the lump sum cash payment related to Base Salary (a “Reduction”). In the event that, after such Reduction any payment or benefit intended to be provided under this Agreement or otherwise is still required to be reduced pursuant to this Section 3.9, the Company will effect such reduction by reducing other consideration due to Executive.",Contract,4.568376,4.492084,5.442973
The United States objects to Request No. 2.g for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a.,Legal Decisions,8.705513,13.421783,15.284476
"There is no sufficient governmental interest in prohibiting an otherwise-qualified individual from signing petitions to get multiple candidates on the ballot for the same office and election. Such a signer “express[es] the view” that both candidates “should be considered by the whole electorate”—regardless of which candidate the signer might vote for. Reed, 561 U.S. at 195. Moreover, the State lacks any sufficient interest in prohibiting a candidate from “band[ing] together” with a signer to obtain ballot access just because that individual already signed an opponent’s petition. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 586. Just as governments cannot prohibit individuals from making monetary contributions to multiple candidates for the same office and election, this holds true for the equally expressive act of petition signing. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 204-05 (2014).",Party Submissions,5.860833,5.896936,6.1787977
Respondent takes note of Claimants' agreement to conduct a search for and to produce non-privileged documents that are responsive to this request. Respondent requests Claimants to provide a privilege log as explained in Respondent’s general comments above.,Legal Decisions,10.838362,10.699582,12.767634
"Further, as explained, the Texas Legislature has mandated that lawsuits involving Texas contractors and Texas construction projects should be heard in Texas courts. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 272.001. Oklahoma has no material interest in this lawsuit, and this dispute has no relationship to Oklahoma. Finally, when applying the principle of comity, the proper remedy is abatement of the second-filed suit—not dismissal. VE Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 860 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).",Party Submissions,6.939209,6.911664,7.5905666
"Reading Walker in its entirety demonstrates that the Court of Appeals meant only that the experts failed to causally link any of the alleged breaches to H.W.’s injury (i.e., implicitly recognizing that causally linking one would be enough for the case to proceed4). In its opinion, the Court went through each departure Dr. Tappan listed, compared all of them with his and Dr. Null’s causation opinions, and then determined each of them fell short of explaining how and why Dr. Castillo’s actions in particular proximately caused H.W.’s injuries. Id. at *2-*5. So the Walkers are right. The Court of Appeals deemed each causation opinion insufficient—not because the Court required something more of their experts after Thompson, but because each of the opinions failed on their own under long-standing expert report jurisprudence (such as Wright, Scoresby, and Zamarripa).",Party Submissions,14.254958,15.313763,15.897864
"While this Court has appellate jurisdiction to evaluate the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction under Texas Government Code, Section 22.001(a), it would be imprudent to exercise such jurisdiction to grant review of a case that does not present a novel question of law. This case is a routine dismissal of a claim against a governmental entity wrongly hauled into litigation, and the Court would risk issuing an impermissible advisory opinion if it granted review and expanded the reach of Texas solid waste disposal law. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993) (stating that advisory opinions would constitute “a legislative enlargement of a court’s power”).",Party Submissions,5.9400005,5.748791,6.0341506
"Ultimately, the amici curiae seek to clarify the application of Lucas analysis in regulatory takings. Trinity II has complicated Lucas’ framework by deeming the public fully liable for property value losses that are not total, but merely reductions from the maximum potential. Given the profound implication this could have on future zoning decisions, the amici urge this court to approve the Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that before the public can be made to compensate a landowner for a regulatory taking, the Lucas standard requires the total eradication of a property’s value.",Party Submissions,14.850904,14.499314,14.391293
"This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Texas, without regard to the conflict of laws principles thereof.",Contract,2.672489,3.0882018,3.8380575
"In contrast to a tenant like the one in Kemp, a tenant who abandons a leased premise because the landlord’s harassment forces it to leave— as Westwood did here — has established the central element of a constructive-eviction claim. And it does not matter whether that decision is forced upon the tenant before, during, or after the eviction proceeding on appeal from the judgment.",Party Submissions,13.800602,13.709214,16.123272
"Petitioner, HAKAN ALI OKSUZLER submits his Petition for Review. For clarity, Petitioner, HAKAN ALI OKSUZLER will be referred to herein as “Husband”; Cross-Petitioner, LAUREN OKSUZLER will be referred to as “Wife”; and the 469TH Judicial Court of Collin County, Texas will be referred to as “trial court”. The August 17, 2020, Final Decree of Divorce will be referred to as “Order.” The Clerk’s Record and the Reporter’s Record will be referred to as “CR” and “RR” respectively.",Party Submissions,4.99105,5.253313,5.130446
"McCarthy Subcontract -15-01-12-2017 Rev. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed this Agreement, the day and year first above written, which together with the Contract Documents as defined herein represent the entire and integrated agreement between the parties hereto, supersedes all prior negotiations, representations or agreements, oral or written, and may only be amended or modified as defined in Article 4 hereof.",Party Submissions,6.982206,5.782522,7.9362183
Specified Date Benefit. Specified Date Benefit means any benefit(s) payable to a Participant under the Plan in accordance with Section 6.1(b).,Contract,6.373446,6.284412,9.323156
"For the denial of a Disability Benefit, the notice will also include a statement that the Appeals Committee will provide, upon request and free of charge: (i) any internal rule, guideline, protocol or other similar criterion relied upon in making the decision, (ii) any medical opinion relied upon to make the decision, and (iii) the required statement under Section 2560.503- l (j)(5)(iii) of the Department of Labor regulations.",Contract,6.323806,7.8962927,7.466354
"In Echols v. Austron, Inc., 529 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1975), writ refused n.r.e., a bonus paid to a spouse shortly after divorce was held to be his separate property. Although the court did not explain its reasoning, it appears that the fact that the bonus was not received during marriage was of controlling significance. Note, however, that the Texas Supreme Court later abandoned the requirement that the right to receive property after divorce had to vest before the right became divisible upon divorce [Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976)].",Party Submissions,6.2184434,5.939579,6.234036
"Security for Costs, based on Riverside’s lack of liquid assets8, is unfounded given the high value of Riverside’s investments in Nicaragua, currently under Nicaraguan control. Nicaragua already holds assets exceeding the $4 million security for costs it seeks, rendering the risk of nonpayment of an adverse cost award against Riverside negligible.",Party Submissions,14.972303,15.112008,19.433565
"To amend the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act to authorize the use of Commodity Credit Corporation funds for emergency assistance to dairy producers in the case of livestock relocation and feed crop losses due to natural disasters, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.138865,4.1771264,5.0688024
"As to the second ground, Respondent further notes that Claimants fail to explain why this exercise would be unreasonably burdensome aside from their speculative claim that this might encompass ""hundreds"" of communications with ""Claimants' legal or other advisors"". In other words, it could happen that there are only several documents corresponding to Respondent's requests.",Legal Decisions,14.759849,15.416593,17.37101
"But, even assuming Dr. Null’s qualifications are sufficient, the Amarillo Court properly dismissed the Walkers’ claims because, between Dr. Null’s conclusory opinion about causation (that never even mentions Dr. Castillo) and the fact that Dr. Tappan’s opinions were deficient for the reasons argued, the Amarillo Court properly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Dr. Castillo’s motion to dismiss. The two expert reports, even when read together, fail to represent an objective good-faith effort to “summarize the causal relationship between [Dr. Castillo’s] failure to meet the applicable standards of care and [H.W.’s] injury.” Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ opinion and judgment should be affirmed.",Party Submissions,7.796785,8.716696,8.982354
"Before the Court are two original proceedings arising from related lawsuits—each filed in a Travis County district court—resulting from a workplace injury that led to the death of 20-year-old Pedro Jovany ""Bruno"" Martinez. In cause No. 03-21-00182-CV, alleged employer Hellas Construction, Inc., seeks mandamus [*2] relief from the district court's order lifting the abatement of a tort suit brought by Bruno's family (Martinez Family) against Hellas. Real parties in interest are the Martinez Family and T.F. Harper & Associates, L.P., the general contractor allegedly responsible for the construction site. In cause No. 03-21-00233-CV, the Martinez Family seeks mandamus relief from the district court's order overruling its plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of its own suit for judicial review of a final order from the Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers Compensation (DWC). Real party in interest in the latter cause is Texas Mutual, which provides Hellas's workers' compensation policy. For the reasons that follow, we will grant the relief sought by Hellas and deny the relief sought by the Martinez Family.",Party Submissions,4.8156652,5.0157247,4.9164424
"R.007. Accordingly, a soil study was made a prerequisite to the ability of the contractor to prepare a fixed price for this work. R.744, R.453.",Party Submissions,21.46566,23.932352,25.795727
"Respondents’ effort to minimize the adverse consequences for tenants flowing from the court of appeals’ ruling— which the court itself entirely ignored — is likewise unavailing. If the law is as Respondents say it is, and any effort by a tenant to comply with an eviction order by departing the premises conclusively demonstrates “voluntary abandonment” of every right the tenant ever had to claim damages for wrongful eviction or breach of contract, then tenants must waste time, expend resources, and risk sanctions pursuing appeals from justice court which they know will likely to be fruitless simply to preserve their ability to maintain a claim in district court. ( See Pet. Br. 23-24) The law should not require such futile and wasteful acts.",Party Submissions,10.779495,10.461701,11.650007
"The timeline of Khanoyan is itself instructive. This Court wrote on January 6, 2022 that “no amount of expedited briefing of judicial expediency at this point can change the fact that the primary election for 2022 is already in its early stages.” In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 766. That election “began” with the candidate filing period, and the Court noted that “[b]allots must be finalized very soon to comply with deadlines for mailing ballots to military and overseas voters.” Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded that “any relief that we theoretically could provide here would necessarily disrupt the ongoing election process.” Id.",Party Submissions,9.419805,9.625185,9.73195
"This Court has held that “the candidate’s own fault is a consideration when weighing the right to equitable relief,” though “mistakes” are “not an absolute bar” to relief. In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d 313, 318 (Tex. 2002). Justice Devine is not at fault. He acted in good faith that signers would follow instructions and that Chairman Rinaldi would inform him if his signatures were defective. See Tex. Elec. Code §141.032(e). Neither happened. It would be inequitable to block Justice Devine from the primary ballot on these facts.",Party Submissions,8.952038,8.989563,9.657594
"Luxury Travel Source v. American Airlines, Inc., 276 SW3d 154 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth, 2008, no writ) holds that: Even if a nonresident corporate officer's acts were undertaken in a corporate capacity, that officer may still be subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum if those actions were tortious or fraudulent and if the tortious or fraudulent actions satisfy the three Michiana minimum contacts factors: (1) only the defendant's contacts with the forum count; (2) the acts relied on must be purposeful rather than merely fortuitous; and (3) the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing itself of the forum.11 Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785, 788-89; Niehaus v. Cedar Bridge, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, no pet.); SITQ, 111 S.W.3d at 651. At 166. This is exactly the situation with regard to Marsenison. The allegations are that Marsenison’s actions were tortious and fraudulent, and clearly satisfy the three Michiana contacts factors. This case involves negligence and breach of warranty actions against out of state Defendants where the issue is personal jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,6.3159266,6.242671,6.733275
"Requiring an explanation to causally connect those earlier departures with H.W.’s ultimate injury was not novel. See Providence Health Ctr. v. Dowell, 262 S.W.3d 324, 329-30 (Tex. 2008) (defendants’ negligence too attenuated from suicide to have been a substantial factor), and Shenoy v. Jean, No. 01-10-01116-CV, 2011 WL 6938538 at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], Dec. 29, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“A causal link can be too attenuated to satisfy the causation requirement for an expert report.”). Contrary to the Walkers’ claim (Pet. Br. at 28-30), the Amarillo Court did not bemoan the lack of evidence about earlier departures. It simply recognized that neither expert—faced with Dr. Tappan’s statements that those acts were departures from the standard of care—explained how and why those alleged breaches were causally connected to H.W.’s stroke or asphyxia some six or more hours later. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *4.",Party Submissions,6.9513674,7.1746697,7.1345177
"On January 29, 2003-- more than sixty days after receiving notice-- Service Lloyds disputed Bestor's claim on the ground that his condition was preexisting. Bestor prevailed in a contested administrative hearing and in Service Lloyds's administrative appeal based in part on a ruling that Service Lloyds did not contest the compensability of Bestor's injury within sixty days and thus waived its right to contest compensability. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 409.021(c) (Vernon 2006). During the administrative process, Bestor's attorney was awarded and was paid attorney's fees in the amount of $ 11,868.02, but those payments were paid directly to Bestor's attorney out of Bestor's [**2] benefits, i.e ., by deducting them from Bestor's recovery. See id. § 408.221(b) (""Except as provided by Subsection (c) or Section 408.147(c), the attorney's fee shall be paid from the claimant's recovery.""); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1995) .",Party Submissions,5.196026,4.9495287,5.4346495
"An administrative declaration of ineligibility is governed by Section 145.003 of the Election Code, which provides that a candidate may be declared ineligible only if: (1) the information on the candidate’s application for place on the ballot indicates that the candidate is ineligible for the office; (2) facts indicating that the candidate is ineligible are conclusively established by another public record; or (3) the candidate fails to pay the filing fee or submit a petition in lieu of a filing fee.",Party Submissions,4.3594747,4.2045455,4.499797
"Beyond the immediate barriers to access, this absence of a cost cap ushers in a chilling effect on potential claimants. Many, even those armed with robust claims, may find themselves deterred from seeking rightful relief, weighed down by the risk of exorbitant, uncontrollable costs. This goes beyond individual hesitance — it chips away at the very integrity of the contract. When one party operates with the knowledge that the other is effectively deterred from seeking redress, accountability is undermined.",Party Submissions,12.1219,12.796726,13.373235
"According to ACOG Obstetric Care Consensus No. 1, the most common indication for primary cesarean delivery is labor dystocia. Non-reassuring fetal tracing is the second most common indication and requires assessment and prompt treatment to avoid fetal hypoxia and acidosis. Dr. Castillo failed to recognize that recurrent decelerations, minimal variability, and absent accelerations, suggest that the baby would likely be acidotic and therefore would be at risk for hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy. In the absence of accelerations of the fetal heart rate, defined in a fetus at or after 32-weeks gestation as an increase in the FHR of at least 15 beats above baseline and lasting for at least 15 seconds, ACOG recommends eliciting accelerations by fetal scalp or vibroacoustic stimulation. Dr. Castillo also failed, not only to attempt to elicit accelerations but to pursue an expedited delivery after making the decision for a cesarean section at 15:52. As a result of the leisurely preparation for surgery, the operation did not begin until 16:56, during which 64 minutes the FHR baseline was tachycardic (165 bpm), the variability was minimal, accelerations were absent, and there were recurrent decelerations, all signs consistent of ongoing fetal hypoxia and acidemia. App. 7, CR 670; App. 5, CR 217 (defining hypoxia as decreased oxygen in tissue and metabolic acidosis acidemia as the increase in lactic acid in the blood that results from hypoxia).",Party Submissions,5.9733987,6.279669,6.125902
"But Thompson did not address—much less alter—the well-established standards for evaluating the sufficiency of preliminary expert reports that this Court affirmed only one week before Thompson issued. See E.D. by & through B.O. v. Tex. Health Care, P.L.L.C., 644 S.W.3d 660, 664 (Tex. 2022).",Party Submissions,7.599675,7.9696965,9.350042
"For column 22: Indicate the outbreak notifications of the year when the survey took place. The outbreak notification number does not need to be included when the competent authority has decided that the finding is one of the cases referred to in Article 14(2), Article 15(2) or Article 16 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031. In this case, indicate the reason for not providing this information in column 25 (‘Comments’).",Legislation,9.069807,8.549337,9.595634
"A breach of contract without more is not a tort. As this Court first explained almost 40 years ago in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.1986), and reiterated in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. DeLanney: Tort obligations are in general obligations that are imposed by law—apart from and independent of promises made and therefore apart from the manifested intention of the parties—to avoid injury to others.",Party Submissions,7.529107,7.824365,8.387351
"Rather than address this argument head on, Barina inaptly invokes D. Mag. Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal,2 a case involving a mislabeled column about a Dallas socialite. This characterization, however, undercuts rather than supports the court of appeals’ decision. Rosenthal was a defamation-by-gist case about an article that focused solely on, and made critical statements only about, the plaintiff. But here, the Program is not about Barina and does not make statements only about Barina. It is about guardianship abuse in general, and this Court has consistently cautioned that simply placing a plaintiff in the context of a larger dispute does not mean all of the statements about that larger controversy are defamatory of the plaintiff. It is precisely because this case is not like Rosenthal that this Court’s review is warranted.",Party Submissions,11.168336,11.095713,11.807991
"Foreclosure by another lienholder cannot have acted automatically as acceleration of the Note or began accrual of Respondent’s rights to enforce the Note. “A claim generally accrues when facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy.” Sowell, 416 S.W.3d at 598. But foreclosure by another lienholder is not ipso facto an authorization for all lienholders to seek a judicial remedy. If Petitioner had remained current on all of her obligations under the Note throughout the for eclosure by the senior lienholder, Petitioner’s interpretation would nonetheless have required the holder of the Note to sue within two years – and potentially litigate the fair market value of the Property even though it had not carried, sold, or benefited from it.",Party Submissions,11.049442,10.583758,11.49428
"Respondents insist that Oncor is attempting to avoid a binding agreement, upon which the District purportedly has relied to its detriment. See Respondents’ Brief at 4-5 & 28-30. But again, Oncor does not seek to undermine or change the agreement the parties made to settle Sharyland’s protests of the subjective market valuation of all of its transmission lines. Oncor seeks to enforce that agreement by correcting a clerical error that the parties did not know about or address when they executed the 2019 settlement. See also Oncor’s Brief at 40-42.",Party Submissions,8.88208,10.090779,10.366789
Weatherford’s argument is based on the single premise that the SWDA’s domestic sewage exclusion was misapplied by the Court of Appeals.,Party Submissions,17.42109,18.565561,21.938326
Rafiei acknowledges that he relies upon the affidavit of David Joeckel to show that arbitration is disproportionately expensive when compared with litigation. Brief at 28. But there are a number of reasons the Joeckel affidavit does not support that assertion.,Party Submissions,8.98097,11.749876,12.983227
"The common practice of staying district court proceedings during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal taken under § 16(a) reflects common sense. If the district court could move forward with pre-trial and trial proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongoing, then many of the asserted benefits of arbitration (efficiency, less expense, less intrusive discovery, and the like) would be irretrievably lost—even if the court of appeals later concluded that the case actually had belonged in arbitration all along. Absent a stay, parties also could be forced to settle to avoid the district court proceedings (including discovery and trial) that they contracted to avoid through arbitration. The Griggs rule avoids these detrimental results.",Party Submissions,9.224296,9.225664,9.990809
"AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO CREDIT AND GUARANTY AGREEMENT, dated as of November 20, 2018 (this “Amendment”), to that certain Credit and Guaranty Agreement, dated as of October 31, 2018 (as amended, modified, restated or supplemented from time to time in accordance with its terms, the “Credit Agreement”), among United Rentals (North America), Inc. (the “Borrower”), United Rentals, Inc. and certain of its subsidiaries as the Guarantors party thereto, the financial institutions party thereto from time to time (the “Lenders”), Bank of America, N.A., as agent for the Lenders (in such capacity, together with any successor in such capacity, the “Agent”), and the other parties thereto.",Contract,2.121805,1.9917023,2.1317785
"As explained above, the requested documents will show: ( i ) whether Serbia intended to place the bus loop at Obnova’s premises from the very beginning of the process of the 2013 DRP’s preparation; and ( ii ) whether either the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction or the Public Urban Planning Company “Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade” had considered Obnova’s right s to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP and, if so, what was their contemporaneous understanding of these rights. The requested documents are therefore relevant and material for two issues in this case. First, they are relevant and material to assess whether the decision to put the bus loop on Obnova’s premises was unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory and in line with the principle of proportionality. Second, they are relevant and material to assess whether Ser bia’s contemporaneous view on Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 was consistent with the position that Serbia takes in this arbitration — i.e. that Obnova does not have any rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23.222 The requested documents are not unreasonably burdensome to produce The letters listed in the request represent all letters exchanged between the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction and the Public Urban Planning Company “Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade” that are mentioned in the 2013 DRP documentation available to Claimants. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that if there are any additional responsive documents, their number should be limited.",Legal Decisions,5.589926,5.7872267,5.742634
"Third, Rafiei’s calculation of a $6,000 limit for “fees and expenses up front” does not make any sense. His affidavit indicates that he makes $20,000 a month, or $240,000 a year. CR115, ¶1. He specifically indicates that his disposable income after expenses is $6,000 a month, which is $72,000 a year. Id. at ¶ 2.",Party Submissions,6.653846,7.749754,7.546045
"Petitioners only lose the protection of the fair-report privilege if the Program leaves Barina in a “worse light than the proceedings themselves.” KBMT, 492 S.W.3d at 716. Because the Program does not, the privilege applies. The Court should grant review to address this important issue.",Party Submissions,19.150629,19.846342,21.244713
Nutrition Act of 1966 to prohibit the use of cell-cultivated meat under the school lunch program and the school breakfast program.,Legislation,10.617097,8.777073,12.047289
"When the Court considered whether a breach of an implied warranty, under the UCC article 2, violated an applicable legal standard, the Court again noted that the nature of an implied warranty is a tort. See JCW Elecs., Inc. v. Garza, 257 S.W.3d 701, 705 (Tex. 2008).",Party Submissions,7.69647,7.103601,8.732551
"In response to Question No. 4, the jury found Steven Terry liable for $6 million in exemplary damages and Newsom, Terry & Newsom, L.L.P. liable for $1 million in exemplary damages. The issue of attorney's fees damages arising from the property owners’ post-judgment collection efforts and the bankruptcy proceedings against HSM was presented to the trial court for resolution. The court signed a final judgment awarding HSM “$15,395,910.20 (representing $14,303,316.50 in actual damages, plus prejudgment interest of $3,444,575.25, both having been appropriately reduced by a settlement credit of $6,000,000), plus additional prejudgment interest at the rate of $1,635.60 per day from December 20, 2019, until the day before this judgment was signed, [ ] $6,000,000 in exemplary damages against Defendant Steven K. Terry, and [ ] $1,000,000 in exemplary damages against Defendant Newsom, Terry & Newsom.” Terry timely brought this appeal.",Party Submissions,6.106632,6.0433035,6.357358
"Flaven’s only “duty” to the BNC Sellers was a contractual one, which the BNC Sellers argued in the underlying trial, cannot form the basis of an RTP designation. See 17RR740–45. Although the BNC 30 Sellers’ trial counsel in the underlying trial took a different position in the malpractice trial, HSMiller (who relied on testimony from the BNC Sellers’ former trial counsel) has pointed to no evidence or legal authority to support the position change, i.e., that the Flaven RTP designation would ever have been granted, no matter when it was filed.",Party Submissions,17.621267,16.329466,20.166586
"For the reasons stated herein, we deny the Martinez Family's petition for writ of mandamus but conclude that Hellas has met its burden to establish its right to mandamus relief. We therefore grant a conditional writ ordering the district court presiding over the tort suit (Travis County No. D-1-GN-19-004416) to abate the litigation until there is a final decision in the suit for judicial review of the DWC's final order. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(c). The writ will issue only if the trial court [*23] fails to comply.",Party Submissions,6.1076374,6.450455,7.2662725
"Mesquite Logistics ultimately filed a motion to dismiss Berrelez's suit based on the *72 exclusive remedy provision of the Act and Berrelez's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies thereunder. Berrelez responded, arguing her claims were “excepted” from the Act pursuant to section 406.032(1) (C), which provides an insurance carrier is not liable for compensation if the employee's injuries were the result of an act of a third person who intended to injure the employee for personal reasons that were not directed at the employee as an employee or because of her employment. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.032(1)(C) (West 2015). This exception is commonly referred to as the “personal animosity” exception. See, e.g., Walls Reg'l Hosp. v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805, 806–07 (Tex. 1999); Nasser v. Sec. Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Tex. 1987).",Party Submissions,4.6125455,4.7141094,4.867735
"Any and all documents representing “ the basic report of the Republic Geodetic Authority No. 952-297/03 of April 9, 2003 ” as referred to on page 1 of the Additional Report Regarding the Registration of Enterprise in Real Estate Cadaster prepared by the Republic Geodetic Institute of Serbia on 20 May 2003 (exhibit R-130) According to exhibit R-130, the requested documents show “immovables” owned or used by Obnova in April 2003. The requested documents are therefore relevant and material to establish what was Serbia’s and Obnova’s contemporaneous understanding of Obnova’s rights to i ts premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23.",Legal Decisions,12.604605,12.646382,12.7532015
"The Tribunal’s analysis 586. Article 40(1) does not impose on the Tribunal the obligation to apply the principle by which arbitration costs are “borne by the unsuccessful party,” but instead states that the Tribunal may deviate from this rule at its discretion if it determines that a different apportionment is reasonable “taking into account the circumstances of the case.” As for the costs of legal representation and assistance, Article 40(2) grants the Tribunal broad discretion to apportion such costs in a reasonable manner taking into account the circumstances of the case.",Legal Decisions,6.268173,5.630733,6.256427
"The Walkers’ experts’ reports were insufficient to meet their burden under section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code for all reasons identified in Baptist St. Anthony’s Brief on the Merits. Issue No. 2: The Walkers’ experts’ reports failed to “explain, to a reasonable degree, how and why [Dr. Castillo’s claimed] breach caused [H.W.’s] injury based on the facts presented.” Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 539-40 (Tex. 2010). They were, therefore, insufficient to satisfy the Walkers’ burden under section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.",Party Submissions,6.0520377,6.1558084,7.045227
"F. ... If it is determined [by audit] that royalty owner has not been correctly paid all sums owed him, then Lessee shall reimburse the requesting royalty owner for all costs and expenses incurred by Lessor for such audit, together with all unpaid revenues, late charges, and interest thereon.",Party Submissions,13.892136,13.196001,15.230511
"Most of the time when a lawyer is accused of gross negligence in rendering professional services, he has either missed a limitations deadline so that the claim is entirely barred, or he has some personal interest in making the decision he made. There is neither here. This was a reasonable judgment call (an issue the courts are in a much better position to decide than a jury, given the legal complexities of the decision). Terry was not looking out for his own interest in making these strategic decisions.",Party Submissions,13.793865,14.315336,15.034928
"Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to grandfathering, continuation, or otherwise carrying forward obligations contained in NAFTA Chapter 11 by November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain Canada’s and Mexico’s consent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to grandfathering, continuation, or otherwise carrying forward obligations contained in NAFTA Chapter 11.",Legal Decisions,5.7760315,6.2152467,6.161199
The Lawyers’ third excuse is that Terry allegedly made a good- faith judgment call not to designate Flaven. Lawyers’ Brief at 76-77.,Party Submissions,41.596066,41.581013,48.755753
"Samson needs to substitute terms to support its erroneous interpretation. The leases distinguish between Late Charges and “interest.” They refer to Late Charges in only two places: arts. XVII.C and XVII.F (the audit provision). If an audit determines a royalty owner “has not been correctly paid all sums owed him,” the audit provision requires the Lessee to reimburse that owner for all costs and expenses of the audit, plus “all unpaid revenues, late charges, and interest thereon.” The leases thus distinguish and separate “late charges” and “interest.” Contracting parties are presumed to intend different things when they use different language in different parts of a contract. used different words. See Sundown Energy LP v. HJSA No. 3, Ltd. P’ship, 622 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. 2021). “Late Charges” are triggered by past due royalties and compensatory royalties. Art. XVII.C. Such royalties include the usual reserved royalties on production subject to the lease (art. III), compensatory royalties on production not subject to the lease (art. VI.B), as well as shut-in royalties (art. III.B.5) and minimum royalties (art. V.H). “Interest” would be due on payments other than royalty, such as delay rentals (art. IV), force majeure payments (art. XIII), 25% of take-or-pay payments (art. XVII.J), and 25% of contractual modification benefits (art. XVII.J).",Party Submissions,8.017886,7.790919,8.342921
By: _________________________ Eric C. Opiela State Bar No. 24039095 eopiela@ericopiela.com I hereby certify that I have reviewed the above Reply Brief and have concluded that every factual statement in the said petition is supported by competent evidence included in the appendix or record. I further certify that the documents contained in the appendix are true and correct copies of those documents in the possession of Relator.,Party Submissions,6.2611465,8.137688,8.571839
What is the legal situation under Clause 11 of the Investment Agreement specifically in relation to Claimant’s La Rosita lot and the alleged requirement to obtain a CUSTF (Authorisation for Soil-Use Change in Forested Terrains / Autorización de Cambio de Uso del Suelo en Terrenos Forestales)?,Party Submissions,15.255747,17.525333,16.7157
"That standard has been met here. Contrary to Yellowfin’s assertion, see Resp. Br. 19-21, this case involves not a simple delay in enforcement but rather an intentional failure by the holders of the junior indebtedness to contact Santos or inform her whether any balance was still outstanding after foreclosure.",Party Submissions,18.538567,20.227926,26.029758
"Taub v. Aquila Southwest Pipeline Corp., 93 S.W.3d 451, 456 n. 8 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (6th ed.1990)).",Party Submissions,3.4373336,4.111869,4.1107054
"The guaranty also contained a termination clause that provided: that any and all obligations of the Guarantor under this Guaranty shall terminate upon the construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation of that certain building generally located at 1111 Rusk Street in Houston, Texas.",Party Submissions,8.335047,9.626923,10.094163
"E : As stated in Respondent’s Counter-Memorial, the case file for this decision does not exist as this is a draft decision.192 In fact, this draft concerns the same case file from Claimant’s request no. 32.",Legal Decisions,30.087784,24.96453,26.653687
"Despite that Mann has very little to no memory of the pedestrian-vehicle accident itself, there is no conclusive evidence that he was in the course and scope of employment as claimed by Bay. Thus, it is a bona fide fact question for the jury to decide if Bay has standing to assert the defense at all.",Party Submissions,16.56973,17.830088,19.916313
"Nor can Respondents reframe the court of appeals’ decision as the mere enforcement of a “voluntary agreement” by which Westwood abandoned its ultimate right to possess the premises or gave up its claims in district court (Resp. 21-22, 33)—because Westwood did no such thing. Respondents place great weight on the fact that Westwood did not merely dismiss its appeal in the forcible entry and detainer action, but further “affirmatively agree[d]” to the agreed judgment (Resp. 16). To Respondents, this makes the dismissal effective as a “Rule 11 agreement” ( id. 21, 28). They also insist that this supposed “agree[ment]” in the agreed judgment is far more critical to understanding the lower court’s decision of the court below than the agreed judgment’s legal effect as a “judgment.” (Resp. 20) But Westwood’s previous counsel agreed to that judgment only “AS TO FORM.” (DX43) And Respondents have taken inconsistent positions on whether this “Rule 11 agreement” actually exists (Resp. 33) and what it is supposed to do.",Party Submissions,10.381674,10.444229,10.607753
"The time crunch is Relator’s fault. According to Relator’s evidence, Justice Devine’s petition was filed on November 14. Exs.A,C. At that time, Relator was the only individual who could have possibly known about these alleged defects. Yet he waited until December 27, 2023, to bring his administrative challenge to Chairman Rinaldi. Ex.A. Even then, his letter invoked no urgency. Ex.A. Only on January 5, 2024 (the same day Relator filed this lawsuit in this Court), did he follow-up with Rinaldi, demanding action “within the next hour.” Ex.D. Relator cannot demand this Court work on an emergency schedule and remove Justice Devine from the ballot when he waited 52 days to file this mandamus petition.",Party Submissions,9.461176,10.50596,10.4466095
"This Court has appellate jurisdiction to evaluate the Court of Appeals’ decision if the appeal presents a question of law important to the jurisprudence of the state. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.001(a). However, it would be imprudent to exercise such jurisdiction to grant review of a case that does not present a novel question of law, particularly where, as is the case here, governmental immunity is waived for a payment-for-services contract. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152. Further, contrary to Ames’s contention, there is no conflict between the courts of appeals on any issue of law meriting review, as Ames simply contends that the Court of Appeals reached an unfavorable conclusion in the underlying case (the underlying Contract is a payment-for-services agreement for which immunity was waived), and other courts — reviewing different contracts with different terms — have reviewed those different contracts and decided in some cases immunity was not waived.",Party Submissions,7.0081005,7.378702,7.0392485
"Foremost, Oncor ignores the express language of section 1.111(e)(2) which makes such agreements final with regard to any matter “which may be corrected under § 25.25.” The statute is not specific to section 25.25(c-1) or (d), it simply refers to section 25.25, which presumably encompasses all sub-sections of section 25.25. And, of course, cases such as Houston Cement have held that section 25.25(c) motions are precluded by a section 1.111(e) agreement.",Party Submissions,8.649461,9.018712,9.49421
"WHEREAS, the Parties desire to enter into this Agreement for the purpose of establishing the terms and conditions of RSUs (as defined below) that have been granted to the Participant.",Contract,5.372641,5.013163,6.8888307
"There are no disputed facts in this case. At this point, there is no dispute that (1) when Cochran received the Alabama judgment on July 13, 2001, for purposes of section 406.075, he ""elected"" to recover benefits under Alabama's workers' compensation laws; 11 (2) Cochran did in fact receive benefits under Alabama's laws; (3) Sonic filed its claim for reimbursement under the TWCA on July 17, 2001; and (4) [*476] Sonic sought reimbursement as Cochran's subclaimant. In light of these undisputed [**15] circumstances, the question before us in this appeal is a narrow one: if a claimant is barred from recovering benefits under the TWCA due to his election to pursue and recover benefits under the laws of another state, is that claimant's subclaimant barred from receiving reimbursement under section 409.009 after the claimant's ""election"" has occurred?",Party Submissions,5.923515,6.0782986,6.008611
"In any case, the Court of Appeals’ decisions cited by Yellowfin do not warrant any respect as to the issues here. One case cited by Yellowfin does not address the statute of limitations issue at all. See Washington v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., 2022 WL 16646409, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). The other two decisions, Smith v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., 2023 WL 2596070 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 22, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.), and Thompson v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., 2023 WL 17492 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 3, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.), rely largely on Santos— the decision under review — which says nothing about whether that decision is correct.",Party Submissions,4.2477937,4.392364,4.600907
"To amend title 31, United States Code, to provide for a joint meeting of the Congress to receive a presentation from the Comptroller General of the United States regarding the audited financial statement of the executive branch, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.5078826,3.4335253,4.556135
"This case presents a similar pattern. While the nurses are accused of not gathering or reporting additional data, there is no indication that the outcome would have been any different if they had. There is no explanation of what Dr. Castillo (or anyone else) would have done differently if the additional data was obtained and reported. Further, Dr. Castillo was aware of the clinical presentation, including the fetal heart rate, and was at the bedside for the majority (if not all) of the critical time periods. (CR.789-90) Nowhere in the reports is there an indication that the nurses could have done anything in contradiction to Dr. Castillo’s orders, or that they could have administered or discontinued medication when Dr. Castillo was aware of the clinical presentation and in the room and giving orders to them. As in Zamarripa, there is no causal link between the alleged nursing failures and the ultimate harm. See also Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Davidson, No. 14-15-00643-CV, 2016 WL 2935715, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (report insufficient when showed physicians were aware of clinical findings and now showing additional communications with physician would have made a difference); Hollingsworth, 353 S.W.3d at 523 (expert failed to explain what actions would have resulted from initiation of chain of command, rendering report insufficient). Courts cannot create missing explanations. See Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 461. The Amarillo Court was correct to recognize and apply this truism.",Party Submissions,7.1014986,6.748719,7.6947837
"Death Benefit. In the event of the Participant’s death, his or her designated Beneficiary(ies) shall be entitled to a Death Benefit as set forth in Section 6.1(c). The Death Benefit shall be equal to the vested portion of the Participant’s unpaid vested Account Balances and shall be payable in a single lump sum.",Contract,3.720348,3.3275297,4.0191264
"Devine disingenuously cites to John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 191 (2010) for a jumbled assertion that signers “’express the view”’ that the candidate ‘”should be considered by the whole electorate’” – even ‘”if the signer is agnostic’” as to whether that candidate should be elected” Id. at 195. However, that case has absolutely nothing to do with a situation where an individual is restricted to signing a candidate ballot petition for only one candidate. Notably, every single case cited by Devine relates to matters other than ballot application petition signatures. Reed, 561 U.S. at 191 (concerning “whether disclosure of referendum petitions in general [violates the First Amendment]); Clingman, 544 U.S. 581 (upholding semi-closed primary system); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (federal campaign finance regulation; Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (upholding prohibition against appearing twice on a ballot); Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, Sw., & Texoma Regions, 610 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. 2020) (upholding governor’s mail ballot order during pandemic); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)(upholding write-in restrictions).",Party Submissions,5.7338367,5.7338963,5.9861484
Misstatements of the law. But these repeated phrases also did something more harmful by misleading and confusing the jury and misstating the court’s obligation to strike an RTP if no evidence has been produced for its responsibility.,Party Submissions,55.61448,39.969467,59.587776
"MVP appears to rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id. at 52 (citing, e.g., In re Longoria, 470 S.W.3d 616, 625 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding)). MVP does not explain what aspect of equitable estoppel it asserts, but this Court has not recognized the “concerted-misconduct doctrine” in the forum-selection clause context. Pinto Tech., 526 S.W.3d at 446. And as to “direct benefits” estoppel, in the arbitration context, this Court has concluded it is not enough that a party’s claim “relates to” a contract containing an arbitration agreement. G.T. Leach Builders, 458 S.W.3d at 527 (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 741 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)). “Instead, the party must seek ‘to deprive a direct benefit’—that is, a benefit that ‘stems directly’—from that contract.” Id. (quoting Kellogg Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d at 741).",Party Submissions,4.5807924,4.9018035,4.7091975
"This letter contains certain objections to the Report on the Strategic Environmental Assessment of the 2013 DRP. The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the Secretariat for Environmental Protection considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP, and if so, what was its contemporaneous understanding of these rights.",Legal Decisions,17.441835,17.356758,18.328842
"The Klorer-Reed owners argued their facts differed enough from Hooks to overcome Samson’s ratification defense, but ultimately lost that argument. See T.S. Reed, 521 S.W.3d at 38. But Samson contended that they could not even oppose Samson on the merits due to whatever Hooks had held. According to Samson, Hooks supplied the “law of the case” for the other owners in the original Klorer case. In its later appeal to this Court, Samson’s oral argument exhibits reflected that “law of the case” argument it had started making in the trial court: Tab 11 in Samson’s Oral Argument Exhibits in Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Properties, Inc., 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017), Case No. 15-0886, located at: https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=841dac28-f4d9-476b-8945-f9d5b916c7d5&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=c5cd9329-01f3- 4033-acb9-9f37288e1961.",Party Submissions,11.699096,9.794521,11.796212
"This RESTRICTED STOCK UNIT AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”) is made as of the Date of Grant set forth above by and between UNITED RENTALS, INC., a Delaware corporation, having an office at 100 First Stamford Place, Suite 700 Stamford, CT 06902 (the “Company”), and Awardee (together with the Company, the “Parties”), currently an employee of the Company or an affiliate of the Company.",Contract,2.9631987,3.0403998,3.0111048
"As MVP seems to concede, MVP’s Brief at 28, MVP was required to “(1) establish the existence of a valid [forum-selection] agreement; and (2) show that the claims asserted are within the scope of the agreement.” Ridge Nat. Res., L.L.C. v. Double Eagle Royalty, L.P ., 564 S.W.3d 105, 117 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); see also In re Harris Corp., No. 03-13-00192-CV, 2013 WL 2631700, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 4, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); Geo-Tech Found. Repair v. Leggett, No. 02-16-00289-CV, 2017 WL 1173840, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 30, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, it was MVP’s initial burden to establish both that RLB was bound by and that RLB’s claims fall within the scope of MCC paragraph 47.7 containing the forum-selection/choice-of-law and “waiver” provisions. Although forum-selection clauses may be presumed valid and enforceable, this presumption does not relieve MVP of its initial burden.",Party Submissions,4.2305036,4.677586,4.443434
"Beginning with Sonic's argument that it is entitled to reimbursement under section 409.009 because the voluntary payments were made prior to Cochran's election to recover benefits under Alabama's laws, although Sonic's payments preceded the Alabama judgment, this does not necessitate the conclusion that Sonic is therefore entitled to seek benefits under the TWCA after Cochran was barred from receiving [*478] benefits. 16 Under section 406.075, Cochran was barred from recovering benefits under the TWCA when Sonic pursued reimbursement under section 409.009 as Cochran's subclaimant.",Party Submissions,9.258673,9.397491,10.247473
"Allowing parties to avoid their accrued breaches of contract through delay is the antithesis of Texas lending law. Indeed, the Opinion directly conflicts with the Austin Court of Appeals’ decision in Person v. MC-Simpsonville, SC-1-UT, LLC, No. 03-20-00560-CV, 2021 WL 3816332 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 27, 2021, no pet.), upholding the principle that a prior breach is enforceable notwithstanding subsequent attempt to trigger sunset termination. A tenant defaulted on its lease obligations and the landlord sued the tenant and guarantor. Id. at *2. As here, the guaranty agreement provided that the guarantor’s obligations would “be immediately due and payable. .. immediately upon the occurrence of a default under the Lease.” Id. at *3. In this case, the termination clause was arguably triggered during the litigation, and the Opinion assumed arguendo that the guaranty terminated. Id. at *2.",Party Submissions,6.678836,6.9878273,7.210388
Article 4 Italy shall carry out administrative and on-the-spot checks in accordance with Articles 59 and 60 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( ).,Legislation,6.249851,6.206704,7.634445
"As with a person who chooses not to wear a seatbelt and then is injured in an accident, or a person who ingests illegal substances and then dies, HSMiller’s negligent decisions also should have been considered when the malpractice jury was deciding who contributed to causing the underlying judgment against it. See Nabors, 456 S.W.3d at 559-64 (holding that plaintiff’s fault in increasing their damages by not wearing seat belts must be submitted in the liability and apportionment questions); Arrendondo, 408 S.W.3d at 830-32 (holding that deceased’s own comparative negligence in ingesting illegal drugs should be submitted to jury).",Party Submissions,8.454894,8.329508,8.955867
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session, the 1st C.S. and the 2nd C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the 2023 ballot proposition contingencies to date.",Party Submissions,8.685042,7.9217057,8.740299
"Petitioner claims the appellate court “mischaracterized” its own standard of review to justify its request for rehearing, and created a split in authority on how to determine motions to compel arbitration when two contracts are at issue.",Party Submissions,13.673474,12.924476,12.519939
"A parent-child relationship may be terminated if a trial court finds that a parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). When deciding whether or not there is clear and convincing evidence of a parent who “knowingly places or knowingly allows a child to remain in conditions or surrounding which endanger the physical or emotional wellbeing of a child,” ... “the relevant time frame ... is before the child w as removed.” Ybarra v. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs., 869 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tex. App. —Corpus Christi 1993, no writ). As well, “abusive or violent conduct by a parent or other resident of child’s home can produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional wellbeing of a child.” In the Interest of C.L.C., 119 S.W.3d at 392-93 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.).",Party Submissions,3.5116122,4.071948,4.0601196
"This is a pleading burden, as this Court has determined that “[i]f additional facts would be necessary to state. .. a viable claim falling within a waiver or exception to immunity, then the plaintiff has not affirmatively demonstrated the court's jurisdiction. In such a case, a plea to the jurisdiction should be granted.” Id.",Party Submissions,10.069621,11.764946,14.432688
"Cadaster Plans ( in Serbian: katastarski planovi ) that have been prepared between 1946 and 1995 and include Dunavska 17-19, Dunavska 23 and the Surrounding Area.",Legal Decisions,13.736109,15.6471,12.990314
"First, there is no showing that Joekel’s arbitration experience is with claims similar to Rafiei’s claims. Joeckel handles “employment and nonsubscriber cases.” CR108. That is an important practice area, but the cases are not shown to be similar to high value products liability personal injury cases. Recall that Rafiei’s injuries occurred when a garbage disposal exploded with enough force to create the potential of a seven-figure damage award.",Party Submissions,20.28527,23.840603,24.30496
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner HAKAN ALI OKSUZLER prays this Court reverse the judgment of the court of appeals as to the characterization of the marital assets in question and affirm the judgment of the trial court; or, alternatively, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals as to the rendering of judgment and, instead, remand the matter to the trial court for new trial on the merits of the remaining issues.",Party Submissions,6.3596735,7.049382,8.218748
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session; the 1st C.S.; the 2nd C.S.; the 3rd C.S. and the 4th C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the November 7, 2023 election results.",Party Submissions,4.4236245,3.9969761,5.1074567
"The Court of Appeals, therefore, appropriately dismissed their claims, and its decision should be affirmed. Dr. Castillo also prays the Court tax her costs of appeal against the Walkers and grant her all other relief as this Court deems just.",Party Submissions,14.748232,17.493118,20.034658
"To direct the Federal Communications Commission to establish a program to make grants available to States to inform Medicaid enrollees, SNAP participants, and low-income residents of potential eligibility for the Af-fordable Connectivity and Lifeline programs of the Commission, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.08252,8.04708,7.1697025
"Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex.1996) (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 702). Under the TMLA, a witness offering opinion testimony on causation must be otherwise qualified “ under the Texas Rules of Evidence. ” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 73.351(r)(5)(C). Texas Rule of Evidence 702, in turn, instructs that a witness may offer causation testimony when “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153 (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 702)).",Party Submissions,4.061016,4.3481283,4.374694
To amend title XI of the Social Security Act to require the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to test a model to improve access to specialty health services for certain Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.,Legislation,4.561616,3.9785423,3.9149537
"Arbitration, the exact paragraphs of which they reference: See Request for Arbitration, par.31-32, pp. 9-10 and Exhibit 20.",Legal Decisions,19.873846,22.078732,22.397356
Just so. This Court should dismiss Walker’s petition for failure to comply with Rule 52.3(e) or deny it as coming too late.,Party Submissions,17.808327,18.30965,26.613745
"The trial court’s order made the jurisdictional resolution a priority, while allowing Galovelho to request leave to amend its pleadings if it wished to do so. By – 25– failing to seek leave to amend, Galovelho has failed to preserve error for our review. We overrule Gal ovelho’ s sixth issue.",Party Submissions,14.87567,21.807598,20.271603
"Sept. 21, 2021) and M.S.A. § 334.01 (“interest shall not be compounded”); North Dakota ( see Haider v. Montgomery, 423 N.W.2d 494, 495 (N.D. 1988) and N.D.C.C., 47-14-09 (“in the computation of interest the same may not be compounded”); South Dakota ( see S.D.C.L. § 51A-12-15); and Wisconsin ( see WISC. STATS ANN. §138.05 (interest upon any bond, note, or other instrument or agreement, “shall not be compounded, nor shall the interest thereon be construed to bear interest, unless an agreement to that effect is clearly expressed in writing”). Texas has no comparable statute pertinent to this case.",Party Submissions,5.994404,5.4822025,6.8824086
Seabron and Mr. Heo waived an appraisal and a determination by the Court of the fair market value of the Property.,Party Submissions,21.181118,26.589226,31.157831
"To redesignate the Richard H. Poff Federal Building located at 210 Franklin Road Southwest in Roanoke, Virginia, as the ‘‘Reuben E. Lawson Fed-eral Building’’, and for other purposes.",Legislation,10.281235,7.88706,9.4243965
"In Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999), the court found that requiring an employee to pay for one-half the arbitrator’s fees failed to pass the “accessible forum” requirement for federal statutory claims. This Court has interpreted Shankle as “holding that fee-splitting arrangements per se unconscionable” and rejected that holding. In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 356 (Tex. 2008). The Fifth Circuit has similarly rejected Shankle, as have several other federal circuit courts. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 712 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Morris on v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 659-60 (6th Cir. 2003); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 555 -56 (4th Cir. 2001).",Party Submissions,4.793912,4.4615283,4.888916
"Bay is not arguing on appeal that Mann is covered under Bay's own workers' compensation policy so that argument is waived on appeal. Nonetheless, the *12 uncontested summary judgment evidence demonstrates that Bay's non-ROCIP policy specifically excludes Bay employees assigned to Valero's Bill Greehey Refinery. 26 Thus, Bay has not and cannot come forward with a policy that it obtained for itself and it must seek its coverage elsewhere.",Party Submissions,21.278751,24.650896,28.142355
"R: [...] Hay que decir que la empresa lo hizo: interpuso un juicio de amparo, al menos está documentado en el expediente, el 431 del 2022 ante el juez séptimo del distrito de Quintana Roo, y pidió la suspensión. Lo que ocurrió es que pidió la suspensión o reclamó actos con relación a predios distintos a La Rosita. Lo pidió respecto a La Adelita y El Corchalito, si no mal recuerdo.",Party Submissions,11.734534,20.803543,15.139202
RLB respectfully requests the Court grant mandamus relief and vacate the court of appeals’ opinion and instructions to the trial court to dismiss the Texas Lawsuit. RLB requests such other relief to which it is entitled.,Party Submissions,10.195427,13.09626,14.486446
"Wilbarger CAD, as a political subdivision of the state, is immune from the present action under the DJA because governmental immunity bars DJA actions against the state and its political divisions absent a legislative waiver. See TEX. TAX CODE § 6.01(c); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex.",Party Submissions,6.8029056,7.6871576,7.5571046
"The case of Zeon Chemicals, L.P. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., No. 14-20-00798-CV, 2022 WL 619681 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] March 3, 2022, no pet. ) is not opposed. Therein, the appraisal district and property owner entered a § 1.111(e) agreement regarding value, but did not enter any agreement regarding Zeon’s application for exemption. The court held that Zeon was still free to contest the denial of its exemption. Oncor cites the case for the proposition that § 1.111(e) agreements only cover matters which they purport to cover. Wilbarger CAD does not disagree. The fallacy in Oncor’s argument is that its § 25.25(c)(1) and (3) motion does seek to alter value, the only subject of the § 1.111(e) agreement at issue. An exemption is not a value issue. Note that value is determined under Chapter 23 of the Tax Code while exemptions are covered under Chapter 11. See also TEX. TAX CODE § 25.02, which specifies the contents of an appraisal record. It requires, among other things, a listing of the appraised value of the property, subsections (a)(5) and (6) and any applicable exemption, subsection (9). It does not require the description of how many miles of what type of transmission line or any other detail of the appraisal of the property in issue. That is because things such how many miles of what type of transmission line constitute the subject property is subsumed in value. Exemptions are something else.",Party Submissions,5.9711986,6.8037186,6.0599647
The focus of the alleged malpractice claim concerned decisions counsel in the underlying trial made regarding a purported responsible third party. The RTP issue was a core issue at trial. HSMiller frames its issue as an intellectual conundrum facing all trial judges in legal malpractice cases. It asserts that legal malpractice cases warrant different rules for the introduction of evidence and jury charge instructions.,Party Submissions,27.065052,23.338343,29.521336
"To direct the Federal Communications Commission to issue reports after activation of the Disaster Information Reporting System and to make improvements to network outage reporting, and for other purposes.",Legislation,12.6109915,10.82474,12.593829
"Pildegovics claims, and Norway denies, that Norway’s actions resulted in Sea & Coast’s business drying up as North Star and its other customers ceased harvesting snow crab and thus no longer required the services of Sea & Coast.",Legal Decisions,30.583582,40.945248,34.86647
"Contemporaneous documents concerning any information about, due diligence on, or inquiry into, the rights of Obnova as regards the Objects and the Dunavska Plots and/or Obnova's entitlement to compensation in relation to the 2013 DRP obtained by Mr Broshko from 2012 onwards, and in particular between 24 February 2016 and 14 November 2017, i.e. between the Land Directorate's letter announcing the planned demolition of Obnova's buildings affected by the 2013 DRP and the time of the alleged investment, including any communications, e-mails, analyses, notes, or memoranda on this issue, in particular exchanged between (i) Mr Broshko and/or his advisors or representatives or MLI on the one hand and (ii) Mr Rand or his advisors or representatives, and/or the Ahola Family Trust and/or their advisors or representatives, and/or the Cypriot Claimants and/or their advisors or representatives, and/or Mr Obradović and/or his advisors or representatives, and/or Obnova and/or its advisors or representatives on the other hand.",Legal Decisions,7.531967,7.6506824,7.7764506
"To authorize rural health facilities to use certain Federal agricultural credit assistance for the purpose of refinancing debt obligations, updating necessary services, technology, and equipment, and supporting ancillary needs.",Legislation,29.192356,23.723837,30.572025
"Pierce also is irrelevant here because the objection in this case was made to the two paraphrased non-statutory instructions that directly addressed a single, major issue running throughout trial: to survive a motion to strike Flaven as an RTP, was Terry required to show more than a simple breach of contract? Since the second paraphrased non-statutory instruction explicitly instructed the jury on this legal issue, the trial court would have known what issue Terry was addressing. (8RR7-20, 34-35, 185-190; 9SCR8405-08; 20RR658-61; CR541-52) Regardless of what objections Terry did or did not make at the charge conference, Terry is entitled to respond to HSMiller’s claim that the court of appeals holding should be reversed because the instruction improperly stated the law.",Party Submissions,17.552418,17.997885,18.93944
"IT IS ORDERED that until the child reaches age seven (7), the electronic communication shall be for a period of up to fifteen (15) minutes.",Party Submissions,10.419911,16.031055,16.007662
"It is Respondent's case that Claimants have not discharged their burden of proof in establishing that Kalemegdan has made an ""investment"" within the meaning of both Article 1(1) of the Cyprus-Serbia BIT and Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. They have provided no evidence that Kalemegdan made a contribution or otherwise ""caused"" an investment to be made in Serbia, whether through the expenditure of money or some other effort in exchange for the Obnova shares. On the contrary, Kalemegdan passively acquired the Obnova shares, without having paid any consideration and without any apparent ability to fund Obnova.",Legal Decisions,7.3977623,7.2793136,7.003083
"To require reports on critical mineral and rare earth element resources around the world and a strategy for the development of advanced mining, refining, separation, and processing technologies.",Legislation,14.882284,13.04291,15.149365
"Second, given the vague wording of Serbia’s request, potential responsive documents would cover, for example, any forms of communication between Coropi’s shareholders and/or Coropi’s directors and Claimants’ lega l or other advisors. There are potentially hundreds of such responsive documents. A search for all such documents and their potential production, or even their inclusion in a privilege log, would be unreasonably burdensome (Article 9(2)(c) of the IBA Rules).",Legal Decisions,14.258789,14.114956,15.590688
"Several of Weatherford’s statements of fact assume evidence expressly excluded by the Trial Court and mischaracterize the facts as they relate to Midland’s sewer system. As such, the City provides this restated Statement of the Facts.",Party Submissions,21.793642,23.858355,27.900928
Mr. Lukas Montoya Lévy Kaufmann-Kohler 3-5 rue du Conseil-Général P.O. Box 552 CH-1211 Geneva 4 Switzerland lukas.montoya@lk-k.com 8.6. The Assistant shall submit his claims for fees and expenses to the ICSID Secretariat on a quarterly basis.,Legal Decisions,11.173159,10.240156,10.443163
"This Court in 2015 reversed the First Court of Appeals’ initial decision in Hooks and remanded it for further action. Samson still insisted that the prior First Court of Appeals decision in Hooks bound the other owners in the severed case as to “all issues the Supreme Court’s decision did not reverse or address”: Samson’s Supplemental Brief of February 23, 2015, to the Ninth Court of Appeals in T.S. Reed, at 18, located at: https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=0068f947-108a-4c7d-a96e-519858e251aa&coa=coa09&DT=Brief&MediaID=50524136-16e0- 4ed2-80f0-742a82871955.",Party Submissions,12.166149,9.572712,12.186073
