Divyanshu67/squad_v2 huggingface dataset:
Charleston,_South_Carolina

After the defeat of the Confederacy, federal forces remained in Charleston during the city's reconstruction. The war had shattered the prosperity of the antebellum city. Freed slaves were faced with poverty and discrimination, but a large community of free people of color had been well-established in the city before the war and became the leaders of the postwar Republican Party and its legislators. Men who had been free people of color before the war comprised 26% of those elected to state and federal office in South Carolina from 1868 to 1876.

Question: What percentage of those elected from 1868 to 1876 were Freemen?
Answer: 26%

Question: Freeman became the leaders of what party in Charleston?
Answer: postwar Republican Party

Question: What else did freed slaves face in postwar Charleston besides discrimination?
Answer: poverty

Question: For what did the Federal forces remain in Charleston?
Answer: city's reconstruction

Question: Which side was defeated in the war before Reconstruction?
Answer: Confederacy

Question: What percentage of those elected from 1868 to 1886 were Freemen?

Question: Freeman never became the leaders of what party in Charleston?

Question: What else did freed slaves face in prewar Charleston besides discrimination?

Question: For what did the Federal forces leave Charleston?

Question: Which side was defeated in the war after Reconstruction?
The_Blitz

Between 7 September 1940 and 21 May 1941, 16 British cities suffered aerial raids with at least 100 long tons of high explosives. Over a period of 267 days, London was attacked 71 times, Birmingham, Liverpool and Plymouth eight times, Bristol six, Glasgow five, Southampton four, Portsmouth and Hull three and a minimum of one large raid on eight other cities. This was a result of a rapid escalation starting on 24 August 1940, when night bombers aiming for RAF airfields drifted off course and accidentally destroyed several London homes, killing civilians, combined with the UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill's retaliatory bombing of Berlin on the following night.[clarification needed]

Question: What was the beginning date of the aerial raids on Great Britain?
Answer: 7 September 1940

Question: How many days did the aerial raids on Great Britain last?
Answer: 267 days

Question: How many times was London attacked?
Answer: 71 times

Question: Who was the UK Prime Minster at the time of the aerial raids?
Answer: Winston Churchill

Question: What city did Winston Churchill bomb in retaliation for the killing of civilians? 
Answer: Berlin
The_Blitz

From 7 September 1940, one year into the war, London was bombed by the Luftwaffe for 57 consecutive nights. More than one million London houses were destroyed or damaged and more than 40,000 civilians were killed, almost half of them in London. Ports and industrial centres outside London were also attacked. The main Atlantic sea port of Liverpool was bombed, causing nearly 4,000 deaths within the Merseyside area during the war. The North Sea port of Hull, a convenient and easily found target or secondary target for bombers unable to locate their primary targets, was subjected to 86 raids in the Hull Blitz during the war, with a conservative estimate of 1,200 civilians killed and 95 percent of its housing stock destroyed or damaged. Other ports including Bristol, Cardiff, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton and Swansea were also bombed, as were the industrial cities of Birmingham, Belfast, Coventry, Glasgow, Manchester and Sheffield. Birmingham and Coventry were chosen because of the Spitfire and tank factories in Birmingham and the many munitions factories in Coventry. The city centre of Coventry was almost destroyed, as was Coventry Cathedral.

Question: How many nights did the Luftwaffe bomb London?
Answer: 57 consecutive nights

Question: What north sea port was the secondary target for bombers that could not find their primary target?
Answer: Sea port of Hull

Question: How many homes in London were destroyed in London?
Answer: More than one million

Question: How many people were killed in Liverpool?
Answer: nearly 4,000 deaths

Question: Which city centre was destroyed?
Answer: Coventry
The_Blitz

The bombing failed to demoralise the British into surrender or significantly damage the war economy. The eight months of bombing never seriously hampered British production and the war industries continued to operate and expand. The Blitz was only authorised when the Luftwaffe had failed to meet preconditions for a 1940 launch of Operation Sea Lion, the provisionally planned German invasion of Britain. By May 1941 the threat of an invasion of Britain had passed, and Hitler's attention had turned to Operation Barbarossa in the East. In comparison to the later Allied bombing campaign against Germany, the Blitz resulted in relatively few casualties; the British bombing of Hamburg in July 1943 inflicted some 42,000 civilian deaths, about the same as the entire Blitz.

Question: What was the name of the Luftwaffe plan to invade Britain?
Answer: Operation Sea Lion

Question: How many people died in the bombing of Hamburg?
Answer: 42,000

Question: What was the date of the bombing of Hamburg?
Answer: July 1943

Question: Who was the leader of the Luftwaffe? 
Answer: Hitler
The_Blitz

In the 1920s and 1930s, air power theorists Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell espoused the idea that air forces could win wars by themselves, without a need for land and sea fighting. It was thought there was no defence against air attack, particularly at night. Enemy industry, their seats of government, factories and communications could be destroyed, effectively taking away their means to resist. It was also thought the bombing of residential centres would cause a collapse of civilian will, which might have led to the collapse of production and civil life. Democracies, where the populace was allowed to show overt disapproval of the ruling government, were thought particularly vulnerable. This thinking was prevalent in both the RAF and what was then known as the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC) between the two world wars. RAF Bomber Command's policy in particular would attempt to achieve victory through the destruction of civilian will, communications and industry.

