IN THE COURT OF SH. A.K. CHAWLA : DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE (HQS.) : DELHI PPA - 10/2013/2011 Unique Case ID No.02401C012[SECTION]852011 Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. Appellants Versus [ENTITY] & Anr. Respondents ORDER
Vide this order, I proceed to dispose off an application filed by the appellants U/[SECTION] of the [ACT] seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, hereafter referred to as 'the said application'.
2. Succinctly stated, the facts relevant for the disposal of 'the said application' are that the appellants have preferred an appeal under [SECTION] of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupant) Act, 19[SECTION]1 in short 'the [ACT]' against order dated 28.[SECTION].2010 passed under [SECTION] & [SECTION] of 'the [ACT]'. It is accompanied with 'the said application' and thereby, the appellants have sought condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. Delay is sought to be condoned on the premise that the impugned order was received by the appellant on 11.8.2010 and after its receipt, the file was sent to the Legal Department on 28.9.2010. Matter was thereafter, assigned to the Govt. counsel, but, the Govt. counsel went abroad in the first week of October, 2010 and on his return, the original record, which was very old and related to the year 1961, come to be made available to him and the appeal filed, thereafter. Appellant has thus prayed for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. By the reply filed, the respondents have contested the application. According to the respondents, the application was not filed under the proper provision of law and the filing of the appeal after about six months, while the appeal could have been filed only within 12 days of the publication of the order, was much belated and no just explanation was given for condoning the delay. Also, According to the respondents, the appellants were habitual of delays in as much as, even before the [ENTITY], similar dilatory practice was followed.
3. I have heard the ld. counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully.
4. 'The [ACT]' is a complete Code in itself and proviso attached to [SECTION], provides for entertaining appeal, even after the prescribed period, if, it was satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. Application in hand therefore, should have been filed under the said provision of law and not U/[SECTION] of the [ACT]. It is however, well settled that incorrect mentioning of the provision cannot be fatal. Application filed is therefore, taken to have been filed under the proviso attached to [SECTION] of 'the [ACT]' and the same is thus, maintainable.
Contention raised to the contrary is therefore, rejected.
As for the delay in preferring the appeal, which, as per the own case of the appellant, is of 194 days, is sought to be attributed to the departmental procedural wrangles as also the lapses attributable to its Advocate. In [PRECEDENT] relied upon by the ld. Counsel for the appellant, the Hon'ble Supreme Court elaborating the expression 'sufficient cause' in relation to the aspects of the condonation of delay in relation to a State, observed as follows :
"6. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) (1984) 4 SCC 66 : (AIR 1984 SC 1[SECTION]44), a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantang v. Mst. Katiji, (198[SECTION]) 2 SCC 10[SECTION] : (AIR 198[SECTION] SC 1353), a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that [SECTION] was enacted in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits.
The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before the law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.
[SECTION]. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represent collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case of technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay was accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Smt. Prabha v. Ram Prakash Kalra, (198[SECTION]) Supp SCC 338 : (AIR 198[SECTION] SC 1[SECTION]26), this Court had held that the Court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. Appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.
In view of the aforegoing proposition of law and, to do substantial justice amongst the parties, in my considered view, the delay in preferring the appeal should be condoned.
5. In view of the foregoing, the appeal is granted and the delay in preferring the appeal is condoned.
Announced in the open Court ([ENTITY]) on this 24th day of September, 2013 Distt. & Sessions Judge (HQs) Delhi