[CASE NUMBER] ORDER [ENTITY] R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4481of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4482of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4483of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4484of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4485of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4486of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4487of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4488of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4647of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4648of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4649of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4650of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4802of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4804of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4805of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4807of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4808of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4809of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4935of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4936of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4937of2018 Page 1 of 15 [CASE NUMBER] ORDER With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4939of2018 With R/SPECIALCIVILAPPLICATIONNO.4940of2018
[ENTITY] Versus [ENTITY] Appearance:
[ENTITY],SENIORADVOCATEwithMSVIDHIJ CORAM: HONOURABLEMR.JUSTICE[ENTITY] Date:20/04/2018 ORALCOMMONORDER
1. ThisgroupofpetitionsarefiledunderArticles226and227of [ACT] for the purpose of challenging the legality andvalidityoftheimpugnedawardpassedbythelearnedPresiding Officer,LabourCourt,SuratinvariousReference(LCS)numbers.
2. AttherequestofthelearnedSeniorAdvocateforthepetitioners' Mr.[ENTITY],theCourthastreatedthepresentpetitioni.e.SpecialCivil ApplicationNo.4481of2018asaleadmatterascommonquestions oflawandfactsarearisinginthepresentgroupofpetitions.Hence, thisgroupofpetitionsaretakenupforfinalhearingattherequestof learnedSeniorAdvocateMr.Shalin[ENTITY]appearingwithMs.[ENTITY],learnedadvocateforthepetitioners.
3. The petitioner was working as 'Field Worker (Beldar)' in the FilariaMalariaDivisionoftherespondent-Corporationonmonthly payofRs.1,700/onpermanentbasis.Itisthecaseofthepetitioner thatattherelevantpointoftimeintheyear1997,whentheservices were terminated, the respondentCorporation has neither complied withanyoftheprovisionscontainedundertheIndustrialDisputesAct norhadgivenanynoticeoropportunityofhearing.Itisthecaseofthe petitionerthatthoughthepetitionerhasputinthreeyearsofservice withmorethan240daysineveryyear,theauthoritywasexpectedto complywiththeprocedureestablishedbylaw.Sincethesamehasnot beenfollowedwhentheserviceswerediscontinued,industrialdispute was raised by the petitioner, which ultimately was referred to for adjudication to the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Surat, whichwasregisteredasReference(LCS)No.456of1999.Despitethe factthatitwasevidentlyprovedbythepetitionerthat240dayshave been completed, learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court,Surat has dismissedthereference whichisthesubjectmatterofthisgroupof petitionsunderArticles226and227ofthe[ACT]ofIndia.
3.1. So far as [CASE NUMBER] is concerned, herealsothepetitioner wasworkingasa'FieldWorker' (Beldar) in the Filaria - Malaria Division of the respondent -
CorporationonamonthlypayofRs.2,100/onpermanentbasis.A case has been putforth on the ground that he was working on permanentbasisdrawingmonthlysalaryofRs.2,100/andcompleted 240 days and thereafter, has been discontinued orally without complyingwiththeprocedure.Asaresultofthis,industrialdispute wasraisedwhichwasultimatelyreferredforadjudicationbeforethe learnedPresidingOfficer,LabourCourtSuratwhichwasregisteredas Reference (LCS) No. 760 of 1999. The learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Surat based upon the material produced, has dismissedthereferencewhichhasgivenrisetofilingoftheaforesaid petition.
3.2. Similar is the case with respect to other Special Civil Applications Nos. 4483/2018, 4484/2018, 4485/2018, 4486/2018, 4487/2018, 4488/2018, 4647/2018, 4648/2018, 4649/2018, 4650/2018, 4802/2018, 4809/2018, 4804/2018, 4805/2018, 4807/2018, 4808/2018, 4935/2018, 4936/2018, 4937/2018, 4939/2018and4940/2018,inwhichalmostsimilaristheposition withregardtoeachofthepetitionersandtherefore, witha view to avoidunnecessaryburden,detailfactsarenotnarratedinthepresent order.However,sincetheissueisrelatingtotheirdiscontinuancehas been identically dealt with by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Surat all these petitions are disposed of by this present commonorder.