Question: In the 1920's and 30's to theorist thought wars could be won by air forces what were their names?
Answer: Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell

Question: Bombing of civilian's was believed to cause what?
Answer: collapse of civilian will

Question: What kind of populace was believed to be most vulnerable?
Answer: Democracies

Question: What does USAAC stand for?
Answer: United States Army Air Corps

Question: What kind of bombing raids were most favored?
Answer: night
The_Blitz

Within the Luftwaffe, there was a more muted view of strategic bombing. The OKL did not oppose the strategic bombardment of enemy industries and or cities, and believed it could greatly affect the balance of power on the battlefield in Germany's favour by disrupting production and damaging civilian morale, but they did not believe that air power alone could be decisive. Contrary to popular belief, the Luftwaffe did not have a systematic policy of what became known as "terror bombing". Evidence suggests that the Luftwaffe did not adopt an official bombing policy in which civilians became the primary target until 1942.

Question: Who believe air power alone would not be decisive?
Answer: Luftwaffe

Question: What was the name of the Luftwaffe's bombing raids?
Answer: terror bombing

Question: What year did the terror bombing policy become official?
Answer: 1942
The_Blitz

In 1936, Wever was killed in an air crash. The failure to implement his vision for the new Luftwaffe was largely attributable to his immediate successors. Ex-Army personnel Albert Kesselring and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff are usually blamed for the turning away from strategic planning and focusing on close air support. However, it would seem the two most prominent enthusiasts for the focus on ground-support operations (direct or indirect) were actually Hugo Sperrle and Hans Jeschonnek. These men were long-time professional airmen involved in German air services since early in their careers. The Luftwaffe was not pressured into ground support operations because of pressure from the army, or because it was led by ex-army personnel. It was instead a mission that suited the Luftwaffe's existing approach to warfare; a culture of joint inter-service operations, rather than independent strategic air campaigns.

Question: How did Wever die?
Answer: air crash

Question: What year did Wever die?
Answer: 1936

Question: Who took over for Wever after his death?
Answer: Albert Kesselring and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff

Question: What two men were the most important in ground support?
Answer: Hugo Sperrle and Hans Jeschonnek

Question: What long time careers were Sperrle and Jeschonnek involved in?
Answer: German air services
The_Blitz

Adolf Hitler failed to pay as much attention to bombing the enemy as he did to protection from enemy bombing, although he had promoted the development of a bomber force in the 1930s and understood that it was possible to use bombers for major strategic purposes. He told the OKL in 1939 that ruthless employment of the Luftwaffe against the heart of the British will to resist could and would follow when the moment was right; however, he quickly developed a lively scepticism toward strategic bombing, confirmed by the results of the Blitz. He frequently complained of the Luftwaffe's inability to damage industries sufficiently, saying, "The munitions industry cannot be interfered with effectively by air raids ... usually the prescribed targets are not hit".

Question: What year was the beginning of enemy bombing first promoted by Hitler?
Answer: 1930s

Question: Who had skepticism towards strategic bombing? 
Answer: Adolf Hitler

Question: Why did Hitler feel bombing wasn't working?
Answer: inability to damage industries

Question: In 1939 Hitler said bombing of Britain would begin when?
Answer: the moment was right

Question: Why did Hitler feel the Luftwaffe was unsuccessful in bombing raids?
Answer: prescribed targets are not hit
The_Blitz

Ultimately, Hitler was trapped within his own vision of bombing as a terror weapon, formed in the 1930s when he threatened smaller nations into accepting German rule rather than submit to air bombardment. This fact had important implications. It showed the extent to which Hitler personally mistook Allied strategy for one of morale breaking instead of one of economic warfare, with the collapse of morale as an additional bonus. Hitler was much more attracted to the political aspects of bombing. As the mere threat of it had produced diplomatic results in the 1930s, he expected that the threat of German retaliation would persuade the Allies to adopt a policy of moderation and not to begin a policy of unrestricted bombing. His hope was — for reasons of political prestige within Germany itself — that the German population would be protected from the Allied bombings. When this proved impossible, he began to fear that popular feeling would turn against his regime, and he redoubled efforts to mount a similar "terror offensive" against Britain in order to produce a stalemate in which both sides would hesitate to use bombing at all.

