ORDER [ENTITY], J.
1. These petitions raise a question of considerable importance to the proper working of the Mandal Panchayats constituted under the provisions of the [ACT], Taluka Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats Act, [SECTION]83 (in short called as the Act) and the Rules framed thereunder.
2. Various contentions have been taken by the petitioners in these petitions challenging the validity of the nominations made by the Zilla Parishads under the provisions of [SECTION] of the Act. They have questioned not only the validity of the nominations but also the eligibility of the candidates who were nominated oh the ground that those candidates do not satisfy the criteria of backwardness as defined in the Act.
3. In the course of the arguments by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, it was observed by this Court that a preliminary issue touching the jurisdiction of the [ENTITY] of the Zilla Parishads to make nominations under [SECTION] of the Act has to be considered first since if he has no jurisdiction to make the nominations under [SECTION], the other question relating to the eligibility of the candidates so nominated will not arise. Learned Counsel for both the sides agreed with this view. So in this order I will be dealing with the validity of the nominations made by the [ENTITY] by virtue of the powers conferred on him by the resolutions duly passed by the elected members of the respective Zilla Parishads.
4. The long title and the preamble to the Act which are quite in keeping with the large number of provisions in the Act and the elaborate Rules enacted for ushering in Panchayat Raj in this State should be noticed first.
5. The preamble to the Act discloses that it was enacted with a view to provide for the establishment in rural areas, of Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats to assign to them local Government and judicial functions and to entrust the execution of certain works and development schemes of the State Five Year Plans to the Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and to provide for the decentralisation of powers and functions under certain enactments to those local bodies for the purpose of promoting the development of democratic institutions and securing a greater measure of participation by the people in the said plans and in local and Governmental affairs and for purposes connected with and incidental thereto.
6. Before going into the contention of the. learned Counsel for the petitioners, it will be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act which will throw some light and have a bearing also on the proper construction of [SECTION] of the Act.
7. 'Zilla Parishad' is defined under [SECTION] of the Act. Zilla Parishad means Zilla Parishad constituted under this Act. The main [SECTION] deals with the constitution of Mandal Panchayat which shall consist of such number of elected members as may be notified from time to time by the Government, at the rate of one member for every four hundred population or part thereof of the Mandal as ascertained at the last preceding census of which the relevant figures are published. [SECTION] provides that such number of seats as nearly as may be twenty five per cent of the total number of the members of the Mandal Panchayats shall be reserved for women in every Mandal Panchayat; provided that out of the seats so reserved one seat shall be reserved for a woman belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes. [SECTION] of the Act reads as under:
"Where no person belonging to Backward Classes is elected to a Mandal Panchayat, the Zilla Parishad shall nominate two persons belonging to the said classes to the Mandal Panchayat."
The scheme of [SECTION] of the Act provides that the Mandal Panchayat should consist of elected members on the basis of certain ratio to the population in the particular Mandal Panchayat constituency. There is also provision for reservation for women belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. [SECTION] makes a departure from the earlier provisions and provides for nomination of two persons belonging to the back-ward classes by the Zilla Parishad. What the Zilla Parishads have done in all these cases is that they had authorised their respective President or [ENTITY] by a resolution properly passed to nominate two persons from the back-ward classes and accordingly the President had nominated them. The nominations made by him are also challenged in the various other Writ Petitions, which are not listed today, on the ground his choice is arbitrary inasmuch as those persons really do not answer the description of the back ward class tag as defined under the Act. The word "Backward Class' under this Act is not the same as Scheduled Caste or Tribe as defined under other laws or under the various Government Orders made by the Government from time to time for reservations in public service and in Educational Institutions. Backward Class for the purpose of this Act is defined as persons who are landless agricultural labourers or rural artisans. A number of Writ Petitions have been filed against the nominations made by the [ENTITY] on the ground that the persons so nominated really do not belong to the backward class as defined in the Act. The other provisions of the Act which throw some light on the power of the [ENTITY] under [SECTION] are [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION] and [SECTION].'
