Divyanshu67/squad_v2 huggingface dataset:
The_Blitz

Y-Gerät was the most complex system of the three. It was, in effect, an automatic beam-tracking system, operated through the bomber's autopilot. The single approach beam along which the bomber tracked was monitored by a ground controller. The signals from the station were retransmitted by the bomber's equipment. This way the distance the bomber travelled along the beam could be precisely verified. Direction-finding checks also enabled the controller to keep the crew on an exact course. The crew would be ordered to drop their bombs either by issue of a code word by the ground controller, or at the conclusion of the signal transmissions which would stop. Although its maximum usable range was similar to the previous systems, it was not unknown for specific buildings to be hit.

Question: Which system was the most complex of the three?
Answer: Y-Gerät

Question: Who operated the automatic beam system?
Answer: the bomber's autopilot

Question: What kind of checks help to keep the plane on course?
Answer: Direction-finding

Question: The crew could be order to drop the bomb by what?
Answer: a code word

Question: Who issued the code word to the bombers?
Answer: ground controller
The_Blitz

In June 1940, a German prisoner of war was overheard boasting that the British would never find the Knickebein, even though it was under their noses. The details of the conversation were passed to an RAF Air Staff technical advisor, Dr. R. V. Jones, who started an in-depth investigation which discovered that the Luftwaffe's Lorenz receivers were more than blind-landing devices. Jones therefore began a search for the German beams. Avro Ansons of the Beam Approach Training Development Unit (BATDU) were flown up and down Britain fitted with a 30 MHz receiver to detect them. Soon a beam was traced to Derby (which had been mentioned in Luftwaffe transmissions). The first jamming operations were carried out using requisitioned hospital electrocautery machines. A subtle form of distortion was introduced. Up to nine special transmitters directed their signals at the beams in a manner that widened its path, negating its ability to accurately locate targets. Confidence in the device was diminished by the time the Luftwaffe decided to launch large-scale raids. The counter operations were carried out by British Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) units under Wing Commander Edward Addison, No. 80 Wing RAF. The production of false radio navigation signals by re-transmitting the originals was a technique known as masking beacons (meacons).

Question: In 1940 a German prisoner overheard boasting that the British would never find what system?
Answer: Knickebein

Question: Which RAF technical advisor was the conversation passed onto?
Answer: Dr. R. V. Jones

Question: The Bean Approach Training Development Unit were fitted with what kind of transmitter to search for the Knickebein? 
Answer: 30 MHz receiver

Question: The beam was traced to what town?
Answer: Derby

Question: The first jamming operation was carried out using what machines?
Answer: electrocautery machines
The_Blitz

German beacons operated on the medium-frequency band and the signals involved a two-letter Morse identifier followed by a lengthy time-lapse which enabled the Luftwaffe crews to determine the signal's bearing. The Meacon system involved separate locations for a receiver with a directional aerial and a transmitter. The receipt of the German signal by the receiver was duly passed to the transmitter, the signal to be repeated. The action did not guarantee automatic success. If the German bomber flew closer to its own beam than the Meacon then the former signal would come through the stronger on the direction finder. The reverse would apply only if the meacon were closer.

Question: The German beacons used what frequency band?
Answer: medium

Question: What two letter identifier did the signal have?
Answer: Morse

Question: What system used a separate locations for a receiver and a directional aerial?
Answer: Meacon

Question: When a German bomber flew to close to its own beam what happened to the signal?
Answer: stronger on the direction finder
The_Blitz

In general, German bombers were likely to get through to their targets without too much difficulty. It was to be some months before an effective night fighter force would be ready, and anti-aircraft defences only became adequate after the Blitz was over, so ruses were created to lure German bombers away from their targets. Throughout 1940, dummy airfields were prepared, good enough to stand up to skilled observation. A number[clarification needed] of bombs fell on these diversionary ("Starfish") targets.

Question: Anti-aircraft defenses became better after what?
Answer: Blitz was over

Question: What did they use to lure German bombers away from their targets?
Answer: ruses

Question: What kind of airfields were prepared to stand up to skilled observers? 
Answer: dummy

Question: What was the name given to these dummy airfields?
Answer: Starfish
The_Blitz

The use of diversionary techniques such as fires had to be made carefully. The fake fires could only begin when the bombing started over an adjacent target and its effects were brought under control. Too early and the chances of success receded; too late and the real conflagration at the target would exceed the diversionary fires. Another innovation was the boiler fire. These units were fed from two adjacent tanks containing oil and water. The oil-fed fires were then injected with water from time to time; the flashes produced were similar to those of the German C-250 and C-500 Flammbomben. The hope was that, if it could deceive German bombardiers, it would draw more bombers away from the real target.

