JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. This writ petition and the other eleven writ petitions mentioned in the Schedule raise the common controversies, namely, (i) the validity of [SECTION] read with [SECTION] of the [ENTITY]asthan Panchayati [ENTITY] Act, 1994; (ii) the legality and correctness of the orders passed by the respective Chief Executive Officer, by which the petitioners were declared disqualified; and (iii) the jurisdiction of the Chief Executive Officer to hold an enquiry in the matter of declaring a Panch of a Member of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution to continue as the [ENTITY] as he has incurred the disqualification on account of birth of an additional child in the family raising the number of the children to more than two. As all these writ petitions involve the common questions of law and facts, therefore, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The petitioner was declared elected as the [ENTITY] of Gram Panchayat, Baner (district Bhilwara) on 4.2.95. While he was acting as the [ENTITY], a notice dated 9.7.96 issued under [SECTION] of the [ENTITY]asthan Panchayati [ENTITY] Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act') was served on the petitioner on 12.7.96 stating therein that on account of increase in the number of the children in the family to more than two after 27.11.95, the petitioner has rendered himself ineligible to hold the Office of the [ENTITY] and, therefore, why he should not be declared 'disqualified to hold the Office of the [ENTITY] of Gram Panchayat, Banera?
3. The petitioner filed reply to this notice challenging the jurisdiction of the Chief Executive Officer to hold the enquiry on the grounds that (i) no notification has been issued declaring the Chief Executive Officer to be the Competent authority under [SECTION] of the Act; (ii) the enquiry can be conducted only by the Judicial Authority under [SECTION] of the Act as the petitioner does not admit the allegations made in the notice; and (iii) copy of the complaint has not been supplied to him.
4. The Chief Executive Officer passed the order Annexure 3 on 17-7-96 declaring the petitioner as 'disqualified' to hold the Office of the [ENTITY] and further declared the Office of the [ENTITY] as becoming vacant. The petitioner has challenged this order Annexure. 3 on the grounds that (i) the order has been passed in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice and without dealing with the preliminary objections raised by the petitioner; (ii) since the petitioner has not admitted the allegations made against him in the notice, it was imperative and obligatory on the part of the competent authority to refer the matter for judicial determination on the question of disqualification of the petitioner and the Chief Executive Officer has no authority to determine the disqualification; (iii) the disqualification envisaged under [SECTION] of the Act deals with the qualification at the time of election and not any subsequent disqualification; and (iv) the question regarding disqualification can be raised within thirty days by filing an election petition in accordance with [SECTION] of the Act read with [SECTION] of the Rules and cannot be challenged otherwise. The petitioner has further submitted that [SECTION] is ultra-vires of the [ACT] and there is no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved in enacting these provisions. In the other writ petitions, also, the legality of the orders has been challenged almost on the identical grounds.
5. learned Additional Advocate General as well as the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Chief Executive Officer and Zila Parishads, on the other hand, have supported the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer and submitted that the Chief Executive Officer was competent to pass the order as there was failure to respond to by denial on behalf of the petitioner regarding the allegations made in the notice and no reply to the notice was received till the matter was decided by the Chief Executive-Officer. The learned Additional Advocate General as well as the learned Counsel for the respondents have further submitted that the provisions of [SECTION] of the Act do not suffer from the vice of discrimination or arbitrariness and they have been made by the Legislature within its competence.
6. Before embarking upon the discussion on the controversy involved in the writ petitions, we think it proper first to state the facts under which the relevant provisions of the Act were enacted.
7. Panchayats are the institutions of the Local Self-Government in the rural areas. [SECTION] of the [ACT], which enshrines one of the Directive Principles of the State Policy, lays down that the State shall take steps to organise Village Panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as the unit of Self-Government. Looking to the past experience of long years though the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institutions in the rural areas were in existence but these institutions failed to acquire the status and dignity of viable and responsive people's bodies. It was, therefore, considered necessary to enshrine in the [ACT] itself certain basic and essential features of the Local Authorities to impart certainty, continuity and strength to them. To achieve this object, the Parliament passed the [ACT] which received the assent of His Excellency the President of India on 20-4-93. By this amendment, a new [SECTION] consisting of [SECTION] relating to Panchayats, was inserted in the [ACT]. This amendment, also, added [SECTION] to the [ACT], in which a List of subject matters has been given and the matters given in [SECTION]G with respect to the powers, authority and responsibility will vest in the Panchayats.