8. Under [SECTION] of the Act, there shall be a Zilla Parishad for every district having jurisdiction over the entire district excluding such portion of the District as are included in Municipality. [SECTION] states that the Zilla Parishad is a body corporate and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and subject to such restrictions as are imposed by or under this or any. other enactment. [SECTION] of the Act deals with the composition of Zilla Parishad. There is no dispute that the President of Zilla Parishad is known as [ENTITY] and he and the other members are all elected members as provided under [SECTION] of the Act. [SECTION] of the Act deals with the power of the [ENTITY], i.e., the President. He shall be the executive head of the Zilla Parishad and he performs all the duties imposed and exercises all the powers conferred under this Act and the Rules made thereunder. Under [SECTION] of the Act the Zilla Parishad shall have the Standing Committees, viz., (a) General Standing Committee ; (b)Finance and Audit Committee ; (c) Planning and Development Committee ; (d) Public Works and Amenities Committee ; (e) Social Justice Committee; (f) Education Committee ; (g) Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Committee ; (h) Health Committee and (i) Industries Committee. [SECTION] of the Act provides that each Standing Committee shall consist of such number of members not exceeding six including the Chairman as specified by the Zilla Parishad elected by the members of Zilla Parishad from among themselves in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of single transferable vote. [SECTION] of the Act deals with functions of the Standing Committee. [SECTION] of the Act is a residuary provision which empowers the Zilla Parishad to appoint committees for any purpose other than those specified in [SECTION] of the Act. This gives an indication that the business of Zilla Parishad has to be carried on mostly by the Standing Committees mentioned in [SECTION] of the Act. But in regard to matters which are not specifically provided for under [SECTION] of the Act, the Zilla Parishad could appoint a committee and invest that committee so appointed with such powers as may be necessary or expedient for the fulfilment of the purpose for which it is appointed, and every such committee shall cease to exist on completion of the specific purposes for which it is appointed or at such time as may be determined by the Zilla Parishad. [SECTION] of the Act deals with the delegation of powers. Under this Section, the Zilla Parishad may by a notification delegate to the Secretary or other officer any of the powers conferred by or under this Act on Zilla Parishad. Under [SECTION] of the Act, the powers of Zilla Parishad in respect of Mandal Panchayats are enumerated. The last Section to be noted is [SECTION] of the Act. Under this Section the Zilla Parishad has the power to make regulations with the previous sanction of the Government to carry out the purpose of this Act in so far as it relates to its powers and duties.
It is well settled that there is a distinction between the literal approach and purposive approach in the interpretation of Statutes. If the language of [SECTION] is interpreted on its plain terms by adopting the literal approach, it is only the Zilla Parishad acting as a body that could make the nominations. If the same conclusion can be reached by adopting the purposive approach also, that conclusion would rest on an infallible premise. This approach is also known as the schematic and teleological method of interpretation and all it means is that the Court should go by 'the design or purpose which lies behind the Statute and not by the literal meaning of the words or the grammatical structure of the sentence. The Discipline of Law - page - 2O.
9. The contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners may be noted now. They contended that [SECTION] of the Act confers a power on the Zilla Parishad and not on the [ENTITY]. So the entire body of Zilla Parishad consisting of elected members of the Zilla Parishad inclusive of Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assembly, who have a right to participate in the meetings of the Zilla Parishad should consider the choice of the candidate belonging to the backward class and after such consideration only two such members should be nominated. According to then, what has been done in these cases is that the power conferred on the Zilla Parishad was delegated to the [ENTITY] and the [ENTITY] by virtue of such delegation which is impermissible under [SECTION] of the Act made the impugned nominations and this is bad in law. Whereas the contention of learned Advocate General is that there was no delegation of power under [SECTION]. But what had been done is that the [ENTITY] only exercised the constituent power of the Corporate body since the Act itself has conferred a legal status on the Zilla Parishad, namely it is a Corporate body and when once it is conceded that Zilla Parishad is a Corporate body, then the constituent of the said Corporate body could always exercise the power of that body if that power is properly conferred on the constituent. The second submission of the learned Advocate General is that [SECTION] does not attract the provisions of [SECTION] and so the resolution authorising the [ENTITY] to nominate two persons is not made under [SECTION] and the power of the [ENTITY] under [SECTION] has to be ascertained independently of the provisions in [SECTION] of the Act which deal with the functions and powers of the Zilla Parishad. Elaborating this contention, learned Advocate General submitted that the conferment of power on the constituent of the Corporate body like the Zilla Parishad does not amount to delegation and therefore the [ENTITY]s had the necessary power and also the authority by virtue of the resolution in their favour to make the impugned nominations.
10. The nominated candidates who have impleaded themselves in one of the Writ Petitions have supported the learned Advocate General and have further taken the plea that even though the resolution authorising the [ENTITY] is bad in law, the nominations made by him were again placed before the Zilla Parishad and the Zilla Parishad had ratified such nominations and therefore the nominations of these persons are valid by subsequent ratification. This contention also requires serious consideration and that can be done only after answering the first point, that is, whether the [ENTITY] was acting under delegated powers, as contended by the petitioners or was acting as the constituent of Zilla Parishad as contended by learned Advocate General.
11. It is necessary at this stage to examine the scheme of the Act which provides for the functions of the Zilla Parishad, its powers and duties. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that under [SECTION] of the Act, the Zilla Parishad does not discharge any of the functions under [SECTION] of the Act or the powers under [SECTION] of the Act. There is some substance in this contention because [SECTION] of the Act in my view confers a power on the Zilla Parishad for the purpose of the proper constitution of the Mandal Panchayat. That power is a contingent power. It becomes available when only no persons belonging to backward classes are elected to a Mandal Panchayat. That power cannot be exercised as provided under [SECTION] of the Act, as [SECTION] deals with the executive functions of the [ENTITY] of the Zilla Parishad.
