JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the Judgment and order dated March 2[SECTION], 1987 passed by the Designated Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol, in [CASE NUMBER], rejecting the application for releasing the applicants on bail, the applicants have filed this application under [SECTION] [SECTION] of the [ACT] to release them on bail.
2. The applicants and other persons are alleged to have committed the offences punishable under [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION] of the [ACT] and [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT], (hereinafter referred to as The [ACT]"). The incident took place on March 10, 1987. The applicants were arrested on the same day. The applicants filed an application before the Designated Court for releasing them on bail. The Designated Court arrived at the conclusion that prima facie the acts committed by the accused constitute an offence punishable under [SECTION] [SECTION] of the [ACT]. The Designated Court held that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused are responsible for the offence punishable under [SECTION] of the [ACT] and, therefore, under the provisions of [SECTION] they cannot be released on bail.
3. When this matter was called out before the learned single Judge, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the State of Gujarat that against the order dated March 2[SECTION], 1987 passed by the Designated Court under the [ACT], the application under [SECTION] or [SECTION] of the [ACT] is not maintainable before the High Court. It was further pointed out that under [SECTION] of the [ACT] the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any application filed on behalf of the applicants against whom the allegations are for the offence punishable under [SECTION] [SECTION] of the [ACT]. The learned Single Judge referred the whole matter to the Division Bench and for deciding the question whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain application under [SECTION] or [SECTION] of the [ACT] in view of the provisions of the [ACT].
[SECTION]. For deciding the question whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application under [SECTION] or [SECTION] of the [ACT] in a case where the allegations against the accused are under the provisions of the [ACT], it would be necessary to refer to certain provisions of the [ACT].
5. The [ACT] is framed for a specific object for making special provisions for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist and disruptive activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Its operation is limited for a period of two years from the. date of its commencement. [SECTION] of the [ACT] defines the phrase "Designated Court" meaning thereby a Designated Court constituted under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. [SECTION] of the [ACT] defines "High Court" in relation to a Designated Court and states that "High Court", in relation to a Designated Court, means the High Court within the territorial limits of whose jurisdiction such Designated Court is proposed to be, or is constituted. [SECTION] of the [ACT] defines "Public Prosecutor" meaning thereby a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor or a Special Public Prosecutor appointed under [SECTION] and includes any person acting under the directions of the Public Prosecutor. [SECTION] of the [ACT] provides that the State Government may for the whole or any part of the State constitute one or more Designated Courts. The Designated Court shall be presided over by a Judge to be appointed by the State Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court.
6. [SECTION] of the [ACT] provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, every offence punishable under any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder shall be triable only by the Designated Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. [SECTION] empowers the Central Government to transfer a case pending before a Designated Court in one State to a Designated Court in any other State, if it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do. That transfer can be only with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India. Therefore it is clear that the High Court has no jurisdiction to transfer a case pending before a Designated Court to any other Designated Court. Under [SECTION] of the [ACT] the State Government is required to appoint a person to be the Public Prosecutor to appear before the Designated Court. It also empowers the State Government to appoint a Special Public Prosecutor in any case or class of cases and also to appoint Additional Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutors. This provision also makes it clear that the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor appointed by the State Government under the [ACT] cannot conduct the cases under the [ACT] unless they are specifically appointed under [SECTION] of the Act.
7. [SECTION] of the [ACT] provides the procedure and powers of Designated Courts which reads as under:
12.(1) A Designated Court may take cognizance of any offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a police report of such facts.