Question: Fake fires were used as what kind of technique?
Answer: diversionary

Question: Two tanks one of oil, one of water fed what kind of fire?
Answer: boiler

Question: What was injected into the fires from time to time to produce a flash?
Answer: water

Question: What did these flashes simulate?
Answer: German C-250 and C-500 Flammbomben

Question: What was the purpose of these fires?
Answer: deceive German bombardiers
The_Blitz

Initially the change in strategy caught the RAF off-guard, and caused extensive damage and civilian casualties. Some 107,400 long tons (109,100 t) of shipping was damaged in the Thames Estuary and 1,600 civilians were casualties. Of this total around 400 were killed. The fighting in the air was more intense in daylight. Overall Loge had cost the Luftwaffe 41 aircraft; 14 bombers, 16 Messerschmitt Bf 109s, seven Messerschmitt Bf 110s and four reconnaissance aircraft. Fighter Command lost 23 fighters, with six pilots killed and another seven wounded. Another 247 bombers from Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3) attacked that night. On 8 September, the Luftwaffe returned. This time 412 people were killed and 747 severely wounded.

Question: The bombing of the Thames Estuary cause how many civilian casualties?
Answer: 1,600

Question: How many were killed in the bombing of the Thames Estuary?
Answer: around 400

Question: How many aircraft did the Luftwaffe lose?
Answer: 41

Question: How many German pilots were killed?
Answer: six

Question: How many Air Fleet 3 attacked that night?
Answer: 247
The_Blitz

On 15 September the Luftwaffe made two large daylight attacks on London along the Thames Estuary, targeting the docks and rail communications in the city. Its hope was to destroy its targets and draw the RAF into defending them, allowing the Luftwaffe to destroy their fighters in large numbers, thereby achieving an air superiority. Large air battles broke out, lasting for most of the day. The first attack merely damaged the rail network for three days, and the second attack failed altogether. The air battle was later commemorated by Battle of Britain Day. The Luftwaffe lost 18 percent of the bombers sent on the operations that day, and failed to gain air superiority.

Question: On September 15 the Luftwaffe made daylight raids on what target in London?
Answer: Thames Estuary

Question: What two targets were the Luftwaffe trying to destroy?
Answer: docks and rail communications

Question: What was the reason to try and draw the RAF into a battle?
Answer: destroy their fighters in large numbers

Question: What was this air battle called?
Answer: Battle of Britain Day

Question: The Luftwaffe lost what percentage of its bombers sent that day?
Answer: 18
The_Blitz

While Göring was optimistic the Luftwaffe could prevail, Hitler was not. On 17 September he postponed Operation Sea Lion (as it turned out, indefinitely) rather than gamble Germany's newly gained military prestige on a risky cross-Channel operation, particularly in the face of a sceptical Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union. In the last days of the battle, the bombers became lures in an attempt to draw the RAF into combat with German fighters. But their operations were to no avail; the worsening weather and unsustainable attrition in daylight gave the OKL an excuse to switch to night attacks on 7 October.

Question: Who thought the Luftwaffe could win?
Answer: Göring

Question: What day did Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion?
Answer: 17 September

Question: What was the name of the man from the Soviet Union who was doubtful of Operation Sea Lion?
Answer: Joseph Stalin

Question: Who did the Luftwaffe try to lure into battle using its bombers?
Answer: RAF

Question: When did the OKL switch to night raids?
Answer: 7 October
The_Blitz

On 14 October, the heaviest night attack to date saw 380 German bombers from Luftflotte 3 hit London. Around 200 people were killed and another 2,000 injured. British anti-aircraft defences (General Frederick Alfred Pile) fired 8,326 rounds and shot down only two bombers. On 15 October, the bombers returned and about 900 fires were started by the mix of 415 short tons (376 t) of high explosive and 11 short tons (10.0 t) of incendiaries dropped. Five main rail lines were cut in London and rolling stock damaged.

Question: On October 14 how many German bombers attacked?
Answer: 380

Question: How many people were killed?
Answer: Around 200

Question: Who fired anti-defense rounds?
Answer: General Frederick Alfred Pile

Question: How many rounds of anti-defense were fired?
Answer: 8,326 rounds

Question: How many German bombers were shot down?
Answer: two
The_Blitz

Loge continued during October. According to German sources, 9,000 short tons (8,200 t) of bombs were dropped in that month, of which about 10 percent of which was dropped in daylight. Over 6,000 short tons (5,400 t) was aimed at London during the night. Attacks on Birmingham and Coventry were subject to 500 short tons (450 t) of bombs between them in the last 10 days of October. Liverpool suffered 200 short tons (180 t) of bombs dropped. Hull and Glasgow were attacked, but 800 short tons (730 t) of bombs were spread out all over Britain. The Metropolitan-Vickers works in Manchester was targeted and 12 short tons (11 t) of bombs dropped against it. Little tonnage was dropped on Fighter Command airfields; Bomber Command airfields were hit instead.