8. The striking feature of the new provisions inserted in the [ACT] by [SECTION] are that they are in the nature of basic provisions which are to be supplemented by law made by the respective State Legislatures because Local Government including the Self-Government Institutions for the rural areas, is an exclusive State Subject under [SECTION]. The Union, thus, cannot enact any law to create right and liability relating to these subjects. The [ENTITY]asthan Legislative Assembly, therefore, enacted this [ENTITY]asthan Panchayati [ENTITY] Act. The [ENTITY]asthan Panchayati [ENTITY] Act is an implementing legislation undertaken by the State of [ENTITY]asthan within the frame-work of the scheme/Out-line set-out by the Union by inserting [SECTION] in the [ACT].
9. [SECTION] of the Act deals with the qualification for election as a Panch or a Member and provides that every person registered as a voter in the List of Voters of a Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution, shall be qualified for election as a Panch or, as the case may be, a Member of such Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution unless such person is disqualified for the conditions mentioned in Sub-clauses (a) to (L). [SECTION] provides that a person is disqualified to be elected as a Panch or a Member to the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution if he hats more than two children.
10. Proviso (iv) to [SECTION] states that the birth during the period from the date of commencement of this Act, hereinafter in this proviso referred to as the date of such commencement to 27.11.95, of an additional child shall not be taken into consideration for the purpose of disqualification mentioned in Clause (L) and a person having more than two children (excluding the child, if any, born during the period from the date of such commencement to 27.11.95) shall not be disqualified under that Clause for so long as the number of children he/she had on the date of commencement of this Act, does not increase.
11. The Explanation appended to [SECTION] states that for the purpose of Clause (L) to [SECTION] where the couple has only one child from the earlier delivery or deliveries on the date of commencement of this Act and thereafter any number of children born out of a single subsequent delivery, shall be deemed to be one entity.
12. [SECTION] of the Act deals with the cessession of Membership. The Section provides that subject to the provisions of [SECTION], a Member of a Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution shall not be eligible to continue as the Member if (a) he is or becomes subject to any disqualification specified in [SECTION]. [SECTION] states that whenever it is made to appear to the competent authority that the Member has become ineligible to be continued as a Member for any of the reasons specified in Sub-section (1), the competent authority may, after giving him an opportunity of hearing, declare him to have become so ineligible and thereupon he shall vacate the' office as such a Member.
13. The proviso to Sub-section (2) further provides that no such opportunity shall be given if such person has, under [SECTION], been determined by the Judge to be, or to have become ineligible under [SECTION]. [SECTION] of the Act deals with the powers of the Judge to. decide the question of disqualification. [SECTION] states that whenever it is alleged that any Member of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution is, or has become, disqualified and such member does not admit the allegations or whenever any Member is himself in doubt whether or not he is or has become disqualified for being a member, such member or the competent authority or any Member of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution concerned, may apply to the District Judge having jurisdiction for a decision on the allegations or doubt.
14. In the light of these provisions enacted by the State Legislature, now we will like to consider the various controversies involved in these writ petition.
15. The first ground on which the order of the Chief Executive Officer has been challenged by the petitioners is that no notification appointing the Chief Executive Officer as the competent authority, under [SECTION] of the Act has been issued and, therefore, the Chief Executive Officer was riot the competent authority to pass the order declaring the petitioners as the disqualified persons.
16. The contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is devoid of any substance because the respondents, alongwith the reply, have placed on record the Gazette Notification dated [SECTION].12.94 (Annexure [SECTION] appointing the Chief Executive Officer of the concerned Zila Parishad as the competent authority under [SECTION] of the Act in the case of [ENTITY] or a Panch, relating to the disqualification under [SECTION] of the Act. In view of this Notification appointing the Chief Executive Officer as the 'competent authority', the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is bereft of any substance.
17. The next ground on which the order declaring the petitioners as disqualified to hold the Office, has been challenged is that in view of the provisions of [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the Act, the Chief Executive Officer was not competent to hold an enquiry and to declare the petitioners as being disqualified to hold the Office.