12. [SECTION] of the Act is the reservoir of power for the [ENTITY] to act on his own and that is amply made clear under [SECTION] of the Act. That Section confers powers on the Zilla Parishad to constitute various committees as mentioned thereunder for the proper discharge of its various functions under the Act and more particularly those mentioned under [SECTION] of the Act.
13. If this is clear, the point for consideration is whether the Zilla Parishad though a Corporate Body could be treated as a Corporate Body as understood in the [ACT]. The purpose of conferring the status of Corporate body on the Zilla Parishad is to ensure that it shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and subject to such restrictions as are imposed by or under this or any other enactment, shall be vested with the capacity of suing or being sued in its Corporate name, of acquiring, holding and transferring property movable or immovable, whether without or within the limits of the area over which it has authority, of entering into contracts and of doing all things, necessary, proper or expedient for the purpose for which it is constituted but, does this Corporate body have all the attributes of a Corporate body as constituted under the [ACT] or under any other like statute? It is here the preamble to the Act comes into play. The object and purpose of the Act is to decentralise the powers and functions of the Government for the purpose of promoting the development of democratic institutions and for securing a greater measure of participation by the people in the State Five Year Plans and also in the Government affairs. The members of the Mandal Panchayat as provided under [SECTION] of the Act are all elected members. So also the members of the Zilla Parishad under [SECTION] of the Act. So, an element of participation by every member in the functioning of Zilla Parishad or the Mandal Panchayat whether it is exercising the powers conferred or discharging the duties imposed by the Act is necessary to achieve the purpose and object of the Act. Therefore, it is for consideration whether the Legislature intended under [SECTION] of the Act that the [ENTITY] of Zilla Parishad should be permitted to decide on the choice of the nominations to be made from the backward classes to fill up the vacancies caused by the absence of elective candidates from the said class. Determination of the backward class under the Act is a very sensitive issue, given the need for the representation of this class for the proper functioning of all our democratic institutions. That class has the benefit of constitutional protection. That class under the Act consists of either landless agricultural labourers or rural artisans, i.e., the test is economic backwardness, but in substance again it is relatable to the community or caste to which they belong. Rural artisans may be carpenters or blacksmiths or goldsmiths or was her men and they have their own needs and aspirations. A potter belongs to Kumbara caste, the carpenter belongs to Badige caste, the was her man belongs to Dhobi caste. So the backward class as defined under the Act is closely and inextricably linked to the caste to which they belong to and therefore the choice of these candidates would necessarily involve an element of deliberation by the members of Zilla Parishad. That deliberation would be in the form of a discussion i.e., a certain member may propose one candidate belonging to one artisan group and another candidate may propose the name of a landless agricultural labourer who may be [ENTITY] or Girijan of the Village. Those proposals may meet with counter proposals and the proposals and counter proposals may result in the proper choice from these two sections of the backward class. In the circumstance, this Court has to ponder whether the legislature would have intended the non-participation of all the members of the Zilla Parishad who had been duly elected, for making a success of the decentralisation of the powers. This intention of the Legislature has to be gathered from the provisions of [SECTION] of the Act and with reference to the other provisions of the Act.
14. The Act is said to be a model piece of legislation by the social scientists and political pandits for ushering in Panchayat Raj. However, certain provisions of the Act bear a close resemblance to the provisions of the Local Government Act, [SECTION]72, in the United Kingdom. In the Introduction to the Law of Local Government, Halsbury's Laws of England at para 1001 (Vol.No. 28) states as follows :
"The structure of local Government is founded on two tiers of principal authorities throughout the country with the addition of a system of elected parish or community councils in most rural and some urban parts. The local authorities in each tier are independent bodies responsible to their electorates, to ministers to the extent enacted by Parliament and to each other only to the extent so enacted In that the local authorities are all statutory Corporations, they are subject to the ultra vires rule by which their powers to act are limited to those functions expressly conferred on them, or which are calculated to facilitate or are conducive or incidental to the discharge of those functions. There are certain respects, whether in relation to the interpretation of their statutory powers or duties or in relation to historic rights and privileges attaching to local authorities or their inhabitants in which the history and origins of local authorities may be significant."
In United Kingdom the local authorities like the Zilla Parishad and Mandal Panchayat and other bodies had spent about (SIC)31 billion in the year [SECTION]81 on current and capital account representing about a quarter of total public expenditure. They received about 50 per cent of their resources by way of Central Government grants. In this State also it will not be wrong to say that about Rs. 960 crores would be ear-marked and spent towards developmental expenditure by these local bodies. Therefore a great responsibility is cast on the Zilla Parishads to discharge the powers conferred on them and the duties imposed on them by the Act.