Question: How did Hitler threaten small nations into accepting German rule?
Answer: air bombardment

Question: What policy did Hitler hope the bombing of Allies would cause? 
Answer: policy of moderation

Question: What kind of prestige was Hitler hoping for?
Answer: political

Question: Why did Hitler use terror bombing against Britain? 
Answer: to produce a stalemate
The_Blitz

A major problem in the managing of the Luftwaffe was Hermann Göring. Hitler believed the Luftwaffe was "the most effective strategic weapon", and in reply to repeated requests from the Kriegsmarine for control over aircraft insisted, "We should never have been able to hold our own in this war if we had not had an undivided Luftwaffe". Such principles made it much harder to integrate the air force into the overall strategy and produced in Göring a jealous and damaging defence of his "empire" while removing Hitler voluntarily from the systematic direction of the Luftwaffe at either the strategic or operational level. When Hitler tried to intervene more in the running of the air force later in the war, he was faced with a political conflict of his own making between himself and Göring, which was not fully resolved until the war was almost over. In 1940 and 1941, Göring's refusal to cooperate with the Kriegsmarine denied the entire Wehrmacht military forces of the Reich the chance to strangle British sea communications, which might have had strategic or decisive effect in the war against the British Empire.

Question: Who did Hitler have a conflict over running the air force?
Answer: Hermann Göring

Question: What strategy could have worked against the British Empire?
Answer: strangle British sea communications

Question: Who did Goring refuse to work with in 1940 and 1941?
Answer: the Kriegsmarine

Question: What did the Kriegsmarine try to gain control over?
Answer: aircraft
The_Blitz

The deliberate separation of the Luftwaffe from the rest of the military structure encouraged the emergence of a major "communications gap" between Hitler and the Luftwaffe, which other factors helped to exacerbate. For one thing, Göring's fear of Hitler led him to falsify or misrepresent what information was available in the direction of an uncritical and over-optimistic interpretation of air strength. When Göring decided against continuing Wever's original heavy bomber programme in 1937, the Reichsmarschall's own explanation was that Hitler wanted to know only how many bombers there were, not how many engines each had. In July 1939, Göring arranged a display of the Luftwaffe's most advanced equipment at Rechlin, to give the impression the air force was more prepared for a strategic air war than was actually the case.

Question: What was the major cause of the separation between the Luftwaffe and the other military structure?
Answer: communications gap

Question: What did Goring do because of his fear of Hitler?
Answer: misrepresent what information

Question: What year did Goring display the Luftwaffe's advanced equipment?
Answer: 1939

Question: In what city did Goring display the advance equipment?
Answer: Rechlin

Question: Who's bombing program did Goring abandon in 1939? 
Answer: Wever
The_Blitz

Within hours of the UK and France declaring war on Germany on 3 September 1939, the RAF bombed German warships along the German coast at Wilhelmshaven. Thereafter bombing operations were against ports and shipping and propaganda leaflet drops. Operations were planned to minimize civilian casualties. From 15 May 1940 – the day after the Luftwaffe destroyed the centre of Rotterdam – the RAF also carried out operations east of the Rhine, attacking industrial and transportation targets. Operations were carried out every night thereafter.

Question: Which two countries declared war on Germany on September 3 1939?
Answer: UK and France

Question: The RAF bombed what Germany coast?
Answer: Wilhelmshaven

Question: What kind of leaflets were dropped?
Answer: propaganda

Question: What were the RAF operations trying to lessen?
Answer: civilian casualties

Question: What year did the Luftwaffe destroy Rotterdam center?
Answer: 1940
The_Blitz

Although not specifically prepared to conduct independent strategic air operations against an opponent, the Luftwaffe was expected to do so over Britain. From July until September 1940 the Luftwaffe attacked RAF Fighter Command to gain air superiority as a prelude to invasion. This involved the bombing of English Channel convoys, ports, and RAF airfields and supporting industries. Destroying RAF Fighter Command would allow the Germans to gain control of the skies over the invasion area. It was supposed that Bomber Command, RAF Coastal Command and the Royal Navy could not operate under conditions of German air superiority.

Question: Which tactics were the Luftwaffe excepted to use against Britain? 
Answer: air operations

Question: Why did the Luftwaffe bomb the RAF Fighter Command?
Answer: to gain air superiority

Question: What was the name of the Channel the Luftwaffe bomb to try to gain air superiority?
Answer: English

Question: Which Navy was assumed not to be able to operate under German air superiority?
Answer: Royal
The_Blitz

The Luftwaffe's poor intelligence meant that their aircraft were not always able to locate their targets, and thus attacks on factories and airfields failed to achieve the desired results. British fighter aircraft production continued at a rate surpassing Germany's by 2 to 1. The British produced 10,000 aircraft in 1940, in comparison to Germany's 8,000. The replacement of pilots and aircrew was more difficult. Both the RAF and Luftwaffe struggled to replace manpower losses, though the Germans had larger reserves of trained aircrew. The circumstances affected the Germans more than the British. Operating over home territory, British flyers could fly again if they survived being shot down. German crews, even if they survived, faced capture. Moreover, bombers had four to five crewmen on board, representing a greater loss of manpower. On 7 September, the Germans shifted away from the destruction of the RAF's supporting structures. German intelligence suggested Fighter Command was weakening, and an attack on London would force it into a final battle of annihilation while compelling the British Government to surrender.

