JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. By filing the present petition the petitioner has prayed for setting aside and quashing the enquiry report submitted by Dr. [ENTITY], the Enquiry Officer, on February 14, 1996 and also the memorandum dated March 21, 1996 whereby the decision of the Executive Council to accept the findings of the Enquiry Officer was communicated to the petitioner. By the said memorandum dated March 21, 1996 the petitioner was further informed that he should show cause as to why his services in terms of the decision of the Executive Council accepting the findings of the Committee holding that the petitioner was guilty of defrauding the University in the purchase of the computer for the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies be not terminated in terms of provisions of clause 6 of the Agreement.
2. It is alleged by the respondents that certain complaints were received by the Vice Chancellor of the Delhi University regarding irregularities made by the petitioner in purchase of a computer. In view of the receipt of the aforesaid complaints, an enquiry was ordered to be conducted by the Internal Audit Officer to ascertain the veracity of the aforesaid allegations. The petitioner was requested by the Internal Audit Officer to cooperate in the aforesaid enquiry as several complaints had been received from the teachers of the department regarding the purchase of the computer. It is, however, alleged that the petitioner did not cooperate with the Internal Audit Officer and, therefore, the Internal Audit Officer had to personally visit the petitioner's office on October 26, 1993 and upon such visit he could not locate the computer anywhere in the Department's office, Laboratory, Library or Teachers Room. Thereafter, the Vice Chancellor appointed a Committee headed by Prof. [ENTITY] to examine whether there was a prima facie case for further probe and for any action for a full fledged investigation and enquiry. Said Prof. [ENTITY] conducted a fact finding enquiry wherein the petitioner participated. The said committee after making an enquiry submitted a report recommending that there was enough evidence on record to establish a prima facie case for a full fledged departmental enquiry. The aforesaid recommendations of Prof. [ENTITY] were placed before the Executive Council in its meeting held on April 7, 1995. On the basis of the recommendations of Prof. [ENTITY], the petitioner was asked to step down from the headship of the Department of Japanese and Chinese Studies. The petitioner, however, did not respond to the aforesaid letter and, therefore, the Vice Chancellor passed orders requesting Prof. Mrs. [ENTITY] to perform the duties of the head of the department until further orders. In view of the unanimous view recorded by Prof. [ENTITY] that there was a prima facie case for proper departmental enquiry, the respondent University decided to hold a departmental enquiry against the petitioner. The articles of charges were drawn up against the petitioner listing three charges and a statement of imputation of misconduct in support of the said charges was also sent to the petitioner. Along with the aforesaid memo of charges, lists of documents and witnesses were also sent to the petitioner. The petitioner was also informed that Dr. [ENTITY], the former Principal of Shri Ram College of Commerce, would act as the Enquiry Officer. Dr. [ENTITY], the enquiry authority, called on the petitioner to participate in the committee and issued letters to him for attending the proceedings held on August 31, 1995, October 27, 1995, November 3, 1995 and November 10, 1995. The petitioner neither submitted any written statement of defense nor participated in the aforesaid enquiry in spite of receipt of the aforesaid communication issued by the enquiry authority. Having no other alternative, the enquiry authority proceeded in the matter even in his absence as he did not appear in the enquiry, examined the witnesses and also perused the documents placed and thereafter submitted its report finding the petitioner guilty of the charges. The findings of Dr. [ENTITY] were placed before the Executive Council which accepted the aforesaid findings. In terms of the decision of the Executive Council, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on March 21, 1996. The petitioner filed a reply on April 11, 1996 asking for furnishing certain documents and informations. A letter was sent by the respondent University on April 12, 1996 to the petitioner informing him that his reply would be placed before the Executive Council on April 23, 1996 and that further he should make himself available for personal hearing in case the Executive Council so agreed. However, before any action could be taken by the Executive Council in its meeting scheduled to be held on April 23,1996 which was also required to go into his letter dated April 11, 1996 the petitioner filed the present writ petition in this Court alleging that the aforesaid report submitted by the Enquiry Officer and the resolution of the Executive Council asking him to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated were illegal and void and are in violation of the principles of natural justice.