Question: How much of the short tons of bombs were dropped during the day?
Answer: 10 percent

Question: What two cities had 500 short tons of bombs dropped on them during the end of October?
Answer: Birmingham and Coventry

Question: Liverpool had how many short tons dropped on it?
Answer: 200

Question: What was targeted with 12 short tons of bombs?
Answer: The Metropolitan-Vickers works in Manchester

Question: Which was targeted more heavily, bomber or fighter command airfields?
Answer: Bomber Command airfields
The_Blitz

Luftwaffe policy at this point was primarily to continue progressive attacks on London, chiefly by night attack; second, to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands, again chiefly by night attack; and third to disrupt plants and factories during the day by means of fighter-bombers. Kesselring, commanding Luftflotte 2, was ordered to send 50 sorties per night against London and attack eastern harbours in daylight. Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, was ordered to dispatch 250 sorties per night including 100 against the West Midlands. Seeschlange would be carried out by Fliegerkorps X (10th Air Corps) which concentrated on mining operations against shipping. It also took part in the bombing over Britain. By 19/20 April 1941, it had dropped 3,984 mines, ⅓ of the total dropped. The mines' ability to destroy entire streets earned them respect in Britain, but several fell unexploded into British hands allowing counter-measures to be developed which damaged the German anti-shipping campaign.

Question: What was the Luftwaffe's second primary policy?
Answer: to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands

Question: Who was in command of the Luftflotte 2?
Answer: Kesselring

Question: How many sorties a night was Luftflotte 3 doing?
Answer: 250

Question: What did the Fliegerkorps X concentrate on?
Answer: mining operations against shipping

Question: By April of 1941 about how many mines had been dropped?
Answer: 3,984 mines
The_Blitz

By mid-November 1940, when the Germans adopted a changed plan, more than 13,000 short tons (12,000 t) of high explosive and nearly 1,000,000 incendiaries had fallen on London. Outside the capital, there had been widespread harassing activity by single aircraft, as well as fairly strong diversionary attacks on Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool, but no major raids. The London docks and railways communications had taken a heavy pounding, and much damage had been done to the railway system outside. In September, there had been no less than 667 hits on railways in Great Britain, and at one period, between 5,000 and 6,000 wagons were standing idle from the effect of delayed action bombs. But the great bulk of the traffic went on; and Londoners—though they glanced apprehensively each morning at the list of closed stretches of line displayed at their local station, or made strange detours round back streets in the buses—still got to work. For all the destruction of life and property, the observers sent out by the Ministry of Home Security failed to discover the slightest sign of a break in morale. More than 13,000 civilians had been killed, and almost 20,000 injured, in September and October alone, but the death toll was much less than expected. In late 1940, Churchill credited the shelters:

Question: By mid November of 1940 how many incendiaries were dropped on London?
Answer: 1,000,000

Question: What locations suffered strong diversionary tactics?
Answer: Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool

Question: In September how many railway hits were there in Great Britain?
Answer: no less than 667

Question: What did the Ministry of Home Security fail to discover?
Answer: the slightest sign of a break in morale

Question: About how many civilians were injured in September and October?
Answer: 20,000
The_Blitz

British night air defences were in a poor state. Few anti-aircraft guns had fire-control systems, and the underpowered searchlights were usually ineffective against aircraft at altitudes above 12,000 ft (3,700 m). In July 1940, only 1,200 heavy and 549 light guns were deployed in the whole of Britain. Of the "heavies", some 200 were of the obsolescent 3 in (76 mm) type; the remainder were the effective 4.5 in (110 mm) and 3.7 in (94 mm) guns, with a theoretical "ceiling"' of over 30,000 ft (9,100 m) but a practical limit of 25,000 ft (7,600 m) because the predictor in use could not accept greater heights. The light guns, about half of which were of the excellent Bofors 40 mm, dealt with aircraft only up to 6,000 ft (1,800 m). Although the use of the guns improved civilian morale, with the knowledge the German bomber crews were facing the barrage, it is now believed that the anti-aircraft guns achieved little and in fact the falling shell fragments caused more British casualties on the ground.

Question: British night air defenses were effective to what height?
Answer: 12,000 ft (3,700 m)

Question: By July of 1940 how many guns were deployed in Britain?
Answer: only 1,200 heavy and 549 light guns

Question: What was the practical ceiling of the effective heavy guns?
Answer: 25,000 ft (7,600 m)

Question: What type of light gun dealt with aircraft up to 6000 ft.?
Answer: Bofors 40 mm

Question: What is believed to have caused many civilian casualties from anti-aircraft guns?
Answer: falling shell fragments
The_Blitz

London's defences were rapidly reorganised by General Pile, the Commander-in-Chief of Anti-Aircraft Command. The difference this made to the effectiveness of air defences is questionable. The British were still one-third below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery AAA (or ack-ack) in May 1941, with only 2,631 weapons available. Dowding had to rely on night fighters. From 1940 to 1941, the most successful night-fighter was the Boulton Paul Defiant; its four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type. AA defences improved by better use of radar and searchlights. Over several months, the 20,000 shells spent per raider shot down in September 1940, was reduced to 4,087 in January 1941 and to 2,963 shells in February 1941.

