ORDER [ENTITY], J.
1. These two Revision Petitions arise out of a common order passed by the District Judge, Chitradurga, in [CASE NUMBER] directing to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises in Which they are residing to the respondents within a period of 45 days.
2. The brief facts of the case the petitioners are employees of the City Municipal Council, Davanagere. [ENTITY] the petitioner in [CASE NUMBER] was working as a Manager in the Davanagere Municipality and he continued to work in that capacity tilt 14.7.89. By an order dated 6.7.1989 passed by the Director of Municipal Administration, he was sent on deputation to Ramadurg Town Municipality temporarily. Thereafter, again the petitioner was repatriated and posted to the original place of work to work as an Assessing Officer vide Order dated 18.12.1989 passed by the Government. Since the petitioner has been working as an Assessing Officer in Davanagere City Municipal Council. That being the position and facts of the case, the respondent by order dated 26.3.90 directed the petitioner to vacate & deliver vacant possession of the premises in which he is residing within a period of 45 days and further directed him to remit a sum of Rs. 16,622.50 as damages.
3. [ENTITY] the petitioner in [CASE NUMBER] Was working as Accounts Superintendent, Urban Development Authority, Davanagere. While he was working at City Municipal Council, he was allotted a quarters. While he was working at City Municipal Council, Davanagere, he was transferred and relieved with effect from 5.6.1988 to the office of the Commissioner, Urban Development Authority, Davanagere. In this place, he reported for duty on 2.11.88 as Accounts Superintendent. Thereafter, the petitioner was on leave on medical grounds from 5.6.1988 to 1.11.1988. The quarters were allotted to the petitioner by the Municipal Commissioner by order dated 11.6.1988 bearing No. GAD (Misc.) 32/84-85 and the same is not a designated one, but a general one. With these being the facts of the case, the 2nd respondent issued an order dated 26.3.1990 under [SECTION] of the [ACT], (for short 'the Act'), directing him to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the quarters and further directed him to pay damages of Rs. 19,464.85 on the ground that he has occupied the premises unauthorisedly. As against this, as stated earlier, among other petitioners these two petitioners also preferred an appeal under [SECTION] of the Act, before the District Judge, Chitradurga. The learned District Judge disposed of the appeals - the operative portion of the order reads as follows:
"In the result for the reasons stated above the appeals are partly allowed. The orders passed by the Estate Officer against the appellants insofar as they relate to the eviction of the appellants under [SECTION] of the Act are confirmed. The impugned orders insofar as they relate to the recovery of damages under [SECTION] of the Act are set aside. The Estate Officer is at liberty to initiate fresh action for recovery of damages under [SECTION] of the Act. The appellants have been granted 45 days from this date to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the municipal quarters in their occupation. If the appellants fail to vacate the quarters in their occupation within 45 days from this date, the respondents may take possession of the same in accordance with law. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.
This order is questioned in these Revision Petitions.
4. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Counsel for the respondents.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners without going into the merits of the case has submitted that the order passed by the learned District Judge is contrary to law. He contended that the appeals were preferred under [SECTION] of the Act. The appellate officer should have passed the order. On the other hand, the District Judge passed the impugned order. The District Court has no power but only appellate officer has jurisdiction under the Act, to pass an order. He further submits that since the District Judge passed the order, the C.R.P. is filed and not Writ Petition. In support of his argument, he placed reliance on a decision [PRECEDENT] wherein this Court has held:
"The District Judge who is constituted as an appellate Officer under [SECTION] of the [ACT], does not act as Court but as a persona designata. Hence his order is not revisable under [SECTION] [ACT].
Subordination means, not judicial subordination within the purview of [SECTION] of the [ACT], but subordination under the hierarchy of Courts under the [ACT]."
6. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellate Tribunal is subordinate to High Court. Hence revision lies. The District Judge does not become persona designata. But if a retired District Judge if appointed as an appellate officer, he becomes persona designata. The contention of the petitioners that he should have preferred Writ Petition cannot be accepted. In support of his argument, he placed reliance on a decision in [PRECEDENT] the Division Bench of this Court has held while dealing with [SECTION] of the [ACT]:
"An Additional District Judge of the District Court having jurisdiction over an area in which the premises are situate, has jurisdiction to hear and decide an appeal under [SECTION] of the Act, when such appeal has been transferred or assigned to him by the District Judge of that Court.