4. LearnedSeniorAdvocateMr.Shalin[ENTITY]appearingwithMs. [ENTITY], learned advocate for the petitioners has vehemently contendedthatthetotalperiodofserviceismorethan240daysandit wasobligatoryonthepartoftherespondent-Corporationtocomply with the mandatory provisions contained under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. It has further been contended that this mandateofthestatuteifnotobservedactionisvoid,whichaspecthas notbeenconsideredbythelearnedPresidingOfficer,LabourCourt, Surat. It has also been contended that looking to the cross examinationwhichisreflectinginpara14oftheaward,theultimate conclusionisnotjustandproper.Asaresultofthis,theawardin questionisnotsustainableintheeyeoflaw.
5. Having heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. [ENTITY] and having gone through the material which has been placed along with the presentpetition,itappearsthatthepetitionerwasissuedconditional appointmentorderon11.03.1996onlyforaperiodof85dayswherein itismentionedthatafteralapseofthesaidperiod,therewillbean automaticdiscontinuance.Itisalsoreflectingfromtheappointment order that the monthly salary is not Rs.1,700/, but the same is rangingfromRs.750940/permonthonly.Yetanotherorderwhich isbroughttothenoticeoftheCourtistheorderdated12.06.1996, again reflecting the very same position. Further, the order is also dated09.09.1996,reflectingonpage28ofthepetitionwhichisalso reflecting the same situation and from the aforesaid letter of appointment it is revealing that thepetitioner wascalled for in the year1996andonlyintermittentlyappointedtodosomemanualwork foraperiodof85daysandnotatasalaryofRs.1,700/.
6. In view of the aforesaid position which is prevailing, an assertion which has been made by the petitioner on oath that the petitionerwasworkingatmonthlysalaryofRs.1,700/onpermanent basisisillfoundedandnotsupportedbyanymaterialonrecord.Itis alsoemergingfromtherecordthatthereisnopreviousserviceofthe petitionerinanyyear.Onthecontrary,onlyfortheyear1996,the petitionerhasworkedintermittentlyandbyeffluxoftime,theservices wereautomaticallydiscontinued.
6.1. Itisalsoreflectingfromtheorderthatdiscontinuancehastaken placeon26.10.1997asperthesayofthepetitioner,butthathasnot been supported by any other material which is attached with the petition. Theorderwhichhasbeenattachedtothepetitionisalso onlyrelatingtoyear1996andnothingbeyondthat. 6.2. Additionally if perusal of the award is made by the Court, it reflects that the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Surat has considered every aspect of the matter and has also considered the rigorofSection25BoftheIndustrialDisputesActaswellas[SECTION]ofthe[ACT]Acategoricalconclusionisarrived atbythelearnedPresidingOfficer,LabourCourtSuratthatviolation of provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT] is not establishedandasaresultofthis,consideringthedecisionwhichhas beenrelieduponbytherespectivesides,thelearnedPresidingOfficer appearstohaveexerciseddiscretionvestedinlaw.Byconstruingand analyzing the provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT],ithasbeennoticedbytheCourtthatthepetitionerhasnotbeen able to establish the violation of provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT]
6.3. Whenthematteristakenupforhearingaquerywasraisedby theCourtthatastowhetheranypreviousserviceisonrecordofthe petitioner.LearnedSeniorAdvocateMr.[ENTITY]hasnotbeenableto expressandhenceonthebasisofthematerialavailableonrecordof the petition. what has been considered is that the intermittent temporaryengagementofworkisoftheyear1996only.Asaresultof this,thequestionofpreviousyearandcompletionof240daysdoes notarise.Itisfurthersettledpositionoflawthatthereshallbeno automaticreinstatementafteralonglapseoftime.Infactbasedupon such circumstance, if the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Surathasfoundthataclearviolationisnotpossibletobeconfidently concluded,thenasamatterofright,itisnotopenforthepetitionerto claimandhereisacaseinwhichtheallegedterminationisaroundof theyear1996andassuchinsuchpeculiarsetofcircumstance,to granttheorderofreinstatementandconsequentialeffectwouldbeon thecontrarymiscarriageofjustice.Thereisnomaterialofanynature which indicates long length of service, as such prior to almost 19 years and if for few days, the petitioner has worked on daily rated wage, then the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Surat is justified in discarding the request of the petitioner and as such accordingly since no case is found to have been made out by the petitionerbeforethelearnedPresidingOfficer,LabourCourt,Surat,it isnotpossibleforthisCourttosubstitutetheconclusionarrivedatby thelearnedPresidingOfficer,LabourCourt,Surat,moreparticularly whenthereisnomaterialenoughonrecordtojustifytheclaimofthe petitioner-workmen.Hence,ifthisbethesituation,theCourtisnot in a position to brand the award of the learned Presiding Officer, LabourCourt,Suratasperverseinanymanner.