How the local bodies function in England under the Local Government Act of [SECTION]72 requires to be noticed since there is a close parallel to the functioning of the local bodies under the Act and the functioning of the local bodies in England. At page 318 of the Book on the 'Law and Practice' of Meetings' by [ENTITY], it is stated thus :
"A local authority may arrange for the discharge of any of its functions by a Committee, unless the function is one which by Statute must be performed by the whole council, for example, the levying of a rate. Such a committee may, unless the council shall have provided otherwise, delegate any of its functions to a sub-committee, and committees and sub-committees may similarly sub-delegate to an officer of the council. Where a sub-committee exists, the council itself may delegate a function to the sub-committee direct.
The constitution of any committee is determined by the appointing authority and except for a finance committee, may include persons who are not councillors, provided that two-thirds of the committee consists of Council members. Every member of a committee so appointed, who at the time of his appointment was a member of the local authority by whom he was appointed, ceases to be a member of the Committee upon ceasing to be a member of the local authority."
In Halsbury's Laws of England, at para 1143, Vol.28, it is stated thus:
"Subject to any express provision in the local Government Act [SECTION]72 or any later Act, a local authority may arrange for the discharge of any of its functions by a Committee, a sub-committee or an officer of the authority, by another local authority, or jointly with one or more other local authorities, but arrangements made by an authority to devolve a function in any of these ways do not prevent the authority itself from exercising the function." "Functions with respect to levying or issuing a precept for a rate of borrowing money may not be devolved by the local authority."
15. The functioning of the local bodies under the Act is not different. The Act enables the Zilla Parishad to constitute as many committees as are necessary for discharging the various functions under the Act. The election to this body is by a single transferable vote. The residuary clause i.e., [SECTION], provides for constitution of the committees to discharge the other functions that are not specifically covered by [SECTION]. That only shows that the very object and purpose of the Act being decentralisation of the administration, that is sought to be achieved by the constitution of various committees and subcommittees and not by any individual acting in his individual capacity. That being the scheme of the Act, what was the intendment of the legislature under [SECTION] of the Act when it empowered the Zilla Parishad to nominate members from the Backward Classes? Did it envisage that the [ENTITY] should have all the powers and the absolute discretion to nominate whomsoever he chooses or was it left to the consensus of the Members who constitute the Zilla Parishad, that is", nominations by the simple rule of majority? The Zilla Parishads as they are constituted are not controlled by one political party. Its members are elected on the basis of party programmes and party symbols. Some of them belong to the ruling party in this State, some belong to the opposition party and some belong to minority communities who do not belong to any of the political parties in the State. So an element of participation by the members who belong to different political groups or communities will be necessary in choosing the 2 candidates from the Backward Class. This has to be underscored since their nominations finally will upset the voting power of the Mandal Panchayat as all the decisions of the Mandal Panchayat are taken by the simple rule of majority votes in its various meetings. So, if the intendment, object and also the scheme of the Act are kept in view, it would be possible for this Court to put a proper construction on [SECTION] of the Act.
16. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that this power is a constituent power and not a delegated power and, therefore, it is permissible for the President to make nominations on behalf of the Zilla Parishad. This contention overlooks the fact that the constituent power as envisaged in the decision of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT], is totally absent under the scheme of the Act and also in the plain language of [SECTION] of the Act. This constituent power that found favour with the Supreme Court in that case related to the provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT] under which the power of control over the Subordinate Judiciary vested in the High Court and thereby there was an implied power to frame the rules to make the exercise of the control feasible, convenient and effective. The Supreme Court observed as follows in the said decision:
"But [SECTION] is not the sole repository of the High Court's power to frame fules. The relevant part of [SECTION] of the [ACT] provides that the control over District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto shall be vested in the High Court. Since [SECTION] provides that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint. [SECTION] has to be construed to mean that the control over District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto is vested in the entire body of Judges who together constitute the High Court and not in the Chief Justice as representing the High Court or an Administrative Judge or a small body of Judges acting as an Administrative Committee. But though the control over subordinate Courts is vested institutionally in the High Courts by [SECTION], it does not follow that the High Courts have no power to prescribe the manner in which that control may in practice be exercised. In fact, the very circumstance that the power of control, which comprehends matters of a wide-ranging variety, vests in the entire body of Judges makes it imperative that rules must be framed to make the exercise of control feasible, convenient and effective. The seeds of the jurisdiction to frame rules regulating the manner in which the control over subordinate Courts is to be exercised are thus to be found in the very nature of the power and in the fact that the power vests in the entire body of Judges. The High Court has, therefore, the power under [SECTION] itself to frame rules for regulating the manner in which the control vested in it may be exercised. The power to do a thing necessarily carries with it the power to regulate the manner in which the thing may be done. It is an incident of the power itself and indeed, without it, the exercise of the power may in practice be fraught with difficulties which will frustrate, rather than further, the object of the power."
