ORDER [ENTITY], J.
1. The present petition arises out of an eviction petition filed under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. In the course of hearing it appears that a statement was made on behalf of Petitioners that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. According to the Petitioners the recording of the statement was immediately ended. After hearing arguments on the same day, the Rent Controller dismissed the petition holding that the petition was not maintainable under [ACT] and that, therefore, no opportunity was given for cross-examination. It is this Order that has been assailed by the Petitioners/landlord in these proceedings under [SECTION] of the [ACT].
2. At the very threshold learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent had taken an objection pertaining to the non maintainability of the present petition under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. It was his contention that the landlord ought to have filed an Appeal under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Sub-section (1) of which reads as follows:
"38. Appeal to the Tribunal. (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller made under this Act only on questions of law to the Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) consisting of one person only to be appointed by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette:
"Provided that no appeal shall lie from an order of the Controller made under [SECTION]."
3. Learned counsel for the Respondent had further stated that if the petition was withdrawn with the purpose of filing of an Appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal, he would not raise the limitation as one of the grounds in opposition to the Appeal. Despite this concession learned counsel for the Petitioner had insisted that the present petition is maintainable. Arguments were heard on 5.12.2000. After they continued for some time learned counsel for the Petitioner asked for an adjournment on the ground that he would cite judgments to the effect that relief under [SECTION] of the [ACT] was the most appropriate relief. On the next date of hearing i.e. 7.12.2000 the Respondent again reiterated his assurance that if the present proceedings were transferred to the Rent Control Tribunal, he would not contest the Appeal on the grounds of delay. This offer was again declined by learned counsel for the Petitioner whose obduracy in insisting that the present petition was well founded cannot be appreciated for the reason that similar relief could as easily have been obtained from the Rent Control Tribunal.
4. Mr. [ENTITY], Learned counsel for the Petitioner, has relied on [PRECEDENT], , in which it was observed that "it is a well settled rule of practice of this Court not to interfere with the exercise of discretionary power under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT] merely because two views are possible on the facts of the case. It is also well established that it is only when an order of a Tribunal is violative of the fundamental basic principles of justice and fair play or where a patent or flagrant error in procedure or law has crept or where the order passed results in manifest injustice, that a court can justifiably intervene under [SECTION] of the [ACT]." Mr. [ENTITY] relied on the underlined portions to buttress his contention that the present petition was maintainable. However, what cannot be lost sight is the fact that the Supreme Court had expressed these views in the context of circumstances where an alternative and convenient remedy, such as [SECTION] of the [ACT] was available. In the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT], a Coordinate Bench observed as follows:
"6. The petition under [SECTION] of the [ACT] was wholly misconceived. An appeal lay from an order under [SECTION], [SECTION] setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale under [SECTION], [SECTION] to the District Judge. That apart, the application made by the petitioner claiming to be the legal representative of the surety, the judgment-debtor's representative, on the one hand and the auction-purchaser, the decree-holder's representative, on the other alleging that there had been a fraud perpetrated by the decree-holder in causing the sale to be held, with a prayer for recording satisfaction of the decree under [SECTION], raised a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and therefore fell within the purview of [SECTION] which prior to February 1, 1977 was appealable because then a decision under [SECTION] was deemed to be a decree under [SECTION] of the Code, and therefore the petitioner had the remedy of an appeal to the District Judge. Even if no appeal lay against the impugned orders of the learned Subordinate Judge, the petitioner had the remedy of filing a revision before the High Court under [SECTION] of the Code. Upon any view of the matter, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under [SECTION].
7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under [SECTION] of the [ACT] is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority," and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent of the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under [SECTION], the High Court does not act as an appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigth the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision."
5. It was the contention of Mr. [ENTITY], learned counsel for the Petitioner that an Appeal under [SECTION] was not maintainable from every Order of the Controller, but such Order should have been (a) "made under the Act" and that too (b) "only on question of fact. No decision was cited before me to the effect that the dismissal of an eviction petition was not an Order under the Act. Furthermore, since the arguments put forward on behalf of Petitioner/landlord was that the Rent Controller had erred in stopping the statement made on behalf of Petitioner midway, and had failed to appreciate that the relationship of landlord and tenant had been admitted by the Respondent, the procedure followed by her was incorrect. If this is so the grievance of the Petitioners/landlord would squarely raise a question of law in contradistinction of a question of fact.
6. I see no merit in the petition under [SECTION] of the [ACT] and since the matter was heard over two days, it is dismissed with costs of Rs.5,000/- to be paid by the Petitioner within thirty days in favor of the 'Prime Ministers Relief Fund', by Demand Draft, to be deposited with the Registrar of this Court for onward transmission.