ORDER [ENTITY], J.
1. Heard the learned Advocate, Ms. [ENTITY], appearing on behalf of petitioner and learned Advocate, Mr. [ENTITY], appearing on behalf of respondent.
2. In the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the award passed by Labour Court, Rajkot in [CASE NUMBER] dated 28.2.2006, whereby, the Labour Court, Rajkot has set aside the termination order and granted the reinstatement with continuity of service with 20% back wages of interim period.
3. Learned Advocate, Ms. [ENTITY], heavily relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of [PRECEDENT] . She relied upon Heade Note-A and Para.6 of the said decision. She submitted that Labour Court has committed gross error in drawing adverse inference against the petitioner for non-production of documentary evidence on record. She also submitted it is burden upon the workman to prove 240 days continuous service and it is not the burden upon the employer. She also submitted that workman has not produced any documentary evidence to justify his case of completion of 240 days continuous service. She submitted that at Page-26, presence of workman noted for the year 1989 but, looking to the record of the Labour Court, the specific observation has been made vide Exh.27 that petitioner has produced muster roll from November, 1982 to December, 1988. The submissions made by Ms. [ENTITY] cannot be accepted on the ground that the Court should have to consider the award as it is and no new document can be examined by this Court when legality and validity of award is under challenge. If according to petitioner, any mistake has been committed by the Labour Court, then, they should have to first approach the Labour Court to correct the mistake by giving such application. No such application was given by petitioner before the Labour Court to correct the said mistake, if it is a mistake according to petitioner. She also submitted that Labour Court has committed gross error in granting 20% back wages of interim period. Except that, no other submission is made by learned Advocate, Ms. [ENTITY] and no decision has been relied by her.
4. The dispute against termination referred for adjudication on 28.8.1990. The date of termination is 1.6.1990. The workman had filed statement of claim vide Exh.3. The daily wage was Rs. 24.25 paise. According to workman, he was working since 9 years with the petitioner and his service was terminated on 1.6.1990 without any notice, notice pay and retrenchment compensation. The demand was made by workman to the petitioner to reinstate him but, no response received from the petitioner. Therefore, the dispute was referred for adjudication. According to workman, junior employees were continued and no seniority list was prepared and published by petitioner and, therefore, the termination order is bad. The petitioner has filed written statement vide Exh.8 and according to respondent, workman was working in workshop of petitioner and doing repairing work as per requirement of the petitioner. The workman is required to work as and when work is required to be carried out by the petitioner and he had not completed 240 days continuous service within a period of 12 months. No junior was appointed by petitioner after termination of respondent workman. The workman is gainfully employed and, therefore, reference should have to be rejected. Before the Labour Court, on behalf of workman, certain documents were produced on record. One demand notice vide Exh.17, receipt of demand vide Exh.18 and Exh.19 and workman was examined vide Exh.20 before the Labour Court. On behalf of petitioner, one witness [ENTITY] was examined vide Exh.26 and vide Exh.27, muster roll from November, 1982 to December, 1988 was produced. After the examination of witness vide Exh.26, petitioner has not remained present before the Labour Court in spite of various opportunities were given by Labour Court, Rajkot. On behalf of petitioner, his Advocate has not argued the matter before the Labour Court. Despite several opportunities were given to the petitioner, the petitioner has not produced any written arguments or oral submissions were made before the Labour Court, Therefore, ultimately, since the Reference is of 1990, the Labour Court has decided the matter in absence of arguments of petitioner. The Labour Court has framed the issue on the basis of the record produced by respective parties. The Labour Court has come to conclusion that relationship between employer and employee is established. Therefore, workman is covered by definition of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Thereafter, the Labour Court has examined, whether workman remained in continuous service as required under [SECTION] of the [ACT] or not. The Labour Court has relied upon the averments made in the statement of claim that workman remained in service for more than 9 years with the petitioner. This averment has been supported by the workman in his deposition vide Exh.20. The workman denied the fact that he was not appointed or engaged to carry out the work as and when required by petitioner. That suggestion has been denied by the workman. It was also admitted by the workman that no written order was given to him by petitioner for appointment. No muster card and pay slip was given and not a single document has been given by petitioner to the workman for proving completion of 240 days. The petitioner raised contention that workman has not completed 240 days continuous service and muster roll was produced from 1982 to 1988 but, relevant muster for the last year about 1 year from the date of termination preceding 12 months was not produced by petitioner before the Labour Court. According to petitioner, during that period, no work was available with the petitioner and, therefore, complete record was not produced by petitioner. The Labour Court has come to conclusion that these original musters were in possession of petitioner as per the evidence of the witness of petitioner, even though complete record was not produced by the petitioner before the Labour Court. Since the last 12 months' record was not produced by the petitioner, the Labour Court has drawn adverse inference against the petitioner and come to the conclusion that according to evidence of the workman, he remained in service from 1982 to 1990 continuously. Therefore, he completed continuous service within the meaning of [SECTION] of the [ACT].
