JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bangalore Rural District, has dismissed [CASE NUMBER] filed by the claimants-appellants herein for payment of compensation on the ground that the accident resulting in the death of late Sri [ENTITY] was not attributable to any fault on the part of the driver of the vehicle in which he was travelling nor did the same arise out of the use of any motor vehicle. The present appeal filed by the claimants assails the correctness of the said order.
2. The deceased Sri [ENTITY] was working as Head Master in the Government High School at Sooda in Dakshina Kannada. On 7.4.1995 he was traveling in a bus owned by the respondent-Corporation from Udupi to Bangalore in connection with certain official business. When the bus reached a place near Gandhi Farm on the Kunigal-Bangalore road at about 6.45 a.m., a Banyan tree growing on the side of the road fell on the running bus resulting in the death of the Sri [ENTITY] and two other passengers travelling in the same. A claim petition for payment of compensation was originally filed by the widow, minor, children and the parents of the deceased under [SECTION] of the [ACT] before the Tribunal at Bangalore. The said petition was subsequently amended so as to make a claim for compensation on no fault basis in terms of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. The claim was opposed by the respondent-Corporation giving rise to the following five issues:
"1. Whether the petitioners prove that [ENTITY] died in motor vehicle accident which occurred on 7.8.1995 at 6.45 a.m. on Kunigal Bangalore road while he was travelling in KSRTC bus bearing Regn. No. KA-01-F-1164?
2. Whether the petitioners prove that this petition is maintainable in law?
3. Whether the petitioners prove that they are entitled to compensation? If so, to what amount?
4. Whether the respondent proves that it is not liable to pay compensation as the accident was not due to rash and negligent driving by its driver?
5. What order or award?"
3. While the widow of the deceased appeared in support of the claim petition, the Corporation examined the driver of the bus in rebuttal. By its judgment and order dated 4.7.1998 impugned in this appeal, the Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition. It has while dealing with issues 1 to 4 come to the conclusion that the accident in question had not arisen out of the use of the vehicle owned by the Corporation, The accident was according to the Tribunal as a result of vis major for which neither the driver of the bus nor the owner thereof could be held responsible. The claim for payment of compensation was on those findings dismissed as already mentioned above.
4. Appearing for the appellants, Mrs. [ENTITY], strenuously argued that the view taken by the Tribunal was palpably erroneous. She contended that the Tribunal had totally misunderstood the expression "arising out of the use of motor vehicle" appearing in [SECTION] of the [ACT] and ignored the legislative object behind the introduction of the said provisions. She argued that the 1994 amendment of the [ACT] by which [SECTION] was added to the statute book was intended to ensure speedy disposal of claims arising out of the motor vehicle accidents. Proof of fault in cases that qualified for determination under [SECTION] was by reason of the language employed in the Section made unnecessary. The victim of a road accident or his legal representatives could therefore claim compensation in accordance with the structured formula given in the [SECTION] supra upon proof of the fact that the accident had arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle. The accident in question was according to the learned counsel clearly referable to the use of the motor vehicle in which the deceased was travelling. The only condition required to be satisfied for maintaining a claim or award of compensation under the said provision had thus been satisfied by the appellants. In as much as the Tribunal had rejected the claim notwithstanding the material on record and the admitted position that the deceased died in an accident involving the use of the bus owned by the respondent-Corporation, it had committed a mistake that deserved to be corrected in appeal.
5. On behalf of the respondent-Corporation, it was on the other hand argued by Mr. [ENTITY] that the driver of the vehicle in which the deceased was travelling was in no way responsible for the accident. The accident in question had according to the learned Counsel occurred due entirely to an act of God and could not have been avoided by the driver despite due care and caution. He further argued that even when the claimants under [SECTION] may not be required to prove negligence on the part of the driver or the owner of the motor vehicle involved in the accident, it was open to the owner of the vehicle to establish by leading affirmative evidence that the driver or the owner were in no way at fault. Once it was established that the owner or the driver was not at fault, the claim petition for payment of compensation was bound to fail. He urged that the payment of compensation in terms of the [ACT] was based on the common law principle that the liability to pay compensation arises upon proof of negligence on the part of the tort-feasor and not otherwise. That position has not according to Mr. [ENTITY] been displaced by the enactment of [SECTION] The Tribunal was therefore justified in dismissing the claim petition.
6. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made at the bar. [SECTION] was added to the [ACT] by an amendment in the year 1994. The purpose underlying the introduction of the said provisions was examined by the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT]. The Court declared that the object underlying the amendment was to determine and pay compensation on the basis of a predetermined formula, which itself is based on the criteria relevant for determining compensation in fault cases.
Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of the ever increasing motor vehicles accidents in a fast moving society. The Court further held that the law before the introduction of [SECTION] gave a limited benefit to the extent provided under [SECTION] for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking a long time before the Tribunals.
That mischief was sought to be remedied by introducing [SECTION] and the disease of delay sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on the basis of a structured formula. If that be the purpose underlying the introduction of [SECTION] as indeed it is, we see no reason how proof of fault can still be made a basis for denying relief under the said provision. The claimant is on the plain language employed in [SECTION] not required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or any other person. This implies that the right to seek compensation for death or injury would be enforceable under [SECTION] to the Act even in the absence of any plea or proof of the accident having resulted from any rash or negligent act on the part of the driver of the vehicle. The argument of Mr. [ENTITY] that while the claimant need not plead or prove negligence of the driver, it is open to the owner or the driver of the vehicle to prove that there was no real negligence leading to the accident does not therefore commend itself to us. The provisions of [SECTION] are substantive in nature they have been held to be so in a full bench decision of this Court in [PRECEDENT]. The provision is not intended to introduce a rule of evidence merely shifting the burden of proof from the claimant to the owner or the driver of the vehicle. If the intention of the Parliament behind the introduction of [SECTION] was to simply shift the burden of proof to the owner or the driver of the vehicle, the provisions of [SECTION] would have been differently worded. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that a victim or legal heirs of a victim are entitled to claim compensation in terms of [SECTION] to the Act without either pleading or proving that the accident in question had resulted from any act of negligence or default on the part of the owner or the driver of the vehicle. All that need be shown by the claimant in support of the claim is that the injury or death which is made the basis for the claim arose out of the use of a motor vehicle.
7. That brings us to the question whether the accident leading to the death of the deceased in the instant case arose out of the use of the bus owned by the respondent-Corporation. The expression "due to accident arising out of use of motor vehicle" appearing in [SECTION] has not been defined. The decisions of the Supreme Court and that of this Court have however placed a definite meaning on the expression "arising out of the use of the motor vehicle". It is in our view unnecessary to refer to all the decisions on the subject in which the said expression was considered or interpreted by the Courts. Reference to three decisions of the Supreme Court should in our view suffice. The first of these decisions which bears direct relevance to the point urged before us was delivered in [PRECEDENT], . That was a case where a petrol tanker on National Highway-4 collided against a truck coming from the opposite direction. The tanker was on account of the collision thrown off the road on one side at some distance from the Highway. As a result of the over turning of the tanker, the petrol contained in it started leaking and got collected nearby. Few hours after the initial accident, an explosion took place in the petrol tanker resulting in a fire causing burn injuries to a number of persons who had gathered there to collect petrol that was leaking from the same. A claim petition filed for payment of compensation on account of the death of one such injured person raised the question whether the accident had arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle. The Supreme Court considered the question in the context of the provisions of the [ACT] and came to the conclusion that even when the tanker in question had turned turtle and could not be moved unless it was once again put back on wheels yet the explosion resulting in injuries to the people who had gathered to collect petrol was an accident arising out of the use of the vehicle. The following passages from the said decision is in this connection apposite:
"26. These decisions indicate that the word "use" in the context of motor vehicles, has been construed in a wider sense to include the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary, being either parked on the road and when it is not in a position to move due to some break-down or mechanical defect. Relying on the abovementioned decisions, the Appellate Bench of the High Court has held that the expression "use of a motor vehicle" in [SECTION] covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when it is stationary. With reference to the facts of the present case the learned Judges while proceeding along National Highway No. 4 (i.e., while in use) after colliding with a motor lorry was lying on the side and that it cannot be claimed that after the collision the use of the tanker had ceased only because it was disabled. We are in agreement with the said approach of the High Court. In our opinion, the word "use" has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of a break-down or mechanical defect or accident. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the petrol tanker was not in the use at the time when it was lying on its side after the collision with the truck.