Question: Who reorganised London's defences?
Answer: General Pile

Question: The British were how far below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery?
Answer: one-third

Question: Who relied on night fighters?
Answer: Dowding

Question: Who's four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type?
Answer: Boulton Paul Defiant

Question: How were AA defenses improved?
Answer: by better use of radar and searchlights
The_Blitz

Airborne Interception radar (AI) was unreliable. The heavy fighting in the Battle of Britain had eaten up most of Fighter Command's resources, so there was little investment in night fighting. Bombers were flown with airborne search lights out of desperation[citation needed], but to little avail. Of greater potential was the GL (Gunlaying) radar and searchlights with fighter direction from RAF fighter control rooms to begin a GCI system (Ground Control-led Interception) under Group-level control (No. 10 Group RAF, No. 11 Group RAF and No. 12 Group RAF).

Question: What was considered unreliable?
Answer: Airborne Interception radar

Question: What used most of Fighter Command's resources?
Answer: the Battle of Britain

Question: The bombers used what out of desperation?
Answer: airborne search lights

Question: Gunlaying radar and RAF controls combined to create what system?
Answer: Ground Control-led Interception
The_Blitz

Whitehall's disquiet at the failures of the RAF led to the replacement of Dowding (who was already due for retirement) with Sholto Douglas on 25 November. Douglas set about introducing more squadrons and dispersing the few GL sets to create a carpet effect in the southern counties. Still, in February 1941, there remained only seven squadrons with 87 pilots, under half the required strength. The GL carpet was supported by six GCI sets controlling radar-equipped night-fighters. By the height of the Blitz, they were becoming more successful. The number of contacts and combats rose in 1941, from 44 and two in 48 sorties in January 1941, to 204 and 74 in May (643 sorties). But even in May, 67% of the sorties were visual cat's-eye missions. Curiously, while 43% of the contacts in May 1941 were by visual sightings, they accounted for 61% of the combats. Yet when compared with Luftwaffe daylight operations, there was a sharp decline in German losses to 1%. If a vigilant bomber crew could spot the fighter first, they had a decent chance at evading it.

Question: Who replaced Dowding on November 25?
Answer: Sholto Douglas

Question: How many pilots remained in February 1941?
Answer: 87 pilots

Question: What supported the GL carpet?
Answer: six GCI sets controlling radar-equipped night-fighters

Question: How many number of contacts and combats were there in May?
Answer: 204 and 74

Question: What did a bomber crew need to do for a good chance at evasion?
Answer: spot the fighter first
The_Blitz

Nevertheless, it was radar that proved to be critical weapon in the night battles over Britain from this point onward. Dowding had introduced the concept of airborne radar and encouraged its usage. Eventually it would become a success. On the night of 22/23 July 1940, Flying Officer Cyril Ashfield (pilot), Pilot Officer Geoffrey Morris (Observer) and Flight Sergeant Reginald Leyland (Air Intercept radar operator) of the Fighter Interception Unit became the first pilot and crew to intercept and destroy an enemy aircraft using onboard radar to guide them to a visual interception, when their AI night fighter brought down a Do 17 off Sussex. On 19 November 1940 the famous RAF night fighter ace John Cunningham shot down a Ju 88 bomber using airborne radar, just as Dowding had predicted.

Question: What was critical in the night battles over Britain?
Answer: radar

Question: What concept eventually became successful?
Answer: airborne radar

Question: On what day did airborne radar help intercept and destroy enemy aircraft for the first time?
Answer: the night of 22/23 July 1940

Question: Who was the RAF night fighter ace that used airborne radar to destroy a Ju 88 bomber?
Answer: John Cunningham
The_Blitz

From November 1940 – February 1941, the Luftwaffe shifted its strategy and attacked other industrial cities. In particular, the West Midlands were targeted. On the night of 13/14 November, 77 He 111s of Kampfgeschwader 26 (26th Bomber Wing, or KG 26) bombed London while 63 from KG 55 hit Birmingham. The next night, a large force hit Coventry. "Pathfinders" from 12 Kampfgruppe 100 (Bomb Group 100 or KGr 100) led 437 bombers from KG 1, KG 3, KG 26, KG 27, KG 55 and Lehrgeschwader 1 (1st Training Wing, or LG 1) which dropped 394 short tons (357 t) of high explosive, 56 short tons (51 t) of incendiaries, and 127 parachute mines. Other sources say 449 bombers and a total of 530 short tons (480 t) of bombs were dropped. The raid against Coventry was particularly devastating, and led to widespread use of the phrase "to conventrate". Over 10,000 incendiaries were dropped. Around 21 factories were seriously damaged in Coventry, and loss of public utilities stopped work at nine others, disrupting industrial output for several months. Only one bomber was lost, to anti-aircraft fire, despite the RAF flying 125 night sorties. No follow up raids were made, as OKL underestimated the British power of recovery (as Bomber Command would do over Germany from 1943–1945). The Germans were surprised by the success of the attack. The concentration had been achieved by accident. The strategic effect of the raid was a brief 20 percent dip in aircraft production.