(2) Where an offence triable by a Designated Court is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or with fine or with both, the Designated Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in [SECTION] or [SECTION] of the Code, try the offence in a summary way in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code and the provisions of [SECTION] of the Code, shall, so far as may be, apply to such trial:
Provided that when, in the course of summary trial under this sub-section, it appears to the Designated Court that the nature of the case is such that it is undesirable to try it in a summary way, the Designated Court shall recall any witnesses who may have been examined and proceed to re-hear the case in the manner provided by the provisions of the Code for the trial of such offence and the said provisions shall apply to and in relation to a Designated Court as they apply to and in relation to a Magistrate:
Provided further that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for a Designated Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
8. From the aforesaid section, it is clear that exclusive jurisdiction is given to the Designated Court to try an offence punishable under the provisions of the [ACT]. The Designated Court can take cognizance of the offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a police report of such facts. Under [SECTION] of the [ACT] it has been provided that notwithstanding anything contained in [SECTION] or [SECTION] of the Code, the Designated Court is required to try the offence in a summary way in a case where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or with fine or with both and the Designated Court is required to follow the procedure prescribed for summary trial and the provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT], shall, so far as may be, apply to such trial. [SECTION] of the [ACT] empowers the Designated Court to tender a pardon. From this sub-section it is clear that the provisions of [SECTION] or [SECTION] are not made applicable but a deeming provision is made that tendering of a pardon under Sub-section (3) shall be deemed to have been granted under [SECTION] of the Code. [SECTION] of the [ACT] provides that the Designated Court shall, for the purpose of trial of any offence, have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Session so far as may be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code for the trial before a Court of Session. The aforesaid provisions of the [ACT] clearly show that the entire [ACT] is not made applicable but only specific provisions thereof are made applicable.
9. The other most relevant section for our purposes is [SECTION] which reads as under:
16. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie as a matter of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Designated Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law.
(2) Except as aforesaid no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, sentence or order of a Designated Court.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from:
Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days.
This section begins with non obstante clause and provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the [ACT], an appeal shall lie as a matter of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Designated Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law. By this section it has been made clear that against any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Designated Court, no appeal or revision lies to the High Court but straightway an appeal or revision lies to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law. By this provision the different hierarchy (other than the one provided by the [ACT]) is provided. Designated Court is made subordinate straightway to the Supreme Court. [SECTION] of the [ACT] further lays down in emphatic terms that no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, sentence or order of a Designated Court except as provided in Sub-section (1). Therefore, against any order passed by Designated Court no revision application is maintainable. The phrase "any Court" used in Sub-section (2) would without any doubt mean that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain appeal or revision application against the judgment, sentence or order of Designated Court.
10. Learned counsel for the applicants heavily relied upon [SECTION] of the [ACT] for contending that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this application. [SECTION] reads as under:
17. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, every offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of [SECTION] of the Code and "cognizable case" as defined in that clause shall be construed accordingly.
(2) [SECTION] of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder subject to the modifications that-
(a) the reference in Sub-section (1) thereof to "Judicial Magistrate" shall be construed as a reference to "Judicial Magistrate or Executive Magistrate";
(b) the references in Sub-section (2) thereof to "fifteen days", "ninety days" and "sixty days", wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to "sixty days", "one year" and "one year", respectively; and
(c) Sub-section (2A) thereof shall be deemed to have been omitted.
(3) [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence triable by a Designated Court subjected to the modifications that the references to "Court of Session" and "High Court", wherever occurring therein, shall be construed as references to "Designated Court" and "Supreme Court", respectively.
([SECTION]) Nothing in [SECTION] of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless
(a) The public prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and
(b) Where the public prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
(6) The limitations on granting of bail specified in [SECTION] are in addition to the limitation under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.
Sub-section (1) of this section begins with non obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any law, every offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of [SECTION] of the Code. By [SECTION] is made applicable with certain modifications. By Sub-section (3) the provisions of [SECTION] which deal with submission of death sentences for confirmation and [SECTION] of the Code are made applicable with modification that the references to "Court of Session" and "High Court", wherever occurring in the said provisions, shall be construed as references to "Designated Court" and "Supreme Court" respectively. Under this Sub-section (3) it is clear that the order of death sentence passed by the Designated Court is to be referred to the Supreme Court for confirmation. For bail entirely different provisions are made under Sub-sections ([SECTION]), (5) and (6). By Sub-section ([SECTION]) it is provided that the provisions of [SECTION] of the Code for anticipatory bail would not be applicable to any person involved on an accusation of having committed an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder. Again [SECTION] begins with non obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder shall, if in custody, be released on bailor on his own bond unless
(i) the public prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and
(ii) where the public prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and
(iii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
reading these Sub-sections (5) and (6) together it is abundantly clear that entirely different criteria is laid down for considering the bail application of a person accused of an offence punishable under the [ACT]. The Court can release such accused on bail only if it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty of such offence and further he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Even if the Court is satisfied to the aforesaid extent, the limitations on granting of bail under [SECTION] of the [ACT] or any other law for the time being in force are made applicable. [SECTION] of the [ACT] empowers the Supreme Court to make such rules, if any, as it may deem necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Act relating to Designated Courts. [SECTION] gives overriding effect to the provisions of the [ACT] or any rule made thereunder or any order made under any such rule notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment.
11. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that even if an appeal or revision is not maintainable against the order passed by a Designated Court, yet this Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application under [SECTION] of the [ACT] for releasing the accused on bail because there is no provisions under the [ACT] which debars the application of [SECTION] of the [ACT] He further submitted that in any circumstances the High Court has inherent powers under [SECTION] of the [ACT] to quash and set aside any illegal or arbitrary order passed by the Designated Court situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and to decide whether prima facie the provisions of the [ACT] are applicable to the facts of the case. For this purpose, reliance was placed on the provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT] and it was contended that specific provision is made to the effect that [SECTION] of the [ACT], with some modifications, would be applicable to a case involving an offence punishable under the [ACT]. Further, specific provision is made that [SECTION] of the [ACT], for granting anticipatory bail shall not apply while no such provision is made that [SECTION] will not apply. The learned counsel further submitted that all throughout in the [ACT] wherever the Legislature wanted to confer powers on the Designated Court it has been specifically mentioned as "Designated Court" while under [SECTION] the word used is "Court". He, therefore, submitted that the accused against whom allegation for offence punishable under the [ACT] is made, can be released under [SECTION] of the [ACT] by the High Court or by the Sessions Court. The counsel emphasized upon [SECTION] wherein it is provided that limitations on granting of bail specified in [SECTION] are in addition to the limitations under the [ACT] or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. He, therefore, submitted that with regard to the bail, the provisions of [ACT] are applicable and this Court has jurisdiction under [SECTION] or [SECTION] of the [ACT] to release the accused on bail.
12. In our view, it is difficult to accept these contentions of the learned counsel for the applicants for the reasons stated hereinbelow.
13. It is an admitted fact that under [SECTION] of the [ACT], exclusive jurisdiction is conferred upon the Designated Court established as per provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT] to try every offence punishable under any provision of the [ACT] or any rule made thereunder. No other Court has jurisdiction to deal with or try the person who is involved in any offence punishable under the [ACT].
1[SECTION]. Entire [ACT] is not made applicable but some specific provisions are made applicable or some provisions of the [ACT] with modifications are made applicable.
15. The following provisions of the [ACT] would make it clear that the entire [ACT] is not made applicable. Under [SECTION] of the [ACT] a Designated Court is entitled to sit for any of its proceedings at any place, other than the ordinary place of its sitting, in the State in which it is constituted. [SECTION] of the [ACT] provides for transfer of case from one Designated Court to another Designated Court. That power is conferred upon the Central Government and is to be exercised with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India. So it is clear that the provisions of transfer which are there in the [ACT] would not be applicable. Under [SECTION] of the [ACT] the jurisdiction is conferred upon the Designated Court to try any other offence with which the accused may, under the [ACT], be charged at the same trial, if the offence is connected with such other offence, but for this provision the Designated Court would have no jurisdiction to try the accused for any other offence. Other important provision is [SECTION] of the [ACT] which provides that for every Designated Court, the State Government shall appoint a person to be the public prosecutor and may appoint one or more persons to be the Additional Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutors or Special Public Prosecutor. That means the Public Prosecutor appointed under the [ACT] would have no right to conduct the trial or appear before the Designated Court as a Public Prosecutor unless he is specifically appointed under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. As discussed above, same is the position with regard to the procedure prescribed under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. The provisions of appeal and revision are not made applicable. In this view of the matter, it is amply clear that the entire [ACT] is not made applicable to [ACT] but some provisions of the [ACT] are made applicable with or without modifications. Therefore there is no reason to hold that provisions of [SECTION] or [SECTION] of the [ACT] are applicable to a person accused of an offence punishable under the [ACT].