5. It is necessary to note that finding of Labour Court is that workman remained in continuous service within the meaning of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Therefore, considering the fact that [SECTION] of the [ACT], which requires one year continuous service which fact is established by the evidence of the workman and, therefore, there is no need to prove continuous service of 240 days. If the workman is able to justify by leading oral evidence that he remained in continuous service for one year without any break, then, provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT] is satisfied, then also the workman is entitled the benefit of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. This aspect has been considered by the Apex Court in case of [PRECEDENT] which has been relied by learned Advocate, Ms. [ENTITY], on behalf of petitioner. Para.8 of the said decision is very relevant, which is quoted as under:
8. To attract the provisions of [SECTION], one of the condition required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be not less than one year. [SECTION] of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of [SECTION] "Lay-off and Retrenchment". The purport of this Section is that if a workman has put in an uninterrupted service of the establishment, including the service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorized leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service, for that period. Thus the workmen shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e., 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under [SECTION] However, the workmen must have been in service during the period, i.e., not only on the date when he actually worked but also on the days he could not work under the circumstances set out in Sub-Section (1). The workmen must be in the employment of the employer concerned on the days he has actually worked but also on the days on which he has not worked. The import of [SECTION] is that the workmen should be in the employment of the employer for the continuous, uninterrupted period for one year except the period the absence is permissible as mentioned hereinabove. [SECTION] introduces the fiction to the effect that even if the workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of [SECTION] for the period of one year or six months he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for that period under an employer if he has actually worked for the days specified in clause (a) and (b) of Sub-s(2). By the legal fiction of Sub-section 2(a) (i), the workmen shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. Provisions of the Section postulate that if the workmen has put in at least 240 days with his employer, immediately prior to the date of retrenchment, he shall be deemed to have served with the employer for a period of one year to get the benefit of [SECTION]
The workman was remained in continous service without any interruption for more than one year as per his evidence Exh.20. There was no rebuttable evidence produced by the petitioner. The cessation of work if it is on the fault of workman, then, it cannot amount to termination. The provisions of [SECTION] considered by this Court in cases of [PRECEDENT]; [PRECEDENT], [PRECEDENT], [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT] are applicable to facts of this case.
6. In the aforesaid decision, the Apex Court has considered that, "to attract the provisions of [SECTION], one of the condition required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would be not less than one year. [SECTION] of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of [SECTION] "Lay-off and Retrenchment". The purpose of this Section is that if a workman has put in an uninterrupted service in the establishment, including the service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorized leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service, for that period. Thus the workmen shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e., 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under [SECTION]" The meaning of this observation in Para.8 is clear that if the workman remained in continuous service and interrupted on account of sickness, authorized leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service. In the facts of this case, according to deposition vide Exh.20 of the workman, he remained in service from 1982 to 1990. The petitioner has not raised any contention / objection about the period which has been specified by the workman from 1982 to 1990. But, only contention was raised before the Labour Court by petitioner that workman had not completed continuous service of 240 days. So looking to the continuous service of not less than 1 years from 1982 to 1990, the workman has satisfied the condition as required under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. It is not the case of the petitioner before the Labour Court that from 1982 to 1990, the service of the respondent workman was terminated by petitioner. So from 1982 to 1990, service of workman was not terminated by the petitioner and cessation of work not due to fault on the part of workman which cannot be considered to be a termination and, therefore, workman has satisfactorily by oral evidence proved the fact that he remained in continuous service from 1982 to 1990. This fact is not disputed by petitioner by leading proper evidence before the Labour Court. On the contrary, it was admitted by the petitioner that workman had remained in service from 1982 to 1990 but, he had not completed