JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. The petitioner management has filed the present writ petition being aggrieved by an order dated 19th January, 2005 passed by the Labour Court on an application filed by the respondent workman under [SECTION] of the [ACT] (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
2. The facts leading to the filing of the aforesaid application by the respondent workman are that on 11th August, 1973, an agreement of Wage Revision was entered into by the petitioner management with its workers' union. However, certain points of dispute were referred for decision to the Sole Arbitrator, Sh. [ENTITY] on 18th October, 1973. The arbitrator gave an interim award on 24th October, 1973 which was implemented by the petitioner management. The arbitrator gave his final award on 21st March, 1977 but the same was not implemented by the petitioner management. As a result, the workers' union raised a dispute which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the appropriate authority vide order dated 17th February, 1978. The Industrial Tribunal passed an award dated 28th January, 1988 whereunder the award of the sole arbitrator was confirmed and the petitioner was directed to implement the same.
3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid award, the petitioner management challenged the same by filing a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court. The petitioner management assailed the aforesaid order of the High Court before the Supreme Court by filing an SLP which was also dismissed on 20th September, 1988. Thus, the litigation pertaining to the award dated 28th January, 1988 attained finality. However, even thereafter, the petitioner management did not implement the award and make payments of the salaries to the respondent workman.
4. In the meantime, in the year 1991, the respondent workman filed an application before the Labour Court under [SECTION] of the Act seeking directions to the petitioner management to make payment towards arrears of pay with interest at the bank rate and revise the basic pay scale of the respondent workman with effect from 1st November, 1991. During the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, on 8th December, 2004, the Labour Court was informed that the petitioner management had implemented the award in the year 1995 and wages which were refixed as per the award had already been paid to the respondent workman. Thus, it was stated on behalf of the petitioner management that nothing further survived in the writ petition. It was also stated that the claim for payment of interest could not be made by the respondent workman as the jurisdiction of the Labour Court while exercising powers under [SECTION] of the Act were very limited. After hearing the counsels for the parties, the Labour Court passed the impugned award relying on a judgment rendered by the Allahabad High Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] and awarded interest @ 6% p.a. to the respondent workman from the year 1989 till the date of filing of the LCA along with costs of Rs. 5,000/-.
5. The dispute between the parties lies in a narrow compass. The only ground taken on behalf of the petitioner management to assail the aforesaid award is that the Labour Court could not have awarded interest in favor of the respondent workman for the reason that there was no existing right in favor of the respondent workman which entitled him to claim interest as the said right had not been determined and crystalized in any adjudication including the award dated 28th January, 1988, passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Thus, it was argued that the Labour Court did not have the jurisdiction to award interest for the first time in proceedings taken out by the respondent workman under [SECTION] of the Act.
6. In support of the aforesaid contention, counsel for the petitioner management relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] as .
7. The aforesaid arguments were sought to be refuted by the counsel for the respondent workman who submitted that once the award of the Sole Arbitrator was upheld by the Industrial Tribunal for being implemented and the award dated 28th January, 1988 was also upheld by the High Court as well as the Supreme Court, the petitioner management had no option but to implement the same. It was urged that having failed to implement the award and drag on the matter for almost 11 years, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner management to assail the impugned order dated 19th January, 2005 directing payment of interest to the respondent workman. It was further stated that the petitioner management denied the respondent workman his legal dues and compelled him to approach the Labour Court and therefore, he was entitled to receive interest on the salary/arrears released to him during the pendency of the application.
8. Counsel for the respondent workman thus supported the impugned order and submitted that the Labour Court rightly relied on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] (supra) to hold that the respondent workman was entitled to receive interest on the amount withheld by the petitioner management unlawfully.
9. The issue with regard to the scope of [SECTION] of the Act has already been cyrstalized by the Supreme Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] (supra). While addressing the question as to whether without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claims of the workmen therein, the proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages claimed by them on the basis of equal pay for equal work were maintainable under [SECTION] of the Act, the Supreme Court referred to decisions rendered earlier on the said issue, including those in the cases of [PRECEDENT], [PRECEDENT] [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT] and held as below:
Para 8. Reference may be made first to the Constitution Bench decision in The [PRECEDENT]. on which Shri [ENTITY] placed heavy reliance. That was a case in which the question of maintainability of proceedings under [SECTION] of the Act was considered in a claim made by the workmen on the basis of the Sastry Award. The employer disputed the claim of the workmen on several grounds including the applicability of [SECTION] of the Act. It was urged that since the applications involved a question for interpretation of the Sastry Award, they were outside the purview of [SECTION] because interpretation of awards or settlements has been expressly provided for by [SECTION] This objection was rejected. This Court pointed out the difference in the scope of [SECTION] and [SECTION] indicating that the distinction lies in the fact that [SECTION] is not concerned with the implementation or execution of the award whereas that is the sole purpose of [SECTION] and whereas [SECTION] deals with cases of implementation of individual rights of workmen falling under its provisions, [SECTION] deals merely with a question of interpretation of the award where a dispute arises in that behalf between the workmen and the employer and the appropriate Government is satisfied that the dispute deserves to be resolved by reference under [SECTION] In this context, this Court also indicated that the power of the Labour Court in a proceeding under [SECTION] being akin to that of the Executing Court, the Labour Court is competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under [SECTION], like the power of the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. Relevant extract from that decision is as under-
Besides, there can be no doubt that when the Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court; but like the executing Court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under [SECTION]. Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under [SECTION], it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests.