Arbitration Rule 6 13.1. The ICSID Secretariat shall be the channel of written communications between the Parties and the Tribunal.,Legal Decisions,10.238266,10.465095,10.971412
"The Election Code’s prohibition on individuals signing multiple candidates’ petitions burdens both signers’ and candidates’ First Amendment rights and corresponding speech and association rights under Texas law. Signers “express the view” that the candidate “should be considered by the whole electorate”—even “if the signer is agnostic” as to whether that candidate should be elected. John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 195 (2010) (cleaned up). Petition signing therefore “implicates a First Amendment right” and “remains expressive even when it has legal effect in the electoral process.” Id. Likewise, candidates have the First Amendment right to associate with other citizens: “the First Amendment, among other things, protects the right of citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political views.” Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005) (cleaned up).",Party Submissions,5.1165752,5.281791,5.4443383
"Given the Respondent’s objections regarding the lack of specific mention in the Request for Arbitration, and for the sake of efficiency, the Claimant is prepared to withdraw the Request.",Legal Decisions,14.538063,10.749494,13.81025
"First Year of Eligibility. In the case of the first (1st) year in which an Eligible Employee becomes eligible to participate in the Plan, if permitted by the Committee, he or she has up to thirty (30) days following his or her initial eligibility to submit a Compensation Deferral Agreement with respect to Compensation to be earned during such year. The Compensation Deferral Agreement described in this paragraph becomes irrevocable upon the end of such thirty (30) day period, or such earlier date as the Committee may provide. The determination of whether an Eligible Employee may file a Compensation Deferral Agreement under this paragraph shall be determined in accordance with the rules of Code Section 409A, including the provisions of Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-2(a)(7). A Compensation Deferral Agreement submitted under this paragraph applies only to Compensation earned on and after the date the Compensation Deferral Agreement becomes irrevocable.",Contract,3.2357051,3.2841618,3.5118973
"Petitioner ’s request for rehearing should be denied. The Appellate Court’s Opinion does not conflict with the past precedent of this Court, nor does it create a split of authority. The Appellate Court properly applied the correct standard of review through every step of its analysis. Furthermore, the opinions of this Court cited by Petitioner are not disrupted by the Appellate Opinion as they can co-exist in harmony given the significant factual and legal deviations this matter has from those upon which Petitioner relied. Therefore, Respondents respectfully request the Court deny Petitioner ’s Motion for Rehearing, and grant such other and further relief to which they may be justly entitled.",Party Submissions,6.4129767,6.4228063,6.89489
"Buttercup Pool ’s written safety policy requires camps to actively supervise campers with at least one camp counselor for every ten campers. Under the policy, if a camp does not have enough counselors present to satisfy this requirement, the camp should be denied entry to the pool. Some evidence in the record suggests that, on the day in question, High Hopes Summer Camp was admitted to the pool with only ten 1 This appeal was transferred to us from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV ’ T CODE ANN. §§ 22.220(a) (delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer).",Party Submissions,6.003859,7.361416,7.005
This case is the result of Oncor filing a motion under TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25(c) to attempt to avoid that agreement.,Party Submissions,17.508886,18.388931,22.89863
"Eleven months later, Dunn filed a motion to strike the designation of responsible [*3] third parties. She urged, in part, that Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which includes the responsible third party statute, does not apply to the case because it is an action to collect benefits under the workers' compensation laws of Texas. In response, ETMC Athens argued, in part, that Dunn waived her objections to the designations, Dunn failed to argue there was no evidence supporting the designations, and that its status as a nonsubscriber does not alter the availability of a responsible third party designation. After conducting two hearings, Respondent granted the 3 ETMC EMS v. Dunn, No. 12-19-00152-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1006, 2020 WL 562971, at *6, 8 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 5, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). motion to strike. This original proceeding followed.",Party Submissions,5.7829695,6.21614,6.4976087
Separation from Service Benefit. Separation from Service Benefit means the benefit payable to a Participant under Sections 6.1(a) and 6.2(a) of the Plan as a result of the Participant’s Separation from Service.,Contract,3.2950203,3.3724914,3.98436
"The election by Executive to not renew any Successive Term pursuant to Section 1.1 shall not be a termination for Good Reason and shall not entitle Executive to Severance Pay. However, the election by the Company to not renew any Successive Term pursuant to Section 1.1 shall be deemed to be a termination without Cause effective as of the termination of the Successive Term and shall entitle Executive to Severance Pay as hereinafter provided or the severance benefits described in Section 3.6 hereof, as applicable.",Contract,4.569641,5.2551107,5.9455094
"In April 1997, almost two years after the incident, Gaetjen filed the underlying negligence suit against Luby's. On December 10, 1997, after discovery revealed information about Aguirre's past criminal record and after urging by Luby's counsel, TIG reopened Gaetjen's claim. The parties proceeded to a benefit review conference and then a contested case hearing. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. §§ 410.021, 410.024, 410.151 (Vernon 1996). On June 21, 1998, the hearing officer found Gaetjen sustained a compensable injury and ordered TIG to pay benefits. On July 7, 1998, Gaetjen appealed this ruling. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 410.202 (Vernon 1996). Ten days later, Luby's requested an abatement of the September 8, 1998 trial, pending a final decision by the Commission. Luby's did not obtain a ruling on its motion.",Party Submissions,4.2554774,4.4008527,4.614439
"The Tribunal’s analysis A) Overview 530. As per its previous findings, the Tribunal will calculate the damages Respondent must pay Claimant based on the finding that an indirect creeping expropriation and a violation of both the FET and the umbrella clauses exist, to the extent stated in each section.",Legal Decisions,22.82208,18.111015,20.961636
"Statement of Reasons included these statements but the extension was not granted is not a volte face on risk allocation or a flip-flop on the extension.1395 Claimants appear to invoke the Statement of Reasons as a public statement of MINEM’s position rather than the Draft Supreme Decree legislation itself.1396 In either case, the denial of the Third Extension Request was not unfair or inequitable treatment contrary to the FET standard.",Legal Decisions,30.321842,21.726418,27.549438
"Id., at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.401(a)(2). This contemplates that the lawsuit will center on the treatment of the illness, injury or condition of the patient, not the adequacy of the workplace or in this case, procedures for the identification of infants upon discharge from the hospital.",Party Submissions,10.07969,10.878619,12.003921
"These documents were contained in hardcopy or electronic files on computers, phones, hard drives and/or USB keys belonging to the Claimant that were seized by the Respondent either during his arrestation or his detention and not returned to the Claimant since then. The requested information is therefore within the possession of the relevant Qatari governmental entities, agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore the Respondent is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,12.094222,12.84508,12.831432
"Making emergency supplemental appropriations in line with the President’s request in response to the ongoing attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty by Russia and in response to the attacks in Israel for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.3609805,7.334461,7.1539254
"Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 272.001. Section 272.01 applies “only to a construction contract concerning real property located in this state.” Id. § 272.001(a). If the section applies, a forum-selection clause making any conflict arising under the contract subject to litigation in the courts of another state “voidable by the party obligated by the contract or agreement to perform the work that is the subject of the construction contract.” Id. § 272.001(b).",Party Submissions,5.268385,6.071297,5.5247955
"The court of appeals erred when it refused to allow petitioners to replead their claims under a premises defect theory because it determined the City had no duty to enforce its own safety procedures. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court. Texas Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tex. 2002). The question of a legal duty is a multifaceted issue requiring courts to balance a number of factors. Otis Eng’g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983); see also EDGAR & SALES, TEXAS T ORTS & REMEDIES § 1.03[2][b] (2000). Courts apply these factors along with common law principles.” City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 622-23 (Tex. 2009).",Party Submissions,5.734128,5.8716006,6.055641
"Respondents acknowledge that the result in Kemp turned mainly on the fact that the tenant lacked the legitimate “right of possession” to the property necessary to maintain a constructive-eviction claim. (Resp. 34, citing Kemp, 2020 WL 205313, at *4) Respondents claim that they too challenged Westwood’s right of possession by questioning whether Westwood’s renewal of the lease was effective. (Id.) But the two challenges are very different. The challenge brought by the landlord in Kemp was meritorious : The tenant was a holdover whose continued “possession [was] unlawful. ” (Pet. Br. 16, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *1-2) By contrast, Respondents’ challenge to Westwood’s right of possession in this case was specious. See supra, at pp. 8-9. Thus, unlike the tenant in Kemp, Westwood possessed the property rights necessary to maintain a claim for constructive eviction, and breach of contract.",Party Submissions,6.5502486,6.62817,7.0510697
"More still, in performing its de novo review of the Wright ’s expert reports, the Seventh Court ignored the providers’ specific objections (other than to note that there were many), failed to distinguish between the providers’ objections, and even raised and sustained objections that the providers themselves had never asserted at any stage of the proceeding. See Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *1. (“The arguments posed are many. They encompass the qualifications of the experts and whether their reports satisfy the applicable statute. ” ).",Party Submissions,16.312397,15.076363,17.317362
"The present case illustrates the point. [Husband’s] pension rights, a valuable asset built up by 24 years of community effort, under the French rule would escape division by the court as a community asset solely because dissolution occurred two years before the vesting date.",Party Submissions,21.14654,29.70079,24.893639
"In Tatum, the parents of a teenager who shot himself after a car accident published a paid obituary in the defendant newspaper stating that their son died as a result of injuries sustained in the crash. Id. at 621-22. The newspaper subsequently published a column that cited the obituary as an example of an undisclosed suicide, and lamented that “we, as a society, allow suicide to remain cloaked in such secrecy, if not outright deception.” Id. at 622. The parents sued, arguing that the column’s “gist” was defamatory of them, in that it implied that they acted deceptively in publishing the obituary, and that their deception “perpetuates and exacerbates the problem of suicide in others.” Id. at 636. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “[t]he column's gist has nothing to do with the [plaintiffs]. Rather, the column’s gist is that our society ought to be more forthcoming about suicide and that by failing to do so, our society is making the problem of suicide worse, not better.” Id.at 636 – 637 (emphasis added).",Party Submissions,5.1759415,5.1531854,5.541698
"Governmental immunity protects the State’s political subdivisions, including its cities, against suits and legal liability. See Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex. 2022). The TTCA waives immunity for “personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property” if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(2).",Party Submissions,3.0713336,3.9239252,4.0013137
"This AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”), dated as of November 1, 2023 (the “Effective Date”), is entered into by and between The Dow Chemical Company, a Delaware corporation (“Dow”), and Union Carbide Corporation, a New York corporation and an Affiliate of Dow (“UCC”, and together with Dow, the “Parties” and each, a “Party”).",Contract,2.622179,2.2977846,2.8676205
"To amend the Energy Policy and Conservation Act to require a certain efficiency level for certain distribution transformers, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.9747486,5.584624,5.8248677
"To amend the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to require the Secretary of Agriculture to make timely decisions on applications of retail food stores to accept benefits from recipients of supplemental nutrition assistance through on-line transactions, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.703341,4.3385983,4.7118506
"Essentially, Osprin asks us to change the wording used by the parties to the guaranty by adding qualifying language to its broad scope, such as: “ any and all obligations of the Guarantor under this Guaranty, except those obligations that are matured, fixed, and non-executory, shall terminate upon the construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation [of the Texaco building] ” ; or, alternatively, “ any and all obligations of the Guarantor under this Guaranty shall terminate upon the construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation [of the Texaco building], provided such construction and completion occurs before any default by borrower .” However, when a clause is clear and enforceable based on its terms, as in this case, we “‘cannot rewrite the parties’ contract or add to or subtract fro m its language. ” URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 770 (quoting Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 242 (Tex. 2016)).",Party Submissions,7.5948825,7.8535504,8.061703
"Survey, Abstract 1152, and described as partof a 29.14 acre tract inthat certain Warranty Deed dated November 25,1911, from C.",Party Submissions,13.59903,19.076845,24.261969
"The Plan constitutes an unsecured promise by a Participating Employer to pay benefits in the future. Participants in the Plan shall have the status of general unsecured creditors of the Company or the Adopting Employer, as applicable. Each Participating Employer shall be solely responsible for payment of the benefits of its employees and their beneficiaries. The Plan is unfunded for Federal tax purposes and is intended to be an unfunded arrangement for eligible employees who are part of a select group of management or highly compensated employees of the Employer within the meaning of Sections 201(2), 301(a)(3) and 401(a)(1) of ERISA. Any amounts set aside to defray the liabilities assumed by the Company or an Adopting Employer will remain the general assets of the Company or the Adopting Employer and shall remain subject to the claims of the Company’s or the Adopting Employer’s creditors until such amounts are distributed to the Participants.",Contract,3.1484685,3.200556,3.5959022
"Particularly given the lack of explanation of the significance of these various cases, it is difficult to know exactly what Rafiei wants the Court to take away from them. None of the cases are presented as support for an argument that the Court needs to change Texas law.",Party Submissions,14.725426,17.345015,16.804731
"Appellee/Defendant: Sharon West 7015 Anderson St. Texas City, TX 77591 shangrewe@gmail.com Citation Certified Mail Rejected No Counsel on Record IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .........................................................ii.",Party Submissions,24.469915,22.481722,33.259445
"Specified Employee Effective Date. Specified Employee Effective Date means the first (1st) day of the fourth month following the Specified Employee Identification Date, or such earlier date as is selected by the Committee.",Contract,4.9661613,8.200097,6.959206
"HN2 [ ] Appeals, Appellate Briefs Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e), (h) requires that a brief state the issues presented for review and contain argument.",Party Submissions,10.653976,14.467677,12.854928
"Subsequent to Zuckerberg, Delaware courts have continued to rule that demand is excused in cases involving self-dealing. E.g., Atallah v. Malone, No. 2021-1116-SG, 2023 WL 4628774, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2023) (demand futility established by self-dealing alone). The Zuckerberg decision did not change substantive Delaware law in this respect. PFR at 18 (citing Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d at 1059). The Response deflects the majority opinion’s sua sponte The majority opinion held, sua sponte, that Condon was required to obtain Alpesh’s approval before filing suit on the ground because the loot he received through his self-dealing may not have been “substantively” important to him. Respondents did not brief this argument in the lower courts because it is definitively incorrect. Unsurprisingly, they now argue that the majority did not adopt an “unsanctioned ‘subjective material benefits test.’” Resp. 14. This argument ignores the majority opinion’s actual analysis.",Party Submissions,9.973918,10.267992,10.516812
"Simply put, such extreme costs to obtain a threshold ruling are too great for Rafiei to bear. To that end, Rafiei has provided his own affidavit in support of his contention that the delegation provision is unconscionable. Specifically, Rafiei had testified he could not afford to pursue his claims through arbitration and would be forced to abandon his claim (such as his claim that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable) if he was required to pay more than $6,000.00 in arbitration fees and expenses. This testimony is itself evidence, inherently, that Rafiei anticipated having to pay expenses out of his own pocket as the case progressed. Additionally, the mere fact that Rafiei pled his claim’s value as more than one million has no bearing on whether his claim will be overtaken by the expenses of arbitration – the overtaking doesn’t happen at end of a case post -resolution, it happens on the front end and prevents a party from ever reaching trial because they simply cannot afford to maintain the litigation that long.",Party Submissions,11.08582,11.08438,11.4742565
"Clause 11 of the Investment Agreement (Exh. C-010) provides: “The COMPANY undertakes, before commencing the Project, to obtain, in accordance with the applicable legal provisions, the permits, licenses and authorizations that may be necessary for the execution of said Project.” With reference to the above and any other relevant provision: What is the legal situation under Clause 11 of the Investment Agreement in relation to permits, licenses and authorisations that become applicable subsequent to the commencement of the Project?",Party Submissions,8.035697,6.334037,8.110317
"To amend the Federal Crop Insurance Act to modify eligibility for prevented planting insurance under certain drought conditions, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.142331,4.60879,5.8473945
"This AMENDED AND RESTATED EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”), entered into as of February 27, 2023 by and between OneSpan North America, Inc. (the “Company”), and Matthew Moynahan (“Executive”), amends and restates in its entirety the Executive Employment Agreement effective as of November 29, 2021 (the “Effective Date”) by and between the Company and the Executive (the “Prior Agreement”).",Contract,2.742474,2.2604563,2.771254
"Permission must be stated in the order to be appealed. An order previously issued may be amended to include such permission. The permission must identify the controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and must state why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.",Party Submissions,6.4069366,8.147169,8.084943
"Section 1. Effective Date and Plan Year. The “Effective Date” of the Plan shall be October 27, 2016. The “Plan Year” shall be the 12-consecutive month period beginning on January 1 and ending on December 31; provided, however, that, the first Plan Year shall be a short Plan Year beginning on the Effective Date and ending on December 31, 2016. This amendment and restatement of the Plan shall be effective March 21, 2023.",Contract,2.9478915,3.057707,3.0478342
The ground assigned for the motion to dismiss the appeal was a want of jurisdiction in this court to take cognizance of it.,Party Submissions,7.5070868,12.77465,16.116377
"Barina also contends the rule does not apply to the Program because nothing in the Program suggests that it contains third-party allegations. As a matter of law and logic, Barina’s argument is meritless: Petitioners are seeking the protection of the third-party-allegation rule for claims made by Ross and Martinez while being interviewed on camera. Barina’s Response, in fact, liberally quotes from Ross’ interview. E.g., Resp. Br. at 10-11, 22. Any reasonable viewer—and Barina herself—understands that Ross and Martinez are the ones making the statements, not Petitioners. Even if there were some kind of “attribution” requirement (there is not), it would be more than satisfied here.",Party Submissions,9.778417,9.890111,10.045081
"When parties delegate the decision of arbitrability to an arbitrator, a court “possesses no power to decide the arbitrability issue.” TotalEnergies E&P USA Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, 667 S.W.3d 694, 721 n.3 (Tex. 2023) (citing Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019)). Thus, unless Rafiei can show that the delegation provision is unconscionably expensive, the Court must reverse the majority and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to refer the delegation provision to an arbitrator.",Party Submissions,5.1793203,5.225805,5.5751395
"Furthermore, in the spirit of cooperation, Claimants are willing to limit the scope of this request in the following way: • Production may be limited to documents that are in the possession, custody, or control of USTR (which led the USMCA negotiations); the U.S. State Department (the “State Department”) (which co-leads, or at a minimum plays a key role, in the negotiations of investment chapters in free trade agreements, like USMCA, and obviously plays a central role in investor-state dispute settlement matters);15 and the National Archives and Record Administration (the “National Archives”) (which maintains certain records of U.S. Government agencies),16 to the extent that documents in the National Archives originated from USTR or the State Department.",Legal Decisions,8.178466,7.5767903,8.038894
"Weatherford argues that the residual four-year statute of limitations did not begin unless and until the TCEQ approved the remediation plan. However, the statute itself indicates that the removal or remedial action itself is the requisite fact that starts the limitations period. Weatherford stated that the costs of the required remediation commenced between November 1998 and January 1999. (CR 14.) (noting that the TCEQ’s predecessor agency “required Weatherford to perform the response to the contamination.”). The statute of limitations began when Weatherford initiated remediation. To hold otherwise would allow Weatherford to recover costs from an action that occurred over two decades ago, which would contravene the very purpose of a statute of limitations. Further, potential defendants would essentially be barred from participating in the remediation itself.",Party Submissions,8.713618,8.723266,8.864555
"County, R.L.S. pled guilty to the burglary of a habitation offense and received deferred adjudication community supervision. In 2016, R.L.S. filed his petition for expunction of the Limestone County arrest.",Party Submissions,7.0853276,7.894753,10.2044
"The testimony and exhibits at the hearing demonstrate that Respondent was subject to general jurisdiction. Most importantly is Exhibit 7. (RR Vol. 2, Ex. 7, and Appendix, Tab 3). That Exhibit is a public offering on behalf of Integrity Aviation, LLC. (RR Volume 2, page 104) Integrity is a Texas Company. (RR Vol. 2, p. 27) Exhibit 7 shows that the “Management Team” of Integrity consists of Victor Farias and Matt Marsenison, among others and has pictures of both of those individuals. (RR Vol. 2, p. 108, and Appendix, Tab 3) In addition it shows and address of 2 Spencer Rd., Suite 103, Boerne, Texas. (RR Vol. 2, p. 109) As such, this is ample evidence that Respondent entered into a contract with a Texas resident, is an officer of a Texas Company participating in a public offering to raise money from investors, which contacts are obviously consistent and systematic.",Party Submissions,10.226949,9.436292,10.801654
"Unless and until such time as Shares are issued in settlement of vested RSUs, the Participant shall have no ownership of the Shares allocated to the RSUs and, subject to the provisions of Section 5, shall have no rights as a shareholder with respect to such Shares. Upon settlement, the Company shall cause the Company’s transfer agent to issue a certificate or certificates for the Shares in the name of the Participant, or to make a book entry record of such issuance, and the Participant shall thereupon have all rights as a shareholder with respect to such Shares, including the right to vote such Shares and to receive all dividends and other distributions paid with respect to such Shares. The Company may place on the certificates representing the Shares such legend or legends as the Company may deem appropriate and the Company may place a stop transfer order with respect to such Shares with the transfer agent(s) for the Shares.",Contract,3.1787798,3.5100842,3.4259434
"App. 9, CR 709. decided for a cesarian delivery at 15:15, and that H.W. would been born without neurologic injury if he was delivered atraumatically by 15:45. Id. at 671.",Party Submissions,20.58702,26.810562,25.698652
"Justice Jewell observed that “[t]he initial filing fee for ‘nonmonetary claims’ is under $3,250 under the standard fee schedule; and it is only $2,000 under the “flexible” schedule.” Id.",Party Submissions,17.753244,17.999413,18.470642
"R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how the requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the opinion of the Secretariat for Environmental Protection is relevant to the question of Obnova's alleged property rights or material to the Tribunal's determination of this question. This is a classic ""fishing expedition"", with Claimants simply casting about for any documents which might contain information they consider helpful for in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case. PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants.199 In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".200 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the mentioned authority in order to obtain documents in question.201 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves.",Legal Decisions,11.757833,10.934832,12.008693
"The TTCA provides a limited waiver of immunity for certain tort claims against governmental entities, including claims for “personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2). This waiver encompasses “two distinct tort causes of action: one arising from tangible personal property and one arising from a premises defect.” Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 385 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 230 (Tex. 2004)). A plaintiff’s claim must be one or the other, but it cannot be both. Id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 233).",Party Submissions,2.701631,3.2688274,3.2397773
"Between the filing of the motion to dismiss and corresponding hearing, Dunn amended her petition to include allegations that ETMC Athens failed to provide a safe place to work and was negligent at the time of the incident. ETMC Athens is a nonsubscriber to workers' compensation. Following the dismissal of Dunn's claims against Woolverton and ETMC EMS, ETMC Athens filed a motion to designate them as responsible third parties. Dunn did not object, and Respondent granted the motion.",Party Submissions,8.776857,8.08195,9.709797
"These documents were contained in hardcopy or electronic files on computers, phones, hard drives and/or USB keys belonging to the Claimant that were seized by the Respondent either during his arrestation or his detention and not returned to the Claimant since then. The requested information is therefore within the possession of the relevant Qatari governmental entities, agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore the Respondent is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,12.094222,12.84508,12.831432
"The Diocese claims that Question 2 in the jury charge was erroneous because it did not submit the increased value of the Ranch due to the improvements. The Diocese then argues that because there was no evidence of increased value, a rendition is appropriate. But that’s not correct.",Party Submissions,13.140504,16.766594,15.180012
"During the due diligence period, the buyer has the right to receive information from the seller to determine the suitability of the property.",Party Submissions,6.0804358,6.517295,7.416418
"Although the Property Tax Code allows a property owner to file an administrative protest to the appraisal review board of certain actions, such as the inclusion of the owner’s property in the appraisal records pursuant to Chapter 41 or other corrections under § 25.25, Oncor is prohibited from pursuing any such remedy when it has agreed to an appraised value with the chief appraiser. The cases interpreting § 1.111(e) hold that such agreements are final and the trial court does not have jurisdiction to review it. See MHCB (USA) Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 249 S.W.3d 68, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Houston Cement Co. v. Harris County Appraisal District, No. 14-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 3243281, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2013, no pet. ); Bastrop Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Acme Brick Co., 428 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet. ). Note that § 1.111(e) specifically makes the agreement controlling over any matter that may be brought by a motion under § 25.25, the exact remedy Oncor has sought to employ.",Party Submissions,4.6026096,4.9125366,4.538584
"Finally, Barina emphasizes Thrash’s unmentioned dementia diagnosis, see Resp. Br. at 2, 4, 7, 10, as if that omission would positively affect a viewer’s perception of her actions. It would not. The medical exam, which reported moderate dementia, noted no deficit in long-term memory; basic recognition, comprehension, or communication ability; or inability to attend to basic activities of daily living. CR1:699. Thrash’s treating physician also reported that Thrash did not lack capacity as late as January 2019, CR2:4303, less than a year before the probate court upheld the guardianship. In re Guardianship of Thrash, No. 04-19-00104-CV, 2019 WL 6499225, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 4, 2019, pet. denied). Far from justifying for the viewer Thrash’s permanent guardianship, then, the inclusion of the full context of the dementia diagnosis would have suggested to viewers that Barina fought to keep Thrash in a guardianship that he did not then need, let alone want.",Party Submissions,7.9411354,8.547878,8.97648
"Therefore, contrary to the Gaonos' argument that the statutory process was complete upon the appeals panel issuing its decision, the Act expressly provides the decision, though binding, is not final during the pending judicial review. Id. § 410.205(b).",Party Submissions,15.905769,22.23598,20.975903
Liberty argues that the Contract provides for only one service. Liberty’s Response at 23. This ignores the construction of the Contract. The Contract details multiple obligations and prohibitions (for both parties) in its terms. Liberty is not obligated to provide treatment for certain industrial waste (Section 3.3); Liberty is not obligated to accept wastewater above the TAV (Section 3.5 and 4.1); Liberty is obligated to accept wastewater flows up to the TAV (Section 4.1); Ames is to provide retail sewer service within certain areas (Section 4.2); Ames may not provide retail sewer service within other areas (Section 4.2). The Contract involves more than wastewater simply being accepted by Liberty from Ames.,Party Submissions,9.618516,8.619372,10.253735
"Similarly, this Court has repeatedly stated that if a promissory note contains an optional acceleration clause, limitations does not automatically start to run upon default, and that an action accrues “only when the holder actually exercises its option to accelerate” the entire note. Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001); Hammann v. H.J. McMullen Co., 62 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex. 1933). The Wolf opinion disapproved of any case “to the extent they can be read to require affirmative action towards foreclosure to trigger acceleration of a note secured by real property when the parties’ agreement does not require such action.” Wolf, 44 S.W.3d at 569-70. The Court explicitly rejected the concept that an action to foreclose a lien constituted acceleration, claiming that the result would be “nonsensical”, since the act of foreclosure cannot be both the triggering event and the right itself. Id, at 570.",Party Submissions,6.533464,6.8182006,6.783667
"These documents were co ntained in hardcopy or electronic files on computers, phones, hard drives and/or USB keys belonging to the Claimant that were seized by the Respondent either during his arrestation or his detention and not returned to the Claimant since then. The requested information is therefore within the possession of the relevant Qatari governmental entities, agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore the Respondent is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,13.390581,13.452183,14.155488
"This conclusion is underscored by the fact that, at oral argument, they were unable to identify any material difference in a subsequent trial with yet another small group of plaintiffs.",Party Submissions,17.399033,22.567863,25.39995
"Just as the record does not support MVP’s assertion that RLB’s “sole objection to the forum-selection clause’s enforcement” was that the MCC’s choices of Oklahoma forum and law could be voided under Section 272.001, the record also does not support that “the trial court apparently based its ruling on that objection.” MVP’s Brief at 29. To the contrary, although the court noted during the hearing that “it seems to all pin on whether or not this 272[.]001 is something that’s going to be applicable in this instance,” the court also noted it would look at the parties’ arguments before making its final decision. See 04/23/2021.Tr.12-13. Further, the court’s orders are not limited to Section 272.001, but specifically note that its rulings were based on the plea in abatement, motions, responses, replies, supplements, and “any other item presented to the Court” by the parties. R.0580, 725-26.",Party Submissions,8.56195,9.602786,9.072819
"The issue of compensation in situations involving war or other conflicts 266. Article X of Annex III of the Treaty, relied upon by Respondent, sets forth: COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES Investors of one Party whose Investments in the territory of the other Party suffer losses owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency, revolt, insurrection or riot in the territory of the latter Party shall be accorded by the latter Party treatment, as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or other settlement, no less favourable than that which the latter Party accords to investors of any third State.",Legal Decisions,5.4612846,4.956156,5.2232904
"The principle which lies at the foundation of the whole system of community property is, that whatever is acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and wife, shall be their community property. It would be an unnecessary consumption of time, to quote authorities for this proposition.",Party Submissions,7.978719,9.370576,8.929934
"Perhaps more importantly, however, none of the evidence Respondents cite played any part in the court of appeals’ decision. The court refused to consider it. Nor did the court rely on any “Rule 11 agreement” memorialized in the agreed judgment (Resp. 21, 28) because it deemed the judgment’s contents themselves unimportant. All that mattered to the court below was the judgment’s very existence, which purportedly “precluded” Westwood’s constructive eviction and breach-of-contract claims in district court. (Op. 6) That conclusion conflicts with Texas statutes and this Court’s precedent, creates conflicts among the lower courts, strips eviction proceedings of the jurisdictional limits necessary to ensure their efficiency, threatens the separation of powers and the jurisdictional boundaries between Texas district courts, and creates intractable practical problems for Texas tenants. It therefore raises issues of substantial importance to Texas jurisprudence that this Court should review and resolve.",Party Submissions,12.352074,11.817583,12.544428
"Second, in considering a sufficiency review of the evidence, the court of appeals exceeds the proper scope of review when it disregards circumstantial evidence as to a question of characterization of marital assets and only considers the absence of direct evidence to determine a question of legal versus factual sufficiency.",Party Submissions,15.02282,15.276129,18.596704
"Petitioner (Oncor) presents a distorted and somewhat imaginative Statement of Facts that inaccurately characterizes the core issues as attributable to mistakes made by Wilbarger CAD or its appraisers. What actually happened is Oncor, or its predecessor Sharyland, rendered what it now represents as incorrect figures on the miles of its grades of transmission lines. I C.R. 334-335. Wilbarger CAD appraised the transmission lines. I C.R. 129-130. Oncor protested the values. I C.R. 207-208. Then Oncor and Wilbarger CAD reached an agreement on the two accounts, specifying the values agreed upon without any other detail. I C.R. 18. That agreement is also attached at Appendix A to this brief and is the seminal document to this appeal.",Party Submissions,12.792873,13.150818,12.831823
The snow crab eats and lives on the bottom all its life except in the larval phase where the larvae live in the upper water masses up to several months before they settle.,Legal Decisions,14.677967,15.84861,16.14385
"I hereby certify that on October 23, 2023 a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petit ioners’ Oral Argument Exhibits has been electronically filed and served on all counsel below. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(c)(1), 9.5(b)(1).",Party Submissions,7.0077257,8.993308,9.614192
"I, a resident of (state, or country if other than U.S.), accept and agree to the terms of the Restricted Stock Unit Award described in this Agreement and in the Plan, acknowledge receipt of a copy of this Agreement, the Plan and the applicable Plan Summary, and acknowledge that I have read them carefully and that I fully understand their contents.",Contract,5.644772,6.5079694,6.707486
"HN5 [ ] Equitable estoppel may be asserted to bar a defendant from raising a particular defense. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 156 n. 1 (Tex. 2004). To establish equitable estoppel, a party must prove (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts, (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts, (3) with the intention that the representation [*9] should be acted on, (4) to a party without knowledge, or the means of knowledge of those facts, (5) who detrimentally relied upon the misrepresentation. Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991) (citing Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 418, 252 S.W.2d 929, 932 (1952) ).",Party Submissions,3.5371144,4.0633483,3.9486823
"Because, under the termination clause, all of Backes ’s obligations under the guaranty terminated upon the completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco building, and because the trial court entered an unchallenged fact-finding establishing when the completion occurred that was supported by evidence at trial, we find that the trial court did not 18 err in entering a take-nothing judgment in favor of Backes. We overrule Osprin’s fir st, second, and fifth issues.",Party Submissions,13.742709,15.895283,16.635586
"Section 4.10. Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the Stockholders Agreement (as defined below), embodies the complete agreement and understanding between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof. Except as provided below, this Agreement supersedes and preempts any prior understandings, agreements or representations by or between the Parties, written or oral, that may have related to the subject matter hereof in any way. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event of any conflict between this Agreement and the Stockholders Agreement by and among Mitsui & Co., LTD., Mitsui & CO (U.S.A.), Inc. (“Mitsui”), Penske Corporation and Penske Automotive Holdings Corp. (collectively, “Penske”), dated as of July 30, 2013 (as it may be amended, supplemented or restated from time to time (solely to the extent such amendment, supplement or restatement relates to the election of directors of the Company, Mitsui’s tag-along rights, and Penske’s obligations under Section 2.3 thereof), the “Stockholders Agreement”), including Section 2.1 and Section 2.2 thereof, the terms of the Stockholders Agreement shall control, and nothing in this Agreement shall require Penske Corporation to take any action (or fail to take any action) that would, or would reasonably be expected to, result in a breach of the Stockholders Agreement.",Contract,2.956896,2.6145358,3.0409358
"To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to eliminate certain fuel excise taxes and impose a tax on greenhouse gas emissions to provide revenue for maintaining and building American infrastructure, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.129734,5.2611966,5.8281083
Signature of Presiding Juror Printed Name of Presiding Juror __ Our verdict is not unanimous. Eleven of us have agreed to each and every answer and have signed the certificate below.,Party Submissions,15.5485,23.37455,23.44038
"Id. (internal citations omitted). Essentially, the Court clarified that, unlike cases in which an employer is a subscriber to workers' compensation, an employee must prove negligence against a nonsubscribing employer.",Party Submissions,8.016025,11.019912,10.651106
"Part of Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 23 is located on a part of former land plot N o. 39/1. According to excerpts from the Real Estate Cadaster, this land plot was registered as privately owned by Selfnest doo.168 Claimants consider that this registration is incorrect and Obnova has the right of use over the respective part of this land plot. Clarification of Selfnest’s alleged ownership is relevant and material to establish the area subject to Obnova’s rights.",Legal Decisions,16.889423,18.10891,17.97844
"As Oncor noted in its initial brief, the agreement at issue in Houston Cement was materially different from the one at issue in this case. In Houston Cement, the agreement included “itemized descriptions of the initial and final appraised values of several types of property, including inventory .” Houston Cement, 2013 WL 3243281 at *1 (emphasis added). The property owner later sought to correct the agreed-upon values under Tax Code section 25.25(c), arguing that “both valuations included inventory that had been in transit and not yet located in Harris County” at the relevant times. Id. The court of appeals held that the valuation of inventory could not be corrected because “the value of inventory was a specific matter to which the agreements related,” id. at *3, and the parties had “clearly expressed harmony of opinion as to the final values of Cement’s combined business personal property and of its inventory in the signed, specifically written agreements,” id. at *2 (emphasis added).",Party Submissions,9.024481,8.854517,9.506242
"In sum, Douglas failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on her equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel theories. Accordingly, we overrule her sole issue and affirm the summary judgment in favor of Moody.",Party Submissions,6.157743,9.125145,9.190209
"CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This document complies with the form requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4 and contains 2,175 words (except for those items excluded by Rule 9.4(h)(1)). /s/ Deborah Race Deborah Race CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On October 20, 2023, I electronically filed this Motion for Rehearing from Denial of Petition for Review with the Clerk of the Court using e-File, TxCourts.gov electronic filing system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.",Party Submissions,4.6177397,6.0759,6.9645104
"This Court has recognized that differential diagnosis enjoys widespread acceptance as a valid diagnostic technique in the medical community and that it has been subjected to use, peer review, and testing. Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2010). And at least one appellate court has held that reasoning similar to Dr. Null ’ s satisfied a post-trial sufficiency review on similar facts. See Morrell v. Finke, 184 S.W.3d 257, 280 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied) (expert testimony was sufficient when expert linked brain injury to hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy based on baby’s clinical and laboratory symptoms while ruling out other potential causes of similar injury).",Party Submissions,7.6505837,7.1680965,8.096573
"But they also claim his “extensive teaching and supervisory experience, as detailed in his report, shows that he has the knowledge and experience necessary to opine on the cause of diverse neonatal injuries....” ( Id. ). To support that claim, the Walkers cite to one page of Dr. Tappan’s report in which he describes his qualifications. ( Id., citing to CR.663). There, Dr. Tappan lists his expertise in managing pregnancies and deliveries and “working with obstetrical nurses.” (CR.663).",Party Submissions,13.546588,11.85679,16.075064
"Rafiei moves on to Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enterprises, Inc., 293 P.3d 1197 (Wash. 2013). Rafiei offers Gandee as an example of a plaintiff that successfully demonstrated that an arbitration provision was unconscionably expensive. But the evidence in Gandee is much more persuasive than the evidence proffered by Rafiei. First, Ms. Gandee estimated that her claim was worth “roughly $3,500 in actual damages.” Id. at 604. Rafiei has pled that his claim is worth $1,000,000. Gandee presented evidence that her AAA fees would be $4,775, so the fees would obviously outweigh any award that she might obtain. Id. She also proved that she was currently unemployed and her husband’s income was “substantially consumed” by living expenses. Id. Rafiei’s evidence shows that he makes $240,000 a year.",Party Submissions,6.924017,6.9939694,7.377063
"Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s authority to decide a case. In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2020) (original proceeding) (per curiam) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993)). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2016).",Party Submissions,2.252419,2.2600121,2.4714825
"Petitioners were limited to claiming a latent, physical defect, which the facts did not support. Id. at *7. But the court also struggled with what duties the City owed to Catiana. Id. Unable to fully answer these questions, the court held whatever duties may exist, the City had no duty to protect patrons from the natural perils of swimming at its pool as they are “open” and “obvious.” Id. (citing Mullens v. Binsky, 719 N.E.2d 599, 604 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)). This is apparently a matter of first impression in Texas. See id. (citing Ohio law). The court also seemingly agreed with the City that because it had no duty to protect patrons from the natural perils of swimming at its pool, it also had no enforceable duty to provide lifeguards. See id.",Party Submissions,8.803297,8.636065,9.123566
"Taken that broadly, the mandatory-general-stay rule the Court adopts today would upend federal litigation as we know it. Aware that any interlocutory appeal on a dispositive issue grinds the plaintiff's case to a halt, defendants would presumably pursue that tactic at every opportunity. This would occur, for example, in interlocutory appeals available *761 as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) from orders granting preliminary injunctions. Any defense lawyer worth her salt would invoke the right to take that appeal and throw up some objection— to venue, jurisdiction, or a dispositive element of the merits—to trigger a mandatory stay. For plaintiffs, then, every preliminary-injunction motion becomes a trap: Even if the motion is granted, the defendant can take that opportunity to stop the trial court proceedings in their tracks. Facing these destabilizing consequences, the majority stops short of following its own reasoning to that ominous conclusion. Today's holding reaches only arbitration appeals under § 16(a). Ante, at 1918, 1921 – 1922. And it might well be that the concerns motivating today's mandatory-general-stay rule do not extend beyond arbitration. So the majority will not commit, for example, to concluding that appeals over non-arbitration forum-selection clauses warrant the same mandatory stay. Ante, at 1922 – 1923.",Party Submissions,7.8266063,7.939748,8.098838
"Instead of proposing modifications that could allow EOG’s wells to recover riverbed minerals, Ammonite demanded compulsory pooling even though the riverbed minerals would not be recovered by EOG’s wells. That was its position at the offer stage, 5.SCR.258, and in its MIPA application, e.g., 1.SCR.218-19, so that is the proposition the Commission rejected, FOF 7, 9, 11; COL 5. that this applicant failed to show that pooling is “necessary to prevent waste.” FOF 11; COL 5; Commission Resp. BOM at 23; see Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 102.011. That does not foreclose a future MIPA applicant from proving that forced pooling will “prevent waste” despite present lack of drainage—perhaps even on a theory like the one Ammonite advances in this Court. That is, Ammonite or another applicant might show that a forced-pooling order would prevent waste by removing “a contractual barrier” (Letter at 6) to recovery that is technically achievable and economically feasible. But such an applicant would need to make a fair and reasonable offer, see Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 102.013(b), and present evidence to the Commission establishing such achievability and feasibility. Ammonite did neither. Ammonite points to no evidence in the administrative record showing that recovery of riverbed minerals by EOG’s wells is technically achievable or economically feasible through modifications, much less that Ammonite proposed such a thing in its MIPA offers. See 3.SCR.3-8, 33-35, 5.SCR.257-59; COL 2.",Party Submissions,8.669555,8.607518,9.300607
"None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant at the time of the seizure of the assets or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,13.483333,15.683864,14.543471
"For that matter, “virtually every right that could be enforced appropriately by pretrial dismissal might loosely be described as conferring a ‘right not to stand trial.’ ” Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994). “Such motions can be made in virtually every case.” Ibid. Does every interlocutory appeal concerning a case-dispositive issue now trigger a mandatory general stay of trial court proceedings?",Party Submissions,6.073421,5.306412,6.337313
"Husband did present was not “of asubstantive and probative character to support the-decision.” S'ee In reMarriage ofC:.A.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 383 (Tex. App—Dallas 2013, no pet).",Party Submissions,15.722351,15.761842,18.307926
"HN4 [ ] ""An agency has exclusive jurisdiction [over a claim] when a statutory scheme indicates the Legislature intended the statutory process to be the exclusive means of remedying the problem to which the statute is addressed."" Tyler Asphalt, 107 S.W.3d at 838 (citing Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002) ). ""Typically, if an agency has exclusive jurisdiction [over a claim], a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial [*12] review of the agency's action."" Id. (footnote omitted). ""Until then, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss without prejudice those claims within the agency's exclusive jurisdiction."" Id. (citing Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 221 ).",Party Submissions,4.3885646,4.8226013,4.89967
"First, Walker fails at the threshold. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(e) directs mandamus applicants to seek relief from the appropriate court of appeals, if available, and only to seek relief initially in this Court if “compelling reasons” require it. As Walker concedes (at 3–4), the Election Code vests concurrent mandamus jurisdiction in both this Court and the courts of appeals. He was therefore obligated to seek relief in the court of appeals first, which he failed even to attempt. His sole stated reason for bypassing the court of appeals—an imminent need to print primary ballots—fails because Walker has had all the information needed to seek judicial relief for months or, measured charitably, at least weeks. He could have sought mandamus from the court of appeals on an expedited basis on that timeline; his failure to do so is fatal.",Party Submissions,7.3954277,8.593761,7.8553095
"Fourth , Respondents are wrong to downplay the legal errors below by claiming there is no evidence of a “require[ment]” under the correct standard.",Party Submissions,47.990173,36.966667,53.863293
"IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL......................................................i Wilbarger CAD disagrees with Oncor’s phrasing of the issues. The issues are more properly phrased: 1. May a property owner seek to change the appraised value of its property under TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25 after entering a binding and final agreement with the chief appraiser pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e)? 2. May a property owner bypass the pervasive regulatory scheme of the Texas Tax Code and lower the appraised value of its property under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act? 3. Is an appraisal review board a proper party to a suit to correct the appraisal roll notwithstanding TEX. TAX CODE § 42.21(b), which provides that a petition for review may not be brought against the appraisal review board?",Party Submissions,5.5607657,6.0588875,5.747854
"Q. Let me just clarify. You’re not saying that she was within the course and scope of her employment at the time of her injury, are you?",Party Submissions,6.9755683,9.062058,11.345321
"Furthermore, the basis of the Trial Court’s granting of the Plea to the Jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming that decision was jurisdiction-based, and as a result, this Court need not entertain any substantive law analysis when Weatherford failed to meet its threshold burden to connect Midland to the harm Weatherford alleges. Weatherford continues to push a strained argument that a regulatory statute for landfills should also extend to govern sewer systems, even after it failed to introduce a genuine issue of material fact (when it had the opportunity to do so) that might subject Midland to the statute. The fact that the Court of Appeals agreed with the obvious evidence-supported proposition that Midland’s sewer system transports domestic sewage—and thus was not a “solid waste facility”—does not give Weatherford a pass on its failure to present baseline jurisdictional evidence under the statute it relies upon.",Party Submissions,11.650957,11.99841,12.826648
"The term of this Agreement shall commence on the Effective Date and shall automatically expire on the one (1) year anniversary of the Effective Date (the “Term”). No Party shall have any obligation under this Agreement after the expiration of the Term (other than in respect of any obligations incurred during the Term, which shall survive the expiration of the Term). Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, no Party shall have any obligation hereunder to extend the Term.",Contract,3.2783744,2.9392726,3.4692938
"Gal ovelho’s equal protection claim alleged that the Emergency Orders “determin[ed] which people, businesses, services, and groups are permitted to operate their business, and who must shut down their business on the whim of Government ,” and identified no “discernable, legitimate, criteria that has any rational relationship to the governmental interest of stopping the spread of Covid-19. ” Its due process claim asserted that “[n]o local government or state government has ever provided notice of deprivation, notice of hearing, a hearing, or any meaningful review of the actions of the state and local government. ” Gal ovelho sought injunctive relief from the purportedly unconstitutional effects of the Emergency Orders.",Party Submissions,10.719437,11.67189,11.555003
"To amend title 38, United States Code, to clarify the organization of the Office of Survivors Assistance of the Department of Veterans Affairs.",Legislation,3.9677348,3.4038005,3.8263805
"Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 991 (Cal. 2003), requires that arbitration costs in employment cases must be paid by the employer in all instances. See Response at 14. As mentioned above, that position has been rejected by this Court in Poly-American. The Little opinion has been questioned by a California federal district court which raised the concern that the decision is inconsistent with AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.",Party Submissions,7.3911457,7.941522,8.923232
"Samson Got the Cases Severed by Promising They Would Be Treated Equally In November 2006, the Bordages and Hooks owners were in the same lawsuit against Samson. Their nine nearly identical leases were collectively called “Tract 4/14 Leases” based on the numbers Samson had assigned the three tracts they covered. 1CR229-34, 252-54. The owners had filed suit seeking (among other things) damages for unpaid royalties and Most Favored Nations royalties on the nearly $200 million in revenues Samson had derived from their lands, plus associated lease Late Charges. 1CR223-25, 229-34; 4CR5508-09, 5513-18; 5CR5944-49, SuppCR144. The Hooks had also sued Samson for fraudulently inducing them to agree to pooling one of the gas units. 1CR234-39.",Party Submissions,13.394368,12.473606,14.318774
"In the further alternative, the Court should affirm the remand of the case for a new trial for the reasons stated by the court of appeals or for the further reasons not addressed by that court, discussed above. As HSMiller points out, the case has been tried 43 twice already, as the unfortunate consequence of the BNC Sellers’ relentless pursuit of liquidity to satisfy the damages found in the underlying dispute and HSMiller’s attempt to blame everyone but itself for the adverse result. The waste of judicial resources is no fault of the Lawyers.",Party Submissions,20.938988,19.575764,22.811531
"See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.221(a), (b). Counsel: For APPELLANT: Stuart F. Lewis, Law Office of Stuart F. Lewis, Bryan, TX. For APPELLEE: Dwaine Boydstun, Harris & Harris, Austin, TX.",Party Submissions,7.277199,8.608413,9.35192
"This is a personal injury case that necessarily raises the initial question of Bay's standing to raise the exclusive remedy affirmative defense. In order to do so, Bay must first prove it complied with the statutorily required conditions set forth in the Texas Labor Code § 406.123, the statute that governs the type of co-employer agreements referred to as Rolling Owner Controlled Insurance Program (“ROCIPs”). Then, if the court determines that Bay has met the mandatory statutory requirements, the court will be faced with a question of first impression: whether *3 Bay has standing to seek immunity under a worker's compensation policy for the actions of an employee-tort-feasor who is outside of a potential policy clearly intended to cover and protect a work-site and its statutory participants. There is no authority for Bay to rely upon to expand the scope of a workers' compensation policy's coverage outside of its own terms.",Party Submissions,11.0298815,10.413596,11.931137
"B. SMITH COUNTY COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. [16] We agree with Tyler that the Smith County court has exclusive jurisdiction because determination of the course and scope issue is committed to the statutory workers' compensation process, judicial review is a part of that process, and judicial review must occur in Smith County. 1. COURSE AND SCOPE ISSUE COMMITTED TO STATUTORY WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROCESS *839 [17] [18] The Texas Workers' Compensation Commission clearly has exclusive jurisdiction to determine compensability because the Act vests the power to determine whether a claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits solely in the Commission, subject to judicial review.",Party Submissions,5.7497354,5.6081533,6.367701
"On Petition for Review from the Eleventh Court of Appeals, Eastland Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 55.3 and in response to this Court’s request, the City of Midland respectfully submits its response brief on the merits.",Party Submissions,6.9628005,6.7219954,6.934588
"Justice Huddle posed the following hypothetical: if Bay had gone “through each of these injuries described in the final judgment, and for this particular one said, ‘We allocate $100,000 of the 1.9 to this injury,’ would that be sufficient to carry their burden, and you would have a $100,000 settlement credit? Or do you think that you would then sort of look behind the allocation and test its veracity somehow?” Counsel for the Diocese agreed at oral argument that extrinsic evidence could be used. He suggested, however, that Bay, Ltd. should have allocated an amount to each of the 23 injuries. But that’s conflating the Sky View steps.",Party Submissions,17.362022,19.596148,19.68709
Arbitration Rule 29(4)(i) 23.1. Recordings shall be made of all hearings and sessions. The recordings shall be provided to the Parties and the Tribunal Members.,Legal Decisions,12.883772,13.804397,14.599623
Serbia argues in the Counter-Memorial that Claimants did not prove that Obnova built the buildings presently existing at its premises and argue that all Obnova’s buildings at Dunavska 17 -19 had been built bef ore the creation of Obnova’s predecessor Otpad.46 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess Serbia’s contemporaneous understanding of the: ( i ) existence of buildings at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23; and (ii) ownership and other rights to these buildings and the land plots at these premises.,Legal Decisions,12.996551,14.173433,13.771451
"The instruction to exclude only the later-in-time signature, Tex. Elec. Code §141.066(c), compounds the constitutional problems. If anything, a duplicative signature shows that the individual changed his mind and supports the second candidate more. The State’s instruction to treat differently two candidates who received the same signature from the same individual does not serve any sufficient governmental interest and is entirely arbitrary.",Party Submissions,21.259655,28.600233,18.761078
The Court of Appeals did not address the volume of information presented by Petitioners to demonstrate that those omissions did not render the program false. Op.,Party Submissions,28.596298,30.74629,35.628838
"National Archives (to the extent that documents in the National Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) by November 27, 2023.",Legal Decisions,12.524337,15.401379,19.86112
"Justice Devine here would likewise be entitled to cure signature defects. He filed his application nearly a month before the statutory deadline. Ex.C. Chairman Rinaldi accepted the application on December 1, 2023. Ex.C. Understandably, Rinaldi did not identify that some of Justice Devine’s signers had, at least facially, previously signed Relator’s application, because Relator did not file his application until three days later. Ex.B. So even though it was possible for Chairman Rinaldi, as the Election Code contemplates, to have identified this facial deficiency and offered Justice Devine an opportunity to cure in the seven days between Relator’s filing and the statutory deadline, Rinaldi did not provide that opportunity. So just like the candidates in Francis, Holcomb, and Sharp, Justice Devine would be “entitled to an opportunity to cure and be included on the primary ballot.” Holcomb, 186 S.W.3d at 554.",Party Submissions,9.638814,9.378316,10.7717905
"Liberty incorrectly argues that all it had to do was plead “the contract was signed by the mayor and therefore properly executed.” The only authority Liberty cites for this proposition is the Court of Appeals opinion in this very case. A city “may contract only upon express authorization of the city council. .. by vote of that body reflected in the minutes.” City of Bonham, 871 S.W.2d at 767. The “proof of the governing body’s acts may only be supplied by the authenticated minutes of the meeting at which the action occurred, unless the minutes have been lost or destroyed.” Id. With regard to the pleading burden, “[a] plaintiff suing to establish a contract with a city has the burden to both plead and prove that the minutes show the council’s act in authorizing or ratifying the contract.” Id. “Persons or entities contracting with the governmental unit are charged by law with notice of the limits of their authority and are bound at their peril to ascertain if the contemplated contract is properly authorized.” Id.",Party Submissions,8.116504,8.78288,8.776295
We conclude that RLB and McCarthy contractually waived their respective rights under section 272.001 to void the forum-selection clause and the trial court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. We must now determine whether MVP has an adequate remedy by appeal.,Party Submissions,11.775132,14.447681,16.858671
It would be good if you could describe this process for registration and how long it takes to obtain registrations ?736 520. Ms Jensen replied on 12 June 2013: The attached regulations for registration and reporting when fishing in waters outside any state’s fisheries jurisdiction are sent for information.,Legal Decisions,32.266895,31.968086,35.958717
"For example, while both providers generally alleged that the reports were deficient as to causation, neither objected to the reports ’ discussion of foreseeability at any stage. The Court of Appeals, though, raised the objection sua sponte to find the reports deficient on this issue. See Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *5.",Party Submissions,13.062988,12.233491,13.231383