6.4. [ENTITY],thelearnedPresidingOfficer,LabourCourt Surathasassignedproperreasonswhileexercisingjurisdictionwhich thisCourtisnotinapositiontodislodgeinexercisingextraordinary jurisdiction.Thelawiswellsettledbycatenaofdecisionsofexercising ofextraordinaryjurisdictionparticularlywhiledealingwiththeaward passedbythelearnedPresidingOfficer,LabourCourt,Surat.Ithas beenstatedandpropoundedbytheApexCourtthatunlessanduntil theawardreflectsanyperversityormaterialillegalityorirregularityin passing the award, only in those contingencies, this Court can exercisejurisdictionunderArticles226and227ofthe[ACT]of India.ThisCourtisnotsitinginanappealoverthedecisionofthe learnedPresidingOfficer,LabourCourt,Suratespeciallywhenthereis notinfirmitybasicallyvisiblefromthebarereading ofthedecision. AnymeredifferentopinionwouldnotpermitthisCourttosubstitute thefindingwhichhasbeenarrivedatafterhearingthepetitionerat length. While taking this view, this Court is mindful of the circumstanceaboutwelldefinedpropositionoflawlaiddownbythe ApexCourtinthecaseofSameerSureshGuptathroughPAHolder V/s.RahulKumarAgarwal,reportedin(2013)9SCC374inwhich para6and7certainstipulationareprovidedasguidingfeatureasin whichcircumstanceextraordinaryjurisdictioncanbeexercised.The Courthasconsideredthesaidobservationwhiletakingthisparticular view.Asaresultofthis,therelevantobservationscontainedinpara6 and7arereproducedhereinafter: "6.Inourview,theimpugnedorderisliabletobesetaside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondentthelearnedSingleJudgeignoredthelimitations of the High Court'sjurisdictionunderArticle227 of the [ACT].TheparametersforexerciseofpowerbytheHigh CourtunderthatArticle were considered bythetwoJudge BenchofthisCourtinSuryaDevRaivs.RamChanderRaiand others(2003)6SCC675. Afterconsideringvarious facets of the issue,the two Judge Bench culled out the following principles:
"(1) [CASE NUMBER] 2002 in [SECTION] of [ACT] cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High CourtunderArticles226and227ofthe[ACT].
(2) Interlocutoryorders,passedbythecourtssubordinate to theHighCourt,againstwhichremedyofrevisionhasbeen [CASE NUMBER] neverthelessopentochallengein,andcontinuetobesubject to,certiorariandsupervisoryjurisdictionoftheHighCourt.
(3) Certiorari, under [SECTION] of the [ACT], is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e. when a subordinatecourt is found to have acted (i) without jurisdictionbyassuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregardof law or therules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and therebyoccasioning failure of justice.
(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the [ACT]isexercisedfor keeping the subordinate courts withintheboundsoftheirjurisdiction.Whenthesubordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or hasfailedtoexerciseajurisdictionwhichitdoeshaveorthe jurisdictionthoughavailableisbeingexercisedbytheCourtina manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injusticehasoccasionedthereby,theHighCourtmaystepinto exerciseitssupervisoryjurisdiction.
(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction,noneisavailabletocorrectmereerrorsoffactorof law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedingssuchaswhenitisbasedonclearignoranceorutter disregardoftheprovisionsoflaw,and(ii)a graveinjusticeor grossfailureofjusticehasoccasionedthereby.