16. Even if we refer to [SECTION] of the [ACT], the same is the position. [SECTION] of the [ACT] provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the [ACT] or any other law, every offence punishable under the [ACT] or any rule made thereunder shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of [SECTION] of the [ACT] and "cognizable case" as defined in that clause shall be construed accordingly. [SECTION] of the [ACT] makes a specific provision that [SECTION] of the [ACT], shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under the [ACT] or any rule made thereunder subject to the modifications provided therein. In our view, this clearly indicates that entire provisions of the [ACT] with regard to bail, remand or sending the accused to judicial custody are not made applicable. Otherwise there was no necessity of providing that [SECTION] of the [ACT] shall apply in relation to the case involving the offence punishable under the [ACT]. [SECTION] of the [ACT] provides that [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT] shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence triable by a Designated Court subject to the modifications that references to "Court of Session" and "High Court", wherever occurring therein, shall be construed as references to "Designated Court" and "Supreme Court", respectively. [SECTION] of the [ACT] deal with submission of death sentence for confirmation. [SECTION] of the [ACT] deals with the procedure where Judges of the Court of appeal are equally divided. By [SECTION] of the [ACT] it has been provided that concept of anticipatory bail is not at all applicable and it provides that nothing in [SECTION] of the [ACT] shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence punishable under the [ACT] or any rule made thereunder. [SECTION] of the [ACT] begins with the non obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in the [ACT], no person accused of an offence punishable under the [ACT] or any rule made thereunder shall, if in custody, he released on bail or on his own bond unless
(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and
(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and (ii) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
This [SECTION] of the [ACT] lays down entirely different criteria for deciding the bail application. In view of this sub-section the provisions of bail provided under the [ACT] would not be applicable and the bail application is required to be decided as per the criteria laid down under [SECTION]. Nowhere it is provided that [SECTION] of the Code is applicable. Therefore, in our view, there is no question of applying [SECTION] of the Code and entertain the application under it. As against this, reliance was placed upon [SECTION] of the [ACT] and it was contended that [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT] would be applicable. In our view, it is total misreading of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT] are to be read together. [SECTION] of the [ACT] lays down that the limitations on granting of bail specified in [SECTION] of the [ACT] are in addition to the limitations under the [ACT] or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. So the limitations which are provided in [SECTION] of the [ACT] are also made applicable by [SECTION] of the [ACT]. But it cannot be said that [SECTION] of the [ACT] which provides that the High Court or the Court of Session may direct that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail if the offence is of the nature specified in [SECTION], is applicable. The limitations on granting bail are not provided under [SECTION] of the [ACT] Limitations are provided under [SECTION] of the [ACT] This would be clear by referring to [SECTION] of the [ACT] [SECTION] of the [ACT] read as under:
[SECTION]37(1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail but
(i) such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life;
(ii) such person shall not be so released if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non-bailable and cognizable offence:
Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in Clause (i) or Clause (ii) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm:
Provided further that the Court may also direct that a person referred to in Clause (ii) be released on bail if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so to do for any other special reason:
Provided also that the mere fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by witnesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives an undertaking that he shall comply with such directions as may be given by the Court.
(3) When a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under [SECTION] of the [ACT] or abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on bail under Subsection (1), the Court may impose any condition which the Court considers necessary
(a) in order to ensure that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter, or
(b) in order to ensure that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused or of the commission of which he is suspected, or
(c) otherwise in the interest of justice.
[SECTION] of the [ACT] confers special powers on the High Court or the Court of Session regarding bail.