18. [SECTION] provides the manner in which the action has to be taken by the Chief Executive Officer when it is made to appear to him that the Member has become ineligible to continue as a Member for any of the reasons specified in [SECTION]. This Sub-section provides that after giving an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned, the Chief Executive Officer may declare the person concerned to be ineligible, but no such opportunity is required when the determination has already been made by the Judge under [SECTION] of the Act.
19. [SECTION] authorises the Judge to decide the question of disqualification when such member, against whom the allegations are made, does not admit the allegations. [SECTION] further provides that the question regarding disqualification can be raised before the Judge by the competent authority or by any Member who is in doubt whether or not he is or has become disqualified to be a Member or by any Member of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution.
20. [SECTION] starts with the expression "subject to the provisions of [SECTION]". The expression "subject to the provisions of [SECTION]" means 'conditional upon' the observance of the conditions prescribed and the restrictions imposed by [SECTION]. The expression introduces a condition or a proviso. The expression "subject to the provisions of [SECTION]" is not merely referential but means subject to the compliance of [SECTION]. A harmonious consideration of [SECTION] and [SECTION], therefore, reflects that the power of the Chief Executive Officer has been taken away in respect of the enquiry entrusted to the Judge under [SECTION] of the Act. The enquiry regarding the disqualification, there fore, falls within the exclusive domain of the Judicial Authority where there is a denial of the allegations.
21. The Chief Executive Officer can pass an order under [SECTION] and can hold an enquiry only where there is no denial of the allegations, i.e., there is an admission of the allegations by the person concerned, otherwise in all other matters relating to the disqulification under [SECTION], the Chief Executive Officer, to whom a complaint is made, or it is made to appear to him that the member has become ineligible to be continued as a member for any of the reasons specified in [SECTION], he is obliged to refer the question of disquaification for adjudication to the District Judge for his decision, as the enquiry envisaged falls within the excluded filed of power of the Chief Executive Officer. It is the decision of the Judicial Authority under [SECTION] on the question of disqualification which will be final and after the decision is given by the Judicial Authority under [SECTION] regarding the disqualification, the Chief Executive Officer thereafter can declare the person concerned to have become ineligible to hold the Office and on such declaration being made by the Chief Executive Officer, the Panch or the Member of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution shall vacate his/her Office as such a Member. The Chief Executive Officer was, therefore, not right to hold the enquiry in the present matters as there was no admission of the allegations by the petitioners.
22. Admission is a positive act of acknowledgement or confession. It is a conscious and deliberate act and not something which could be inferred. A party, by a voluntary acknowledgement of the existence of certain facts during the judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, can concede as true or valid the allegations made in the proceedings or in the notice. This formal act of acknowledgement during the proceedings waives or' dispenses with the production of evidence by conceding for the purpose of litigation that proposition of facts claimed by the opponent is true. Mere failure to respond by denial or silence or inaction, in response to the notice, cannot be treated as an 'admission'. No acknowledgement or implied admission can be inferred from silence, inaction ro failure to act. Admission with respect to existence of certain facts, which are in issue or relevant to an issue in the case, should be in express terms. Merely because the allegations have not been denied, it cannot be admitted to be established. The omission to answer the notice by itself cannot be treated as an evidence of truth of the statement/allegations made in the notice. The allegations can be said to have been proved only when there is a conscious and deliberate admission in express terms. No such admission has been made by the petitioners in these proceedings, rather there were denial of the allegations by the petitioners. In this view of the matter it is only after holding the enquiry under [SECTION] of the Act by the Judge concerned that the declaration regarding disqualification could have been made. No such enquiry in the present case was held by the Judicial Authority under [SECTION] of the Act and, therefore, the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer declaring the petitioners as 'disqualified' to hold the office, are therefore wholly without jurisdiction.
23. The next contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that [SECTION] deals with the disqualification which was in existence prior to the election and subsequent disqualification cannot disentitle the petitioners to hold the office and when once the person is elected, the subsequent event cannot hold the elected representative disqualified to continue in the Office.