This decision itself indicates that the power of the Labour Court under [SECTION] extends to interpretation of the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests, like the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution, where the basis of the claim is referrable to the award or settlement but it does not extend to determination of the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim if there be no prior adjudication or recognition of the same by the employer. This decision negatives instead of supporting the submission of learned Counsel for the respondents.
Para 9: Another decision on the point is [PRECEDENT], wherein also [ENTITY], J., (as he then was) speaking for the Bench, referring to the above Constitution Bench decision, stated that the proceedings contemplated by [SECTION] are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court, like the Executing Court in the execution proceedings governed by the [ACT], would be competent to interpret the award on which the claim is based. It is obvious that the power of the Executing Court is only to implement the adjudication already made by a decree and not to adjudicate a disputed claim which requires adjudication for its enforcement in the form of decree. The Executing Court, after the decree has been passed, is however competent to interpret the decree for the purpose of its implementation. This position was settled by the above Constitution Bench decision and has been the consistent view of this Curt ever since then.
10. Thus, it is well settled that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workman to certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement which cannot be treated as incidental to the benefit claimed, is clearly outside the purview of [SECTION] of the Act. The Labour Court in exercise of its powers under [SECTION] of the Act, does not have the jurisdiction to decide the entitlement of the workman first and then proceed to compute the benefits so adjudicated on that basis. Reference in this context may also be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] and of this Court in the case of [PRECEDENT].
11. The judgment rendered by a Single Judge of this Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] makes a helpful reference in deciding the present matter, wherein while allowing the workman's claim for deputation allowance, it was held by this Court that no interest as claimed by the workman could be granted on the said deputation allowance, as the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under [SECTION] of the Act is only to compute the benefit and not to confer any new benefit.
12. It is also relevant to mention that the Madras High Court, in similar facts, in the case of The [PRECEDENT], held that the Labour Court under [SECTION] of the Act while making computation, has only got the role of an executing court and cannot go beyond the award unless the question is incidental to working the reliefs on the basis of the award. It was further held that the heads of claim could be based only on the award and in the absence of any provision for payment of interest in the award, there could not be a claim for such interest, and the claim of interest not being incidental to the computation of benefits given under the award, the Labour Court would not be justified in granting interest on its own while exercising its powers under [SECTION] of the Act.
13. Reliance has been wrongly placed in the impugned order on the judgment rendered by the Allahabad High Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] (supra) in the year 1991, as the said judgment does not lay down the law on the issue of the scope of [SECTION] of the Act. The entire issue has been put at rest after the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] (supra) was rendered in the year 1995. There is no ambiguity left in this regard and thus it was not appropriate for the Labour Court to deviate from the settled course charted by the aforesaid judgment.
14. In the present case, it is not disputed that no interest was directed to be paid by the Industrial Tribunal in the award dated 28th January, 1988 whereby the petitioner management was only directed to implement the award dated 21st March, 1977 given by the Sole Arbitrator. Thus, it cannot be stated that the claim of payment of interest was already adjudicated upon and was an existing one in favor of the respondent workman. The Labour Court in exercise of its powers under [SECTION] of the Act cannot enlarge the scope of the said provision by arrogating to itself the function of adjudicating the dispute relating to the claim of interest made by the respondent workman. The limitations placed on the Labour Court under [SECTION] of the Act are of such a nature which do not permit it to entertain a claim put forward by a workman in respect of a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be adjudicated upon in an industrial dispute which requires reference under [SECTION] of the Act. Despite the fact that a reference was made by the appropriate authority on the basis of a dispute raised by the workers' union, and the same fructified in the award dated 28th January, 1988, admittedly, no order was made in the said award for grant of interest in case of delayed implementation of the award.
15. For the aforesaid reason, it is held that the Labour Court committed an error in proceeding to award interest to the respondent workman on the arrears/salaries paid to the respondent workman in the course of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, once the award was implemented by the petitioner management, during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court, the application of the respondent workman filed under [SECTION] of the Act was rendered infructuous and ought to have been disposed of.
16. In view of the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 19th January, 2005 is set aside. There shall be no orders as to costs. The petitioner management is at liberty to withdraw 50% of the awarded amount deposited in Court in terms of the interim order dated 18.11.2005, along with interest, if any, accrued thereon.