Question: The Luftwaffe's change in strategy targeted what primarily?
Answer: the West Midlands

Question: How many parachute mines were dropped?
Answer: 127

Question: The Coventry raid led to what phrase being in widespread use?
Answer: "to conventrate"

Question: What stopped work in 9 factories in Coventry?
Answer: loss of public utilities

Question: What effect did the raid have strategically? 
Answer: a brief 20 percent dip in aircraft production
The_Blitz

Five nights later, Birmingham was hit by 369 bombers from KG 54, KG 26, and KG 55. By the end of November, 1,100 bombers were available for night raids. An average of 200 were able to strike per night. This weight of attack went on for two months, with the Luftwaffe dropping 13,900 short tons (12,600 t) of bombs. In November 1940, 6,000 sorties and 23 major attacks (more than 100 tons of bombs dropped) were flown. Two heavy (50 short tons (45 t) of bombs) attacks were also flown. In December, only 11 major and five heavy attacks were made.

Question: How many bombers hit Birmingham?
Answer: 369

Question: For how many months did the night raids continue for?
Answer: two months

Question: How many tons of bombs had to be dropped to be considered a major attack?
Answer: more than 100 tons of bombs dropped

Question: December saw how many attacks?
Answer: only 11 major and five heavy attacks
The_Blitz

Probably the most devastating strike occurred on the evening of 29 December, when German aircraft attacked the City of London itself with incendiary and high explosive bombs, causing a firestorm that has been called the Second Great Fire of London. The first group to use these incendiaries was Kampfgruppe 100 which despatched 10 "pathfinder" He 111s. At 18:17, it released the first of 10,000 fire bombs, eventually amounting to 300 dropped per minute. Altogether, 130 German bombers destroyed the historical centre of London. Civilian casualties on London throughout the Blitz amounted to 28,556 killed, and 25,578 wounded. The Luftwaffe had dropped 18,291 short tons (16,593 t) of bombs.

Question: On what day was London itself attacked?
Answer: the evening of 29 December

Question: What group was the first to use incendiaries?
Answer: Kampfgruppe 100

Question: How many fire bombs were dropped per minute?
Answer: 300

Question: How many civilians were killed in the bombing?
Answer: 28,556 killed

Question: The Luftwaffe dropped how many short tons of bombs?
Answer: 18,291 short tons
The_Blitz

Not all of the Luftwaffe's effort was made against inland cities. Port cities were also attacked to try to disrupt trade and sea communications. In January Swansea was bombed four times, very heavily. On 17 January around 100 bombers dropped a high concentration of incendiaries, some 32,000 in all. The main damage was inflicted on the commercial and domestic areas. Four days later 230 tons was dropped including 60,000 incendiaries. In Portsmouth Southsea and Gosport waves of 150 bombers destroyed vast swaths of the city with 40,000 incendiaries. Warehouses, rail lines and houses were destroyed and damaged, but the docks were largely untouched.

Question: Why were port cities targeted by the Luftwaffe?
Answer: to try to disrupt trade and sea communications

Question: How many times was Swansea bombed heavily?
Answer: four times

Question: What was primarily damaged in the attacks?
Answer: commercial and domestic areas

Question: What cities had large sections of them destroyed?
Answer: Portsmouth Southsea and Gosport

Question: What was left mostly unharmed?
Answer: the docks
The_Blitz

These decisions, apparently taken at the Luftflotte or Fliegerkorps level (see Organisation of the Luftwaffe (1933–1945)), meant attacks on individual targets were gradually replaced by what was, for all intents and purposes, an unrestricted area attack or Terrorangriff (Terror Attack). Part of the reason for this was inaccuracy of navigation. The effectiveness of British countermeasures against Knickebein, which was designed to avoid area attacks, forced the Luftwaffe to resort to these methods. The shift from precision bombing to area attack is indicated in the tactical methods and weapons dropped. KGr 100 increased its use of incendiaries from 13–28 percent. By December, this had increased to 92 percent. Use of incendiaries, which were inherently inaccurate, indicated much less care was taken to avoid civilian property close to industrial sites. Other units ceased using parachute flares and opted for explosive target markers. Captured German air crews also indicated the homes of industrial workers were deliberately targeted.

Question: Decision changes at organizational levels led to what type of attacks?
Answer: unrestricted area attack or Terrorangriff (Terror Attack)

Question: What was one of the reasons for unrestricted area attacks?
Answer: inaccuracy of navigation

Question: How was it known that precision bombing was changed to area attacks?
Answer: tactical methods and weapons dropped

Question: What percentage of incendiaries were used in December?
Answer: 92 percent

Question: How was it determined that homes of industrial workers were targeted?
Answer: Captured German air crews
The_Blitz

In 1941, the Luftwaffe shifted strategy again. Erich Raeder—commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine—had long argued the Luftwaffe should support the German submarine force (U-Bootwaffe) in the Battle of the Atlantic by attacking shipping in the Atlantic Ocean and attacking British ports. Eventually, he convinced Hitler of the need to attack British port facilities. Hitler had been convinced by Raeder that this was the right course of action due to the high success rates of the U-Boat force during this period of the war. Hitler correctly noted that the greatest damage to the British war economy had been done through submarines and air attacks by small numbers of Focke-Wulf Fw 200 naval aircraft. He ordered attacks to be carried out on those targets which were also the target of the Kriegsmarine. This meant that British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland were the prime targets.