(6)Apatenterrorisanerrorwhichisselfevident,i.e.which canbeperceivedordemonstratedwithoutinvolvingintoany lengthyorcomplicatedargumentoralongdrawn process of reasoning. Wheretwoinferencesarereasonablypossibleand the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannotbecalledgrossorpatent.
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisoryjurisdictionaretobeexercisedsparinglyandonly inappropriatecaseswherethejudicialconscienceoftheHigh Courtdictatesittoactlestagrossfailureofjusticeorgrave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of anysuitorproceedingsinasubordinatecourtandtheerror thoughcallingforcorrectionisyetcapableofbeingcorrectedat the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferredthereagainstand entertaining a petition invoking certiorariorsupervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstructthesmoothflowand/orearlydisposalofthesuitor proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment,maybecome incapableofcorrectionatalaterstage andrefusaltointervenewouldresultintravestyofjusticeor wheresuchrefusalitselfwouldresultinprolongingofthelis.
(8) TheHighCourtinexerciseof certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulgeinreappreciationorevaluationofevidenceor correct errorsindrawinginferencesorcorrecterrorsofmereformalor technicalcharacter.
(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisoryjurisdictionarealmostsimilar and the width of jurisdictionexercised by the High Courts in India unlike Englishcourtshasalmostobliteratedthedistinctionbetween the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writofcertioraritheHighCourtmayannulor setaside the act,orderorproceedingsofthesubordinatecourtsbutcannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitabledirectionssoastoguidethesubordinatecourtasto themannerinwhichitwouldactorproceedthereafteror afresh,theHighCourtmayinappropriatecasesitselfmake anorderinsupersession or substitution of theorderofthe subordinatecourtasthecourtshouldhavemadeinthefacts andcircumstancesofthecase."
7. ThesamequestionwasconsideredbyanotherBenchin ShaliniShyamShettyandanothervs.RajendraShankarPatil (2010)8SCC329,anditwasheld:
"(a)A petition under [SECTION] of the [ACT] is differentfrom a petition under [SECTION]. The mode of exerciseofpowerbytheHighCourtunderthesetwoarticlesis alsodifferent.
(b)Inanyevent,apetitionunderArticle227cannotbecalleda writpetition.Thehistoryoftheconfermentofwritjurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of confermentofthepowerofsuperintendenceontheHighCourts underArticle227andhavebeendiscussedabove.
(c)HighCourtscannot,atthedropofahat,inexerciseofits powerofsuperintendenceunderArticle227ofthe[ACT], interferewiththeordersoftribunalsorcourtsinferiortoit.Nor canit,inexerciseofthispower,actasacourtof appealover theordersofthecourtortribunalsubordinateto it. Incases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided,thatwouldalsooperateasarestrainontheexercise ofthispowerbytheHighCourt.
(d)TheparametersofinterferencebyHighCourtsinexerciseof theirpowerofsuperintendencehavebeenrepeatedlylaiddown bythisCourt.InthisregardtheHighCourtmustbeguidedby theprincipleslaiddownbythe[ACT]BenchofthisCourt in [ENTITY] and the principles in [ENTITY] have beenrepeatedlyfollowedbysubsequent [ACT]Benches andvariousotherdecisionsofthisCourt.
(e) According to the ratio in [ENTITY], followed in subsequentcases,theHighCourtinexerciseofitsjurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunalsandcourtssubordinatetoit,"within the bounds of theirauthority".
(f)Inordertoensurethatlawisfollowedbysuchtribunalsand courtsbyexercisingjurisdictionwhichisvestedinthemandby notdecliningtoexercisethejurisdictionwhichisvestedinthem.
(g)Apartfromthesituationspointedin(e)and(f),HighCourt caninterfereinexerciseofitspowerofsuperintendencewhen therehasbeenapatentperversityintheordersofthetribunals andcourtssubordinatetoitorwheretherehasbeenagross andmanifestfailureofjusticeorthebasicprinciplesofnatural justicehavebeenflouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because anotherview thanthe one takenbythe tribunals or courtssubordinatetoit,isapossibleview.Inotherwordsthe jurisdictionhastobeverysparinglyexercised.