17. While considering similar provisions with regard the [ACT] In re, [ACT] constitutional validity of the said Bill was examined, by the Supreme Court. In that case it was urged that a person put up for trial before the Special Court is denied the benefit of [SECTION] of the [ACT] under which, High Court or a Court of Session may release an accused on bail. The Supreme Court observed that as regards bail, it is open to the accused to ask for it and in appropriate case, the Special Court would be justified in enlarging him on bail (paras 92-93). In that reference the Court also construed the contention that the Parliament has no power to create a Court outside the hierarchy of Courts recognised by the [ACT] and that the creation of a trial Court which is not subject to the control and superintendence of High Court is detrimental to constitutional concept of Judicial independence and held that Parliament is entitled to set up Courts of the same kind and designation as are referred to in the Special Courts Bill and create new or Special Courts, the Court also observed that "it is also true to say that the Special Courts are not District Courts within the meaning of [SECTION], with the result that the control over them will not be vested in any High Court. But we do not accept that by reason of this considerations, the creation of Special Courts is calculated to damage or destroy the constitutional safeguards of Judicial independence. The reasons given by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid reference are confirmed by it in the case of [PRECEDENT] In this view of the matter, in our opinion, no application under [SECTION] of the [ACT] is maintainable either to this Court or to the Sessions Court.
18. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that in any case this Court has inherent jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the Code to release the applicants on bail and to find out whether the accusation against the applicants was justified to hold that they are prima facie liable to be punished under the provisions of the [ACT]. In our view, there is no substance in this contention also.
Firstly, as stated above, the entire [ACT] is not made applicable and the different hierarchy of the Courts is established under the [ACT] i.e. Designated Court is directly subordinate to the Supreme Court. This position is abundantly clear from [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Under [SECTION] of the [ACT], straightway appeal lies to the Supreme Court against any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Designated Court. [SECTION] of the [ACT] in explicit terms provides that except as aforesaid no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, sentence or order of a Designated Court. The phrase "any Court" would include High Court. Therefore against the final or interlocutory order passed by a Designated Court no appeal or revision is maintainable in the High Court or any other Court. [SECTION] does not confer fresh or new or additional powers on the High Court. It saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. If the Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application or appeal, then its powers are not circumscribed by anything in the Code except in so far as the sections expressly dealing with them do so. But if the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal or application, there is no question of exercising inherent jurisdiction.
19. Similar contention that even though the High Court has no appellate or revisional jurisdiction, High Court was possessing inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the order of Special Magistrate, was negatived by the Privy Council in the case of Kumar Singh v. Emperor AIR 19[SECTION]6 PC 169 : [SECTION]7 Cri LJ 933, and the Court held that no Court can claim inherent jurisdiction to exercise powers expressly taken away by legislation. In paragraph 12 of the said judgment the Court held as under:
In their Lordships' opinion, the suggestion that the High Court possessed inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Special Magistrate is quite untenable. At the date when the order of the High Court was made the Special Magistrate had been held to have had no jurisdiction. He was not a Court inferior to the High Court and indeed was not a Court at all, his order was a mere nullity, and no question of revising it could arise. This was pointed out in the opening passages of the judgment of this Board delivered by Lord [ENTITY] in [CASE NUMBER]. The restoration of the jurisdiction of special Magistrates by the decision of this Board is irrelevant, since by that time the Ordinance of 19[SECTION]2 had been repealed by the Ordinance of 19[SECTION]3, and, apart from this, clause 26 of the former Ordinance took away all powers of revisions by the High Court and no Court can claim inherent jurisdiction to exercise powers expressly taken away by legislation. In their Lordships' view, if the High Court possessed any power of revision in the present case, such power must be found in the Ordinance of 19[SECTION]3.
Similar contention was dealt with by [ENTITY] J. in the case of Vishnu Ghanshyam v. Emperor AIR 19[SECTION]1 Nag 97 : [SECTION]2 Cri LJ 108. In that case the Court was considering the provisions of [ACT]. By the said Act limited power was conferred upon the High Court and [SECTION] of the said Act provided as under:
No proceeding purporting to be taken under this Act shall be called in question by any Court, except the High Court on application under [SECTION].