24. [SECTION] clearly speaks of a person not being eligible to continue to be such member if he is, or has become, subject to any of the disqualifications specified in [SECTION]. [SECTION], therefore, stands incorporated in [SECTION] also for continuance as a Member of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution and makes a provision for declaring a person disqualified who has incurred the disqualification after being elected as the Panch or a Member of the Panchayati [ENTITY] Institution. Clauses (b) to (f) also deal with the disqualification which are incurred by the Panch or a Member of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution after he was declared elected. The word "becomes" used in [SECTION] and the word "continue" used in [SECTION] clearly speaks about the disqualifications incurred by the elected representative after he/she was declared elected. Thus, the elected [ENTITY], Panch or a Member can be declared to be disqualified if he/she incurred the disqualification mentioned in [SECTION] after the election and, therefore, they cease to be the [ENTITY] or Member of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution as they are not eligible to be continued as such members on account of their incurring the disqualification mentioned in [SECTION]. The contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is, therefore, bereft of any substance.
25. The next ground on which the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer has been challenged is that after a person is declared elected, his election can be challenged only by way of filing an election petition in accordance with [SECTION] of the Act read with [SECTION] of the Rules. These two provisions make a provision calling in question the election of any candidate by presenting an election petition on the prescribed grounds and within the prescribed period. The election of a person can be called in question under [SECTION] only on the grounds which are in existence at the time of filing the nomination and holding the election. If any person incurred the disqualification subsequent to his election envisaged under [SECTION] then the action can be taken against that candidate only under [SECTION] and [SECTION] and not by way of filing an election petition under [SECTION]. [SECTION] deals with the challenge to the election of a particular person on the ground existing at the time of election and not on the ground of disqualification incurred later on.
[SECTION]. Now coming to the validity of [SECTION] of the Act. The validity of the provision has been challenged on the grounds that (i) there is no authorisation under the [ACT] to the Legislature to legislate such provision; (ii) the provisions are arbitrary and discriminatory and are against the basic features of the [ACT] (iii) infringe the privacy and right of procreation of more than two children and thus violative of [SECTION]; (iv) there is no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved; and (iv) it is violative of [SECTION] of the [ACT].
27. The arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners challenging the Validity of the provisions of [SECTION] read with [SECTION] of the Act, though appear to be attractive but are bereft of any substance. [SECTION] of the [ACT], which is in the nature of basic provision, provides that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being a member of a Panchayat. [SECTION] thus permits a provision being raised by the State Legislature laying down disqualification of being chosen and to be continuing as a member of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution. The conditions therefore, can be laid down by the State Legislature while legislating the law relating to the disqualification for being chosen as well as for being continued as a Member of the Panchayat. We are, therefore, of the view that the [ENTITY]asthan Panchayati [ENTITY] Act, 1994, which is an implementing legislation under taken by the State Government, has been legislated within the frame-work of the Scheme set-out by the [ACT] in accordance with [SECTION] of the [ACT].
28. Besides [SECTION], [SECTION] authorises the State Legislature to make any law relating to Local Government. [SECTION], i.e., the [SECTION] of the [ACT] authorises the Union of India and the State Legislature to frame the law on population control and family planning. Entries mentioned in [SECTION] are the fields of legislation and not the powers. Power to legislate are drawn from the relative Articles of the [ACT]. The State Legislature derives powers to enact laws relating to the Local Government from [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT]. To enact a law relating to the Local Bodies, is in the exclusive domain of the State Legislature. We, therefore, up-hold the validity of these provisions in view of [SECTION], [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT].
29. [SECTION], thus, cannot be said to be enacted by the legislature in excess of the powers vested in it, rather it is within the competence of the State Legislature to legislate such law under [SECTION] read with [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT].
30. The next ground on which the validity of [SECTION] has been challenged is that it is arbitrary and discriminatory. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the disqualification to contest the election or to continue as the elected representative has been provided by [SECTION] of the Panchayati [ENTITY] Act only with respect to the election of a [ENTITY], Panch or a Member of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution but no such conditions or restrictions have been made with respect to the Members of Parliament or a Member of State Legislative Assembly In the [ACT], or in other elections like that of Cooperative Societies etc. and thus violates [SECTION] of the [ACT].
