ORDER [ENTITY], J.
Page 0148
1. Whether [SECTION] of the [ACT] can be so read as to give the prescribed authority the discretion to extend, in appropriate cases, the period for furnishing details of stocks for claiming input tax credit under [SECTION] of the [ACT]? This is the common question arising in all the four writ petitions.
2. The petitioners in the four cases pray for answering the question in the affirmative and on their behalf, it is submitted that any other view would render [SECTION] bad & illegal for being destructive of the right granted by [SECTION] of the Act. The Revenue, on the other hand, maintains that the answer to the question can only be in the negative, otherwise it would amount to substituting the Court's will for the mandate of the law.
3. The facts and circumstances in which the above question arises can be briefly described as follow. On 2.3.2005, the Governor of Bihar promulgated [ACT]. It was published in the Official Gazette on 4.3.2005. [SECTION] of the Ordinance provided that that section would come into force at once but the remaining provisions of the Ordinance would come into force on such date(s) as the State Government might appoint by notification in the Official Gazette and different dates might be appointed for different provisions. In terms of that provision, the State Government issued notification No. S.O.18, dated 18.03.2005, for enforcement of [SECTION] of the Ordinance with effect from 1.4.2005. [SECTION] of the Ordinance contained the rule-making power and authorised the State Government to make rules, subject to the condition of previous publication. In exercise of that power, the State Government framed the [ACT] under S.O.26, dated 24.03.2005. But at that time, the condition of previous publication of the rules was somehow overlooked. By virtue of notification, dated 18.03.2005, all the provisions of [ACT] came into force on 1.4.2005 and consequently the previous Act holding the field, namely, the [ACT] was repealed by [SECTION] of the Ordinance. On 23.06.2005, the State enacted the [ACT] which received the assent of the President of India on 23.06.2005 and on the same date it was published in the Gazette of India (Extra Ordinary). [SECTION] of the Act provided that it would be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of April, 2005. Later, a number of Page 0149 amendments were introduced in the Act by [ACT]). The [ACT] received the assent of the President of India on 19.04.2006 and it was published in the Bihar Gazette (Extra Ordinary) on the same date. While introducing a number of amendments in the Act, it seems that the omission to follow the condition of previous publication in the making of rules was also realised. The lacuna was corrected by amending [SECTION] and removing the condition of previous publication retrospectively with effect from 1.4.2005.
4. The essence of [ACT] is said to lie in giving set-off for the tax paid earlier and this object is given effect to by providing for input tax credit/rebate. The provisions relating to input tax credit are contained in [SECTION] of the Act. It is a long section dealing with the different ways in which a claim for input tax credit may arise and may be claimed by the dealer. For the present, we are concerned with input tax credit on goods lying in stock with the dealer on 1.4.2005 that had already suffered the incidence of tax under the [ACT] before the [ACT] came into force. [SECTION] reads as follows:
Input Tax Credit : (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an input tax credit as provided in this section shall be claimed by a registered dealer, subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed, on sales of goods in the following circumstances, namely:
(d) When a registered dealer holds in stock, on the 1st day of April, 2005 such goods as have been purchased by him on or after the 1st day of April, 2004 and which have suffered the incidence of tax under the [ACT] as it stood before its repeal by [SECTION] and -
(i) he sells such goods within the State of Bihar or in the course of inter-State trade & commerce, or
(ii) he consumes such goods in the manufacture of any goods mentioned in [SECTION] and the goods so manufactured are sold within the State of Bihar or in the course of inter-State trade & commerce, he shall claim credit of the input tax in the manner prescribed;
5. It needs to be noted here that [SECTION] is expressly made subject to the other provisions of the Act and further that an input tax credit may be claimed by a dealer subject to such conditions and restrictions as might be prescribed. Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) further provides input tax credit only on such goods as were purchased by the dealer on or after the 1st day of April, 2004. In other words, even though the other conditions laid down by the Act and the rules may be satisfied, no input tax credit is available on goods that were purchased by the dealer before 1.4.2004 and that might be lying in the dealer's stock for over a year. It is thus plain and clear that the claim of input tax credit is a right conferred by [SECTION] of the Act and is accordingly subject to all the conditions laid down in that Section and the corresponding rules. This little clarification seem necessary because much of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners appeared to be based on the assumption that once it was established that the goods had earlier suffered the incidence of tax, the right of input tax Page 0150 credit to the dealer was absolute and uncompromisable and any rules to the contrary would, therefore, be bad as being opposed to the very objective of the Act. This is not the correct position.
