[CASE NUMBER] INTHEHIGHCOURTOFGUJARATATAHMEDABAD SPECIALCRIMINALAPPLICATION(MAINTAINANCE)NO.4of2015 FORAPPROVALANDSIGNATURE: HONOURABLEMR.JUSTICE[ENTITY] 1 WhetherReportersofLocalPapersmaybeallowedtoseethe judgment? 2 TobereferredtotheReporterornot? 3 WhethertheirLordshipswishtoseethefaircopyofthejudgment? 4 Whetherthiscaseinvolvesasubstantialquestionoflawastothe interpretationofthe[ACT]1950oranyordermade thereunder? 5 Whetheritistobecirculatedtotheciviljudge? ANWARHUSSEINMOHAMMADRAFIQSHEIKH Applicant(s) Versus [ENTITY] Respondent(s) Appearance: [ENTITY],ADVOCATEfortheApplicant(s)No.1 [ENTITY],ADVOCATEfortheApplicant(s)No.1 [ENTITY],APPfortheRespondent(s)No.1 CORAM:HONOURABLEMR.JUSTICE[ENTITY] Date:21/01/2015 CAVJUDGMENT
1. ThispetitionisfiledunderArticle227oftheConstitutionofIndia withaprayertoquashandsetasidetheorderdated29.11.2014,passed bythelearnedJudge,FamilyCourt,Godhra,belowapplicationExh.15 filed in [CASE NUMBER], and thereby, to quash the proceeding of [CASE NUMBER], whichisfiledbyrespondentNo.2hereinundertheprovisionsof[SECTION]oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure,1973(hereinafterreferredtoas 'the Code'). The petitioner has alternatively prayed to transfer the proceedings of [CASE NUMBER] from the learnedFamilyCourtatGodhratolearnedFamilyCourtatAhmedabad.
2. Brieffactsleadingtothefilingofpresentpetitionareasunder:
2.1. The marriage of the petitioner and respondent No.2 was solemnizedon25.04.2004aspertheritesandritualsofMuslimreligion.
Thatababyboywasbornon10.04.2006outofthesaidwedlock.Itis thecaseofthepetitionerthatonaccountofthedisputesanddifferences betweenthehusbandandthewife,petitionerhusbandgavedivorceto therespondentNo.2on25.04.2013.Thepetitionerhusbandhadsent thedeclarationofdivorcebycourieralongwiththreechequesofdated 25.04.2013foranamountofRs.10,000/eachtowardsthemaintenance for the period of Iddat. The said cheques had been deposited by respondentNo.2.Thereafter,respondentNo.2initiatedtheproceedings under the provisions of the [ACT] (hereinafter referredtoasthe'Actof2005')inSeptember2013,whereinshehas soughtforRs.20,000/permonthtowardsthemaintenanceandother expensesforhersonandRs.20,000/permonthtowardstherentofthe residential accommodation. The respondent No.2, thereafter, initiated the proceedings under [SECTION] of the [ACT] the 'Act of 1986' for short). In the said proceedings also, the respondentNo.2hasprayedforanamountofRs.1croretowardsthe future maintenance. The grievance of the petitioner is that without disclosingtheaforesaidproceedings,therespondentNo.2haspreferred anapplicationundertheprovisionsofSection125oftheCodebefore the learned Family Court at Godhra and prayed for maintenance of Rs.50,000/permonth.Thepetitioner,therefore,movedanapplication Exh.15 before the learned Family Court with a prayer to reject the applicationfiledbyrespondentNo.2seekingmaintenanceunder[SECTION]oftheCode.However,thesaidapplicationExh.15hasbeenrejected by the larned Family Court and therefore the present petition is preferredbeforethisCourtbythepetitioner-husband.