"The point is that Willacy created an exception to the finality of § 1.111(e) agreements for fraud and for fraud only. Of course, there will be an exception for fraud. How could there not be an exception for fraud? But, this Court did not make a judicial exception to the explicit legislative finality of § 1.111(e) agreements for any other reason. If anything, by not over-ruling the long list of cases affirming the finality of § 1.111(e) agreements, and even citing as authoritative Bastrop and MHCB, what this Court did was accentuate that the exception to finality of § 1.111(e) agreements is for fraud and fraud only. Fraud is a fundamentally different thing than a mutual mistake. Fraud in overt and intentional wrongdoing, a deliberate attempt to obtain a result that is neither equitable nor within the object of the statute. Willacy at 51-52.",Party Submissions,8.693484,7.9963007,9.042076
"Aside from the Contract, Liberty claims that it is “obligated—by its permit and simple plumbing realities—to provide treatment to wastewater reaching its WWTP, including Ames’s flows exceeding the TAV.” Liberty’s Response at 14-15. However, there is nothing in Section 26.121 of the Texas Water Code (general prohibition against unauthorized waste discharges cited by Liberty) or in Liberty’s TPDES wastewater permit that requires it to specifically treat Ames’s wastewater in excess of the TAV. The real reason that Liberty has continued to accept Ames’s wastewater is that if Liberty cut off Ames, it would be cutting off service to its OWN RESIDENTS within part of Liberty’s Certificate of Convenience and Necessity (“CCN”).",Party Submissions,10.768422,9.915249,11.102002
The court of appeals below opined correctly. The agreement of the parties pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e) is final and not subject to review save for fraud.,Party Submissions,11.594917,12.816456,13.912354
"West Headnotes (1) [1] Workers' Compensation Remand in General In employee's direct action against employer alleging bad faith denial of reasonable and timely workers' compensation benefits, Supreme Court would grant employee's petition for review of affirmance of summary judgment for employer and would remand for appropriate action, where dispute over compensability of claim was never resolved by Workers' Compensation Commission and Supreme Court could not determine whether it was still possible for employee to proceed before Commission, that has exclusive jurisdiction over entitlement to benefits.",Party Submissions,14.159123,12.770441,13.08028
"GREG ABBOTT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF TEXAS; COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS, AND CITY OF FRISCO, TEXAS, Appellees On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 219-02595-2020. Opinion delivered by Justice Pedersen, III. Justices Goldstein and Rosenberg participating.",Party Submissions,3.446253,4.478031,4.94076
"The Legislature can rectify a mistaken judicial interpretation, and if it does not do so, there is little reason for courts to reconsider a prior statutory construction. Id .... [U]nless the Supreme Court has overruled its decision or the Legislature has superseded it by statute, [an intermediate appellate] court is bound by [the Supreme Court of Texas’s] statutory interpretation ....",Party Submissions,8.154589,8.75327,8.661431
"Both section 31.004(a) and section 24.008 cover more than just res judicata. Section 31.004(a) explicitly goes beyond prohibiting giving “res judicata” effect to lower court decisions by also prohibiting them from having effect as “estoppel by judgment”—i.e., “collateral estoppel.” Avila v. St. Luke’s Lutheran Hosp., 948 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied). And section 24.008 reaches further still, explicitly forbidding courts from giving any legal effect to the result in an eviction proceeding that would “bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits.” And both statutes have long been interpreted to reach further still, preventing “a judgment in a court of limited jurisdiction from controlling the results in a suit in a district court” for any reason—legal or factual. Genender v. Kirkwood, 506 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (quoting McClendon v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 796 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex.",Party Submissions,4.911246,5.253634,5.036213
"Notably, “endangerment under subsection (D) focuses on evidence related to the child’s environment.” In the Interest of V.A., 598 S.W.3d 317, 329 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet. h.). “Environment refers to the acceptability of living conditions, as well as a parent’s conduct in the home.” Id. “A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger and the parent is aware of the danger but consciously disregards it.” Id. Moreover, “in evaluating endangerment under subsection D, the court is to consider the child’s environment before the Department obtained custody.” Id. “Subsection D is not a basis for termination of parental rights if the parent was unaware of the endangering environment.” Id. “There must be clear and convincing evidence both of endangerment and the parent’s awareness of the endangering environment.” Id.",Party Submissions,4.7422237,5.0368376,5.168136
"Texas Rule of Evidence 702 requires experts to be “qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to offer testimony. TEX. R. EVID. 702; see also Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1996). And, although the Walkers are correct that rules about expert qualifications should not be interpreted rigidly (Pet. Br. at 40), not every “medical doctor can always testify on any issue against any other medical doctor in a medical malpractice case.” Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 152; see also In re Commitment of Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296, 304-05 (Tex. 2012) (“Credentials are important, but credentials alone do not qualify an expert to testify. We have observed, for example, that “a medical license does not automatically qualify the holder ‘to testify as an expert on every medical question.’”).",Party Submissions,4.6313286,4.7774343,4.774784
"Contrary to HSMiller’s assertions, this case does not involve an intellectual dilemma for trial judges in legal malpractice cases. It does not require the Court to revisit its writings on incidental instructions or consider a new twist to what might be “incidental.” There is no 6 dilemma here, only an abuse of discretion and harmful error. Under the Court’s established caselaw, the jury instruction was erroneous and reversible.",Party Submissions,13.915406,13.530499,15.010422
"The distinct characteristics of Rafiei’s case set it apart from this Court’s jurisprudence on prohibitive arbitration costs. Rafiei’s case presents compelling evidence that the arbitration agreement he entered into is unconscionable due to the potential prohibitive costs associated with the arbitration process. Unlike Shattenkirk, Rafiei's agreement provides a clear and detailed fee structure under the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, eliminating any speculative nature regarding the associated costs. Moreover, the absence of protective measures, such as expenditure ceilings, distinguishes this case from In re Poly-America and makes it more analogous to Santorsola, putting Rafiei at risk of bearing exorbitant fees without any ceiling or limit. A dditionally, the application of the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, which lack cost caps, creates a significant distinction from In re Olshan. Overall, the arbitration agreement in this case, due to its detailed fee structure and lack of protective measures, threatens his ability to effectively vindicate his rights, rendering the agreement unconscionable.",Party Submissions,8.698645,8.651826,9.344319
"This Court has been clear that in defamation-by-gist cases, the “potential chilling effect [on speech] is especially strong.” Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 632 (Tex. 2018). The appellate court committed two errors in applying that complex doctrine by (1) creating an endorsement exception to the third-party-allegation rule that simply does not exist; and (2) failing to consider the truth of the actual facts the Program reported, rather than those Barina claims were omitted. This Court should grant review and reject those arguments, lest they infect Texas defamation law and imperil the press’ ability to report on complex social issues and advocate for systemic change.",Party Submissions,10.270462,10.658038,11.136606
"Article 1 The information that is required to be automatically exchanged pursuant to Part XX of Income Tax Act, as added by Section 78(1) of the Budget Implementation Act, 2023, No 1, and the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on automatic exchange of information on income derived through digital platforms (‘DPI-MCAA’) currently signed by the competent authorities of Canada and Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden (‘the signatory Member States’) is equivalent, within the meaning of Section I, subparagraph A(7) of Annex V to Directive 2011/16/EU, to the information specified in Section III, paragraph B, of Annex V to Directive 2011/16/EU.",Legislation,5.3438168,5.1431913,5.171105
"For the avoidance of doubt, Claimant notes that its readiness to limit its request in this matter is not to be construed as an acceptance of all of Respondent’s objections regarding the Request. Further the Claimant herein reserves its right to request the production of any such Documents at a later stage.",Legal Decisions,11.485278,10.376781,11.849436
"Both parties rely on Loya v. Loya, 473 S.W.3d 362, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2015), rev’d on other grounds, 526 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. 2017), which is the most recent Texas Supreme Court opinion discussing adiscretionary bonus received by aspouse post-divorce.",Party Submissions,5.5043874,5.7925277,5.8582144
"While this Court has never directly addressed a negligent undertaking in the context of either a public pool or an artificial condition, the logical extension of Wilson suggests that the City negligently undertook a duty to make Buttercup pool safe according to the Mandatory Safety Rule. Wilson, 8 S.W.3d at 636. The court of appeals’ holding is a sweeping pronouncement that owners and operators of public pools have no duty at all to protect patrons from the perils of swimming even when they promise that they will keep the premises safe. Delapena, 2022 WL 16993493, at *7. Such a holding is out of step with this Court’s jurisprudence. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 627. This Court should grant this petition to clarify under what circumstances a governmental unit assumes a duty by posting a Mandatory Safety Policy.",Party Submissions,9.427371,9.5941515,9.705868
"Texas Bar No. 24058017 TNesloney@edlaw.com Darryl W. Pruett Texas Bar No. 00784795 DPruett@edlaw.com 4201 W. Parmer Lane, Suite A100 Austin, Texas 78727 (512) 476-9944 (512) 472-2599 fax I certify that based on a word count run on Microsoft Word 365, this Reply contains 2,320 words, excluding the portions exempt from the word count under Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,5.401112,7.0825996,7.102036
"Any and all documents based on which the company Selfnest doo was inscribed as an owner of a part of a former land plot No. 39/1 CM Stari grad (Claimants understand that the land plot was renumbered, and its borders changed recently).",Legal Decisions,50.656845,51.0672,60.633667
"Under Delaware law, as summarized in CKC’s petition, a material personal benefit must be alleged only in the absence of self-dealing. PFR at 16-17. The cases cited by the majority opinion fall within category 3 of Delaware’s demand-futility rubric, governing directors or managers who are insufficiently “independent.” See PFR at 17. Alpesh’s self-dealing does not fall within that category of cases. Adopting a mistaken analysis that was not briefed by the parties, the majority committed error.",Party Submissions,16.566807,15.780079,17.839186
"ANYTHING HEREIN TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING, and in lieu of the terms and provisions contained in Sections 91.401 through 91.406 of the Texas Natural Resources Code, the parties hereto specifically agree that the following provisions shall apply to this Lease and all royalty payments made hereunder or any other rights as provided in the above listed sections, and that such provisions of the Texas Natural Resources Code shall not be applicable; such parties further, by their signatures below, waive any and all rights which might be claimed or asserted under such Sections 91.401 and 91.406 of the Texas Natural Resources Code; thus, it is specifically provided that: A. All rentals and royalties which may become due hereunder shall be payable at addresses shown in Exhibit “B” or at such other place, if any, as may be specified by written directive of the royalty owner, as to such owner's interest.",Party Submissions,6.094868,5.9225264,6.1257095
"Unless and until such time as Shares are issued in settlement of vested Performance Share Units, the Participant shall have no ownership of the Shares allocated to the Performance Share Units and, subject to the provisions of Section 7, shall have no rights as a shareholder with respect to such Shares. Upon settlement, the Company shall cause the Company’s transfer agent to issue a certificate or certificates for the Shares in the name of the Participant, or to make a book entry record of such issuance, and the Participant shall thereupon have all rights as a shareholder with respect to such Shares, including the right to vote such Shares and to receive all dividends and other distributions paid with respect to such Shares. The Company may place on the certificates representing the Shares such legend or legends as the Company may deem appropriate and the Company may place a stop transfer order with respect to such Shares with the transfer agent(s) for the Shares.",Contract,3.2278433,3.6099749,3.474357
"To speed up the deployment of electricity transmission and clean energy, with proper input from affected communities, and for other purposes.",Legislation,36.84754,29.194666,32.883076
"Indeed, the court of appeals did not consider the undisputed evidence when it errantly decided this based solely on Tostado’s allegations. Op.",Party Submissions,24.959913,26.65285,28.100895
The United States objects to Request No. 3.h for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.,Legal Decisions,9.011099,13.992557,15.4416065
"As the lower court acknowledged, sections 25.25(g) and 42.21(b) “seem to be in conflict.” See Appendix J to Oncor’s Brief at 766. To the extent they do, this Court should resolve the conflict in accordance with established rules of statutory construction. The more specific provision in section 25.25(g) should control. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. 1994).",Party Submissions,5.4957113,5.8443236,5.933273
"To require the Secretary of Energy to conduct a study and submit a report on the greenhouse gas emissions intensity of certain products produced in the United States and in certain foreign countries, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.0406804,4.601257,5.255618
"However, the day after filing its omnibus response, Galovelho also filed its Second Amended Petition, which added allegations that the Emergency Orders were “ invalid because they are unconstitutional and illegal under Texas Law.” The pleading alleged equitable claims based on the Emergency Orders, including claims for both injunctive and declaratory relief. Galovelho pleaded that he was denied due process rights to notice and a hearing before the Emergency Orders took effect and that restaurants were being denied equal protection of the law without a rational basis for the deprivation. He prayed that appellees be permanently enjoined from enforcing the provisions of the Emergency Orders and that the court enter judgment declaring the various Emergency Orders unconstitutional and invalid.",Party Submissions,7.912094,8.102428,8.527712
"Termination. The Company, by action taken by its Board of Directors, may terminate the Plan and pay Participants and Beneficiaries their Account Balances in a single lump sum at any time, to the extent and in accordance with Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-3(j)(4)(ix). If a Participating Employer terminates its participation in the Plan, the benefits of affected Employees shall be paid at the time provided in Article VI.",Contract,4.877133,4.6602087,5.649619
"The SLSA requires a written contract between the staff leasing company and its client company and that written contract must provide that the leasing company “shares, as provided in Subsection (b), with the client company the right of direction and control over employees assigned to a client's worksite. Garza at 478. The leasing company further decides whether to obtain workers' compensation coverage, and its election is binding on its client. Garza at 478. If the leasing company elects to provide workers' compensation coverage, its policy covers both the leasing company and its client. If it doesn‘t, then both employers BERRY CONTRACTING, L.P., d/b/a Bay Ltd. And Juan..., 2017 WL 1806766...",Party Submissions,12.195769,10.813388,12.445635
"Under Texas law, there are only two exceptions to the requirement that each employer obtain its own insurance to avoid common law liability. One is the blanket statutory coverage under the Staff Leasing Services Act (“SLSA”). See TEX. LAB. CODE § 91, et seq. The other is a ROCIP under Texas Labor Code § 406.123. Both exceptions require written contracts.",Party Submissions,10.209635,9.392747,11.198422
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Petitioners pray that the Court grant the Petition for Review, reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings, and that Petitioners have such other and further relief to which they may be justly entitled.",Party Submissions,3.0988967,4.650197,5.1112185
"HARMLESS TDCC FROM AND AGAINST, ANY AND ALL CLAIMS WHICH ARE MADE, ASSERTED OR ALLEGED AGAINST TDCC BY ANY ONE OR MORE UCC MEMBERS OR ANY OTHER PERSON, OR WHICH ARISE IN FAVOR OF ANY ONE OR MORE UCC MEMBERS OR ANY OTHER PERSON, ORIGINATING FROM ANY SOURCE IN CONNECTION WITH (a) TDCC ACTING AS AN AGENT OR DELEGATE FOR ANY ONE OR MORE UCC MEMBERS, AND/OR (b) THE FAILURE OF A UCC SUBSIDIARY TO FULLY ACCEPT, ABIDE BY, OR COMPLY WITH, THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, AND/OR (c) ARRANGED PURCHASES AND/OR ARRANGED SALES, AND/OR (d) THE USE OR APPLICATION, BY A UCC MEMBER OR ANY OTHER PERSON, OF ANY PRODUCT SUPPLIED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT.",Contract,4.3124094,3.7976182,4.328479
"Furthermore, it is doubtful at best that there was mutual mistake. The mistake happened when Oncor, or its predecessor, erroneously rendered miles of lines to Wilbarger CAD and then signed a settlement agreement with Wilbarger CAD to the effect that the values were accurate. Oncor made the mistake. Wilbarger CAD simply took Oncor at its word and listed the property according to Oncor’s representations and agreement. G. Oncor erroneously cites to Matagorda Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal.",Party Submissions,12.569267,15.3057165,13.705845
"Neither Wilson Plaintiffs’ participation in pre-trial proceedings nor their long-shot goal of obtaining offensive collateral estoppel on the Harpst judgment would trigger Taylor Privity Path 3. A simple reading of its plain language demonstrates that it is talking about formal legal representations, including class action representatives, trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries. Nobody is claiming that the Harpst plaintiffs were class representatives, trustees, guardians, or other fiduciaries for the Wilson Plaintiffs, so Taylor Privity Path 3 does not apply. Without such formal legal representation relationships, parties with similar claims based on similar underlying facts or parties that share the same lawyer or co-parties in pre-trial proceedings do not qualify for Taylor Privity Path 3.",Party Submissions,13.155199,11.763436,14.259373
We sustain Bay's first issue. This requires us to consider whether summary judgment in favor of the Manns could be affirmed on any other basis.,Party Submissions,18.20009,47.652134,55.47588
"Respondent has conducted a reasonable search for the category of documents requested, and provides Claimant with the documents identified in the request that are in its possession, custody or control, as resulting from that search.",Legal Decisions,12.293462,19.341578,15.236405
"Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314 (2018) 4. Was Randy Mann in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his accident?",Party Submissions,7.0397987,6.720871,8.171048
"En el caso de procedimiento de arbitraje el Tribunal determinará, salvo acuerdo contrario de las partes, los gastos en que estas hubieren incurrido en el procedimiento, y decidirá la forma de pago y la manera de distribución de tales gastos, de los honorarios y gastos de los miembros del Tribunal y de los derechos devengados por la utilización del Centro. Tal fijación y distribución formarán parte del laudo.",Legal Decisions,6.4634924,9.107375,7.8969727
"The issue of expropriation 300. Article XI of Annex III of the Treaty, invoked by Claimant, provides: CONDITIONS FOR EXPROPRIATION Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalised either directly or indirectly through the application of measures equivalent to expropriation, except for reasons of public interest, in non-discriminatory fashion, and after payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, in a freely convertible currency and in accordance with due process of law and with the general principles of treatment established in Articles III and IV.",Legal Decisions,6.1828246,5.05581,6.67274
"The City argued that there is no waiver under the TTCA for a premises liability claim that does not allege a physical defect in the property. City’s Reply Brief, p.16. Relying on Sampson, the court of appeals agreed, holding that the City’s failures were not an actionable premises liability claim. Delapena, 2022 WL 16993493, at *4-5. Both the City and the court of appeals appear to read Sampson to limit premises defect claims against a governmental unit to conditions of real property only. See id.",Party Submissions,7.547547,7.9098554,8.697322
"HN2 [ ] Burdens of Proof, Movant Persuasion & Proof When both parties move for summary judgment on the same issues and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, a reviewing court examines the summary judgment evidence presented by both sides, determines all questions presented, and if reversing, renders such judgment as the trial court should have rendered. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). When reviewing a summary judgment, the reviewing court takes as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulges every reasonable inference, and resolves any doubts in his favor.",Party Submissions,3.5046458,4.409035,4.12569
"After Mann filed suit against Bay for the injuries caused by Alvarez, Bay answered with a general denial and the affirmative defense of exhaustion of remedies. 22 To end the litigation against it, Bay then urged its own workers' compensation carrier to cover Mann's injuries and provide him benefits. 23 Prior to the underlying lawsuit, Bay took no steps to assist Mr. Mann in obtaining benefits.",Party Submissions,12.416101,11.553502,17.266354
"While the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue, the providers also objected to both doctors’ qualifications to offer causation testimony. Citing judicial efficiency, this Court has exercised its discretionary authority to consider undecided issues when addressing the sufficiency of preliminary exert reports. See Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 226; Baty v. Futrell, 543 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. 2018) ( “ Although the court of appeals did not address the report ’ s sufficiency as to breach and causation, the parties argued those issues here, and we will address them in the interest of judicial economy); see also Tex. R. App. P. 53.4. The Walkers respectfully request that the Court address the qualifications objections here for similar reasons.",Party Submissions,8.59312,9.033302,9.171258
Marital Residence Wife contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Husband aone hundred percent separate property interest in the marital residence because the evidence indicated he gied her afty-percent interest as her separate property. Husband responds the evidence was sufcient to support the trial court’s characterization of the marital residence such that there was no abuse of discretion.,Party Submissions,12.29092,11.431443,11.900982
"Separation from Service Benefit. A Participant who is entitled to receive a Separation from Service Benefit shall receive payment of his or her Retirement Account and each Separation from Service Account in a single lump sum, unless the Participant has elected on his or her Compensation Deferral Agreement to have an Account paid in annual installments.",Contract,5.580848,5.515052,7.773268
"See supra Part I.B. Market actors, as well as litigants and courts, will have to grapple with how to reconcile these decisions. Reported § 2301.467(a)(1) cases have been relatively infrequent, but this ruling risks an uptick in manufacturers/distributors imposing onerous new standards. And the infrequency of appellate cases on § 2301.467(a)(1) makes review here more appropriate because another chance may not arise soon, yet the statute will in the meantime have a widespread and important effect in the industry. Manufacturers, distributors, dealers, ALJs, the Board, and lower courts should not be left to divine the law. The Court should grant review and provide clarity.",Party Submissions,12.821163,12.254857,14.339621
Respondent takes note of Claimants' agreement to conduct a search for and to produce non-privileged documents that are responsive to this request. Respondent requests Claimants to provide a privilege log as explained in Respondent’s general comments above.,Legal Decisions,10.838362,10.699582,12.767634
"Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314 (2018) a certified self-insurer, the copy must be filed with the division.",Party Submissions,12.567868,11.971361,15.008984
"Galovelho argues that “ the only way a claim to the constitutionality of a statue, or actions thereunder, could be rendered moot is by some other declaration determining the statute or actions thereunder unconstitutional. ” It cites cases dealing largely with a plaintiff’s complaint about the defendant’s interpretation of a statute or application of a policy. See, e.g., Lakey v. Taylor ex rel. Shearer, 278 S.W.3d 6, 9 (Tex. App. — Austin 2008, no pet.) (dispute over Texas Department of State Health Services’ policy and practice regarding providing competency -restoration treatment to persons found incompetent to stand trial); Tex. Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (dispute over amount of civil penalty permitted for HMO’s failure to file annual Health Plan Employer Data Information Set report). These cases address the situation where a defendant abandons its position on the statutory interpretation or application of a policy and then contends the plaintiff’s claim is moot; the reviewing courts conclude that the parties’ same dispute could arise again if the government reasserts its interpretation or policy. See Lakey, 278 S.W.3d at 12; Tex. Health Care Info. Council, 94 S.W.3d at 847-- 48.",Party Submissions,6.30343,6.8380823,6.7618275
"Oncor attempts to distinguish Houston Cement by arguing that the “value of the inventory was a specific matter to which the agreements related,” citing Houston Cement at *3, Oncor’s Brief at 32. The alleged distinction is contrived. The value of the electric lines in question was “a specific matter to which the agreement[] [in this case] related. Appendix A, I C.R. 18.",Party Submissions,17.838007,21.695385,23.201502
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade in accordance with the applicable regulations.265 In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".266 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.267 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek. B, U : The request is overly broad Claimants seek ""any and all"" documents related to the preparation of the 2015 DRP in general, without specifying the time frame, and not only those dealing specifically with the reasons for rezoning the land plot located across the street from Dunavska 17-19 and 23 or addressing Obnova's alleged property rights. As a result, production of the requested documents would be unreasonably burdensome for Respondent. R, M : Claimants have not demonstrated the relevance and materiality of the requested documents. It is irrelevant in the context of the 2013 DRP that the 2015 DRP rezoned the land across from the Dunavska Plots, where a bus depot was located, for residential developments. At the time of preparation of the 2013 DRP (or before), the bus depot was not considered as a possible location for the bus loop and the relocation of the bus depot was considered only in June 2015.268 This request is yet another example of a ""fishing 109 expedition"", with Claimants seeking production of a time-unlimited category of documents, which Claimants consider to be helpful in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case.",Legal Decisions,8.67601,9.1972,8.9737
"Arbitration Rule 31 21.1. The Tribunal may convene, on its own initiative or if the Parties so request, case management conferences with the Parties in accordance with ICSID Arbitration Rule 31 in order to (i) identify uncontested facts (e.g., joint chronology of facts); (ii) clarify and narrow the issues in dispute (e.g., address tribunal questions, decision tree, road map, matric and/or skeleton arguments); or (iii) address any other procedural or substantive issue related to the resolution of the dispute (e.g., appointment of Tribunal-appointed expert, production of evidence).",Legal Decisions,7.321343,7.6478868,7.719406
"That Walker has no pre-election recourse is his own fault. The Court in Kha-noyan noted the relators’ delay of three weeks between passage of the complained-of map and filing the lawsuit. Yet here, Walker waited 53 days—over twice as long as the relators in Khanoyan—from Justice Devine’s application to the filing of this case seeking his removal from the ballot. Even accounting for some amount of time necessary to review signatures and draft a petition, Walker cannot begin to justify the weeks that he sat on his rights before seeking to upend an in-progress election.",Party Submissions,18.923412,20.151054,21.142143
"See Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801–02 (Tex.1994) (stating to establish collateral estoppel, it is necessary that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the first action). Thus, the course and scope issue could be tried again in Smith County with a different result if the Harris County suit were tried first. In contrast, the Gaonas and Tyler are both parties to the Smith County suit; thus, its determination on course and scope would bind the parties if it were tried first. See id.",Party Submissions,6.817756,9.390268,8.143816
"To promote space situational awareness and space traffic coordination and to modify the functions and leadership of the Office of Space Commerce, and for other purposes.",Legislation,12.065433,10.662614,13.563283
To amend the Consumer Product Safety Act to strike provisions relating to the maximum civil penalties for violations of product safety standards.,Legislation,8.620973,6.965145,8.925964
"Barina has no meaningful response to these facts. First, Barina denies that she offered to end the guardianship proceedings in exchange for a portion of Thrash’s estate. Resp. Br. at 29, citing CR1:911 at 32:40. Her self-serving denial is unpersuasive.",Party Submissions,12.850095,16.486277,15.918319
The United States objects to Request No. 2.a. Claimants have not established that the requested documents are relevant to the U.S. preliminary objection or material to its outcome.,Legal Decisions,17.028614,17.520935,19.822111
"The following analysis is ultimately unnecessary and any opinion by a court on the matter would be advisory, as Weatherford has failed to meet its burden to show jurisdiction over a SWDA claim against Midland; however, we address Weatherford’s contentions regarding the Court’s precedent to show there are no inconsistencies between the Trial Court’s and Court of Appeals’ application of existing law to the facts in the underlying case and this Court’s SWDA precedent.",Party Submissions,11.931591,15.05973,14.500828
"Subcontractor agrees to promptly make good without cost to the Owner or McCarthy any and all defects due to faulty workmanship and/or materials which may appear within the guarantee or warranty period so established in the Contract Documents, and if no such period be stipulated in the Contract Documents, then such guarantees shall be for a period of one year from date of completion and acceptance of the Project by the Owner. Such warranty obligation of Subcontractor includes all costs to remove or correct work of Subcontractor or others not otherwise covered by said warranty in order to perform the warranty work. Receipt by McCarthy of all guarantees or warranties stipulated by the Contract Documents is required prior to processing Subcontractor's final payment. This warranty shall be in addition to all other warranties and remedies, expressed or implied, under the law or the Contract Documents.",Party Submissions,6.137283,5.509247,6.495163
"Bonus “A premium paid in addition to what is due or expected; esp., a payment by way of division of a business's profits, given over and above normal compensation <year-end bonus>.” Bonus, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).",Party Submissions,12.41152,11.780493,14.123173
"Further, Respondents failed to address Petitioners’ point that the court of appeals failed to apply the correct summary judgment standard. Specifically, the court of appeals failed to consider all evidence favorable to Petitioners as true, committing an error of law of substantial importance to Texas. In fact, Respondents specifically ask this Court to disregard the summary judgment standard by refusing to consider admitted evidence that is favorable to the Petitioners. The Texas PricePoint records list reasonable prices of certain medical services provided to each patient. These records were admitted into evidence. Respondents argue, “this Court should refuse to consider the evidence.” Respondents’ Br. at 20.",Party Submissions,10.465386,10.479923,10.1531
"On 1 April, the EU sent a letter to NEAFC and all delegation leaders informing them that an EU vessel intends to conduct experimental fishing for snow crab and red king crab in parts of the Smutthullet in accordance with Recommendation 19:2015 (recommendation related to the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in NEAFC’s regulatory area). The relevant area is the Russian continental shelf, cf. the Demarcation Agreement of 2010. If the snow crab and red king crab are considered sedentary species, they will be subject to shelf jurisdiction and it will be up to the coastal state to decide on any experimental fishing in the relevant area, cf. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 77 (2). Given that the relevant area where experimental fishing is to be carried out is subject to Russian shelf jurisdiction, it is Russia that has the clearest interest in pointing this out to NEAFC. At the same time, the snow crab will eventually also be able to be on the Norwegian shelf and it will therefore be in Norway’s interest to point out to NEAFC that NEAFC here cannot allow experimental fishing without the coastal state’s consent.",Legal Decisions,8.374954,7.323232,8.291339
"Naba’a, an owner of Sargeant, and/or members of his family. Id at 181. This personal dislike is reflected in Respondent’s own decision to file a suit against not only Sargeant, but Mr. Abu Naba’a personally, in the Dominican Republic’s local administrative courts. See Claimant’s Memorial ¶ 102. Respondent’s Memorial makes clear that it considers Mr. Abu Naba’a’s, as well as his son’s, personal relationship with members of the Dominican government relevant and material because it includes numerous unsubstantiated allegations about Sargeant’s corruption due to those relationships. See Respondent’s Memorial ¶ 248. Indeed, Respondent’s Memorial cites multiple extremely negative articles about Mr. Abu Naba’a’s son. See Respondent’s Memorial ¶ 248(v), n. 139, R-0042, R-0043. If Mr. Abu Naba’s personal relationships and his son’s personal relationships were not relevant, Respondent would not have mentioned them multiple times in its Memorial.",Legal Decisions,7.242801,7.453052,7.7594323
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 2.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,25.689241,30.791883,37.788612
"By 15:25, H.W.’s non-reassuring fetal heartrate pattern was Category II-III, with minimal variability, inadequate accelerations (less than 15 minutes above baseline for longer than 15 seconds), and recurrent decelerations. App. 7, CR 668-69. In response, Dr. Castillo should have ordered uterine resuscitative measures and decreased Pitocin to reduce uterine contraction frequency. Id. Instead, she did the opposite — ordering Nurse Beukleman to increase Pitocin to 15-minute intervals, a move that went against a BSA protocol mandating longer, 30-minute intervals: According to ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 116, a patient with Category II tracing, absent accelerations, and minimal FHR variability should be treated with intrauterine resuscitative measures, including lateral positioning, maternal oxygen administration, IV fluid bolus, and reduction of uterine contraction frequency by decreasing oxytocin. Dr. Castillo failed to meet the standard of care at 15:25 on 05/22/2015 when she ordered the Pitocin to be increased every 15 minutes despite strong (90-100 mmHg) contractions every 1-3 minutes, lasting 70-120 seconds, when there was a non-reassuring FHR pattern (Category II-III) manifest by minimal variability, inadequate accelerations (less than 15 by 15), and recurrent decelerations. She did so despite signing the BSAH’s Oxytocin Infusion Protocol orders (Plaintiff 0000216) mandating that Pitocin only be increased every 30 minutes.",Party Submissions,6.993574,7.622967,6.945244
"The tenant’s claim in Kemp did not fail because of anything that occurred in the forcible entry and retainer action itself. Thus, there is no conflict between the result in Kemp and Texas law on the division of authority between the district courts and the justice of the peace courts, or the proper dividing line between the matters that be heard in a forcible entry and detainer action and those that must be heard in a constructive-eviction action. Thus, Kemp cannot be used to rationalize the conflicts created in this case between the basic statutory principles and the court of appeals’ untenable rule.",Party Submissions,9.95514,11.660058,10.514892
"By mistakenly relying on Thompson, not only did the Court of Appeals effectively review the trial court’s ruling de novo, but it also went as far as to identify supposed deficiencies that neither BSA nor Dr. Castillo raised at any stage of the litigation.",Party Submissions,14.050963,13.810609,15.702013
"For column 4: Indicate the approach: Eradication or Containment. Please, include as many rows as necessary, depending on the number of DA per pest and the approaches these areas are subject to.",Legislation,34.20888,44.592457,49.071613
FAILURE OF A PARTY TO MAKE A CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT TO THE PLACE AND IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY A COURT ORDER MAY RESULT IN THE PARTY'S NOT RECEIVING CREDIT FOR MAKING THE PAYMENT.,Party Submissions,3.8302522,4.372088,4.322567
"Section 4.03. Successors and Assigns; Parties in Interest. Neither this Agreement nor any of the rights or obligations under this Agreement shall be assigned, in whole or in part, by any Party without the prior written consent of the other Party (in the case of the Company, with such assignment or such consent to assignment being authorized by Independent Approval). Subject to the foregoing, the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties and their respective successors and permitted assigns. Nothing in this Agreement, express or implied, is intended to confer any rights, remedies or causes of action under or by reason of this Agreement upon any Person other than the Parties and their respective successors and permitted assigns.",Contract,2.829917,2.750739,3.372851
"B, V, U : The request is unduly burdensome as it covers a period of 50 years. Respondent cannot reasonably be bound to produce all documents from this time period that relate to the Dunavska Plots. The request is also unduly broad and vague in that it captures all notes prepared in the course of conducting a geometric survey, regardless of whether said notes (or survey) concerned or had any bearing on the Objects in dispute. PCC : Claimants could have obtained these documents themselves by submitting a request to the Cadastre (see above request no. 9). R, M : The requested documents are also irrelevant to Claimants’ case and are not material for the outcome of the proceedings, as explained at request no. 9 above. Claimants' request is little more than a fishing expedition for documentation proving “when the buildings at Dunavska 17 -19, as well as Dunavska 23, were built”. Claimants have not identified any specific documen ts or category of documents that are in Respondent's possession which provide this information and instead are casting about for any potentially relevant information which might be in Respondent's possession. However, if Obnova built the Objects, as Claimants allege, Obnova (and therefore Claimants) would be in possession of documents proving the construction.",Legal Decisions,11.916268,13.334859,12.260933
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,26.068045,30.948666,38.062782
The United States objects to Request No. 1.j for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.,Legal Decisions,9.167935,13.633328,15.608652
"Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex.1988). The court with the first-filed suit should proceed, and the other suit should be abated. See id. This rule applies when both courts are proper forums for the suit. See id.",Party Submissions,6.1214833,7.2002354,7.9578733
"In sum, homebuyers like Rafiei should not, in equity and good conscience, be tethered to such a disproportionate and skewed agreement. III. Standard for Finding Arbitration Unconscionable While arbitration agreements are usually enforceable, Rafiei has presented the trial court with evidence that this arbitration agreement is unconscionable. See generally Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1992). He argued that both the delegation provision and the broader arbitration agreement are unconscionable due to prohibitive costs. Indeed, what makes Rafiei’s case unique is that the agreement lacks a cap on expenses he would be required to pay throughout the arbitration process, whether it is conducted by one arbitrator or three. Furthermore, the arbitration agreement does not cap the amount Rafiei would likely be required to pay even in the initial phase addressing the delegation clause.",Party Submissions,7.9505525,8.503985,9.0511675
"Attorneys for Petitioner Westwood Motorcars, LLC 1. This brief in reply complies with the type-volume limitation of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(C) because it contains 6,393 words, excluding the parts of the petition exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9 .4(i)(l).",Party Submissions,5.6278124,6.1661386,9.823965
"Bustamante also discussed the evidentiary “equal-inference rule,” confirming that a claimant must exclude other plausible causes of an injury with reasonable certainty, but only when presented with evidence that other plausible causes exist. See Bustamante, 529 S.W.3d at 456-57. Even under a sufficiency review, however, a claimant need not “speculate” about other possible unknown causes and then disprove them. Id. at 457.",Party Submissions,7.509541,8.700028,8.458674
"IV. Assuming Bay Satisfied Section 406.123, no case holds that a ROCIP participant can apply the exclusive remedies doctrine outside the scope of the terms of the ROCIP itself.",Party Submissions,42.483982,47.73558,52.195984
"Under any of these provisions, Bay, Ltd. could recover under a passive receipts theory of recovery, which the Court should adopt expressly.",Party Submissions,38.689625,44.08719,71.0206
"When construing a statute, courts use the ordinary meaning of terms unless the Legislature provided a definition. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 (West 2013). And the ultimate goal in any statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature to the greatest degree possible. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021, 311.023 (West 2013).",Party Submissions,2.967258,3.5075073,3.245067
"That is exactly the problem with Dr. Tappan’s report. True, he established he has extensive experience managing pregnancies and deliveries, including difficult deliveries. (CR.663). But “nowhere does his [report or] curriculum vitae indicate he has any experience, training or education in the field of [pediatric] neurology or, more specifically, brain injuries.” Alonzo, 2013 WL 6073431 at *4. He is, therefore, not qualified to offer an opinion about the cause(s) of H.W.’s claimed brain injuries.",Party Submissions,10.338131,11.109969,11.562958
"Perhaps Walker could advance other interests that the Code’s signature requirement advances; perhaps he could demonstrate that those interests outweigh the heavy burdens that enforcing them through removing Justice Devine from the ballot would impose. But the point, just as in Brady, is more fundamental: a court may not resolve disputed questions of fact like these through original mandamus proceedings, such as this one. Brady, 795 S.W.2d at 714. That this fact-intensive balancing test would be necessary to resolve Walker’s entitlement to relief on the merits is sufficient to deny him mandamus in the first place.",Party Submissions,12.13258,16.181864,14.156864
"NOTICE TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: YOU MAY USE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF CHILD CUSTODY SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER. A PEACE OFFICER WHO RELIES ON THE TERMS OF A COURT ORDER AND THE OFFICER'S AGENCY ARE ENTITLED TO THE APPLICABLE IMMUNITY AGAINST ANY CLAIM, CIVIL OR OTHERWISE, REGARDING THE OFFICER'S GOOD FAITH ACTS PERFORMED IN THE SCOPE OF THE OFFICER'S DUTIES IN ENFORCING THE TERMS OF THE ORDER THAT RELATE TO CHILD CUSTODY. ANY PERSON WHO KNOWINGLY PRESENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT AN ORDER THAT IS INVALID OR NO LONGER IN EFFECT COMMITS AN OFFENSE THAT MAY BE PUNISHABLE BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR AS LONG AS TWO YEARS AND A FINE OF AS MUCH AS $10,000.",Party Submissions,3.0227587,2.8976922,3.0155692
"Amerigo, Inc., No. 10-05-00041-CV, 2006 WL 22213, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 4, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). Yellowfin has acknowledged as much. 1CR216 (“ Yellowfin’s Note is not ‘ secured by ’ anything and has not been since the November 6, 2007 foreclosure sale. ”).",Party Submissions,8.234325,8.49171,9.805809
"To start, the purported signature failures were outside of Justice Devine’s knowledge and control. For nearly three weeks—between when Justice Devine filed his application and Relator filed his—Relator himself is the only person who could have spotted the alleged defects. Justice Devine did everything right. He collected 73 signatures from the Eighth Court of Appeals District, Ex.C—almost 50% more than required. Tex. Elec. Code §172.021(g). Relator never alleges—much less proves—that Justice Devine ever had any indication that any of these signatures lacked validity.",Party Submissions,13.361382,12.565034,14.112654
"This Agreement is intended not to result in the imposition of any Section 409A Penalty and shall be administered, interpreted and construed in a manner consistent with such intent. For purposes of Section 409A, each installment in a series of payments shall be treated as a separate payment.",Contract,3.679543,4.2437105,4.3652043
"The so-called “emergency” is entirely of Relator’s own making. He could have sought judicial relief as early as November 15, 2023, but he instead waited until December 27, 2023, to contact Respondent Rinaldi. He then waited another full week before filing this proceeding—skipping every other court. “Although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (cleaned up). Mandamus “aids the diligent and not those,” like Relator, “who slumber on their rights.” In re Self, 652 S.W.3d 829, 830 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) (cleaned up).",Party Submissions,4.9816008,5.7829723,5.408154
"Further, Oncor’s attempted distinction between the unit appraisals that are applied to power lines and other appraisals is artificial. If jurisdiction exists to litigate the intentions of parties and thought processes behind the agreements in this case, there is no legal distinction for such jurisdiction not existing in any case. Certainly Oncor has pointed to none. It claims unit appraisals are complex. Perhaps, but so are peaking power plant appraisals and a host of other appraisals which appraisal districts routinely perform. Nor is there any legal bright line for what appraisal are or are not complex, nor any authority for allowing jurisdiction for review of agreements concerning the complex ones but not the non-complex ones.",Party Submissions,16.859247,17.246168,18.251678
"Account Balance. Account Balance means, with respect to any Account, the total payment obligation owed to a Participant from such Account as of the most recent Valuation Date.",Contract,7.341578,7.4609385,9.541674
"General Liability Insurance may be arranged under a single policy for the full limits required or by a combination of underlying policies with the balance provided by an Excess or Umbrella Liability policy. If Excess or Umbrella Policies are used, coverage must be on a follow-form basis. Coverage under such policies shall be primary and non-contributory to McCarthy’s, the Owner’s and any others as noted above and must be maintained for the longer of ten (10) years after Substantial Completion of the Project or the statute of repose in the state in which the Project is located.",Party Submissions,6.5586123,7.0321565,7.05301
"In the demarcated areas, the competent authorities shall carry out intensive annual surveys, as referred to in Article 19(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031, to detect the presence of the specified pest, taking into account the information referred to in the Authority’s pest survey card.",Legislation,8.57974,7.370755,8.574861
"The requested Documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute in that they address (i) the expectations of the Cypriot Claimants as regards the possible use and development of the Dunavska Plots by Obnova, and (ii) the Cypriot Claimants' knowledge at the time of making the investment regarding the possible designation of the Dunavska Plots for use for the bus loop and hence the foreseeability of the investment dispute.",Legal Decisions,12.522706,14.646125,13.182898
"Assuming without deciding that the Investment Agreement had a term of 25 years as argued by Respondent (see Respondent’s Opening Presentation, slide 13), why and on what legal basis has Respondent allowed CALICA to continue its operations under the Investment Agreement after the expiry of that period?",Party Submissions,11.674022,10.185708,12.908018
"In its motion for summary judgment in the trial court, Sonic argued that section 406.075 had not been satisfied when it made payments to Cochran and, therefore, no remedy was obtained in Alabama until the judgment was entered and section 406.075 could not bar its reimbursement [**3] claim. Sonic also argued that there was no ""election"" under section 406.075 until Cochran recovered the Alabama judgment on July 13, 2001. Thus, by its arguments, Sonic conceded that receipt of the Alabama judgment was Cochran's ""election"" to recover benefits under Alabama's laws for purposes of section 406.075. The opinion notes there was no dispute that once Cochran received the Alabama judgment, he recovered benefits under Alabama's laws for purposes of section 406.075 and no dispute that Sonic sought reimbursement after that election. The opinion does not address whether Sonic may have been able to recover payments had it filed the reimbursement claim prior to Cochran's receipt [*484] of the Alabama judgment. As we noted, HN1 [ ] section 409.009 requires a subclaimant seek and be refused reimbursement from the insurance carrier. TMI refused reimbursement-- according to Sonic-- in 1997; however, Sonic did not pursue reimbursement benefits under the TWCA until after Cochran received the Alabama judgment. Further, Sonic received credit in the Alabama judgment for payments it made to Cochran-- adjudicating those payments-- and, in the trial court, the parties indicated the payments may be characterized [**4] as ""damages"" in the underlying contract dispute. Sonic is not left without a remedy regarding those payments.",Party Submissions,7.3319435,7.3268375,7.4559083
"Attorneys for Petitioner Westwood Motorcars, LLC 1. This brief in reply complies with the type-volume limitation of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(C) because it contains 6,380 words, excluding the parts of the petition exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9 .4(i)(l).",Party Submissions,5.6459994,6.168315,9.813123
"As the Cypriot Claimants claim that Mr Obradović and Mr Rand relied on the 2003 RP in their expectation to develop the Dunavska Plots, the requested documents (serving as the basis for such reliance) are in the Cypriot Claimants' possession, custody or control.",Legal Decisions,18.770016,20.320492,24.103672
"January 20, 2017 to the present, National Archives (to the extent that documents in the National Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) by November 27, 2023.",Legal Decisions,12.068502,11.844861,15.582259
"Further, the El Paso court was wrong to suggest that World Car invited an exclusive focus on the dealer agreement. App. G at 19. World Car simply argued that HMA imposed a specific consequence for World Car’s failure to be 100% sales efficient (treating World Car as in material breach of the dealer agreement), and that this was evidence that HMA “require[d]” the standard. None of this can excuse the Board’s or court’s failure to apply § 2301.467(a)(1) properly by analyzing the evidence on which World Car’s claim relied.",Party Submissions,16.192656,16.764982,18.934185
"Whether Flaven was a proper RTP depended on the suit the BNC Sellers brought, the facts they alleged, and the damages they claimed. They sued HSMiller and its agent Defterios in tort for fraud and negligent misrepresentation and alleged damages based in tort.",Party Submissions,37.81249,36.658016,51.572807
"This Court rejects holdings that attempt to silently overrule or deviate from its previous reasoned opinions. See, e.g., Nazari v. State, 561 S.W.3d 495, 506 (Tex.",Party Submissions,9.284991,11.756083,10.445404
"Ammonite asks for reversal and remand on the ground that “the Commission never reached or decided” whether “EOG’s existing wells could be extended or reworked in the future and thereby produce hydrocarbons from the riverbed tracts.” Letter at 1. That is no basis for reversal or remand. Ammonite did not propose such a thing to the Commission, see, e.g., 1.SCR.97-115 (written closing argument), 137-46 (reply), and this Court cannot reverse based on an issue never presented to the agency, see Imperial Am. Res. Fund, Inc. v. RRC, 557 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. 1977). Ammonite had the burden of proof as the MIPA applicant, so the administrative record’s lack of evidence showing whether EOG’s wells could be extended or reworked is attributable to Ammonite’s decision not to develop such evidence during the administrative proceedings.",Party Submissions,8.455266,8.715256,8.831229
"Making emergency supplemental appropriations to respond to the attacks in Israel for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes.",Legislation,8.237205,7.1163654,8.347398
"The City’s duty to deny access to Catiana and High Hopes arose because it became subjectively aware of an unreasonable risk of harm. Unnegated evidence in the record establishes that “the lifeguard supervisor on site stated that they had to [sic] many children” and “took photos and 8 The court of appeals also alluded to this Court’s decision in Suarez v. City of Texas City, but there this Court commented only on the risks of “open-water swimming.”465 S.W.3d 623, 634 (Tex. 2015).",Party Submissions,16.969868,16.958971,18.058262
The United States objects to Request No. 3.c for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.,Legal Decisions,8.143477,12.339021,14.069344
"Nor was the Seventh Court in error by stating that an event that happened six or more hours before the injury was “too attenuated” to the eventual harm. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 17324338, at *4. The court’s point was that the event was not connected to the harm. Specifically, no expert explained why the nurses’ failure to attach fetal scalp electrode around 9:00 a.m. was connected to the harm that occurred (according to the reports) somewhere between 3:15 and 3:45 p.m. (CR.795, 805) The Walkers are again attempting to shoehorn the court of appeals’ holding into something that it is not. The court did not require the expert reports negate other possible causes of harm, as the Walkers suggest. But the court did rightly require the expert to explain how and why the two things were causally connected. Arguing otherwise would require the court to assume a causal connection, which is not permitted. See Bowie Mem’l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 53.",Party Submissions,8.679484,8.906312,9.563774
"Fundamentally, like this Court’s opinion in Zamarripa, there is no showing that the nurses could have taken the actions Dr. Tappan assigned to them when the treating physician was highly involved in the labor and delivery course and giving the medication and other orders. See Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 461. The courts are prohibited from creating the missing explanations. Id. ; Bowie Mem’l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 53. The case is unlike those cited by the Walkers on what they claim to be “similar” facts. While those were birth cases, they were decided on factually specific expert reports. See Cornejo v. Hilgers, 446 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (report explained pregnant woman should not have been sent home following hospital visit and that baby’s brain tissue was not receiving oxygen during the 13 hours she was away from the hospital); McKellar v. Cervantes, 367 S.W.3d 478 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (expert report explaining how one twin was injured during birthing process while other twin remained neurologically intact).",Party Submissions,9.031558,9.065715,9.760656
"For the avoidance of any doubt, Claimants also reiterate their general objection to production of any documents covered by privilege under the legal or ethical rules.",Legal Decisions,15.151161,16.802433,21.443403
"This is crucial because even if Rafiei wished to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement, according to the arbitration agreement and the fee schedule he would be required to pay an Initial Filing Fee of $3,250, a Final Fee of $2,500, all of his own costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees and paraprofessional fees, as well as the cost of a hearing room and the cost of an arbitrator.",Party Submissions,8.391952,10.133255,9.723883
"At the designation stage the trial court can still deny the motion for leave if the defendant cannot plead a violation of a legal standard or duty. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(g)(2). So, while RTP designations are governed by the “fair-notice pleading standard,” see In re YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d 805, 809-10 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding), even under that standard, a court can dismiss a claim where the pleader fails to provide fair notice of a legally cognizable claim for relief. E.g., City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016) (discussing Rule 91a). At this point, it is not an evidentiary challenge, but a legal one. See In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 621 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (“[W]hether a defendant is entitled to dismissal under the facts alleged is a legal question.”).",Party Submissions,4.7562256,4.7387447,5.1517262
"Claimant its receivables, even at the reduced values resulting from the measures.901 Even after the construction of the FONINVEMEM plants, Argentina did not respect or reinstate the principles set forth in the Electricity Law, as promised, and granted itself the right to increase its stock share in the FONINVEMEM plants.902 The Claimant also submits that it was repeatedly forced to waive certain rights to receive payments for its receivables and that the Government withheld payment to Cerros Colorados.903 The Claimant argues that entering into the agreements was the only way for the Claimant to recover any of its outstanding receivables.904 786. Citing Total v. Argentina, 905 the Claimant submits that, although participating in the FONINVEMEM program appeared voluntary, the Respondent through Resolutions 826/04 and 1427/2004, forced the Claimant to invest its outstanding receivables in the FONINVEMEM, thereby giving the Government a below market loan. The Claimant submits that the findings of the Total tribunal are sufficiently clear and can assist the Tribunal, and the fact that the Total tribunal issued its findings 10 years ago is irrelevant.906 787. The Claimant submits that its participation in the FONINVEMEM was not voluntary.",Legal Decisions,9.213691,8.585716,10.051586
The United States objects to Request No. 1.b for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.,Legal Decisions,7.5836673,11.9900255,12.516125
"Memorial, paras. 92-96 Counter-Memorial, paras. 364-380, 398-403 Kalemegdan was registered in the Cypriot corporate register on 23 March 2012. According to Claimants, on 26 April 2012, Mr Obradović, acting upon Mr Rand's instruction, contributed his shares in Obnova and in four other Serbian companies to Kalemegdan, of which he was the sole legal owner, in exchange for additional share capital in Kalemegdan ( C-318 ). As a result of Mr Obradović's in -kind contribution, Kalemegdan became the nominal and direct beneficial owner of the Obnova shares. That same day, Mr Obradov ić purportedly concluded the first of two trust deeds with Coropi in respect of his shares in Kalemegdan. Claimants allege that Coropi acquired a beneficial interest in Kalemegdan (and an indirect beneficial interest in the Obnova shares) through the conclusion of these two trust deeds. The trust deeds state that Coropi "" for consideration given is beneficially interested and entitled to "" Mr Obr adović's shares in Kalemegdan ( C-066, Whereas (a), and C-067, Whereas (a)).",Legal Decisions,8.023359,8.531207,8.027198
"To ensure that a declaration for a major disaster or emergency is made on a timely basis, rural areas receive assistance, and for other purposes.",Legislation,16.661722,15.439534,19.711014
Claimants note that Serbia’ s objections relate to the lack of a specific time period and the fact that the request was not limited to documents related to the rezoning for residential purposes of the land plot located directly across the street from Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23. Claimants have limited the scope of their request accordingly. Requested documents are relevant and material Claimants hereby incorporate their reply from Request No. 53 above.,Legal Decisions,16.915295,16.818748,18.696327
"Under Cockerham, parol evidence may establish lack of intent to gift. Id. To the contrary, the First District Court of Appeals has held that parol evidence is not admissible to rebut the gift presumption creating an irrebuttable presumption of gift in such deed. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 79 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The Raymond court distinguished the Cockerham case because the deed in Raymond involved a conveyance directly from husband to wife with no other reasoning for the conveyance other than to transfer the one-half interest to wife. Id. at 81. As such, the court held that the husband was estopped to contradict the recitations in the deed conveyance except through fraud, accident, or mistake. Id .",Party Submissions,6.311329,7.0923467,7.0321302
"Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Article 34.1 of USMCA by November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain Canada’s and Mexico’s consent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Article 34.1 of USMCA.",Legal Decisions,5.6527095,6.132845,6.0861173
"Bay alleges that Mann was covered by two separate, complementary workers' compensation policies. One policy was a “rolling owner controlled insurance program” that was procured by Valero (the “ROCIP policy”). 1 The ROCIP policy covered *319 the refinery and was designed to provide blanket workers' compensation coverage to contractors who worked on Valero projects (such as Bay), as well as their employees (such as Mann).",Party Submissions,13.230731,13.180286,15.634985
"To amend title 31, United States Code, to prohibit the misrepresentation and receipt of a false obligation to the Government, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.6050925,6.8890805,7.8245206
"What are the implications, if any, of the fact that Respondent brought its jurisdictional objection based on the supersession of NAFTA by the USMCA together with its Counter-Memorial on the Ancillary Claim of 19 December 2022 (see Counter-Memorial on Ancillary Claim, ¶ 407 et seq.)?",Party Submissions,8.710803,8.417073,9.300013
"All past due royalties (including any compensatory royalties payable under Paragraph VI.B) shall be subject to a Late Charge based on the amount due and calculated at the maximum rate allowed by law commencing on the day after the last day on which such monthly royalty payment could have been timely made and for every calendar month and/or fraction thereof from the due date until paid, plus attorney’s fees, court costs, and other costs in connection with the collection of the unpaid amounts. Any Late Charge that may become applicable shall be due and payable on the last day of each month when this provision becomes applicable.",Party Submissions,7.377473,7.716916,7.9167156
To amend title XI of the Social Security Act to require the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to test a model to improve access to specialty health services for certain Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.,Legislation,4.561616,3.9785423,3.9149537
Respondent Rafiei respectfully requests that the Court uphold the trial court’s order denying Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and grant Respondent all other appropriate relief.,Party Submissions,7.2350445,8.674316,8.48788
"For the reasons explained in Oncor’s initial brief and this one, petitioner respectfully requests this Court—either through a per curiam opinion or after oral argument—reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, render judgment that the district court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of Oncor’s claims, and remand the case for further proceedings. Oncor further requests any other relief to which it may show itself justly entitled.",Party Submissions,5.9925575,6.726288,8.039038
A similar analogy was made by the Brown court with respect to the community interest in contingent fees earned during marriage.,Party Submissions,39.098984,49.030155,87.730644
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session, the 1st C.S. and the 2nd C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the 2023 ballot proposition contingencies to date.",Party Submissions,8.685042,7.9217057,8.740299
"Dr. Castillo prays that this Court affirm the Court of Appeals’ opinion and judgment because the experts’ Chapter 74 reports (as amended) failed to address, factually, how and why Dr. Castillo’s alleged standard-of-care breaches proximately caused H.W.’s injuries. That result should be cemented if this Court addresses the experts’ lack of qualifications. Because Dr. Tappan was not qualified to opine about causation, and because Dr. Null’s causation opinion was conclusory, the Walkers provided essentially no causation opinion at all.",Party Submissions,13.560599,14.368062,14.673881