Even though an Additional District Judge has not been conferred under the [ACT], the powers of the District Court, when once a case is assigned or transferred to him by the District Judge under [SECTION] of that Act, he has all the powers of the District Judge under that Act or any other law for the time being in force, in respect of that case, and he can hear and decide that case in the same manner as the District Judge could have done.
In the Karnataka State Judicial Service, there is no separate cadre of Additional District Judge. Both the District Judge and Additional District Judge are of the same cadre.
There is nothing in [SECTION] of the Act which indicates that the appellate jurisdiction conferred on the District Judge thereunder, should be exercised only by the Principal District Judge of a District Court and not by an Additional District Judge of that Court. Though [SECTION] of the Act designates the District Judge and not the District Court as the appellate authority, the conferment of the appellate jurisdiction on the District Judge, appears to be virtue of his presiding over the District Court & the District Judge is not a persona designata. Though the term 'District Judge' has been used in [SECTION] of the Act, the appeal provided thereunder is in reality to the Court of the District Judge."
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a decision in [PRECEDENT], have elaborately discussed the definition of 'persona designata' and held:
"The District Magistrate mentioned in [SECTION] of the [ACT] is not a persona designata. Under the definition of District Magistrate in [SECTION] of that Act the special authorisation by the District Magistrate had the effect of creating officers exercising the powers of a District Magistrate under the [ACT]. To that extent, those officers would, on authorisation, be equated to the District Magistrate. A persona designata is a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character."
7. The learned Counsel for the respondents has further submitted that the Full Bench of this Court has held that the officer deciding the case under [SECTION] of the Act is not persona designata. On the other hand, it is the District Judge who is empowered under the Act for passing the order. Therefore, it cannot be said that no revision petition lies against the said order and only Writ Petition lies. The question before the Full Court was whether a revision under [SECTION] of [ACT] would lie against the order of the District Judge functioning as the Educational Appellate Tribunal under the [ACT], is somewhat a significant question. The [CASE NUMBER] pending before the Division Bench came to be referred to the Full Bench. Following the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT], ; [PRECEDENT], and [PRECEDENT] it is held that the District Judge who functions as Educational Appellate Tribunal under the provisions to [SECTION] of the Act does not cease to be a Court subordinate to the High Court and any order passed by him is amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under [SECTION] of [ACT]. With reference to these decisions, it is now necessary to refer to [SECTION] of the Act which reads:
"An appeal shall lie from every order of the Estate officer made in respect of any public premises under [SECTION] or [SECTION] or [SECTION] to an appellate officer who shall be the district judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years standing as the District Judge may designate in this behalf."
This Section is analogous to [SECTION] of the [ACT]. The Legislature also intended to mean that Appellate Officer is none other than an officer of the District Judge and he is given power under this Act, in addition to the existing power exercised by him as a District Judge. From this it is clear that in the absence of the constitution of a Tribunal under [SECTION] the District Judge of a District has been conferred jurisdiction to hear appeals. By conferring such jurisdiction the Legislature has only added one more subject besides other matters over which the District Judge has jurisdiction to deal with. The District Judge does not become persona designata. Persona designata is "a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class or as filling a particular character (as can be seen from [ENTITY]'s Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 253). This is also made clear if a reference is made to the decision in [PRECEDENT] wherein it is held as follows:
"Personae designatae are "persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges."