6. In light of what is noted above, it would be appropriate to take a look at [SECTION] of the Act before proceeding to examine the relevant rules. [SECTION] is as follows:
Declaration of stock of goods held on 1st April, 2005: Every dealer who was registered under the [ACT], as it stood before its repeal by [SECTION], or who makes an application for registration as a dealer on the 1st April, 2005 shall declare such details regarding the stock of goods held by him on the 31st March, 2005 in such manner and with such particulars and within such time and to such authority, as may be prescribed.
7. It is thus clear that the Legislature expressly left it open to the rule-making authority to fix, apart from the manner in which and the particulars of the goods with which, the period of time within which the details regarding the stock of goods are to be submitted before the prescribed authority.
8. Now coming to the Rules, [SECTION] provides for the manner of computation of input tax credit on the opening stock. This rule is expressly subject to the provisions of [SECTION]. This takes us to [SECTION], a true interpretation of which is the subject of dispute. [SECTION] reads as follows:
[SECTION]. Declaration of opening Stock (1) Every dealer holding stock of any goods on the appointed date shall furnish to the authority specified in [SECTION] details of such stock in form D-II within 45 days of the appointed date.
(2) If a dealer required to furnish the declaration in form D-II fails to furnish the details of opening stock as required under [SECTION], he shall not be entitled to input tax credit on the opening stock under [SECTION].
9. Form D-II is framed under [SECTION] of the Act read with [SECTION] of the Rules and column 3 of the form requires the dealer to give details of stock of goods as on 1.4.2005 which were purchased after 1.4.2004.
10. The appointed day within the meaning of [SECTION] was 1.4.2005 when the [ACT] came into force. The period prescribed under [SECTION] thus came to end on 15.05.2005. That date was Sunday. The prescribed period, therefore, naturally got extended to 16.05.2005. The petitioners in the four cases did not furnish to the prescribed authority the details of their respective stocks in form D-II by that date. They, however, take the plea that they were prevented from submitting the returns by the due date for reasons beyond their control and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the prescribed authority to consider the reasons that prevented them from submitting their respective returns by the due date and to accept their returns by extending the period fixed under the rule.
11. The single petitioner in [CASE NUMBER] is a proprietory firm engaged in the sale of drugs. It was registered as a dealer under the [ACT]. The reason given by it for not submitting the details of its stock in form D-II before the prescribed authority by the due date appears to be rather specious. Page 0151 It is stated that the firm's authorised representative went to the 'prescribed authority of the circle' for submitting the declaration in form D-II. The date on which he went there is not stated in the petition. He found that there was no counter for receiving those declarations and the concerned Assistant was not present on his seat. He waited for him for about two hours and came away when asked to come on the next day. He went again to the Office on 16.05.2005 but on that date the people in the Office declined to accept the return saying that the period was over on 15.05.2005. The authorised representative was finally able to submit the details in form D-II on 26.05.2005 and was given a receipt on that date, a photostat copy of which is at Annexure-2 to the writ petition. There is nothing to support the statement that on the previous occasion, the authorised representative of the petitioner firm was unable to submit the return because the dealing Assistant was not present on his seat in the Office, apart from the simple averment made in the writ petition. It does not seem to have occurred to the petitioner to send the return in form D-II to the prescribed authority by registered/speed post against a postal receipt. Needless to say that the statement made in the writ petition is denied in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.
12. In [CASE NUMBER], the petitioner is a partnership firm with two brothers being the partners. The firm carries on wholesale business in cosmetics. It was also registered as a dealer under the [ACT]. The reason assigned by it for failure to submit the return in form D-II by the due date is simpler and appears to be more truthful than the previous case. It is stated that on 14.05.2005, the list of goods covered by [SECTION] of the Act was finally prepared in form D-II for being submitted before the prescribed authority on the following Monday (16.05.2005). However, on 15.05.2005, the mother of the partners of the firm suddenly became seriously ill and she had to be taken (from Katihar to Purnea) for medical treatment. The partners of the petitioner firm were unable to return to Katihar on 16.05.2005 and in that circumstance, the return in form D-II could be submitted before the prescribed authority after one day's delay on 17.05.2005.