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35. This would show that as compared to the expression "caused by", the expression "arising out of" has a wider connotation. The expression "caused by" was used in [SECTION] of the Act. In [SECTION], Parliament, however, chose to use the expression "arising out" which indicates that for the purpose of awarding compensation under [SECTION], the casual relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This construction of the expression "arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in [SECTION] enlarges the field of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment."
8. The issue was examined once again by the Apex Court in [PRECEDENT], The driver of an auto-rickshaw employed by the owner was in that case carrying passengers on hire. With a view to stealing the auto-rickshaw the passengers directed the driver to take the rickshaw to a lonely spot where the driver was murdered and the rickshaw stolen. The question that fell for consideration was whether the death of the driver of the rickshaw arose out of the use of the motor vehicle. The Court held that although the auto-rickshaw driver had been murdered in the course of a felony and with a view to steal the auto-rickshaw, the same was a death related to an accident within the meaning of [ACT]. The claim for compensation was accordingly allowed by their Lordships and the appeal filed by the Insurance Company before the High Court held not maintainable.
9. The third and an equally significant decision which the Supreme Court delivered in regard to the interpretation of the term "arising out of the use of the motor vehicle" is in [PRECEDENT]. In that case, because of the bursting of the front tyre of the vehicle, the vehicle appears to have hit the footpath and crushed a pedestrian. The question that arose was whether a claim for compensation could be maintained even if the driver of the vehicle was not proved to be negligent in driving the vehicle. The Supreme Court declared that jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide claims arising out of negligence in the use of Motor Vehicles. Negligence is only one of the species of causes of action for making a claim for compensation in respect of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles. It was further declared that even apart from [SECTION] which envisages no fault liability claim for compensation can be sustained by applying the Rule in [PRECEDENT] unless the said Rule is inapplicable on account of any one of the exceptions intervening. What is significant is that the Supreme Court recognised the principle that compensation on account of accident arising from the use of the motor vehicle can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute and that the [ACT] permits the payment of compensation on no fault liability basis.
10. We may at this stage also refer to the decision of the Kerala High Court in [PRECEDENT]., . That was a case where a bus had dashed against a way side electric post. Passengers of the bus started rescue operations after coming out of the bus in the process whereof one of the passengers who came in contact with a stray electric wire was killed. The argument advanced in opposition to the claim for payment of compensation was that the accident resulting in the death of the deceased passenger was not in any way related to the accident as it was not the part of the duty of the passenger to have started a rescue operation after the bus had collided against the electric post. Rejecting the contention, the division bench of the Kerala High Court held that the accident involving the death of the passenger had arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in supra, the Court held:
"It will be a travesty of justice if we deprive the legal representatives of the deceased of their right to claim compensation on the ground that the Act of the [ENTITY] was voluntary. [ENTITY] has acted as a responsible and good citizen in carrying a rescue operation. But for the rash and negligent driving, the accident would not have occurred. Rescue operation and resultant death of [ENTITY] are closely connected with the accident and we do not find any justification to deny compensation to the legal representatives of [ENTITY]."
11. It is evident from the above pronouncements that the expression "arising out of the use of the motor vehicle" has been given the widest interpretation by the Apex Court as also other Courts in the country having regard to the purpose underlying the motor vehicle legislation. If a tanker turned turtle explodes hours after the accident causing death of those who had gathered there to collect petrol that was leaking from the tanker, if a passenger who after the motor vehicle meets with an accident starts rescue operation to help the other trapped passenger and dies in the course of the same, if the pedestrian crushed by a vehicle on account of the bursting of the tyre or an autorickshaw driver killed by the passengers for stealing the autorickshaw can be said to be accidents arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, it is difficult to see how the accident in the instant case resulting in the death of the deceased while he was admittedly traveling in the bus owned by the respondent-Corporation on account of a tree falling on the vehicle can be held otherwise. It is true that but for the falling of the tree on the bus the deceased may not have lost his life, but the use of the vehicle on which the same fell and the death of the deceased are so closely inter-related that it is difficult to treat the death to be an act of God unrelated to such user. We have therefore no difficulty in holding that the Tribunal was in error in dismissing the claim petition on the ground that the accident in question had not arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle.