3. Heard learned advocate Mr. [ENTITY] for the petitioner and learnedAPPMs.HBPunaniforrespondentNo.1-[ENTITY].
4. Learnedadvocateforthepetitionermainlycontendedthatwhen therespondentNo.2hasinitiatedtheproceedingsundertheprovisions of [SECTION] of the Act of 1986, she cannot initiate the proceedings under the provisions of [SECTION] of the Code and therefore the learned Family Court ought to have allowed the application Exh.15 submittedbythepetitioner byholdingthattheapplication underthe provisions of [SECTION] of the Code is not maintainable. Learned advocateforthepetitionerfurthersubmittedthattheActof1986isa SpecialActandthereforeitwouldprevailovertheCodeandwhenthe respondentNo.2haschosentoproceedagainstthepetitionerunderthe provisions of the Act of 1986, subsequent application under the provisionsoftheCode,cannotbeentertained.Learnedadvocatefurther submittedthatrespondentNo.2hassoughtforthemonetaryrelieffor futuremaintenanceinherapplicationfiledundertheActof1986and thereforeoncesuchanapplicationismadeforfuturemaintenance,an application for monthly maintenance under some other provisions of other statute, cannot be validly filed and simultaneously entertained, otherwise, this would lead to conflict of decision. Learned advocate reliedupontheprovisionsofSection4oftheActof1986andcontended thattheproperremedyfortherespondentNo.2istoapproachunder Section4oftheActof1986forredressalofhergrievanceandnotunder [SECTION] of the Code. Learned advocate for the petitioner further contended that the respondent No.2 is earning Rs.30,000/ to Rs.40,000/permonthoutofbusinessofrealestateandishavingother source of income. Learned advocate for the petitioner alternatively submitted that if this Court is not inclined for quashing of the proceedingsfiledbytherespondentNo.2underSection125oftheCode thentheproceedingsofCriminalMisc.[CASE NUMBER] transferredfromlearnedFamilyCourt,GodhratolearnedFamilyCourt, AhmedabadastherespondentNo.2andsonareresidingatAhmedabad. Learnedadvocatefurthersubmittedthattheminorsonisstudyingin3 rd standard in D.A.V. International School at Ahmedabad. Hence, the learned advocate has submitted that the cause, if any, has arisen to movetheapplicationundertheprovisionsofSection125oftheCodeat Ahmedabadandthereforethesaidproceedingsbetransferredasprayed for.
5. Ontheotherhand,learnedAPPMs.HBPunanihaspointedout thatthoughtherespondentNo.2hasinitiatedtheproceedingsunderthe provisionsoftheActof2005andActof1986,tilltoday,theconcerned Court has not passed any order of granting maintenance to the respondentNo.2.ThelearnedAPPhassubmittedthatthepetitionerhas giventheapplicationExh.15onlywithaviewtodelaytheproceedings of [CASE NUMBER]. The learned APP has furthersubmittedthateventherespondentNo.2-wifehasinitiatedthe proceedingsundertheprovisionsoftheActof2005aswellastheActof 1986 beforethe concernedCourtatGodhra, the petitioner hasnever raisedanygrievancewithregardtotransferofthoseproceedings,and therefore,now,itwouldnotbeproperonthepartofthepetitionerto seek the transfer of the proceedings, which are initiated by the respondent no.2 under the provisions of the Code, from the learned Family Court at Godhra to the learned Family Court at Ahmedabad. Further,incountertothecontentionraisedbythelearnedadvocatefor the petitioner that the wife is earning handsome amount by way of business of real estate and from other source and therefore the proceedings under the provisionsof [SECTION] ofthe Code maybe quashed,learnedAPPsubmittedthattheCourtmaynotdealwiththis contentionatthisstagesinceitistooearlyandprematureforthisCourt todealwiththiscontentionandthepetitionercanverywellraisethis contention before the learned Family Court at an appropriate stage. LearnedAPPfurtherreferredtotheprovisionsofSection3oftheActof 1986andtheprovisionsofSection125oftheCodeandsubmittedthatit isopenfortherespondentNo.2-wifetoinitiatetheproceedingsunder Section125oftheCodeandshecanclaimamountofmaintenanceper monthfromherhusband.LearnedAPPfurtherreferredtothereasoning givenbythelearnedFamilyCourtwhilerejectingtheapplicationExh.15 and submitted that no illegality is committed by the learned Family Court,andtherefore,whileexercisingpowersunderArticle227ofthe [ACT]thisCourtmaynotinterferewiththeimpugned orderpassedbythelearnedFamilyCourt.LearnedAPPrelieduponthe decisionoftheHon'bleApexCourtincaseof ShamimBanov.[ENTITY] [ENTITY].[ENTITY] reported in [PRECEDENT] and contended that the contentiononwhichthepetitionerhasquestionedtheimpugnedorderis nomore resintegra.LearnedAPPthussubmittedthatthepetitionmay bedismissed.