(i)TheHighCourt'spowerofsuperintendenceunderArticle227 cannotbecurtailedbyanystatute.Ithasbeendeclaredapart ofthebasicstructureofthe[ACT]by the [ACT] BenchofthisCourtinL.ChandraKumarv.UnionofIndiaand therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also verydoubtful.
(j)Itmaybetruethat astatutoryamendment of a rather cognateprovision,[ACT] under Article227.Atthesametime,itmustberememberedthatsuch statutoryamendmentdoes not correspondingly expandthe HighCourt'sjurisdictionofsuperintendenceunderArticle227.
(k)Thepowerisdiscretionaryandhastobeexercisedon equitableprinciple.Inanappropriatecase,thepowercanbe exercisedsuomotu.
(l)Onaproperappreciationofthewideandunfetteredpowerof theHighCourtunderArticle227,ittranspiresthatthemain object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicialcontrolbytheHigh Court on the administration of justicewithinitsterritory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioningoftheentiremachineryofjusticeinsuchawayas it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interferenceunderthisarticleistobekepttotheminimum to ensurethatthewheelofjusticedoesnotcometoahaltandthe fountainofjusticeremainspureand unpolluted in orderto maintainpublicconfidenceinthefunctioningof the tribunals andcourtssubordinatetotheHighCourt.
(n)Thisreserveandexceptionalpowerofjudicialinterventionis nottobeexercisedjustforgrantofreliefinindividualcases butshouldbedirectedforpromotionofpublicconfidenceinthe administrationofjusticeinthelarger public interestwhereas Article226ismeantforprotectionofindividualgrievance. Therefore,thepowerunderArticle227maybeunfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial disciplinepointedoutabove.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductiveandwilldivestthisextraordinarypowerofits strengthandvitality."
6.4. EventhisprinciplehasbeenreiteratedinadecisionoftheApex CourtinthecaseofGollaRajanna&Ors.,v.DivisionalManager &Anr.,reportedin2017(1)SCC45.Asaresultofthis,thisCourtis oftheopinionthatthisisnotafitcaseinwhichanyinterferenceis permissible.EveninanotherdecisionoftheApexCourtinthecaseof [ENTITY].NationalInsuranceCo.Ltd.,&Anr.,reported [CASE NUMBER], itisheldthatthefindingsarrivedatbythe LabourCourt,normallycannotbeinterferedwithunlesssomespecific perversity is reflecting. The relevant extract of the said decision containedinpara7isreproducedhereinafter: "7.The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under [SECTION] of the [ACT] is confined only to see whetheran inferiorCourt orTribunal has proceeded withinits parametersandnottocorrectanerrorapparentonthefaceofthe record,muchlessofanerroroflaw.Inexercisingthesupervisory powerunderArticle227ofthe[ACT],theHighCourtdoes not act as an Appellate Court or the Tribunal. It is also not permissibletoaHighCourtonapetitionfiledunderArticle227of the[ACT]torevieworreweightheevidenceuponwhich theinferiorCourtorTribunalpurportstohavepassedtheorderor tocorrecterrorsoflawinthedecision."
6.5. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] Director of Higher Education & Ors., reported in [PRECEDENT] the Apex Court has distinguished in respect of the adhoc appointmentandadhocappointmentforafixedperiodandthesalary andhasheldthatthenatureofappointmentwillalsotobeconsidered whiledealingwiththegrievanceraisedbytheemployee.Ithasbeen observedbytheApexCourtthatsincethenatureofemploymentwas on adhoc basis,suchemployeehadnorightevenforregularization andifthatbeso,lookingtothenatureofworkwhichthepetitioners weredoingisnotpermittingthisCourttodisturbthefindingsarrived bythelearnedPresidingOfficer,LabourCourt,Surat.
7. Consideringthissetofcircumstance,theCourtisoftheopinion thatnocaseismade outby thepetitioner.Asa result ofthis, the petitions deserve to be dismissed and accordingly the same are dismissedwithnoorderastocosts.
([ENTITY],J.) /phalguni/