Question: Why did the Luftwaffe fail to locate their targets?
Answer: poor intelligence

Question: Britain's  fabrication  of fighter planes out paced Germany by what margin?
Answer: 2 to 1

Question: How many aircraft did Britain produce in 1940?
Answer: 10,000

Question: What did German crew members face if they were shot down over Britain?
Answer: capture

Question: How big was the crew of a bomber?
Answer: four to five crewmen
The_Blitz

The decision to change strategy is sometimes claimed as a major mistake by the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL). It is argued that persisting with attacks on RAF airfields might have won air superiority for the Luftwaffe. Others argue that the Luftwaffe made little impression on Fighter Command in the last week of August and first week of September and that the shift in strategy was not decisive. It has also been argued that it was doubtful the Luftwaffe could have won air superiority before the "weather window" began to deteriorate in October. It was also possible, if RAF losses became severe, that they could pull out to the north, wait for the German invasion, then redeploy southward again. Other historians argue that the outcome of the air battle was irrelevant; the massive numerical superiority of British naval forces and the inherent weakness of the Kriegsmarine would have made the projected German invasion, Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion), a disaster with or without German air superiority.

Question: What does OKL stand for?
Answer: Oberkommando der Luftwaffe

Question: What month would the weather window begin to decline?
Answer: October

Question: If serious loss had happened to the RAF where might they have pulled out of?
Answer: the north

Question: What is the German name of Operation Sea Lion?
Answer: Unternehmen Seelöwe

Question: Who had exponential larger naval forces?
Answer: British naval forces
The_Blitz

Regardless of the ability of the Luftwaffe to win air superiority, Adolf Hitler was frustrated that it was not happening quickly enough. With no sign of the RAF weakening, and Luftwaffe air fleets (Luftflotten) taking punishing losses, the OKL was keen for a change in strategy. To reduce losses further, a change in strategy was also favoured to take place at night, to give the bombers greater protection under cover of darkness.[b] On 4 September 1940, in a long address at the Sportspalast, Hitler declared: "And should the Royal Air Force drop two thousand, or three thousand [kilograms ...] then we will now drop [...] 300,000, 400,000, yes one million kilograms in a single night. And should they declare they will greatly increase their attacks on our cities, then we will erase their cities."

Question: The Luftwaffe air fleets were taking what kind of losses?
Answer: punishing

Question: What did the punishing losses to the air fleet cause the Luftwaffe to do?
Answer: change in strategy

Question: What kind of strategy did the Luftwaffe use to give their bombers better protection?
Answer: cover of darkness

Question: What city did Hitler give a speech where he said he would erase British cities?
Answer: Sportspalast

Question: In what year did Hitler give the speech at Sportspalast? 
Answer: 1940
The_Blitz

It was decided to focus on bombing Britain's industrial cities in daylight to begin with. The main focus of the bombing operations was against the city of London. The first major raid in this regard took place on 7 September. On 15 September, on a date known as the Battle of Britain Day, a large-scale raid was launched in daylight, but suffered significant loss for no lasting gain. Although there were a few large air battles fought in daylight later in the month and into October, the Luftwaffe switched its main effort to night attacks in order to reduce losses. This became official policy on 7 October. The air campaign soon got underway against London and other British cities. However, the Luftwaffe faced limitations. Its aircraft—Dornier Do 17, Junkers Ju 88, and Heinkel He 111s—were capable of carrying out strategic missions, but were incapable of doing greater damage because of bomb-load limitations. The Luftwaffe's decision in the interwar period to concentrate on medium bombers can be attributed to several reasons: Hitler did not intend or foresee a war with Britain in 1939; the OKL believed a medium bomber could carry out strategic missions just as well as a heavy bomber force; and Germany did not possess the resources or technical ability to produce four-engined bombers before the war.

Question: Which British city did the Luftwaffe focus its bombing on?
Answer: London

Question: What was the name of the large air raid that took place in daylight hours in Britain?
Answer: Battle of Britain Day

Question: What was the main reason the Luftwaffe was not able to cause extensive damage with their missions?
Answer: bomb-load limitations

Question: What kind of bombers was Germany not able to build?
Answer: four-engined bombers
The_Blitz

Although it had equipment capable of doing serious damage, the problem for the Luftwaffe was its unclear strategy and poor intelligence. OKL had not been informed that Britain was to be considered a potential opponent until early 1938. It had no time to gather reliable intelligence on Britain's industries. Moreover, OKL could not settle on an appropriate strategy. German planners had to decide whether the Luftwaffe should deliver the weight of its attacks against a specific segment of British industry such as aircraft factories, or against a system of interrelated industries such as Britain's import and distribution network, or even in a blow aimed at breaking the morale of the British population. The Luftwaffe's strategy became increasingly aimless over the winter of 1940–1941. Disputes among the OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy. This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it began.