3. When the writ petition was filed notice was issued by this Court on April 19, 1996 when an interim order was also passed by this Court permitting the Executive Council to consider the matter but directed that in case that decision is against the petitioner, the implementation of the said decision would remain stayed till the next date. The aforesaid interim order passed by this Court continued to operate by orders passed by this Court extending the same until further orders. In terms of the aforesaid interim order passed by this Court, the Executive Council proceeded with the matter and on April 23, 1996 the Executive Council in its meeting gave a personal hearing to the petitioner. After considering the reply of the petitioner and the personal/verbal submission of the petitioner which was presented in the said meeting, the Executive Council resolved to confirm the earlier decision to terminate the services of the petitioner. The Executive Council, however, did not implement the said decision in compliance of the interim order passed by this Court on April 19, 1996.
4. Being placed in the aforesaid situation, counsel appearing for the petitioner proceeded to argue the matter at length challenging the decision of the Executive Council to terminate the services of the petitioner on various grounds which shall be dealt with and discussed during the course of this judgment and order. Counsel appearing for the respondents during the course of his submissions placed before me the original records which have been perused by me very carefully and minutely in order to arrive at a just decision in this matter. Having regard to the submissions of the counsel for the parties and on perusal of the records I proceed to decide the matter recording my reasons for the decision.
5. The counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the Vice Chancellor in the instant case invoked the emergency provisions for initiation of the departmental proceedings against the petitioner. It was submitted by her that there was no emergent situation which could be exercised by the Vice Chancellor for initiation of the departmental proceeding against the petitioner as there were a number of inquiries held by the university even prior to the initiation of the aforesaid departmental proceedings and, therefore, the aforesaid exercise of emergency powers by the Vice Chancellor was illegal and was in colourable exercise of powers and, therefore, the entire inquiry proceeding is vitiated. It was also submitted by her that not only the Vice Chancellor did have the power of and jurisdiction to invoke the emergency powers in the facts and circumstances of the present case but the Vice Chancellor also failed to bring to the notice of the Executive Council that the emergency powers were exercised by him even in the next meeting of the Executive Council held on April 4, 1995 and the said fact was brought to the notice of the Executive Council by the Vice Chancellor only in its meeting held on April 7, 1995. It was further submitted that there was violation of the provisions of [SECTION] and, therefore, the entire proceeding is required to be set aside and quashed. It was also submitted that the facts which were required to be brought and were brought to the notice of the Executive Council were also not properly placed and, therefore, the impugned inquiry report and the impugned memorandum issued on behalf of the Executive Council are required to be set aside and quashed. In support of the aforesaid submission counsel drew my attention to the provisions of [SECTION] and also the contents of Annexure 23. The counsel in support of the aforesaid submission also relied upon a number of decisions of this Court and also of the Supreme Court to which reference shall be made at an appropriate place.
6. [SECTION] deals with the powers of the Vice Chancellor. [SECTION](1) provides that the Vice Chancellor shall be the principal Executive and Academic Officer of the University and he would take his rank in the University next to the Pro-Chancellor. It is also provided that he shall be ex-officio Chairman of the Executive Council. [SECTION] provides that if, in the opinion of the Vice Chancellor, any emergency has arisen which requires that immediate action should be taken, the Vice-Chancellor shall take such action as he deems necessary and shall report the same for confirmation at the next meeting to the authority, which in the ordinary course, would have dealt with the matter. Two provisos are added thereto providing that if the action taken by the Vice Chancellor is not approved by the authority concerned he may refer the matter to the Visitor whose decision thereon shall be final. The second proviso lays down that where any such action taken by the Vice Chancellor affects any person in the service of the University, such person shall be entitled to prefer, within thirty days from the date on which he receives notice of such action, an appeal to the Executive Council. Sub clause (5) provides that the Vice Chancellor would exercise general control over the affairs of the University and would give effect to the decisions of the Authorities of the University. Sub clause (6) is also relevant which provides that all powers relating to the proper maintenance of discipline, in the