17. The Judges of the High Court are all constitutional functionaries and they neither belong to any political party nor do they get themselves elected on the basis of party ticket on the hustings. All their actions, powers and duties either on the judicial side or on the administrative side are controlled and tested by the touch stone of judicial conscience and their oath to uphold the [ACT]al provisions. But, it is not so in the case of Zilla Parishads whose members are elected on the basis of adult franchise irrespective of their attainments and experience in local administration. Therefore, the analogy of exercise of power by a Committee of Judges which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in [ENTITY]'s case, may not be apposite to the exercise of power by an [ENTITY] of the Zilla Parishad. It is common ground that no rules have been framed under the Act by the Government for the exercise of the powers conferred on the Zilla Parishad by the [ENTITY]. So, the power of the [ENTITY] will have to be spelt out from the plain language of [SECTION] of the Act and not from the provisions of the [ACT]. In my view the decisions of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT]., as also in [PRECEDENT]., on which the learned Counsel for the petitioners have relied have laid down the law on the point in question. In [ENTITY]'s case, the provisions of the [ACT], Middle School Tatha Madhamik Shiksha ([ENTITY]) [ENTITY] (13 of [SECTION]73) came up for consideration. That act was enacted by the legislature for the purpose of making recommendations to prescribe text books for the various secondary schools in the State of Madhya Pradesh. One of the functions entrusted to the Board constituted under the Act was to select text books for the prescribed courses of instruction and syllabi for the Higher Secondary classes. [SECTION] of the [ACT] provided that the State Government may, by order, prescribe the text books according to syllabi laid down provided that the text books for secondary education shall not be prescribed without the prior consultation with the Board. The Board consisted of the Chairman and certain other Members duly constituted under the Act. The State Government, thereafter, in exercise of its power under [SECTION] of the [ACT] issued a notification according its approval to certain text books on certain subjects. It was stated therein that the approval to prescribe those books was given by the State Government in consultation with the Board. The petitioner who was a person interested in the supply of text books to various courses challenged the notification issued by the State Government on various grounds. One of the grounds which found favour with the Supreme Court was that it was only the Chairman of the Board who had taken the decision to recommend the books and that decision was taken without consultation with the other members of the Board. That was disputed by the State Government. Therefore, the Supreme Court after going into the facts placed before it in the affidavits filed by the parties found, on a question of fact that those recommendations were made by the Chairman of the Board. That was not disputed by the learned Advocate General. But, his contention was that the Chairman was entitled on behalf of the Board to make the recommendations and the recommendations made by him in the eye of law are the recommendations of the Board. [ENTITY], J., as he then was, speaking for the Court observed :
"Now we do not dispute the general proposition that when a power or function is given by the statute to a corporate body and no provision is made in the statute as to how such power or function shall be exercised, the corporate body can by a resolution passed at a general meeting devise its own mode of exercising such power or function, such as authorising one or more of the members to exercise it on behalf of the Board. But here this broad proposition would have no application. There are several provisions in the Act of [SECTION]65 which provide for delegation of the powers and functions of the Board to the Chairman and other Committees by means of Regulations. If, therefore, any power or function of the Board is intended to be made exercisable by the. Chairman, that can only be done through the mechanism of the Regulations. The Board cannot, by a resolution passed at a general meeting, authorise the Chairman to exercise a particular power or function entrusted to the Board. The decision of the Board dated 12th October, [SECTION]71 relied on cannot therefore, help the respondents even if it were construed as authorising the Chairman to exercise the power of the Board to recommend or give advice in relation to text books to be prescribed by the State Government, But in fact we do not think it can be so construed. This decision merely authorises the Chairman to take all necessary steps for the purpose of proceeding further with the implementation of the text books improvement scheme and it does not confer any authority on him to exercise a power of the Board which he otherwise did not possess. In any event the authority conferred by this decision cannot include the exercise of a statutory function which came to be vested in the Board for the first time on 23rd March, [SECTION]73 when [SECTION], [SECTION] was enacted. We are, therefore, compelled to reach the conclusion that the only consultation which the State Government had before issuing the notification dated 24th March, [SECTION]73 was consultation with the Chairman and not with the board."