6. Havingheardthelearnedadvocatesfortherespectivepartiesand havinggonethroughthedocumentsproducedonrecord,itisclearthat the petitioner has given an application Exh.15 in [CASE NUMBER] withaviewtodelaytheproceedingsinitiatedbytherespondentNo.2- wifeunderSection125oftheCode.Fromtherecord,itisfurtherclear thattherespondentNo.2initiatedtheproceedingsundertheprovisions oftheActof2005on16.09.2013bysubmittinganapplicationtothe ProtectionOfficer,wherein,shehasclaimedvariousrelief/s.Thereafter, therespondentNo.2hasfiledanapplicationundersubsection(1)of Section3oftheActof1986beforethelearnedJudicialMagistrateFirst Class,Godhra,wherein,shehasprayedforgrantofanamountofRs.1 croreforfuturemaintenance.Inthemeantimeshehasalsoinitiatedthe proceedingsunderSection125oftheCodebeforethelearnedFamily CourtatGodhra,wherein,shehasprayedthatthehusbandbedirected topayRs.50,000/permonthbywayofmaintenancetoherandherson. WhenthisCourtinquiredfromthelearnedadvocateappearingforthe petitioner about the orders passed by the learned Magistrate in the applicationpreferredundertheprovisionsoftheActof1986aswellas intheapplicationpreferredundertheprovisionsoftheActof2005,the learnedadvocateforthepetitionerfairlysubmittedthattilltodayorder of maintenance is not passed by the Courts below in favour of respondent No.2 - wife. Thus, prima facie, it is clear that though respondentNo.2-wifehasinitiatedtheproceedingsandclaimedthe reliefundertheprovisionsoftheActof2005,tilltoday,theconcerned CourthasnotpassedanyorderinfavouroftherespondentNo.2-wife. Similarly,thelearnedMagistratehasalsonotpassedanyordergranting future maintenance in favour of respondent No.2 - wife in the proceedingsinitiatedunderthe provisionsoftheActof1986.Atthis stage,itisrelevanttonotethattheaforesaidtwoproceedingsarefiled byrespondentNo.2-wifealone,whereastheapplicationunder[SECTION]oftheCodeisfiledbyrespondentNo.2-wifeaswellasherminor son,whoisstudyingin3rdstandard.
7. Intheaforesaidfactualaspectsofthematter,now,Iwouldliketo refer to the relevant provisions of the Act of 1986 as well as the provisionsofSection125oftheCode.Section3oftheActof1986reads asunder:
"3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce.(1) Notwithstanding anythingcontainedinanyotherlawforthetimebeinginforce,a divorcedwomanshallbeentitledto
(a)areasonableandfairprovisionandmaintenancetobemade andpaidtoherwithintheiddatperiodbyherformerhusband;
(b)wheresheherselfmaintainsthechildrenborntoherbeforeor after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenancetobemadeandpaidbyherformerhusbandfora period oftwo years from the respective dates of birthof such children;
(c) anamountequaltothesumofmahrordoweragreedto be paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time thereafteraccordingtoMuslimlaw;and
(d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriageorafterthemarriagebyherrelativesorfriendsorthe husbandoranyrelativesofthehusbandorhisfriends.
(2) Whereareasonableandfairprovisionandmaintenanceor theamountofmahrordowerduehasnotbeenmadeorpaidor thepropertiesreferredtoinclause(d)ofsubsection(1)havenot beendeliveredtoadivorcedwomanonherdivorce,sheor any one duly authorised by her may, on her behalf, make an application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of such provision and maintenance, mahr or dower or the delivery of properties,asthecasemaybe.
(3) Whereanapplicationhasbeenmadeundersubsection(2) byadivorcedwoman,theMagistratemay,ifheissatisfiedthat
(a)herhusbandhavingsufficientmeans,hasfailedorneglected tomakeorpayherwithintheiddatperiodareasonableandfair provisionandmaintenanceforherandthechildren;or
(b)theamountequaltothesumofmahrordowerhasnotbeen paidorthatthepropertiesreferredtoinclause(d)ofsubsection (1)havenotbeendeliveredtoher,makeanorder,withinone monthofthedateofthe filingoftheapplication,directingher formerhusbandtopaysuchreasonableandfairprovisionand maintenancetothedivorcedwomanashemaydetermineasfit andproperhavingregardtotheneedsofthedivorcedwoman, thestandardoflifeenjoyedbyherduringhermarriageandthe meansofherformerhusbandor,asthecasemaybe,forthe paymentofsuchmahrordowerorthedeliveryofsuchproperties referredtoinclause(d)ofsubsection(1)tothedivorcedwoman;
ProvidedthatiftheMagistratefindsitimpracticabletodisposeof theapplicationwithinthesaidperiod,hemay,forreasonstobe recordedbyhim,disposeoftheapplicationafterthesaidperiod.