"McCarthy from all claims and losses arising from professional services including negligent acts, errors or omissions of Subcontractor in the performance, nonperformance or failure to render professional services, including but not limited to design, design assist, inherent design, preconstruction services, design coordination or testing responsibilities under this Agreement. In addition, Subcontractor shall comply with the requirements of Paragraphs 5.1.",Party Submissions,10.784259,9.267756,11.585734
"Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to the length of the transition period, including but not limited to its relationship, vel non, to NAFTA Chapter 11’s limitations period, or paragraph 3 of Annex 14-C of USMCA, by November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with the transition period in paragraph 3 of Annex 14-C of USCMA.",Legal Decisions,7.464463,7.692124,7.6977654
"The application to qualify for the income tax credits in the federal program consists of three parts, Parts 1, 2, and 3, which are submitted to and must be approved by the National Park Service (NPS). Part 1 requests that the historic building be deemed eligible for historic rehabilitation tax credits. Part 2 requires a description of the scope of work with a request that 5 The Texaco building actually consisted of three buildings built in 1915, 1936, and 1959.",Party Submissions,7.9818044,7.7417426,9.063711
"For these reasons, the evidence is conclusive that Wilson Plaintiffs did not mutually assent with the trial court to accept defensive collateral estoppel, and thus, there is no agreement, implied or otherwise, between Wilson Plaintiffs and the trial court to accept defensive collateral estoppel.",Party Submissions,9.263791,8.775763,11.462229
"To require the Secretary of Agriculture to establish and maintain a training program for Department of Agriculture personnel and third-party pro-viders on the rapidly evolving methodologies, science, and practices of biological soil health managagement systems on agricultural land, and for other purposes.",Legislation,14.446813,14.099024,15.08186
A. The Appellate Court erred in its decision that this agreed judgment on attorney fees constituted a relinquishment of the right to appeal.,Party Submissions,12.78747,13.580882,14.426285
"Nature of the case: This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal concerning the sufficiency of preliminary expert reports under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74. Daniel and Kristen Walker, individually and as next friends of their minor son, H.W., filed a health care liability claim against obstetrician Dr. Rhodesia Castillo, M.D., and Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital. CR 4.",Party Submissions,8.755794,9.621552,10.546225
"Therefore, the documents are neither relevant to the case nor material to its outcome, based on Claimant's grounds for its request. In any event, Respondent has conducted a reasonable search of the requested category of documents, and other than the documents referred to in the objection below (Privilege), it does not have in its possession, custody or control the documents described in the request.",Legal Decisions,10.595615,11.407528,11.788601
"Executive shall be entitled to fringe benefits and perquisites (including but not limited to any applicable benefits related to health, dental, vision, life, disability, retirement, etc.) consistent with the practices of the Company and governing benefit plan requirements (including plan eligibility provisions), and to the extent the Company provides similar benefits or perquisites (or both) to similarly situated executives of the Company.",Contract,7.169052,7.540076,8.679402
"According to the Norwegian Food Safety Authority, it should also be okay to land live crabs at Norwegian reception centres. 742 526. Norway maintains that this email relates only to landing not harvesting of snow crab. That is true but the Tribunal does not consider that it put Mr Ankipov on notice that there might be a need for authorization for EU vessels to take snow crab in the Loop Hole. On the contrary, the assumption of both correspondents appears to have been that there was no such requirement and, indeed, until December 2015 there were no Norwegian regulations prohibiting the taking of snow crab in the Loop Hole.",Legal Decisions,14.072519,15.8753395,16.36924
HSMiller is wrong. The instruction the malpractice trial judge gave — specifically the last two sentences of the instruction4 — incorrectly stated the law on a hotly disputed issue at trial. It was harmful and alone supports reversal of the case as the court of appeals held.,Party Submissions,21.911749,29.14697,29.848928
"In rebuttal, Samson announced a new “meaning” for the last sentence of XVII.C: that an unpaid Late Charge is a “ground for termination of the lease” under “the very next sentence,” so that failing to timely pay a Late Charge is grounds for the Lessor to “play the game of gotcha” and terminate the lease. This theory has no basis in the text of the Bordages Leases. It highlights the perils of construing a single-spaced, 23-legal-page long contract using one paragraph and a red marker. (For reference, all of art. XVII is reproduced in the Appendix below.) That “very next sentence” is in art. XVII.D. It does not even mention Late Charges. There is nothing “gotcha” about the provision. It authorizes the Lessor to give a 30-day notice of intent to terminate the lease if the Lessee fails to pay “royalty payments as provided herein.” Samson’s scenario requires ignoring the actual words and substituting other words in art. XVII.D.",Party Submissions,11.153197,10.989743,11.682651
"Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Harris Cnty. v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2018) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)). When reviewing a trial court’s grant of a Plea to the Jurisdiction that challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the court looks to the “relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. When such review requires the examination of evidence, the trial court “exercises its discretion in deciding whether the jurisdictional determination should be made at a preliminary hearing or await a fuller development of the case, mindful that this determination must be made as soon as practicable.” Id. (citing Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000)).",Party Submissions,3.1341121,3.4499757,3.5996273
"FAILURE BY A PARTY TO OBEY THE ORDER OF THIS COURT TO PROVIDE EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY WITH THE CHANGE IN THE REQUIRED INFORMATION MAY RESULT IN FURTHER LITIGATION TO ENFORCE THE ORDER, INCLUDING CONTEMPT OF COURT. A FINDING OF CONTEMPT MAY BE PUNISHED BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR UP TO SIX MONTHS, A FINE OF UP TO $500 FOR EACH VIOLATION, AND A MONEY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS.",Party Submissions,3.5096927,3.3165815,4.0070357
"The Tribunal will refer to these costs as “ Legal and Other Costs ,” which the Tribunal understands include legal fees and expenses, expert and witness fees and expenses, travel expenses, bank fees, delivery fees, photocopying, support services, translation, research and other internal expenses. Under Clause 11.8 of the RER Contract, Legal and Other Costs are excluded from the provisions of Clause 11. The Tribunal concurs with Claimants’ interpretation1544 that the meaning of this provision is that each party will bear its own Legal and Other Costs with respect to an arbitration under the RER Contract.",Legal Decisions,9.946226,8.05505,10.111002
"On October 8, 2015, Mann clocked in to work at 6:44 a.m. at a terminal on the side of Up River Road in Corpus Christi, Texas. Around 6:47 a.m., as Mann walked across the road, he was struck by a vehicle driven by Alvarez, also an employee of Bay. There are four different versions of what Mann was intending to do as he crossed the road: (1) gathering water for his workers, (2) preparing for a safety meeting, (3) going to look at an excavation site to determine what paperwork he would need to obtain from Valero before his men could commence work, or (4) walking to his truck to get out of the rain.",Party Submissions,7.5002136,8.025447,8.163828
"I agree with Judge McElhaney's 1 observations regarding the “substantial grounds for disagreement” standard, and courts should take these observations into account when deciding whether to grant a petition for permissive appeal. Nothing in this record, including Bay's petition, demonstrates a substantial ground for disagreement in the exclusive remedy defense. The fact that the parties have taken “diametrically opposed legal positions” is not enough for me to agree that a permissive appeal should be granted. Parties taking opposite legal positions is but one of the joys of litigation, and, in my opinion, simply not enough to warrant a permissive appeal. If we are to utilize that low standard to decide whether substantial grounds for disagreement exists in order to grant a permissive appeal, appellate courts need to brace for an influx of permissive appeals.",Party Submissions,8.316233,8.686459,9.230861
"Galovelho no longer faces the purportedly unconstitutional conduct about which it complains; any prospective declaratory relief we might grant cannot help it. See Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184. Deciding Galovelho’s declaratory judgment claim would yield no more than an advisory opinion. The claim is moot. We overrule Gal ovelho’s fourth issue.",Party Submissions,13.554787,15.491539,14.305309
"In family law cases, the traditional sufciency standard of review overlaps with the abuse of discretion standard of review; therefore, legal and factual insufciency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. In reviewing the evidence for legal sufciency, we consider all the evidence, in the light r'nost favorable to the judgment, to determine if the trier of fact could reasonably have formed arm belief or conviction that its nding was true. See Sink, 364 S.W.3d at 344. We must assume that the factnder resolved disputed facts in favor of its nding if areasonable factnder could do so. Id. In reviewing the evidence for factual sufciency, we must give due consideration to evidence that the factnder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing and then determine whether, baSed on the record, afaCtnder could reasonably form arm conviction or belief that the allegations were proven. .Id.",Party Submissions,6.9417734,8.756434,8.835195
"December 19, 2013)(mem.op.); Poston v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., No. 14-11-00485-CV, 2012 WL 1606340, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 8, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.).",Party Submissions,3.1044617,4.555018,4.124786
"Nicaragua’s asset freeze upon HSF.12 These were actions outside of Riverside’s control and all within Nicaragua’s control and dominion. Nicaragua caused the illiquidity and then relied upon it for this Application. In any event, Nicaragua’s accusations fail to meet the necessity requirements for the relief sought. Nicaragua has not fulfilled its burden of proving these necessities as the moving party. c) Nicaragua’s lack of evidence for exceptional circumstances is apparent.",Party Submissions,16.35198,18.935404,18.431108
"The Lender agrees, on the terms and conditions stated in this Agreement, to make one advance to the Borrower (the “Advance”) on the date hereof in an aggregate principal amount not to exceed USD 1,543,400,000. The amount of the Advance outstanding from time to time under this Agreement is referred to as the “Loan.” Any amount of Loans repaid or prepaid may not be reborrowed.",Contract,4.3075533,3.624307,4.9544644
"The Company shall advise you of the percentage of Units earned for the Performance Period, which may be subject to further adjustment under Section 2(c), as soon as practicable following the Certification Date. All earned Units for the Performance Period shall be settled in accordance with Section 4 and any Units not earned for the Performance Period shall be canceled and forfeited as of the Certification Date.",Contract,4.755146,6.7641525,6.1271014
"Differential diagnosis “is a clinical process whereby a doctor determines which of several potential diseases or injuries is causing the patient’s symptoms by ruling out possible causes— by comparing the patient’s symptoms to symptoms associated with known diseases, conducting physical examinations, collecting data on the patient’s history and illness, and analyzing that data — until a final diagnosis for proper treatment is reached. Coastal Tankships, U.S.A., Inc. v. Anderson, 87 S.W.3d 591, 604 – 05 & n.24 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).",Party Submissions,7.441353,6.927956,8.045872
Parties in the Court of Appeals: The City was the appellant. Petitioners were appellees. The appeal was transferred to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals from the Third Court of Appeals.,Party Submissions,7.0288,7.813402,7.9491954
"Petitioners seek this Court’s guidance on fundamental principles of Texas defamation law, including whether the third-party-allegation rule in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 73.005(b) (“CPRC”) includes an unexpressed “endorsement” exception, how to apply the substantial-truth doctrine in defamation-by-gist cases, and whether the Program’s criticisms leveled at state institutions and their agents constitute constitutionally-protected opinion. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits (“Pet. Br.”) at X.",Party Submissions,9.999175,9.586817,10.654022
"C) The Tribunal’s analysis 427. Certain preliminary observations are necessary in order to properly analyze the arguments raised by the Parties regarding the Treaty obligation to ensure FET for investments and returns. It should be noted, in particular, that the Parties have stated radically opposite positions on the FET standard applicable in this case.",Legal Decisions,13.741189,13.399344,14.368422
The United States objects to Request No. 1.i for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.,Legal Decisions,8.963881,13.600171,15.68962
"Delaware courts have also recognized that “self-dealing” covers a broad range of fiduciary misconduct, including attempts by directors to usurp corporate opportunities. See Halpin v. Riverstone Nat’l, Inc., No. CV 9796-VCG, 2015 WL 854724, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2015). Under Delaware law, “self-dealing” has also been applied to “three specific kinds of self-dealing practices....: (1) directing employees to perform services that did not benefit the entity; (2) diverting funds from the entity; and (3) usurped corporate opportunities that belonged to the entity.” Balin v. Amerimar Realty Co., No. CIV. A. 12896, 1993 WL 542452, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1993).",Party Submissions,5.2401175,5.3352447,5.2901363
The Walkers’ short argument about causation as to the BSA nurses remains untethered to their expert reports. At best the reports list a number of alleged failures of the BSA nurses and provide an unsupported conclusion of a suggestion of a possible mechanism of injury. This is insufficient.,Party Submissions,31.453392,21.870409,40.793648
"Svalbard Treaty in more detail later (see Section V.B(4), below). For the moment, however, the only question is whether this proposed redeployment alters the conclusion that North Star’s fishing vessels were not an investment in the territory of Norway.",Legal Decisions,20.784481,24.30535,33.69691
"In the end, even if one sees differently the issue’s importance (or other points like how this case will ultimately come out if “require” is properly applied), this Court’s intervention is needed. The legal errors below are so straightforward that they can easily be corrected, even by summary reversal. That would avoid confusion by future courts and litigants, and prevent parties from rendering § 2301.467(a)(1) useless against unreasonable actions. And the infrequency of appellate opinions confronting this statute’s meaning only adds to the case for intervening here because, though this statute has widespread effect and is important in the industry, the Court may not soon have another chance to address its meaning. The Court should grant review and reverse.",Party Submissions,20.053947,20.982685,21.127737
"Weatherford goes on to misstate the Court of Appeals’ holding, completely ignoring that Court’s jurisdictional basis for affirming the Trial Court, and wrongly characterizing the Court of Appeals’ analysis as hinging on the domestic sewage exclusion. Brief at 12. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals deemed the SWDA inapplicable, and as such had no reason to perform a merits-based analysis on the exclusion to such statute. Weatherford’s argument conflates two separate types of infrastructure—a wastewater collection system and a landfill—with two entirely different regulatory schemes. Such interpretation would be an overreach of the SWDA and the intent of the Texas Legislature.",Party Submissions,10.143523,10.32354,10.564533
"As mentioned in the previous section, Texas Mutual filed a ""request to schedule, reschedule, or cancel a benefit review conference"" in March of 2020, listing the disputed issue as ""whether or not Mr. Bruno Martinez was an employee of Hellas Construction, Inc. at the time of injury and subsequent death."" See 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 141.1(b) (Tex. Dep't of Ins., Div. of Workers' Comp., Requesting and Setting a Benefit Review Conference). In October, following a contested-case hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that ""[d]ecedent did sustain a compensable injury on July 19, 2019, that resulted in his death,"" and that ""Hellas Construction[,] Inc.[,] was Decedent's employer for purposes of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act."" The Martinez Family requested review by an appeals panel, arguing that DWC's jurisdiction had ""never been invoked"" because the Martinez Family had chosen not to file a claim with the agency. In December, the appeals panel adopted the ALJ's Decision and Order.",Party Submissions,5.350273,5.973326,5.8330684
"C) The Tribunal’s analysis 205. First of all, the Tribunal notes that Claimant does not seem to dispute that the Tribunal may, in principle, sanction a potential abuse of right.",Legal Decisions,15.281273,12.515543,16.164055
"Midland does not address Weatherford’s subsidiary questions 5 and 6 as to whether the Trial Court erred in sustaining Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction based upon either notice or liability defense of limitations, as the underlying Trial Court and Court of Appeals determinations were based upon jurisdictional defects rather than notice or statute of limitations issues. As to Weatherford’s subsidiary question 7, while Midland does not offer a corollary question, Midland would point out that while Weatherford complains that it lacked a “meaningful opportunity to conduct discovery” in subsidiary question 7, the fact that Weatherford failed to trigger subject matter jurisdiction of the Trial Court precludes subjecting Midland to the type of discovery Weatherford requests for the reasons set forth herein.",Party Submissions,8.199406,9.229509,8.401521
"Recall that Section 51.003(a) applies to “ any action brought to recover the deficiency” after a foreclosure sale. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.003(a) (emphasis added). It does not say “any action brought by the senior lienholder, ” or “any action brought by the foreclosing party ,” or “indebtedness remaining on the note on which the lender foreclosed.” It says “any action,” period.",Party Submissions,6.6341214,6.158551,6.4768887
"In Respondents’ telling, Westwood merely decided to leave the location where it had sold cars for more than four years as part of a “broader strategic decision to shut” down its business, “leave the warehouse space that it no longer needed,” “and make a fresh start with a new entity.” (Resp. 12, 31, 38) And, according to Respondents, upon losing the forcible entry and detainer action, Westwood simply “announced its intention” to “vacate the premises” and “withdraw its appeal” in an exchange of letters. (Resp. 11-12, 28, citing 16RR307(DX42)) Nothing can be further from the truth.",Party Submissions,12.486478,12.389795,13.936403
To amend title XI of the Social Security Act to establish a pilot program for testing the use of a predictive risk-scoring algorithm to provide oversight of payments for durable medical equipment and clinical diagnostic laboratory tests under the Medicare program.,Legislation,6.5960917,5.4545197,6.805689
"Affiliate. Affiliate means a corporation, trade or business that, together with the Company, is treated as a single employer under Code Section 414(b) or (c).",Contract,3.8421736,4.594676,7.7718077
"Such documents are relevant to demonstrate the nature of the treatment and protection accorded by the Respondent to the Claimant and are therefore, notably, material to an assessment of the Respondent’s alleged breach of the Claimant’s rights under Art. 325 of the France-Qatar BIT.",Legal Decisions,9.94558,10.44448,11.459595
"Groce Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.—App. San Antonio 1994, writ ref’d)) 9. Oregon: Gregory v. Lovlien, 174 Or. App. 483, 26 P.3d 180 (Or.",Party Submissions,10.120476,11.791014,11.012702
"Request No. 952-02-6-74/2004 referred to on pages 5 and 7 of exhibit R-043 and any and all documents and information used for the preparation of the sketch ( in Serbian: skica ), which was prepared based on that request.",Legal Decisions,23.697317,26.835709,27.420464
"To overcome the community presumption, the burden is on the spouse claiming certain prOperty as separate to trace and clearly identify the property claimed to be separate. Id. However, real property gifted by one spouse to another during marriage is the recipient spouse’s separate pr0perty. TEX. CONST. art. 16, §15. Agi is avoluntary transfer of property to another made gratuitously and without consideration. Magness, 241 S.W.3d at 9'12. The elements of agi are (1) the intent to make agift;_(2) delivery of the property; and (3) acceptance of the property. Adeed for property from one spouse as grantor to the other spouse as grantee creates apresumption the grantee spouse received the property as separate property by gift. Id.",Party Submissions,10.630698,10.187616,10.602276
"In essence, Petitioner’s entire case centers on her mistaken insistence that the Property’s first lienholder’s foreclosure must constitute mandatory acceleration of the Note, rather than an optional default. She argues that Texas Prop. Code § 51.003(a) mandates acceleration of all loans secured by liens on any one piece of real property, transforming the provision into a complete revocation of several legal concepts, such as the optional acceleration clause or the separate obligations of liens and notes. This confusion negates the need to address the matter in this Court.",Party Submissions,15.197241,16.02265,16.231606
"None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant at the time of his arrest or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,14.367309,17.40334,14.598733
"This Court cannot grant the relief that Walker seeks without throwing the primary election into chaos—if not deciding it outright. Courts are rightfully cautious to engage in “judicial interference in an election that is imminent or ongoing,” and such interventions are “strongly disfavored.” In re Hotze, 627 S.W.3d at 645–46 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Court orders affecting elections. .. can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006); see also Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020).",Party Submissions,5.09654,5.4086204,5.7640715
"In its appeal, TMI presents two issues for our review: (1) whether section 406.075 applies to bar Cochran's pursuit of remedies under the TWCA; and (2) if so, is Sonic, as Cochran's subclaimant, barred from seeking reimbursement under section 409.009. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 409.009 [**9] (Vernon 2006).",Party Submissions,6.619525,7.22723,7.8476515
"Both section 31.004(a) and section 24.008 cover more than just res judicata. Section 31.004(a) explicitly goes beyond prohibiting giving “res judicata” effect to lower court decisions by also prohibiting them from having effect as “estoppel by ju dgment”—i.e., “collateral estoppel.” Avila v. St. Luke’s Lutheran Hosp., 948 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. App. — San Antonio 1997, writ denied). And section 24.008 reaches further still, explicitly forbidding courts from giving any legal effect to the result in an eviction proceeding that would “bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits.” And both statutes have long been interpreted to reach further still, preventing “ a judgment in a court of limited jurisdiction from controlling the results in a suit in a district court” for any reason—legal or factual. Genender v. Kirkwood, 506 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (quoting McClendon v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 796 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex.",Party Submissions,5.313078,5.739611,5.4912515
"Considering all the circumstances of the case, we cannot say that it is clear from the facts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award Osprin attorney fees against TX 1111 under the UDJA. See Nabers, 2020 WL 830025, at *2. For these reasons, we overrule this issue.",Party Submissions,8.733592,10.57418,12.398796
"In fact, Oncor’s agent, Dennis Deegear, testified at the hearing on Respondents’ jurisdictional pleas and motions that what he agreed to with P&A on behalf of Sharyland in 2019 was P&A’s “total value of the transmission lines in Texas,” which subjective unit valuation was “$496,193,596.” See Appendix H to Oncor’s Brief at 41. Mr. Deegear also testified that he emailed P&A how many miles of 138kV and 345kV transmission line Sharyland owned in the state, but he mistakenly and unknowingly transposed those numbers in his email. See id. at 42-43 & 45-46. Though the District objected several times during Mr. Deegear’s testimony, the district court repeatedly overruled the District’s objections and admitted the testimony. See id. at 32, 35-36, 37, 42, 45. Neither the District nor the Board asked to strike the testimony. Id. Neither the District nor the Board challenged any evidentiary rulings on appeal. See Appellants’ Brief to Seventh Court of Appeals. Mr. Deegear’s uncontroverted testimony is corroborated by his affidavit, which confirms that neither P&A nor Mr. Deegear was aware of the clerical error when the parties signed the 2019 agreement. See Appendix F at ¶¶ 7-12; see also CR.268-69.",Party Submissions,6.573226,6.8624043,7.012379
"The mootness doctrine implicates subject-matter jurisdiction. A case becomes moot when one seeks to obtain a judgment on some controversy, when in reality none exists, or when one seeks a judgment on some matter which, when rendered for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect on a then-existing controversy.",Party Submissions,8.5237465,10.339237,11.275288
"The instruction then concluded with this phrase: “but the designation may be struck, by the Court, for lack of evidence after an adequate time for discovery has passed.” (Id.) The first sentence of the second non-statutory instruction repeated this “may be struck” language a second time, emphasizing the point. (Id. at 587) These statements cut in favor of HSMiller’s positions at trial on an important issue and negated Terry’s testimony and credibility.",Party Submissions,23.844046,27.190338,26.571045
"The Planning Commission is a commission that was created by the Assembly of the City of Belgrade for providing expert assistance and performing tasks in the process of drafting and implementing planning documentation.150 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess the factors the Commission took into consideration when working on the 2013 DRP —including whether it considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 and i f so, the Commission’s contemporaneous understanding of the extent of these rights.",Legal Decisions,21.501736,20.542446,21.702007
"A copy of the agreement concluded between Luka Beograd and Obnova on 15 March 1994 (as referred to in the Agreement on Provision and Use of Transhipment and Warehousing Services between Luka Beograd and Obnova of 25 January 2000, R-013 ), as well as a copy of all lease agreements entered into by Obnova with regard to the Dunavska Plots or the Objects, to the extent such agreements have not already been submitted in this arbitration.",Legal Decisions,10.089238,10.096218,11.401324
"The Response includes an extended discussion of Delaware demand-futility law. Resp. 10-14. This discussion, however, does not meaningfully address CKC’s argument that the Zuckerberg8 decision did not address cases involving self-dealing by a manager or director. See PFR 18-19.",Party Submissions,17.85177,25.06613,22.957771
"HSMiller also raises the specter of preemption, arguing that any action this Court might take to set aside the assignment would be improper meddling and would violate preemption principles. It then argues the Lawyers are making an improper collateral attack on the Bankruptcy Plan. Both are wrong.",Party Submissions,16.18979,17.455881,22.362999
"Perhaps more importantly, reliance on the Infusion Protocol is misplaced. Internal hospital policies do not set the standard of care under Texas law. See Espalin v. Children’s Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 27 S.W.3d 675, 686 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) (hospital’s policy did not set standard of care); Denton Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. LaCroix, 947 S.W.2d 941, 951 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 1997, pet. dism’d by agr.) (same); Hicks v. Canessa, 825 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no writ) (same). This is an extension of the general rule in Texas that a company’s internal policies or procedures do not create a negligence duty where no such duty otherwise exists See, e.g., FFE Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Fulgham, 154 S.W.3d 84, 92 (Tex. 2004) (refusing to create a standard of care or duty based upon internal policies). Dr. Tappan’s seeming reliance on the Infusion Protocol as some sort of standard of care for the administration of oxytocin and terbutaline is insufficient to set a standard of care.",Party Submissions,4.1792765,4.4221478,4.407021
"Deferral. Deferral means a credit to a Participant’s Account(s) that records that portion of the Participant’s Compensation that the Participant has elected to defer to the Plan in accordance with the provisions of Article IV. Unless the context of the Plan clearly indicates otherwise, a reference to Deferrals includes Earnings attributable to such Deferrals.",Contract,5.1863494,4.7989235,6.249037
"S.W.3d 144, 148 (Tex. 2020) (“[A]n ambiguous contract’s meaning must be determined by a finder of fact, who may consider evidence of the parties’ subjective intent.”). It is also appropriate to consider evidence in a jurisdictional dispute. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). This Court should not, therefore, ignore the only evidence in the record illuminating what the parties’ intent when they signed the 2019 settlement. That evidence and Oncor’s pleadings establish at least a justiciable controversy over the scope and effect of the 2019 settlement, so the district court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of the dispute.",Party Submissions,5.181475,5.20444,6.480064
Agreement number 71 dated 13 January 2003 and Agreement number 72 dated 13 January 2003 – both referred in Article 2 of an agreement submitted as Serbia’s exhi bit R-015.,Legal Decisions,17.921453,14.624083,19.548601
"As explained above, Serbia argues that Obnova allegedly did not have the right of use over its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23. According to Serbia this is, amongst other things, because the right of use purportedly belonged to Luka Beograd which leased the premises to Obnova.72 The agreement submitted by Serbia as R-060 is an agreement dated 6 March 1975 under which: ( i ) Luka Beograd agreed to transfer back to the City of Belgrade the right of use over the entirety of the land it had received from the City of Belgrade in 1961; and ( ii ) the City of Belgrade agreed to grant Luka Beograd the right of use over the land that Luka Beograd actually needed for its activities. According to Article 7 of the agreement, “ The development of the construction land referred to in Article 4 of this contract will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Decision on the Development and granting of construction land for construction (Official Gazette of the City of Belgrade No. 22/72) and in accordance with the Spatial Development Program of the Company as well as the Construction Land Development Program, with the provision that the land which according to the Port Program needs to be developed must also be entered into the Construction Land Development Program. ”73 The requested documents address the scope of the development envisaged by Luka Beograd and may determine whether Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and/or 23 were within the area that was necessary for Luka Beograd’s development. Therefore, the requested documents may show whether Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 were part the land over which Luka Beograd was granted the right of use under the agreement submitted as R-060.",Legal Decisions,6.162481,6.0630975,5.9353456
"There is an increasing trend throughout the country of hospitals using the term “reasonable value” in their lien notices to exclude the possibility of an attack under Chapter 12 for intent to collect on “a fraudulent claim” using otherwise facially valid hospital liens. Hospitals like Respondents believe that by simply meeting the procedural requirements of securing a lien under Chapter 55, they cannot be liable for filing and using that lien with the fraudulent intent to collect a grossly unreasonable amount later.",Party Submissions,17.871914,14.435937,20.309584
"In contrast, other provisions of the Business and Commerce Code impose conditions on the waiver of statutory rights — even specifying when the waiver must be executed.",Party Submissions,11.825647,17.147198,17.194563
"HN10 [ ] But we are bound by our own precedent. See, e.g., Dyer v. Medoc Health Servs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied) (""[A]bsent an intervening change [*9] in law, we follow our own precedent.""). This Court was previously asked whether a negligence case against a nonsubscriber is a workers' compensation case in Kroger Co. v. Keng, 976 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App.— Tyler 1998), aff'd, 23 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. 2000).4 In that case, Kroger sought to limit its liability in asserting comparative negligence against Keng, its employee. Id. at 888. HN11 [ ] In attempting to determine whether the proportionate responsibility statute in Section 33.001 conflicted with the TWCA, we held that ""when an employee files suit against a nonsubscribing employer, that suit is 'an action to collect benefits [and damages] under the workers' compensation laws of Texas.'"" Id. at 891. Two reasons supported this determination. First, under the TWCA, an employee has a statutory burden to prove the employer's negligence. Id. (citing Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 406.033(d) (West 2006)). Therefore, under the statute, if the employee is the sole cause of the injury, he cannot recover pursuant to the statute even without the defense of contributory negligence. Id. ""Consequently, an employee's negligence action against his nonsubscribing employer is brought 'under the workers' compensation laws of Texas,' not only common law."" Id. Second, a nonsubscriber is statutorily prohibited from asserting certain common law defenses in a personal injury [*10] action brought by an employee. Id. (citing Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 406.033(a)). ""It is 'by the terms of [Texas Workers' Compensation] law"" that an employer is deprived of the defenses of contributory negligence, assumed risk, and fellow servant negligence. Id.",Party Submissions,4.488752,4.590564,4.748716
"This Agreement may be executed and delivered (including by facsimile or other means of electronic transmission, such as by electronic mail in “pdf” form) in two or more counterparts, each of which when executed shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which taken together shall constitute one and the same agreement.",Contract,2.5705001,2.6887777,2.928901
"E) The calculation of interest 567. The Tribunal has established that the compensation due by Respondent for its violations of the Treaty amounts to USD 4,880,609 + 38,709,481 = USD 43,590,090, plus interest, to be added to this sum on the basis of the principle of full reparation.",Legal Decisions,9.913409,9.564906,10.235126
"Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 346. The bankruptcy court’s order is not void, and therefore, the Lawyers may not collaterally attack it here.",Party Submissions,8.534686,9.525539,11.725756
"ETMC Athens contends Respondent abused his discretion when it granted Dunn's motion to strike the designation of Woolverton and ETMC EMS as responsible third parties. Applicable Law HN4 [ ] Texas law allows a tort [*5] defendant to designate a person as a ""responsible third party."" Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(a) (West 2020). The designation's purpose is to have the responsible third party submitted to the trier of fact as a possible cause of the claimant's harm. See id. § 33.003 (West 2020). This may reduce the percentage of responsibility attributed to the defendant, thus ultimately reducing its liability to the claimant. See id. § 33.013 (West Supp. 2022); Flack v. Hanke, 334 S.W.3d 251, 262 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied) (""[T]he defendant typically would be the party seeking to retain the RTP in the jury charge to diminish his potential liability and perhaps eliminate any joint and several liability."").",Party Submissions,5.5578647,5.9251094,5.701336
"Footnotes 1 The Hon. Michael J. O'Neill, Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment. 2 The elements of a legal malpractice claim are not in dispute. Under Texas law, a plaintiff alleging legal malpractice must establish four elements: (1) that the defendant attorney owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) that the attorney breached that duty; (3) that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (4) that damages occurred. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (citing Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. 2004)). A litigation attorney's negligence causes damage to a client if the result the client would have obtained with competent counsel is more favorable to the client than the result actually obtained. See Kelley & Witherspoon, LLP v. Hooper, 401 S.W.3d 841, 847 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2013, no pet.). The plaintiff must prove that it would have obtained a more favorable result but for its attorney's negligence. See id. Legal malpractice damages “are the difference between the result obtained for the client and the result that would have been obtained by competent counsel.” Elizondo v. Krist, 415 S.W.3d 259, 263 (Tex. 2013). 3 HSM alleges the failure to properly “designate and scope” an expert witness to address damages also constituted gross negligence, but the parties do not address the issue in detail or explain how the record provides clear and convincing evidence of the objective and subjective components of gross negligence on this point. We therefore do not address this contention further. 4 This statutory section, part of The Real Estate License Act, provided, “A licensed broker is liable to the commission, the public, and the broker's clients for any conduct engaged in under this chapter by the broker or by a salesperson associated with or acting for the broker.” The applicability of this statute was hotly contested at trial. HSM's position was that the statute did not apply because Defterios's alleged misrepresentations were not made to “the commission, the public, [or] the broker's clients,” but to the plaintiffs in the Underlying Lawsuit who were the opposing parties in a transaction. The Lawyers, in turn, relied on the statute to argue that as a matter of law HSM was liable for all of Defterios's actions. In the jury charge, the trial court explained it had “concluded that reasonable attorneys could differ in their opinions as to whether this statute in fact applied to the Underlying Lawsuit.” The trial court instructed the jury that “[y]ou need not decide whether this section applied in the Underlying Lawsuit. Instead, you are to decide whether it was negligence on the part of [the Lawyers] to assume that it applied and to conduct the defense of the Underlying Lawsuit in accordance with that assumption.” 5 The statute was amended in 2015 to replace the term “salesperson” with “sales agent.” See Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 1158, § 89, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 3896, 3921 (codified at Tex. Occ. Code § 1101.803). This amendment was effective on January 1, 2016, after the verdict and judgment in this case. Id. 6 The record reflects that the motion was filed on September 26, 2008, less than sixty days before the October 20, 2008 trial date. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(a) (motion to designate responsible third party must be filed on or before 60th day before trial date unless court finds good cause to allow later filing). 7 These statements were made in an email dated December 18, 2007, approximately ten months before the trial in October 2008.",Party Submissions,3.8763385,3.7942607,4.018766
"The requested document, referred on page 14 of the 2013 DRP, includes, among other things, an analysis of traffic frequency considered as one of the parameters for deciding on optimal location of a bus loop. The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the decision to place the bus loop at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23 was reasonable in light of the conclusions in the Public Transport System Work Plan or whether there was a more appropriate location.",Legal Decisions,18.055132,19.29225,18.230309
"Any and all lease agreements, agreements on use of warehousing space, land and/or buildings, including all of their annexes, concluded between Serbia or Luka Beograd on one side and Obnova on other side between 1948 and 26 April 2012 related to Dunavska 17-19, Dunavska 23 and/or the Surrounding Area, including, but not limited to, Agreement no. 619 dated 15 March 1994 referred to i n Article 16 of Serbia’s exhibit R -013 and Agreement no. 1819 for providing and using port and warehousing services dated 16 March 2006 refe rred to on page 3 of Serbia’s exhibit R-028.",Legal Decisions,11.263277,9.402955,11.009397
"If Samson had taken these positions during its opening argument, Respondents could have hit them head-on from the podium. Because Samson saved them for rebuttal, an answer to each is appropriate. First, the U.S. Supreme Court has never sat to overrule this Court’s pronouncements of Texas law. Second, unpaid Late Charges do not furnish a ground for lease termination. Finally, departing from Hooks would be unfair to the Bordages parties who were slow-walked and severed against their will on the strength of Samson’s argument about treating everyone the same.",Party Submissions,24.056889,24.791752,26.250385
"Nor can Respondent argue that unilateral mistake makes the Agreement voidable. “Two separate unilateral mistakes in the minds of the grantors and grantees do not create a factual issue for a mutual mistake cause of action.” Holley v. Grigg, 65 S.W.3d 289, 295 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2001, no pet.). A unilateral mistake does not provide grounds for relief even though it results in inequity to one of the parties. “A mistake by only one party to an agreement, not known to or induced by acts of the other party[,] will not constitute grounds for relief.” Johnson v. Snell, 504 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.1974). A unilateral mistake does not provide grounds for relief even though it results in inequity to one of the parties. Holley, 65 S.W.3d at 295.",Party Submissions,4.6099954,4.7261653,4.822322
"Similarly, as above, a notice evaluation is unnecessary to conclude jurisdiction is lacking for Weatherford’s SWDA suit against Midland; however, the provision of reasonable notice is yet another threshold requirement that Weatherford has failed to satisfy. Notice under the SWDA requires: (1) notice “of the existence of the release or threatened release”; and (2) notice that the person seeking cost recovery intended to take steps to eliminate the release or threatened release.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.344(c)(1)–(2). While case law does not provide a detailed process for providing notice, Vine St. LLC v. Keeling indicates that defendants should be notified prior to the completion of remediation. Vine St., LLC v. Keeling, 460 F.Supp.2d 728, 756 (E.D. Tex. 2006). Further, as Weatherford cites, the court in Aviall held that “the court will assume that § 361.344 required. . . advance notice of its intention to undertake remediation. .. .” Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., 694 F.Supp.2d 567, 581 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (emphasis added).",Party Submissions,6.828818,7.4721127,7.4797325
"To amend the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act to fund the information clearinghouse through fiscal year 2031, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.5225635,5.5502963,6.4079223
"None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant at the time of his arrest or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden.",Legal Decisions,14.367309,17.40334,14.598733
"On March 11, 2021, the trial court signed the order denying MVP’s plea in abatement. MVP filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration. MVP asked the trial court to dismiss the Texas case based on RLB’s and McCarthy’s waiver of the right to object to the forum-selection clause, or alternatively abate the Texas case until entry of the final judgment in the Oklahoma case. MVP also filed a motion to stay, in which it advised the trial court that it intended to seek mandamus relief in the court of appeals and asked the trial court to stay the trial court proceedings until the appellate court had ruled on MVP’s mandamus petition.2 The trial court held a hearing on April 23, 2021, and signed the order denying MVP’s motions on July 14, 2021.",Party Submissions,4.022007,4.4442086,4.4404526
"The majority cannot justify why it treats these “easily severable” matters as intertwined in an arbitrability appeal. “[T]he question on appeal,” as the majority opinion correctly identifies, is “whether the case belongs in arbitration.” Ante, at 1919. But the questions remaining before the district court are different: whether the claims have merit, *756 whether the parties are entitled to the discovery they seek, and so on. Proceedings on those questions would not interfere with the appellate court's review of the arbitrability order. Those proceedings, in other words, do not implicate the Griggs principle, which addresses the “danger a district court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously analyzing the same judgment.” 459 U.S. at 59, 103 S.Ct. 400.",Party Submissions,8.303374,9.18259,9.470598
"Defendant Alvarez was not assigned to the “Bill Greehey” refinery when he struck and injured Mann, and therefore his actions were not within the scope of people protected from suits at common law under the umbrella of Valero's ROCIP. Had Alvarez been assigned to Valero's “Bill Greehey” refinery at the time he struck and injured Mann, and had Mann also conclusively been in the course and scope of employment, then both may have been under the coverage of the potential ROCIP, and Bay would have the immunity it seeks. But those aren't the facts in this case.",Party Submissions,13.788339,14.346685,15.574409
"Tribunal may draw the inferences it deems appropriate in relation to the documents not produced, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances.",Legal Decisions,12.040475,17.599371,20.045103
"Respondent argues that Claimants' investment does not deserve protection as it was not made in good faith, in particular because the investment dispute was foreseeable at the time of the alleged investment of the Cypriot Claimants in April 2012. Claimants' allegations also concern multiple circumstances concerning Obnova's rights pre-dating the Cypriot Claimants' investment, such as (i) Obnova's unsuccessful attempt to be inscribed at the holder of the right of use over the Objects in March 2003, (ii) the inscription of the City of Belgrade as the holders of the rights of use over the Objects and Dunavska Plots in November 2004, and (iii) the adoption of the decision on 6 March 2006 on drafting a Detailed Regulation Plan concerning an geographic area covering the Dunavska Plots. This shows that as of April 2012, an investment dispute over the Dunavska Plots was objectively foreseeable. Respondent also disputes the actual rights held by Obnova and the possibility of conversion.",Legal Decisions,8.919703,8.062669,9.022766
"The City of Liberty (“Liberty”) contends that “Liberty provided a service for which Ames has not fully paid.” Respondent’s Response to Petition for Review (“Liberty’s Response”) at 16. The City of Ames (“Ames”) has paid all amounts owed for the services that Liberty was contractually required to provide under the Liberty-Ames Disposal Contract (the “Contract”). The only amounts that Liberty pled were owed are associated with the “Additional Service Charge” for exceedances of the Total Acceptable Volume (“TAV”). However, under the Contract, this was not a service that Liberty was to provide, and in fact it was prohibited, by the Contract’s explicit terms. Liberty’s performance of accepting flows above the TAV is voluntary and should not be sufficient to waive Ames’s immunity.",Party Submissions,9.601339,7.5490065,9.209737
"Again, Terry was acutely aware of the Flaven problem. But in Terry’s view, designating Flaven — who Terry believed to be a fraudster — as an RTP before he had any idea what Flaven would say, was a greater risk to his clients than waiting to designate him. He believed Flaven’s testimony was likely to make his clients look worse than they already did. In short, Terry painstakingly 40 demonstrated a concern regarding the consequences of his acts and a belief that he chose the better strategy.",Party Submissions,19.639711,18.475147,21.816309
Arbitration Rule 38 19.1. All the rules set forth in Section 18 above shall apply by analogy to experts unless they are inconsistent with this Section.,Legal Decisions,13.236451,13.577684,15.444221
"G. Without limiting the other provisions of this Article XVII, it is further specifically acknowledged and agreed by the parties hereto that the term “market value” as used herein shall be defined in accordance with the above Paragraph III.H. and not. in accordance with the provisions of Subsection 91.402 (i) of the Texas Natural Resources Code.",Party Submissions,10.0834255,9.554863,10.868688
"Manager, Superintendent and necessary assistants. The Project Manager or Superintendent and necessary assistants shall be in attendance at the Project site during the progress of the Work. These personnel shall be satisfactory to McCarthy and shall not be changed except with the consent of McCarthy, unless such personnel are unsatisfactory to McCarthy or cease to be in Subcontractor's employ. The Project Manager and Superintendent shall represent Subcontractor, and all communications given to the Project Manager or Superintendent shall be as binding as if given to Subcontractor. The Project Manager or Superintendent shall attend all coordination, scheduling and safety meetings where Subcontractor's Work is involved and as required by McCarthy.",Party Submissions,5.1470413,5.9092383,5.4766374
"Without specific explanations factually connecting Dr. Castillo’s claimed negligence to H.W.’s injuries, Dr. Tappan’s causation opinions left readers to do exactly what this Court has held they cannot: speculate, infer, or fill in gaps in his report. Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52; see also Tiscareno, 495 S.W.3d at 607.",Party Submissions,11.554825,12.750317,13.288685
"The seminal case in this area is Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). In Grenn Tree, the United States Supreme Court noted that “[i]t may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant. .. from effectively vindicating [her] rights in the arbitral forum.” Id. at 90. However, the Court held that the mere “‘risk’ that [a plaintiff] will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidati on of an arbitration agreement.” Id. at 91. Where “a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.” Id. at 92.",Party Submissions,4.0326524,4.1005116,4.375628
"Division of Debt: Wife’s Attorney’s Fees In Wife’s nal issue, she argues the trial court abused its discretionby failing to consider the $140,000 she incurred in attomey’s fees as debt when dividing the marital estate. She asserts this resulted in a. grossly disproportionate division in favor‘ of Husband. Husband responds the trial court acted within its broad disoretion by_ not including Outstanding attorney’s fees in the community liabilities.",Party Submissions,10.598802,11.400715,11.346743
"Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized that the Republican Party of Texas enjoys a robust First Amendment right to select the candidates that shall bear its nomination. Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 795 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. 1990); Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Dem. Ctrl. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1989). That First Amendment right protects the Republican Party’s prerogative to “identify the people who constitute the [Party]” as well as the ability to “select a standard bearer who best represents the [P]arty’s ideologies and preferences.” Eu, 489 U.S. at 224. “When a political party questions the constitutionality of state statutes regulating the party’s method of selecting a candidate, as applied to a particular office or candidate, the courts must employ a balancing test,” Brady, 795 S.W. at 715, which “weighs the burden on the. .. party against the compelling state interest the state must advance to justify the burdens.” Id. Mandamus against Chairman Rinaldi here would impose an unconstitutionally heavy burden on the Republican Party’s associational rights.",Party Submissions,4.9570355,5.198624,5.215004
"Sequentially, assuming arguendo that Bay can meet these monumental burdens, and only after those two issues are established, does the court then reach what Bay chooses to argue as the dispositive issue: whether Bay has conclusively established “course and scope” as a matter of law. Mann contends course and scope cannot be conclusively established; that it is a fact question. Mann does not have the burden of conclusively disproving course and scope as argued by Bay. Mann contends that course and scope cannot be conclusively established on contested facts but that nonetheless, a determination of course and scope would only affect the availability of certain common law defenses.",Party Submissions,11.567887,11.845984,12.923403
"No amendment or modification of any provision of this Agreement, the Note or any instrument delivered under this Agreement or the Note is effective unless the same is in writing and signed by the Lender and the Borrower.",Contract,4.7431836,4.642446,6.13675
"Weatherford insists that Midland must prove that a leak occurred after mixture with residential sources in order to show that the domestic sewage exclusion applies. R.R. Street never required the cost-recovery defendant to prove such a finding, nor did it affirmatively decide whether the exclusion applied. In R.R. Street, this Court held that a fact issue existed as to whether the sewage pipes actually leaked, and due to insufficient evidence, no holding was made regarding the application of the domestic sewage exclusion in that case. R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 250 (“Because there is conflicting testimony that raises a fact issue as to whether the sewage pipes leaked at Pilgrim’s facilities, we cannot determine as a matter of law whether the [perchloroethylene] mixture Corbin poured down the drains at Pilgrim’s facilities qualifies as solid waste subject to SWDA regulation[.]”) (alteration in original). Consequently, R.R. Street imposes no duty under the SWDA for a cost-recovery defendant to provide evidence showing that the alleged leak occurred after any mixing with residential waste.",Party Submissions,8.600166,8.630495,9.0069685
"The arbitration agreement has a “delegation provision,” which “is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement.” Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010). The delegation provision required “issues of formation, validity or enforceability of [the arbitration agreement itself]” to be arbitrated. Op. at 2. The delegation provision specifically required that “[a]ll decisions respecting the arbitrability of any Dispute shall be heard and determined by the arbitrator(s)[.]” Id. at 3.",Party Submissions,4.6312346,4.8940234,4.8962464
"On cross-examination, Thomas testified as required by A.S.’s plan of service, A.S. completed her: (1) parenting class; (2) psychological; (3) psychosocial; and (5) may have completed her ETCADA/Sabine Valley Assessment with another case worker. 4 RR 144-46. Thomas also testified that A.S. did not miss appointments with her counselors. 4 RR 147-78. Thomas testified that A.S. was appropriate during visits that she supervised. 4 RR 159-60.",Party Submissions,9.66694,11.045461,10.76768
"This payment-for-services Contract is a textbook contract for goods and services for which the Legislature has expressly waived governmental immunity. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152. The Contract obligates Liberty to provide wastewater treatment services to Ames in exchange for Ames’s payments, including payments for treatment of wastewater over and above an established threshold volume of flows. (CR 41.) Ames incorrectly attempts to separate out Liberty’s single service—treating Ames’s wastewater — into two parts: (1) the treatment of Ames’s wastewater flows up to the baseline TAV level; and (2) the treatment of Ames’s wastewater flows above the TAV. ( Pet’r’s Pet. at 6. ) Ames states that Liberty has discretion over the treatment of Ames’s excess flows, however the Contract contains no such distinction; no provision makes Liberty’s treatment of wastewater flows above the threshold amount voluntary. Ames’s argument turns on its insistence that Liberty’s treatment of any wastewater exceeding the TAV is not an obligation under the Contract, and therefore does not qualify as a “service” under the Texas Local Government Code, Chapter 271, waiver of governmental immunity. However, Liberty is obligated — by its permit and simple plumbing realities — to provide treatment to wastewater reaching its WWTP, including Ames’s flows exceeding the TAV. (CR 49.); Tex. Water Code § 26.121.",Party Submissions,7.3272796,7.2204943,7.365608
"To amend the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to require the timely appointment of agency transition officials, to ensure adequate performance and oversight of required transition-related preparation, to require new guidance for agencies and possible transition teams, and for other purposes.",Legislation,9.632676,9.264915,9.375476
"Acting as the factfinder, the trial court had the right to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight that it wished to give to their testimony.",Party Submissions,5.4071026,6.786561,7.1569667
"The lower court also noted the reports’ lack of explanation of why it mattered that Dr. Castillo left the unit or what would have been different had she not. There was no explanation of what the BSA nurses could have done about Dr. Castillo’s leaving that would have made a difference in the outcome. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 173214338, at *4. They allegedly could have gone “up the chain of command.” But, the experts did not even address “whether those higher up the chain of command had a right to stop Castillo from leaving, persuade her to remain, secure a substitute physician, or the like.” Id. (citing Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 461). There was not any explanation of what someone higher up could have or should have done differently at the time when Dr. Castillo left the unit. Also lacking is any explanation of how or why going up the chain of command would have affected the outcome. This is especially the case when the harm was not alleged to have occurred until several hours after she returned.",Party Submissions,8.635675,8.523587,9.041807
"On October 9, 2023, this document was served on Douglas W. Alexander, lead counsel for Petitioner, via DAlexander@adjtlaw.com; and on Jane M. N. Webre, lead counsel for Respondent EOG Resources, Inc., via JWebre@scottdoug.com.",Party Submissions,14.710983,15.873144,19.60995
"We propose to uphold COES’s proposal regarding a joint optimization program/secondary reserve (Unit Commitment) since it would be difficult for a model of specific allocations of a Unit Commitment based on costs to coexist, such as the current daily programming in Perú, with a separate market model for the secondary band. [...] However, the assignment algorithm should take the Base Provision reserve into account as a boundary condition, in such a way that the units that supply the Base Provision should be adequately programmed to ensure the supply and the minimum reserve they provide must not be taken into account when optimization occurs.",Legal Decisions,48.34918,42.30041,45.515003
"Cabe señalar además que la propia Demandante atribuye lo cual contradice abiertamente el argumento de que el valor de CALICA es equivalente a la de la Red CALICA.204 182. El otro defecto que tiene la estrategia empleada por la Demandante es que no se puede aislar el valor de CALICA del valor de la Red CALICA. Como no presentó una valuación alterna basada únicamente en CALICA, la Demandante busca convencer al Tribunal de que todo el valor de la Red CALICA reside en CALICA.",Party Submissions,8.061308,12.160991,9.573071
"If the Lawyers had filed a motion for leave to designate Flaven as an RTP more than 60 days before trial and if the trial court had granted that motion over the BNC Sellers’ objections, the next step would be surviving a motion to strike. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(l). As explained in the Lawyers’ brief, no evidence suggests that the Flaven RTP designation would have survived a motion to strike, assuming the BNC Sellers raised the same objections as they did in the underlying trial. See Pet’rs’ Br. at 54-56. Terry’s testimony that the trial judge focused solely on the duty issue at the hearing on the motion to strike and that is why she denied the motion remains unrebutted by Stanley (the BNC Sellers’ trial counsel), the only other person who was there.",Party Submissions,9.769455,9.368576,10.38714
"Serbia does not seem to dispute that the requested documents indeed are material and relevant. Serbia merely asserts that the requested documents are “ not sufficiently ” relevant and material. However, Serbia does not propose any test nor refers to any authority that would establish when documents requested in a document production process are “ sufficiently ” relevant. For the avoidance of doubt, the requested documents clearly are relevant and material. As explained above, the requested documents will show the envisaged costs of building a bus loop at Obnova’s premises and their comparison with the costs that would be potentially incurred at other locations. As such, the requested documents are relevant and material to assess: ( i ) whether Serbia’s decision to put the bus loop at Obnova’s premises was reasonable in light of the envisaged costs (or, on the contrary, arbitrary); and ( ii ) whether Serbia acted in compliance with the proportionality principle when it decided to place the bus loop at Obnova’s premises. Serbia’s claim that “ Claimants' request for the documents underlying the implementation costs for the construction of the bus loop is wholly speculative and of limited relevance to the dispute ” is thus clearly incorrect. Finally, as for Serbia’s argument that “ Claimants and Respondent have not argued that implementation costs played any role in respect of the decision to locate the bus loop on the Dunasvka [sic] Plots ”, it seems that Serbia misunderstood Claimants arguments in their Memorial. Claimants clearly pointed out that in order to comply with requirements under the Cyprus-Serbia BIT, t he decision to put the bus loop on Obnova’s premises cannot be arbitrary and, at the same time, must respect the proportionality principle.95 The comparison of implementation costs for building of the bus loop at Obnova’s premises and potential other locat ions is directly relevant to assess both whether the eventual decision to put the bus loop on Obnova’s premises was reasonable, i.e. not arbitrary, and whether it respected the proportionality principle. DECISION Any and all documents relied upon in the preparation of the tables summarizing the evaluation of the four potential locations for a new bus loop presented on pages 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of exhibit R-101.",Legal Decisions,6.826924,7.022669,6.8693824
This is the ninth of nine requests for documents which the Claimant contends was seized during the criminal proceedings in Qatar.,Legal Decisions,29.448599,30.19039,36.398533
"Court concluded the appellate court erred in upholding the denial of a party’s motion to compel arbitration on a ground not presented in the trial court. MVP’s Brief at 30-31 (citing 392 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. 2013)). This Court noted that the party opposing arbitration never denied the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate; thus—unlike here—the court reached a conclusion unsupported by the record and contrary to both parties’ positions. Richmont Holdings, 392 S.W.3d at 635. • In Fritz Management, LLC v. Alfortish Contractors, LLC, the plaintiff did not challenge the existence of a valid arbitration clause in the trial court or on appeal except in a footnote unsupported by briefing. No. 04-22-00572-CV, 2023 WL 2672901, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 29, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). The existence of a valid governing arbitration clause was never in dispute—only whether the defendant waived by conduct its right to enforce the arbitration clause. Id.",Party Submissions,5.4696264,5.748039,5.908939
The United States objects to Request No. 1.h for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.,Legal Decisions,9.014922,13.688306,14.657824
"To restore the ability of the people of American Samoa to approve amend- ments to the territorial constitution based on majority rule in a democratic act of self-determination, as authorized pursuant to an Act of Congress delegating administration of Federal territorial law in the territory to the President, and to the Secretary of the Interior under Execu-tive Order 10264, dated June 29, 1951, under which the Constitution of American Samoa was approved and may be amended without requirement for further congressional action, subject to the authority of Con-gress under the Territorial Clause in article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the United States Constitution.",Legislation,8.112366,7.684755,7.8057456
"Galovelho also relies on mootness cases that express a concern when charged conduct is voluntarily ceased by the defendant without an admission that the action – 20– was wrongful. The concern is that “ defendants could control the jurisdiction of courts with protestations of repentance and reform, while remaining free to return to their old ways. ” Matthews, on behalf of M.M., 484 S.W.3d at 418. In a voluntary cessation case, dismissal is appropriate only when subsequent events make clear that the challenged conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur. Id. Again, no court can predict the future. But we can conclude that, based on the passage of more than two years without imposition of any further restrictions on restaurants, it is not reasonable to expect appellees to issue restrictions comparable to those issued at the height of the pandemic. Here, the complained-of conduct was voluntarily ceased as the dangers of Covid-19 were mitigated through vaccination and immunity gained after infection. Subsequent events do not support a concern that appellees will “return to their old ways.” See id.",Party Submissions,10.617626,11.381156,11.24304