18. Under the scheme of the Act, the Government has the power to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act. Under [SECTION], Zilla Parishad has power subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made under [SECTION] and with the previous sanction of the Government to make regulations to carry out the purpose of the Act in so far as it relates to its power and duties. [SECTION] of the Act confers a power on the Zilla Parishad to nominate 2 persons from the Backward Class and that is a power which is within the scope of [SECTION] of the Act. Therefore, the scheme of the Act thus postulates framing of necessary rules under [SECTION] by the Government or necessary regulations under [SECTION] by the Zilla Parishad to carry out the purpose of the Act in so far as it relates to its powers and duties. Though there may be two different Chapters under the Act - one to deal with the powers of the Zilla Parishad and the other to deal with the functions of the Zilla Parishad, the existence of 2 different chapters relating to powers and functions does not in any way control the interpretation of [SECTION] of the Act. [SECTION] of the Act confers a power on the Zilla Parishad to nominate 2 persons belonging to Backward Classes and that power has to be regulated either by the provisions of that sub-section or by the rules and regulations expressly made in regard to the exercise of such powers. Therefore, in the absence of any rules and regulations, [SECTION] must be given full effect and, if so construed it, an authorisation to the President to nominate 2 persons or delegation of power to him to do so would not render the nominations valid. The principle of delegation is not a rule of law but a rule of construction as observed by the Supreme Court in Barium Chemical's case, . The action of the Company Law Board in that case was challenged by the petitioner/Company not only on the ground of malafides but also on the ground of violation of the [ACT]al guarantee under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Though the Supreme Court negatived the contention of the petitioner/company based on the [ACT]al guarantees conferred on it, it upheld its contention in so far as it related to the exercise of the delegated power to the Company Law Board under [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]56. [ENTITY], J. speaking for the majority view observed : ' "As a general rule, whatever a person has power to do himself, he may do by means of an agent. This broad rule is limited by the operation of the principle that a delegated authority cannot be re-delegated, delegatus non potest delegare. The naming of a delegate to do an act involving a discretion indicates that the delegate was selected because of his peculiar skill and the confidence reposed in him, and there is a presumption that he is required to do the act himself and cannot redelegate his authority. As a general rule, 'if the statute directs that certain persons, their performance in any other manner than that specified or by any other person than one of those named is impliedly prohibited.' See Crawford on Statutory Construction, [SECTION]40 Edn., Article [SECTION]5, Page 335. Normally, a discretion entrusted by Parliament to an administrative organ must be exercised by that organ itself. If a statute entrusts an administrative function involving the exercise of a discretion to a Board consisting of two or more persons it is to be presumed that each member of the Board should exercise his individual judgment on the matter and all the members of the Board should act together and arrive at a joint decision. Prima facie, the Board must act as a whole and cannot delegate its function to one of its members.
The learned Attorney-General submitted that a distribution of business among the members of the Company Law Board is not a delegation of its authority, and the maxim has no application in such a case. I cannot accept this submission. In [PRECEDENT], the Court held that where a drainage board constituted by an Act of Parliament was authorised by it to delegate its powers to a committee, the powers so delegated to the committee must be exercised by them acting in concert and it was not competent to them to apportion those powers amongst themselves and one of them acting alone, pursuant to such apportionment, could not justify his acts under the statute. Lord [ENTITY], C.J. said at Page 262 :
'It was not competent to them to delegate powers, which required the united action of the three, to be exercised according to the unaided judgment of one of them.' Again, in Vine v. National Dock Labour Board, [SECTION]57 AC 488, the House of Lords held that a local Board set up under the scheme embodied in the schedule to the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Order, [SECTION]47 had no power to assign its disciplinary function under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the scheme to a committee and the purported dismissal of a worker by the committee was a nullity. In my opinion, the distribution of the business of the Board among its members is a delegation of its authority.
But the maxim 'delegatus non potest delegare must not be pushed too far. The maxim does not embody a rule of law. It indicates a rule of construction of a statute or other instrument conferring an authority. Prima facie, a discretion conferred by a statute on any authority is intended to be exercised by hat authority and by no other. But the intention may be negatived by any contrary indications in the language, scope or object of the statute. The construction that would best achieve the purpose and object of the statute should be adopted."
In my view this enunciation of law is applicable for the proper interpretation of [SECTION] of the Act.
[SECTION]. As noticed earlier, the Zilla Parishad could have made the nominations by the simple rule of majority of votes. It could have done so through its committees and sub-committees constituted under [SECTION] of the Act. No Rule or Regulation has been made under the Act empowering the [ENTITY] to act on his own without even a prior consultation with the other members of the Zilla Parishad. The nominations of these members from the Backward Classes will have considerable bearing on the voting power of the Mandal Panchayat since all the decisions of the Mandal Panchayat will have to be taken by the simple rule of majority votes.
20. However a contention is put forward by Sri [ENTITY], learned Counsel for one of the respondents that the Zilla Parishad can form a one-man Committee under [SECTION] of the Act and accordingly, the impugned resolution authorised the President to act as a one man Committee. There is no doubt, in law, there can be one-man Committee.
To quote [ENTITY] on the Law and Practice of Meetings again :
"There is nothing to prevent a Committee of one being appointed, and [SECTION] appears to cover such a possibility of its reference to a 'member or members'."
That observation was made by [ENTITY] with reference to the provision of [SECTION] to the [ACT]. The language of [SECTION] should be noted :
"The directors may delegate any of their power to committees consisting of such member or members of their body as they think fit; any committee so formed shall in the exercise of the powers so delegated conform to any regulations that may be imposed on it by the directors."