13. A single petitioner in [CASE NUMBER] is another partnership firm of the same brothers as in the previous case ([CASE NUMBER]). This firm is described as 'Super-Stockist and Distributor' engaged in selling cosmetics in wholesale. In this case too, the return in Form D-II containing the details of the goods in stock was submitted before the prescribed, authority on 17.05.2005 for the same reason as stated in the previous case.
14. In [CASE NUMBER], the petitioner is an individual, being the proprietor of a firm, namely, M/S Ranjan Brothers. The firm was registered as a dealer under the [ACT]. It submitted the details of its stocks in form D-II before the prescribed authority on 2.6.2005. The plea advanced for not submitting the return by the due date is that by that time, the petitioner was not assigned the Tax Payer Identification Number (TIN) and for want of that it was not possible to properly fill up Form D-II. The plea is quite unacceptable on its face because the rules provide that till such time as Tax Payer Identification Number (TIN) is assigned, a dealer may use his previous registration number in its place.
Page 0152
15. In the last case ([CASE NUMBER]), the petitioner submitted form D-II along with a formal petition for condoning the delay in its submission. The Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Saran Circle, Chapra rejected, the petitioner's claim for input tax credit by order dated 1.8.2005.
16. In the other three cases, the details of stocks submitted by the respective petitioners were not entertained on the ground that those were furnished beyond the statutory period and the petitioners were not allowed input tax credit on the goods in stock as on 1.4.2005. The petitioners seek a direction to the Revenue Authorities to allow them input tax credit under [SECTION] of the Act after relaxing the period fixed for submission of the details of stock in form D-II as provided under [SECTION] of the Rules.
17. On a plain reading of [SECTION], it would appear that it does not envisage any relaxation of the period of time fixed under it. Nevertheless, Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the power to condone the delay and extending the period for submission of form D-II must be taken as inherent in the rule 'like any provision fixing a period of limitation'.
18. Mr. [ENTITY], Counsel appearing for the petitioner in [CASE NUMBER] submitted that in the absence of any power/discretion to the prescribed authority to relax the period of 45 days for submission of form D-II, in approppriate cases the provision of [SECTION] would defeat the substantive right conferred on a dealer under [SECTION] of the Act and, for that reason, the rule would be ultra vires the provisions of the Act. He next submitted that [SECTION], insofar as it fixed the period of limitation, must be viewed as part of procedural law and hence, directory and not mandatory. Further, being procedural in nature, the provision of [SECTION] can not be allowed to defeat the substantive right of the dealer under [SECTION] of the Act. In this regard, he also submitted that taking a contrary view and disallowing any power to the prescribed authority to condone the delay in submitting form D-II and/or extending the time fixed under the rule would lead to unnecessary hardship for the dealer. Learned Counsel also submitted that in terms of [SECTION], for claiming input tax credit on account of opening stock, the dealer was obliged to submit true declarations) in form IX (C) issued by his seller from whom those goods were purchased under the earlier law. In other words, sufferance of tax on the opening stock was required to be unquestionably established by production of the relevant materials. In that view too, the strict adherence to the time limit fixed under [SECTION] would appear inappropriate and unreasonable. He lastly submitted that [SECTION] of the Act was bad and suffered from excessive delegation of power as it allowed the delegatee to make prescriptions on a number of issues without laying down any guidelines.
19. In support of the submissions. Mr. [ENTITY] relied upon a Supreme Court decision in State of Mysore and Ors. v. [ENTITY] and Co. etc AIR 1973 SC 1449. In this case, [SECTION] of the [ACT], fixing a period of time for filing claim for refund under [SECTION] of the [ACT] were struck down as ultra vires [SECTION] of the [ACT], holding that the impugned Rule was an attempt to deny the dealers the refund to which they were entitled under the law or at least to make enforcement of that right unduly difficult. The decision was rendered in the context of [SECTION] of the Central Page 0153 [ACT]. [SECTION] of the [ACT] reads as follows:
(b) Where a tax has been levied under that law in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, the tax so levied shall be refunded to such person in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be provided in any law in force in that State.