(4) Ifanypersonagainstwhomanorderhasbeenmadeunder subsection(3)failswithoutsufficientcausetocomplywiththe order,theMagistratemayissueawarrantforlevyingtheamount ofmaintenanceormahrordowerdueinthemannerprovidedfor levyingfinesundertheCodeofCriminalProcedure,1973(2of 1974)andmaysentencesuchperson,forthewholeorpartof anyamountremainingunpaidaftertheexecutionofthewarrant, toimprisonmentforatermwhichmayextendtooneyearor untilpaymentifsoonermade,subjecttosuchpersonbeingheard indefenceandthesaidsentencebeingimposedaccordingtothe provisionsofthesaidCode."
8.Now,therelevantpartoftheprovisionsofSection125oftheCode readsasunder:
"125.Orderformaintenanceofwives,childrenandparents.(1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain
(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether marriedornot,unabletomaintainitself,or
(c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself,or
(d) hisfatherormother,unabletomaintainhimselfor herself, aMagistrateofthefirstclassmay,uponproofofsuchneglector refusal,ordersuchpersontomakeamonthlyallowanceforthe maintenanceofhiswifeorsuchchild,fatherormother,atsuch monthlyratenotexceedingfivehundredrupeesinthewhole,as suchMagistratethinksfit,andtopaythesametosuchpersonas theMagistratemayfromtimetotimedirect:
Provided thatthe Magistratemay order the father of a minor femalechildreferredtoinclause(b)tomakesuchallowance, untilsheattainshermajority,iftheMagistrateissatisfiedthat the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessedofsufficientmeans.
[ProvidedfurtherthattheMagistratemay,duringthe pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenanceunderthissubsection,ordersuchpersontomakea monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of his wife or suchchild,fatherormother,andtheexpensesofsuchproceeding whichtheMagistrateconsidersreasonable,andtopaythesame tosuchpersonastheMagistratemayfromtimetotimedirect: Providedalsothatanapplicationforthemonthlyallowancefor theinterimmaintenanceandexpensesofproceedingunderthe secondprovisoshall,asfaraspossible,bedisposedofwithinsixty daysfromthedateoftheserviceofnoticeoftheapplicationto suchperson.] Explanation.For the purposes of this Chapter, (a) "minor"
meansapersonwho,undertheprovisionsoftheIndianMajority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875); is deemed not to have attained his majority;(b)"wife"includesawomanwhohasbeendivorcedby, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried.
Providedfurtherthatifsuchpersonofferstomaintainhiswifeon conditionofherlivingwithhim,andsherefusestolivewithhim, suchMagistratemayconsideranygroundsofrefusalstatedby her,andmaymakeanorderunderthissectionnotwithstanding suchoffer,ifheissatisfiedthatthereisjustgroundforsodoing. Explanation.Ifahusbandhascontractedmarriagewithanother woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just groundforhiswife'srefusaltolivewithhim.
(4) NoWifeshallbeentitledtoreceivean[allowanceforthe maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be] from her husband under this sectionifsheislivinginadultery,orif,withoutanysufficient reason,sherefusestolivewithherhusband,oriftheyareliving separatelybymutualconsent.
(5) Onproofthatanywifeinwhosefavouranorderhasbeen made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficientreasonsherefusestolivewithherhusband,orthatthey are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall canceltheorder."
9. Thus, from the aforesaid provisions of [SECTION] of the Act of 1986, it can be seen that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to a reasonableandfairprovisionandmaintenancetobemadeandpaidto herwithintheiddatperiodbyherformerhusbandandisalsoentitledto allthepropertiesgiventoherbeforeoratthetimeofmarriageorafter themarriagebyherrelativesorfriendsorthehusbandoranyrelatives ofthehusbandorhisfriends,whereas,theprovisionsofSection125of theCodearemeantformonthlymaintenancetothewife.