University would stand vested in the Vice-Chancellor. [SECTION] with the terms and conditions of appointment of the teaching staff. Clause 6(1) of the said Ordinance provides that the Executive Council would be entitled summarily to determine the engagement of the teacher on ground of misconduct but the Executive Council would not be entitled to determine the engagement of the teacher save for good cause and after giving three months salary in lieu of notice. Clause 7 provides that the Vice-Chancellor may suspend a teacher against whom any misconduct is alleged and would report the case to the next meeting of the Executive Council, but before any orders for dismissal are passed the teacher shall be informed of the allegations made against him and given an opportunity of making such representations to the Executive Council or to any Committee thereof appointed for the purpose as he may desire to make. The revised form of agreement of service for University teachers is annexed to [SECTION]. A clause being clause 6 is appended thereto which provides that the Executive Council of the University shall be entitled summarily to determine the engagement of the reacher on the ground of misconduct in accordance with the provisions set out in the said agreement. Sub clause (3) of clause 6 of the said agreement provides that the Executive Council shall investigate all matters reported to it by the Vice-Chancellor about the misconduct of the teacher whether he has been suspended or not. It is also provided that the Executive Council may appoint a Committee for the purpose and that the teacher shall have to be notified in writing of the charges against him and shall be given not less than three weeks time to submit his explanation in writing. It is also provided that the Executive Council or the Committee may hear the teacher and take such evidence as it may consider necessary. It is further provided that the Executive Council may determine the engagement of the teacher where it deems that the misconduct of the teacher deserves to be dealt with in that matter, after he has considered the explanation and the evidence, if any, and/or the report of the Committee, if one has been appointed.
7. The facts leading to the action taken by the University against the petitioner have already been set out at length in the foregoing paragraphs. In view of the pleas raised by the counsel appearing for the petitioner, it would now be necessary to ascertain and decide whether or not the University/the Executive Council in deciding to take the aforesaid action failed to comply with any of the provisions referred to herein before. The petitioner was the Head of the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies. While he was so placed and was discharging his duties as such, certain complaints were received by the Vice-Chancellor regarding irregularities made by the petitioner in purchase of the computers. The Internal Audit Officer who had conducted a preliminary inquiry found and submitted a report contending that the said computer was not traceable anywhere in the department. It is also brought out on record that the said Internal Auditor of the Finance Department sought for cooperation from the petitioner in locating the computer in the department. However, the petitioner did not cooperate with the Internal Audit Officer and, therefore, the internal Audit Officer made a local inspection in the department on 26.10.1993 but he was unable locate the said computer in the department. It was also recorded by the Audit Officer that the petitioner was avoiding actual inspection of the computer and did not make available to the said Audit officer the asset register and the stock register and also to show the computer. The Vice-Chancellor in view of the receipt of the several complaints appointed a fact finding inquiry by appointing Prof. [ENTITY] to ascertain and to submit a report as to whether a regular procedure for purchase of the computer was followed. The Prof. [ENTITY] submitted its findings after hearing the petitioner and on perusal of various documents that a prima facie case existed against the petitioner to conduct a departmental inquiry against the petitioner. Since such a report was submitted by the fact finding Committee and also by the Internal Audit Officer, the Acting Vice-Chancellor passed an order on 1.2.1995 directing for initiation of a departmental proceeding against the petitioner and also appointed Dr. [ENTITY] as the Enquiry Officer in the matter. The petitioner was also informed about the departmental inquiry instituted against him by letter dated 23.2.1995 and he was supplied with articles of charges and statement of imputation of misconduct in support thereof. Three charges were drawn up against the petitioner which are as follows:
"Article I That Prof. [ENTITY] while functioning as Head of Department, Chinese and japanese Studies, is stated to have purchased a Computer PC-8088 for the Department from M/s [ENTITY] Computer Services, Laxmi Bai Street, Darya Ganj, New Delhi - 110002, on 16.2.1993 for Rs.39,600/-. The said firm, namely, M/s [ENTITY] Computer Services, was not a genuine firm and by purchasing the computer from such a firm, Prof. [ENTITY] misused his position as Head of Department, which he was holding at the relevant time.