continuous service of 240 days in preceding 12 months. So looking to the facts on record, the workman has proved continuous service as required under [SECTION] of the [ACT] because he remained in service from 1982 to 1990 and meanwhile, the service was not terminated by petitioner and interruption in the service by cessation of work. Meaning thereby that not to providing the work to the workman for a number of days in a year, that cannot be considered to be a termination by petitioner and it was not a fault on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the decision which has been relied by learned Advocate, Ms. [ENTITY], is not helpful to her but, on the contrary, same is helpful to the respondent on the ground that it has proved that workman remained in continuous service within the meaning of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Therefore, the Labour Court has come to conclusion that at the time of terminating the service of the workman, it is not the case of the petitioner that [SECTION] of the [ACT] has been complied with. Therefore, the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the work which was carried out by the petitioner was remain continued as per the evidence of witness of petitioner and even though service of the workman was terminated by violating mandatory provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Therefore, the Labour Court has come to conclusion that termination order is ab-initio void. Thereafter, the Labour Court has examined the question of about back wages. No evidence was led by petitioner to prove gainful employment of the workman. But, workman had admitted certain part of gainful employment. Therefore, the Labour Court has only granted 20% back wages of interim period. This 20% back wages is equivalent to two month's salary in one year period which cannot be considered to be on higher side.
7. In view of this fact, when workman has proved his case before the Labour Court by his oral evidence and there is no rebuttable evidence produced by petitioner contrary to the oral evidence of the workman concerned and the Labour Court has properly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence. The petitioner has not explained as to why the muster of 1989 to 1990 not produced when same was in their possession. This being a finding of fact arrived by Labour Court on the basis of evidence on record, this Court cannot disturb the finding of fact while exercising the power under [SECTION] of the [ACT].
8. In the case of [PRECEDENT], the Punjab High Court has observed in Para.5 as under:
5. Learned State counsel has argued that respondent-workman was being appointed intermittently, as a stop gap arrangement, on 89 days basis and that he had not completed 240 days in preceding 12 calender months from the date of his termination , as such, he is not entitled to protection under [SECTION] of the Act. Contention is merit less. The claim of the workman was that he joined as a Bulldozer Operator on 6.4.1990 and continuously worked with the department till 15.7.1996 i.e. the day when his services were terminated. The onus was on department to produce the record, in their custody, to show that workman was only appointed intermittently on 89 days basis, as a stop g gap arrangement and had not completed 240 days in preceding 13 caldender months from the date of termination. A bare perusal of award shows that management -petitioner, for the reason best known to it, had not produced any such record, to rebut the claim of the workman. At this juncture, the State counsel, to substantiate the plea, has referred to the attendance sheets of daily wages staff (Annexure P-3/T) from the period November 1990 till June, 1996. The said document does not convince us. It is the plea of the management itself that the workman had worked up to 15.7.1996, but a bare perusal of the said attendance sheet shows that the same is only up to June 1996. There is absolutely no explanation for having not submitted the attendance sheet for the month of July, 1996. Therefore, no authenticity can be attached to the said attendance sheet and an adverse inference can be drawn against the petitioner-management. A perusal of the award shows that the Labour Court, on the basis of letter dated 22.7.2003 (Ex.M2 before it) written by the petitioner-management to other allied offices giving instructions to stop the bulldozer working at any place, has rightly observed that the bulldozer working had existed till 22.7.2003 and in this backdrop there was no occasion for the petitioner-management to terminate the service of the workman on 15.7.1996
9. It is also necessary to consider one decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of [PRECEDENT] . This decision is delivered by three Judges Bench of the Apex Court. The decision which has been relied by learned Advocate, Ms. [ENTITY], is the decision delivered by two judges Bench of the Apex Court. The decision which has been relied by learned Advocate, Ms. [ENTITY], is delivered on 7.5.2005 and the decision of three Judges Bench in case of [PRECEDENT] (supra) is delivered on 25.10.2005. This being a latter decision of three Judges deciding the same issue which has been raised before this Court by learned Advocate, Ms. [ENTITY]. The relevant discussion in Para.17, 18 and 19 are quoted as under:
17. Analyzing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the [ACT] in terms do not apply to the proceedings under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under [SECTION] of the [ACT] will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case.
