Court No.22 [CASE NUMBER] Jagdish Chandra Verma Petitioner Versus The State of Uttar Pradesh and others Opposite parties Hon'ble [ENTITY], J.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
The present petition has been filed with the prayer that the suspension order dated 29.2.1992 passed against the petitioner may be quashed along with the enquiry proceedings.
The facts in brief are that the petitioner was appointed under the Dying in Harness Rules on 11.3.1987. After aforesaid appointment, the petitioner joined on the post of Assistant Teacher in Junior Basic school, Village - Darawan, Vikas Khand - Nindura, District - Barabanki and continued to work to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned but the salary of the petitioner was withheld. So, the petitioner was compelled to file the present writ petition. This Court proceeded to pass an order for payment of salary vide order dated 26.2.1992. As soon as the aforesaid order was served upon the opposite parties, the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 29.2.1992. Neither any charge sheet has been served nor any enquiry has been concluded and in the meantime, the petitioner has retired on 30.6.2007. Hence this writ petition.
Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that enquiry cannot go for indefinite period in view of the law settled by the Apex Court and since the petitioner has retired, therefore, no enquiry can be held at this stage. He submits that employer and employee relationship has come to an end and moreover, pendency of enquiry for such a long time is a sheer abuse of the process of the court. Further submission is that once this Court had passed an order for payment of salary, it was incumbent upon the opposite parties to have released the salary of the petitioner and they have deliberately violated the order of this Court with malafide intention.
Learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, has submitted that the petitioner was placed under suspension and during suspension he has retired, therefore, he cannot be given any salary.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Appointment of the petitioner cannot be doubted in any manner as the petitioner was appointed under the Dying in Harness Rules on 11.3.1987. The petitioner continued to work on the post in question with entire satisfaction of the opposite parties. The petitioner after his appointment continued to work on the post in question without any complaint but because of the fact that his salary was not paid, he filed the present writ petition.
In the present case, an interim order was passed on 26.2.1992 for payment of salary to the petitioner but no salary was paid and the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 29.2.1992. Neither any charge sheet has been served upon the petitioner nor any enquiry has been concluded and in the meantime, the petitioner has retired on 30.6.2007. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the enquiry cannot go for indefinite period in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of [PRECEDENT]. He has also placed reliance upon a judgment rendered in the case of [PRECEDENT]. Paragraphs 15 and 23 of the said judgment are reproduced hereunder:-
"15. We have set out the facts in sufficient detail to show that there is no presumption that the Government always acts in a manner which is just and fair. There was no occasion whatever to protract the departmental inquiry for a period of 20 years and keeping the appellant under suspension for a period of nearly 11 years unless it was actuated with the mala fide intention of subjecting him to harassment. The charge framed against the appellant was serious enough to merit his dismissal from service. Apparently, the departmental authorities were not in a position to substantiate the charge. But that was no reason for keeping the departmental proceedings alive for a period of 20 years and not to have revoked the order of suspension for over 11 years. An order of suspension of a government servant does not put an end to his service under the Government. He continues to be a member of the service in spite of the order of suspension. The real effect of the order of suspension as explained by this Court in [PRECEDENT], is that he continues to be a member of the government service but is not permitted to work and further during the period of suspension he is paid only some allowance - generally called subsistence allowance - which is normally less than the salary instead of the pay and allowances he would have been entitled to if he had not been suspended. There is no doubt that an order of suspension, unless the departmental inquiry is concluded within a reasonable time, affects a government servant injuriously. The very expression 'subsistence allowance' has an undeniable penal significance. The dictionary meaning of the word 'Subsist' as given in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. II at P. 2171 is "to remain alive as on food; to continue to exist". "Subsistence" means - means of supporting life, especially a minimum livelihood. Although suspension is not one of the punishments specified in [SECTION] of the Rules, an order of suspension is not to be lightly passed against the government servant. In the case of [PRECEDENT], the Court held that the expression 'life' does not merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery through life. The expression 'life' has a much wider meaning. Suspension in a case like the present where there was no question of inflicting any departmental punishment prima facie tantamounts to imposition of penalty which is manifestly repugnant to the principles of natural justice and fair play in action. The conditions of service are within the executive power of the State or its legislative power under the proviso to [SECTION] of the [ACT], but even so such rules have to be reasonable and fair and not grossly unjust. It is a clear principle of natural justice that the delinquent officer when placed under suspension is entitled to represent that the departmental proceedings should be concluded with reasonable diligence and within a reasonable period of time. If such a principle were not to be recognised, it would imply that the Executive is being vested with a totally arbitrary and unfettered power of placing its officers under disability and distress for an indefinite duration.
23. The public interest in maintaining the efficiency of the services requires that civil servants should not be unfairly dealt with. The Government must view with concern that a departmental inquiry against the civil servant should have been kept alive for so long as 20 years or more and that he should have been placed under suspension without any lawful justification for as many as 11 years, without any progress being made in the departmental inquiry. It should also view with concern that a decision should have been taken by the competent authority to enforce the bar under [SECTION] against the civil servant long after his retirement with a view to cause him financial loss. Such a course not only demoralises the services but virtually ruins the career of the delinquent officer as a government servant apart from subjecting him to untold hardship and humiliation. We hope and trust that the Government in future would ensure that departmental proceedings are concluded with reasonable diligence and not allowed to be protracted unnecessarily. The Government should also view with concern that there should be an attempt on the part of the competent authority to enforce the bar against a civil servant under [SECTION] long after his retirement without affording him an opportunity of a hearing. It comes of ill- grace from the Government to have defeated the just claim of the appellant on technical pleas."
Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that in such circumstances, the enquiry proceedings are deemed to be malicious and if the enquiry is pending for 10 years or more, then in such circumstances, the enquiry proceedings are liable to be quashed. In the present case, the enquiry proceedings have not been concluded and neither any charge sheet has been issued to the petitioner.
Considering the aforesaid dictum laid down by the Apex Court, the writ petition is allowed. Enquiry proceedings pending against the petitioner as well as the suspension order dated 29.2.1992 are hereby quashed. The opposite parties are directed to release the salary of the petitioner. This Court is passing the aforesaid order on account of the fact that an interim order was in favour of the petitioner for payment of salary since 26.2.1992 but the opposite parties did not comply the order of this Court although the petitioner has been paid suspension allowance all throughout of the post in question.
04.08.2010 RBS/-