10. InthecaseofShamimBano(Supra),asobservedinpara7,"two issuescameupforconsiderationbeforetheHon'bleSupremeCourt,first waswhethertheappellant'sapplicationforgrantofmaintenanceunder Section125oftheCodeistoberestrictedtothedateofdivorceand,as anancillarytoit,becauseoffilingofanapplicationunderSection3of theActafterthedivorceforgrantofmahrandreturnofgiftswould disentitletheappellanttosustaintheapplicationunderSection125of the Code; and second, whether regard being had to the present fact situation,asobservedbythehighCourt,theconsentunderSection5of the Act was an imperative to maintain the application." The Hon'ble SupremeCourt,afterconsideringtheaforesaidprovisionsandvarious decisionsoftheHon'bleSupremeCourt,observedinpara13asunder:
"13. The aforesaid principle clearly lays down that even an application has been filed under the provisions of the Act, the MagistrateundertheActhasthepowertograntmaintenancein favourofadivorcedMuslimwomanandtheparametersandthe considerationsarethesameasstipulatedinSection125ofthe Code.Wemaynotethatwhiletakingnoteofthefactualscoreto the effect that the plea of divorce was not accepted by the MagistratewhichwasupheldbytheHighCourt,theConstitution Bench opinedthatastheMagistratecouldexercisepowerunder Section125oftheCodeforgrantofmaintenanceinfavourofa divorcedMuslimwomanundertheAct,theorderdidnotwarrant anyinterference.Thus,theemphasiswaslaidontheretentionof thepowerbytheMagistrateunderSection125oftheCodeand theeffectofultimateconsequence."
11. TheHon'bleSupremeCourtfurtherobservedinpara15,16and 17asunder:
"15. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that the High Courthasheldthatastheappellanthadalreadytakenrecourse toSection3oftheActafterdivorcetookplaceandobtainedrelief which hasbeenupheld by the HighCourt, the application for grantofmaintenanceunderSection125oftheCodewouldonly bemaintainabletillshewasdivorced.Itmaybenotedherethat duringthependencyofherapplicationunderSection125ofthe Codethedivorcetook place.Thewifepreferredanapplication under [SECTION] of the Act for grant of mahr and return of articles.ThelearnedMagistrate,asisseen,directedforreturnof thearticles,paymentofquantumofmahrandalsothoughtit appropriatetograntmaintenancefortheIddatperiod.Thus,in effect,nomaintenancehadbeengrantedtothewifebeyondthe Iddat period by the learned Magistrate as the petition was different. We are disposed to think so as the said application, which has been brought on record, was not filed for grant of maintenance. That apart, the authoritative interpretation in DanialLatifi(supra)wasnotavailable.Inanycase,itwouldbe travestyofjusticeiftheappellantwouldbemaderemediless.Her applicationunderSection125oftheCodewascontinuing.The husbandcontestedthesameonmeritswithoutraisingthepleaof absenceofconsent.EvenifanapplicationunderSection3ofthe Actforgrantofmaintenancewasfiled,theparametersof[SECTION]oftheCodewouldhavebeenmadeapplicable.Quiteapart from that, the application for grant of maintenance was filed prior to the date of divorce and hearing of the application continued.
16. Anotheraspectwhichhastobekeptuppermostinmindis that when the marriage breaks up, a woman suffers from emotionalfractures,fragmentationofsentiments,lossofeconomic andsocialsecurityand,incertaincases,inadequaterequisitesfor survival.Amarriageisfundamentallyauniquebondbetweentwo parties. When it perishes like a mushroom, the dignity of the femalefamegetscorroded.Itisthelaw'sdutytorecompense,and the primary obligation is that of the husband. Needless to emphasise,theentitlementandthenecessitousprovisionshaveto bemadeinaccordancewiththeparametersoflaw.
17. Underthesecircumstances,regardbeinghadtothedictum in [ENTITY]'s case,seekingofoptionwouldnotmakeany difference.TheHighCourtisnotcorrectinopiningthatwhenthe appellantwifefiledapplicationunderSection3oftheAct,she exercisedheroption.AstheMagistratestillretains thepowerof granting maintenance under [SECTION] of the Code to a divorced Muslim woman and the proceeding was continuing withoutanyobjectionandtheultimateresultwouldbethesame, therewasnojustificationonthepartoftheHighCourttohold that the proceeding after the divorce took place was not maintainable."