The Court held that in view of this specific provision no general section conferring inherent power can be invoked. It would be worthwhile to reproduce the relevant discussion which is as under:
It is urged that the High Court has powers under [SECTION], [ACT] But I am clear that that that section can have no application to a matter of this kind. That section confers no fresh or new or additional powers or the High Court. It merely states that the existing powers are not circumscribed by anything in the [ACT] except in so far as the sections expressly dealing with them do so. It is well known that inherent powers cannot be invoked where the Legislature expressly deals with the matter. It has dealt with the matter in this case. It has stated that no proceeding purporting to be taken under the Act shall be called in question except in one particular matter and in one particular way. That is express and absolute. No general section conferring inherent power can be invoked in the face of that. But it is argued that these sections in the Act are ultra vires because they contravene [SECTION] [SECTION] cannot possibly have been intended to relate to powers which were not in existence at all at the date when it was passed. It does not give a power of superintendence or of revision in respect of matters which have been specially created by the Legislature at a later date. If the Legislature chooses to confer those powers upon any Court or body and State that there shall neither be appeal nor revision it has every right and power to do so. We are familiar with the exercise of these powers on the civil side. Many Special Acts are passed conferring special and extraordinary powers upon Courts, persons or bodies and stating that there shall be no appeal from orders made under those Acts, or stating that an appeal shall not lie in the civil Courts. It would be impossible to argue that these Acts are ultra vires because inherent powers are conferred upon the High Court on its civil side by [SECTION], [ACT] The same reasoning applies here.
(Emphasis added)
20. In the case of [PRECEDENT], the Division Bench of the Assam High Court considered the question whether the High Court can exercise inherent jurisdiction, while dealing with the Assam Opium Prohibition Act XXIII of 19[SECTION]7 and the Court held that the effect of the provision is to exclude the revisional jurisdiction of the Court at least by necessary implication, if not in express terms, for otherwise [SECTION] loses all significance and meaning. The order of learned Sessions Judge, therefore, is not revisable under the [ACT]. The attribute of finality which the law attaches to the order will also prevent the Court from exercising its inherent jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the [ACT]
21. In the case of [PRECEDENT] the Court while considering the provision of [SECTION] held that a provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision contained in the statute which saves that power. The relevant discussion in this case is as under:
[SECTION] of the Code under which the heirs of the deceased filed the application for compensation corresponds to [SECTION] of the [ACT]. It saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision contained in the statute which saves that power. This is put in another form by saying that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject-matter there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern the particular subject-matter. From this it will be clear that the application made by the heirs of the deceased for compensation could not have been made under [SECTION] since [SECTION] expressly confers power on the court to pass an order for payment of compensation in the circumstances mentioned therein.
In the present case also [SECTION] of the Act explicitly states that no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, sentence or order of the Designated Court except as provided in [SECTION]. [SECTION] of the Act gives overriding effect to the provisions of the [ACT]. Therefore, when [SECTION] bars the appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the High Court against the order passed by the District Court, this Court cannot interfere against the order passed by the Designated Court by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the Code.
22. Same position is laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] wherein the Court has laid down that inherent power of the High Court should not be exercised against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. Further, in the case of [PRECEDENT] the Court had laid down that the power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code.
23. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, when there is specific bar under [SECTION] of the [ACT], this Court cannot exercise the inherent jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the Code.
2[SECTION]. However, the learned counsel for the applicants submitted that in any case where the false allegations are made against the accused persons for the offences under the [ACT], the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere with the order passed by the Designated Court and to quash the investigation or to grant bail. In our opinion, once the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application, this contention has no foundation. It is for the Designated Court to decide whether there is sufficient material collected during the investigation and find out whether the accusation is well-founded. High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the prima facie finding of the Designated Court.
25. In the result, in our opinion the application under [SECTION] [SECTION] of the [ACT] is not maintainable against the order passed by the Designated Court under the [ACT]. Hence this application is rejected. Rule discharged.