Question: Poor intelligence and what other problem made it difficult for the Luftwaffe to do extreme damage?
Answer: unclear strategy

Question: What year did the OKL become aware that Britain would be a possible target?
Answer: early 1938

Question: What disagreements did the  Luftwaffe staff center around?
Answer: tactics

Question: What did the disputes between the staff cause to happen to the strategy against Britain?
Answer: failure before it began
The_Blitz

In an operational capacity, limitations in weapons technology and quick British reactions were making it more difficult to achieve strategic effect. Attacking ports, shipping and imports as well as disrupting rail traffic in the surrounding areas, especially the distribution of coal, an important fuel in all industrial economies of the Second World War, would net a positive result. However, the use of delayed-action bombs, while initially very effective, gradually had less impact, partly because they failed to detonate.[c] Moreover, the British had anticipated the change in strategy and dispersed its production facilities making them less vulnerable to a concentrated attack. Regional commissioners were given plenipotentiary powers to restore communications and organise the distribution of supplies to keep the war economy moving.

Question: Coupled with British quick reactions what cause operational capacity hard to achieve?
Answer: limitations in weapons technology

Question: What was an important fuel in the Second World War?
Answer: coal

Question: What kind of bombs were effective in the beginning but became less so with time?
Answer: delayed-action bombs

Question: What did Britain do that helped make the new strategy less effective? 
Answer: dispersed its production facilities

Question: Who was given permission to restore power and move supplies to keep the war moving?
Answer: Regional commissioners
The_Blitz

Based on experience with German strategic bombing during World War I against the United Kingdom, the British government estimated after the war that 50 casualties— with about one third killed— would result for every tonne of bombs dropped on London. The estimate of tonnes of bombs an enemy could drop per day grew as aircraft technology advanced, from 75 in 1922, to 150 in 1934, to 644 in 1937. That year the Committee on Imperial Defence estimated that an attack of 60 days would result in 600,000 dead and 1,200,000 wounded. News reports of the Spanish Civil War, such as the bombing of Barcelona, supported the 50-casualties-per-tonne estimate. By 1938 experts generally expected that Germany would attempt to drop as much as 3,500 tonnes in the first 24 hours of war and average 700 tonnes a day for several weeks. In addition to high explosive and incendiary bombs the enemy would possibly use poison gas and even bacteriological warfare, all with a high degree of accuracy. In 1939 military theorist Basil Liddell-Hart predicted that 250,000 deaths and injuries in Britain could occur in the first week of war.

Question: How many casualties did the British government estimate for every ton of bombs dropped?
Answer: 50

Question: As technology increased what was the amount of bombs that could be dropped in 1937 per day? 
Answer: 644

Question: What committee estimated that 60 days of attacks would result in 600,000 deaths?
Answer: Imperial Defence

Question: How many tons did experts expect Germany to drop in the first 24 hours of the war?
Answer: 3,500

Question: Who was the military theorist in 1939 who said 250,000 deaths and injury could occur in the first week of war in Britian?
Answer: Basil Liddell-Hart
The_Blitz

In addition to the dead and wounded, government leaders feared mass psychological trauma from aerial attack and a resulting collapse of civil society. A committee of psychiatrists reported to the government in 1938 that there would be three times as many mental as physical casualties from aerial bombing, implying three to four million psychiatric patients. Winston Churchill told Parliament in 1934, "We must expect that, under the pressure of continuous attack upon London, at least three or four million people would be driven out into the open country around the metropolis." Panicked reactions during the Munich crisis, such as the migration by 150,000 to Wales, contributed to fear of societal chaos.

Question: What was the biggest fear aerial attacks would cause besides death and wounded?
Answer: psychological trauma

Question: Psychiatrists believe in 1938  that mental trauma could reach how many millions?
Answer: three to four

Question: Where did 150,000 migrate during the Munich crisis?
Answer: Wales

Question: Who told Parliament that after long periods of attacks people would leave the cities for the country? 
Answer: Winston Churchill
The_Blitz

The government planned to voluntarily evacuate four million people—mostly women and children—from urban areas, including 1.4 million from London. It expected about 90% of evacuees to stay in private homes, and conducted an extensive survey to determine available space. Detailed preparations for transporting them were developed. A trial blackout was held on 10 August 1939, and when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September a blackout began at sunset. Lights would not be allowed after dark for almost six years, and the blackout became by far the most unpopular aspect of the war for civilians, more than rationing.:51,106 The relocation of the government and the civil service was also planned, but would only have occurred if necessary so as not to damage civilian morale.:33

Question: The government planned to evacuate 1.4 million from which city?
Answer: London

Question: What trial took place on August 10 1939?
Answer: a blackout

Question: How long were lights not allowed on after dark?
Answer: almost six years

Question: What was most unpopular affect of the war with civilians ?
Answer: the blackout

Question: Why did the government  and civil service not want to relocate during the war?
Answer: damage civilian morale
The_Blitz

The most important existing communal shelters were the London Underground stations. Although many civilians had used them as such during the First World War, the government in 1939 refused to allow the stations to be used as shelters so as not to interfere with commuter and troop travel, and the fears that occupants might refuse to leave. Underground officials were ordered to lock station entrances during raids; but by the second week of heavy bombing the government relented and ordered the stations to be opened. Each day orderly lines of people queued until 4 pm, when they were allowed to enter the stations. In mid-September 1940 about 150,000 a night slept in the Underground, although by the winter and spring months the numbers had declined to 100,000 or less. Noises of battle were muffled and sleep was easier in the deepest stations, but many were killed from direct hits on several stations.

