Duruo/forecastbench-single_question huggingface dataset:
Question: Before 1 January 2025, will Iran announce that it will leave the JCPOA ("Iran nuclear deal")?
Background: 
    The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”, or “Iran nuclear deal”) is an agreement signed in 2015 by Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council–China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States–plus Germany) that lifted sanctions on Iran in exchange for limits on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program (<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal" target="_blank">CFR</a>). 
    
  <div><br></div><div>After the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed sanctions, Iran breached multiple limits set by the agreement (<a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/restoring-jcpoas-nuclear-limits" target="_blank">Arms Control Association</a>). The assassination of Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds force, prompted Iran to further reduce compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA (<a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793814276/iran-abandons-nuclear-deal-limitations-in-wake-of-soleimani-killing" target="_blank">NPR</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/05/iran-abandons-nuclear-deal-killing-soleimani-094197" target="_blank">Politico</a>). While Iran has not officially withdrawn from the JCPOA, it has stopped the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments and significantly limited monitoring of its nuclear-related facilities (<a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/23/06/gov2023-24.pdf" target="_blank">IAEA GOV/2023/24</a>). The United States and Iran had been in discussions to restore both parties to full compliance with the deal, but negotiations appear to have stalled (<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/20/what-exactly-happened-to-the-iran-nuclear-deal" target="_blank">Al Jazeera</a>, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/blinken-says-no-nuclear-deal-on-table-with-iran/7158920.html" target="_blank">VOA</a>).</div><div><br></div><div><b>Resolution Criteria: </b></div><div> This question will be resolved using news media reports and announcements from the Iranian government that Iran is withdrawing from the JCPOA. The announcement must be made on or before 31 December 2024 and indicate that Iran is leaving the JCPOA, not just ignoring limits or commitments under the deal. Leaving the JCPOA as part of signing a new nuclear deal with countries party to the JCPOA will <b>not</b> count towards resolution.</div><div><br></div><div><i>This question is part of the issue decomposition on “Iran's Nuclear Progress.” For more, see <a href="https://www.infer-pub.com/the-pub/forecasting-iran-nuclear-development" target="_blank">INFER's explainer</a>, <a href="https://www.infer-pub.com/archive" target="_blank">issue reports</a>, and <a href="https://www.infer-pub.com/challenges/53-iran-threats-influence?tags=Iran%20Nuclear%20Program" target="_blank">other questions in this decomposition</a>.</i></div>
  
Source: infer
Resolved outcome (1 = yes, 0 = no): 0
Question: By 31 December 2024, will uranium enriched to 90% or more be discovered in an Iranian facility, according to the IAEA?
Background: 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    <p>Uranium is typically enriched to 90% U-235 or higher (commonly called "weapon-grade uranium") for use in nuclear weapons (<a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/uranium-enrichment-for-peace-or-for-weapons/" target="_blank">Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation</a>, <a href="https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/weapon-materials-basics" target="_blank">Union of Concerned Scientists</a>). Iran promised to curtail uranium enrichment to less than 4% as part of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (i.e., the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” or “JCPOA”), but it stepped back from these commitments in retaliation for attacks on Iranian leaders and the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement (<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal" target="_blank">Council on Foreign Relations</a>, <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/may/03/timeline-iran%E2%80%99s-nuclear-program-2018" target="_blank">U.S. Institute of Peace</a>). Following the U.S.' withdrawal, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, the European Union, and Iran remained participants in the JCPOA. </p><p>Although Iran has increasingly limited monitoring and verification of its nuclear program, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to report on its JCPOA commitments (<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/exclusive-iran-restricts-iaea-access-main-enrichment-plant-after-attack-2021-07-01/" target="_blank">Reuters</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/10/un-agency-iran-nuclear-probe-00066350" target="_blank">Politico</a>). In February of 2023, it reported that it had found particles containing up to 83.7% enriched uranium (<a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/23/03/gov2023-8.pdf" target="_blank">IAEA</a>, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-enriching-uranium-weapons-grade-nuclear-iaea-rcna72753" target="_blank">NBC</a>).
    