Question: What did Erich Raeder believe the Luftwaffe needed to do?
Answer: support the German submarine force

Question: Raeder convinced Hitler to do what?
Answer: attack British port facilities.

Question: What ultimately convinced Hitler that Raeder was right?
Answer: the high success rates of the U-Boat force

Question: Submarines and naval aircraft damaged what primarily?
Answer: British war economy

Question: What became the new targets for the Kriegsmarine?
Answer: British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland
The_Blitz

Hitler's interest in this strategy forced Göring and Jeschonnek to review the air war against Britain in January 1941. This led to Göring and Jeschonnek agreeing to Hitler's Directive 23, Directions for operations against the British War Economy, which was published on 6 February 1941 and gave aerial interdiction of British imports by sea top priority. This strategy had been recognised before the war, but Operation Eagle Attack and the following Battle of Britain had got in the way of striking at Britain's sea communications and diverted German air strength to the campaign against the RAF and its supporting structures. The OKL had always regarded the interdiction of sea communications of less importance than bombing land-based aircraft industries.

Question: What was Hitler's Directive 23?
Answer: Directions for operations against the British War Economy

Question: What was a top priority of Directive 23?
Answer: aerial interdiction of British imports by sea

Question: What prevented the targeting of sea communications before?
Answer: Operation Eagle Attack and the following Battle of Britain

Question: What was considered more important than the interdiction of sea communications?
Answer: bombing land-based aircraft industries
The_Blitz

Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.

Question: What was the concession Goring made with the strategic bombing against Britain?
Answer: Directive 23

Question: What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support?
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units

Question: Who was Raeder's successor? 
Answer: Karl Dönitz

Question: What was detrimental to the success of a strategic effect against Britain?
Answer: Göring's lack of cooperation

Question: How did Goring expect to regain prestige?
Answer: by subduing Britain by air power alone
The_Blitz

Even so, the decision by OKL to support the strategy in Directive 23 was instigated by two considerations, both of which had little to do with wanting to destroy Britain's sea communications in conjunction with the Kriegsmarine. First, the difficulty in estimating the impact of bombing upon war production was becoming apparent, and second, the conclusion British morale was unlikely to break led OKL to adopt the naval option. The indifference displayed by OKL to Directive 23 was perhaps best demonstrated in operational directives which diluted its effect. They emphasised the core strategic interest was attacking ports but they insisted in maintaining pressure, or diverting strength, onto industries building aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and explosives. Other targets would be considered if the primary ones could not be attacked because of weather conditions.

Question: What was the first consideration for the OKL to support Directive 23?
Answer: difficulty in estimating the impact of bombing upon war production

Question: What was the second consideration?
Answer: the conclusion British morale was unlikely to break

Question: What did the OKL insist on maintaining?
Answer: pressure, or diverting strength, onto industries

Question: When would other targets be considered available?
Answer: if the primary ones could not be attacked because of weather conditions
The_Blitz

A further line in the directive stressed the need to inflict the heaviest losses possible, but also to intensify the air war in order to create the impression an amphibious assault on Britain was planned for 1941. However, meteorological conditions over Britain were not favourable for flying and prevented an escalation in air operations. Airfields became water-logged and the 18 Kampfgruppen (bomber groups) of the Luftwaffe's Kampfgeschwadern (bomber wings) were relocated to Germany for rest and re-equipment.

Question: What was inflicting heavy losses and increasing the air war designed to do?
Answer: create the impression an amphibious assault on Britain was planned for 1941

Question: What was preventing escalation of air operations?
Answer: meteorological conditions over Britain

Question: What happened to airfields?
Answer: Airfields became water-logged

Question: How many bomber groups were relocated to Germany?
Answer: 18
The_Blitz

From the German point of view, March 1941 saw an improvement. The Luftwaffe flew 4,000 sorties that month, including 12 major and three heavy attacks. The electronic war intensified but the Luftwaffe flew major inland missions only on moonlit nights. Ports were easier to find and made better targets. To confuse the British, radio silence was observed until the bombs fell. X- and Y-Gerät beams were placed over false targets and switched only at the last minute. Rapid frequency changes were introduced for X-Gerät, whose wider band of frequencies and greater tactical flexibility ensured it remained effective at a time when British selective jamming was degrading the effectiveness of Y-Gerät.

Question: How many sorties were flown in March 1941?
Answer: 4,000

Question: When did the Luftwaffe fly inland missions?
Answer: only on moonlit nights

Question: Why were ports better targets?
Answer: Ports were easier to find

Question: How did the Germans confuse the British?
Answer: radio silence was observed until the bombs fell

Question: Why was the X-Gerat frequencies used more?
Answer: British selective jamming was degrading the effectiveness of Y-Gerät
The_Blitz

The attacks were focused against western ports in March. These attacks produced some breaks in morale, with civil leaders fleeing the cities before the offensive reached its height. But the Luftwaffe's effort eased in the last 10 attacks as seven Kampfgruppen moved to Austria in preparation for the Balkans Campaign in Yugoslavia and Greece. The shortage of bombers caused the OKL to improvise. Some 50 Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers and Jabos (fighter-bombers) were used, officially classed as Leichte Kampfflugzeuge ("light bombers") and sometimes called Leichte Kesselringe ("Light Kesselrings"). The defences failed to prevent widespread damage but on some occasions did prevent German bombers concentrating on their targets. On occasion, only one-third of German bombs hit their targets.