"A breach of a contract by itself is not a negligent act or omission. B. HSMiller’s claim that the phrase “that violates a legal HSMiller argues Flaven was a proper RTP based on the concluding phrase defining an RTP as someone who has engaged in “other conduct or activity that violates an applicable legal standard.” (Cross-Pet’r’s Br. at 28 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6)) (emphasis original)). But, as noted above, this Court has never held that a violation of a contractual promise alone violates an “applicable legal standard” sufficient to qualify one as an RTP in a tort case. And its cases suggest it would hold otherwise. See DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d at 404 (holding that a claim for negligent breach of contract sounded in contract rather than tort).",Party Submissions,9.754736,8.997509,10.268232
"If the Court agrees with the Lawyers’ arguments on the assignment or negligence issues, gross negligence and exemplary damages should be set aside as a matter of law. E.g., U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 137 (Tex. 2012). But, if the Court does decide that remand on any issue is appropriate (which the Lawyers dispute), the Court should not remand gross negligence and should, instead, reverse and render the award of exemplary damages. No evidence supports the jury’s finding on gross negligence. See id. at 141 & n.23 (remanding for new trial on negligence claims but rendering take nothing judgment on gross-negligence claims based on legally insufficient evidence).",Party Submissions,6.0981174,5.8320694,6.798981
"Finally, Mann will address Bay's creative attempt to collaterally establish standing at the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation (“the Division”). This issue was not addressed in the trial courts order granting permission to file this permissive appeal and is not necessary to the determination of any issues before the trial court or this reviewing court. Nonetheless, Mann will demonstrate that Bay cannot collaterally bootstrap standing before the Division.",Party Submissions,16.340322,16.392134,17.481657
"Worse still, relief here would greatly disserve the public interest. Signature requirements, like other laws that “require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot,” serve the public interest by keeping “frivolous candidates” off the ballot. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983). That interest is not served here, where there is no dispute that Justice Devine has ample support. He has been elected twice to the same position, having received tens of thousands of votes from Eighth Court of Appeals District voters in previous elections. Office of the Secretary of State, 2018 General Election Results, https://perma.cc/389N-T8MT.",Party Submissions,6.1517982,7.0607653,7.39217
"Even with the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's waiver of defenses, an employee must still prove all elements of a negligence claim to prevail against nonsubscribing employers.",Party Submissions,5.952728,7.5746436,8.032341
"Id. Second, the Court noted that the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction does not extend to all cases that touch on workers’ compensation issues. Id. (quoting AMS Constr. Co., Inc. v. K.H.K.",Party Submissions,11.396755,12.231123,12.66534
The United States objects to Request No. 3.f for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.,Legal Decisions,8.448828,13.670918,15.115705
"Memorial, paras 90-96 Counter-Memorial, paras 357-359, 492-495 Kalemegdan was registered in the Cypriot corporate register on 23 March 2012. According to Claimants, on 26 April 2012, Mr Obradović, acting upon Mr Rand's instruction, contributed his shares in Obnova and in four other Serbian companies to Kalemegdan, of which he was the sole legal owner, in exchange for additional share capital in Kalemegdan ( C-318 ). As a result of Mr Obradović's in -kind contribution, Kalemegdan became the nominal and direct beneficial owner of the Obnova shares. That same day, Mr Obradov ić purportedly concluded the first of two trust deeds with Coropi in respect of his shares in Kalemegdan. Claimants allege that Coropi acquired a beneficial interest in Kalemegdan (and an indirect beneficial interest in the Obnova shares) through the conclusion of these two trust deeds.",Legal Decisions,8.0464735,8.44871,8.471875
"Weatherford claims that limitations are an issue that cannot be reached if the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction because Midland enjoyed immunity from suit. However, a time-barred suit is yet another threshold requirement for a valid SWDA claim that Weatherford failed to meet. City of Madisonville v. Sims, 620 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Tex. 2020) (“When a statutory prerequisite to suit is not met, ‘whether administrative (such as filing a charge of discrimination) or procedural (such as timely filing a lawsuit),’ the suit may be properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”).",Party Submissions,9.167688,8.8347645,9.744241
"In a self-dealing case involving two principals, the demand-futility arguments advanced by the Response have no legitimate place. As the Delaware Chancery Court explains, it makes “little sense to find that demand is required in an evenly divided situation.... Rather, it is enough for a plaintiff to show that there is an absence of impartial board members necessary to cause the corporation to accept demand.” Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 86 (Del. Ch. 2000).",Party Submissions,12.828844,13.412421,13.6883745
"C) Damages related to Claimant’s shares in Lajun 549. The Tribunal considers that, in view of Respondent’s breaches of the Treaty, the value of Claimant’s shares in Lajun has been materially impaired. As a consequence, Claimant is entitled to full reparation for the loss of his ownership interest, which is 90% of Lajun’s capital.",Legal Decisions,8.175908,7.8337417,7.783941
"But assuming the filing fee for a $1 million claim applies, the initial filing fee for such a claim under the flexible schedule is $3,500. Further, the payment of the initial fee can be deferred upon request in cases of extreme hardship. See AAAA Construction Industry Arbitration Rule 55. Dissent, p. 7.",Party Submissions,15.994551,15.265891,18.1717
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Relator, Hon. Brian Walker, prays that the Court grant his Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus and issue a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent, Hon. Matt Rinaldi, to review and reject the application of Hon. John Devine for a place on the 2024 Republican General Primary ballot for the office of Justice, Texas Supreme Court, Place 4, and further directing Respondent to notify Devine, and the Secretary of State that Devine’s application does not comply with the applicable statutory requirements and will thereby be removed from the list of certified candidate in the 2024 Republican General Primary Election. Finally, Relator prays for all other relief, at law or in equity, to which he may be justly entitled.",Party Submissions,5.208718,5.032641,5.983452
"To amend the Agricultural Credit Act of 1978 to remove barriers to agricul- tural producers in accessing funds to carry out emergency measures under the emergency conservation program, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.9716177,6.2745485,8.345556
The United States objects to Request No. 2.i for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a.,Legal Decisions,8.912113,13.559953,15.544323
"To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to clarify when the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to prohibit the specification of a defined area, or deny or restrict the use of a defined area for specification, as a disposal site under section 404 of such Act, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.7602334,4.269073,4.3918333
"This point can be illustrated by an analogy to the law of intestate succession. Suppose a person dies without a will. In such a case, a statutory scheme provides a set of default rules about who inherits what. Anyone who wishes to opt out of the statutory default scheme may do so by executing a will. And if someone chooses to execute a will, courts understand that various words and phrases have attained stable meanings through adjudication over generations of common-law tradition.",Party Submissions,7.427786,9.205104,8.01945
"NAFTA Articles 1127, 1128 and 1129 28.1. Non-Disputing NAFTA Parties may make submissions to the Tribunal within the meaning of NAFTA Article 1128 by the date indicated in Annex B .",Legal Decisions,6.655997,8.342679,8.333483
"After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding Berrelez had not exhausted her administrative remedies under the Act and her claims were barred by the Act's exclusive remedy provision. Thereafter, the trial court severed Berrelez's claim against Mascorro, creating a final, appealable judgment with regard to the order of dismissal in favor of Mesquite Logistics. Berrelez then perfected this appeal.",Party Submissions,6.789678,8.760198,8.365277
"As explained above, the requested documents will show the basis for the inscription of Selfnest doo as the owner of a part of the former land plot 39/1, on which a part of Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 23 is located. Clarification of Selfnest’s alleged ownership, its extent and its validity is relevant and material to establish whether the registratio n of Selfnest in any way affects the area subject to Obnova’s rights. The area of land to which Obnova has rights at Dunavska 23 is clearly relevant and material for the outcome of this case.",Legal Decisions,14.947229,15.775936,16.190834
"COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS Each Party shall comply with its commitments regarding investment and shall, in no way, impair, through the adoption of arbitrary and discriminatory measures, the management, development, maintenance, utilisation, usufruct, acquisition, expansion or transfer of said investments.",Legal Decisions,13.970463,8.681651,12.872716
"All contributions Husband made to his 401(k) during the marriage are part of the community estate. The trial court found that $62,042.77 of Husband’s 401(k) was community property and $311,778.24 was his separate property. (CR 596–597). The evidence showed that Husband contributed to his 401(k) each year of the marriage, and Husband testified that his paystubs show each contribution to his 401(k). (6RR D 729–751; 4RR 103:6–9). To determine the community interest in Husband’s 401(k), the trial court consider all the contributions Husband made during the marriage. (6RR D 729–751). Further, Husband offered a summary of his yearly contributions based on the values stated on his paychecks. (4RR 98:2–25, 99:1–3; 6RR D 752). Based on this evidence, the trial court was able to determine that Husband contributed $62,042.77 to his 401(k) during the marriage and included that amount to the community estate.",Party Submissions,4.445754,4.7752542,4.5943513
"Liberty ignores the clear language of the Contract and argues that the Additional Service Charge is part of an agreed upon rate structure. The Contract did not contain volumetric rate brackets, as Liberty claims, where Liberty agreed to accept all of Ames’s wastewater and Ames agreed to pay a certain rate up to the “Total Acceptable Volume” (“TAV”) and an additional progressive high-volume rate for exceeding the TAV. In reality, the Contract prohibits Ames from sending flows in excess of the TAV, and Liberty has no obligation to accept such flows. The Additional Service Charge is not a “high-volume” rate to cover increased treatment costs as Liberty claims for accepting higher wastewater volumes; instead, it is Liberty’s attempt at charging Ames liquidated damages for sending Liberty flows that are prohibited by the Contract. This liquidated damages provision is an unenforceable penalty because at the time it was drafted, it was not a reasonable forecast of just compensation (it arbitrarily requires Ames to pay SIX times the highest rate of any charged by Liberty for volumes exceeding the TAV with no relation to actual increased treatment costs as Liberty claims) and there is an unbridgeable discrepancy between Liberty’s actual damages (Liberty has pled no actual damages2 other than the Additional Service Charges) and the liquidated damages Liberty’s seeks ($1,356,611.20). See Atrium Med. Ctr, LP v. Houston Red C LLC, 595 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. 2020).",Party Submissions,8.947651,7.545019,9.46593
"A case where litigants were found to NOT be in privity with each other despite being in the same case together during pre-trial was Saqui v. Pride Intern., Inc., No. 14-10-00540-CV, 2011 WL 5056162, at *1 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 25, 2011, no pet.). In Saqui, the Saqui Plaintiffs and the Spinoso Plaintiffs filed their suit together in the same case on September 12, 2006. Id. They were in pre-trial together for 16 months. Id. On July 27, 2007, one defendant (“PCA”) filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, and all the plaintiffs filed a response thereto on August 16, 2007. Id. and Doc. 41. Before that motion was heard, on January 22, 2008, the Saqui Plaintiffs’ cases were dismissed without prejudice for failing to show up for a status conference. Id @ 2. On September 29, 2008, the trial court finally granted PCA’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Id. The Saqui Plaintiffs later filed a new lawsuit, and PCA sought and obtained summary judgment on collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of the forum non conveniens issue. Id. The 14th Court of Appeals reversed, essentially finding that conducting pre-trial together did not rise to the level of privity as follows: 7 ... because they had been dismissed from the lawsuit, appellants were not parties to the federal district court litigation at the time the district court reversed its forum non conveniens decision. In addition, PCA has not established as a matter of law that the Spinoso Plaintiffs represented appellants' interests in the federal district court litigation. Also, PCA has not established as a matter of law that after appellants were dismissed from the federal district court litigation, they participated in, exercised any control over, or had any right to do either in the federal district court litigation. ...PCA has not established as a matter of law that appellants have any beneficial interest in any recovery by the Spinoso Plaintiffs or the reverse, the Spinoso Plaintiffs have any right to any recovery made by appellants. ... we conclude the fact the two cases arise out of the same maritime accident does not establish as a matter of law that appellants and the Spinoso Plaintiffs were in privity.",Party Submissions,4.5265794,4.4279094,4.5285826
"Galovelho pleaded: “The economic impact of the regulations was total and failed to allow any economic or beneficial use of the property as a full-service restaurant. ” But the Lucas requirement of a “complete elimination of value” or a “total loss” is not tied to an owner’s preferred economic use of the property. Galovelho does not dispute that restaurants were always permitted to operate under the Emergency Orders, albeit in a limited capacity. Customers could always take food out or have it delivered. And for significant amounts of the affected time period, restaurants were permitted to operate as “full -service dine-in restaurants”— to use Galovelho’s description— with limited levels of occupancy on site. Moreover, all of the regulations on the res taurant industry were temporary, which means an owner’s economic loss could not be complete. See id. at 332 (“Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted .”). We conclude that Galovelho’s complaints cannot meet the requirements of a categorical taking because the Emergency Orders never completely destroyed all economic value of its property.",Party Submissions,12.1812105,12.888098,13.822303
"NATURE OF THE CASE: Financial retribution and explicit bias obstruction in the expose of extrajudicial misconduct in the theft of Uniformed Partition of Heirs Property Act (UPHPA) protected land, active mineral leases, and producing mineral estate protected.",Party Submissions,50.49768,56.38293,52.146057
"Sonic acknowledges that abatement orders are ordinarily incidental rulings of the court not subject to mandamus review. But Sonic argues that when extraordinary circumstances exist, this general rule may not apply. Sonic claims extraordinary circumstances are present here because continued abatement prevents it from pursuing remedies against real parties in interest and violates the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. See TEX. CONST. Art. I, § 13. Sonic also contends that the trial court has abused its discretion because there is no authority to support continued abatement.",Party Submissions,6.5793233,8.016594,7.9071593
"If Lessee is not producing any quantities of gas from leased premises but is receiving payments under the “pay” portion of such “take or pay” gas purchase contract provision, such payments shall not relieve Lessee of the duty to make shut-in royalty payments if Lessee desires to continue this Lease, but such “take or pay” payments shall be applied as a credit against any shut-in royalty obligation of the Lessee.",Party Submissions,9.792779,10.325642,10.326344
"Not only is the franchise more than the OEM’s agreement, Texas also defines it to include a written communication in which a duty is imposed from an OEM to a franchisee. A franchise also includes the recognition that a dealer relies upon its OEM for a continued supply of motor vehicles. A franchise is also defined to encompass any right, duty, or obligation that is granted or imposed by Chapter 2301, Texas Occupations Code.",Party Submissions,15.076391,12.27348,17.049398
"As a result, we find th at the trial court’s aw ard of attorney fees to Osprin did not result in a double recovery and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the fees under the UDJA. We overrule Backes ’s sole iss ue. VI. Conclusion For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.",Party Submissions,9.802067,9.953559,13.293678
"Taylor v. Sturgell does not indicate the Wilson and Harpst plaintiffs were in privity. Taylor describes six paths to privity, and Fleming Defendants focused almost exclusively on the first one (“Taylor Privity Path 1”) as being allegedly applicable in this case. Taylor Privity Path 1 states the following: First, “[a] person who agrees to be bound by the determination of issues in an action between others is bound in accordance with the terms of his agreement.” 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 40, p. 390 (1980).",Party Submissions,10.307878,10.742392,11.385245
"Also, the history of this litigation demonstrates that guidance is needed from this Court now—to avoid the inevitable need for yet another appeal in the near future. For example, in an unusual procedural ruling, the court of appeals did not determine the Naths actually raised a fact issue on attorney’s fees: instead it remanded for “reconsideration” of former Justice Craig Enoch’s counter-affidavit, even after strongly hinting the $1.2 million fee award for two joint motions to dismiss (filed two months after the case started) was excessive.3 Nath v. Baylor Coll ege of Med., No. 01-20-00401-CV, 2022 WL 1038372, at *16 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The court thereby sidestepped the question of whether a jury must decide the reasonableness and necessity of any fee award under the TCPA or Rule 91, finding that argument is “moot” while the trial court reconsiders the correctness of its summary judgment. Id. at *17. The jury question will likely need to be decided in yet another appeal—if not addressed now by this Court.",Party Submissions,8.140108,8.620691,8.670583
"Word 2019, which indicated that the total word count (exclusive of those items listed in Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i) (1)) is 4,116 words.",Party Submissions,9.251889,17.932446,17.461824
"First, Relator’s cursory assertion “explain[s]” nothing “with precision.” Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 764. Relator contends that the time to print the ballots “would typically be ten days.” Pet.2. But he does not address whether this allegedly “typical” number applies to each of Texas’s 254 counties. Nor does he defend the apparent assumption that the “typical” ballot printing timeline is the same in, say, Harris County (pop. 4,780,913) versus Loving County (pop. 51). Compare U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts: Harris County, Texas, https://perma.cc/WA7L-UMRX, with U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts: Loving County, Texas, https://perma.cc/3X2X-MDLN.",Party Submissions,7.0312066,8.036115,7.298515
"Petitioner essentially argues that an optional acceleration clause must be considered mandatory after some certain, undefined length of time. How the parties or the courts are to determine where this line in the sand should be drawn is not an ambiguity that the law should favor.",Party Submissions,23.496956,27.366581,26.520578
"The Court of Appeals, below, held that the “gist” of “Guardians, Inc.” was defamatory and not substantially true because it omitted certain facts. Op. at 4–5.",Party Submissions,19.323622,15.486933,18.494556
"In their petition, appellants Berry Contracting, L.P., d/b/a Bay Ltd. and Juan Tomas Hernandez Alvarez (Bay) fail to meet their burden entitling them to a permissive appeal. Berry asserts that the requirement that there is substantial ground for difference of opinion on the controlling question of law is “obvious from the fact that [appellees] Gernal Randolph Mann and Jennifer Mann and Bay have taken diametrically opposed legal positions on the exclusive remedy defense.” Such an argument is unpersuasive.",Party Submissions,14.583927,15.472176,15.550757
"ON THIS DAY came to be heard the petition for writ of mandamus filed by East Texas Medical Center Athens; who is the relator in appellate cause number 12-23-00263-CV and a defendant in trial court cause number 68714, pending on the docket of the County Court at Law of Smith County, Texas. Said petition for writ of mandamus having been [*13] filed herein on October 11, 2023, and the same having been duly considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that the writ should not issue, it is therefore CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the said petition for writ of mandamus be, and the same is, hereby denied .",Party Submissions,5.0324655,6.917882,6.6903973
"Declaratory Judgment both by failing to join a proper party Defendant, and on the ground of governmental immunity. VII. WILLACY v SEBASTIAN DOES NOT SUPORT RESPONDENT’S Throughout these proceedings, Respondent has relied heavily—and almost exclusively—on Willacy County. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd ., 555 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2018), opinion corrected on reh'g (Tex. Sept. 28, 2018). Petitioners contend that Willacy be limited to its facts, at least as far as precluding the conclusion of the Third Court of Appeals that “For our purposes, however, the pivotal holding in Willacy is that courts may entertain a challenge to the validity of a Section 1.111(e) agreement at all.” This opinion is not binding precedent for the current case.",Party Submissions,10.732131,10.994104,10.417805
"Eligible Employee. Eligible Employee means a member of a “select group of management or highly compensated employees” of a Participating Employer within the meaning of Sections 201(2), 301(a)(3) and 401(a)(1) of ERISA, as determined by the Committee from time to time in its sole discretion.",Contract,2.448609,2.4915814,2.9556086
"Oncor’s argument that the agreement did not purport to resolve the possibility of a clerical error existing is specious. The agreement resolved value. If Oncor’s sole concern were for the accuracy of Wilbarger CAD’s records, records not apparent on the face of the appraisal roll, but that it was not seeking to alter value, this matter would have never reached this Court. What Oncor is patently seeking to change, however, is the value of it property on the Wilbarger CAD 2019 appraisal roll, that same value it previously agreed to resolve. C. The preclusive effect of § 1.111(e) agreements is not limited to §§ In another utterly mind-boggling twist of legal illogic, Oncor contends that §1.111(e) agreements do not preclude § 25.25(c) motions, but only § 25.25(c-1) and (d) motions. The argument rests on the fact that § 25.25(c-1) and (d-1) prohibit corrections under sub-sections (c-1) and (d) when an agreement has been reached on value, but no such language exists regarding sub-section (c).",Party Submissions,8.865804,9.759109,9.465923
"Relator, Justice Brian Walker of the Second Court of Appeals, seeks mandamus relief originally in this Court—bypassing both the appropriate district court and court of appeals—to address a putative emergency of his own creation. Walker al-leges, though no court has ever found, that Justice John Devine’s application to appear on the ballot in the Republican primary for Place 4 of this Court is facially defective. E.g., Pet. at 1 (“Walker will show that, at best, Devine has 45 signatures from the 8th Court of Appeals District.”) (emphasis added). Walker attacks Justice Devine’s application based on information publicly available no later than November 14, 2023. Though Walker is aware that mail-in ballots for the Republican primary election will be printed imminently—in just two days by Walker’s estimate, Pet. at 2—he waited until January 5, 2024 to bring this action. Pet. at 16. Indeed, Walker waited until December 27 before he even raised the possibility that Devine’s application was flawed. Pet. Ex. A.",Party Submissions,8.571188,8.339155,9.267507
"H.B. A No. A 59 AN ACT relating to child water safety requirements for certain organizations; authorizing disciplinary action, including an administrative penalty.",Party Submissions,39.19506,33.98355,45.453007
"But no such “attribution” rule exists. The statute is clear—media defendants cannot be held liable for “accurate reporting of allegations made by a third party regarding a matter of public concern.” CPRC § 73.005(b). The statute does not, in any way, mention or imply an attribution requirement, just as it includes no endorsement exception. See generally CPRC § 73.005; Public Util. Comm'n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. 1988) (“A court may not write special exceptions into a statute so as to make it inapplicable under certain circumstances not mentioned in the statute.”); Tex. Gov't Code § 311.021(2) (entire statute is intended to be effective).",Party Submissions,6.027546,6.736502,6.8597693
"TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a). Only community property is subject to the trial court ’ s just and right division. Barnard v. Barnard, 133 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex.",Party Submissions,4.8876514,6.649094,5.7242255
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made.,Legal Decisions,26.068045,30.948666,38.062782
Husband responds the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s characterization of the marital residence such that there was no abuse of discretion.,Party Submissions,10.9225645,13.829384,14.764082
"This RESTRICTED STOCK UNIT AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”) is made as of the Date of Grant set forth above by and between UNITED RENTALS, INC., a Delaware corporation, having an office at 100 First Stamford Place, Suite 700 Stamford, CT 06902 (the “Company”), and Awardee (together with the Company, the “Parties”), currently an employee of the Company or an affiliate of the Company.",Contract,2.9631987,3.0403998,3.0111048
"When the episode introduces Tonya, it cuts to a photo of her scowling in the courtroom as foreboding music plays in the background.",Party Submissions,16.085625,16.156557,16.987001
"The name-change issue that Respondents did brief is entirely meritless. That issue relates solely to the damages that Westwood would be entitled to recover under the jury’s verdict if the court of appeals’ ju dgment is reversed. And while Respondents insist that Westwood’s name change creates “intractable problems” for the entire damages award (Resp. 31), it actually leaves most of it untouched.",Party Submissions,15.421136,15.605821,16.792084
"Relator’s petition should be denied because it would disrupt the ongoing election process. Relief at this late hour would be incredibly destabilizing, as the Secretary of State has advised counties across Texas to “complet[e] [thei]r ballots not later than the 60th day before election day, which is Friday, January 5, 2024. ” Christina Worrell Adkins, Director of Elections, Tex. Sec’y of State, Election Advisory No. 2023-27 (Dec. 23, 2023), https://perma.cc/8MMK-48DV. Relator never confronts this fact, and he never explains how this Court could grant relief “that would not disrupt the larger election.” In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d 762, 764 (Tex. 2022). That is fatal to his claim because, on mandamus, it is his burden to clearly prove that relief would not disrupt the election process. Speculation and empty assurances have never been sufficient under this Court’s caselaw.",Party Submissions,7.9356585,9.106448,8.375385
"In the first instance, it is up to a local appraisal board to decide whether there has been more than one protest relating to the same property. While a board has no authority to change a settlement reached by a taxpayer and the chief appraiser, it certainly has the authority to take note of what property was included.",Party Submissions,10.018972,12.088733,11.882392
"One Lease Ended Up in Both the Hooks and this Bordages Case The severance also put a single lease into both the Hooks case and Bordages cases. One Bordages owner under that lease is also in privity with the Hooks, who own the executive rights under that lease.",Party Submissions,38.532383,44.14165,49.602325
Orders confirming Chapter 11 reorganization plans become final judgments when not challenged for fraud in accordance with 11 U.S.C.,Party Submissions,10.1776,11.361624,11.074043
"Synopsis Employer petitioned for writ of mandamus, compelling the 189th District Court, Harris County, Carolyn Marks Johnson, J., to abate employee's negligence action against employer until Workers' Compensation Commission made final decision on employee's claim. The Court of Appeals, Bill Cannon, J. (Assigned), held that trial court abused its discretion by refusing to abate negligence trial in which employer asserted that workers' compensation was exclusive remedy for employee's injury until Commission made final decision on whether employee's injury was compensable, and thus, employer was entitled to mandamus relief.",Party Submissions,6.544973,6.4805784,6.64504
"The Texarkana court held that the Raymond exclusion only applies where the deed is from one spouse as the grantor to the other spouse as grantee. Id. at 710. In Moncey, the sisters were the grantors under the deed, so it was not a conveyance from one spouse to the other spouse to exclude parol evidence. Id.",Party Submissions,10.758111,10.503847,13.138333
"Perhaps more importantly, however, none of the evidence Respondents cite played any part in the court of appeals’ decision. The court refused to consider it. Nor did the court rely on any “Rule 11 agreement” memorialized in the agreed judgment because it deemed the judgment’s contents themselves unimportant. All that mattered to the court below was the judgment’s very existence, which purportedly “precluded” Westwood’s constructive eviction and breach -of-contract claims in district court. (Op. 6) That conclusion violates Texas statutes and this Court’s precedent, creates conflicts among the lower courts, strips eviction proceedings of the jurisdictional limits necessary to ensure their efficiency, threatens the separation of powers and the jurisdictional boundaries between Texas district courts, and creates intractable practical problems for Texas tenants. It therefore raises issues of substantial importance to Texas jurisprudence that this Court should review and resolve.",Party Submissions,13.715796,13.656862,14.071822
"Therefore, the Respondent is ordered to produce: “all documents, communications, or other correspondence issued/received by the MOPC directly addressing its decision to remit payment and subsequently revoke payment of libramiento no. 7852-1 to Sargeant, from 1 August 2019 to date”.",Legal Decisions,28.822428,28.6154,29.509077
"Notice shall be given to the other party by delivering a copy of the notice to the party by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. Notice shall be given to the Court by delivering a copy of the notice either in person to the clerk of this Court or by registered or certified mail addressed to the clerk at 2100 Bloomdale, McKinney, Texas 75071. Notice shall be given to the state case registry by mailing a copy of the notice to State Case Registry, Contract Services Section, MC046S, P.O. Box 12017, Austin, Texas 78711-2017.",Party Submissions,4.2033377,4.259696,4.348806
"Two days later, McCarthy filed a motion to dismiss in the Oklahoma case, arguing that (1) the forum-selection clause in the MCC is voidable under the Texas “home-rule” statute found in section 272.001 of the Business and Commerce Code;1 and (2) the case should further be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.",Party Submissions,9.061017,7.565163,10.690118
"On the other hand, protecting the public fisc is cold comfort for an injured person barred from the judicial remedies that would otherwise be available to them had the complained-of-acts been committed by a private person. See id.; Bacon v. Tex. Hist. Comm ’ n, 411 S.W.3d 161, 172 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (noting that “sovereign immunity generally shields our state government ’ s improvident acts — however improvident, harsh, unjust, or infuriatingly boneheaded these acts may seem” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Consequently, c ourts “ defer to the Legislature in waiving immunity because it is in a better position to weigh the conflicting public policy interests associated with subjecting the government to liability. ” Dohlen, 643 S.W.3d at 392 (citing Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 432 – 33 (Tex. 2016)).",Party Submissions,7.0476923,7.0987163,7.3221393
"Agreement was the result of a negotiated process to which generators could choose to adhere or not. As appears from a letter from CAMMESA to the Energy Secretary dated 20 October 2005, the Tribunal notes that not all generators that adhered to the Adhesion Contract adhered to the FONINVEMEM I Agreement.944 This further confirms the noncoercion in relation to the program. 803. The testimony of the Claimant’s witness Ms. Bertone confirms the Tribunal’s findings.",Legal Decisions,18.620777,14.98413,18.782494
"To prohibit the Environmental Protection Agency from using assessments generated by the Integrated Risk Information System as a tier 1 data source in rulemakings and other regulatory actions, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.167085,6.225279,6.9638186
"Finally, Rafiei concludes his discussion with Brunke v. Ohio State Home Services, Inc., No. 08CA009320, 2008 WL 4615578 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2008). In Brunke the court found procedural unconscionability of a contractual arbitration clause because both of the plaintiffs had “very limited reading ability,” “poor quality” comprehension skills, and an almost total lack of understanding what they were signing. 2008 WL 4615578, at *2-3. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable. Id. at *3. The court then found the arbitration provision to be substantively unconscionable because the plaintiffs would have to spend nearly 50% of the contract price to arbitrate the dispute. Id. at *4. Brunke was subsequently distinguished by two Ohio decisions based on the “extreme facts” of the case. Khaledi v. Nickris Prop., Inc., No. H-17-015, 2018 WL 3738083, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. August 3, 2018); Moran v. Riverfront Diversified, Inc., 968 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).",Party Submissions,4.9429584,4.9504085,5.023098
America; 2) not tied to any commissioned work and 3) an “expectancy” and not an entitlement until it was received. Id.,Party Submissions,29.565308,52.287674,57.097412
"Relevant court of appeals precedent can be found in the Cunningham case. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 183 S.W.2d 985 (Tex.",Party Submissions,6.0018435,6.395123,7.064515
"Having overruled each of Grant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court ordering partition and the order requiring Grant to pay costs.",Party Submissions,12.009193,19.84321,25.23186
"We will collectively describe these state, county, and municipal limitations on restaurants, which began in March 2020 and extended to varying degrees for approximately one year, as the Emergency Orders.",Party Submissions,13.502373,18.073174,15.584849
"Under the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, the legislature grants an administrative agency the sole authority to make the initial determination in a dispute. If an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute until the party has exhausted all of the administrative remedies within the agency. Absent subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court must dismiss any claim within the agency's exclusive jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,6.2599907,6.044031,7.052415
"Drawings and Operating and Maintenance Manuals, receipt by McCarthy of such materials is required prior to processing Subcontractor's final payment.",Party Submissions,21.13589,35.42519,30.655293
"Terry: $ ~ 1 000 0~0 1 Newsom, Terry & Newsom, L.L.P.: $~MU00 1 When you go into the jury room to answer the questions, the first thing you will need to do is choose a presiding juror.",Party Submissions,18.699684,18.860493,28.109444
"Third, Rafiei assumes that he will be burdened with the cost of three arbitrators. But the parties can agree to use one arbitrator. Rafiei has not explored that prospect with the Lennar. Additionally, Rafiei can petition the AAA for a hardship waiver, which he has not done. III. Rafiei’s cases from other jurisdictions.",Party Submissions,14.182256,17.42988,16.380648
"Without this erroneous reading of art. XVII.D, Samson gives no meaning to the last sentence of XVII.C. The importance of this last sentence is shown both by the text of XVII.C and the legal context in which it was drafted.",Party Submissions,19.2307,27.844118,28.252722
"The Relator is a candidate for statewide office. The Respondent is the Chairman of the Republican Party of Texas, which is headquartered in Austin. Relator seeks a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent to reject the application of the Real Party in Interest, Justice John Devine, to appear on the ballot in an upcoming election.",Party Submissions,5.916372,6.3806853,6.8735948
This body of law is in straightforward opposition to the application of any common law principles. This recognizes the fundamental difference between common law and statute law.,Party Submissions,17.865656,22.69967,27.952665
"Letter from the Directorate for Construction Land and Urban Development of Belgrade to the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction No. 19111/96000-VI-I dated 14 April 2010, together with all accompanying attachments. RELEVANCE Claimants hereby incorporate explanation from Request No. 34 above.",Legal Decisions,21.775541,17.361172,22.520325
"McCarthy’s position would render other portions of the paragraph 47.7 in the MCC meaningless. McCarthy admits that it waived any “objection” to venue or convenience of forum. Significantly, however, McCarthy “irrevocably submit[ted] to the exclusive jurisdiction” of the Tulsa County District Court or the Northern District Federal Court located in Tulsa, Oklahoma; “agree[d] that all claims in respect of such action or proceeding shall be heard and determined only in” the Tulsa County District Court or the Northern District Federal Court located in Tulsa, Oklahoma; and “agree[d] not to bring any action or proceeding arising out of or relating to this contract or the enforcement hereof in any other court.” It is not inconsistent for McCarthy to have waived any objection to venue or convenience of forum while also agreeing that claims arising out of or relating to the MCC be brought in the Tulsa County District Court or the Northern District Federal Court located in Tulsa, Oklahoma. We must harmonize all provisions in paragraph 47.7 of the MCC so that none will be rendered meaningless. See Nettye Engler Energy, LP, 639 S.W.3d at 690; Sundown Energy LP, 622 S.W.3d at 888. Moreover, we cannot rewrite a contract or add to its language under the guise of interpreting it. Abdullatif v. Choudhri, 561 S.W.3d 590, 602 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). McCarthy bargained freely to waive its section 272.001-right to void the forum-selection clause in the MCC.",Party Submissions,4.8956084,5.143765,5.19725
The United States objects to Request No. 2.f for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a.,Legal Decisions,8.428967,13.278079,14.621537
"As in the Diocese’s own proposed definition of “undue advantage,” passive receipt of a benefit that it would be unconscionable to retain has been equated with taking an “undue advantage,” the phrase used in Heldenfels, by the PJC committee and several appellate courts. See TEX. PATTERN JURY CHARGES Business 101.44 (2022) (citing Tex. Integrated Conveyor Sys., Inc. v. Innovative Conveyor Concepts, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 348, 367 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied); Villarreal v. Grant Geophysical, Inc ., 136 S.W.3d 265, 270 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied); City of Corpus Christi v. S.S. Smith & Sons Masonry, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1987, writ denied). By incorporating the “equity and good conscience” language into Question 1, the jury charge adequately instructed the jury on undue advantage. (2CR839).",Party Submissions,6.0050664,6.4501495,6.217472
"Section 272.001 makes the forum-selection clauses in construction contracts “voidable.” See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 272.001(b). RLB cites to statutes from other states that make forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses in construction contracts void and unenforceable in support of its position that the Texas Legislature intended for section 272.001 to be non-waivable. RLB’s reliance on these other statutes is misplaced because those statutes expressly deem forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses in construction contracts as “against public policy” and/or “void” and/or “unenforceable” rather than merely “voidable.”4 RLB contends that the Legislature indicated its intent to grant a non-waivable right by making forum-selection clauses in construction contracts requiring litigation in another forum voidable and that contractual waiver of the right to void such clauses would be against Texas public policy. RLB relies on legislative analysis on section 272.001 observing that Texas has “provided protection for general contractors and subcontractors who contract with entities from other states” and that “projects constructed in Texas will be decided in Texas, under Texas law.” Senate Res. Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. S. B. 807, 85th Leg. R.S. (April 18, 2017). Generally, however, we do not resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to interpret a clear and unambiguous statute because the statute’s plain language is the surest guide to the Legislature’s intent. See Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. 2016). In any event, we do not dispute that the Legislature intended to protect contractors. But insofar as forum-selection clauses are concerned, the Legislature clearly did not intend to void them in all construction contracts or prohibit contractual waivers of the right to void them.",Party Submissions,4.201049,4.3352957,4.325892
"HN1 [ ] Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P., 235 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Tex. 2007). Generally, a writ of mandamus will issue only when the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal and the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion. In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005). The relator has the burden of establishing these prerequisites, and this burden is a heavy one. In re Fitzgerald, 429 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2014, orig. proceeding.); see In re EPIC Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 41, 56 (Tex. 1998).",Party Submissions,3.0825891,3.2883582,3.559622
"Since TX 1111 would not receive the state tax credits or the Contributions until completion of the historic rehabilitation, it sought a loan to assist funding the rehabilitation project until the state tax credits could be monetized. TX 1111 was referred to First NBC, a lender with significant experience in making tax credit loans and as a tax credit investor, for the loan. First NBC was willing to make the loan to TX 1111 for purposes of funding a portion of the rehabili tation and to “bridge” receipt o f the Contributions, with the Contributions serving as collateral for the contemplated loan.",Party Submissions,9.513799,8.06938,10.2681465
"For these reasons, Petitioner OSPrin II, LLC, respectfully prays that this Court grant this Motion for Rehearing of the Petition for Review, grant the Petition for Review, and reverse the opinion of the court of appeals, and remand to the court of appeals to consider issues it did not previously reach. Petitioner also prays for such further relief to which it may be entitled.",Party Submissions,6.8022823,7.488001,7.916842
"The EU has raised the issue of regulation of snow crab in NEAFC, both at the Commission meeting in 2014 and in PECCOE, but so far without success. Russia has stated in the NEAFC that they consider the snow crab as a sedentary species that must be managed according to the shelf jurisdiction in accordance with the Convention on the Law of the Sea. From the Norwegian side, it was communicated in PECCO in January that we currently have the case under consideration, but that there is much to suggest that the snow crab is a sedentary species according to UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 77 (4).",Legal Decisions,9.184357,10.217381,9.245458
"OSPrin first argues, again, that the Court of Appeals’ opinion conflicts with the Austin Court of Appeals’ decision in Person v. MC-Simpsonville, SC-1-UT, No.",Party Submissions,43.230087,45.72315,49.305904
"Confidentiality Agreement by Claimants. In this regard, Clause 8 of the Confidentiality Agreement prevents the Parties from using any statements made by one party to the other party, or to a third party, or any action taken over the course of the consultation and negotiation procedure, in a future arbitration (see ¶ 1293 above). However, there is an express carve-out in Clause 8 for information which is “generally available to the public or which has come into the public domain for reasons other than a breach of this Confidentiality Agreement” (see ¶ 1293 above). Respondent has not established that Claimants revealed non-public information in making their assertions. Nor is the Tribunal satisfied that by making these assertions, Claimants effectively “opened up” the content of the Parties’ settlement discussions.",Legal Decisions,6.7507353,6.654772,7.5193
"Section 3. Participation. Each Eligible Associate shall become a participant (a “Participant”) in the Plan on the later of the Effective Date, or the date on which he or she has a Qualifying Termination. A Participant’s participation in the Plan shall cease as of the date the Participant is no longer an Eligible Associate and is not entitled to any benefit provided under this Plan.",Contract,4.5902905,4.0925317,4.790078
"On the other hand, the courts of appeals widely cite the standard for abuse of discretion in most family law decisions to be a two-prong inquiry: (1) Did the trial court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) Did the trial court err in its application of discretion? Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 549 (Tex. 2018), J. Devine dissent, citing Lindsey v. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. App. – El Paso 1998, no pet); Roberts v. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d 224, 231 (Tex.",Party Submissions,4.189278,4.0596614,4.2970943
"By my signature above, I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served as required Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5 to the parties to the proceeding, via-efiling on this the 5th day of January, 2024.",Party Submissions,8.907785,11.534811,12.664416
"Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314 (2018) By its second issue, Bay asserts that the ROCIP carrier's denial of coverage does not prevent Bay from asserting the exclusive-remedy defense. In the trial court, the Manns argued that the workers' compensation insurance carrier was Bay's agent. The Manns reasoned that the carrier's denial of coverage therefore binds Bay, preventing Bay from contesting the issue of coverage on appeal. Based on related reasoning, the Manns asserted that the carrier's denial of coverage estops Bay from taking a contrary position.",Party Submissions,7.684374,8.098392,8.813342
"Wife argued that the transfer constituted an irrebuttable presumption of gift and therefore should be characterized as wife’s separate property. Id. Husband made no claims of fraud, accident, or mistake. Id. Wife argued that the parol evidence rule should not allow evidence of the parties’ intent. Id. The trial court granted directed verdict in favor of wife as to the irrebuttable presumption of gift. Id. The trial court did not allow parol evidence by husband as to his position on the characterization. Id .",Party Submissions,7.4566884,8.306301,8.48672
"R. 024, 035-036. RLB alleges that it based its fixed-price bid on the soil conditions set forth in the Terracon report. R.3-4, 6.",Party Submissions,17.15975,21.26768,27.060469
Claimants agree to conduct a reasonable search for and produce documents responsive to this request that are in the Claimants’ possession and/or control.,Legal Decisions,8.80494,12.352917,11.246558
"That reason fails on its own terms: Walker is the architect of his own timeliness problem. Walker waited 53 days between when Devine’s application became public information and when he sought mandamus relief. Measuring more generously from when Walker filed his own petition, on December 4, or even from when he first raised his complaint to Chairman Rinaldi, on December 27, Walker waited either over three weeks or nearly a week and a half to act. He easily could have sought emergency mandamus relief in the court of appeals on either of those timelines, asking for a decision by a date certain if necessary; an attempt to do so would have satisfied Rule 52.3(e)’s requirements. Other litigants have done so on similar timelines before seeking mandamus relief from this Court. Walker’s “failure to diligently pursue relief. .. belies [his] justification for not first seeking mandamus in the court of ap-peals,” In re Dorn, 471 S.W.3d 823, 824 (Tex. 2015) (Brown, J., concurring in denial of petition for mandamus), because “the urgency [Walker] face[s] is of [his] own making,” and therefore “is no excuse for skipping past the court of appeals.” Id. II. The Petition Should Be Denied on the Merits.",Party Submissions,8.207117,8.686463,9.357825
"Group, Inc. was founded in 1986, went public in 1995 and is traded on the NASDAQ Global Select Market under the ticker symbol SBGI.",Party Submissions,4.549388,4.476818,5.309244
"In a decree of divorce or annulment, the court shall determine the rights of both spouses in a pension, retirement plan, annuity, and bonus, among other things.",Party Submissions,8.6091585,8.948124,10.767469
"HN5 [ ] Standards of Review, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretation The Texas Labor Code provides for a modified de novo review of appeals panel decisions on issues of compensability or eligibility for or the amount of income or death benefits. Generally, a trial court is required to give consideration to the appeals panel's decision. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.304(b). A question of statutory interpretation, however, is a question of law and the administrative determination of a question of law is not entitled to a presumption of validity. Neither a district court nor an appellate court is bound by an administrative agency's construction of one of its statutes. The construction given to a statute by the administrative agency charged with its execution is entitled to serious consideration if it is reasonable, consistent with the Legislature's intent, and does not contradict the plain language of the statute. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(6) (1998).",Party Submissions,4.8957825,5.555412,5.2768345
"This letter contains certain objections to the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of the 2013 DRP. The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the Secretariat for Environmental Protection considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP, and if so, what was its contemporaneous understanding of these rights.",Legal Decisions,18.578884,17.308214,18.969515
"B. Respondent assumed the risk of mistake. “A party bears the risk of mistake when the risk is allocated to him by agreement or when he knowingly treats his limited knowledge of the facts surrounding the mistake as sufficient. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154(a) & (b) (1981)” de Monet v. PERA, 877 S.W.2d 352, 359 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994) Furthermore, relief is barred where a mistake is shown to be due to negligence on the part of the party seeking avoidance. Roland v. McCullough, 561 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. —San Antonio, 1978), writ refused n.r.e.",Party Submissions,6.0181313,6.5554748,6.2214904
"Testimony at trial created a fact issue on whether Diamond State failed to provide an effective defense by failing to hire separate counsel for Defterios and HSMiller, (8RR273-74), and by allegedly hindering Terry’s defense on damages. (7RR38-39, 92-96) As this Court held in Keck, Mahin & Cate, an insurance company’s negligence in providing a defense may be considered in an ensuing malpractice case against the insured’s lawyer. 20 S.W.3d at 701-03.",Party Submissions,14.853563,13.201678,15.79947
"You are instructed that negligence means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a lawyer or law firm of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a lawyer or law firm of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.",Party Submissions,2.8867352,3.89514,3.7879946
"It is true that the error in the total mileage of Sharyland’s transmission lines that P&A used in the allocation process originated in an email communication from Sharyland’s agent.1 Appendix F to Oncor’s Brief at ¶ 7; RR.Vol.2 at 42-43 & 45-46 (Appendix H to Oncor’s Brief). But even though that error caused nonsensical internal inconsistencies in P&A’s appraisal report, neither P&A nor Sharyland had discovered the error when Sharyland settled its 2019 protests. Appendix F to Oncor’s Brief at ¶¶ 9-12; Appendix H to Oncor’s Brief at 44-46. Though Sharyland could have filed protests to correct the clerical error on the appraisal rolls of P&A’s thirteen client counties, see Texas Tax Code section 41.41(a)(9), Sharyland did not do that because it did not know of the clerical error. Appendix F to Oncor’s Brief at ¶¶ 11-12.",Party Submissions,7.270651,7.594109,7.7715707
"Trial Court’s disposition: The trial court overruled the objections and denied the motion to dismiss. App. 1, CR 1332; App. 2, Supp. CR 4.",Party Submissions,9.994385,14.779913,12.026704
"The Hooks Case and This Bordages Case Remained Allied to the End The severance formally divided Hooks and Bordages, but they remained allied. The parties did file separate pleadings, but their ownership stipulation, most evidence, many pleadings, and some court orders were jointly filed in all three cases, and all summary judgment motions were simultaneously heard by the same special master. See, e.g., 2CR1784, 1824, 1826, 2636, 3448, 3516, and SuppCR1208-33, 1234-41, 1242-49, 1250-55, 1569-1606.",Party Submissions,11.841952,12.58848,12.711043
"Counsel for Petitioners/ Cross-Respondents This motion for rehearing complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i) because it contains 3,231 words.",Party Submissions,10.046936,12.318953,14.448948
"Petitioner’s arguments have been repeatedly and unanimously rebuffed by multiple Courts of Appeal. Smith v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., No. 05-21-00305-CV (Tex.App.-Dallas Mar. 22, 2023, no pet. h.)(mem. op.); Thompson v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., No. 01-21-00147-CV (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 3, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Washington v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., No. 02-21-00215-CV (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Nov. 3, 2022, no pet.)(mem. op.). The reason for this is not because – as Petitioner argues – everyone is getting it wrong, but because Petitioner is trying to force a revision of Texas jurisprudence that need not occur.",Party Submissions,3.4250007,3.5032644,3.4791849
Respondent respectfully prays that this Court deny Petitioners' motion for rehearing and consider the relief sought by Respondent in its pending Motion for Rehearing.,Party Submissions,7.2776785,7.940428,9.712347
"On August 17, 2020, Santos filed her First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction, Answer, and Counterclaim. CR1:4-52. The Plea to the Jurisdiction alleged that Yellowfin lacked standing to sue because it lacked standing to enforce the Note and because Yellowfin’s immediate predecessor, RCS Recover Services, LLC forfeited its right to do business in Texas prior to selling the Note to Yellowfin. CR:82-83.",Party Submissions,10.255828,9.789607,12.477315
"The intermediate courts are in near uniform agreement that an obstetrician’s experience dealing with all aspects of labor and delivery qualify him to opine on complications that can occur during delivery, including neurological birth injuries. See, e.g., Monga v. Perez, No. 14-16-00961-CV, 2018 WL 505263, at *9 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 23, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“There is no per se requirement that an expert be a pediatric neurologist to opine on causes of fetal brain injury occurring during labor and delivery.” ) (emphasis omitted); Cornejo, 446 at 120 – 23 (board certified obstetrician/gynecologist qualified to testify about neurological injuries suffered at or around time of birth because report demonstrated he had specific expertise in complications in pregnancy, management of labor, and evidence of fetal hypoxia as predicted by fetal heart rate patterns); Abilene Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Allen, 387 S.W.3d 914, 922 – 23 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2012, pet. denied) (obstetrician/gynecologist qualified because expert had attended hundreds of deliveries and was familiar with biological mechanisms that can lead to brain injury in fetus); Livingston, 279 S.W.3d at 877 (obstetrician qualified to testify even though not a pediatric neurologist because expert had sufficient experience managing labor and delivery and the complications that stem from labor and delivery, including an infant ’ s neurological injuries).",Party Submissions,5.2325497,5.0813456,5.36609
"If Chapter 74 is to function as the Legislature intended, it is vital that the lower courts consistently apply the appropriate standard and scope of review when evaluating and reviewing preliminary reports. This Court should grant review to preserve the balance.",Party Submissions,18.049408,19.70952,24.926748
"For column 9: Indicate the epidemiological units surveyed, indicating its description and unit of measurement. ‘Epidemiological unit’ means a homogeneous area where For column 10: Indicate the methods used during the survey including the number of activities in each case, depending on the specific legal requirements of each pest.",Legislation,23.429754,24.46771,27.669523
"The requested Documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute in that they address (i) the expe ctations of the Cypriot Claimants and/or Mr Obradović as regards Obnova's rights to the Dunavska Plots, and (ii) the Cypriot Claimants' knowledge at the time of making the investment and foreseeability of the investment dispute.",Legal Decisions,14.089457,16.996803,15.861803
"PCC : The requested documents must be in Obnova’s, i.e., Claimants’, possession, custody or control since all requested documents appear to be the annexes of the agreements concluded by Obnova. In any event, Respondent is not in possession of these documents.",Legal Decisions,17.359198,21.536568,22.718937
"Contents of Notice. If a claim for benefits is completely or partially denied, notice of such denial shall be in writing and shall set forth the reasons for denial in plain language. The notice shall: (i) cite the pertinent provisions of the Plan document; and (ii) explain, where appropriate, how the Claimant can perfect the claim, including a description of any additional material or information necessary to complete the claim and why such material or information is necessary. The claim denial also shall include an explanation of the claims review procedures and the time limits applicable to such procedures, including a statement of the Claimant’s right to bring a civil action under Section 502(a) of ERISA following an adverse decision on review. In the case of a complete or partial denial of a Disability Benefit claim, the notice shall provide a statement that the Committee will provide to the Claimant, upon request and free of charge, a copy of any internal rule, guideline, protocol, or other similar criterion that was relied upon in making the decision.",Contract,3.0425427,3.3030114,3.2979784
The purpose of an appeal is to review a trial court’s exercise of discretion. The court’s discretion was never meant to be unbridled. For this trial court to hold a standard for trial court discretion that eliminates FS review by court of appeal would unnecessarily give the court judges the ability to impose rulings with out any oversight. Such situation fails to serve justice and instead sets back our idea of justice immeasurably.,Party Submissions,20.2965,19.006203,20.36155
To direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to include information relating to the rate of suicide among covered Reserves in each National Veteran Suicide Prevention Annual Report of the Office of Mental Health and Suicide Prevention of the Department of Veterans Affairs.,Legislation,5.893317,4.814111,6.365016
"This appears to have generated confusion among the courts of appeals as to whether “use” of property claims have been eliminated. See City of Brownsville v. Nezzer, No. 13-21-00150-CV, 2022 WL 2251818, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2022, no pet.) (holding a claim for premises defect or arises when “plaintiff alleges injury as a result of a physical condition or defect left on the premises.”). But see Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Halstead, 650 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (“A claim for a condition or use of real property is a premises defect claim under the TTCA.”).",Party Submissions,4.97118,5.223181,5.2632413
"The HMA Agreement is replete with provisions regarding sales, performance, and objectives for a franchisee as HMA depends upon those sales for its standing amongst other OEMs and for its profitability. Whether a sales objective is reasonable for a particular dealer requires a hearing because if HMA determines the dealer has not performed adequately in sales then HMA may elect to terminate the Agreement16–an action that is the essence of a required sales standard.",Party Submissions,28.153925,21.123909,28.251133
"Respondent, H A O appeared in person and through attorneys of record, Michael D. Wysocki and Ryan H. Segall, and announced ready.",Party Submissions,29.72293,32.487804,49.03666
"The Parties desire to amend the Credit Agreement according to the terms in this Amendment. Any capitalized terms used in this Amendment, but not otherwise defined in this Amendment, are as defined in the Credit Agreement.",Contract,4.586882,4.022069,5.8742023
"The Bordages owners later filed amicus briefs at the court of appeals and in this Court in support of the Hooks in Samson’s appeal. 5CR6188, 6284. Samson asked the First Court in 2011 to strike the Bordages brief. 5CR6255-60. The Bordages owners pointed out that Samson had briefed “how to compute Late Charges under the identical Hooks and Bordages leases.” 5CR6262. But Samson succeeded in muzzling them. The First Court struck their brief. 5CR6303.",Party Submissions,12.392412,11.951559,14.55225
"Read together with Dr. Tappan’s report, Dr. Null’s deductive reasoning easily provides at least some factual basis to support the experts’ conclusion that intrapartum factors (including the prolonged second stage labor, fetal heartrate abnormalities, and forceful delivery) caused H.W.’s brain injury. See Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 513 – 15 (reading expert reports together and concluding that when considered together they met the statutory requirements); Van Ness, 461 S.W.3d at 144. And at this early stage of the proceedings, some explanation is all that is required. See E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664.",Party Submissions,8.831074,10.470889,10.418504
"These are not circumstances of Nicaragua asserting defenses that were not just simply wrong, but where the bona fides of Nicaragua’s behavior in this Arbitration is called into question.",Party Submissions,18.87213,26.290583,23.270607
"The Court should grant review because this case involves the construction of two statutes—Chapter 55 of the Texas Property Code and Chapter 12 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See id. Additionally, due to the profound impact the construction of the statutes will have on similarly situated parties, the court of appeals has committed an error of law of such importance to the state’s jurisprudence that it should be corrected. See id.",Party Submissions,6.5447297,7.173463,6.9330263
No failure or delay on the part of the Lender to exercise any right under this Agreement or the Note operates as a waiver of this Agreement or the Note. Nor does any single or partial exercise of any right under this Agreement or the Note preclude any other or further exercise of any right under this Agreement or the Note or the exercise of any other right. The remedies provided in this Agreement or the Note are cumulative and not exclusive of any remedies provided by law.,Contract,2.345806,2.3977125,2.9116194
"See Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.1985). The refusal to abate is such an incidental ruling for which there is an adequate remedy by appeal. See id. at 567; Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.. Flores, 908 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1995, orig. proceeding) (opinion on motion for leave). There are limited exceptions to this rule such as when one court interferes with the jurisdiction of another court or when a party seeks to enforce mandatory statutory rights.",Party Submissions,5.277,5.5706487,6.247726
"Nor could he. Relator says (Pet.5) that 28 individuals signed his petition first, thus invalidating those same individual’s signatures for purposes of Justice Devine’s petition under Tex. Elec. Code §141.066(a), (c). But no amount of diligence could have led Justice Devine to discover this before December 4. Even contacting these signers individually likely would have been fruitless because all 28 signed Justice Devine’s petition despite it stating that “Signing the petition of more than one candidate for the same office in the same election is prohibited.” Id. § 141.066(b); Ex.C.",Party Submissions,12.023974,11.459341,13.133313
"Attempting to defend that precedent, Respondents maintain, “Petitioners have no support for their argument that the use of an otherwise valid lien can support a Chapter 12 claim.” Respondents’ Br. at 13. Respondents’ argument ignores the plain language of §12.002 that prohibits the use of a lien for an improper purpose such as to collect “a fraudulent. .. claim” with the intent to cause financial injury. Further, the cases Petitioners cited are, contrary to Respondents’ argument, directly supportive of Petitioners’ position.",Party Submissions,9.055404,9.096351,10.369928
"HSMiller argues that the Lawyers cannot raise the assignment issue because they failed to address it fully in the most recent trial. HSMiller also claims the Court cannot consider three documents the Lawyers cite in their Petitioners’ Brief: the Litigation Agreement, the Bankruptcy Plan, and the Bankruptcy Court’s order on fees (in which the court notes that the case lacks the attributes of the usual bankruptcy case and wonders why it was ever brought).",Party Submissions,18.701391,15.772117,20.76201