12. ThisCourtin the case [ENTITY] [ENTITY] (Supra),in para12,observedasunder:
"12.Itwasinlightoftheabovementioneddecision thatHon'ble ApexCourtconsideredtheissueofapplicabilityofSection125 afterenactmentofthe Actandthe issueaboutthe rightof Muslimdivorcedwomantopreferapplicationunder[SECTION] of the Code after enactment of the Act and to claim maintenanceafterIddatperiodonthegroundthatshehasnot remarriedandisnotabletomaintainherself/childrenstaying with her. After considering the decisions in case of [PRECEDENT] (supra), [ENTITY] (supra) and also upon consideringtheprovisionsunderSection125oftheCodeand theprovisionundertheAct,Hon'bleApexCourtobservedand [ENTITY] evena divorced Muslim woman would be entitled to claim maintenancefromherdivorcedhusband,aslongasshedoes notremarry.Thisbeingabeneficialpieceoflegislation,the benefitthereofmustaccruetothedivorcedMuslimwomen.In thesaiddecision Hon'bleApexCourtfurther observedthat, " It is held that even if a Muslim woman has been divorced, she would be entitled to claim maintenance from herhusbandunderSection125oftheCr.P.C.aftertheexpiry ofperiodofiddatalso,aslongasshedoesnotremarry"
13. InviewoftheaforesaiddecisionsoftheHon'bleSupremeCourt and this Court, it is clear that a divorced Muslim woman would be entitled to claim maintenance after Iddat period from her divorced husband as long as she does not remarry. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions,itisclearthattheproceedingsunderSection125oftheCode canbeinitiatedbythedivorcedMuslimwifeandshecanclaimmonthly maintenanceafterIddatperiodfromherdivorcedhusbandaslongasshe doesnotremarry.Similarly,shecanalsoinitiatetheproceedingsunder Section3oftheActof1986,whichisprovidingforgrantofreasonable andfairmaintenancewithintheIddatperiod.[ENTITY],itisalso clear from the record that till today no amount is awarded towards maintenanceto the respondentNo.2- wifeeither in the proceedings filedbyherundertheprovisionsoftheActof2005orintheproceedings undertheprovisionsofActof1986andthereforewhenshehasfiledthe proceedingsunderSection125oftheCode,itcannotbesaidthatitis notmaintainableandmoreparticularlythesaidproceedingsareinitiated bytherespondentNo.2-[ENTITY].
14. Now, so far as the contention with regard to the income of respondent No.2 is concerned, the petitioner has not produced any documentsfromwhichitcanbesaidthattherespondentNo.2isearning handsome amount and she is able to maintain herself as well as her minorson.Inabsenceofanyevidencewithrespecttotheincomeofthe petitioner,atthisstage,itisverydifficultforthisCourttocometoa definiteconclusionwithregardtotheincomeofrespondentNo.2andas suggestedbylearnedAPP,thepetitionercanverywellraisethisissue beforethelearnedtrialCourtatanappropriatestage.
15. Thelearnedadvocateforthepetitioneralternativelyprayedthatif thisCourtisnotinclinedtoquashtheimpugnedorderpassedbythe learned Family Court, Godhra, the proceedings initiated under the provisionsofSection125oftheCodebetransferredfromFamilyCourt atGodhratoFamilyCourtatAhmedabad.Inthisregard,itisrelevantto notethattherespondentNo.2-wifehasinitiateddifferentproceedings undertheprovisionsoftheActof2005aswellastheActof1986before theconcernedCourtsatGodhraandatnopointoftime,thepetitioner- husband has raised any objection with regard to transfer of those proceedings.Itprimafacieappearsthatthisprayerismadeonlywitha viewtodelaytheproceedingsandbyraisingthepointoftransfer,the petitioner is trying to escape from his liability of paying a fair and reasonablemaintenancetohisdivorcedwifeandhisminorson.
16. Thus,itfollowsfromtheforegoingdiscussionthatthecontention onwhichthepetitionerhasquestionedtheimpugnedorderisnomore resintegraandtheHon'bleApexCourthassettledtheissueandclarified thelegalpositioninvariousdecisions.Hence,thepetition challenging theimpugnedorderpassedbythelearnedJudge,FamilyCourt,Godhra belowapplicationExh.15inCriminalMisc[CASE NUMBER], mustfail.Theimpugnedorderdoesnotsufferfromanyinfirmity.The orderisinconsonancewiththeobservationsmadebyandlegalsituation clarifiedbyHon'bleApexCourtandthereforeitdoesnotwarrantany interference in petition under [SECTION] of [ACT]. Therefore, the petition deserves to be rejected and is accordingly rejected.
([ENTITY],J.) [PRECEDENT]