  </p><div><br></div><div><b>Resolution Criteria: </b></div><div>The question will be resolved based on IAEA reports about Iran’s nuclear program, which are posted <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-board-reports" target="_blank">here</a>. The IAEA report must indicate that the IAEA found uranium particles containing 90% or more U-235 at an Iranian nuclear facility.  </div><p></p><div><i>This question is part of the issue decomposition on “Iran's Nuclear Progress.” For more, see <a href="https://www.infer-pub.com/the-pub/forecasting-iran-nuclear-development" target="_blank">INFER's explainer</a>, <a href="https://www.infer-pub.com/archive" target="_blank">issue reports</a>, and <a href="https://www.infer-pub.com/challenges/53-iran-threats-influence?tags=Iran%20Nuclear%20Program" target="_blank">other questions in this decomposition</a>.</i></div>
  
  
Source: infer
Resolved outcome (1 = yes, 0 = no): 0
Question: Will the Houthi movement and Yemen reach a ceasefire that is in effect on 31 December 2024 and lasts at least six months?
Background: 
    The internationally-recognized government of Yemen has been engaged in conflict with rebels from the Houthi movement since 2014 (<a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen" target="_blank">CFR</a>). The government of Yemen is supported by a Saudi-backed military coalition, while the Houthi movement has close ties to Iran and Hezbollah (<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis" target="_blank">CFR</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/" target="_blank">Brookings</a>). 
    
  <div><br></div><div>In April 2022, the United Nations negotiated a ceasefire between the Houthi movement and the Yemeni government (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/02/world/middleeast/yemen-cease-fire.html" target="_blank">New York Times</a>). The ceasefire was originally intended to last two months, but was extended twice before being allowed to lapse in October 2022 (<a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/can-the-third-time-be-the-charm-for-yemen-6125/" target="_blank">IPS Journal</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-houthis-after-the-yemeni-cease-fire/" target="_blank">Brookings</a>). Following Hamas’ October 2023 attack, there are now concerns that the war between Hamas and Israel could push the Houthis closer to Iran and away from a new ceasefire agreement with the Saudi-backed government of Yemen (<a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/why-hamas-israel-war-can-be-a-turning-point-for-yemens-houthis-149895" target="_blank">ISPI</a>).</div><div><br></div><div><b>Resolution Criteria:  </b></div><div>This question will be resolved using credible, open source reports that Yemen and the Houthi movement have signed a ceasefire. For the question to resolve “yes”, the ceasefire must be signed on or before 31 December 2024, last at least six months, and still be in effect on 31 December 2024. If a ceasefire is agreed upon, this question will be resolved either on 1 January 2025 or six months after the agreement is reached, whichever is later. A ceasefire originally intended to last less than six months but is extended to last longer than six months and lasts through the end of 2024 will still count towards resolution. </div><div><br></div><div><i>This question is part of the issue decomposition on “Iran's Influence on Violent Non-State Actors.” For more, see <a href="https://www.infer-pub.com/the-pub/iran-influence-vnsa" target="_blank">INFER's explainer</a>, <a href="https://www.infer-pub.com/archive" target="_blank">issue reports</a>, and <a href="https://www.infer-pub.com/challenges/53-iran-threats-influence?tags=Iran%20Influence%20on%20VNSAs" target="_blank">other questions in this decomposition</a>.</i></div>
  
Source: infer
Resolved outcome (1 = yes, 0 = no): 0
Question: Will the China Coast Guard or PLA Navy attempt to anchor one or more of their vessels on or near one of the disputed maritime features in the South China Sea before 1 January 2025?
Background: 
    The South China Sea is one of the most geopolitically contentious regions in the world, with overlapping territorial claims from several nations, including China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and Vietnam (<a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea" target="_blank">CFR</a>). The various islands, reefs, and shoals in the South China Sea (such as the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal) are valuable not only for their strategic military positioning but also for their potential economic benefits, particularly in terms of fishing rights, undersea natural resources, and control of vital maritime trade routes (<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349" target="_blank">BBC</a>, <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/maritime-chessboard-the-geopolitical-dynamics-of-the-south-china-sea/" target="_blank">Geopolitical Monitor</a>). China has been especially assertive in the region, using both official Coast Guard and Navy ships, as well as unofficial maritime militias, to enforce its claims and confront other nations’ ships in the South China Sea (<a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-philippines-us-sea-clash-d08f4532c2a66047c6fa2833b76d7773" target="_blank">AP News</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/13/china-maritime-militia-explainer-south-china-sea-scarborough-shoal" target="_blank">The Guardian</a>).
    
  <div><br></div><div><b>Resolution Criteria: </b></div><div>This question will be resolved as “Yes” if open-source news reports, official statements from the Chinese government, or statements from governments that also dispute the maritime features (such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, or Taiwan) indicate that the China Coast Guard or People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has attempted to anchor one or more of their vessels on or near one of the disputed maritime features in the South China Sea before 1 January 2025. Attempts by unofficial or quasi-official Chinese ships (i.e., China’s “maritime militia”) will not count toward resolution.</div><div><br></div><div>An “attempt to anchor” is defined as any clear action to position or moor a vessel at or near the disputed maritime features in the South China Sea, even if such an attempt is disrupted or unsuccessful. Routine patrols or transits that do not involve an effort to anchor will not count toward resolution.</div><div><br></div><div>Disputed features in the South China Sea include, but are not limited to, the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal (<a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10607" target="_blank">Congressional Research Service</a>).</div>
  
Source: infer
Resolved outcome (1 = yes, 0 = no): 0
Question: Will the Syrian Democratic Forces collapse, fragment, or lose control over key territories, specifically Manbij, Raqqa, or Deir ez-Zor, before 1 October 2026?
Background: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a multi-ethnic coalition primarily composed of Kurdish fighters, established in 2015 with U.S. support to combat ISIS. The SDF has maintained control over key regions in northeastern Syria, including Manbij, Raqqa, and parts of Deir ez-Zor. 
    