We do not have any such provision in the Act and no rules are framed so far to carry out the purpose of the Act under [SECTION] nor any regulations have been framed by the Zilla Parishad with the previous approval of the Government. Whether such rules or regulations could be validly made does not arise in these petitions and may have to be decided in an appropriate case.
[ACT] of one man Committee again depends on the intendment, object and the scheme of the Act. But, the Act with which we are concerned does not provide for one man Committee to function at the Zilla Parishad level. Because that may amount to negation of the very principle of decentralisation of powers which is the prime and laudable object of the Act. However, it is contended by the learned Counsel Sri [ENTITY] for some of the respondents that since one-man Committee is permissible in the eye of law, [ENTITY] should be treated as one-man Committee and accordingly till the rules are framed by the Government or Regulations are made by the Zilla Parishad, this Court during the transitional period should not interfere with the nominations made by the [ENTITY]. According to him, [SECTION] should be interpreted in such a way as to confer powers on the [ENTITY] treating him as one-man committee.
This contention is wholly untenable. The ultra vires doctrine cannot be and ought not to be sacrificed at the altar of expediency. There is no ambiguity in the words of [SECTION] and it is not the case of the respondents that by permitting all the members of the Zilla Parishad to make the nominations by the Rule of simple majority, [SECTION] becomes unworkable.
The strength of the Zilla Parishad varies from District to District. By convening a proper meeting it will be possible for all the members to participate in the meeting. The meeting wilt have to be preceded by an Agenda. The Agenda has to disclose the subject matter of the meeting. That will give an opportunity to all the members to make up their minds regarding the choice of nominations. That is the way to promote the development of democratic institutions and to secure a greater measure of participation by the people as emphasised in the preamble to the Act.
21. That takes me to the next question, i.e., whether the ratification of the nominations made by [ENTITY] validates such nomination. Mr. [ENTITY] appearing for some nominated members, submitted that whatever irregularity was there in the nominations by the [ENTITY], that irregularity was cured by the subsequent ratification by the members of the Zilla Parishad. The Act provides for confirmation of the business of the Zilla Parishad. The relevant provision namely. [SECTION] of the Act shows that the action taken by the Zilla Parishad in its meeting are brought up for confirmation in the next meeting of the Zilla Parishad. That is the normal way in which these elected bodies which are bodies corporate function. Similar provisions are found in the Articles of Association framed under the [ACT] and also under the other Acts dealing with local bodies, like the [ACT] and the [ACT]. But, there cannot be a ratification of an [ACT]. This position admits of no doubt and it has been settled by the decision of the highest Courts in the United Kingdom.
22. Learned Counsel for the petitioners have not cited any direct authority of the Supreme Court or of this Court on this point. But they have relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in BARNARD AND ORS. v. NATIONAL DOCK LABOUR BOARD AND ANR., ([SECTION]53) 1 All.E.R. 1113 as an authority for this proposition. Though in that case the power delegated to a subordinate body was a judicial power, the principle enunciated by the Court Appeal in that case is equally applicable to the delegation of administrative power which is controlled by statute. In that case "the plaintiffs were registered dock workers employed by a firm of master lightermen.The National Dock Labour Board was set up under the Dock Workers (Regulations of Employment) Order,. [SECTION]47, to administer the scheme provided by the order, with power to delegate to local dock boards constituted by the order certain disciplinary functions, including the power to suspend a worker for failing to comply with the provisions of the order. The plaintiffs refused to obey a lawful order issued to them by their employers who reported them to the National Board under Clause 15(3) of the order. The local board purported to delegate their powers to suspend the plaintiffs to the secretary to that board, the Port Manager, who, purporting to act under Clause [SECTION](b) of the order, suspended the plaintiffs from work, and their appeal under Clause 18(1)(b) to the appeal tribunal against the suspension was disallowed. In an action by the plaintiffs against the National Board for a declaration that their suspension was wrongful, it was held that the power of suspension conferred by Clause [SECTION](b) on the local Board was a judicial or quasi-judicial function and the local Board had no power to delegate it or subsequently to ratify a decision by a person to whom the power of suspension had been improperly delegated, and, therefore, the suspension of the plaintiffs by the port manager was a nullity ; the Court had power in their discretion to make a declaration relating to the validity of the decision of a statutory tribunal; and in the circumstances would grant the plaintiffs a declaration that their suspension was wrongful and a nullity."
Lord [ENTITY] in his supporting judgment at pages 1118 and 11[SECTION] observed as follows :
"While an administrative function can often be delegated, a judicial function rarely can be. No judicial tribunal can delegate its functions unless it is enabled to do so expressly or by necessary implication. In Local Government Board v. Arlidge ([SECTION]15 A.C. 120) the power to delegate was given by necessary implication, but there is nothing in this scheme authorising the board to delegate this function and it cannot be implied. It was suggested that it would be impracticable for the Board to sit as a board to decide all these cases, but I see nothing impracticable in that. They have only to fix their quorum at two members and arrange for two members, one from each side, employers and workers, to be responsible for one week at a time.