31. The principle of equality enshrined in [SECTION] of the [ACT] does not mean that every law must have a universal application. [SECTION] does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation provided the classification is based on intelligible differentia and is not arbitrary. Every classification though likely to produce an inequality but inequality alone cannot determine the question of [ACT]ality. The State, for the purpose of giving effect to its Policies, can make laws classifying and distinguishing persons to be subjected to such law. The mandate of [SECTION] is that all persons similarly situated should not be discriminated and not that the same Rule of law should be applicable to all the elected bodies. By the process of classification the State has the power to make the law for a particular set of persons. [SECTION] cannot be used for declaring a Law made by the State unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions made in the State Law and the law made by the Centre. Two laws made by different legislature, i.e., one by the Centre and the other by the State, cannot be read in conjection.
32. It has been held by the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] that [SECTION] does not authorise the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that it contrasts with the law of another State on the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory nor does it contemplate a law of the Centre or of a State dealing with similar subjects being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the two enactments. The sources of authority for the two statutes being different, [SECTION] of the [ACT] can have no application." The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Sant Lal Bharti v. State of Punjab
33. The provisions of [SECTION], therefore, cannot be declared as arbitrary or discriminatory as no provision has been made with respect to the Members of Parliament, Members of the State Legislative Assembly or the Members of Cooperative Societies etc. etc. The [ACT] relating to the Members of Parliament and the Members of State Legislative Assemblies, has been enacted by the Centre while the present law has been enacted by the State Legislative Assembly. [SECTION] of the [ACT] has no application in the present case because the sources of Authority for both these laws are different. It is the function of the Legislature of the State concerned to follow the method considered to be suited for that State. The law can be made applicable gradually in a particular set of circumstances to a particular set of persons.
34. [SECTION] does not prevent the Legislature for the gradual Introduction of reforms. It is open to the State Legislature to select even a single institution for the purpose of implementing its Policy. Implementation of a Policy in a phased manner is not prohibited by [SECTION] of the [ACT]. It has been held by the Supreme Court in: [PRECEDENT].
There can be no doubt that when nationalisation has to be done in a phased manner, all the institutions cannot be taken over at a time. The nationalisation in a phased manner contemplates that by and by the object of nationalisation will be taken over. Therefore, in implementing the nationalisation of private institutions in a phased manner, the Legislature has started with the Institute. Therefore, the question of singling out the Institute or treating it as a class by itself does not arise, for as the provisions of the Act and the Ordinance go, all the private educational institutions, as defined in [SECTION] of the Act, will be nationalised in a phased manner.
35. [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the Act, therefore, clearly show a nexus between the classification and the object of the Act under consideration and these provisions are, therefore, not violative of [SECTION] of the [ACT].
36. The validity of these provisions have, also, been challenged on the ground that they are violative of [SECTION] of the [ACT] as it puts restrain on the inherent and natural human right of procreation of third and subsequent child and infringes the right of privacy. We have considered this aspect of the case, also. What is guaranteed under [SECTION] is that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Right to marry and right to procreation of third and subsequent child is neither a Common Law right nor a right recognised or embodied in the [ACT]. [SECTION] forbids a registered voter to be elected as a [ENTITY], Panch or a Member of a Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution if. he has more than two children. [SECTION] imposes a condition for the eligibility of his continuance in the Office if he/she becomes subject to any of the disqualification specified in [SECTION] of the Act.
37. These provisions have been enacted by the Legislature to control menace of population explosion. Growing population is one of the major problem which India is facing today. Population progresses by geometrical progress while the resources increase only at an arthematical rate. [ENTITY] has stated "Poulation explosion is more dangerous than the hydrogen bomb." The legislative power to deal with the population matter effectively, purposely, meaningfully, objectively and efficiently stem basically from the social policy contained in the Directive Principles of the State Policy enshrined in [SECTION] of the [ACT]. This social policy is designed to secure social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, adequate means of livelihood, raising the level of nutrition and standard of living, improving public health etc. These objectives can be achieved if the rapidly increasing population is controlled and the rate of population growth is essentially minimised otherwise all these policies will remain in vacuum. Imposing the conditions by providing the disqualification in the election of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution is a first step to achieve this goal. The Leaders at the grass-root level have to put an example before the electorates. The disqualification provided in [SECTION] cannot be said to be against the basic human dignity or against the right to life and personal liberty. The right to be elected is neither a fundamental right nor a Common Law right. It is a statutory right which flows from the statute. A statutory right created under the statute is subject to the limitations provided under a particular statute. According to [SECTION], every person registered as a voter of a Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution, is qualified for election as a Panch or a Member of the Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution. The right to be elected, thus, flows from [SECTION] of the Act and, therefore, this right accrues to a person concerned is subject to the restrictions contained in [SECTION] or other provisions of the Act.