18. Now applying the above decision to the facts of the present case, we find that the workman herein had stepped in the witness box. He had called upon the management to produce the nominal muster rolls for the period commencing from 22.11.1988 to 20.6.1994. This period is the period borne out by the certificate (Ex.W1) issued by the former Asstt. Executive Engineer. The evidence in rebuttal from the side of the management needs to be noticed. The management produced five nominal muster rolls (NMRs), out of which 3 NMRs, Ex.M1, Ex.M2 and Ex.M3, did not even relate to the concerned period. The relevant NMRs produced by the management were Ex.M4 and Ex.M5, which indicated that the workmen had worked for 43 days during the period 21.1.1994 to 20.2.1994 and 21.3.1994 to 20.4.1994 respectively. There is no explanation from the side of the management as to why for the remaining period the nominal muster rolls were not produced. The labour court has rightly held that there is nothing to disbelieve the certificate (Ex.W1). The High Court in its impugned judgment has not given reasons for discarding the said certificate. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the division bench of the High Court ought not to have interfered with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court and confirmed by the learned single judge vide order dated 7.6.2000 in [CASE NUMBER]. This is not, therefore, a case where the allegations of the workman are founded merely on an affidavit. He has produced cogent evidence in support of his case. The workman was working in SD-1, Athani and Ex.W1 was issued by the former Asstt. Executive Engineer, Hipparagi Dam Construction Division No. 1, Athani-591304. In the present case, the defence of the management was that although Ex.W1 refers to the period 22.11.1988 to 20.6.1994, the workman had not worked as a daily wager on all days during that period. If so, the management was duty bound to produce before the labour court the nominal muster rolls for the relevant period, particularly when it was summoned to do so. We are not placing this judgment on the shifting of the burden. We are not placing this case on drawing of adverse inference. In the present case, we are of the view that the workman had stepped in the witness box and his case that he had worked for 240 days in a given year was supported by the certificate (Ex.W1). In the circumstances, the division bench of the High Court had erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact.
19. Before concluding, we would like to make an observation with regard to cases concerning retrenchment/termination of services of daily waged earners, particularly those who are appointed to work in Government departments. Daily waged earners are not regular employees. They are not given letters of appointments. They are not given letters of termination. They are not given any written document which they could produce as proof of receipt of wages. Their muster rolls are maintained in loose sheets. Even in cases, where registers are maintained by the Government departments, the officers/clerks making entries do not put their signatures. Even where signatures of clerks appear, the entries are not countersigned or certified by the appointing authorities. In such cases, we are of the view that the State Governments should take steps to maintain proper records of the services rendered by the daily wagers; that these records should be signed by the competent designated officers and that at the time of termination, the concerned designated officers should give certificates of the number of days which the labourer/daily wager has worked. This system will obviate litigations and pecuniary liability for the Government.
10. The Apex Court has observed in aforesaid decision that, "this burden is discharged only by the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged by the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will be also no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case."
11. In view of the aforesaid decision in case of [PRECEDENT] (supra) and considering the facts of this case, when workman had led oral evidence before the Labout Court vide Exh.20 proving continuous service of more than 1 year with the petitioner with interruption of cessation of work, no fault on the part of workman which satisfies the requirement of [SECTION] of the [ACT] and also not produced the relevant record for last preceding 12 months by petitioner from 1982 to 1990 before the Labour Court, the Labour Court has rightly drawn adverse inference against the petitioner which is according to Apex Court's decision in case of Surendranagar District Panchayat and [PRECEDENT] (supra). The scope of inquiry is only about last 12 months which relevant period, the record was not produced by petitioner. Therefore, the Labour Court has rightly come to conclusion that in absence of the documentary evidence from the petitioner, considering the oral evidence of the workman which remain unchallenged that he had completed continuous service of 240 days in last preceding 12 months has been rightly accepted as there is no contrary evidence produced by petitioner before the Labour Court, though record was available with the petitioner and it is not the case of the petitioner that relevant record from 1982 to 1990 was not available with the petitioner. Therefore, not producing the relevant documents which are in possession of petitioner have remained unexplained and, therefore, the conclusion of the Labour Court drawing adverse inference against the petitioner is right and no error has been committed by the Labour Court which requires any interference by this Court while exercising the power under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Therefore, according to my opinion, the Labour Court has rightly passed an award and no error has been committed by the Labour Court.