Next, it was suggested that, even if the Board could not delegate their functions, any rate they could ratify the actions of the port manager, but, if the Board have no power to delegate their functions to the port manager, they can have no power to ratify what he has already done. The effect of ratification is to make it equal to a prior command, but as a prior command, in the shape of delegation, would be useless, so also is a ratification."
This decision was followed by the House of Lords in VINE v. NATIONAL DOCK LABOUR BOARD, [SECTION]57 AC 488 and the decision of the House of Lords was followed by the Supreme Court in Barium Chemical case, .
In my view, though the Court of appeal had made a distinction between delegation of judicial power and the delegation of an administrative power, that distinction is immaterial for the purpose of these petitions, since, here, it is not delegation of a ministerial act as contended by Mr. [ENTITY], Senior Advocate, appearing for some of the contesting respondents. But, it is the delegation of a statutory power conferred on the Zilla Parishad. Therefore, the subsequent ratification by the Zilla Parishad of some of the nominations would not validate the nominations made by the [ENTITY]. In the view 1 have taken, it must be made clear thai the nominations made by the [ENTITY] cannot be validated by ratification in other cases by passing a resolution to that effect.
23. A distinction was sought to be made between the meaning of the words 'nomination' and 'delegation.' That distinction is without any substance. What is relevant for the purpose of this case is what is the scope of [SECTION] of the Act? From the scheme of the provisions of [SECTION] of the Act it is clear that [SECTION] confers on the Zilla Parishad a power that has to be exercised in the manner provided under the Act, and, therefore, the action of the [ENTITY] in making the nominations by virtue of the resolution passed in his favour attracts the ultra vires doctrine which is applicable to test the validity of the actions of the local bodies and thus viewed it has to be held that the [ENTITY] was not competent to make the nominations under [SECTION] of the Act.
Bailey, Cross and Garner in the 'Cases and Materials in Administrative Law' have stated on the 'Ultra Vires Principle' as follows :
"Administrative authorities are almost invariably set up by statute. All powers comes from Parliament or exceptionally from the Royal Prerogative, and the administrative authorities must act within those powers. An ultra vires act has no legal validity. In theory it can be ignored in so far as it places a burden on the person affected by it. Usually, it is either more convenient or more prudent for the person affected to challenge its validity before the Courts. Where a person affected has been deprived of a benefit he should have received, recourse to the Courts is necessary if the authority is obdurate.
A person invoking the ultra vires principle may be able to attack one or more of four elements of the act challenged : (1) the competence of the authority in question to perform the act ; (2) the name of the act itself; (3) the discretion exercised in the performance of the Act; and (4) the procedure adopted."
24. A contention was raised by the learned Counsel for other contesting respondents that the Court has to make a distinction between 'Duties' and 'functions' and thus construed [SECTION] does not impose a duty or function and, therefore. [SECTION] is independent of the other provisions and the scheme of the Act relating to functions and duties of the Zilla Parishad. In my view that argument has no substance at all since once it is conceded that the Zilla Parishad has the power to nominate 2 members from the Backward Classes that power should be exercised in the manner provided under the Act and in no other way. That power is not correlated to or controlled by the duties and functions of the Zilla Parishad under the Act.
25. For these reasons the preliminary question as to the jurisdiction of the [ENTITY] to make nominations which are impugned in these proceedings will have to be answered in favour of the petitioners and against the Zilla Parishad and, therefore, it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the nominations made by the [ENTITY] in each of these cases.
26. Consequently, Rule is made absolute in all these cases and the nominations made by the [ENTITY] being ultra vires of the provisions of [SECTION] of the Act, these nominations are set aside. However, it is open to the Zilla Parishads concerned to make fresh nominations in the light of the observations made in this order.
27. In Writ Petition No. 6630 of [SECTION]87 it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by virtue of the votes of the nominated members in favour of Respondents 7 and 8 they were elected. The nominations of the nominated members being contrary to law they could not have voted in the election of [ENTITY] and [ENTITY] and, therefore, the elections of Respondents 7 and 8 are declared void. It is ordered accordingly. However, it is open to the prescribed officer to hold elections in accordance with law.
28. In Writ Petitions No. 5840 and 7230 of [SECTION]87 since the elections of the [ENTITY] and [ENTITY] were stayed by this Court, the returning officer is directed to continue the election process from the stage from which it is stayed in accordance with law.
29. After the pronouncement of this order, learned Government Pleader made a submission that in view of the implications of this order on the functioning of the Mandal Panchayats, operation of this order may be stayed to enable the Government to prefer an appeal. His request is reasonable and, therefore, operation of this order is stayed for a period of 4 weeks subject to the condition that the Mandal Panchayat is permitted to carry on its day to day business without the voting power of the nominated members who are nominated by the [ENTITY] of the Zilla Parishad in question.