Article II That Prof. [ENTITY], while functioning as the Head of Department of the Chinese and Japanese Studies, having purchased the said computer PC-8088 for the Department on 16.2.1993 kept the same at his residence unauthorisedly. The computer was brought in the Department only on 9.12.1993 after written complaints had been received by the University.
[SECTION] That Prof. [ENTITY], while functioning as the Head of the Department of the Chinese and Japanese Studies did not maintain any proper record concerning purchase of the said computer PC-8088 for the Department.
8. The petitioner was asked to submit his report to the aforesaid charges but the petitioner did not submit any reply. The aforesaid position was brought to the notice of the Executive Council by placing a report before the said Council and the Executive Council ratified the decision taken by the Acting Vice-Chancellor in its meeting held on 7.4.1995 for initiation of departmental proceeding against the petitioner and in drawing up charges against the petitioner and also in appointing Dr. [ENTITY] as the Enquiry Officer. Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon various decisions including [PRECEDENT], ; [PRECEDENT], ; and [ENTITY], Advocate v. University of Delhi and others, . In [PRECEDENT]'s case (supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that the emergency powers under [SECTION] of the Act are obviously intended for certain emergent situations necessitating "immediate action" and that before they can be exercised it must appear that there is, in fact, such a situation as to warrant the exercise of extraordinary powers conferred under [SECTION]. It was further held that the provision for reporting the action taken to the authority or other body "which in the ordinary course would have dealt with the matter" shows that the power of the Vice-Chancellor was confined to making a tentative decision which, whether he meant the appointment to be temporary or permanent, was subject to confirmation by the Executive Committee and until then it was not final. In [PRECEDENT]'s case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that when the very existence of emergency on which the impugned action is sought to be based, has been questioned, it is the duty of the respondents to plead necessary facts and place material on record, at least to prima facie show existence of emergency in order to justify the exercise of emergency powers and to that extent the issue is justiciable. It was further held that as the respondents in the said case had failed to discharge the said burden, therefore, there was emergency prevailing in the university to justify exercise of powers under [SECTION] by the Vice Chancellor. To the similar effect is the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in [ENTITY], Advocate's case (supra). In the said decision it was held that the emergency powers conferred on the Vice-Chancellor under Clause 11-G(4) of the Statutes can be exercised where an unforeseeable event takes place and that it cannot be resorted to where an event is predictable and action by the Executive Council could be taken in time in anticipation of the event. It was further held that if the Vice-Chancellor did not convene the meeting of the Executive Council which he could have convened for enabling the Executive Council to take action as per the Statutes, he cannot for his own neglect or inaction take recourse to emergency powers and do something which Executive Council was required to do. In this connection reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in The [PRECEDENT], , wherein it was held that in an emergency the powers of the Chairman are co-terminus with those of the Board and that he can take action himself and later report it to the Board in a case where the action was taken by the Chairman and reported it to be Board which fully endorsed it, and that the same cannot be challenged on the ground that it was incompetently made.
9. There can be no doubt with regard to the aforesaid legal position propounded by this Court as also by the Supreme Court. Provisions of [SECTION] have been set out in the foregoing paragraph 6 which indicate that the Vice-Chancellor is the principal executive and academic officer of the University and that all powers relating to the proper maintenance of discipline in the University would also stand vested in the Vice-Chancellor. The Executive Council is given the power to investigate all matters reported to it by the Vice-Chancellor about the misconduct of the teacher and the Executive Council is also given the power to appoint a committee for the aforesaid purpose. It is also settled position of law that a departmental proceeding could be initiated by a subordiante authority than the disciplinary authority unless it is specifically provided that it is only the disciplinary authority who would draw up such a proceeding. In support of the aforesaid proposition, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT], . In the said judgment it was held by the Supreme Court that insofar as initiation of enquiry by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority is concerned, it is well settled now that it is unobjectionable. It was further held that the initiation can be by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority and that only the dismissal/removal shall not be by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. Having held so it was held by the Supreme Court that it was not a permissible ground for quashing the charges by the Tribunal. In the present case although the Acting Vice-Chancellor passed the orders for initiation of the departmental proceedings against the petitioner pursuant to which charges were drawn up against the petitioner and an enquiry officer was appointed, yet the said decision of the Acting Vice-Chancellor was placed before the Executive Council, which considered and ratified the said action and the decision as stated herein before, and the said action having been approved by the Executive Council no objection could be taken against the initiation of the departmental proceedings against the petitioner and also appointment of the enquiry authority. Even assuming but not holding that there was some irregularity in exercise of the emergency powers by the Acting Vice-Chancellor, the same stood validated immediately on the date when the Executive Council ratified the decision of the Acting Vice-Chancellor. Admittedly, the Executive Council ratified the entire action of the Vice-Chancellor to draw up the proceedings and to appoint an enquiry authority in its meeting held on April 7, 1995 and, therefore, the first submission of the council appearing for the petitioner that the entire proceedings and the action taken on the basis of such proceedings are vitiated has no merit and is rejected.