20. The Supreme Court found that refund of tax collected on sale of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce was a right guaranteed under the [ACT] and the time fixed under [SECTION] of the Rules would render the right guaranteed under the [ACT] nugatory or at any rate the enforcement of that right unduly difficult. In the case in hand, it is seen above that contrary to the petitioners' assumption [SECTION] of the [ACT] does not confer upon a dealer any absolute right to input tax credit. The right guaranteed under [SECTION] is expressly subject to several conditions, restrictions and limitation. It is, therefore, clear to me that the decision in the case of [ENTITY], has no application to the facts of the cases under consideration.
21. He next relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in [PRECEDENT]. In that decision, [SECTION] of the [ACT] prescribing a period of limitation for claiming refund under [SECTION] of the [ACT] was held invalid. The decision of this Court is mainly based on the Supreme Court judgment in [ENTITY] & Co. (supra). This decision too has no application to the cases in hand for the reason as already stated with reference to the judgment in [ENTITY].
22. Mr. [ENTITY] next relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT]. . The passage on which learned Counsel placed reliance is contained in paragraph 3 of the decision. It is a short paragraph, reading as follows:
3. In interpreting any procedural law, where more than one interpretation is possible, the one which curtails the procedure without eluding justice is to he adopted. The procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid of justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recepient of justice is not be followed.
23. The reliance on the above passage was on the premise that the 45 days' period fixed by [SECTION] was a period of limitation and, therefore, it ought to be taken as part of procedural law. I shall presently examine the validity of this premise.
24. Learned Counsel further placed strong reliance on two other decisions of the Supreme Court, one in [PRECEDENT]. and the other in [PRECEDENT]. . In those two decisions, the Supreme Court explained that notwithstanding the amendment of [SECTION], [SECTION], and the proviso thereto by the amendment [ACT], those provisions were not mandatory but directory and they did not take away or curtail the power of the Court to take a written statement on record though filed beyond the 90 days' period. To my mind, the nature, object and purpose of [SECTION] of the [ACT] is completely different from the provisions Page 0154 of Order 8, [SECTION] and the proviso thereto and these decision are of no help to the petitioners in the present cases.
25. Learned Counsel relied upon another Bench decision of this Court in [PRECEDENT]. In that decision, there is a passing reference to an observation made in an earlier judgment that the authority should consider the prayer for grant of exemption and should not reject the prayer on grounds of technicality, like limitation. The observation is too sweeping and broad to be used as a precedent in a case where the time allowed for submitting the details of stocks is prescribed by the Statute.
26. In the other two cases ([CASE NUMBER]), Mr. [ENTITY] appeared for the petitioners. He veritably treated the Court with a discourse on the philosophy of [ACT]. According to him, at the core of the [ACT] law was the principle of a single incidence of tax on the sales or purchase of goods. Proceeding on that basis, Mr. [ENTITY] submitted that once it was established that certain goods had suffered the incidence of tax, no rule could stop the dealer from getting input tax credit. Unfortunately, the submission is too wide and sweeping and it is apparently not in accord with the plain language of [SECTION] of the Act and [SECTION] of the [ACT]. He also submitted that under [SECTION] of the Act, the dealer was obliged to submit monthly returns of all the transactions during the previous month and in that view also not much rigour should be attached to the period of time fixed under [SECTION] of the Rules. Mr. [ENTITY] also pointed out that the [ACT] were framed on 24.03.2005, that is, even prior to coming into force of the rule-making power under [SECTION] of the Act with effect from 1.4.2005. Moreover, at the time rules were framed, the unamended [SECTION] laid down the condition of previous publication by notification. He submitted that in framing the rules, the condition of previous publication was not observed and for those reasons the entire rules including [SECTION] must be held to be bad and unenforceable. The answer to Mr. [ENTITY]'s submission is quite simple. Notwithstanding any lacuna or deficiency in the making of the rules, those can not be taken as bad and illegal until so held and declared by a competent Court or authority. In the present case, the lacuna/omission was cured by the Amendment Act, namely, the [ACT] before the rules were declared bad by any Court. The petitioners, therefore, can derive no benefit from the omission at the time of the framing of the rules that now stands rectified.