Question: What was focused in March?
Answer: western ports

Question: What did these attacks accomplish?
Answer: breaks in morale

Question: Why was the OKL forced to improvise?
Answer: shortage of bombers

Question: How many Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers and Jabos were used?
Answer: 50

Question: How many German bombs hit their target?
Answer: only one-third
The_Blitz

The diversion of heavier bombers to the Balkans meant that the crews and units left behind were asked to fly two or three sorties per night. Bombers were noisy, cold, and vibrated badly. Added to the tension of the mission which exhausted and drained crews, tiredness caught up with and killed many. In one incident on 28/29 April, Peter Stahl of KG 30 was flying on his 50th mission. He fell asleep at the controls of his Ju 88 and woke up to discover the entire crew asleep. He roused them, ensured they took oxygen and Dextro-Energen tablets, then completed the mission.

Question: How many sorties a night were crews asked to fly?
Answer: two or three sorties

Question: What contributed to the exhaustion of crews flying extra sorties?
Answer: Bombers were noisy, cold, and vibrated badly

Question: What happened to Peter Stahl when he fell asleep flying?
Answer: woke up to discover the entire crew asleep.

Question: What did Peter's crew take to complete their mission?
Answer: oxygen and Dextro-Energen tablets
The_Blitz

Regardless, the Luftwaffe could still inflict huge damage. With the German occupation of Western Europe, the intensification of submarine and air attack on Britain's sea communications was feared by the British. Such an event would have serious consequences on the future course of the war, should the Germans succeed. Liverpool and its port became an important destination for convoys heading through the Western Approaches from North America, bringing supplies and materials. The considerable rail network distributed to the rest of the country. Operations against Liverpool in the Liverpool Blitz were successful. Air attacks sank 39,126 long tons (39,754 t) of shipping, with another 111,601 long tons (113,392 t) damaged. Minister of Home Security Herbert Morrison was also worried morale was breaking, noting the defeatism expressed by civilians. Other sources point to half of the port's 144 berths rendered unusable, while cargo unloading capability was reduced by 75%. Roads and railways were blocked and ships could not leave harbour. On 8 May 1941, 57 ships were destroyed, sunk or damaged amounting to 80,000 long tons (81,000 t). Around 66,000 houses were destroyed, 77,000 people made homeless, and 1,900 people killed and 1,450 seriously hurt on one night. Operations against London up until May 1941 could also have a severe impact on morale. The populace of the port of Hull became 'trekkers', people who underwent a mass exodus from cities before, during, and after attacks. However, the attacks failed to knock out or damage railways, or port facilities for long, even in the Port of London, a target of many attacks. The Port of London in particular was an important target, bringing in one-third of overseas trade.

Question: What did the British fear most?
Answer: intensification of submarine and air attack

Question: What was an important destination for supply convoys from North America?
Answer: Liverpool

Question: The Liverpool Blitz sank how much shipping?
Answer: 39,126 long tons (39,754 t) of shipping

Question: How many ships were destroyed on May 8, 1941?
Answer: 57 ships

Question: How much of the overseas trade did the Port of London take on?
Answer: one-third of overseas trade
The_Blitz

On 13 March, the upper Clyde port of Clydebank near Glasgow was bombed. All but seven of its 12,000 houses were damaged. Many more ports were attacked. Plymouth was attacked five times before the end of the month while Belfast, Hull, and Cardiff were hit. Cardiff was bombed on three nights, Portsmouth centre was devastated by five raids. The rate of civilian housing lost was averaging 40,000 people per week dehoused in September 1940. In March 1941, two raids on Plymouth and London dehoused 148,000 people. Still, while heavily damaged, British ports continued to support war industry and supplies from North America continued to pass through them while the Royal Navy continued to operate in Plymouth, Southampton, and Portsmouth. Plymouth in particular, because of its vulnerable position on the south coast and close proximity to German air bases, was subjected to the heaviest attacks. On 10/11 March, 240 bombers dropped 193 tons of high explosives and 46,000 incendiaries. Many houses and commercial centres were heavily damaged, the electrical supply was knocked out, and five oil tanks and two magazines exploded. Nine days later, two waves of 125 and 170 bombers dropped heavy bombs, including 160 tons of high explosive and 32,000 incendiaries. Much of the city centre was destroyed. Damage was inflicted on the port installations, but many bombs fell on the city itself. On 17 April 346 tons of explosives and 46,000 incendiaries were dropped from 250 bombers led by KG 26. The damage was considerable, and the Germans also used aerial mines. Over 2,000 AAA shells were fired, destroying two Ju 88s. By the end of the air campaign over Britain, only eight percent of the German effort against British ports was made using mines.