10. The next submission of the learned council appearing for the petitioner is that admittedly the action for initiation of the departmental proceedings and the appointment of the enquiry authority was taken by the Acting Vice-Chancellor and not by the Vice-Chancellor and, therefore, the said action is without any jurisdiction. The aforesaid contention is ex facie without any merit as in the absence of the Vice-Chancellor it is the Acting Vice-Chancellor who would act and exercise the powers on behalf of the University in terms of the Statutes and the Ordinances. The Acting Vice-Chancellor who had taken the aforesaid action was the Pro-Vice-Chancellor. [SECTION] has a provision which provides that when the Vice-Chancellor is on leave or is away from town for any other reason the Pro-Vice-Chancellor shall perform the functions of the Vice-Chancellor. In the present case, the Acting Vice-Chancellor was a Pro-Vice-Chancellor and, therefore, he was entitled to perform the functions of the Vice-Chancellor and as such the plea raised by the petitioner regarding the powers of the Acting Vice-Chancellor is without any merit and is rejected.
11. It was also submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that during the enquiry proceedings the petitioner was not furnished with the documents which he had asked for and, therefore, the petitioner did not participate in the enquiry proceedings conducted by Dr. [ENTITY]. Since the aforesaid plea relates to the domain of the principles of natural justice I have considered the said submissions giving my utmost attention to the same. It is the case of the petitioner that the following documents were not supplied to him in spite of his request to the enquiry officer to furnish the same :-
(1) Computer Purchase File containing correspondence between the Department, [ENTITY] and Data Point [the computer firms], including acknowledgements made by Mr. [ENTITY], senior employee at Delhi University library, whose residence at Darya Ganj and phone were reportedly used by [ENTITY];
(2) Lab Attendant File including papers relating to the employment record of [ENTITY], beneficiary of the crossed cheque issued in the name of the computer firm, memos issued to him and his written apologies, and preliminary report on "[ENTITY]" run by his father, Mr. [ENTITY], section officer in the university's Finance Branch;
(3) National Seminar File containing original vouchers and bills of expenditure, including fake bills submitted by "Office Facilitation Centre" run by [ENTITY] that finally led to the termination of his ad hoc services in the Department;
(4) File containing correspondence on the computer controversy between the Department and the university authorities;
(5) 2 Stock Registers [one each for office and lab] containing record of all items bought by the Department or received from Japan Foundation including details of what was kept where; and (6) Dispatch Register containing brief descriptive summaries of every single letter sent from the Department;
(7) List of stocks and materials taken over from the petitioner's charge on 8-3-94, and list of materials removed from the petitioner's room on 23-3-94;
(8) Record of conversations between the enquiry authority and representative of the computer firm dated 21-11-95.