27. Mr. [ENTITY] relied upon a number of decisions in support of his submissions. He cited a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT]. in support of the proposition that not merely the language of the provision but the scheme of the Act should be taken into consideration to judge whether a direction or condition is mandatory or directory. He also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT]. in which it was held that in order to determine whether a direction was mandatory or directory, the use of the word 'shall' or 'may' may not be conclusive and further that a procedural provision may be construed as directory notwithstanding the use of 'shall' if no prejudice was caused by taking the condition as directory. Mr. [ENTITY] like Mr. [ENTITY] before him also relied upon the Supreme Court decision Page 0155 in the case of [PRECEDENT] (supra). Mr. [ENTITY] also referred to another decision of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] in which it was held that [SECTION] of the [ACT] requiring that a copy of analysis report should be provided to local health authority within a period of 45 days was directory. He cited yet another decision of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] in which the provision of [SECTION] of the [ACT] (since omitted with effect from 4.1.1977) was held to be directory and not mandatory.
28. In the last case of the batch ([CASE NUMBER]), Mr. [ENTITY] appeared on behalf of the petitioner. He submitted that the delay in submitting form D-II was due to the illness of the petitioner and the failure by the authority to assign him the Tax Payer Identification Number (TIN) in time. He submitted that the introduction of [ACT] with effect from 1.4.2005 was a very major event in trade and business. At the time of its introduction and till long after, no one had a clear idea what exactly was [ACT] and what were the obligations, responsibilities and duties of the traders/dealers under the new law. There was a lot of confusion, some of which persist till today. He submitted that in that highly confused state, coupled with the failure to get Tax Payer Identification Number (TIN) in time, the petitioner was unable to submit the details of his stocks in time. He further submitted that having regard to the attending circumstances, the delay in submitting form D-II should be condoned and the petitioner should be allowed input tax credit on the stock held by him on 1.4.2005. Mr. [ENTITY] relied upon a decision of this Court in [PRECEDENT], [PRECEDENT]. Unfortunately, I fail to see any application of that decision to the facts of the case.
29. Mr. [ENTITY] who was appointed Amicus Curiae by the Court took a position in opposition to the petitioners. Mr. [ENTITY] submitted that [SECTION] of the Act was key to the issue and all submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners must fail in view of the plain language of that Section. He pointed out that [SECTION] began with the words 'subject to the provisions of this Act' and that would make any right conferred by [SECTION] as expressly subject to [SECTION] of the Act. [SECTION] of the Act made it obligatory for every dealer to make declaration of the stocks held by him on 31st March, 2005 in such manner and with such particulars and within such time and to such authority as may be prescribed. Learned Counsel further submitted that in light of [SECTION] of the Act, there was no scope for the argument that under [SECTION] the prescribed authority must be allowed some discretion to relax the period of 45 days fixed under the rule. In this regard, learned Counsel cited a Supreme Court decision in [PRECEDENT]. In that decision, [SECTION] of the [ACT] that fixed a period of time for submission of all declaration forms was held ultra vires [SECTION] read with [SECTION] of the [ACT] on the ground that the phrase 'in the prescribed manner' in [SECTION] did not take in the time element. Mr. [ENTITY] submitted that unlike the phrase in [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION] of the [ACT] expressly provide for the time element to be dealt with in the rules. Mr. [ENTITY] further submitted that the Page 01[SECTION] legislature enacting the Act and the framers of the Rule were not unconscious of the need to give the competent authority the discretion to allow relaxation of time fixed for different purposes. Accordingly, such discretion was left in the hands of the competent authority with regard to filing of appeal and revision and making of reference etc. but under [SECTION] there was no provision for any relaxation/extention of the time fixed by the rule and hence, there was no question of any extention of the time by any authority. Mr. [ENTITY] further pointed out that the inventory of stocks would be available to the dealer on March 31 if the books of accounts were maintained properly and as per the provisions of the statute. Therefore, there should be no difficulty in submitting the details of stock held on 1.4.2005 within 45 days from that date. He also submitted that mere possibility of hardship to a dealer who was not vigilant in following the directions/conditions laid down in the rule is no ground for declaring the rule as invalid or bad or to introduce into it some additional provision not intended by its framers. He further submitted that the law provided for the grant of input tax credit subject to certain conditions and restrictions. Hence, it was obligatory for the dealer to enact those conditions/restrictions before claiming the credit. In support of the submission, he relied upon two Supreme Court decisions, one in [PRECEDENT] and the other in [PRECEDENT] .