Question: Why did the government refuse to allow the London Underground stations to be used as shelters?
Answer: interfere with commuter and troop travel

Question: Underground officials were ordered to lock the stations during raids but opened how long after the orders?
Answer: by the second week

Question: In 1940 how many people were sleeping in the Underground stations?
Answer: 150,000 a night

Question: Muffling the sound of batter made what easier in the Underground Stations?
Answer: sleep

Question: Why were many killed in Underground Stations?
Answer: direct hits
The_Blitz

Communal shelters never housed more than one seventh of Greater London residents, however. Peak use of the Underground as shelter was 177,000 on 27 September 1940, and a November 1940 census of London found that about 4% of residents used the Tube and other large shelters; 9% in public surface shelters; and 27% in private home shelters, implying that the remaining 60% of the city likely stayed at home. The government distributed Anderson shelters until 1941 and that year began distributing the Morrison shelter, which could be used inside homes.:190

Question: What was the largest number to use Underground shelters in September  27, 1940?
Answer: 177,000

Question: In 1940 what percentage used the Tube for a sleeping shelter?
Answer: 4%

Question: Where did 60% of populations stay?
Answer: at home

Question: What year did the government start giving out Morrison shelters?
Answer: 1941

Question: Where could the Morrison shelters be used?
Answer: inside homes
The_Blitz

Public demand caused the government in October 1940 to build new deep shelters:189–190 within the Underground to hold 80,000 people but were not completed until the period of heaviest bombing had passed. By the end of 1940 significant improvements had been made in the Underground and in many other large shelters. Authorities provided stoves and bathrooms and canteen trains provided food. Tickets were issued for bunks in large shelters to reduce the amount of time spent queuing. Committees quickly formed within shelters as informal governments, and organisations such as the British Red Cross and the Salvation Army worked to improve conditions. Entertainment included concerts, films, plays and books from local libraries.

Question: What year did the government start to build new deep shelters?
Answer: 1940

Question: How many people were the new shelters going to hold?
Answer: 80,000

Question: What helped cut down time standing in the queue for shelters?
Answer: Tickets

Question: Which two groups help improve life in the shelters?
Answer: British Red Cross and the Salvation Army

Question: What kind of trains provided food in the shelters?
Answer: canteen
The_Blitz

Although the intensity of the bombing was not as great as prewar expectations so an equal comparison is impossible, no psychiatric crisis occurred because of the Blitz even during the period of greatest bombing of September 1940. An American witness wrote "By every test and measure I am able to apply, these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit ... the British are stronger and in a better position than they were at its beginning". People referred to raids as if they were weather, stating that a day was "very blitzy".:75,261 However, another American who visited Britain, the publisher Ralph Ingersoll, wrote soon after the Blitz eased on 15 September that:

Question: With the intense bomb what did not happen as great as prewar predictions expected?
Answer: psychiatric crisis

Question: What witness wrote that these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit?
Answer: American

Question: People called the raids very blitzy like they were talking about what?
Answer: weather
The_Blitz

Ingersoll added that, according to Anna Freud and Edward Glover, London civilians surprisingly did not suffer from widespread shell shock, unlike the soldiers in the Dunkirk evacuation.:114,117–118 The psychoanalysts were correct, and the special network of psychiatric clinics opened to receive mental casualties of the attacks closed due to lack of need. Although the stress of the war resulted in many anxiety attacks, eating disorders, fatigue, weeping, miscarriages, and other physical and mental ailments, society did not collapse. The number of suicides and drunkenness declined, and London recorded only about two cases of "bomb neuroses" per week in the first three months of bombing. Many civilians found that the best way to retain mental stability was to be with family, and after the first few weeks of bombing avoidance of the evacuation programs grew.:80–81 Glover speculated that the knowledge that the entire country was being attacked, that there was no way to escape the bombs, forced people to accept and deal with the situation.:118

Question: Anne Freud and Edward Glover said London civilians did not suffer from what?
Answer: widespread shell shock

Question: Why did the psychiatric clinics close?
Answer: lack of need

Question: What two things declined during the attacks in Britain?
Answer: suicides and drunkenness

Question: The entire country was being attack and Glover believe it help people to do what?
Answer: accept and deal
The_Blitz

The cheerful crowds visiting bomb sites were so large they interfered with rescue work, pub visits increased in number (beer was never rationed), and 13,000 attended cricket at Lord's. People left shelters when told instead of refusing to leave, although many housewives reportedly enjoyed the break from housework. Some people even told government surveyors that they enjoyed air raids if they occurred occasionally, perhaps once a week. Despite the attacks, defeat in Norway and France, and the threat of invasion, overall morale remained high; a Gallup poll found only 3% of Britons expected to lose the war in May 1940, another found an 88% approval rating for Churchill in July, and a third found 89% support for his leadership in October. Support for peace negotiations declined from 29% in February. Each setback caused more civilians to volunteer to become unpaid Local Defence Volunteers, workers worked longer shifts and over weekends, contributions rose to the £5,000 "Spitfire Funds" to build fighters, and the number of work days lost to strikes in 1940 was the lowest in history.:60–63,67–68,75,78–79,215–216