I have considered the said list. In the said list the petitioner has listed about eight types of documents. So far serial numbers (1) to (6) are concerned, it is the case of the petitioner himself that those six files/registers were reported to be missing since March 23, 1994. In his letter dated April 11, 1996, which is annexed as Annexure 33 to the writ petition, the petitioner has categorically stated in paragraph 4 that the aforesaid six files/registers were missing since March 23, 1994. So far the document listed at serial No. 7 is concerned, the same was furnished to the petitioner whereas the document listed at serial No. 8 is concerned there is no record of any conversation recorded between the enquiry authority and the representative of the computer firm M/s. [ENTITY] Computer Services. It is also clear from the report of the Enquiry Officer that the representative of Data Point Computers met the Enquiry Officer on November 21, 1995 and he did not give any other information except for the letter in writing to Mrs. [ENTITY], a faculty member, that they had sold a computer to the Department in December 1993. It is specifically stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents that the documents listed in the list of documents were furnished to the petitioner. It is also stated that copies of 23 documents were supplied to the petitioner. It is also apparent from the records that the petitioner was also given inspection of all documents relating to the charges, available either in the Department concerned or in other branches of the University on October 27, 1999 pursuant to the order of this Court. The petitioner sent a letter to the Vice-Chancellor praying for supply of some documents listed with the said letter for presenting his case before the Executive Council. Even thereafter the petitioner appeared before the Executive Council in its meeting held on April 23, 1996, when he was personally heard and he was given reasonable opportunity to state his case. The Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT], , in a case dealing with similar objection regarding non-furnishing of documents asked for by the employee held that the enquiry officer/disciplinary authority is not bound to supply each and every document that might be asked for by the delinquent officer/employee and their duty is only to supply relevant documents and not each and every document asked for by the delinquent officer/employee. In the said decision it was held that unless and until the document is relevant and its non-supply prejudices the case of the respondent it is not necessary that such document is to be supplied. It is held that it must be shown by the employee that non-supply of some specific document has prejudiced the case of the employee. In the present case also the petitioner has not been able to show as to how non-availability of any of the aforesaid documents has in any manner prejudiced the case of the petitioner. The aforesaid ground, therefore, is also without any merit.
12. The stand of the petitioner is that he did not participate in the enquiry proceeding because of non-furnishing of the aforesaid documents. Such a stand of the petitioner cannot be appreciated. The petitioner holds a very responsible position in the University as he was the Head of the Department. There is an allegation of misconduct against him relating to purchase of a computer in the department. It was necessary for him to cooperate in the enquiry proceedings conducted against him and to prove his innocence in the said enquiry proceedings. Instead the petitioner avoided the request of the enquiry authority to appear before it time and again. The consequences thereof were known to the petitioner when he decided not to appear in the said proceedings at all. If the petitioner would have appeared before the Enquiry Officer even for a day, he could have inspected all the records of the Enquiry Officer which were available with him and relied upon. The petitioner chose not to appear before the Enquiry Officer of his own and therefore , he cannot make a grievance of non-supply of documents and that also without specifying the said document(s). A list of the documents recovered from his room was also given to the petitioner, which is also an admitted position as is established from the contents of Annexure A-8 to the counter-affidavit. The said documents including Bill forms of M/s. [ENTITY] Computer Services and the Bill dated February 13, 1993 of M/s. Gaba Printing Press were recovered from his room by Prof. [ENTITY] on the direction of the Vice-Chancellor as the petitioner did not come to the Department for several days in spite of request from the University asking him to give inspection of his room. The aforesaid few documents recovered from his room sufficiently prove the charges against the petitioner as would be seen from the discussion hereinafter made.