Sub-Section (1) to [SECTION] contemplates that the District Judge shall function as an appellate officer. Thus, the Legislature by making such a provision, has only enlarged the jurisdiction of a District Judge, which is an existing Court subordinate to the High Court. The District Judge, while deciding an appeal in view of the powers conferred on him under the proviso, does not become a specially constituted Tribunal as envisaged under [SECTION] of the Act. It can also be gathered from [SECTION] of the Act that the appellate officer shall consist of one person who is or has been a judicial officer not below the rank of a District Judge. It may be mentioned that under [SECTION] of the Educational Appellate Tribunal shall consist of one person who is or has been a judicial officer not below the rank of a District Judge. Thus it is not necessary that a person to be appointed as a Tribunal should be a judicial officer in service; even a retired judicial officer of the rank of a District Judge can be notified to function as an Educational Appellate Tribunal. Under Sub-section (1) the Government has also to fix the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, even one person may be notified as a Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over the entire State. But, under the proviso to [SECTION], it is the District Judge concerned of a district who has been empowered to hear appeals in the matters a0rising within his jurisdiction, in this view of the matter, it is not possible to hold that the District Judge exercising the powers of a Tribunal is not subordinate to the High Court. Similarly, in this case also as per [SECTION] of the Act, it cannot be said that the Appellate Officer ceases to be a Court subordinate to High Court. However, it may also be mentioned here that if a retired District Judge if appointed under Karnataka Educational Appellate Tribunal as provided under that Act, he would be a persona designata but a serving District Judge who is empowered to deal with an appellate power is not a persona designata. Similarly, the District Judge who is functioning as an appellate officer under [SECTION] of the Act, is not a persona designata as claimed by the learned advocate for the petitioner and it cannot be said that the revision petition does not lie against the order passed by the District Judge under the Act. This is further fortified if a reference is made to a recent Judgment of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT], . In that decision a question arose as to applicability of [SECTION] of the [ACT] to [SECTION] of [ACT] which is a special Act or a local Act While answering that question Their Lordships have held:
"The jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under the special laws is sometimes given to the ordinary courts, and sometimes given to separate tribunals constituted under the special law. When the special law provides that the provision contained in [SECTION] shall apply to the proceedings under it, it is really a conferment of the power of the Court under [SECTION] to the tribunals under the special law - whether these tribunals are courts or not. If these tribunals under the special law should be courts in the ordinary sense an express extension of the provision contained in [SECTION] of the [ACT] will become otiose in cases where the special law has created separate tribunals to adjudicate the rights of parties arising under the special law. That is not the intention of the legislature.
The view that since the appellate authority under [SECTION] of the [ACT] is a persona designata and therefore, he cannot resort to [SECTION] of the [ACT] for condoning the delay in filing appeal before him is not correct. An authority can be styled to be persona designata if powers are conferred on a named person or authority and such powers cannot be exercised by anyone else. The appellate authority constituted under [SECTION] has to decide lis between parties in a judicial manner and subject to the revision of its order, the decision would remain final between the parties. Such an authority is constituted by designation as the District Judge of the district having jurisdiction over the area over which the said Act has been extended. Even though the District Judge concerned might retire or get transferred or may otherwise cease to hold the office of the District Judge his successor-in-office can pick up the thread, of the proceedings from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and can function as an appellate authority under [SECTION]. If the District Judge was constituted as an appellate authority being a persona designata or as a named person being the appellate authority as assumed in the present case, such a consequence, on the scheme of the Act would not follow. It must, therefore, be held that appellate authorities as constituted under [SECTION] of the [ACT] being the District Judges they constituted a class and cannot be considered to be persona designata."
8. In this case, admittedly the order came to be passed by the sitting Judge of Chitradurga District by virtue of the power conferred on him under [SECTION] of the Act who was empowered to entertain and dispose of the appeals preferred against any order passed under [SECTION] or [SECTION] or [SECTION] by the Estate Officer. Therefore, it cannot be held that the impugned order is passed by a persona designata and not by a Court and the order is not revisable under [SECTION] [ACT]. On the other hand, I hold that the District Judge who functions as appellate officer under [SECTION] of the Act does not cease to be a Court subordinate to the High Court and any order passed by him is amendable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under [SECTION] [ACT]. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully disagree with the Judgment rendered by this Court reported in [PRECEDENT] referred to supra holding that the District Judge who is constituted as an appellate officer under [SECTION] of the Act, does not act as Court but as a persona designate, and his order is not revisable under [SECTION] [ACT].
9. Having come to the conclusion that the revision is maintainable before the High Court. I hold that the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that impugned order is liable to be set aside and remand the matter to the Court below directing the appellate Officer to pass an order under [SECTION] of the Act is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, rejected.
10. I have also perused the impugned orders passed by the learned Court. The learned District Judge has taken into consideration all the materials placed before him and held that the order passed by the appellate Officer in regard to the direction to the petitioners to deliver vacant possession within 45 days does not call for interference by this Court under [SECTION] [ACT].
11. In the result, therefore, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER The revision petitions are dismissed. Under the circumstances, I hold that the parties shall bear and pay their own costs.