Question: What drink was never rationed?
Answer: beer

Question: How many people attended cricket at Lord's?
Answer: 13,000

Question: What percent of Briton's expected to lose the war?
Answer: 3%

Question: What was Churchill's highest rating? 
Answer: 89%

Question: What were Spitfire Funds used for?
Answer: to build fighters
The_Blitz

The civilians of London had an enormous role to play in the protection of their city. Many civilians who were unwilling or unable to join the military became members of the Home Guard, the Air Raid Precautions service (ARP), the Auxiliary Fire Service, and many other organisations. The AFS had 138,000 personnel by July 1939. Only one year earlier, there had only been 6,600 full-time and 13,800 part-time firemen in the entire country. During the Blitz, The Scout Association guided fire engines to where they were most needed, and became known as the "Blitz Scouts". Many unemployed were drafted into the Royal Army Pay Corps. These personnel, along with others from the Pioneer Corps, were charged with the task of salvage and clean-up.

Question: What is ARP?
Answer: Air Raid Precautions

Question: The Auxiliary Fire Service had how many members in July of 1939?
Answer: 138,000

Question: Who was given the name Blitz Scouts?
Answer: Scout Association

Question: The Royal Army Pay Corps and what other group were in charge of salvage and clean-up?
Answer: Pioneer Corps
The_Blitz

The WVS (Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence) was set up under the direction of Samuel Hoare, Home Secretary in 1938 specifically in the event of air raids. Hoare considered it the female branch of the ARP. They organised the evacuation of children, established centres for those displaced by bombing, and operated canteens, salvage and recycling schemes. By the end of 1941, the WVS had one million members. Prior to the outbreak of war, civilians were issued with 50 million respirators (gas masks). These were issued in the event of bombing taking place with gas before evacuation.

Question: What group did Samuel Hoare set up in 1938?
Answer: Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence

Question: Who was Home Secretary in 1938?
Answer: Samuel Hoare

Question: How many members did the WVS have at the end of 1941?
Answer: one million

Question: How many gas mask were issued before the war?
Answer: 50 million
The_Blitz

In the inter-war years and after 1940, Hugh Dowding, Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command has received credit for the defence of British air space and the failure of the Luftwaffe to achieve air superiority. However, Dowding had spent so much effort preparing day fighter defences, there was little to prevent the Germans carrying out an alternative strategy by bombing at night. When the Luftwaffe struck at British cities for the first time on 7 September 1940, a number of civic and political leaders were worried by Dowding's apparent lack of reaction to the new crisis.

Question: Who was the Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command after 1940?
Answer: Hugh Dowding

Question: What credit did Dowding receive?
Answer: defence of British air space

Question: What strategy could the German's have used instead of day raids?
Answer: bombing at night

Question: Why were civic and political leaders worried about Dowdings?
Answer: lack of reaction to the new crisis
The_Blitz

Dowding accepted that as AOC, he was responsible for the day and night defence of Britain, and the blame, should he fail, would be laid at his door. When urgent changes and improvements needed to be made, Dowding seemed reluctant to act quickly. The Air Staff felt that this was due to his stubborn nature and reluctance to cooperate. Dowding's opponents in the Air Ministry, already critical of his handling of the day battle (see Battle of Britain Day and the Big Wing controversy), were ready to use these failings as a cudgel with which to attack him and his abilities.

Question: Who was reluctant to act quickly when urgent changes need to be made?
Answer: Dowding

Question: Who thought Dowding was stubborn and didn't like to cooperate?
Answer: Air Staff

Question: The Air Ministry was critical of Dowding after which battle?
Answer: Battle of Britain Day

Question: What did the Air Ministry plan to do with his failures?
Answer: attack him and his abilities
The_Blitz

Dowding was summoned to an Air Ministry conference on 17 October 1940 to explain the poor state of night defences and the supposed (but ultimately successful) "failure" of his daytime strategy. The criticism of his leadership extended far beyond the Air Council, and the Minister of Aircraft Production, Lord Beaverbrook, and Churchill themselves intimated their support was waning. While the failure of night defence preparation was undeniable, it was not the AOC's responsibility to accrue resources. The general neglect of the RAF until the late spurt in 1938 had left sparse resources to build defences. While it was permissible to disagree with Dowding's operational and tactical deployment of forces, the failure of the Government and Air Ministry to allot resources was ultimately the responsibility of the civil and military institutions at large. In the pre-war period, the Chamberlain Government stated that night defence from air attack should not take up much of the national effort and, along with the Air Ministry, did not make it a priority.