12. The only other aspect that remains to be examined is as to what is the amount of compensation payable to the claimants. The claim as noticed above one under [SECTION] without proof of fault. The schedule to the Act by reference to which the amount of compensation has to be determined and awarded however provides for compensation on no fault basis only in cases where the annual income of the injured or the deceased is below Rs. 40,000/-. That was not so in the present case. The deceased was working as a Head Master of the Government School and was drawing a salary of over Rs, 7,000/- per month. The annual income would therefore go far beyond the optimum provided under the Schedule. The question then is whether a person whose income is beyond the maximum provided under the Schedule can maintain a claim under [SECTION] An answer to that need not detain us for long as a full bench of this Court has in [PRECEDENT] . GENERAL MANAGER, KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANR. (supra) answered the said question authoritatively. Question No. 4 formulated by the full bench was answered in the following words:
"xxx xxx The legislature in its wisdom has thought it fit to provide the luxury of choice to persons whose income does not exceed Rs. 40,000/- in order to obviate the need for such persons to involve themselves in a long draw litigation, the cost and consequences of which may work to their disadvantage ultimate failure of justice. Such a beneficial provision which is more in the nature of advancement of social justice, keeping in view a select class of citizens, cannot be construed by Courts as applicable to all class of citizens. But, in case the person with the higher income notionally brings down his income to Rs. 40.000/ - in order to present his claim under [SECTION] the same can be permitted."
13. It follows that the claim made by the appellants can be entertained and granted only if the income of the deceased is notionally reduced to Rs. 40,000/- per annum. If that be so, we shall have to chose a multiple applicable for purposes of capitalization. A reference to [SECTION] to the Act would show that for victims in the age group of 45 to 50, the multiple applicable is 13. The said multiple can however be adopted only after 1/3rd of the gross income is deducted towards his personal expenses. If that is done, his contribution towards the family would work out to Rs. 26,670/- which when multiplied by 13 would take the amount of compensation on account of loss of dependency to Rs. 3,46,710/-. To that amount shall be added Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs. 5,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs. 2,500/- towards loss of estate permissible in terms of [SECTION] to the Act. The total amount payable to the appellants therefore goes upto Rs. 3,56,210/- which can be rounded off to Rs 3,56,500/-. The above amount shall earn interest at the rate of 8% p.a. from the date of the claim petition till payment.
14. Counsel appearing for the appellants submits that appellant No. 1, the widow of the deceased has passed away during the pendency of these proceedings leaving appellants 2 & 3 as her legal heirs in terms of an order dated 4.8.2000 passed by this Court on IA-I. That being so, the amount of compensation hereby determined shall be apportioned between appellants 2,3 & 5 only. Having heard counsel for the appellant on the question of apportionment, we deem it just and proper to direct that a sum of Rs- 50,000/- shall be disbursed to appellant No. 5, mother of the deceased. Whereas the balance shall be apportioned between appellants 2 & 3 equally. We further direct that out of the amount payable to appellants 2 and 3, 50% shall be invested by the Tribunal in a scheduled bank for a period of 5 years, in their individual names while the balance shall be released in favour of the appellants if they have attained majority. In both or any one of the two appellants still continues to be a minor, the amount to be disbursed to him/her shall be disbursed through his/her natural guardian. The Tribunal shall do well to satisfy itself about the age and the guardianship aspect of the minor before directing release of the amount. Interest earned on the amount invested in the bank may be withdrawn by appellants 2 & 3 every six months. The respondent-Corporation shall deposit the award amount within two months from today.
15. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part and to the extent indicated above in substitution of the order made by the Tribunal. No costs.