  <div><br></div><div>However, the SDF faces numerous challenges that threaten its stability and territorial integrity. In recent years, the SDF has dealt with increasing pressure from various fronts, including Turkish military operations aimed at curbing Kurdish autonomy, ongoing conflicts with remnants of ISIS, and tensions with the Syrian government. The SDF's governance model has been challenged by internal strife, particularly in areas with significant Arab populations, which have led to clashes and accusations of marginalization (<a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/mena-armed-groups/syrian-democratic-forces-syria/" target="_blank">ECFR</a>).</div><div><br></div><div>Recent reports indicate that fighting erupted between the SDF and Arab tribal groups in Deir ez-Zor after the SDF apprehended a local leader, resulting in casualties and displacement (<a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-10/syria-60.php" target="_blank">Security Council Report</a>). Additionally, as U.S. support has waned under changing political administrations, the SDF's vulnerability to external threats has increased (<a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war" target="_blank">CFR</a>). Given these factors, there is growing concern about the SDF's ability to maintain control over its territories amidst external pressures and internal divisions.</div><div><br></div><div><b>Resolution Criteria:</b></div><div>This question will resolve as "Yes" if credible news sources or international organizations report the SDF has experienced any of the following:</div><ul>
<li>
<b>Collapsed: </b>This would be evidenced by reports from SDF leadership that the SDF has disbanded or that they can no longer function as a cohesive military or administrative entity.</li>
<li>
<b>Fragmented: </b>This would be evidenced by reports of significant divisions within the SDF leading to splinter groups that operate independently or engage in conflict with each other.</li>
<li>
<b>Lost Control Over Key Territories: </b>Reports need to indicate that Manbij, Raqqa, or Deir ez-Zor are no longer under effective SDF governance. Indicators of loss of control may include significant armed conflict resulting in the SDF being unable to maintain security or governance in these areas; withdrawal of SDF forces due to overwhelming opposition; and the emergence of rival administrations or armed groups asserting control over these territories, leading to a breakdown in SDF-led governance structures. </li>
</ul><div><br></div><div>The question will resolve as "No" if none of these events occur before 1 October 2026.</div><div><br></div>
Source: infer
Resolved outcome (1 = yes, 0 = no): 1
Question: Will Huawei sell or announce plans to sell Open RAN equipment before 1 January 2027?
Background: 
    
    
  
    Open RAN is an effort to push the mobile network industry away from vendor lock-in and towards interoperability, i.e., to allow mobile networks to use equipment from multiple companies instead of having to buy a completely proprietary solution from only one vendor (<a href="https://www.networkworld.com/article/970200/what-is-open-ran.html" target="_blank">Network World</a>, <a href="https://www.juniper.net/us/en/research-topics/what-is-open-ran.html" target="_blank">Juniper Networks</a>). Huawei, the world’s leading 5G equipment manufacturer, has expressed skepticism towards Open RAN efforts in the past (<a href="https://www.lightreading.com/open-ran/huawei-gives-another-thumbs-down-to-open-ran-or-so-it-says" target="_blank">Light Reading</a>, <a href="https://strandconsult.dk/does-huawei-not-believe-in-open-ran-or-is-just-playing-poker-with-the-o-ran-alliance-and-policymakers/" target="_blank">Strand Consult</a>). In February 2024, Huawei dismissed speculation that plans to support Open RAN were forthcoming (<a href="https://www.telecomtv.com/content/open-ran/huawei-denies-open-ran-support-speculation-49795/" target="_blank">Telecom TV</a>). 
    