"I. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, Lessor's exercise of the rights under this paragraph shall not be deemed as a waiver of Lessor’s right to take all actions necessary to recover unpaid royalties, interest and other damages incurred.",Party Submissions,7.7835007,7.814874,8.887279
"Petitioner respectfully prays that its petition for review be granted, that the court of appeals’ judgment be reversed, and that the case be remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings.",Party Submissions,3.7722483,3.8047037,4.0952764
"The plain language of the indemnity provision does not show that the parties intended for TX 1111 to indemnify First NBC or its successor-in-interest, Osprin, for defending against claims filed by Osprin against TX 1111. If TX 1111 and First NBC “ had intended to include claims between them, they would have had to specifically add such language ” to the indemnity provision. Id. at *3 (citing Ganske, 129 S.W.3d at 708). Since the indemnity provision lacks any specific language that would overcome the general rule that indemnity provisions do not apply to claims between the parties, Osprin has not shown that the indemnity provision is applicable to its claims. See id.; see also Nat’l City Mortg. Co. v. Adams, 310 S.W.3d 139, 143– 44 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 2010, no pet.); MG Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Moses Lopez Custom Homes, Inc., 179 S.W.3d 51, 63 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied).",Party Submissions,4.8732705,4.8801756,5.2860684
"Serbia does not seem to dispute that the requested documents are not in Claimants’ possession, custody or control. Serbia only asserts that the requested documents are “ in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties. ” This assertion is incorrect for the same reasons that Claimants already explained in paragraphs 30 to 47 above and in their response to Serbia’s objections to Requests No. 6. Claimants hereby incorporate all those arguments.234 Furthermore, as explained above, even if the reque sted documents had been “equally and effectively available to both parties ” ( quod non ), Serbia would still be obliged to allow Claimants access to the responsive documents — as long as the Tribunal concluded that the documents are relevant and material and thus should be produced.235 DECISION 96 NO.",Legal Decisions,9.16973,9.910342,9.687292
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (which prepared exhibit R-101) in accordance with the applicable regulations.92 In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".93 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.94 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek. R, M : Claimants' request is not sufficiently relevant or material. Claimants' request for the documents underlying the implementation costs for the construction of the bus loop is wholly speculative and of limited relevance to the dispute. Claimants and Respondent have not argued that implementation costs played any role in respect of the decision to locate the bus loop on the Dunasvka Plots. This is a classic ""fishing expedition"" as Claimants are merely casting about for any documents which might exist and which might contain information they consider helpful for their case.",Legal Decisions,11.933509,13.143439,12.622742
,Contract,nan,nan,nan
"F. ... If it is determined [by audit] that royalty owner has not been correctly paid all sums owed him, then Lessee shall reimburse the requesting royalty owner for all costs and expenses incurred by Lessor for such audit, together with all unpaid revenues, late charges, and interest thereon.",Party Submissions,13.892136,13.196001,15.230511
"The Seventh Court also misread Thompson to require preliminary experts reports to preemptively explain why negligent acts are not “ too attenuated to the eventual harm. ” Id. at *2. But Thompson involved an appeal from a final judgment following trial. 649 S.W.3d 160. The opinion confirmed than in order to establish cause-in-fact, an expert must negate other causes of an injury, but only when the evidence demonstrates that other plausible causes exist. Thompson, 649 S.W.3d at 161; see also Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 536 (“When the only evidence of a vital fact is circumstantial, the expert cannot merely draw possible inferences from the evidence and state that ‘in medical probability’ the injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence. The expert must explain why the inferences drawn are medically preferable to competing inferences that are equally consistent with the known facts.”).",Party Submissions,8.831471,8.740014,9.371874
"Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314 (2018) We cannot agree. Section 408.001(d)’s only reference to the exclusive-remedy defense is to ensure that employers retain access to the defense even in cases of certain noncompensable injuries; it says nothing of stripping an employer of the defense if coverage is denied for any other reason. See id. Instead, because none of the scenarios referred to in section 408.001(d) are present here, that section neither applies to this case nor provides a basis to affirm summary judgment. Bay's third issue is sustained.",Party Submissions,9.019062,9.060447,9.911316
"Again, a dealer’s primary market area is “not intended to be permanent” as HMA may, in its sole discretion, change a dealer’s primary market area from “time to time as allowed by its Agreement.”7 As a primary market area changes at the discretion of an OEM, so too must a dealer’s required sales standard vary to meet the changed market area assigned by the OEM. The necessary and adequate inventory to fulfill the dealer’s required best efforts to meet the designated sales objective for that new primary market area must also be modified to match the required sales objective.",Party Submissions,16.367851,13.078168,16.272354
"Osprin also argues that, because the trial court awarded it attorney fees, costs, and expenses against Backes for the period from March 2018 through February 12, 2020, the trial court should have awarded it the same fees, costs, and expenses against TX 1111 on the same grounds. Osprin points to the trial court’s findings of fact regarding TX 1 111’s opposition to Osprin’s entitlement to the Contributions during the course of the litigation. The trial court awarded Osprin its reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses against Backes through February 12, 2020, pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.",Party Submissions,6.0174713,6.140443,6.7888904
"Relator never asked any trial court for an injunction, and he never asked any appellate court for mandamus relief. No court has yet considered his challenge. Relator concedes that ballots must be mailed by January 20, 2024. Mot.2. That is the absolute latest date that ballots must be mailed. Relator offers no evidence to support the conclusion that every county in the State has waited (or will wait) until the last possible moment to print and send ballots. Relator also argues that it is “estimated” that county election officials will need “about ten days” “to print the ballots, and run logic/accuracy tests.” Mot.2. But Relator offers no factual support for that guess or any explanation for why it might be accurate. He also does not credit the estimation to any specific individual or source.",Party Submissions,8.622334,9.950983,8.877891
"Congress's longstanding practice reflects the Griggs rule. Given Griggs, when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal and to automatically stay the district court proceedings during that appeal, Congress ordinarily need not say anything about a stay. By contrast, when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal, but not to automatically stay district court proceedings pending that appeal, Congress typically says so. Since the creation of the modern courts of appeals system in 1891, Congress has enacted multiple statutory “non-stay” provisions. Pp. 1918 – 1922.",Party Submissions,6.8498406,7.316536,7.3582573
"Ultimately, like the intermediate courts in Miller, Abshire, and E.D., the Court of Appeals’ “real concern” in this case appears to be the “believability” of the expert ’ s opinions, “not the manner in which [he] stated them.” Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 516; Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 225; E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664. But whether BSA and Dr. Castillo will ultimately be liable for baby H.W.’s brain injury is a question that “will be answered further in the litigation process.” Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 517.",Party Submissions,7.052223,8.478534,7.9787674
"As we have explained, Douglas had her own attorney to advise regarding her rights and responsibilities under the act, including the need to timely file a workers' compensation claim. If she had filed a claim, she may have been compensated for her injury. Alternatively, if the workers' compensation process had ultimately yielded a determination that her injury was not compensable, she could have filed a negligence suit without being subject to the exclusivity provision of the act. Consequently, Douglas is not denied recovery for her injury based on Moody's inconsistent positions. Rather, she is denied recovery because she elected not to timely pursue a workers' compensation claim. Therefore, it is not unconscionable for Moody [*12] to rely on the exclusivity provision of the act as a defense to this suit.",Party Submissions,6.0114603,6.503247,6.6236806
"Based on a word count run in Microsoft Word, this brief contains 4,044 words, excluding the portions of the brief exempt from the word count under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,5.406247,9.196079,10.380731
"Despite the Walkers’ complaints about the Amarillo Court’s decision, this Court always has held that an “objective good faith effort” by an expert requires more than Drs. Tappan and Null provided here. It is true, as the Walkers point out, that Chapter 74 imposes only minimal requirements, and that this Court has held the Legislature intended the statute’s requirements to be a method of separating meritorious claims from frivolous ones. (Pet. Br. at 5-8). But, an expert must nevertheless offer an opinion about the standard of care, breach, and causation. Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Tex. 2001). A conclusory statement is not enough; “the expert must explain the basis of his statements to link his conclusion to the facts.” Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52.",Party Submissions,7.471174,9.269852,8.358615
"The reports wholly fail to explain what caused the possible asphyxia event or stroke. Tenet Hosps. Ltd v. De La Riva, 351 S.W.3d 398, 404-05 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2011, no pet.) (report insufficient when it opined without explanation that “neurological disabilities are the result of hypoxic ischemic brain injury that occurred in the aftermath of a cardiac arrest, which was present immediately after birth” and that a “delivery prior to onset of bradycardia. .. would have prevented all of the baby’s neurological problems”).",Party Submissions,9.095041,9.246573,10.68547
"Because the evidence clearly showed Rafiei would be required to pay more than this amount, such that he would be forced to abandon his claim, there was legally sufficient evidence for the trial court to find the delegation clause was unconscionable and should not be enforced. In turn, because the delegation clause was severable and to be disregarded in the interest of justice, the trial court resultingly had full authority to then consider the unconscionability of the remainder of the arbitration agreement. The very same evidence and arguments addressing the unconscionability of the delegation clause would apply with just as much, if not more, force to the Arbitration Agreement as a whole. Therefore, the trial court had sufficient basis to deny the entirety of Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Arbitration.",Party Submissions,7.360318,7.0628676,7.6426024
"Accordingly, RLB’s argument that some of some of its claims fall outside the scope of the forum-selection clause is, quite simply, irrelevant. RLB BOM at 68.",Party Submissions,19.524214,22.649342,27.629498
"And in the construction context, the Legislature knows how to mandate that a waiver provision be included “in a written original contract or subcontract[.]” Tex.",Party Submissions,19.658352,23.973654,28.638218
"Alonzo v. Lampkin, No. 074-12-00030-CV, 2013 WL 6073431, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 13, 2013, no pet.) (board certified obstetrician not qualified to opine as to cause of brain injuries).",Party Submissions,4.5582013,5.658894,5.984748
"Their response hinges on the assertion that the court of appeals’ rejection of Westwood’s constructive eviction and breach-of-contract claims did not depend on the legal effect of the agreed judgment in the forcible entry and detainer action, but instead on “evidence” that Westwood “voluntarily” “agreed to leave the premises” on its own as part of a strategic effort to gain a “fresh start with a new entity.” (Resp. 7, 8, 12, 31, 38) And they insist this “voluntary abandonment” was memorialized in a “Rule 11 Agreement” contained in the agreed judgment. Maintaining that assertion requires Respondents to rewrite the court’s opinion and take evidence entirely out of context, and to conflate Westwood’s abandonment of its appeal with the abandonment of all rights Westwood ever had in the premises.",Party Submissions,8.93783,9.320024,9.199314
"This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B) because, according to the Microsoft Word 2016 word count function, it contains 7,351 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,3.3506334,5.3518176,6.2778993
"Second, even if the Court assumes that Rafiei’s expenses would in district court would not exceed $30,000, Rafiei’s affidavit—if believed— shows that he cannot afford the expenses of litigation. If Rafiei cannot support more than $6,000 in expenses up front, there is no reason to think that he could afford $30,000 in expenses. (Rafiei argues that the problem with expenses is that they prevent “a party from ever reaching trial because they simply cannot afford to maintain the litigation that long. Brief at 31.",Party Submissions,10.38466,9.964083,10.632131
"To answer the hypothetical, if the forbearance agreement had allocated $100,000 to the Diocese’s injury, that would be sufficient to establish the first step of Sky View and would raise a presumption of a $100,000.00 settlement credit. But the Court could still, under Utts, consider evidence like the affidavit from Bay’s counsel showing that payments and a benefit had not been and would never be received under the allocations.",Party Submissions,17.919384,21.117575,19.779987
"Actual control matters under this analysis; it is dispositive. To apply “arranger” liability, analyzing the control the defendant has over the disposal should focus on the “degree of the defendant’s actual control over the decision regarding the specific method or manner of disposal.” R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 243 (emphasis added). Notably, R.R. Street cites Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., in which several oil companies sold petroleum products, including underground tanks used for storing waste motor oil. R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 243 (citing AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 283–84). Such oil companies were not arrangers because while they periodically inspected the equipment, they “made no recommendations regarding disposal methods and did not participate in disposal decisions.” R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 243. Midland’s alleged actions are even further attenuated than the AAMCO case because it had no way to know that the alleged disposal even took place (if it even did). Absent the proper pretreatment permit or discharge license—the evidence necessary to show Midland’s consent to a discharge—Midland would have no way of knowing that any discharge occurred, as pretreatment authorizations are the manner in which Midland could permit and regulate certain industrial wastes. (CR 54.) Weatherford provided no evidence—nor could it—showing that Midland had any connection or communication with the two electronics manufacturers. Weatherford Int’l, 652 S.W.3d at 915. Consequently, Weatherford failed to demonstrate that Midland had any authority or obligation to make disposal decisions, or that Midland exercised any control over such decisions.",Party Submissions,7.691158,7.6359086,7.6705956
"In its Original and First Amended Petitions, Galovelho pleaded that the Emergency Orders effected an unlawful taking of its property under the Texas constitution. The fundamental rule of article I, section 17 prevents the government’s taking, damaging, or destroying a person’s property for public use without either the consent of the person or adequate compensation’s being made. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a).5 This clause is self-executing and waives any claim of immunity by governmental actors, whether sovereign or governmental, when a takings claim is properly pled. See City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2012) – 7– (clause is self-executing); see also Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex. 2012) ( “In the absence of a properly pled takings claim, the state retains immunity .”). We review the trial court’s grant of a plea to the jurisdiction to determine “whether the plaintiff’s pleadings, construed in favor of the plaintiff, allege sufficient facts affirmatively demonstrating the court ’ s jurisdiction to hear the case. ” Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc., 381 S.W.3d at 476.",Party Submissions,4.9810333,5.084754,5.154447
"Citing Roland v McCullough (supra) the court stated that “A party cannot obtain relief from an agreement as a result of a unilateral mistake if the party’s ignorance of the facts was the result of carelessness, indifference or inattention.” Finally, avoidance of unilateral mistake requires proof that the mistake was known to or induced by the other party. Johnson v. Snell, supra. No such evidence appears in the record of this case.",Party Submissions,9.870161,10.342041,10.824385
"Two years later, Henry and her husband filed this suit in district court against Dillard and its adjuster, Pulaski Adjusting Co., alleging a bad faith denial of reasonable and timely workers compensation benefits. Dillard moved for summary judgment, arguing that the bad faith suit was barred because Henry had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The trial court granted Dillard's motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed.",Party Submissions,5.793305,5.3068204,6.3933387
"Duration. A Participant shall be eligible to defer Compensation and receive allocations of Company Contributions, subject to the terms of the Plan, for as long as such Participant remains an Eligible Employee. A Participant who is no longer an Eligible Employee but has not experienced a Separation from Service may not defer Compensation under the Plan but may otherwise exercise all of the rights of a Participant under the Plan with respect to his or her Account(s). On and after a Separation from Service, a Participant shall remain a Participant as long as his or her Account Balance is greater than zero, and during such time may continue to make allocation elections as provided in Section 8.4. An individual shall cease being a Participant in the Plan when all benefits under the Plan to which he or she is entitled have been paid.",Contract,4.0699096,4.114556,4.782489
"HN4 [ ] Multiple Parties, Absent Defendants Texas law allows a tort defendant to designate a person as a responsible third party. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(a) (West 2020). The designation's purpose is to have the responsible third party submitted to the trier of fact as a possible cause of the claimant's harm. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.003 (West 2020). This may reduce the percentage of responsibility attributed to the defendant, thus ultimately reducing its liability to the claimant. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.013 (West Supp. 2022). The defendant typically would be the party seeking to retain the RTP in the jury charge to diminish his potential liability and perhaps eliminate any joint and several liability.",Party Submissions,5.1698613,5.640327,5.480928
"The majority offers no good reason for that result. The majority says that an automatic stay protects the party seeking arbitration and conserves resources in case the dispute “ultimately head[s] to arbitration” after appeal. Ante, at 1921. But the concern fades if that scenario is unrealistic— i.e., if the party seeking arbitration is unlikely to succeed on appeal.",Party Submissions,13.322666,13.735631,14.581573
Deductions from Pay. The Committee has the authority to determine the payroll practices under which any component of Compensation subject to a Compensation Deferral Agreement will be deducted from a Participant’s Compensation.,Contract,8.348505,9.411207,11.620333
"Because the trial court had insufcient evidence upon which to exercise its_ discretion, it erred in-its application ofthat discretion. Id; see also Sink, 364 S.W.3d at 344 (considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment could the factnder reasonably form arm believe or conviction its nding was true). Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Husband one hundred percent of the marital residence as his separate property. We sustain Wife’s rst issue.",Party Submissions,15.022835,14.122098,15.5806
"Because we conclude Sonic failed to establish as a matter of law that its claim for reimbursement under the TWCA, as a subclaimant, survived the employee's election to pursue and recover remedies under Alabama's workers' compensation laws, we reverse the trial court's judgment in Sonic's favor and render judgment affirming the decision [**3] of the appeals panel in Cause [*472] No. 14-05-00111-CV. Further, because we hold that the trial court's decision to continue abatement of Sonic's contract claims was improper, and Sonic lacks an adequate remedy by appeal should abatement continue, we conditionally grant Sonic's petition for writ of mandamus in Cause No. 14-05-00770-CV.",Party Submissions,6.379662,6.2904577,7.332718
"Finally, to adopt MVP’s “untimeliness” argument would require a party to prematurely file suit seeking to void a forum-selection clause—even if there is no current legal controversy between the parties. MVP’s Brief at 57-58. This Court should avoid a legal principle that will spawn needless and premature litigation. See, e.g., Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 155 (Tex. 2015) (construing statute to discourage “vexatious, time-consuming, and unnecessary litigation”). Put another way, the need for RLB to enforce its rights under Section 272.001 to void any applicable out-of-state forum-selection/choice-of-law provision was not ripe until RLB elected to file suit on its claims or MVP tried to evoke any such provision against RLB.",Party Submissions,8.04254,8.4855795,9.1377325
All TCB Infrastructure Improvements constructed or provided for under this Agreement will be the sole property of TCB upon completion and are intended for the primary use of TCB in the conduct of its railroad operations.,Party Submissions,12.365068,12.289377,15.377541
"The Court today ventures down an uncharted path—and that way lies madness. Never before had this Court mandated a general stay simply because an interlocutory appeal poses the question “whether the litigation may go forward in the district court.” Ante, at 1920 (internal quotation marks omitted). And a wide array of appeals seemingly fits that bill.",Party Submissions,11.590816,15.678117,14.506123
"WHEREAS the Company desires to employ you, and you desire to be employed by the Company, as Interim Chief Executive Officer, on the terms outlined in this Agreement.",Contract,5.7064524,6.3464923,8.769773
"Here, the Delapenas allege that City employees violated the City’s pool safety policy by admitting the camp into the pool without the requisite number of counselors to adequately supervise the campers. Under the policy, a camp without the requisite ratio of counselors to campers should be denied entrance to the pool.",Party Submissions,9.394948,9.521932,11.214488
"A.S. was questioned about an arrest while being pregnant with R.W. in November of 2021. 3 RR 41. A.S. had fake urine in her purse and was put on a one-year deferred probation later in January of 2023. 3 RR 43. Intervenor offered and admitted I-4, a copy of A.S. ’s criminal file out of Smith County, without objection. 3 RR 45-46. A.S. testified she pled to possession of the prescription drug on her, was revoked on probation and put in jail for failing a drug test. 3 RR 47. 2 Then, without neither objection nor a sponsoring witness, Intervenor played the video of A.S.’s arrest while pregnant with R.W. before the jury. 3 RR 50 -51. A.S. agreed that she had smoked cigarettes her entire pregnancy with R.W. and went into labor prematurely. 3 RR 51. The video of A .S.’s arrest was offered and admitted as I-5. 3 RR 53. Intervenor then offered I-6, a copy of Permanency Hearing Order Before Final Order, where A.S. was court ordered to pay Intervenor’s $125 per month. 3 RR 54 -55. Intervenor next offered and admitted I-7, another psychological assessment from August 27, 2021, which described A.S.’s previous relationship and recommendation for A.S. to follow through on. 3 RR 60-63. The psychological stated that A.S. was not forthcoming with drug history. 3 RR 63. A.S. told the jury that she had been in counseling in the instant case with Stenet Frost and Katrina Hines-Ligon. 3 RR 64. I-8, counseling notes, that recommended A.S. continue therapy. 3 RR 67.",Party Submissions,7.5232663,7.24246,7.8210435
"Possible future harvesting of snow crab by vessels from EU member [S] tates on the Norwegian continental shelf, must be based on bilateral agreement. During the EU-Norway bilateral fisheries negotiations for 2017, Norway opened for snow crab being part of the quota exchange between Norway and the EU. However, the EU declined.",Legal Decisions,11.654855,12.410413,11.368028
"As the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held, “ There are fact patterns in which the limitations provision in section 51.003(a) and the limitations provision in section 16.004 do not conflict. ” Sowell v. International Interests, LP, 416 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). That court goes on to list several circumstances in which the provisions don’t conflict – including the situation where the creditor does not elect foreclosure prior to suing for a money judgment. Id. A similarly ideal reading is to apply Section 51.003(a) only to those parties who participated in the foreclosure.",Party Submissions,6.8441544,6.950533,7.019017
By: _________________________ Eric C. Opiela State Bar No. 24039095 eopiela@ericopiela.com I hereby certify that I have reviewed the above Petition for Writ of Mandamus and have concluded that every factual statement in the said petition is supported by competent evidence included in the appendix or record. I further certify that the documents contained in the appendix are true and correct copies of those documents in the possession of Relator.,Party Submissions,5.2824073,6.8277254,7.1172943
"Under the “law of the case” doctrine, the Lawyers did not have to repeat the same arguments ruled on and rejected in the first trial and appeal. “[Q]uestions of law decided on appeal to a court of last resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages.” Loram Maint. of Way, Inc. v. Ianni, 210 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Tex. 2006). Thus, the Lawyers were not required to raise the assignment issue again in either the trial court or the court of appeals, as the trial court had no choice but to follow the previous ruling of the court of appeals. See Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177, 182-83 (Tex. 2012) (explaining doctrine and noting that party was not 14 “required to reargue the issue in a court that already decided the matter”). Since this Court denied the petition the first time the case was before it and did not rule on the issue, the Lawyers properly raise it here. Accord id.",Party Submissions,6.536069,6.29418,7.2237077
"A subsequent act, one of February 5th, 1867, to amend the Judiciary Act of 1789, enacts: † Page 319 14 Id. 385.",Party Submissions,11.9732,13.457094,13.042434
"Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones (“ CIADI ” o el “ Centro ”) sobre la base del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Colombia y El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras, el cual entró en vigor entre Colombia y Guatemala el 12 de noviembre de 2009 (el “ Tratado ”), y las Reglas de Arbitraje del CIADI en vigor desde el 10 de abril de 2006.",Legal Decisions,5.86043,7.2301307,6.6304364
"HN3 [ ] Burdens of Proof, Movant Persuasion & Proof If a movant establishes its right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine material fact issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment.",Party Submissions,11.329429,14.13982,13.155607
"Accordingly, to the extent Claimants seek to exclude such documents from production, Respondent should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to consider the basis for their exclusion. Since the party that asserts a privilege bears the burden of proving why the privilege applies, Respondent requests Claimants to provi de a privilege log as explained in Respondent’s general comments above.",Legal Decisions,10.592899,8.950842,12.3265
Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .,Legislation,2.792873,3.8718991,4.5251327
"First, we agree that the economic impact of the Emergency Orders weighs against finding a taking. See id. at *7. This factor “ merely compares the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property. ” Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 936 (Tex. 1998). We do not ordinarily consider the loss of anticipated gains or potential profits in this consideration. See id. Gal ovelho’s brief is replete with charges that the Emergency Orders “damaged” its property, but it nowhere addresses a comparison of the value of the restaurant before and after the pendency of the Emergency Orders. Galovelho – 10– did not plead facts indicating that the economic impact of the Emergency Orders so interfered with its property rights that the appellees had appropriated the property from him. See City of Baytown v. Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 174, 181 (Tex. 2022). We cannot conclude that the value of Galo velho’s property was greatly diminished by the temporary restrictions placed by those orders. See Stand for Something Grp. Live, 2022 WL 11485464 at *7.",Party Submissions,8.295758,9.301345,8.913213
"KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined in full, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Parts II, III and IV.",Party Submissions,1.9697818,2.0307598,1.9964345
"It is important to note that city staff, while involved in the zoning process, do not have decision-making authority. 16 Their role includes assisting landowners through the city’s processes, ensuring the statutory requirements of Chapter 211 are followed, analyzing landowner applications for compliance, and often making recommendations to a city’s zoning commission or city council based on previously established criteria. Importantly, under Chapter 211’s statutory requirements, staff cannot commit a city to a specific zoning outcome. Any agreement between a city and a property owner promising a certain zoning designation or outcome is void, ensuring the public’s significant involvement in property use debates and decisions within a city. 17 The idea that an agreement or letter between city staff and a landowner could obligate city officials to a predetermined outcome would undermine the procedural safeguards of Chapter 211.",Party Submissions,8.4965725,8.203461,8.960703
"Weatherford mischaracterizes Midland’s representation of its sewage system as domestic in an attempt to yet again bypass jurisdictional deficiencies and brief the underlying merits of a case in which there is no subject matter jurisdiction. The characterization of the sewer system as domestic or not domestic is entirely irrelevant because the landfill-driven statute—the SWDA—has no applicability to a sewer system whatsoever. Weatherford also assumes Midland is strictly liable under the SWDA for any and all leaks that occur from its sewer system, even if the Contaminants originated off-Site. Such a strict liability scheme does not exist under the statute, and Weatherford’s fixation on Midland’s “unilateral[] labelling [of] its entire wastewater operations as ‘domestic’” does not correct Weatherford’s ultimate failure to plead a valid claim under the SWDA. Brief at 9 (emphasis omitted).",Party Submissions,10.027518,10.548418,11.108066
"ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS I certify that this document complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point font for text and 12-point font for footnotes. It complies with the word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1) because it contains 2,399 words.",Party Submissions,3.1180837,4.006387,4.336881
"Dr. Castillo and Baptist timely appealed to the Amarillo Court of Appeals under section 51.014(a)(9) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. (CR.1338-40, 1352-53, 1357-58). As explained above, a panel consisting of Chief Justice 2 Baptist made an identical motion.",Party Submissions,8.7809725,11.505999,12.045531
"Additionally, in Douglas's live petition filed after the Commission's final determination, she also sued Transcontinental Insurance Company, Moody's workers' compensation carrier. Douglas named Transcontinental in order to challenge in this suit the decision rendered by the Commission appeals panel, to which Transcontinental was an interested party. The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of Transcontinental.",Party Submissions,15.429102,13.982162,17.983774
"Because the evidence clearly established that wife did not intend a gift by taking title to the property in both names, the property was properly characterized as her separate property. Id. at 714. 5. Cases preceding Raymond that follow Cockerham In addition to the above authority rejecting the Raymonds cases that distinguish the Cockerham parol evidence rule, there are several cases predating Raymond that follow Cockerham.",Party Submissions,16.300703,18.025974,18.539127
"After bottoming, the snow crab, like most other crab species, depends on the bottom to be able to move. There are a few species of so-called “swimming crabs” that use transformed walking legs to swim, but it is not known that such species have been found in our waters. The beach crab has something similar to “swimming legs” but it only lives in the littoral zone and is not of commercial importance in our areas either .700 469. On 19 January 2015, Ms Finbak provided a written opinion to Ms Gabrielsen in which she said that her section of the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had made a “ preliminary assessment of the issue with a view to communicating a preliminary Norwegian position at the meeting of NEAFC’s PECCOE (the Permanent Committee on Control and Enforcement) ”.701 PECCOE had before it a proposal for a recommendation under Article 5 of the NEAFC Convention related to snow crab. The opinion noted that NEAFC had the power to adopt recommendations regarding crustaceans but under Article 6 could do so in relation to resources within the national jurisdiction of a State only if that State requested it to do so. If snow crab were sedentary, then any snow crab in the Loop Hole fell within Article 6.",Legal Decisions,10.90842,12.419527,12.137452
"But courts should not have to “fill in missing gaps in a report by drawing inferences or resorting to guess work.” THN Physicians Ass’n v. Tiscareno, 495 S.W.3d 599, 607 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.); see also Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546, 556 (Tex. 2011) (“omissions may not be supplied by inference”); Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) (all necessary information should be contained within report’s four corners). The Court of Appeals properly deemed the Walkers’ experts’ reports insufficient on this basis alone.",Party Submissions,5.4846435,5.870508,6.0685263
"RLB further maintains there was no contractual waiver of its section 272.001 right to void the forum-selection clause. RLB contends that the express language and public policy underlying section 272.001 make it “apparent on its face” that a waiver of the section 272.001 right is not enforceable. According to RLB, under MVP’s position, “countless owners would include such waivers in their construction contracts and would require subcontractors, like RLB, to sign them as a condition precedent to being awarded any work on Texas projects,” which would undermine the Legislature’s purpose behind section 272.001.",Party Submissions,7.084804,6.1890845,7.167831
"Request No. 11 above, the hot asphalt contracts are relevant because they form part of the basis of Respondent’s claims related to its refusal to pay Claimant. See Respondent’s Memorial ¶ 102. Claimant is, therefore, entitled to production of the hot asphalt contracts and the corresponding payments from Respondent issued under those contracts to evaluate whether those contracts suffer from the same supposed “irregularities” that Respondent claims are in the 2013 Contract and prove that Respondent continued to pay those companies despite knowing of those purported “irregularities.” The reasons set out in relation to Request 11 supra apply here mutatis mutandis .",Legal Decisions,11.065327,10.10576,11.429091
"Further, the court of appeals has decided an important question of state law that should be, but has not been, resolved by this Court. See id. Respondents devote nearly eight pages of their responsive brief to attempt to explain the construction of Chapters 12 and 55. Respondents’ Br. at 9-17. Yet, none of the arguments are grounded in authority from this Court. That is because this issue remains unresolved in Texas.",Party Submissions,10.017583,10.318741,10.722599
"None of these opinions stands for the proposition that the mere existence of an agreement under section 1.111(e) deprives the district court of jurisdiction to review the scope, validity, and effect of such an agreement. Nor does any of them stand for the proposition that an agreement to “value” as a matter of law bars subsequent claims to correct errors not expressly addressed in the agreement. The authorities Oncor discussed in its initial brief, including this Court’s decisions in Matagorda Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Liquids Partners, L.P., 165 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. 2005) and Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd., 555 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2018), and the language of Texas Tax Code sections 1.111(e), 25.25(c), 25.25(c-1)(4) and (d-1)(2),2 confirm that the lower court’s interpretation of the statutory scheme is wrong. Section 25.25(c) authorizes corrections even when a previous settlement under section 1.111(e) states an appraised value. The only time a settlement bars subsequent correction of an error under section 25.25(c) is when the agreement expressly addresses that particular error.",Party Submissions,5.709306,5.82081,5.9331064
"First, given the fetal heart tracings and the evidence that the widest part of H.W.’s head may not have descended from 11:00 to 15:50, Dr. Tappan concluded that had Dr. Castillo performed a C-section around 15:15 and delivered by 15:45 as the standard of care required, H.W. would have been born without neurologic injury. App. 7, CR 668, 670.",Party Submissions,9.127443,11.517875,11.185121
"Backes focuses only on Ospri n’s argumen t in the trial court claiming its entitlement to attorney fees under the guaranty agreement. However, Osprin also argued that it was entitled to attorney fees under the UDJA. And as noted above, the trial court awarded Osprin attorney fees under the UDJA, not under the guaranty agreement.",Party Submissions,8.643212,10.146555,11.258246
"Convention Article 44; Arbitration Rules 51 24.1. After consultation with the Parties, the Tribunal shall determine whether post-hearing briefs are necessary and, if so, shall set the schedule and procedure for their submission The statement of costs will be submitted by the Parties according to a schedule to be decided at the end of the hearing.",Legal Decisions,8.984331,8.983118,11.259665
Separation from Service. An Employee incurs a Separation from Service upon termination of employment with the Employer. Whether a Separation from Service has occurred shall be determined by the Committee in accordance with Code Section 409A.,Contract,3.2872849,3.9512448,4.771473
Directors who are also employees of the Company will not receive any compensation for their services as directors of the Company.,Contract,6.226594,5.6684766,7.8970256
"Investment Allocations. A Participant’s investment allocation constitutes a deemed, not actual, investment among the investment options comprising the investment menu. At no time shall a Participant have any real or beneficial ownership in any investment option included in the investment menu, nor shall the Participating Employer or any trustee acting on its behalf have any obligation to purchase actual securities as a result of a Participant’s investment allocation. A Participant’s investment allocation shall be used solely for purposes of adjusting the value of a Participant’s Account Balances.",Contract,5.8740587,4.9656844,6.9493213
"American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801(Tex. 2001). The answer depends on whether the injured person is seeking benefits as an injured claimant. So, it's no coincidence that a helpful inquiry is: who is the defendant?",Party Submissions,10.653392,12.39142,12.226921
"In its Counter-Memorial, Serbia relies on a “NOTICE” prepared by the Serbian Republic Geodetic Authority, submitted as Serbia’s exhibit R -043, that compiles various information related to Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 supposedly available to the Serbian Cadaster Office, including excerpts of various sketches ( in Serbian: Skice ). The document was compiled and provided on the basis of Request no. Is pov-3/21 of 26 June 2023.",Legal Decisions,23.260656,24.934868,26.52267
"Accounts; Allocations. The Participant shall specify on his or her Compensation Deferral Agreement (i) the amount of Deferrals for the applicable Plan Year(s), (ii) the allocation of such Deferrals among Accounts in accordance with this Section 4.1(b), and (iii) with respect to any Account established under such Compensation Deferral Agreement, a Payment Schedule consistent with the requirements of Sections 6.1 and 6.2. To the extent that the allocation of Deferrals amongst a Participant’s Accounts has not been specified in a Participant’s Compensation Deferral Agreement, Deferrals under such Compensation Deferral Agreement shall be allocated to the Participant’s Retirement Account. The Committee may, in its discretion, establish a minimum deferral period for Specified Date Accounts (for example, the third (3rd) Plan Year following the Plan Year in which Deferrals are first allocated to such Account.",Contract,4.374383,4.079359,4.747274
"Harbin explained the twenty-three residents who backed up to Windemere Road were requesting the City abandon the right-of-way up to the Lake Friendswood property. She said the right-of-way would remain past the Lake Friendswood property and private access easements, as well as utility easements, would be required. Harbin said Windemere Rd. was not on the Major Thoroughfare Plan to be improved.",Party Submissions,15.827724,15.496508,15.912517
"ETMC further cites to a Fifth Circuit case stating that ""a cause of action does not arise under workers' compensation laws merely because the workers' compensation statute deprives the defendant of certain defenses to the cause of action."" Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Rentech Steel, L.L.C., 620 F.3d 558, 568 (5th Cir.",Party Submissions,5.945056,6.6284037,6.6190357
"The first sentence of the instruction5 also is legally flawed because, under Rule 13, Terry’s signing of the motion for leave to designate constituted a certificate that, “to be the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry the [designation] is not groundless,” that is, has “no basis in law or fact. .. .” TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Thus, Terry was required to have a basis for designating Flaven as an RTP, even if he did not have to show that basis right away.",Party Submissions,12.329798,13.498495,14.21162
"Additionally, Weatherford repeatedly references as “evidence” the single apocryphal statement in the Ramboll Report in an attempt to connect Midland to the disposal, ignoring the fact that its only purported “evidence” was properly stricken as hearsay. Such insistence on the inclusion and consideration of evidence excluded by the Trial Court challenges the evidentiary ruling of the Trial Court. The standard of review for a Trial Court’s inclusion or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. 2000) (“The inclusion and exclusion of evidence is committed to the trial court’s sound discretion.”); City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1995). As such, abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard for Weatherford’s functional challenge of the Trial Court’s exclusion of the hearsay-upon-hearsay “evidence” Weatherford offered to try to connect Midland to an alleged disposal of Contaminants.",Party Submissions,5.733413,5.6539598,5.9585805
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session; the 1st C.S.; the 2nd C.S.; the 3rd C.S. and the 4th C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the November 7, 2023 election results.",Party Submissions,4.4236245,3.9969761,5.1074567
"To amend the National Dam Safety Program Act to require the inclusion of low-head dams in the national dam inventory, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.4498944,4.355271,5.8002033
"MVP also misleadingly claims its “first-filed Oklahoma” case shows it sought to enforce the forum-selection clause before RLB voided it. MVP’s Brief at 59. But RLB is not—and has never been—a party to MVP’s Oklahoma lawsuit. E.g., R.0334. MVP did not seek to enforce any forum-selection clause against RLB until MVP’s Plea in Abatement, which was after RLB filed its original petition.",Party Submissions,10.424449,10.942809,11.39114
"Finally, the proceedings on the merits are in no way prejudiced by the parallel briefing or by the Tribunal’s deliberations and decision on the objection.",Legal Decisions,15.273147,18.358744,23.519144
"The Planning Commission provided expert assistance and performed tasks in the process of drafting and implementing 2015 DRP. The requested documents are relevant and material for evaluating the factors that the Planning Commission took into account when developing the 2015 DRP, especially the reasons for the decision to rezone for residential purposes a significantly larger land plot, owned by the City of Belgrade, which was already designated and used for traffic infrastructure, located directly across the street from Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23.",Legal Decisions,16.058224,12.978135,16.769316
"WHEREFORE, Respondent, Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp. respectfully asks this Court to DENY Deysi Santos’ Petition for Review, or alternatively uphold the decision below.",Party Submissions,19.722187,16.305958,25.207527
"To establish requirements relating to size standard compliance of small busi- ness concerns owned and controlled by women for certain purposes, and for other purposes.",Legislation,21.417171,16.066507,28.671871
"Midland is not subject to the SWDA because it has no connection or “nexus” to the alleged disposal, as is required under this Court’s precedent, and is thus not a “person responsible for solid waste.” R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 232, 242, 246 (Tex. 2005). Midland’s undisputed status as an owner and operator of a sewage collection system (not a “solid waste facility” under the SWDA) does not subject Midland to the SWDA, without some other separate and specific showing of Midland’s agency to a solid waste disposal. Further, Midland is neither an arranger nor acceptor of solid waste because it had no control or knowledge over the alleged disposal of trichloroethylene, perchloroethylene, chloroform, and Freon 113, (the “Contaminants”), and it expressly prohibited such disposals into its sewer system. Weatherford failed to present a genuine issue of material fact as to Midland’s status as a “person responsible for solid waste,” and absent such showing, there is no jurisdiction, and as a result, it is unnecessary to analyze the SWDA as applicable to Midland. Beyond that, it is unnecessary to take a subsequent step to consider whether the domestic sewage exclusion to the SWDA merits analysis—if the baseline statute itself does not apply to Midland, it is a purely academic and impermissibly advisory exercise to consider whether an exclusion to that statute would apply. Yet, that is precisely the invitation Weatherford presents to this Court.",Party Submissions,7.209208,7.568686,7.5982513
"Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, recommend any provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.",Legal Decisions,7.1121674,5.360899,6.135099
"Investment Options. Investment options will be determined by the Committee. The Committee, in its sole discretion, shall be permitted to add or remove investment options from the Plan menu from time to time, provided that any such additions or removals of investment options shall not be effective with respect to any period prior to the effective date of such change. In addition, following a Change in Control, the Committee may add or remove an investment option, provided however, that (i) any decision to add or remove an investment option shall be made in good faith, and (ii) there shall at all times be no less than the number of investment options that existed immediately prior to the Change in Control.",Contract,3.754615,4.091064,4.196753
"The issue in Tyler Asphalt was whether the Harris County tort litigation should be stayed pending the resolution of the Smith County judicial review suit. Id. at 842. Both suits involved the same course and scope issue, and each court was equally able to address it. Id. Since course and scope issue was already committed to the statutory workers' compensation process, the Fourteenth Circuit properly abated the tort action. Id. The case at bar is only pending in the trial court for personal injuries, so Tyler Asphalt doesn't apply under these facts.",Party Submissions,16.591715,18.239668,19.128675
"Fleming Defendants spent their entire Brief on the Merits attempting to prove Taylor Privity Path 1, i.e., but they failed to prove this for all the reasons stated in Respondents’ briefs and above.",Party Submissions,34.985394,37.560005,40.901653
"Subcontractor agrees to perform such part of the Work under the general direction of McCarthy and subject to the final approval of the Architect/Engineer or other specified representative of the Owner, in accordance with and reasonably inferable from the Contract Documents (hereinafter called ""Subcontractor's Work""). Subcontractor will furnish all of the labor and materials, along with competent supervision, shop drawings and samples, tools, equipment, protection, hoisting, and scaffolding which are necessary for such performance.",Party Submissions,7.931142,7.1585217,9.846538
"In an affidavit submitted to the trial court, the individual testified he could not afford to pay more than $5,000.00, and if the costs of arbitration were over that, he would most likely have to abandon his claim. Accompanying this was an affidavit executed by a certified arbitrator stating that, based on the arbitrator’s knowledge of the amount of money required to arbitrate similar claims, the costs of arbitration would likely be above $5,000.00. From these affidavits, the court deduced that if the arbitration lasted even one day, it was unlikely the individual could afford it. Id. Based on this and the fact that the fee-splitting clause contained no cap as to the amount of money the individual would have to pay, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and confirmed the trial court had properly denied the motion to compel arbitration. Id at 10-11.",Party Submissions,5.0702934,5.2241135,5.195554
"Well, it's obvious. The City denied the SUPs on the Gun Club and Radio Tower tracts for no valid reason.",Party Submissions,44.82685,53.463818,55.31058
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session; the 1st C.S.; the 2nd C.S.; the 3rd C.S. and the 4th C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the November 7, 2023 election results.",Party Submissions,4.4236245,3.9969761,5.1074567
"R.L.S. appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for expunction. Because R.L.S. was not entitled to expunction, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.",Party Submissions,3.4882143,4.549247,4.648501
"The provisions in this resolution contain partial and transitory rules which are both necessary and urgent to address the state of emergency affecting the country’s economy, in as much as it has a detrimental effect on the WHOLESALE ELECTRIC MARKET (WEM).",Legal Decisions,20.561052,13.81108,16.630577
"McCarthy Subcontract -14-01-12-2017 Rev. 11.3 of this Agreement. Any disputes remaining following mediation shall be resolved through litigation in the state or federal court having jurisdiction, with venue being in accordance with Paragraph 11.1 of this Agreement. IN THE EVENT OF SUCH LITIGATION, UNLESS OTHERWISE PRECLUDED BY LAW, MCCARTHY AND SUBCONTRACTOR AGREE TO WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY.",Party Submissions,5.842103,5.0470634,6.618643
"R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the documentation relating to the Environmental Impact Assessment is relevant to the question of Obnova's alleged property rights or material to the Tribunal's determination of this question. This is a classic ""fishing expedition"", with Claimants simply casting about for any documents which might contain information they consider helpful in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case.",Legal Decisions,13.078826,11.388471,14.052839
"PCC : To the best of Respondent’s knowledge, the document Claimants are referring to is the document that is already in the case files as exhibit R-100. Alternatively, the requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (who prepared the document according to Article 11 of the said Decision)114 in accordance with the applicable regulations.115 In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".116 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.117 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants 53 obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request the document whose production they now seek.",Legal Decisions,10.850209,11.664017,10.980485
"HSMiller, once again, argues about the “magnitude” of HSMiller’s “exposure” at trial and the likelihood of a fraud finding against HSMiller. Resp’t’s Br. at 58. This evidence is irrelevant because it does not relate to Terry’s strategy to wait to seek leave to designate Flaven as an RTP. See id. Regardless, Terry was already worried about a fraud finding against HSMiller and Defterios whether or not Flaven was an RTP.",Party Submissions,17.064945,17.346317,22.310963
"Samson insisted that law-of-the-case doctrine required that both explicit and implicit legal holdings that Samson perceived had been made in Hooks foreclosed any different result in T.S.Reed : Samson’s Appellant’s Brief filed January 6, 2014, in T.S. Reed at 30, located at: https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=3660681b-414e-4201-8236-5556e611eedd&coa=coa09&DT=Brief&MediaID=f87ea8a4-6125- 4514-b749-457e5b1e1bf5.",Party Submissions,16.036224,11.140609,16.480223
"Trial Court’s Disposition : Summary judgment in favor of Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp. and against Santos for $21,023.13 in damages and $5,160.00 in attorney’s fees. Santos’ counterclaims and plea to the jurisdiction were denied.",Party Submissions,9.208971,10.052141,10.173107
"For column 21: Indicate the number of samples found positive, negative or undetermined. ‘Undetermined’ are those analysed samples for which no result was obtained due to different factors (e.g. below detection level, unprocessed sample-not identified, old).",Legislation,23.502441,20.373476,23.052929
"Osprin argues that, because Backes’ s obligations matured when TX 1111 failed to pay the note at maturity, those obligations became fixed and were not terminated when the tax credit rehabilitation was completed. Yet, the termination clause specifically referred to the guarantor’s obligations under the guaranty. The guaranty refers to two primary obligations of the guarantor.",Party Submissions,17.945816,16.182034,22.09904
"And the reason is simple. Two courts simultaneously analyzing the same judgment could step on each other's toes. It would interfere with the appellate court's review of an order if the district court modified that order mid-appeal. Instead, **1928 an order should be reviewed by one court at a time.",Party Submissions,11.903073,15.068891,16.073479
"Instead, based on its independent review of the facts, the Seventh Court simply concluded that the causation opinion was deficient in its view, and substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *3-*5. This is precisely what an appellate court is forbidden from doing under the applicable standard. See, e.g., Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 513; Wooten, 332 S.W.3d at 410; Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52; see also E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664 (acknowledging under an abuse-of-discretion standard, that “[c]lose calls must go to the trial court.”).",Party Submissions,5.755918,6.455147,6.280344
"Opinion; delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Carlyle and Garcia participating. In accordance with this Court’ sopinion of this da'te, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and RENDEREDin part, and REVERSED and REMANDED 1n part.",Party Submissions,9.8735695,12.733004,14.898043
"This Court should decline to reach these arguments for the reasons stated above, but RLB’s arguments also fail on the merits.",Party Submissions,13.185117,17.770006,20.577393
"The causation issue here relates to “ the causal relationship between labor and delivery and the complications that stem from labor and delivery, including a newborn ’ s neurological injuries. ” See Livingston v. Montgomery, 279 S.W.3d 868, 876 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2009, no pet.).",Party Submissions,7.683817,8.320592,8.401501
"S.W.3d 319, 324 (Tex. 2014). Parties also can “ waive in personam jurisdiction, a requirement of due process.” Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 131.",Party Submissions,6.672465,6.858057,10.038785
"Their response hinges on the assertion that the court of appeals’ rejection of Westwood’s constructive eviction and breach-of-contract claims did not depend on the legal effect of the agreed judgment in the forcible entry and detainer action, but instead on “evidence” that Westwood “voluntarily” “agreed to leave the premises” on its own as part of a strategic effort to gain a “fresh start with a new entity.” (Resp. 7, 8, 12, 31, 38) And they insist this “voluntary abandonment” was memorialized in a “Rule 11 Agreement” contained in the agreed judgment. (Resp. 21, 28) Maintaining that assertion requires Responde nts to rewrite the court’s opinion and take evidence entirely out of context, and to conflate Westwood’s abandonment of its appeal with the abandonment of all rights Westwood ever had in the premises .",Party Submissions,9.026122,9.387962,9.350319
"Claimant means by executive summaries and the subject matter to which the documents would relate, merely stating that they are executive summaries relating to the 2013 Contract.",Legal Decisions,37.357456,40.908577,43.71004
"I have read, understand and agree to abide by the terms of this Award Agreement, the Plan and the most recently executed Associate Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Non-Competition Agreement that I entered into with the Company (the “Associate Agreement”). By checking the box labeled “I Agree,” or by otherwise electronically indicating my acceptance of this Award Agreement, I hereby acknowledge that the grant of the Performance Share Units pursuant to this Award Agreement is consideration for my entering into and complying with the Associate Agreement. I understand this Award Agreement, the Plan and the Associate Agreement in all respects and the terms and conditions of the Performance Share Units granted to me.",Contract,4.437347,3.9003417,4.9814053
The Union shall provide part-financing equivalent to 50 % of the expenditure borne by Italy to support the market of eggs and poultrymeat seriously affected by the 23 outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza of subtype H5 which were detected and notified by Italy between 1 January 2022 and 30 April 2022.,Legislation,6.9110937,8.056089,8.490233
"Agreements, among others, in violation of the umbrella clause contained in Article II(2)(c) of the US-Argentina BIT imported by virtue of Article IV(2) of the BIT. 306. The Claimant denies that Argentina’s breaches can be excused by the necessity defense. 307. The Claimant thus contends that it is entitled to compensation in the amount needed to wipe out the consequences of Argentina’s Treaty breaches, which the Claimant quantifies in the amount of USD 667.3 million plus interest and costs.",Legal Decisions,7.556362,7.250628,8.814125
"MVP retained Terracon Consultants, Inc. to perform a geotechnical analysis of the subsurface conditions at the Project and prepare a geotechnical engineering report documenting the Project’s subsurface conditions for Phase 1 of the Project. The Phase 1 report was not updated for Phase 2. MVP gave the Phase 1 report to contractors, including RLB Contracting, Inc., to use and rely on in preparing bids for Phase 2. On May 23, 2018, McCarthy entered into a subcontract (the “Subcontract”) with RLB for dredging work for the Project.",Party Submissions,5.6084733,5.3758855,5.8985076
"The case is an interlocutory appeal surrounding the Harris County Appraisal District’s (“HCAD”) challenge of the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. Id at *1. In its sole issue, HCAD contended that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the property owner’s suit. Id. Summarized simply, HCAD presented the uncontested fact that it had entered into a § 1.111(e) agreement with the property owner and that resolved value for the year in dispute permanently. Id. The property owner’s argument, on the other hand, was that despite there being in place a § 1.111(e) agreement that determined a final agreed value, HCAD had made an alleged clerical error in determining that value by failing to recognize “established ordinances affecting the ... property by creating a minimum lot size requirement ... which negatively affected the value of the ... property.” Id. HCAD attached as evidence an agreement similar to the agreement in the case at the bar. Titled “Informal Interview Settlement Form,” it included a clear reference to the subject property in the county, a dollar value, and an acknowledgement of the “settled value.” Id. In response to HCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction, the property owner contended that the agreement “had nothing to do with the correction of the tax roll, which [was] the only issue for which [the property owner] ... s[ought] review.” Id at *2. According to the property owner, the agreement only concerned the market and “appraised value of the [p]roperty,” not whether HCAD “committed a clerical error in regard to th[e] property by failing to retrieve information about city ordinances that placed restrictions on the [p]roperty’s use”—which the property owner asserted was the basis for its request for judicial review by the trial court. Id .",Party Submissions,6.866942,7.139478,6.900217
"Therefore, Liberty is prohibited from ceasing to accept flows from Ames, not because of a general prohibition against waste or some obscure provision in its wastewater permit, but because cutting off Ames would result in Liberty cutting off some of its own retail customers within its CCN in direct violation of state law. Liberty cannot suspend or terminate accepting flows from Ames unless Liberty builds its own wastewater facilities to serve the part of Liberty’s CCN that is currently being served with retail wastewater service by Ames.",Party Submissions,15.613919,12.842793,15.573584
"Discretionary Company Contributions. The Participating Employer may, from time to time in its sole and absolute discretion, credit Company Contributions to any of its Employee Participants in any amount determined by the Participating Employer. Such contributions shall be credited to a Participant’s Retirement Account and subject to the Payment Schedule applicable thereto.",Contract,5.8699026,5.5403023,6.6001844
"Appellee/Defendant: Sharon West 7015 Anderson St. Texas City, TX 77591 shangrewe@gmail.com Citation Certified Mail Rejected No Counsel on Record IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .........................................................ii.",Party Submissions,24.469915,22.481722,33.259445
"The Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade was the holder of the plan development for the 2013 DRP.134 As the holder of the plan, this authority was responsible for numerous important tasks in plan development, such as creating a plan draft, conducting strategic environmental impact assessments, collecting the relevant documents and information for plan preparation. The requested documents are relevant and material to assess the factors the Institute took into consideration when working on the 2013 DRP — including whether it considered Obn ova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 and if so, the Institute’s contemporaneous understanding of the extent of these rights.",Legal Decisions,17.742235,18.629925,20.271286
"Indeed whenever the question of whether or not a crab species fell within the definition of “sedentary species” gave rise to an international dispute, e.g. the dispute between Japan and the United States about the latter’s classification of Alaskan king crab as “sedentary species”, the relevant coastal State has always prevailed in the end.",Legal Decisions,10.250928,10.809373,11.622079
"Regarding the unconscionability of fee-splitting provisions, this Court explained that: Courts across the country have universally condemned the use of fee-splitting agreements in employment contracts that have the effect of deterring potential litigants from vindicating their statutory rights in an arbitral forum. Some courts have gone so far as to find fee-sharing agreements unenforceable per se. These courts reason that “an employee can never be required, as a condition of employment, to pay an arbitrator's compensation in order to secure the resolution of statutory claims.... [T]his would surely deter the bringing of arbitration and constitute a de facto forfeiture of statutory rights. Id. at 355 –56 (citations omitted).",Party Submissions,6.271945,6.274071,6.706771
"VerDate Sep 11 2014 23:44 Jan 31, 2024 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\SR538.ATS SR538 ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS • SRES 538 ATS (A) the President of Blue Mountain Chris-tian University, Dr. Barbara Childers McMillin; (B) the Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs of Blue Mountain Christian University, Dr. Sharon Ball Enzor; and (C) the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics of Blue Mountain Christian University, Mr. Will Lowrey.",Legislation,12.6450405,8.449407,12.307366
"According to Claimant’s witness, “.. . there were enough reserves in 2014. .. that the need for the Company remaining extraction activities until at least 2037, and that’s why the Port Concession got extended to that date.” (Transcript Day 1 (Eng), 239:2-7). Please explain the basis for this statement by reference to evidence in the record.",Party Submissions,21.700083,21.40013,23.531288