13.The records including the report of the enquiry officer also disclose and indicate that there are certain manipulations in the official records. It is clearly established that the letter sent by the enquiry authority to M/s. [ENTITY] Computer Services, from whom the aforesaid computer was shown to have been purchased by the petitioner for the department, was returned back with a statement that there was no firm by the name of M/s. [ENTITY] Computer Services in the Laxmibai Street, Darya Ganj. Being posted with the aforesaid information the enquiry authority tried to contact the said firm on the basis of the telephone number printed on the bill of the said firm to the petitioner which is available on record whereupon it was found that the said telephone was installed at somebody's residence and that no telephone was allotted to M/s. [ENTITY] Computer Services. Bill No. 80 dated February 16, 1993 for Rs.39,600/- was to be submitted by the firm to the petitioner as the price of the computer supplied to the department and the payment of the said bill was made by the University by cheque No. 958414 dated March 22, 1993. The entire payment was received on the basis of the aforesaid bill. The enquiry officer also examined the pre-receipted bill received from M/s. [ENTITY] Computer Services and he compared the same with bill forms contained in the cash memo/bills which were recovered/collected from the office of the petitioner by Prof. [ENTITY] and others at the direction of the Vice-Chancellor since the petitioner failed to hand over the documents in his chamber. The cash memo book is also placed for my perusal. The said cash memo/bill forms part together in the form of a book and are identical in all respects with bill No. 80 received from M/s. [ENTITY] Computer Services. The said bill book does not contain bill No. 80 and 81, and bill No. 79 is in a mutilated condition. All other bill forms from 1 to 100 except those were intact. Having compared the same, the enquiry authority came to the conclusion that Bill Form Nos. 80 and 81 were taken out from this cover and used to prepare pre-receipted bills, i.e., Bill No. 80 for Rs.39,600/- as the price of the computer sold to the Head of the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies, and Bill No. 81 for Rs.9,450/- as cost of the printer. It is also interesting to note as to how the bill forms of M/s. [ENTITY] Computer Services could be recovered from the custody and possession of the petitioner. Another interesting feature is to be mentioned at this stage. The records which were placed before me also include a bill dated February 13, 1993 from M/s. Gaba Printing Press, 27, Main Market, Kingsway Camp, Delhi, for printing 100 bill forms for M/s. [ENTITY] Computer Services which were recovered from the room of the petitioner by Prof. [ENTITY] and his associates. The said bill was also recovered from the room of the petitioner. This proves and establishes that the order for printing bill forms of M/s. [ENTITY] Computer Services which were also recovered from the room of the petitioner was also given by the Head of the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies, namely, by the petitioner.
14.There appears to be another manipulation in the records. The petitioner failed to produce the old stock registers in spite of repeated requests from the university authorities. It is proved on the basis of record that transaction relating to the purchase of the computer was kept a closely guarded secret up to October 1993 although according to the petitioner he purchased the same in the month of February 1993. The stock register which was available in the office did not record any entry with regard to the aforesaid purchase made in the month of February and may be because of the said position the stock register of the office was shown to be not available and a new stock register was made out wherein the transaction relating to the aforesaid purchase of the computer was recorded. But there also the purchase made on February 17, 1993 was recorded on page 9 and that of February 16 on page 10. In order to cover up the said position a device was followed by changing the serial number of pages. Page 10 was changed to page 9 and vice versa. The aforesaid manipulation of the records by changing the serial number of pages proves misconduct on the part of the petitioner by falsifying and manipulating the records.
15.The charges that have been drawn up against the petitioner all relate to the purchase of the aforesaid computer by the petitioner as the Head of the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies. M/s. Data Point Computers in their letter dated April 20, 1994 confirmed that no computer was sold to the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies in December 1993. The said firm had confirmed that only the computer which was sold to the Department was in the month of April 1993 by M/s. [ENTITY] Computer Services with whom the said firm had a business tie up and that the responsibility was limited to installation and maintenance. It is, therefore, established from the said letter dated April 20, 1994, on which the petitioner himself relied upon, that no computer was purchased by the petitioner who was the Head of the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies in the month of February 1993 and this letter itself proves the entire allegations made against the petitioner in the charge memo dated February 23, 1995. It is also to be noted that by now it is a settled position of law that this Court exercising jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the [ACT] cannot consider the sufficiency of the evidence in the case of a departmental proceeding. It is also to be noted that disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and the standard of proof required is preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as is required to be proved in a criminal trial. This is so stated in the decisions of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT], , and [PRECEDENT].
16.In [PRECEDENT], , it was held by the Supreme Court that in the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on the charges framed no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. It was further held that the tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority and the truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. It was also held that if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority, as the case may be. Correctness of the charges is, therefore, not subject to judicial review which is also reiterated by the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] (supra).
17.Having considered the entire evidence and documents on record I am of the considered opinion that the pleas raised by the petitioner in the present case are without any merit and the same are dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition also stands dismissed. The interim order stands vacated.