38. It has been held by the Supreme Court in: [PRECEDENT]. that "a right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough neither a fundamental right nor a Common Law right. It is pure and simple a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Out-side of statute there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations, they are and, therefore, subject to statutory limitations."
39. Right to privacy and liberty are not absolute rights. A law imposing reasonable restrictions upon it for compelling interest of State must be held to be valid. The restriction imposed in [SECTION] does not outrage the dignity of the individual. The object of this provision is to control population growth and family planning and such type of interference is necessary in a democratic society in the economic welfare of the country. The restrictions has been laid down with a social purpose, i.e., to fulfil the mandate given in the Directive Principles enshrined in the [ACT]. If the population growth is not controlled and family planning is not observed then looking to the limited sources available with the country, it will be difficult for the State to achieve these goals.
[SECTION]. The Supreme Court, in [PRECEDENT]. considering the danger of over-population and the necessity of the family planning programme, observed:
In the first place the provision preventing the third pregnancy with two existing children would be in the larger interest of the health of the Air Hostesses concerned as also for the good upbringing of the children. Secondly, as indicated above, while dealing with the Rule regarding prohibition of marriage within four years, same considerations would apply to a bar of third, pregnancy where two children are already there because then the entire world is facing with the problem of population explosion, it will not only be desirable but absolutely essential for every country to see that the family planning programme is not only whipped up but maintained at sufficient levels so as to meet the danger of over-population which, if not controlled, may lead to serious social and economic problems through-out the world.
41. Law is enacted to serve the need of the society. It has to keep pace with the aspirations and need of the society as well as to take into consideration the changing concept of the value. It is only with an intention to serve the social purpose, namely, to control the problem of population explosion that these provisions have enaction. We fail to find any constitutional infirmity or any element of arbitrariness in these provisions. There is no invasion of any constitutional right of any person. There is, also, no invasion on the part of the Legislature in marital right of a person concerned or a right or procreation of children. It is a statutory right guaranteed under the Panchayati [ENTITY] Act to be elected but that right is with certain restrictions and if somebody wants to assert that right, he has to abide by such restrictions because this statutory right is subject to statutory restrictions contained in the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the restrictions imposed in [SECTION] neither out-rage the dignity of a person nor it infringe any of the fundamental rights, Common Law right or a marital right of procreation of a child.
42. We, also, fail to understand how the provisions of [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the Act are against the basic structure or features of the [ACT]. There is a reasonable nexus in framing these provisions with the object sought to be achieved. The object which is sought to be achieved is to implement the family planning programme and restrict the family to check the population explosion which is one of the major problems which India is facing today. Though having more than two children does not, in any way, affect the workings of the [ENTITY], Panch or a Member of a Panchayat [ENTITY] Institution but the population explosion has affected the economic condition of the State and it is with the purpose to implement the mandate of the Directive Principles of the State Policy that this measure was considered necessary. These provisions, according to us also, do not violate [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT] as there is no invasion of any of the right to freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. These provisions, also, do not invade the right of petitioners of freedom to profess his/her religious affairs. A person out of the marital life can, produce more than two children but in that case the statutory right conferred upon a voter under the Act will not be available to him as these are the rights created under the statute and are subject to the statutory limitations. There is, thus, no violation of [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT].
43. We are, therefore, of the opinion that [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ENTITY]asthan Panchayati [ENTITY] Act, 1994 are not violative of any of the provisions of the [ACT].
44. In the result, the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are partly allowed. The validity of [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ENTITY]asthan Panchayati [ENTITY] Act, 1994 is up-held but the order Annexure. 3 in this writ petition, as well as the orders passed in the writ petitions mentioned in the Schedule, declaring the petitioners as 'disqualified', are quashed and set-aside as being passed by the Chief Executive Officer without an enquiry being conducted by the Judicial Authority under [SECTION] of the Act.