30. Finding his task made easy by the submissions advanced by the Amicus Curiae, the learned Advocate General submitted that the rules framed by the other States also fixed a period of time (varying between 30-60 days.) without any provision for relaxation or extension of the time. He submitted that the same question arose under the [ACT], and a Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court rejected the dealer's contention for extension/relaxation of the time fixed under the rule. The decision in [PRECEDENT]. Under the [ACT], for claiming Sales Tax Credit a claim is to be submitted to the prescribed authority within ten days from the date of commencement of the Act. However, the Deputy Commissioner may, having regard to the circumstances, extend the period to 30 days from the date of commencement of the Act. Beyond that, the rule does not provide for any extension/relaxation. The dealer wanted further relaxation. The Court rejected the contention in a brief order.
31. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and having gone through the relevant provisions of the law and having examined the decisions cited at the bar, I am clearly of the view that there is no merit or substance in the petitioners' contention and the Advocate General & the Amicus Curiae are quite right that the plain language of [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the Act and [SECTION] does not allow for any relaxation/extension of time by the prescribed authority. It appears to me that all the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners arise from two premises, both of which seem to be unfounded. One is that [SECTION] confers upon the dealer an absolute right to input tax credit on goods that had already suffered an incidence of tax. As seen above, the position is not so. The grant of input tax credit under [SECTION] of the Act is far from absolute and is subject to a number of conditions, restrictions and limitations vide [SECTION] of the Act and [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the Rules. The second premise, equally unfounded, is that [SECTION] lays down some sort of a period of limitation. Mr. [ENTITY] described [SECTION] as containing the provision of limitation. This was adopted and repeated by Messers Page 0157 [ENTITY] and [ENTITY]. All their submissions are made in that light and the decisions cited too mainly deal with the provision of limitation. Consequently, much of the submissions in reply were also made treating [SECTION] as a provision of limitation. To my mind, there is a basic fallacy in describing [SECTION] as laying down the period of limitation or containing the provision of limitation. Notwithstanding the apparent resemblance a period of limitation is quite different from a cut-off date and the difference between the two mostly lies in their effect and consequences. The period of limitation normally appertains to the period of time allowed for initiating an action for some claim or a proceeding before a Court or authority. In Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edition), one of the definitions of Limitation is as follow:
A statutory period after which a lawsuit or prosecution can not be brought in Court.
32. In Words and Phrase Legally Defined (2nd Edition), limitation of Actions is described as follows:
For most actions, periods of limitation are prescribed by Statute with the consequence that an action begun after the period of limitation has expired is not maintainable.
33. The Law Lexicon (3rd Edition, 2005) defines Limitation Period as follows:
A statutory period after which a lawsuit or prosecution can not be brought in Court.
34. Judicial Dictionary by [ENTITY] defines Limitation as also denoting the period within which, according to Statutes, actions ought to be brought in a Court of Law.
35. It is thus clear that the provision of limitation/period of limitation in the relevant context connotes the period of time within which an actionable claim can be brought before the Court or statutory authority. Furnishing the details of stock to the prescribed authority for grant of input tax credit can by no means be held the same as filing of an actionable claim before a Court or authority and, therefore, the period fixed for the purpose can be hardly described as the period of limitation. It is truly a cut-off date which too is quite well known to the law. Instances of cut-off dates may be found galore both in law and in executive actions. Under the [ACT], 22.10.1[SECTION]9 & 9.9.1970 are the cut-off dates fixed for different purposes. (The) [ACT] similarly had a cut-off period for depositing the high denomination notes for exchange before the Reserve Bank of India or the other designated banks. Many more instances can be given of cut-off dates under different laws. Cut off dates are also common in executive or quasi judicial actions. There are fixed and final dates for filing nomination to contest an election; there are fixed dates for filing tender for a Government contract; there are fixed dates for submitting application forms to appear in a selection examination for appointment or to appear in examinations held by a Board/University. In all instances of cut-off dates, the required action has to be completed before the fixed date and the failure to do so would put an end to the matter. In cases of cut-off dates, there is no question of any condonation, relaxation or extension of dates. [SECTION], viewed as fixing the cut-off date instead of laying down a period of limitation, would answer most of the submissions advanced by the petitioners.
36. For the reasons discussed above, I find no merit or substance in any of the four writ petitions. All the four writ petitions are accordingly dismissed.