"David H. Gilliland State Bar No. 07941400 dgilliland@dwmrlaw.com Marnie A. McCormick State Bar No. 00794264 mmccormick@dwmrlaw.com P. O. Box 1149 Austin, Texas 78767-1149 (512) 744-9300 (512) 744-9399 fax I certify that this document contains 5,609 words in the portions of the document that are subject to the word limits of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i), as measured by the undersigned’s word-processing software.",Party Submissions,4.054441,5.2423563,5.5312967
"Arbitration Rule 31 20.1. A case management conference for purposes of discussing hearing organization and logistics will be held on the date provided in Annex B by way of videoconference. The videoconference shall be between the Tribunal, or its President, and the Parties and should resolve any outstanding procedural, administrative, and logistical matters (including modality of interpretation and transcription) in preparation for the hearing.",Legal Decisions,14.56203,12.277299,14.099907
"Thus, Delaware law is designed to facilitate Mr. Condon’s right to seek legal relief from Alpesh, Ruchir, and the other Respondents—not to impede it. This is the reason the Response constructs hurdles and obstacles that have no basis in Delaware law.",Party Submissions,20.021952,19.494184,22.736671
"To establish requirements for the Federal Trade Commission with respect to certain rules related to automotive retailing, and for other purposes.",Legislation,14.409118,18.631094,15.597942
"Preliminarily, in her notice of appeal, Douglas asserted that she is appealing the summary judgments in favor of both Transcontinental and Moody. However, in her brief, Douglas does not assign error to, or present any argument challenging, the summary judgment in favor of Transcontinental. Therefore, Douglas has waived any challenge to this summary judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e), (h) ( HN2 [ ] requiring, inter alia, that brief state issues presented for review and contain argument); Keough v. Cyrus USA, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (recognizing appellant waives error by failing to brief it on appeal). Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Transcontinental. We will address only the summary judgment in favor of Moody.",Party Submissions,4.488966,5.283633,4.9592233
To promote and enhance outdoor recreation opportunities for members of the Armed Forces and veterans on Federal recreational lands and waters.,Legislation,8.604578,8.403501,10.324295
Each Contracting Party will accord in its territory for the investments made by investors of the other Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment.,Legal Decisions,8.990388,8.963577,14.640525
"Justice Brian Walker currently holds Place 7 on the Second Court of Appeals. See Justice Brian Walker, TEXAS JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.txcourts.gov/2ndcoa/about-the-court/justices/justice-brian-walker/ (Jan. 8, 2024). He likewise seeks the Republican Party’s endorsement for the general election to Place 4 on this Court. JUSTICE BRIAN WALKER CAMPAIGN, https://voteforwalker.com/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). Walker filed his application seeking the Republican Party’s endorsement on December 4; Chairman Rinaldi accepted Walker’s application on December 14. See, e.g., Candidate Information, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, https://candidate.texas-election.com/Elec-tions/getQualifiedCandidatesInfo.do (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). On December 27— twenty-three days after filing and sixteen days after the deadline to apply for the Re-publican endorsement—Walker first contacted Chairman Rinaldi regarding his belief that Devine’s application failed to comply with statutory requirements for applications to appear on primary ballots. Pet. Ex. A. Walker alleged that Devine failed to obtain the requisite number of signatures from each of this State’s appellate judicial districts—the Eighth District in particular—to accompany his application to appear on a primary ballot for election to this Court. Pet. Ex. A.",Party Submissions,5.1626053,5.313745,5.4745336
"As to the first ground, Claimants failed to specify which of the documents related to the present arbitration would be covered by legal privilege. It would be obviously erroneous to claim that all documents showing the exercise of Coropi's management and control where the topic was Obnova are covered by legal privilege. Claimants, therefore, should have explained which of these documents are privileged and why. For the avoidance of doubt, Respondent does not seek communications with Claimants' counsel in relation to the present arbitration or which were otherwise prepared for the purpose of providing or obtaining legal advice.",Legal Decisions,13.109856,12.15892,14.744765
"The Mills decision, however, is based almost entirely on a mis-interpretation of and unwarranted expansion of this Court’s decision in Willacy County Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd ., 555 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2018), a position also illogically urged by Oncor in its Brief. The Mills opinion essentially holds that this Court has implicitly over-ruled Bastrop Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Acme Brick Co., 428 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet. ), Signal Int’l Texas L.P. v. Orange Cty., Texas, No. 09-13-00412-CV, 2014 WL 7183667 (Tex. App.— Beaumont Dec. 18, 2014, pet. denied), Valerus Field Sols., LP v. Matagorda Cty. Appraisal Dist., No. 13-17-00520-CV, 2018 WL 4924752 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg, Oct. 11, 2018, no pet. ), and Houston Cement Co. v. Harris County Appraisal District, No. 14-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 3243281 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2013, no pet. ) and broadly applied theories of contract to agreements under TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e). But Willacy hardly holds anything of the sort.",Party Submissions,4.520033,4.473474,4.5557184
"Administrative and Financial Regulation 28 7.1. The Tribunal Secretary is Mr. Alex Kaplan, Senior Legal Counsel, ICSID, or such other person as ICSID may notify the Tribunal and the Parties from time to time. The Tribunal Secretary shall remain at all times impartial and independent of the Parties.",Legal Decisions,9.121033,8.465336,10.375585
"To authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to relocate a memorial honoring the 9 Air Force crew members who lost their lives in an airplane crash in the Cherokee and Nantahala National Forests during a training mission on August 31, 1982.",Legislation,7.2600174,6.464462,7.1673417
"Also please inform us what is the rules concerning informing of Coast Guard or any department on catching of crab [.]770 577. On 15 January 2017, the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries replied: Snow crab is a sedentary species under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This means that the Coastal State exercises sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources, including snow crab. This means that other States cannot harvest snow crab on the continental shelf of a coastal State, without the express consent of the coastal State concerned. According to UNCLOS, exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the continental shelf is a sovereign right vested with the coastal State. Under no circumstances may a State “license” the exploitation of living or non-living resources on the continental shelf of another State. Such illegal licensing would be a blatant violation of the coastal State’s sovereign rights under international law. This includes licensing by the EU on behalf of vessels from EU member States. This has at several occasions been communicated to the EU, including in a verbal note from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the EU dated 9 January 2017. Hence the certificates and licenses your vessels are referring to in the letter are not in accordance with neither [ sic] Norwegian nor international law.",Legal Decisions,7.286148,6.603469,7.364376
"Weatherford correctly states the general issue presented (“whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Trial Court’s grant of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity”). Weatherford Brief on the Merits (“Brief”) at 4. However, several of Weatherford’s seven “subsidiary questions” require a response from Midland as to the true questions presented because they misstate the basis for the lower courts’ rulings in support of Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction. As such, Midland counters with the following subsidiary questions, correlating to Weatherford’s offered questions: 1. Whether Weatherford presented evidence sufficient to raise at least a genuine issue of material fact as to the SWDA’s applicability to Midland at all: as either an owner-operator or arranger-acceptor of solid waste? Midland takes issue with Weatherford’s subsidiary question 1, as it asks the Court to question whether an exception to a statute applies before establishing whether the statute itself would apply to Midland as a threshold inquiry. Furthermore, Weatherford wrongly presents as an incorrect premise in subsidiary question 1 that Midland is an entity “responsible for ‘solid waste’” when that determination is part of the baseline showing Weatherford must provide to establish that the statute itself is applicable. Brief at 4. Finally, Weatherford misstates this Court’s precedent by asserting that in R.R. Street v. Pilgrim Enterprises that this Court reached a “contrary holding under similar circumstances.” Brief at 4; R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. 2005). As Midland details further herein, the R.R. Street precedent did not involve “similar circumstances” as there was not a jurisdictional plea at issue in the case, the Court determined that a fact issue existed as to the applicability of the domestic sewage exclusion, and as a result of such fact issue, the Court did not ultimately render a decision at all related to the domestic sewage exclusion. 2. Whether Weatherford presented evidence sufficient to trigger subject matter jurisdiction as to whether Midland was a person “responsible for solid waste,” irrespective of whether an alleged “mixture” occurred following the alleged acts of a third party not named Midland. With respect to Weatherford’s subsidiary question number 2, once again, Weatherford attempts to circumvent jurisdictional deficiencies in the hope that the Court will allow Weatherford to jump past the required analysis of whether the SWDA even applies in order to conduct a purely academic analysis of whether an exemption to that statute is appropriate.",Party Submissions,6.983011,7.042779,7.118469
"Respondents repeatedly state, “nothing in the lien notice even suggests that the amount of the lien has anything to do with the account number.” Id. However, not once in their brief do Respondents affirmatively state that the account numbers 2 Neither lower court held that an unfair debt-collection claim is more proper than a Chapter 12 claim.",Party Submissions,21.497444,19.640362,26.667303
"The requested Documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute in that they address (i) the expectations of Mr Broshko regards Obnova's rights to the Dunavska Plots and compensation, and (ii) Mr Broshko's knowledge at the time of making the investment and foreseeability of the investment dispute.",Legal Decisions,20.854803,23.751108,24.315372
"Claimants note Serbia’s objections. Claimants have limited the temporal scope of their request to the years 1946 – 1960 during which Obnova’s buildings were built. As for Serbia’s allegation that “ it would be unreasonably burdensome to require Respondent to identify other authorities, not listed in Claimants' request, which might be in possession of the requested documentation and require them to search their archives for any responsive documents ,” Claimants note that Serbia is clearly better positioned to identify their own relevant public authorities than Claimants are. DECISION 71 Counter-Memorial, ¶ 63.",Legal Decisions,11.6915865,12.472333,12.571144
"The malpractice trial. At the malpractice trial HSMiller and the Lawyers disputed (i) whether Terry should have designated Flaven from the beginning, (ii) whether Terry committed malpractice by not designating Flaven more than 60 days before trial, and (iii) whether the trial court denied the motion for designation solely because it was filed late.",Party Submissions,13.192909,12.361812,16.443716
"To amend title 10, United States Code, to include training regarding financial literacy training programs for members of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.",Legislation,5.1170573,4.9446115,5.1221237
"Ames’s third issue presents a blanket statement that the Additional Service Charge, as defined in Section 5.2(c) of the Contract tied to wastewater volumes in excess of a baseline amount, constitutes an unenforceable penalty, consequential damages, or exemplary damages, and Chapter 271 does not waive immunity for such damages. The actual issue is not whether the agreed-upon rates are a penalty, but whether Ames is responsible for paying an amount due and owed for a service as provided for in the Contract. As discussed in more detail below, the Contract provides the Additional Service Charge as a typical volumetric adjustment for wastewater volumes over the Total Accepted Volume (“ TAV”). Amounts owed under this volumetric charge are a direct result of Ames delivering volumes exceeding the TAV. Because the Additional Service Charge is a volumetric charge that was agreed-upon by Ames, such amounts are due and owed under the Contract. Liberty’s restated issue correctly characterizes the Additional Service Charge for what it is: an agreed-upon rate structure where Ames must pay for services received.",Party Submissions,10.398705,9.069477,11.097817
"Samson pressed its “law of the case” argument that rulings in Hooks should dictate results in the severed T.S. Reed case, including even “implicit” rulings: Samson’s Appellant’s Reply Brief filed May 19, 2014, in T.S. Reed at 4, n.2, located at: https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=d771066f-93f0-4556-aed2-ea379e68a886&coa=coa09&DT=Brief&MediaID=02631a8d-e955- 4792-a644-a28978861c76.",Party Submissions,13.548393,9.6458645,13.746412
The requested documents are relevant and material because they will show that the City of Belgrade considered Obnova to be the user of its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 and charged Obnova a fee for the use of the land at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. This is inconsistent with Serbia’s position in this arbitration that Obnova was not a rightful user of its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23.,Legal Decisions,5.782081,6.3776345,5.7552004
Section 14. Successors. The Plan shall bind any successor to all or substantially all of the Company’s assets in the same manner and to the same extent that the Company would be obligated under the Plan if no succession had taken place.,Contract,3.7774236,4.91476,4.769788
The Respondent understands that this Request has been withdrawn. The Respondent reserves the right to object to any further request for these documents in due course.,Legal Decisions,12.391204,10.437552,13.697888
"Section 4.11. No Third Party Beneficiaries. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as giving any Person, other than the Parties and their respective successors, legal representatives and permitted assigns, any right, remedy or claim under or in respect of this Agreement or any provision hereof.",Contract,2.733634,2.7284234,3.444126
"HSMiller has argued that the trial court could both quote the statute and then explain its application under the facts of the case. (Cross-Pet’r’s Br. at 23) The cases it cites in support of this 47 proposition do not support it. One case simply repeats the generic statement that trial courts have broad discretion in submitting jury instructions and then holds that the trial judge correctly refused to give an instruction that covered a matter that was not at issue in the case. See Interstate Northborough P’ship. v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 224 (Tex. 2001) (stating that, although a judge has broad discretion in the instructions it gives, court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit an instruction on a matter that was not at issue in the trial). The second case is one of this Court’s early opinions explaining the meaning of abuse of discretion and whether a sanctions order was an abuse of discretion. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985).",Party Submissions,5.709451,6.381765,6.616689
"We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees under the UDJA for an abuse of discretion. See Nabers v. Nabers, No. 14-18-00968-CV, 2020 WL 830025, at *2 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Under the UDJA, “ reasonable and necessary attorney ’ s fees ” may be awarded if they “ are equitable and just. ” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009. “Trial courts have wide discretion in determining what is equitable and just in awarding attorney ’ s fees, and appellate courts will not overturn such a decision unless it is clear from the facts the trial court abused its discretion. ” Nabers, 2020 WL 830025, at *2 (citing Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998)). “ The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. ” Id. (citing Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)).",Party Submissions,2.6481714,2.983839,3.0184796
"Even if Section 51.003(a) does not apply, Yellowfin’s suit is untimely under any other applicable statute of limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004 (four-year limitations period after cause of action accrues on a debt); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 3.118 (six-year limitations period after the note’s accelerated due date). That is so because foreclosure accelerated the loan. See Opening Br. 28-31.",Party Submissions,6.456249,6.588868,7.135096
"Terry also designated HSMiller as a responsible party in the malpractice trial below. (CR323) Under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 33.003, the jury should have been asked to apportion HSMiller’s own responsibility in causing its harm.",Party Submissions,16.348955,19.347292,20.3418
"Dr. Tappan has no such demonstrated experience in the area of causation. This case is akin to De La Riva, 351 S.W.3d 398. In that case a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist offered an opinion regarding the cause of infant hypoxia. As in this case, nothing in the four corners of his report indicated that he was qualified to offer such opinions. The doctor’s CV was also devoid of any recent perinatological experience. Id. at 407. The court properly determined that the causation opinions were matters of pediatric neurology, not obstetrics. Id. The expert was therefore not qualified to give them. Id.",Party Submissions,7.7543817,8.897351,8.591655
"Proceeding in the Trial Court: The Walkers timely provided Dr. Castillo and BSA with preliminary reports and CVs from Dr. James G. Tappan, M.D., FACOG, FACS, a board-certified obstetrician, Dr. Donald M. Null, M.D., a neonatologist, and Nurse Martha Beach. App. 6, CR 57-450; App. 8, CR 453-490, App. 10, CR 491-506. Both defendants timely objected and moved to dismiss. CR 45; CR 507. The parties then agreed that the Walkers would have more time to file supplemental reports if they waived the right to seek a future 30-day extension. CR 759-80. After being served with amended reports from all three experts (App. 7, CR 663-707; App. 9, CR 708-45; App. 11, CR 842-57), both defendants objected and moved to dismiss. CR 649; CR 763.",Party Submissions,7.2627907,7.8266397,7.74629
"Enacted by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 269 (H.B. 752), § 1, effective September 1, 1993; am. Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1443 (H.B. 3522), § 1, effective September 1, 1997; am. Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 275 (H.B. 2095), § 2, effective September 1, 2003; am. Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 265 (H.B. 7), § 3.003, effective September 1, 2005; am. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 133 (H.B. 1003), § 1, effective September 1, 2007; am. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 134 (H.B. 1006), § 1, effective September 1, 2007; am. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 147 (S.B. 458), § 1, effective September 1, 2007; am. Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 1330 (H.B. 4290), § 13, effective September 1, 2009.",Party Submissions,1.7583812,1.795628,1.7552402
"To establish requirements for the Federal Trade Commission with respect to certain rules related to automotive retailing, and for other purposes.",Legislation,14.409118,18.631094,15.597942
"The fact that Wilson Plaintiffs would have sought offensive collateral estoppel on the Harpst judgment if the Harpst plaintiffs had won does not create privity between the Wilson and Harpst plaintiffs. I t’s important to note that the odds of Wilson Plaintiffs getting offensive collateral estoppel on a favorable Harpst judgment were extremely low. Offensive collateral estoppel on the Kinney judgment had already been denied, and their odds of obtaining offensive collateral estoppel on their second try had gotten vastly worse by the time of the Harpst trial. There’s no evidence or indication that Wilson Plaintiffs could have waltzed into court like Fleming Defendants did without even attaching an affidavit to their cursory motion for summary judgment and obtained collateral estoppel on 4,000 cases after a five-minute hearing. ( Ex 19 to Respondents’ Opposed Motion to Declare Harpst Judgment Unfair and Void). If Wilson Plaintiffs had sought offensive collateral estoppel on a favorable Harpst judgment, they were much more likely to get excoriated and denied like they did on practically every other important ruling before that judge. Id .",Party Submissions,9.143896,8.516169,9.6747055
"Except as otherwise provided under law, or the terms of the Long-Term Incentive Plan, or any other employee benefit plan in which Executive participates, Executive shall not be entitled to receive any additional compensation or benefits from the Company after the termination date.",Contract,5.7857685,6.496246,7.069932
"There are several conflicting versions in the record regarding what Mann was doing, or not doing at the time of his injuries. Bay essentially argues that since most of the differing versions of the facts place Mann within the course and scope of employment, and Mann cannot himself contradict any of the several versions, that course and scope is therefore conclusively established. This is a new rule of evidence never encountered in Texas jurisprudence. The carrier for the ROCIP owner determined through their own investigation, that Mann was going back to his personal truck for personal reasons. 39 It would defy logic and basic jurisprudence to allow multiple versions of an event which, by definition creates a fact issue to establish course and scope as a matter of law.",Party Submissions,15.478654,17.961197,17.651379
"Ru lin g o f th e Fo urth Co u rt o f Ap p e als The Opinion of the Court of Appeals (Tab 2) in this case employs an erroneous standard of review, which led to an erroneous review of the evidence in question. The Opinion notes that whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a non-resident Defendant is, “... a question of law we review de novo.” (Op. p. 3) The correct standard of review is set forth in BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). This Court held that: When a trial court does not issue findings of facts and conclusions of law with this special appearance ruling, all facts necessary to support the judgment by the evidence are implied. ...For legal sufficiency points, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the no evidence challenge fails. (Citing a case) At 795. After the plaintiff has pled sufficient allegations to bring a non-resident defendant within the provision of the long arm statute, the defendant challenging jurisdiction over it must negate all jurisdictional bases. BMC, Supra at 794.",Party Submissions,7.163753,7.686468,8.536294
"This notion of “one order, one reviewing court” is all that was at issue in Griggs. Griggs concerned a party that tried to appeal a judgment while the District Court was still considering whether to alter that same judgment. Id., at 56, 103 S.Ct. 400. The Court held that the appeal needed to wait until after the District Court's work on that judgment was done. *755 Id., at 60–61, 103 S.Ct. 400. This result, which followed from the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, was necessary to “avoi[d]” the situation “in which district courts and courts of appeals would both have had the power to modify the same judgment.” Id., at 60, 103 S.Ct. 400 (emphasis added).",Party Submissions,5.1043615,5.7530084,5.5882144
"Samson’s oral argument rebuttal assertion that compounding Late Charges is an issue “unaddressed by the trial court or either of the courts of appeals” is incorrect. The Hooks jury decided the issue (Oral Argument Exhs. 4 and 4.a-c), the Hooks trial judge decided the issue (Exh. 4.d), and the First Court of Appeals resolved the issue against Samson (Oral Argument Exhs. 4). And collateral estoppel was an alternative grounds for the Bordages summary judgment in this case. 6CR 8170, 7CR9378.",Party Submissions,15.312645,15.355057,16.100363
"According to the undisputed summary-judgment evidence, on April 27, 2001, Douglas was employed at a hotel owned by Moody. During her lunch break, she sat on a curb in the loading dock area of the hotel while smoking a cigarette. A fellow employee inadvertently engaged the accelerator of a utility cart, causing [*2] it to roll over Douglas's leg. Douglas sustained injuries requiring medical treatment.",Party Submissions,7.3016567,7.6233664,8.87457
"To achieve a balance between this public interest and the rights of property owners, a lis pendens can only be filed when “the suit on which the lis pendens is based ... claim[s] a direct interest in real property, not a collateral one.” 6 Id. at 293. If (like here) a party “seeks a property interest only to secure the recovery of damages or other relief that the [party] may be awarded, the interest is merely collateral and will not support a lis pendens.” Id. In this situation (like here) there is no public interest that could outweigh the harm caused by giving litigants an absolute privilege to—even negligently or maliciously—prevent property owners from freely transferring their property.",Party Submissions,8.325771,8.498811,8.816503
"Second, Barina ignores Petitioners’ argument that the appellate court improperly focused its substantial-truth analysis in this defamation-by-gist claim on omitted materials rather than on what the Program actually said, veering dangerously close to re-establishing an already rejected tort of false light in Texas. Had the courts below done the proper analysis, they would have concluded that the Program’s alleged defamatory gist—i.e., that Barina exploited Thrash—was substantially true. The statements actually made about Barina, including most notably that she offered to abandon her role as guardian and leave Thrash in the care of the very people she now claims were abusing him in exchange for half his estate, establish the truth of the alleged defamatory sting.",Party Submissions,13.931696,15.457648,14.728098
The United States objects to Request No. 3.e for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.,Legal Decisions,8.390091,13.359831,15.02727
"Such documents are relevant to demonstrate the nature of the treatment and protection accorded by the Respondent to the Claimant and are therefore, notably, material to an assessment of the Respondent’s alleged breach18 of the Claimant’s rights under Art. 319 of the France-Qatar BIT.",Legal Decisions,12.166365,11.429831,13.447834
"Respondents repeatedly insist that the court below merely analyzed the legal sufficiency of the “evidence” of Westwood’s constructive-eviction claim and concluded that Westwood’s withdrawal of its appeal amounted to “voluntarily abandon[ing] the premises” of its own accord. (Resp. 7, 8, 12, 16-17, 19, 21, 28) But that argument misrepresents the evidence and misconstrues the basis for the court of appe als’ decision.",Party Submissions,8.2825365,8.724787,9.354627
"In short, Section 272.001 expressly authorizes a contractor performing work in Texas to void any provision seeking to fix forum in another state, which necessarily includes any contractual language purporting to “waive” objections to the forum-selection clause. A forum-selection clause and this sort of waiver language are both provisions that “mak[e] the contract or agreement or any conflict arising under the contract or agreement subject to another state’s law, litigation in the courts of another state, or arbitration in another state.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 272.001(b). This Court should conclude RLB voided these contractual provisions under Section 272.001 when it filed suit in a Texas court.",Party Submissions,7.0027194,7.1651382,7.346064
"Value is agreed to be $X Square footage agreed to be X The roof is agreed to be composition The veneer is agreed to be brick The lot size is agreed to be X The age is agreed to be X years. Etc., etc., etc. A property owner could easily claim that when it reported the square footage to the appraisal district, it transposed some numbers. Thus, it might claim, the subsequent agreement on value could be attacked by a clerical error correction. The point is, when one agrees to an appraised value, one agrees to all the components thereof and all the theories thereof and all the remedies to the contrary. Otherwise, such an agreement is toothless.",Party Submissions,14.902376,16.615107,15.688665
"This Court previously recognized this unethical practice. See In re N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd ., 559 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2018). Petitioners should be able to seek recourse under Chapter 12, as intended by the Legislature. Petitioners ask this Court to apply Chapter 12’s plain language and reverse the court of appeals’ erroneous decision that securing a lien under Chapter 55 precludes recovery under Chapter 12. Doing so will restore integrity in hospital billing. More specifically, it will discourage hospitals from using unreasonable chargemaster rates (the fraudulent claim) with the intent to recover more than the “reasonable value” from the patients’ personal injury claims using the enforcement powers of Chapter 55.",Party Submissions,8.321508,7.86698,8.8735285
"As explained above, the requested documents will show when Obnova’s buildings were built. This determination is, in turn, relevant and material to rebut Serbia’s argument that Obnova’s buildings at Dunavska 17-19 were built before Obnova’s establishment and Obnova thus does not have any rights to these buildings.67 Serbia’s argument that the requested documents are not relevant and material because “ Claimants have not identified any specific documents or category of documents that are in Respondent's possession which provide this information ”, supposedly being the information about when the buildings were built, is clearly 67 Counter-Memorial, ¶ 63.",Legal Decisions,12.25512,13.396553,12.850772
"This brief was prepared using Microsoft Word. Relying on the word count function in that software, I certify that this response contains 7,996 words (excluding the cover, tables, signature block, and certificates).",Party Submissions,11.104324,16.884867,18.188126
"This Invention and Non-Disclosure Agreement (this “Agreement”) is made by and between OneSpan North America, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the “Company”), and Matthew Moynahan (“you”).",Contract,6.617649,5.815133,6.9975066
"R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the opinion of the Secretariat for Transport – Department is relevant to the question of Obnova’s alleged property rights or material to the Tribunal’s determination of this question. This is a classic “fishing expedition”, with Claima nts simply casting about for any documents which might contain information they consider helpful in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case. PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants.214 In other words, the requested documents are “in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties”. 215 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the mentioned authority in order to obtain documents in question.216 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants, to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves.",Legal Decisions,13.259588,12.580922,13.110402
"More examples of anti-waiver language may be found in other codes. Of these, section 143A.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is especially noteworthy.",Party Submissions,10.606941,11.287881,12.772034
"DEBTS, LAWSUITS AND CAUSES OF ACTION OF WHATEVER NATURE AND CHARACTER, WHETHER ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO CONTRACT (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, RELATED TO DELAYED DELIVERY, NONDELIVERY, PRODUCT QUALITY OR DEFECTIVE PRODUCT), TORT, STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, MISREPRESENTATION, VIOLATION OF APPLICABLE LAW, AND/OR ANY SOURCE OR CAUSE WHATSOEVER, WITHOUT LIMIT AND WITHOUT REGARD TO THE CAUSE OR CAUSES THEREOF, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF OR ALLEGED TO ARISE OUT OF BODILY INJURY OR LOSS OF PROPERTY.",Contract,3.3613253,2.8703496,3.8976932
"The two-year statute of limitations in Section 51.003(a) of the Texas Property Code bars Yellowfin from pursuing Ms. Santos’s unpaid debt more than twelve years after foreclosure of her home. Section 51.003(a) ’s text plainly covers deficiency actions brought by non-foreclosing junior lenders, and to hold otherwise, as Yellowfin urges, would require this Court to add words to the statute that the Legislature did not include.",Party Submissions,7.7505484,7.5378475,8.195717
To express the sense of the Senate regarding the constitutional right of State Governors to repel the dangerous ongoing invasion across the United States southern border.,Legislation,21.944136,15.45235,26.314112
"Id. At *2, citing Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d at 168. Thus, where husband purchased the home using separate property but took title in both spouses’ names, the presumption arose that he intended to make a gift to wife of one-half of the property. Id. Husband testified that he did not intend to make such a gift, which rebutted the presumption. Id. The trial court’s characterization of the house as husband’s separate property was within its discretion and affirmed. Id .",Party Submissions,5.7556086,6.1773586,5.6441875
"For the reasons stated above, the Walkers pray that this Court grant review, reverse the judgment of the intermediate court, and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. The Walkers further pray for such other and further relief as to which they may be entitled.",Party Submissions,5.430326,6.5965247,7.3132424
"In turn, “Defterios assured [the underlying plaintiffs] that Flaven was a trust-fund beneficiary able to close the deal.” Lawyers’ Brief at 15.",Party Submissions,49.337605,47.218506,65.90752
"In addition, the Request seeks the production of all documents “between and/or among Respondent”. This is overly broad for the reasons set out in relation to Request 9 supra, which apply here mutatis mutandis .",Legal Decisions,15.341169,22.029993,21.80136
"One of our sister courts has recently applied these Penn Central factors to a group of bars complaining of emergency orders during the Covid-19 pandemic and alleging a taking; we find that court’s analysis persuasive. See Stand for Something Grp. Live, LLC v. Abbott, No. 13-21-00017-CV, 2022 WL 11485464 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi – Edinburg Oct. 20, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).",Party Submissions,8.178329,7.500335,8.973818
"Claimant’s 2013 Contract with Respondent, i.e. how many gallons of AC-30 are outstanding to be supplied and stored. The executive summaries, like those cited in paragraph 91 of Mr. Abu Naba’a’s witness statement, will evidence that the Department of Importation and Supply of Asphalt shared the same interpretation of the 2013 Contract as Claimant and advised the MOPC of that interpretation. Moreover, these documents evidence that Respondent operated under the 2013 Contract, which it now alleges was “null and void” ( see Respondent’s Memorial ¶ 8) without issue for almost 10 years. These documents, therefore, directly support Claimant’s assertion that the supply and storage clauses of the 2013 Contract were wholly independent from each other and that the 2013 Contract was valid ( see Claimant’s Memorial ¶¶ 42, 48, 50-51, 86; Witness Statement of M. Abu Naba’a ¶ 45-46, 54, 56-57) and refute Respondent’s allegations that the 2013 Contract was completed and requested documents, has exemplified the alleged content of such documents (see Abu Naba’a WS, ¶ 91), and has clarified that the requested documents are issued annually.",Legal Decisions,9.216621,8.721277,9.057808
"Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce all documents described in this January 20, 2017 to the present, that are in the possession, custody, or control of USTR, the State Department, and the Request No.",Legal Decisions,11.635049,11.4652405,14.218828
"On March 2, 2021, Abbott issued an order stating that “there are no Covid-19-related operating limits for any business or other establishment [in Texas].” GA- – 5– 34.2 Shortly after, appellees filed their joint Supplemental Plea to the Jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Galovelho’s equitable clai ms because the claims had become moot following GA-34. Appellees also argued that Galovelho lacked standing for a number of its claims and that some claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Galovelho responded, and after hearing, the trial court granted the supplem ental plea and dismissed all of Galovelho’s claims with prejudice.",Party Submissions,8.020363,8.449594,9.320136
"It is unclear what Serbia is actually arguing on this issue. To begin with, Serbia argues that searching for responsive documents would put Serbia “ in the difficult position of searching both physical archives and 151 Article 5(2) of the Law on Free Access to the Information of Public Importance states that everyone has the right to have the information of public importance made available to them, by providing them with an access to a document containing information of public importance, the right to a copy of that document, and the right to have a copy of the document sent to him by mail, fax, by email or otherwise, upon their request. Article 2(1) defines information of public importance as information at the disposal of a State authority, created in the work or in connection with the work of the State authority, contained in a certain document, and refers to everything that the public has a legitimate interest in knowing. See Annex 9. 152 See above para 14. 153 State Attorney Office, representing Serbia in arbitration proceedings, is not in physical possession of the requested documents and thus has to address the relevant state authorities to obtain the documentation, just like Claimants are entitled to do. 154 Request to the Assembly of the City of Belgrade, 17 November 2022, Annex-16 .",Legal Decisions,8.773026,9.538505,9.66234
"The issue is limited. Texas Occupations Code § 2301.467(a)(1) states that distributors and manufacturers cannot “require” a franchised dealer to adhere to an unreasonable sales standard. World Car’s § 2301.467(a)(1) argument is that HMA unreasonably demanded that its dealers be 100% “sales efficient”— applying real consequences for noncompliance—but failed to allocate World Car enough vehicle inventory to meet that standard. Receiving ample vehicle allocations is the lifeblood of franchised dealers, who heavily rely on their manufacturers and distributors for those allocations. So HMA’s actions were surely unreasonable, but reasonableness is not at issue here because the El Paso court of appeals and DMV Board ruled that HMA did not “require” the sales standard in the first place. That is the sole issue presented.",Party Submissions,10.154167,10.227561,10.865521
"To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to impose a tax on the purchase of single-family homes by certain large investors, and for other purposes.",Legislation,3.803764,3.8019733,3.952283
"Likewise, before the court of appeals could validly conclude the trial court abused its discretion, it too needed to review the contracts and not simply assume the Subcontract incorporated the MCC’s forum-selection/choice of law and waiver provisions. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., L.P., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (finding a clear failure to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion). If anything in the record supports the trial court’s rulings—and the language of the MCC and Subcontract does—the court of appeals was bound to find the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See In re Univ. Interscholastic League, 20 S.W.3d 690, 691-92 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (appellate court should “review the entire record” and determine if the facts and law permitted “the trial court to make but one decision”). The court of appeals erred in not conducting this contractual analysis and instead just making assumptions.",Party Submissions,5.2718635,5.062198,5.6302433
"Counsel for Respondent I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Respondent’s Oral Argument Exhibits has been served on the following counsel of record via e-service in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, on this 9th day of January, 2024.",Party Submissions,5.790344,5.864811,7.328568
"The majority’s second case citation dealt with an altogether different question, arising from an allegation that a member of a special litigation committee was so dominated by the company controller that she could not fairly consider a litigation demand. The Delaware Chancery Court held this assertion was “beyond the bounds of reasonable conceivability.” In re GGP, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2021 WL 2102326, at *17.",Party Submissions,9.189782,9.702513,10.779601
The Advance shall be made either by a transfer initiated by the Lender pursuant to cash concentration agreements or by a manual transfer from the Lender to the Borrower.,Contract,16.094717,14.405381,22.329557
"Petitioners Dr. Rahul K. Nath and Usha Nath respectfully request the Court grant their motion for rehearing and petition for review, and reverse and remand to the trial court for litigation of their claims. In the alternative, the Naths pray the Court remand the Hospitals’ attorney’s fees claims with instructions that the Naths raised a fact issue and have the right to a jury determination of the reasonableness of any fee award. The Naths pray for any other additional relief to which they may be justly entitled.",Party Submissions,8.363872,7.6967854,8.409647
"Astonishingly, Nicaragua appears to feign ignorance of the wide scope of this US Presidential Proclamation. Still, it would be hard to believe that Nicaragua (represented here in this Arbitration by its Attorney General and its US-based counsel) could be unaware of this barrier to entry for its officials. Without any doubt, Nicaraguan government officials who have already presented evidence before this Tribunal are ineligible for entry to the United States because of US sanctions that are in effect.",Party Submissions,11.447175,12.356077,13.186164
"If the Court chooses to address Dr. Castillo’s qualifications objections, the Walkers’ experts were not qualified to opine on causation. Dr. Tappan was not qualified to offer opinions about H.W.’s neurological injuries or their cause(s); he offered no facts in his report or CV to establish his qualifications to offer those opinions. Similarly, Dr. Null’s report and CV did not establish his qualifications to allow him to offer opinions about an “asphyxia event” or the proximate cause(s) of H.W.’s neurological injuries. Indeed, his primary area of practice deals with pulmonary health and ventilator management practices, not in-utero neurological or brain injuries. Issue No. 4: The Court of Appeals decided this case on the narrow grounds briefed by Dr. Castillo and Baptist. Both defendants objected to the reports’ sufficiency on causation grounds, which necessarily involved both components of proximate cause—cause in fact and foreseeability. Therefore, the Court of Appeals properly considered the foreseeability issue in concluding the reports were insufficient under section 74.351.",Party Submissions,8.520213,8.867163,8.966958
"Thus, the determination of whether any type of claim is within the Act's exclusive jurisdiction depends on whether the claim is based on an entitlement of benefits. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 804; Henry v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 70 S.W.3d 808, 809 (Tex. 2002) (holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate an employee's claim because the trial court could not “adjudicate the damages claim without determining whether the employee was entitled to benefits, a matter within the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction.”).",Party Submissions,5.5654407,5.247218,5.6466684
"On August 14, 2020, the trial court issued an order purporting to support resolution of jurisdictional issues in an efficient manner. The order required Galovelho to seek leave of court before further amending its pleadings. Shortly after, Galovelho’s interlocutory ap peal was voluntarily dismissed and remanded to the trial court. Galovelho, LLC v. Abbott, No. 05-20-00784-CV, 2020 WL 6156014 (Tex. App. — Dallas Oct. 21, 2020, no pet.).",Party Submissions,6.019307,6.075201,6.476165
"On appeal, Grant asserts that the order should be reversed because the trial court ignored her, failed to consider evidence, allowed judicial misconduct, and violated her due process and equal protection rights. We review the trial court’s order requiring payment of costs for an abuse of discretion. In re R.J., No. 02-16-00445-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4567, at *3– 4 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth May 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).",Party Submissions,3.828843,4.3637943,4.381625
"Not all bonuses are paid after the fact. Professional athletes, for example, may receive a bonus for signing an employment agreement which is referable to the entire length of the contract. Treating such a bonus as purely separate or purely community depending on when it is received would be inconsistent with the law’s treatment of other forms of compensation for services.",Party Submissions,14.361103,15.953293,17.68155
"To the extent that Respondent invokes the deliberative process privilege unde r Article 9.2(b) of the IBA Rules, Respondent must show that the requested documents are subject to that privilege within the scope of Article 9.2(b).",Legal Decisions,8.421463,8.812113,10.118522
"Merely reciting the wording of the statute (that the Contract was “properly executed”) is simply making a legal conclusion. Liberty was required to plead facts, not conclusions, that “affirmatively demonstrate that. .. immunity from suit has been waived.” In other words, they were required to plead facts that support the conclusion that the Contract was “properly executed.” Liberty’s argument that presenting a signed and executed contract met its initial burden completely ignores that this Court has held that not every executed contract is “properly” executed. El Paso Education Initiative, Inc. v. Amex Properties, LLC, 602 S.W.3d 521, 532 (Tex. 2020) (“The adjective ‘properly’ necessarily limits the verb ‘executed,’ leading to the inexorable conclusion that not all executed contracts qualify for Chapter 271's waiver.”).",Party Submissions,7.801277,7.836807,8.640519
"The Walkers’ real problem is that only Dr. Tappan addresses foreseeability, and he limits his opinion to one sentence: that “[i]t was foreseeable to an ordinarily prudent obstetrician that failure to deliver by reverse breech extraction might reasonably result in traumatic extraction ... and trauma, including the increased risk of arterial ischemic stroke with injury to the fetal brain.” (CR.669). Missing from Dr. Tappan’s foreseeability opinion—like the rest of his opinions—is the necessary 6 E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664.",Party Submissions,13.959346,15.561087,15.53558
"Company’s choice. The foregoing right of indemnification will not be available to a Covered Person to the extent that a court of competent jurisdiction in a final judgment or other final adjudication, in either case, not subject to further appeal, determines that the acts or omissions of such Covered Person giving rise to the indemnification claim resulted from such Covered Person’s bad faith, fraud or willful misconduct. The foregoing right of indemnification will not be exclusive of any other rights of indemnification to which Covered Persons may be entitled under the United Rentals Restated Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws, as a matter of law, or otherwise, or any other power that the Company may have to indemnify such persons or hold them harmless.",Contract,2.5678267,2.6358283,3.085657
"USMCA does not exclude Claimants’ claims. Annex 14-C of USMCA allows investors holding legacy investments to 70 Commentary on the revised text of the 2020 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, at 9 (Jan. 2021) (“Article 3.3 [of the IBA Rules] is designed to prevent a broad ‘fishing expedition’, while at the same time permitting parties to request documents that can be identified with reasonable specificity and which can be shown to be relevant to the case and material to its outcome.”). 71 Respondent’s Cover Letter for Respondent’s Responses & Objections to Claimants’ Document Requests, Oct. 11, 2023 (“Respondent’s Letter”), at p. 2.",Legal Decisions,7.145689,6.984071,7.5582886
"At the outset, this test is “particularly dependent on a fully-developed factual record.” Id. at 715. But that is another reason why mandamus is improper. As this Court recognized in a parallel context, resolving whether the First Amendment would allow for mandamus here “necessarily requires factual determinations.” Id. at 716. No such record exists here. Yet this is the first opportunity the Republican Party of Texas has had to assert its First Amendment rights: the lack of a robust factual record cannot fairly be charged against it. Nor did this Court hold the absence of such a record against the respondent in Brady, where the Court reversed a court of appeals’ mandamus grant regarding a claim that a candidate did not submit sufficient qualifying signatures when seeking judicial office. Id. at 713, 716. Mandamus is no more proper an avenue to resolve the Republican Party’s First Amendment claim here any more than it was in Brady .",Party Submissions,9.049503,9.124953,9.634768
"The Borrower agrees to pay on demand all losses and all costs and expenses, if any, in connection with the enforcement of this Agreement, the Note and any instruments or other documents delivered under this Agreement or the Note, including, without limitation, losses, costs and expenses sustained as a result of a default by the Borrower in the performance of its obligations contained in this Agreement, the Note or any instrument or document delivered under this Agreement or the Note.",Contract,3.9647655,3.8742414,5.2321205
"The survey design shall take into account the Guidelines for statistically sound and risk-based surveys of Agrilus planipennis. The survey design and sampling scheme used for detection surveys shall be able to identify with at least 95 % confidence, a level of presence of the specified pest of 1 %.",Legislation,16.585707,15.733413,17.911674
"Here, Husband was employed with Bank of America for eight years (from -2002 to 201 0) before marriage. It is undisputed that Husband made contributions to a401(k) prior to marriage. Wife introduced paystubs from 2005 to 2010 showing he contributed $20,648.23 to the retirement account. Husband neither presented evidence to the contrary nor presented evidence of contributions prior to 2005 because he admitted some account statements were unavailable because they were too old. Thus, the value of the 401(k) owned at the time of marriage was never identied.",Party Submissions,8.539253,10.015791,9.759272
"Respondents acknowledge that the result in Kemp turned mainly on the fact that the tenant lacked the legitimate “right of possession” to the property necessary to maintain a constructive-eviction claim. (Resp. 34, citing Kemp, 2020 WL 205313, at *4) Respondents claim that they too challenged Westwood’s right of possession by questioning whether Westwood’s renewal of the lease was effective. (Id.) But the two challenges are very different. The challenge brought by the landlord in Kemp was meritorious: The tenant was a holdover whose continued “possession [was] unlawful.” (Pet. Br. 16, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *1-2) By contrast, Respondents’ challenge to Westwood’s right of possession in this case was specious. See supra, at pp. 8-9. Thus, unlike the tenant in Kemp, Westwood possessed the property rights necessary to maintain a claim for constructive eviction, and breach of contract.",Party Submissions,6.2166023,6.328569,6.7458572
"Convention Article 61(2); Administrative and Financial Regulation 15; Arbitration Rule 50 10.1. The Parties shall cover the direct costs of the proceeding in equal parts, without prejudice to the final decision of the Tribunal as to the allocation of costs.",Legal Decisions,8.900625,9.442092,11.012404
"Midland, a public entity shielded from suit by governmental immunity, submitted an evidentiary Plea to the Jurisdiction to the Trial Court, and the Trial Court granted that plea. Weatherford failed to meet its burden to submit rebuttal evidence that its chosen statute, the SWDA, is in any way applicable to Midland so as to implicate the limited waiver of immunity found in that statute. Weatherford’s shortcoming is a jurisdictional barrier to entry, and its Petition’s focus on a statutory exclusion—the domestic sewage exclusion—should be seen for what it is: a backdoor attempt to argue substantive SWDA law when Weatherford could not even show the statute applied to Midland in the first place.",Party Submissions,10.682013,11.9900675,11.092218
"At minimum, the El Paso court’s decision would cause confusion in future dealings and legal proceedings. The El Paso court created conflicting precedents, or at least confusion, on a statutory-interpretation issue that is critical for the entire auto industry.",Party Submissions,19.07093,18.04424,20.758179
"To amend title 49, United States Code, to establish a program to provide grants to eligible recipients for eligible operating support costs of public transportation, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.588118,4.3228993,6.402948
"E. Neither Lessee nor its purchaser of production· shall be authorized to make any deductions or adjustments against present or future royalty payments for royalty amounts previously paid without first giving Lessor or royalty owner thirty (30) days advanced notice of same along with a full explanation of such overpayment. In the event Lessor or royalty owner disputes the legitimacy of such deduction or adjustment, Lessee or purchaser shall not be entitled to make such deductions or adjustments against Lessor's royalty (and Lessor's full royalty payments shall not be interrupted) until such dispute is resolved. If it is agreed between Lessor or royalty owner and Lessee that a royalty owner was overpaid, then the overpaid royalty owner has the option of repaying such overpayment or allowing Lessee or purchaser to recoup such overpayment out of future royalty payments on a schedule and in monthly amounts agreed to by such overpaid royalty owner and Lessee or purchaser. Any overpaid royalty owner shall not be charged interest on the overpaid sums.",Party Submissions,6.237237,6.091001,6.50933
"Id. at 814–15. A hearing officer eventually determined the employee sustained a compensable injury. Id. at 815. However, an appeals panel reversed and remanded for further factual determinations on the compensability issue.",Party Submissions,6.809627,7.349698,8.182973
"Enacted by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 136 (S.B. 28), § 1, effective September 1, 1995; am. Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 204 (H.B. 4), §§ 4.03, 4.04, 4.10(2), effective September 1, 2003; am. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 203 (H.B. 274), §§ 5.01, 5.02, effective September 1, 2011.",Party Submissions,2.289156,2.459767,2.4141839
"The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the a greement's silence with respect to costs and fees creates a “risk” that she will be required to bear prohibitive arbitration costs if she pursues her claims in an arbitral forum, and thereby forces her to forgo any claims she may have against petitioners. ” Id. at 90. The Court reasoned that “[t]he record reveals only the arbitration agreement's silence on the subject, and that fact alone is plainly insufficient to render it unenforceable. The “risk” that [plaintiff] will be saddled with prohibitive costs [was] too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.” Id. at 91.",Party Submissions,6.7309313,6.8049836,7.076541
Sunset Termination Provision Section 21 of the Guaranty states that the Guaranty terminates upon construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco Building.,Party Submissions,14.462931,17.727541,21.47169
"S.W.3d at 667. The expert explained the physician should have obtained certain heart rate information from the nurses, but that information was misreported. If the physician had known the correct information, he would have delivered the baby sooner. The expert also set out what happened to cause the injury (cord compression) and linked it to the alleged wrongdoing (heart rate variability that was not reported to physician). There is no such explanation here.",Party Submissions,12.434901,13.63259,16.864742
"The split among the courts of appeals compounds the problem by creating confusion among parties. Parties will not know whether a termination clause will effectively end a case, which can have a great impact on early settlement.",Party Submissions,19.722263,25.209654,26.440159
"Liberty asserts that all it had to do to satisfy its burden to show that the Contract was properly executed was to attach a copy of a contract with a signature on it and assert in its pleadings that the Contract was “properly executed.” Liberty’s actual burden was to “allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate that. .. immunity from suit has been waived. . .” Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 389 (Tex. 2021).",Party Submissions,7.651463,8.642691,9.135546
"In Houston Cement Co. v. Harris County Appraisal District, No. 14-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 3243281, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2013, no pet. ), the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held there was no subject matter jurisdiction when an agreement such as the one in this case is made between a taxpayer and an appraisal district. In that case, the taxpayer protested the appraisal district’s market value in 2009 and 2010. Id. at *1. In both years, prior to the appraisal review board hearing, the parties agreed to an amended appraised value “thereby resolving the dispute.” Id. In both years, the parties executed and signed written agreements to such effect. Id .",Party Submissions,3.6720738,3.9125347,3.6514528
"Here, between the medical-ese of Dr. Tappan’s report and Dr. Null’s terse, conclusory opinion, the Amarillo Court of Appeals properly concluded neither report—standing alone or read in tandem with the other—sufficiently explained factually how and why Dr. Castillo’s alleged departures from the standards of care were a proximate cause of H.W.’s injuries. With the help of dictionaries, the Court of Appeals accepted the experts’ statements but concluded that the experts omitted any adequate explanation of how and why each defendant caused, within reasonable medical probability, the baby’s subacute infarction before birth. Thus, the reports were deficient on causation.",Party Submissions,13.1010065,14.457033,14.593151
"Respondents ignore that Oncor asserts the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (“UDJA”) as an alternate theory of jurisdiction not to correct the Wilbarger County appraisal roll, but only to determine the validity and scope of the 2019 settlement agreement under Tax Code section 1.111(e). Oncor made this clear in its initial brief. See Oncor’s Brief at 42-44.",Party Submissions,9.363519,11.534264,10.7955265
"Dr. Castillo has never criticized Dr. Tappan’s expertise as an obstetrician-gynecologist or his qualifications to offer opinions about obstetrical standards of care. The Walkers are right in urging Dr. Tappan has significant experience managing labor and delivery, treatment of pregnant women, and treatment necessary for non-reassuring fetal heart rate patterns, among other things. (Pet. Br. at 41).",Party Submissions,10.982663,11.101009,12.473818
"Galovelho pled two types of regulatory takings claims against the appellees: a categorical taking pursuant to Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 and a traditional taking pursuant to Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.",Party Submissions,6.4493957,7.8108897,7.2534986
"To direct the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to conduct a review of the criteria for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of certain mitigation projects, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.7855086,4.1739492,5.1251545
"The Walkers also overstate the Amarillo Court’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson, 649 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. 2022). The Court of Appeals cited Thompson twice, once for the same proposition found in Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. 2010)—that expert reports must explain how and why claimed departures from the standard of care caused an injury—and once for the elements of proximate cause. See Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *3, *5. That is not novel or inappropriate or divergent.",Party Submissions,8.044337,8.041902,8.637555
"Texas Bar No. 01323555 roy.armstrong@texasarb.com 218 Beimer St. Taos, New Mexico 87571 575-751-4818 Voice Attorneys for Mills County ARB This computer-generated document complies with the word-count limitations set forth in TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i) because it contains 4244 words, excluding the parts of this document exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1). In making this certification, I have relied on the word-count program contained within Microsoft Word.",Party Submissions,6.5760803,7.493423,9.61794
"And as this diagram illustrates, those two spheres of authority do not overlap. Indeed, to reinforce the boundary between those two spheres, Section 31.004(a) and Section 24.008 prohibit the issues related to the award of immediate possession adjudicated in the inferior justice of the peace court from having any effect whatsoever on the different issues reserved to the district court.",Party Submissions,14.214408,12.980834,17.499
Nor is the Tribunal persuaded that the conduct of the Claimant or its counsel in the present arbitration constitutes an exceptional circumstance justifying an order for security for costs.,Legal Decisions,8.5233555,9.261231,11.559511
"HN12 [ ] A writ of mandamus will issue when a trial court does not abate [*22] a tort suit while a suit for judicial review of a DWC decision is pending. See Louisiana-Pac., 112 S.W.3d at 189-90 (affording mandamus relief where trial court failed to abate tort litigation while suit for judicial review of Workers' Compensation Commission decision remained pending). As already explained, the suit for judicial review is still pending before a Travis County district court. There has been no final resolution of the issues presented in that suit. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by lifting the stay on litigation of the tort suit while the suit for judicial review was still pending. And Texas Mutual and Hellas have no adequate remedy by appeal. See id. at 190. Thus, Hellas has shown its entitlement to the writ of mandamus.",Party Submissions,5.979556,6.6656337,6.8675623
"To enhance the Federal Government’s planning and preparation for extreme weather and the Federal Government’s dissemination of best practices to respond to extreme weather, thereby increasing resilience, improving regional coordination, and mitigating the financial risk to the Federal Government from such extreme weather, and for other purposes.",Legislation,8.732777,8.195639,10.245343
"In Del Lago, this Court also rejected the argument that an owner has no duty to warn or protect the patrons where a danger is “known or obvious.” Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 774. As this Court explained, this theory has an exception where “the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965)). Del Lago’s duty arose because it “had reason to expect harm notwithstanding Smith’s awareness of the risk.” Id.",Party Submissions,6.0597444,6.356296,6.9667354
"BSA disagrees with the Walkers’ statement of jurisdiction. There is no reason for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the petition. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.001(a). The court of appeals used the basic causation principles applicable to Chapter 74 preliminary expert report cases in determining that the expert reports had multiple fatal flaws. This case is no different from a plethora of other expert report cases. The Walkers merely advocate for a more favorable view of their expert reports, but the court of appeals correctly applied the law to the facts of this case. The petition presents no error of law important to this state’s jurisprudence.",Party Submissions,9.100117,9.552572,9.614403
"To amend title 18, United States Code, to revise recidivist penalty provisions for child sexual exploitation offenses to uniformly account for prior military convictions, thereby ensuring parity among Federal, State, and military convictions, and for other purposes.",Legislation,6.203044,6.1857295,6.3001966
"Order No. 1 that the Tribunal had requested they give further consideration. 31. On February 13, 2020, the Parties submitted further comments on the procedural calendar.",Legal Decisions,14.393435,15.514285,19.438068
"Kemp ’s true holding is far narrower and has nothing to do with any categorical rule that a tenant’s compliance with the result in a forcible entry and detainer proceeding categorically bars the tenant from pursuing a claim for damages in district court. As Respondents eventually admit (Resp. 34), Kemp turned on whether a particular tenant had offered sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of a constructive-eviction claim that simply happened to arise after the tenant dismissed an appeal of a forcible entry and detainer order and left the premises, 2020 WL 205313, at *1. And while some of the facts in Kemp therefore bear some superficial resemblance to the facts of this case, the dispositive facts are nonetheless very different.",Party Submissions,9.370942,10.48947,11.252418
"In sum, the paraphrased instruction on which the court of appeals reversed amounted to harmful error. The court of appeals properly reversed on this basis.",Party Submissions,12.27583,15.258191,15.759268
"The majority's rule also prevents courts from crafting case-specific solutions to balance all the interests at stake. Under the traditional discretionary-stay rule, for instance, a judge could allow the parties to conduct only the forms of discovery that would also be permitted in arbitration. That would save time and leave nobody worse off even if, as the majority fears, the dispute ultimately heads to arbitration. But this kind of equitable resolution, which the court and the parties might consider “sensible,” ante, at 1921, is forbidden under **1930 the majority's mandatory-general-stay rule.",Party Submissions,13.178602,14.842544,15.547099
"And in another case the Court considered whether a longstanding legal concept — the unlawful acts doctrine — was a proper affirmative defense that would bar the deceased plaintiff’s recovery because he ingested illegal drugs partly causing his death. See Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.w.3d 825, 829-36 (Tex. 2013). The doctrine “barr[ed] a plaintiff from recovering damages if it could be shown that, at the time of the injury, the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act that contributed to the injury” and was “based on public 27 policy that wrongdoers should not be compensated for their immoral acts.” Id. at 829. In deciding the issue, the Court considered Chapter 33 and several other relevant statutes. Id. at 829-36. Chapter 33, it concluded, controlled over the wrongful acts doctrine.",Party Submissions,7.0286565,7.2032065,7.2979097