12. This Court having very limited jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the [ACT], the finding of facts cannot be disturbed unless it perverse. This aspect has been considered by the Apex Court in [PRECEDENT] . Relevant observations made by the apex court in para 9 of the said judgment are therefore reproduced as under:
9. The High Court under [SECTION] cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.
13. In [PRECEDENT] , the Apex Court observed as under in para 4 and 5:
4. It is not denied that the powers conferred upon the High Court under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT] are extraordinary and discretionary powers as distinguished from ordinary statutory powers. No doubt [SECTION] confers a right of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises the jurisdiction but no corresponding right is conferred upon a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction under the said Article as a matter of right. In fact power under this Article cast a duty upon the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority and that they do not cross the limits, ensuring the performance of duties by such courts and tribunals in accordance with law conferring powers within the ambit of the enactments creating such courts and tribunals. Only wrong decisions may not be a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction under this Article unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the subordinate courts and tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party.
5. In [PRECEDENT] this Court held that power of superintendence conferred by [SECTION] is to be exercised more sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This position of law was reiterated in [PRECEDENT]. In [PRECEDENT] this Court held that the High Court could not, in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under [SECTION] convert itself into a Court of appeal when the Legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. After referring to the judgment of Lord [ENTITY] in [PRECEDENT] this Court in [PRECEDENT] held: (SCC p.460 para 20)
20. It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the [ACT] the High Court could go into the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it, if there is any misdirection in law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. But the High Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT] to look into the fact in the absence of clear and cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. The High Court also should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal except where the findings are perverse and not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice (see [ENTITY] . Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction. In our opinion therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case on the question that the High Court has sought to interfere, it is manifest that the High Court has gone into questions which depended upon appreciation of evidence and indeed the very fact that the learned trial Judge came to one conclusion and the Appellate Bench came to another conclusion is indication of the position that two views were possible in this case. In preferring one view to another of factual appreciation of evidence, the High Court transgressed its limits of jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. On the first point, therefore, the High Court was in error.
14. In case of [PRECEDENT] , the Apex Court observed as under in paragraph 12:
12. We are greatly disturbed by the insensitivity reflected in the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in a case where judicial mind would be tempted to utilize all possible legal measures to impart justice to a man mutilated so outrageously by his cruel destiny. The High Court non suited him in exercise of a supervisory and extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Time and again this Court has reminded the power conferred on the High Court under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT] is to advance justice and not to thwart it (vide [PRECEDENT] . The very purpose of such constitutional powers being conferred on the High Court is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The lookout of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the by-produce of an erroneous view of law, the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law.
15. Therefore, according to my opinion, the Labour Court has rightly dealt with the matter comprehensively and considering each and every contention of the petitioner, the Labour Court has given cogent reasons in support of its conclusion. It is not a perverse finding which has been given by the Labour Court. On the contrary, this view is based on legal evidence which are on record. Therefore, according to my opinion, the Labour Court has not committed any error which requires any interference by this Court while exercising the power under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. This Court is having very limited jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the [ACT], cannot act as an appellate authority. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence which has been appreciated by the Labour Court. In case when two views are possible, even though interference by this Court is unwarranted under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. This view has been taken by the Apex Court in case of [PRECEDENT]. Relevant observations are in Para.19 which is quoted as under:
19. The learned single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally reappreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a Tribunal, presided over by a Judicial Officer. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ Court to warrant those findings at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can be reasonably and possibly one taken. The Division Bench was not only justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the learned single Judge and in ordering restoration of the Award of the Tribunal. On being taken through the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as well as the order of the learned single Judge and the judgment of the Division Bench, we are of the view that the Industrial Tribunal had overwhelming materials which constituted ample and sufficient basis for recording its findings, as it did, and the manner of consideration undertaken, the objectivity of approach adopted and reasonableness of findings recorded seem to be unexceptionable. The only course, therefore, open to the writ Judge was to find out the satisfaction or otherwise of the relevant criteria laid down by this Court, before sustaining the claim of the canteen workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact-finding authority and not embark upon an exercise of re-assessing the evidence and arriving at findings of ones own, altogether giving a complete go-bye even to the facts specifically found by the Tribunal below.
16. Hence, there is no substance in the present petition. Accordingly, present petition is dismissed.