Question: Who was summoned to the Air Ministry conference on October 17, 1940?
Answer: Dowding

Question: Lord Beaverbrook and Churchill's support of Dowding was what?
Answer: waning

Question: Neglect of the RAF until 1938 caused what to happen?
Answer: sparse resources to build defences

Question: The Air Ministry and which other group decided to not make night defense a top priority?
Answer: Chamberlain Government
The_Blitz

The attitude of the Air Ministry was in contrast to the experiences of the First World War when a few German bombers caused physical and psychological damage out of all proportion to their numbers. Around 280 short tons (250 t) (9,000 bombs) had been dropped, killing 1,413 people and injuring 3,500 more. Most people aged 35 or over remembered the threat and greeted the bombings with great trepidation. From 1916–1918, German raids had diminished against countermeasures which demonstrated defence against night air raids was possible.

Question: People over the age of 35 reacted to the bombings with what?
Answer: great trepidation

Question: Why had German raids decreased between 1916-1918?
Answer: countermeasures

Question: How many people were killed by bomb drops during the first World War?
Answer: 1,413

Question: How many bombs had been dropped?
Answer: 9,000
The_Blitz

Although night air defence was causing greater concern before the war, it was not at the forefront of RAF planning. Most of the resources went into planning for daylight fighter defences. The difficulty RAF bombers had navigating in darkness, led the British to believe German bombers would suffer the same problems and would be unable to reach and identify their targets. There was also a mentality in all air forces that, if they could carry out effective operations by day, night missions and their disadvantages could be avoided.

Question: What did the RAF put most of their resources into?
Answer: daylight fighter defences

Question: RAF bombers had trouble flying at night, so the British believe the Germans would do what?
Answer: suffer the same problems

Question: Britain believe German bombers would be unable to reach and identify what?
Answer: targets

Question: What did the Air Force believe they could avoid if they carried out effective day missions?
Answer: night missions and their disadvantages
The_Blitz

British air doctrine, since the time of Chief of the Air Staff Hugh Trenchard in the early 1920s, had stressed offence was the best means of defence. British defensive strategy revolved around offensive action, what became known as the cult of the offensive. To prevent German formations from hitting targets in Britain, RAF's Bomber Command would destroy Luftwaffe aircraft on their own bases, aircraft in their factories and fuel reserves by attacking oil plants. This philosophy was impractical as Bomber Command lacked the technology and equipment and needed several years to develop it. This strategy retarded the development of fighter defences in the 1930s. Dowding agreed air defence would require some offensive action, and fighters could not defend Britain alone. Until September 1940, the RAF lacked specialist night-fighting aircraft and relied on anti-aircraft units which were poorly equipped and lacking in numbers.

Question: What did the British offence become know as?
Answer: cult of the offensive

Question: Why was the tactic of bombing German aircraft bases, factories and fuel reserves impractical?
Answer: lacked the technology and equipment

Question: Until 1940 what type of aircraft did the RAF lacked?
Answer: specialist night-fighting

Question: What was wrong with the anti aircraft units?
Answer: poorly equipped and lacking in numbers
The_Blitz

Bomber crews already had some experience with these types of systems due to the deployment of the Lorenz beam, a commercial blind-landing aid which allowed aircraft to land at night or in bad weather. The Germans developed the short-range Lorenz system into the Knickebein aid, a system which used two Lorenz beams with much stronger signal transmissions. The concept was the same as the Lorenz system. Two aerials were rotated for the two converging beams which were pointed to cross directly over the target. The German bombers would attach themselves to either beam and fly along it until they started to pick up the signal from the other beam. When a continuous sound was heard from the second beam the crew knew they were above the target and began dropping their bombs.

Question: What did the Lorenz beam allow aircraft to do?
Answer: land at night or in bad weather

Question: The Germans developed the Lorenz into what system?
Answer: Knickebein

Question: The Knickebein was the same as the Lorenz but used how many beams?
Answer: two Lorenz beams

Question: The Germans flew along one beam until they picked up the second beam the sound telling them when to start doing what?
Answer: dropping their bombs
The_Blitz

While Knickebein was used by German crews en masse, X-Gerät use was limited to specially trained pathfinder crews. Special receivers were mounted in He 111s, with a radio mast on the bomber's fuselage. The system worked on a higher frequency (66–77 MHz, compared to Knickebein's 30–33 MHz). Transmitters on the ground sent pulses at a rate of 180 per minute. X-Gerät received and analysed the pulses, giving the pilot both visual and aural "on course" signals. Three beams intersected the beam along the He 111's flight path. The first cross-beam acted as a warning for the bomb-aimer to start the bombing-clock which he would activate only when the second cross-beam was reached. When the third cross-beam was reached the bomb aimer activated a third trigger, which stopped the first hand of the equipment's clock, with the second hand continuing. When the second hand re-aligned with the first, the bombs were released. The clock's timing mechanism was co-ordinated with the distances of the intersecting beams from the target so the target was directly below when the bomb release occurred.

Question: While Knickebein was used my most German crews who used the X-Gerat system?
Answer: specially trained pathfinder crews

Question: What frequency did the X-Gerat system use?
Answer: 66–77 MHz

Question: What rate per minute did ground transmitters send?
Answer: 180

Question: When the bomber crossed the first beam the bomber-aimer did what?
Answer: start the bombing-clock

Question: What mechanism cause the bombs to be released?
Answer: clock's timing