"Policy Considerations Favor Collateral Estoppel/Issue Preclusion in this Case Relying on Restatement Section 29(7) in this case would extend it beyond its purpose, i.e., so that collateral estoppel not “inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule” upon which an issue of law was previously decided. The only Texas case we have found that applied Section 29(7) did so to avoid the federal Eighth Circuit’s decision from preventing a Texas court deciding the validity of certain workers’ compensation policies. See Tankersley v. Durish, 855 S.W.2d 241, 245–46 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, writ denied). That policy goal is not at issue here. In Hooks, Samson had every opportunity to litigate the same question and did raise it to this Court, but its petition was denied.",Party Submissions,9.429806,9.674687,10.4221945
"Respondents fare even worse in trying to distinguish Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2013). Respondents’ focus on statements from Coinmach that have no bearing on this case—such as that a tenant who “defeats an eviction suit can still be liable for trespass” (Resp. 40)—cannot change Coinmach ’s holding that a tenant who loses a forcible entry and detainer action and gets evicted can still seek damages for wrongful eviction in district court. Respondents are forced to admit, (id.), that Coinmach properly drew support for that holding from Johnson v. Highland Hills Drive Apartments, 552 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.), which had previously adopted the same rule. See Coinmach, 417 S.W.3d at 919. Respondents are also forced to admit that this rule has been followed in numerous other cases. (Resp. 41) And because that is the rule, Respondents cannot explain how the court of appeals’ decision can survive.",Party Submissions,5.0897784,5.7128143,5.5452
"Historically, it has not been entirely obvious that the crab, including the snow crab, is considered a sedentary species according to the Convention on the Law of the Sea Article 77 (4). The content of the provision was little discussed during the Conference on the Law of the Sea, other than that a proposal from several states (including Norway) during the 1958 conference that crustaceans and swimming species should not be included was the subject of discussion and was finally voted down in plenum. There have been several conflicts related to the interpretation of the provision (mainly in the 60s), i.a. related to the king crab between resp. Japan and the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States. The United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement in 1964 which meant that the king crab was considered a “ natural resource of the continental shelf”, but the Soviet Union was allowed to fish for king crab on more specific terms. Although it seems relatively open for a period whether the crab is to be regarded as a sedentary species, recent literature seems quite unambiguous by assuming that the crab is to be regarded as a sedentary species that follows shelf jurisdiction.",Legal Decisions,10.696179,10.671546,10.421636
"Oncor cites to Matagorda Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Liquids Partners, 165 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2005) for the proposition that this Court has held that settlement agreements are merits defenses and not jurisdictional. The proposition is undiscernible from the words of the case.",Party Submissions,8.169733,10.109459,9.403601
"The court of appeals’ decision exceeds the origin and intended purpose of the judicial-proceeding privilege and is contrary to this Court’s recent explanation and application of the privilege. The privilege began with the holding that “[c]ommunications in the due course of a judicial proceeding will not serve as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander, regardless of the negligence or malice with which they are made.” James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam); see also Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tex. 1994). This Court explained that “[t]he rule is one of public policy ... founded on the theory that the good it accomplishes in protecting the rights of the general public outweighs any wrong or injury which may result to a particular individual.” Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co ., 166 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Tex. 1942). Because the “proper administration of justice” requires “full and free disclosure of information by participants in judicial proceedings,” the judicial proceedings privilege covers “any statement made by the judge, jurors, counsel, parties or witnesses, and attaches to all aspects of the proceedings, including statements made in open court, pre-trial hearings, depositions, affidavits and any of the pleadings or other papers in the case.” Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tex. 2021) (citations omitted).",Party Submissions,4.770014,5.0505085,4.835289
"MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Patricia A. Grant, acting pro se, appeals from a final judgment partitioning real property in Fayette County and from an order requiring payment of court costs. 1 We affirm both decisions.",Party Submissions,7.3434176,8.217943,9.555355
"The most current abatement of Sonic's contract claims began approximately twenty-nine months ago, on October 23, 2003, based upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. And, should [**34] Sonic pursue an appeal of our ruling in the judicial review case, its ability to pursue the contract [*482] claims will be further delayed, rendering it impossible to determine when abatement will end. Sonic is faced with a difficult choice. However, at this point in the proceedings, the issues to be finally determined in the judicial review case are not determinative of Sonic's contract claims, and continued abatement of the contract claims does not serve concerns raised in Fodge or Tyler. Therefore, we conclude the trial court's October 23, 2003 orders of abatement are an abuse of discretion. See Gebhardt, 891 S.W.2d at 329-30. It remains whether Sonic has shown that it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal should the contract claims remain abated. terms of the insurance policy indicated TMI was required to reimburse Sonic under the circumstances, but stated ""[i]n any case, the hearings system of the Commission is not a general court of law with the jurisdiction to adjudicate contract liability."" 20 Should Sonic choose to pursue reimbursement of the voluntary payments through its contract claims, because discovery has been conducted on the reimbursement issue, continued abatement does not serve the interests of judicial economy. Sonic argues it has no adequate remedy by appeal because the Alabama judgment has adverse consequences on its ability to operate. Sonic provided an affidavit stating it has lost three prospective buyers due to the adverse judgment, and it is losing profits because it cannot purchase needed equipment and training. Sonic contends that these losses will be increased because a final [**35] resolution of the judicial review case can take several more years. TMI argues that lost profits do not equate to an inadequate appellate remedy.",Party Submissions,9.161236,8.687315,9.843505
"The initial demarcation of the infested zone shall be immediately followed by a delimiting survey, with a design and sampling scheme allowing to detect, with a 95 % level of confidence, a 1 % presence of infested plants.",Legislation,14.707122,18.252853,16.913912
Both principal and interest are payable in the same currency in which the Loan was made to the order of the Borrower at such place as the Borrower shall direct in writing.,Contract,6.391427,9.415932,10.421874
"The Walkers provide an example they believe shows the Court of Appeals’ error: its conclusion that neither expert linked H.W.’s asphyxia event to his stroke. (Pet. Br. at 30-31). They argue that Dr. Tappan set the stage by relating facts that put H.W. at risk for hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy, and stating how H.W.’s condition at birth suggested “suggested the possibility that he in fact suffered such an injury.” (Pet. Br. at 31-32).5 The Walkers further cite to Dr. Tappan’s statement that, if Dr. Castillo had performed an earlier caesarean section, “H.W. would have been born without neurological injury.” (Pet. Br. at 32). Pointing then to Dr. Null’s report, the Walkers say he deductively concluded there could not have been another cause of H.W.’s brain injury and “had [H.W.] been delivered...sooner he would not have suffered the degree of brain injury that he has.” (Pet. Br. at 33). But this discussion still does not address the critical deficiencies identified by the Court of Appeals: neither expert addressed how and why, within reasonable medical probability, Dr. Castillo’s conduct caused the baby’s subacute infarction before birth (or explained how the “asphyxia event” was tied to the subacute infarction), and neither expert addressed foreseeability as to the subacute infarction (except with respect to pushing on the baby’s head, and that explanation also was conclusory). Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *5.",Party Submissions,7.496892,7.828312,7.7566953
"This case involves questions of law that are important to the jurisprudence of the state of Texas. First, the abuse of discretion standard of review, applicable to family law cases generally, lacks clear definition considering this Court’s recent recitation of the standard in the Bradshaw case. Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2018). Further, the consideration of circumstantial evidence on a question in the absence of direct evidence when conducting a sufficiency review under the abuse of discretion standard deserves clarification. Lastly, appellate remedies are unclear in the family law context when conducting a sufficiency review under the abuse of discretion standard.",Party Submissions,6.0651836,5.6753926,6.3923717
"I certify that the foregoing Reply Brief on the Merits complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4 because it contains 7,414 words and has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface, using Microsoft Word via Microsoft Office 365 ProPlus, in 14-point Bookman Old Style font for text and 12-point Bookman Old Style font for footnotes that meets the typeface requirements.",Party Submissions,4.9782267,5.8971353,6.50817
"Alonzo v. Lampkin involved a malpractice claim against a gynecologic surgeon who purportedly nicked plaintiff’s bowel during a hysterectomy, resulting in myriad alleged cognitive problems and infections. Alonzo v. Lampkin, No. 07-12-00030-CV, 2013 WL 6073431 at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). When the patient sued Dr. Lampkin, she served an expert report from a board-certified obstetrician, who offered his opinions about the cause of plaintiff’s neurological injuries. Id. at *4.",Party Submissions,4.3319187,4.437234,4.485808
"The Lawyers objected to the two paragraphs because they were “a redundancy and to the extent they don’t repeat what’s in the statute, then it would be an error of statement of law.” (11RR213) The Lawyers then objected that the language in the paragraphs came from an earlier trial in the case and from the court of appeals opinion that were not applicable. (Id.) Finally they objected that the two paraphrased instructions confused the issues, misled the jury, improperly commented on the weight of the evidence and were unduly prejudicial to Terry. ( Id .) The court of appeals decision. A majority of the panel below concluded that the second non-statutory instruction was improper because it made HSMiller’s “theory of negligence the law of the case,” and it “suggested, if not overtly instructed the jury, that Terry’s reasoning for not designating Flaven earlier in the case was flawed.” Newsom, Terry & Newsom, LLP v. Henry S. Miller Commercial Co., No. 05-20-00379-CV, 2022 WL 3908542, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 31, 2022, pet. filed).",Party Submissions,8.981998,9.184968,9.39156
"Merely satisfying the procedural steps to secure a lien does not ensure that the secured lien is not fraudulent. If it did, then no person could challenge a “secured” lien created and used in bad faith or a lien filed with the intent to cause financial injury. The two statutes at issue serve vastly different purposes. Section 55.005, titled “Securing Lien,” lists how to procedurally secure a lien. Chapter 12, titled “Liability Related to a Fraudulent Court Record or a Fraudulent Lien or Claim,” explains the liability resulting from the “use” of a lien to cause financial injury. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 12.002(a)(1) (“A person may not make, present, or use ...a fraudulent lien or claim. . .”) (emphasis added). Petitioners maintain that a lien is fraudulent under Chapter 12 when it has been created in bad faith or with dishonesty, a lack of integrity, or moral turpitude. See Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Barefoot, 654 S.W.3d 440, 446-47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied).",Party Submissions,5.7466564,5.5938354,6.216811
"The Austin court held that because the guarantor breached the guaranty contract before the termination, the termination did not release the landlord’s claim against it. Id. at *3. “Under settled Texas law, ‘a claim for breach of contract accrues when the contract is breached.’” Id. (quoting Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 39 (Tex. 2015)). “And the termination of a contractual obligation does not release the obligor from a prior breach.” Id. (citing cases). Thus, the guarantor was not released from liability under the guaranty agreement. Id. at *4.",Party Submissions,4.569521,4.6079025,4.739416
"If the bonus is retrospective, and not guaranteed, a clause apportioning it to the spouses if, when, and as received would cause both spouses to share the risk that no bonus will be received. Where the employee spouse controls the amount of the bonus, the issue of dividing a possible future bonus is more complex. Because a possible future bonus is not possessed by a spouse during marriage, the presumption that property possessed by either spouse upon dissolution of the marriage is community property does not apply. An attorney representing the nonemployee spouse who suspects that the employee spouse may receive a bonus after the divorce should try to have the possible bonus divided in kind in the divorce, or at least avoids the assignment of such an interest to the employee-spouse, leaving open the possibility of a postdivorce partition.",Party Submissions,10.05643,10.9243765,10.390539
"In April of 2000, Real Parties in Interest, Maria and Donacino Gaona, Individually and as Representatives of the Estate of Reynaldo Gaona, filed the underlying suit in Harris County against Tyler and the manufacturer and owner of the power sprayer. The Gaonas allege Reynaldo's death was caused by Tyler's negligence. Tyler asserts that the negligence claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act 1 because Reynaldo's death occurred in the course and scope of his employment. 2 See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 408.001 (Vernon 1996).",Party Submissions,4.6041236,4.9428906,5.228197
"To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to modify provisions relating to assistance by States, and political subdivisions of States, in the enforcement of Federal immigration laws, and for other purposes.",Legislation,4.607777,3.1667333,4.7075567
"To require the Secretary of Agriculture to convey certain National Forest System land in the Chequamegon-Nicolet National Forest to Tony’s Wabeno Redi-Mix, LLC, and for other purposes.",Legislation,7.6859426,7.1893377,6.8809195
"The Claimant has not established that the requested documents are likely to exist or are otherwise in the Respondent’s posession, custory or control.",Legal Decisions,13.990562,11.401905,17.221548
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be duly executed on its behalf by an officer thereunto duly authorized and Executive has duly executed this Amendment, effective as of the date and year first written above.",Contract,2.7431269,3.3956366,3.5618336
"Mann timely objected to the affidavit of Pamela McShann 43 for two reasons: 1) Mr. Mann was obviously represented by counsel at the time that Pamela McShann allegedly records a statement to be used against Mann later. Pamela McShann represented Bay' workers' compensation carrier who had already denied coverage for Mann. Thus, Pamela McShann had no legitimate reason to call Mann *29 whatsoever. Pamela McShann served as an agent of Bay, who was already represented by counsel, Mr. Charles Vannaman; and 2) In response to Mann's request for disclosure, Bay tendered McShann's worker's compensation claim file history without Mann's consent and redacted portions of the notes without claiming a privilege or producing a privilege log.",Party Submissions,13.645294,14.327816,16.204748
"Thus, vast numbers of individualized issues are raised by the myriad contractual provisions that bear on the substance of, and the forum for 4 litigating, the breach of fiduciary duty claims in this case. ...Accordingly, this action is inappropriate for certification as a Rule 23(b)(3) class. (VII CR 4139).",Party Submissions,13.607978,12.969824,15.935058
"Indemnification. The Participating Employers shall indemnify and hold harmless each employee, officer, director, agent or organization, to whom or to which are delegated duties, responsibilities, and authority under the Plan or otherwise with respect to administration of the Plan, including, without limitation, the Committee and its agents, against all claims, liabilities, fines and penalties, and all expenses reasonably incurred by or imposed upon him or it (including but not limited to reasonable attorney fees) which arise as a result of his or its actions or failure to act in connection with the operation and administration of the Plan to the extent lawfully allowable and to the extent that such claim, liability, fine, penalty, or expense is not paid for by liability insurance purchased or paid for by the Participating Employer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Participating Employer shall not indemnify any person or organization if his or its actions or failure to act are due to gross negligence or willful misconduct or for any such amount incurred through any settlement or compromise of any action unless the Participating Employer consents in writing to such settlement or compromise.",Contract,4.129731,3.8517623,4.2645984
"To apply user fees with respect to tobacco products deemed subject to the requirements of chapter IX of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.",Legislation,11.470015,10.992765,13.184391
"As in Tatum, Hall, and Huckabee, the Program speaks to a broad social controversy—the exploitative nature of this country’s guardianship systems—and 6 The article did not include Rosenthal’s explanation, or meaningfully attempt to obtain her comment. Id. at 432.",Party Submissions,36.17466,38.20859,45.595413
"Heath represented that there was no right to a jury trial because he was no asserting a separate property claim, and on this basis alone the trial court denied a jury trial. Permitting this error in the deprivation of a constitutional right to escape scrutiny due to some claim of after-the-fact waiver is wrong and offensive to the Texas Constitution.",Party Submissions,15.290529,15.286546,18.627256
"The Clerk’s Record is cited “CR[Page#].” Specific page references when referring to items in the Clerk’s Record are to the CR page numbers, and not to the internal pagination of a particular document.",Party Submissions,13.584973,13.697375,20.459848
"The amended assignment ’s indemnity clause provides: [TX 1111] will indemnify [First NBC] against and hold [First NBC] free and harmless from any and all claims, demands, lawsuits, judgments, awards, costs and expenses, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney fees, arising by reason of any loss or impairment of the availability of the Contributions pursuant to the Borrower Operating Agreement, except to the extent such claims, demands, 21 Neither Osprin nor Backes challenge the applicability of the UDJA in this case.",Party Submissions,10.419144,9.247082,12.361982
"Fleming Defendants could have had this litigation concluded many years ago if they had not successfully defeated class certification. The trial court summarized their argument against class certification and the court’s agreement therewith at the time as follows: [Fleming] Defendants argue in response that common questions would not predominate, given the substantial choice of law questions that need to be resolved, as well as the individualized contractual provisions for arbitration and the treatment of expenses. (VII CR 4123).",Party Submissions,14.957176,13.146358,15.71387
"McCarthy Subcontract -9-01-12-2017 Rev. waive all rights of subrogation against McCarthy, Owner and others as required by the Contract Documents; (c) The Commercial General Liability Policy of the PEO, leasing company, temporary employment or casual labor agency shall name McCarthy, Owner and others as required by the Contract Documents as additional insureds on a primary and non-contributory basis and such policy will contain waivers of subrogation in favor of such additional insureds; (d) Coverage will not be cancelled or non-renewed until 30 days prior written notice has been provided to McCarthy. If such cancellation is the result of non-payment of premium, at least 10 days prior written notice must be provided to McCarthy before such cancellation is effected. Copies of applicable Additional Insured and Waiver of Subrogation Endorsements must be attached to Certificates of Insurance.",Party Submissions,5.946021,5.074079,6.291085
"Those assertions, although not fulsome, were sufficient to allege that 14 In any event, there was evidence that the trial judge would have had no legal basis to deny the motion. 6 RR 123, 222-23, 249; 8 RR 190.",Party Submissions,13.179899,14.748482,17.910398
"By its fourth issue, Bay argues that Mann was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his injury.",Party Submissions,17.783445,31.402235,43.12233
THE SHARES ISSUABLE UPON VESTING OF THIS AWARD WILL NOT BE RELEASED TO YOU UNTIL ALL APPLICABLE TAX-RELATED ITEMS HAVE BEEN COLLECTED FROM YOU OR HAVE OTHERWISE BEEN PROVIDED FOR.,Contract,4.1802697,4.2727976,6.039178
"Respondent has conducted a reasonable search for the category of documents requested, and provides Claimant with the documents identified in the request that are in its possession, custody or control, as resulting from that search.",Legal Decisions,12.293462,19.341578,15.236405
"Petitioners demonstrated in their opening Brief that this Court could reverse the appellate court’s decision for the alternate reason that the court failed even to address Petitioners’ arguments that statements about which Barina complains most vociferously—the allegations of “exploitation” or describing guardianship proceedings as the “crime of the century”, for example—are constitutionally-protected expressions of rhetorical hyperbole or opinion based on disclosed facts. Pet. Br. at 29-38.",Party Submissions,14.351824,16.083597,15.895693
"See Respondent’s Memorial at para. 59. Claimants have shown that this assertion misconstrues the meaning of, and draws incorrect inferences from, Article 34.1.",Legal Decisions,15.724683,16.459814,15.321329
"The court of appeals never directly addressed this issue. The court suggested that the City had negated evidence of gross negligence by taking some steps to protect its patrons, including developing its “safety rules and policies.” Delapena, 2022 WL 16993493, at *8. But this cannot be reconciled with the City’s conscious decision not to enforce those policies. CR139-40. At best, this would create a fact issue. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28 (court must deny the plea when there is a fact issue). More likely, the existence of the policy and the City’s conscious disregard is itself evidence of the City’s gross negligence.",Party Submissions,8.603251,9.184742,9.314894
"The Energy Secretariat shall issue a resolution with the economic dispatch rules to be applied by the DNDC to the energy and capacity transactions provided in Article 35(b) above. This rule shall provide that all generation companies shall receive a uniform price for the electricity they sell at each point of delivery to be defined by the DNDC, based on the economic cost of the system. In calculating such price, the cost that unsupplied electricity represents for the community shall be taken into account. Likewise, offtakers (distributors) pay a uniform rate, stabilized every ninety (90) days, measured at the reception points, which will include what the generators receive for the concepts indicated in the preceding paragraph, and transportation costs between the supply and reception points. 779 676. The Tribunal finds that the language of Articles 35 and 36 of the Electricity Law leaves considerable discretion to the Energy Secretariat in the setting of capacity payments. It does not prescribe any specific currency, method of calculation or price that the Energy Secretariat should reflect in its resolutions.",Legal Decisions,13.162817,14.022708,12.81013
,Party Submissions,nan,nan,nan
"However, to avoid any confusion, the measures that are claimed in both arbitrations are: (i) the freezing or blocking of accounts, and (ii) the deposit of VAT refunds on one of the blocked accounts, in particular those deposited between April 2020 and January 4, 2023.64 82. At the outset, the Claimant wishes to point out that the Request for Arbitration filed on June 29, 2023, does not seek to challenge the measures summarized above that are the subject of this ongoing arbitration.65 The Request for Arbitration seeks remedies concerning PEM’s entitlement.",Party Submissions,10.587843,10.451016,11.610748
"Vested Right “1. A right that so completely and definitely belongs to a person that it cannot be impaired or taken away without the person's consent. 2. A right that the holder can transmit by deed to others, and has transmitted to his or her heirs, in the event of the holder's dying intestate.” Right, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).",Party Submissions,8.120138,7.8386827,7.5579267
"Because of his extended labor and traumatic delivery, H.W. had to be resuscitated and intubated in the operating room at only 3 minutes old. App. 7, 666. H.W. also had significant swelling and bruising in the left parietal/occipital region, which the medical records ascribed to “ birth trauma. ” App. 7, CR 667.",Party Submissions,10.272708,10.534082,11.30159
"The same is true of the Walkers’ reliance on Miller v. JSC Lake Highlands Operations, LP, 536 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. 2017). There, this Court reversed the Dallas Court of Appeals because it failed to consider the various experts’ reports together. Id. at 513-14. Again, that is not what happened here.",Party Submissions,7.393222,7.8751907,8.280994
"Action from which Relator seeks relief: Justice Devine filed his ballot application on November 14, 2023. Respondent accepted Justice Devine’s application on December 1, 2023. Relator did nothing for several weeks, but then challenged Justice Devine’s application on December 27, 2023, asking Respondent to reject the application and to remove Justice Devine from the list of certified candidates. Relator waited an additional full week before filing this emergency proceeding, in which Relator states that the Court must act within three business days. Trial Court : Relator did not seek an injunction in any trial court, and there are no related proceedings in any trial court. Court of Appeals: Relator did not petition for mandamus relief in the Third Court of Appeals, and there are no related proceedings in any court of appeals.",Party Submissions,5.91416,6.5913134,6.6461873
"In this Court, Rafiei does not address any of these concerns; neither did the majority in the court of appeals’ opinion. Justice Jewell’s observation that “Rafiei’s evidence fails to address why any of these options for a reduced or deferred filing fee are unavailable to him[,]” id., remains true. II. Rafiei has not shown that an arbitration on the merits would Throughout the argument in the Amended Brief, Rafiei relies more on rhetoric than any detailed defense of the court of appeals’ opinion or analysis of the evidence before the trial court.",Party Submissions,16.433952,17.995787,17.27299
"And yet, seeking to rewrite the statute for the sake of public policy is precisely what Petitioner requests. Petitioner tries to transmute a statute of limitations into a statute of acceleration and accrual. Doing so would ignore the fact that Section 51.003 does not create any new rights, but merely regulates a right that arises from a different source. Trunkhill Capital, Inc. v. Jansma, 905 S.W.3d 464, 468 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995, writ denied). The purpose of the statute was not to transform the optional acceleration doctrine or impose an increased requirement on all lienholders to watch for the actions of any others with security interests in collateral. Instead, the statute was enacted to ensure that borrowers receive proper credit when their foreclosed property is sold and protect them against large deficiency judgments resulting from unreasonably low prices paid at foreclosure sales. House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 169 72nd Leg., R.S. (1991). Nowhere in the Legislative history is there a shred of evidence that Section 51.003 was intended to apply to lenders uninvolved in the foreclosure, to create a new limitations accrual date, or to overturn long-standing precedent. In fact, the Legislature later amended Section 16.035 to specifically delete the concept of “ lien debt ” and, by doing so, avoid a conflict between the limitations governing foreclosure and Texas Business & Commerce Code § 3.118 – the applicable provision for the recovery of money due under real estate notes that qualify as negotiable instruments. Tex. S.B. 754, 75th R.S. (1997); Senate Comm. on Business & Industry, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 754, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). The implication is clear – the Legislature understood that its laws governing foreclosures should not affect the law governing the enforcement of concurrent monetary obligations.",Party Submissions,7.2392516,7.340603,7.541424
"Petitioners cite several cases following Casteel and argue that this Court did not focus enough on the ""specific errors"" in those holdings and that, if it had, the Court would have seen that none of the cited cases are controlling here. 17 With a bullet-point listing of case holdings, Petitioners suggested that the facts of this case are somehow different and should not be controlled by Casteel and the cited progeny.18 However, the actual holdings of each case support the Court's Opinion here that harmful error exists due the combined negligence question including the legally insufficient yield sign claim.",Party Submissions,18.207535,17.648193,20.067
"Texas district courts have exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases in which jurisdiction is conferred on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body. Tex. Const. art. V, § 8. An administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction when the Texas Legislature grants it the sole authority to make an initial determination in a dispute; in such matters, a complaining party must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking review in district court. Until the party has satisfied the exhaustion requirement, the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss without prejudice those claims within the agency's exclusive jurisdiction.",Party Submissions,4.797829,5.320859,5.2139955
"I certify that the foregoing Response Brief on the Merits complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4 because it contains 9,357 words and has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface, using Microsoft Word via Microsoft Office 365 ProPlus, in 14-point Bookman Old Style font for text and 12-point Bookman Old Style font for footnotes that meets the typeface requirements.",Party Submissions,5.4856324,6.890769,7.4330034
"In the event of corporate transactions described in Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-1(i)6), the identification of Specified Employees shall be determined in accordance with the default rules described therein, unless the Employer elects to utilize the available alternative methodology through designations made within the timeframes specified therein.",Contract,8.324183,9.664096,10.373116
"HSMiller’s objection to the third document, the bankruptcy court’s order on fees, likewise is groundless, in part because of HSMiller’s own arguments. HSMiller has relied on the bankruptcy plan to argue preemption and to inaccurately suggest that the bankruptcy proceedings were the normal fare. See Resp’s’s Br. at 28-35. The order on fees the Lawyers attached to their Petitioners’ Brief is a public order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, available through commercial databases like Westlaw. See In re Henry S. Miller Comm., LLC, No. 09-34422-SGJ-11, 2010 WL 4638882 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2010).",Party Submissions,8.52118,8.319491,9.164993
"Walker’s petition must also be rejected on the merits. First, mandamus relief would “transgress[] this Court’s settled limits on judicial interference with elec-tions,” In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 767, as the primary election process is already well underway—indeed, further along than in Khanoyan itself. Second, while the State’s interests in ensuring broad, statewide support for candidates for statewide office often justify the burden that the Election Code imposes on the Republican Party of Texas’s First Amendment associational rights, those interests fail here. Jus-tice Devine’s track record of statewide support diminishes any such interest the State might have in regulating how the Republican Party of Texas accepts candidates to compete for its endorsement via primary election, and no other plausible interest would be advanced by granting Walker mandamus relief.",Party Submissions,10.971601,11.1073265,11.656308
"Instead of creating a new basis for liability, Section 51.003(a) set the statute of limitations for an action arising from a person ’s liability emanating from another source, such as a promissory note or a guaranty agreement. Sowell v. Int ’ l Interests, L.P., 416 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). Section 51.003(a) thus “ operate[s] as a statute of limitations ,” which is “intended to compel a party who possesses a right of action to exercise that right within a reasonable time after it accrues. ” Trunkhill Cap., Inc. v. Jansma, 905 S.W.3d 464, 467-68 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, writ denied). Section 51.003 is clear that the cause of action accrues at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Tex. Prop. Code § 51.003(a); Sowell, 416 S.W.3d at 597 (“If the price at which real property is sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale under section 51.002 is less than the unpaid balance of the indebtedness secured by the real property, resulting in a deficiency, any action to recover this deficiency must be brought within two years of the foreclosure sale and is governe d by section 51.003.”).",Party Submissions,4.215426,4.1648655,4.2607303
"Notwithstanding anything in this paragraph to the contrary: (i) if a different definition of compensation has been designated by the Company with respect to another nonqualified deferred compensation plan in which a key employee participates, the definition of compensation shall be the definition provided in Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-1(i)(2); and (ii) the Company may through action that is legally binding with respect to all nonqualified deferred compensation plans maintained by the Company, elect to use a different definition of compensation.",Contract,5.4846673,5.546671,6.754756
"The trial court was within its discretionary authority to find Dr. Null qualified to opine as to causation. See Roberts, 111 S.W.3d 113. V. The Court should grant review to ensure Chapter 74’s Nearly three years ago, the Abshire opinion confirmed that lower courts should not prematurely weigh a preliminary expert report’s ultimate evidentiary value, which “is a matter to be determined at summary judgment and beyond.” 563 S.W.3d at 22 6. The Court reaffirmed that holding just last term. E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664.",Party Submissions,13.058919,12.066908,13.265463
"The evidence shows Terry was acutely aware that Flaven was a problem and knew there was a risk. The evidence also shows that regardless of what Flaven did, HSMiller and its agent Defterios were going to have credibility problems before the jury. To a great extent the evidence supports a conclusion that this was a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation: HSMiller and Defterios were not going to look good in the jury’s eyes either way.",Party Submissions,12.848153,12.604978,13.373847
The decision below transgresses the boundary between those separate spheres. And Respondents barely attempt to argue otherwise. They simply try to make the decision mean something other than what it actually says.,Party Submissions,20.476015,24.643051,29.213772
"HN1 [ ] Administrative Proceedings, Costs & Attorney Fees Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.221(c) provides for a carrier's liability for a claimant's attorney's fees if the claimant prevails in the carrier's action for judicial review.",Party Submissions,7.9756937,8.729137,8.950486
"Bay also alleges that it has standing to initiate a proceeding at the Division as a subclaimant. However, even if Bay could prove that it properly preserved a claim as a subclaimant, that tactic will not accomplish what it desires. Citing the Texas Supreme Court in Franks v. Sematech, Inc. 936 S.W.2d 959, 960 (Tex. 1997) the 14th Circuit held “...a derivative claim under the TWCA [Texas Workers' Compensation Act] is not independent of the employee's claim... There is but one cause of action for an employee's injuries, and it belongs to the employee.” It follows that as a subclaimant, [an employer's] ability to recover reimbursement under the TWCA should be coextensive with [the injured's] ability to recover benefits. Texas Mut. Ins. V. Sonic Systems Intern., 214 S.W.3d 469 (Tex.App. -Houston [14th], 2006, writ denied).",Party Submissions,7.3560014,7.5610986,7.527899
"This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session, the 1st C.S. and the 2nd C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the 2023 ballot proposition contingencies to date.",Party Submissions,8.685042,7.9217057,8.740299
"Being part of the management team of a Texas Corporation is an obvious availment of the Respondent’s right to do business in Texas, and clearly embraces the possibility that he may be haled into Texas Courts.",Party Submissions,17.88425,18.220797,19.169212
"Mr Broshko alleges that he decided to invest in Obnova's shares independently from Mr Rand (in November 2017, indirectly through MLI) because he believed that Obnova would either be able to resolve the issue with the 2013 DRP or be awarded compensation due under Serbian law. Mr Broshko argues that the lack of compensation breached the Canada-Serbia BIT.",Legal Decisions,21.548363,20.946932,21.997364
"We believe the reasoning in Mantas is equally applicable here. Claiming that Gaetjen has sustained a compensable injury, Luby's has asserted the exclusive remedy defense to Gaetjen's negligence claim. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 408.001(a) (Vernon 1996) (“recovery of workers compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers' compensation coverage”). Hence, a jury would have to first decide the compensability issue before it could consider the negligence issue. Whether Gaetjen's injury is compensable, however, is a matter within the primary jurisdiction of the Commission.",Party Submissions,5.736797,6.515294,6.6346827
"This mandamus proceeding arises out of a negligence suit filed by Elizabeth Gaetjen (“Gaetjen”) against her employer, Luby's Cafeterias, Inc. (“Luby's”), after Gaetjen was sexually assaulted in the workplace by a fellow employee. The relator, Luby's, contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to abate the negligence trial until the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission decides whether Gaetjen, the real party in interest, sustained a compensable injury. See generally TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. Ch.402 (Vernon 1996).",Party Submissions,4.3381753,4.5763597,4.6063294
"This was and remains a garden-variety immunity case. It presents no novel questions of law, but rather is simply another case in which a plaintiff failed to satisfy the simple evidentiary burden imposed on it when presented with a Miranda Plea to the Jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, Midland respectfully requests that Weatherford’s Petition for Review be DENIED.",Party Submissions,11.129755,12.840274,13.486074
"To amend the Harmful Algal Blooms and Hypoxia Research and Control Act of 1998 to address harmful algal blooms, and for other purposes.",Legislation,2.6840274,2.3198922,2.5674686
"The record in this case reflects that, prior to Catiana’s death, the City hired a risk management consultant to evaluate the City’s operation of Buttercup Pool. The consultant’s report, written approximately six weeks before the incident, specifically found that Buttercup Pool’s use of two lifeguard stands, one covering the deep end of the pool and the other covering the shallow end, was adequate to safely monitor all swimmers in the pool. The Delapenas have not suggested there were any prior incidents at Buttercup Pool that would undermine the City’s reliance on the consultant’s report. See Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 281, 288 (concluding that plaintiffs stated a claim for gross negligence, in part, because the Parks Department received several recent reports of near drownings but failed to act).",Party Submissions,7.1071935,7.322409,7.4956293
"R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. This is a classic ""fishing expedition"". Claimants are seeking any underlying documentation which might not support the decision to place the bus loop on the Dunavska Plots, but they have no reasonable basis for assuming that the work plan will contain anything relevant or material to the outcome of the dispute. PCC : The requested document is accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade in accordance with the applicable regulations.246 In other words, the requested document is ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".247 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.248 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request document whose production they now seek.",Legal Decisions,13.957286,13.532806,14.161278
"If a sales standard is set at 100 widgets but only 50 widgets are available for resale purchase, that 100 widget sales standard cannot be satisfied and is plainly not reasonable without knowing if there are supportable intervening circumstances and facts.",Party Submissions,20.814264,26.233774,22.050467
Walker has neither complied with this Court’s rules in seeking mandamus relief nor is he entitled to it on the merits. This Court should summarily deny the petition for at least three independent reasons.,Party Submissions,11.200684,10.842335,12.953764
Respondent’s interpretation of controlling precedent misses the mark while seeking to obscure the elephant in the room to their benefit.,Party Submissions,24.555464,21.410147,24.39159
"The opinion below not only undermines these authorities, but also directly contradicts decisions reached by other intermediate appellate courts on almost identical facts. See Cornejo, 446 S.W.3d at 125; McKellar, 367 S.W.3d at 486.",Party Submissions,7.370842,7.8329306,8.099974
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Cadastre, in accordance with the applicable regulations.287 In other words, the requested documents are ""in public domain, and are equally and effectively available to both parties"".288 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Cadastre in order to obtain documents in question.289 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents, so it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants already obtained decisions based on which the City of Belgrade was inscribed in the Cadastre as the user/owner of certain Objects on Dunavska Plots (exhibits C-165 and C-166), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek. B, U : The request is overly broad and unduly burdensome as Claimants failed to specify a narrow and specific category of requested documents. Respondent cannot reasonably be requested to identify and locate “any and all documents referred to on page 14 (pdf) of exhibit R -052”, instead of Claimants.",Legal Decisions,13.297866,13.088206,13.830322
"In July of 2019, twenty-year-old Bruno succumbed to injuries caused by heat stroke sustained while working on a construction site overseen by subcontractor Hellas Construction, Inc. Whether Bruno was a Hellas employee at the time of injury is the crux of the litigation in the two courts below. Whether DWC had jurisdiction to decide that issue is the [*3] question before this Court.",Party Submissions,11.282394,10.611547,12.521841
"In addition, Morris v. Kohls-York, 164 SW3d 686 (Tex. App. -Austin, 2005, rev. dism’d) notes that “Corporate agents are individually liable for fraudulent or tortious acts committed while in the service of their corporation.” At 695.",Party Submissions,9.692028,9.425374,10.354529
"Justice John Devine, the Real Party in Interest, filed an application for a place on the 2024 Republican General Primary Ballot, seeking the office of Justice, Texas Supreme Court, Place 4. Ex.C.1 Justice Devine filed his application on November 14, 2023. Ex.C. Pursuant to Tex. Elec. Code §141.035, the application was immediately available to the public. Respondent Matt Rinaldi, the Chairman of the Republican Party of Texas, accepted Justice Devine’s application on December 1, 2023. Ex C. Accordingly, Chairman Rinaldi also certified to the Texas Secretary of State that Justice Devine should appear on the ballot for the election. Ex.C. Relator filed an application for the same office on December 4, 2023. Ex.B.",Party Submissions,4.6810155,5.329191,5.2168736
"The Tribunal considers however that a provisional measure of the type requested by the Claimant, concerning the VAT refunds to which PEM is entitled, in order not to aggravate the dispute and to maintain the status quo, cannot cover actions by the Respondent that predate the relevant request (4 January 2023).53 63. As a result, the Tribunal only granted the Claimant access to future VAT refunds not because prior VAT refunds were measures already contested in the First Arbitration but because the type of provisional measure requested cannot cover actions by the Respondent that predate the relevant request .",Party Submissions,11.230093,11.052884,11.597925
"Second, this Court has never held that a breach of a contractual duty alone qualifies a person as an RTP in a tort case. Conceptually, logically, and legally a breach of contract by itself does not support a tort claim and does not cause damages in tort. As discussed below, for a breach of contract to be actionable in tort, a tort must accompany the breach.",Party Submissions,8.288793,8.737355,10.199122
"To ensure that women seeking an abortion are informed of the medical risks associated with the abortion procedure and the major developmental characteristics of the unborn child, before giving their informed consent to receive an abortion.",Legislation,6.928382,7.7015657,7.4141345
"Lease J thus ended up in both cases: in the Hooks case for the Hooks’ royalty interest, and in this Bordages case for the J.J. Johns Trust’s non-participating royalty interest. Also, the executive rights holder for the a portion of the J.J. Johns Trust’s NPRI was in the Hooks case. But the same Lease J has been in both cases.",Party Submissions,18.270313,22.806654,19.848448
"PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain these documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (which prepared exhibit R-101), in accordance with the applicable regulations.88 In other words, the requested documents are ""in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties"".89 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.90 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek.",Legal Decisions,11.950609,13.162484,13.1545315
"Further, Dr. Tappan relies heavily on the “Oxytocin Infusion Protocol for BSA Women’s Center” (the “Infusion Protocol”). (CR.793-94) These repeated references are confusing because the report does not explain what the Infusion Protocol was, who it applied to, when it applied, or what it called for. Moreover, reference to the outside document is impermissible because it is outside the four corners of the report. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878.",Party Submissions,11.393693,12.896126,13.368909
"During relevant times, Moody was a workers' compensation subscriber. However, Douglas did not timely file a workers' compensation claim. Instead, she filed this negligence suit against Moody. Nevertheless, the issue of whether Douglas sustained a compensable injury became the subject of a workers' compensation proceeding. 1 The trial court abated this suit because the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission (""the Commission"") had not issued its final determination. A Commission hearing officer decided Douglas was injured in the course and scope of her employment, but she was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because she failed to timely file a claim. A Commission appeals panel affirmed this decision. 2 Subsequently, the trial court reinstated this suit.",Party Submissions,5.374928,5.7525043,5.967017
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that public health authorities and tobacco control advocates should encourage American innovation and embrace harm reduction as part of the comprehensive United States approach to tobacco control.,Legislation,15.335952,7.5684824,15.39008
"For the avoidance of any doubt, Claimants also reiterate their general objection to production of any documents covered by privilege under the legal or ethical rules.",Legal Decisions,15.151161,16.802433,21.443403
"Respondents also emphasize that both Westwood and the tenant in Kemp complained they had suffered “mistreatment” from their landlords that occurred in the aftermath of losing a forcible entry and detainer action in a justice of the peace court—and yet the tenant in Kemp could not maintain a constructive-eviction claim in district court. (Resp. 30) But the result in Kemp did not flow from any hard-and-fast rule that constructive-eviction claims are categorically unavailable to the evicted tenant, that compliance with an eviction order conclusively establishes “voluntary abandonment” or disproves damages, or that “testimony” about “perceived mistreatment” simply “doesn’t matter” in a constructive eviction action. ( Id .) Instead, the tenant’s claim failed simply because of the absence of causation: She could not carry her burden of establishing “that the premises was abandoned because of the complained-of condition.” (Resp. 23, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *3) (emphasis in original) Specifically, the tenant had no “evidence demonstrat[ing]” that she “abandoned the property as a direct consequence of the [landlord’s] triggering acts” because she merely “vacated only after being lawfully evicted.” (Id. 24, 34, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *4) That is why the tenant’s admission that she “moved out of the premises” immediately after the “writ of possession was issued”—rather than after any supposed acts of interference by the landlord—was considered dispositive. (Resp. 29, quoting Kemp, 2020 WL 205313, at *3), But none of that can be said about Westwood, because the record here is replete with evidence that Westwood decided to leave only because of Respondents’ repeated wrongful acts, and did not merely abandon the property after receiving an eviction order.",Party Submissions,6.5152946,6.7975683,6.68696
The United States objects to Request No. 1.d for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.,Legal Decisions,8.430825,12.370636,13.937416
Eligibility and Participation. An Eligible Employee becomes a Participant upon the earlier to occur of: (i) a credit of Company Contributions under Article V; or (ii) notification of eligibility to participate by the Committee or its authorized representative.,Contract,8.307238,7.7331076,12.313209
Request No. 5 also fails to comply with Article 3.3(a)(ii) of the IBA Rules because Claimants have offered no basis to believe that there exist any documents discussing the KXL Pipeline in the context of the USMCA negotiations.,Legal Decisions,14.79491,14.850016,17.170435
"In this subtitle: (1) “Adjuster” means a person licensed under Chapter 4101, Insurance Code. (2) “Administrative violation” means a violation of this subtitle, a rule adopted under this subtitle, or an order or decision of the commissioner that is subject to penalties and sanctions as provided by this subtitle. (3) “Agreement” means the resolution by the parties to a dispute under this subtitle of one or more issues regarding an injury, death, coverage, compensability, or compensation. The term does not include a settlement. (4) “Alien” means a person who is not a citizen of the United States. (5) “Benefit” means a medical benefit, an income benefit, a death benefit, or a burial benefit based on a compensable injury. (5-a) “Case management” means a collaborative process of assessment, planning, facilitation, and advocacy for options and services to meet an individual’s health needs through communication and application of available resources to promote quality, cost-effective outcomes. (6) “Certified self-insurer” means a private employer granted a certificate of authority to self-insure, as authorized by this subtitle, for the payment of compensation. (7) “Child” means a son or daughter. The term includes an adopted child or a stepchild who is a dependent of the employee. (8) “Commissioner” means the commissioner of workers’ compensation. (9) “Commute” means to pay in a lump sum.",Party Submissions,3.5391808,3.4241035,3.2938082
"In 1977, this Court again was confronted with an issue over the characterization of retirement benefits. Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.",Party Submissions,6.622967,9.307981,9.23363
"Certificates of historical changes contain certain data about land plots since their registration in the Real Estate Cadaster, including ownership changes, the date when the registration in the Cadaster was made, any changes in the surface and borders of the land plots, etc. The requested documents represent certificates of historical changes for all land plots constituting Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. As such, the requested documents are relevant and material to assess the historical development of rights to individual land plots registered in the Cadaster, as well as reasons for registration of such rights.",Legal Decisions,12.27399,13.261393,12.294482
"What Oncor is proposing is that a court may look behind the appraisal roll to start altering aspects of the appraisal process. Looking behind the appraisal roll to pick apart aspects of the appraisal is not the purpose of a § 25.25(c)(3) motion and has been specifically rejected by courts in similar circumstances. Bauer–Pileco, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 443 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).",Party Submissions,6.8283925,6.744742,7.815137
"Petitioner claims support for the concept that Respondent could not “revive its rights” by “purporting to accelerate” the loan, and cites to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Express Limousines, Inc., No. 03-21-00266-CV, 2022 WL 3048235, at *3 (Tex.App.-Auston Aug. 3, 2022, no pet.)(mem.op.). But Petitioner artfully leaves out key portions of the entire quote: “ Even in the context of a note payable in installments secured by a deed of trust, which was the type of instrument at issue in Holy Cross, acceleration is not relevant once the note has matured under its own terms. If the note has matured, the limitations period commences at that time, and the creditor may not revive its rights to foreclose by purporting to accelerate a note that has already matured.",Party Submissions,6.236258,6.7813387,6.3364096
"Barina attempts to deflect the issue, by engaging instead in a discussion of this Court’s decision in Rosenthal—which she claims precisely addresses the issues before this Court. E.g., Resp. Br. at viii (citing D Mag. Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. 2017)). Barina’s argument is not only wrong, but it further emphasizes why this Court’s review is necessary.",Party Submissions,9.022953,10.20587,9.400211
"For the avoidance of any doubt, Claimants reiterate their general objection to production of any documents covered by privilege under the legal or ethical rules.",Legal Decisions,15.440399,16.272959,20.018091
"Acceleration of or Delay in Payments. The Committee, in its sole and absolute discretion, may elect to accelerate the time or form of payment of a benefit owed to the Participant hereunder, provided such acceleration is permitted under Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-3(j)(4). The Committee may also, in its sole and absolute discretion, delay the time for payment of a benefit owed to the Participant hereunder, to the extent permitted under Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-2(b)(7). If the Plan receives a domestic relations order (within the meaning of Code Section 414(p)(1)(B)) directing that all or a portion of a Participant’s Accounts be paid to an “alternate payee,” any amounts to be paid to the alternate payee(s) shall be paid in a single lump sum.",Contract,3.1239944,3.4008737,3.4144154
"Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 361 (Tex. 2019) (“We are not blind to the truism that, ‘ just as immunity is inherent to sovereignty, unfairness is inherent to immunity. ’” (quoting City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 480 n.38 (Tex. 2007) (Willett, J., dissenting))); Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126, 160 (Tex. 2010) (Willett, J. concurring) (“As litigants often discover, in the Legislature a deal is sometimes a raw deal.”). The TTCA has been routinely criticized by jurists for its difficult application and arbitrary outcomes. See Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 386–87 (collecting cases calling on the Legislature to amend the TTCA); Robinson, 780 S.W.2d at 175 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (“ I confess that not all the consequences of construing ‘use’ to exclude ‘non -use’ seem entirely sensible. ”). Nevertheless, until the Legislature sees fit to redraw those lines, we are duty bound “to interpret and apply the statute as written.” Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 387 (quoting Abutahoun v. Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d 42, 49 (Tex. 2015)). Because the circumstances of this case do not fall within the TTCA’s limited waiver of immunity, the trial court erred in denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction .",Party Submissions,4.6839604,4.67117,4.985478
The reasons for such conclusion and the measures taken as a result of it shall be communicated to the Commission in the report pursuant to Article 9.,Legislation,9.225491,13.17551,12.668775
"Foremost, Oncor ignores the explicit language of § 1.111(e)(2) which makes such agreements final with regard to any matter “which may be corrected under § 25.25.” The statute is not specific to § 25.25(c-1) or (d), it simply refers to § 25.25, which presumably encompasses all sub-sections of § 25.25. And, of course, cases such as Houston Cement have held that § 25.25(c) motions are precluded by a § 1.111(e) agreement.",Party Submissions,8.255683,8.487598,9.111052
"Joint Agreed Motion For Transfer To Pretrial Court And Immediate Stay, filed on December 21, 2021; c. All tag-along cases. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.2 (g). 3. The “Designation of Parties To Serve Request For Transfers And Other Notices On Other Parties In Rule 13 Proceeding” (Designation) signed by the Clerk of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation applies to proceedings before this panel and is not terminated by this order. The Designation does not limit the authority of the Pretrial Judge to designate party representatives in a Pretrial Court.",Party Submissions,10.549547,12.28468,13.073991
"The Tribunal may, if it deems it necessary at any stage of the proceeding, call upon the parties to produce documents, witnesses and experts.",Legal Decisions,5.750584,6.1301727,6.344174
"This letter shall serve to confirm that the Parties have mutually agreed to terminate the Agreement effective as of November 1, 2023. Please confirm your agreement to the foregoing by signing where indicated below.",Contract,4.4801226,6.106942,6.0575156
"In November of 2000, the carrier filed suit in the 114th Judicial District Court of Smith County, Texas, seeking judicial review *837 of the appeals panel decision. The Gaonas also challenged the appeals panel decision in the Smith County suit, but, alternatively, requested affirmance and death benefits should the court find Reynaldo's death compensable. Pursuant to a motion by the Gaonas, the Smith County court abated its suit. The Smith County court has also granted several continuances. 4 Thus, the Smith County suit has not yet been tried.",Party Submissions,8.449807,10.737286,10.344963
"The Walkers attempt to conjure a conflict where there is none by citing cases where obstetricians had experience in diagnosing the cause of injury in babies. Each of those cases was decided on fact-specific details found in the respective reports and CVs. In each, the expert explained their knowledge and experience to support causation testimony. For example, the expert in Livingston v. Montgomery, had stated “knowledge and expertise to recognize the perinatal progression of hypoxia due to inadequate oxygenation through a compromised uteroplacental unit. . .[and] on the subject of hypoxia as it relates to the associated build up of carbon dioxide. .. that complicates ischemia. . .” 279 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.); see also Cornejo, 446 S.W.3d at 117 (experience or training in “the probable causes of. .. hypoxic-ischemic injuries in babies”); Abilene Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Allen, 387 S.W.3d 914, 922-23 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (experience in infant neurological injuries); see also Monga v. Perez, No. 14-16-00961-CV, 2018 WL 505263, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 23, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (expert had many years’ experience with perinatology and maternal-fetal medicine was qualified to opine as to shoulder dystocia that can occur during delivery). Dr. Tappan has no such qualifications, and his causation opinions, such as they are, should not be credited.",Party Submissions,6.2477565,6.1713166,6.629047
"Respondents fare even worse in trying to distinguish Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2013). Respondents’ focus on statements from Coinmach that have no bearing on this case — such as that a tenant who “defeats an eviction suit can s till be liable for trespass” (Resp. 40) — cannot change Coinmach’s holding that a tenant who loses a forcible entry and detainer action and gets evicted can still seek damages for wrongful eviction in district court. Respondents are forced to admit, ( id. ), that Coinmach properly drew support for that holding from Johnson v. Highland Hills Drive Apartments, 552 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. — Dallas 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.), which had previously adopted the same rule. See Coinmach, 417 S.W.3d at 919. Respondents are also forced to admit that this rule has been followed in numerous other cases. (Resp. 41) And because that is the rule, Respondents cannot explain how the court of appeals’ decision can survive.",Party Submissions,5.520664,6.1593113,5.972218
"Without Written Notice by April 1 -If L M O does not give H A O written notice by April 1 of a year specifying an extended period or periods of summer possession for that year, L M O shall have possession of the child for thirty consecutive days in that year beginning at 6:00 p.m. on July 1 and ending at 6:00 p.m. on July 31.",Party Submissions,9.299238,12.173172,11.560762
The judgment alone establishes existence of the easement. But there is more. The City’s 1992 annexation ordinance identified the easement.,Party Submissions,14.649505,24.539896,18.151321
"COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS This document complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains 9,543 words, excluding any parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).",Party Submissions,3.117754,3.826072,4.5643935
"For the above reasons, Claimant respectfully requests the Tribunal to order Respondent to produce the documents requested here Request No. 14: The Request is denied. The Claimant is requesting access to documents mostly prepared by the Claimant himself and relating in whole or in part to the encounter organized by the Claimant between Qatar representative Dr Ali bin Smikh Al Marri and Mr. Etienne Schneider, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy of Luxembourg in May 2019 regarding the negotiations in the field of telecommunications. Such documents are not material to assess the Claimant’s investment in Qatar for the purpose of preparing his forthcoming Memorial, nor are they relevant as an input for a quantum expert evaluating such investment before any submissions have been exchanged on the merits of the instant case, as this is argued in the Claimant’s rubric on the “Relevance and Materiality according to the Requesting Party”.",Legal Decisions,13.4714365,12.580451,13.599537
"Although there is no‘statute specically authorizing an award of attomey’s fees in adivorce proceeding, the trial court may within its sound .discretion award attorney’s fees: See Mandell v. Mandel], 310 S..W.3d 53l, 541 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied); see..alsb C.A.S., 405 S.W-.3d at386. Ari attorney’s fee is but another element for the court torconsider in dividing the marital estate. Mandel], - 310 S.W.3d at 541. That is, in adivorce suit, the trial court has the equitable power to award either spouse attorney’s fees as apart of the just and right division of the marital estate. See, e.g., Mur’v. Murff, 615 S.W.Zd’696', 699 (Tex. 19.81).",Party Submissions,9.451407,9.137659,9.084292
"The Development program is a document issued by the Urban Institute of Belgrade, which offers general information concerning the plan's adoption, such as conditions, deadlines and/or budgeting for its development. This document is an annex and an integral part of Decision No. 350-5/06-c, in accordance with Article 11 of the aforementioned decision.113 The requested document is relevant and material to assess which inputs the City of Belgrade took into consideration when preparing the 2013 DRP —including whether Serbia considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 and if so, the City of Belgrade’s contemporaneous understanding of the extent of these rights.",Legal Decisions,16.036552,17.240786,17.77354
Compensation/Employers Liability policies shall contain endorsements waiving all rights of subrogation in favor of McCarthy and the Owner together with any other entities required by the Contract Documents where allowable by law.,Party Submissions,12.217707,16.380775,16.76542
"Enacted by Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959 (S.B. 797), § 1, effective September 1, 1985; am. Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 2 (S.B. 5), § 2.09, effective September 2, 1987; am. Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 136 (S.B. 28), § 1, effective September 1, 1995; am. Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 204 (H.B. 4), §§ 4.07, 4.10(5), effective September 1, 2003; am. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 593 (H.B. 8), § 3.02, effective September 1, 2007; Acts 2021, 87th Leg., ch. 221 (H.B. 375), § 2.02, effective September 1, 2021; Acts 2021, 87th Leg., ch. 837 (S.B. 109), § 4, effective September 1, 2021.",Party Submissions,1.9180729,2.0803583,1.9836333