Question: How many houses were spared damage in Glasgow?
Answer: seven

Question: How many people per week were losing housing?
Answer: 40,000 people

Question: Why was Plymouth targeted the most?
Answer: because of its vulnerable position on the south coast

Question: What did the Germans use along with incendiaries and bombs?
Answer: aerial mines

Question: How many AAA shells were fired?
Answer: Over 2,000
The_Blitz

In the north, substantial efforts were made against Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Sunderland, which were large ports on the English east coast. On 9 April 1941 Luftflotte 2 dropped 150 tons of high explosives and 50,000 incendiaries from 120 bombers in a five-hour attack. Sewer, rail, docklands, and electric installations were damaged. In Sunderland on 25 April, Luftflotte 2 sent 60 bombers which dropped 80 tons of high explosive and 9,000 incendiaries. Much damage was done. A further attack on the Clyde, this time at Greenock, took place on 6 and 7 May. However, as with the attacks in the south, the Germans failed to prevent maritime movements or cripple industry in the regions.

Question: What were two large ports on the English east coast in the North?
Answer: Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Sunderland

Question: How many bombers were used in a five-hour attack?
Answer: 120

Question: Sunderland saw how many incendiaries used against it on 25 April?
Answer: 9,000 incendiaries

Question: What was the result of the German attacks?
Answer: the Germans failed to prevent maritime movements or cripple industry in the regions
The_Blitz

The last major attack on London was on 10/11 May 1941, on which the Luftwaffe flew 571 sorties and dropped 800 tonnes of bombs. This caused more than 2,000 fires. 1,436 people were killed and 1,792 seriously injured, which affected morale badly. Another raid was carried out on 11/12 May 1941. Westminster Abbey and the Law Courts were damaged, while the Chamber of the House of Commons was destroyed. One-third of London's streets were impassable. All but one railway station line was blocked for several weeks. This raid was significant, as 63 German fighters were sent with the bombers, indicating the growing effectiveness of RAF night fighter defences.

Question: When was the last major attack London saw?
Answer: 10/11 May 1941

Question: How many tonnes of bombs did the Luftwaffe use on London?
Answer: 800 tonnes

Question: How many casualties were inflicted?
Answer: 1,436 people were killed and 1,792 seriously injured

Question: What was the damage done to London's streets?
Answer: One-third of London's streets were impassable

Question: What showed RAF night fighter effectiveness was increasing?
Answer: 63 German fighters were sent with the bombers
The_Blitz

German air supremacy at night was also now under threat. British night-fighter operations out over the Channel were proving highly successful. This was not immediately apparent. The Bristol Blenheim F.1 was undergunned, with just four .303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns which struggled to down the Do 17, Ju 88, or Heinkel He 111. Moreover, the Blenheim struggled to reach the speed of the German bombers. Added to the fact an interception relied on visual sighting, a kill was most elusive even in the conditions of a moonlit sky.

Question: How was the British night fighter operations faring?
Answer: were proving highly successful.

Question: How did the Bristol Blenheim F.1 perform against German aircraft?
Answer: was undergunned, with just four .303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns

Question: How did the Bristol Blenheim F.1 compare to German aircraft speed?
Answer: struggled to reach the speed of the German bombers

Question: What did interception rely upon?
Answer: visual sighting
The_Blitz

Improved aircraft designs were in the offing with the Bristol Beaufighter, then under development. It would prove formidable, but its development was slow. The Beaufighter had a maximum speed of 320 mph (510 km/h), an operational ceiling of 26,000 ft (7,900 m) and a climb rate of 2,500 ft (760 m) per minute. Its armament of four 20 mm (0.79 in) Hispano cannon and six .303 in Browning machine guns offered a serious threat to German bombers. On 19 November, John Cunningham of No. 604 Squadron RAF shot down a bomber flying an AI-equipped Beaufighter. It was the first air victory for the airborne radar.

Question: What was the max speed of a Beaufighter?
Answer: 320 mph (510 km/h)

Question: What is the operational ceiling of the Beaufighter?
Answer: 26,000 ft (7,900 m)

Question: how many machine guns did the Beaufighter include?
Answer: six .303 in Browning machine guns

Question: What day was the first victory the RAF had with airborne radar?
Answer: 19 November
The_Blitz

By April and May 1941, the Luftwaffe was still getting through to their targets, taking no more than one- to two-percent losses on any given mission. On 19/20 April 1941, in honour of Hitler's 52nd birthday, 712 bombers hit Plymouth with a record 1,000 tons of bombs. Losses were minimal. In the following month, 22 German bombers were lost with 13 confirmed to have been shot down by night fighters. On 3/4 May, nine were shot down in one night. On 10/11 May, London suffered severe damage, but 10 German bombers were downed. In May 1941, RAF night fighters shot down 38 German bombers.

Question: What was the most losses the Luftwaffe suffered on any mission?
Answer: one- to two-percent losses

Question: How many bombers hit Plymouth on Hitler's birthday?
Answer: 712

Question: How many bombs hit Plymouth on Hitler's birthday?
Answer: 1,000 tons of bombs

Question: On May 3/4 how many German bombers were lost?
Answer: nine

Question: How many German bombers were shot down by the RAF in May?
Answer: 38 German bombers