  <div><br></div><div><b>Resolution Criteria: </b></div><div>This question will be resolved as “Yes” if Huawei sells or announces a commercial Open RAN equipment offering before 1 January 2027. Announcements about research plans or trials of Open RAN equipment will not count.</div>
  
  
Source: infer
Resolved outcome (1 = yes, 0 = no): 0
Question: By 31 December 2024, will Microsoft announce that its AI Research Lab in China is closing or being relocated?
Background: 
    <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/lab/microsoft-research-asia/overview/" target="_blank">Microsoft Research Lab Asia</a> (MSR Asia), is the division of Microsoft Research based in China and focuses its research on artificial intelligence, computer vision, and other critical technologies. In June 2023, the Financial Times reported that Microsoft was moving some of its top AI experts from MSR Asia to a new research lab in Vancouver that would be organizationally aligned with MSR Asia (<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d21d2f85-7531-4536-bcce-8ca38620fe55" target="_blank">Financial Times</a>). This followed a decision in May by Microsoft-owned LinkedIn to shut down InCareer, the stripped-down version of the LinkedIn app that remained in China after LinkedIn decided to pull out of the country in 2021 (<a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/linkedin-cut-716-jobs-phase-out-china-local-jobs-app-2023-05-09/" target="_blank">Reuters</a>). However, Peter Lee, the head of Microsoft Research, has denied claims that Microsoft is planning to close their lab in China saying, “There has been no discussion or advocacy to close Microsoft Research Asia, and we look forward to continuing our research agenda” (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/10/technology/microsoft-china-ai-lab.html" target="_blank">New York Times</a>).
    
  <div><br></div><div><b>Resolution Criteria:  </b></div><div>This question will be resolved as "Yes" if Microsoft announces in a press release, statement by Microsoft executives, or other official communication that it is closing Microsoft Research Asia or moving the research lab to another country. The announcement must be made on or before 31 December 2024, but the closure or relocation does not need to be effected by that date. The relocation of some MSR Asia staff without the closing of offices or cessation of operations in China will not be sufficient for resolution.</div><div><br></div>
  
Source: infer
Resolved outcome (1 = yes, 0 = no): 0
Question: Will at least five more exoplanets be found to be potentially habitable between 1 February 2024 and 31 December 2024?
Background: 
    
    
    <p>Many building blocks are needed to support life, including water, carbon dioxide, methane, ammonia, and hydrogen gas (<a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/life-sparking-gas-strengthens-evidence-that-enceladus-a-moon-of-saturn-could-be-habitable-180983445/" target="_blank">Smithsonian Magazine</a>). To be considered “potentially habitable”, a planet must be up to 2.5 times the size of the Earth or up to 10 times Earth’s mass and orbit the right distance from its star for liquid water to possibly be present (<a href="https://phl.upr.edu/hwc" target="_blank">Planetary Habitability Laboratory</a>).
    
  </p><div><br></div><div><b>Resolution Criteria:  </b></div><div>As of 1 February 2024, the <a href="https://phl.upr.edu/hwc" target="_blank">Habitable Worlds Catalog</a> identified 69 potentially habitable worlds out of over five thousand known exoplanets, with five of them added to the list in 2023. This question will be resolved as “Yes” if the Habitable Worlds Catalog adds 5 or more new potentially habitable worlds to the list (i.e., the sum of their conservative and optimistic samples) discovered on or before 31 December 2024.</div>
  
  
  
Source: infer
Resolved outcome (1 = yes, 0 = no): 0
Question: Will a North American testing center (OTIC) issue an O-RAN Certificate between 1 April 2024 and 31 March 2025?
Background: 
    
    
    The <a href="https://www.o-ran.org/about" target="_blank">O-RAN Alliance</a> (O-RAN) is an organization that creates standards for telecommunication technology to ensure that mobile network telecommunications equipment operate within an open architecture and are interoperable between vendors. One way that manufacturers can show that a product complies with O-RAN standards is by obtaining an <a href="https://www.o-ran.org/testing-integration#certification-badging-program" target="_blank">O-RAN Certificate</a> from one of O-RAN’s Open Testing and Integration Centres (OTIC). In August 2023, O-RAN announced the opening of four new OTICs in the U.S. (<a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20230817436719/en/O-RAN-ALLIANCE-Welcomes-Four-New-OTICs-In-North-America" target="_blank">Business Wire</a>). However, no companies have received certificates from an OTIC in the U.S. to date.<br><div><br></div><div><b>Resolution Criteria:  </b></div><div>This question will be resolved using the <a href="https://www.o-ran.org/testing-integration#certification-badging-program" target="_blank">O-RAN Certification and Badging Catalogue</a>. To count towards resolution, the catalog entry must show the following:</div><ul>
<li>“Date of issued certificate” must be on or after 2024-04-01 and on or before 2025-03-31</li>
<li>“Type” must be “Certificate”</li>
<li>“OTIC name” must be any of the North American OTICs, which are listed <a href="https://www.o-ran.org/testing-integration#otics-list" target="_blank">here</a>
</li>
</ul><div>In the event that the question is not resolved before the question closes for forecasting, the INFER team will wait until late April to resolve this question to allow for delays in updating the catalog. Note that the question will be resolved as of the “Date of issued certificate” listed in the catalog.</div><div><br></div>
  
  
  
Source: infer
Resolved outcome (1 = yes, 0 = no): 0