[CASE NUMBER] IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2951 of 2014 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE [ENTITY] 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the [ACT] or any order made thereunder ? 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? [ENTITY] Petitioner(s) Versus [ENTITY] & 2 Respondent(s) Appearance: MR [ENTITY], ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 MS [ENTITY], AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 2 - 3 RULE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 1 - 2 CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE [ENTITY] Date : 07/04/2014 [ENTITY]
[CASE NUMBER]
1. Perusedthepetition,materialssuppliedtothedetenu,detention order and heard learned advocate Mr.[ENTITY] for the petitioner and learnedA.G.P.Ms.[ENTITY].
1.1 Therespondent-Statehasnotfiledaffidavitinreply.Therefore, avermentsandcontentionsraisedinthepetitionremainsunchallenged anduncontroverted.
2. This petition under [SECTION] of the [ACT] is directedagainsttheorderofdetentiondated10.12.2013passedbythe respondentauthorityinexerciseofpowersconferredunderSection3(2) oftheGujaratPreventionofAntiSocialActivitiesAct,1985(forshort theAct)bydetainingthedetenueasa "dangerousperson"asdefined underSection2(c)oftheAct.
3. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the order of detentionimpugnedinthispetitiondeservestobequashedandsetaside andthegroundthat twooffencesregisteredagainstthedetenubefore theconcernedpolicestationvideIC.R.Nos.174of2013and241of2013 for the offences punishable under [SECTION], [SECTION] etc. of [ACT] respectively, byitselfcannotbringthecaseofthedetenuewithinthe purviewofdefinition"dangerousperson"underSection2(c)oftheAct. Learned advocate for the detenue further submits that illegal activity carried out as alleged cannot have any nexus or bearing with maintenanceofpublicorderandatthemostitcanbesaidtobebreach oflawandorder.Further,exceptregistrationofFIRs,nootherrelevant or cogentmaterialisavailable on recordconnectingthe allegedanti socialactivitiesofthedetenuewithbreachofthepublicorder.
4. [SECTION] of the Actdefinesthe term "dangerousperson"as [CASE NUMBER] under: "2(c)."dangerousperson"meansaperson,whoeither by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habituallycommits,orattemptstocommitorabetsthe commission of any of the offences punishable under ChapterXVIorChapterXV11oftheIndianPenalCode (GLVof1860)oranyoftheoffencespunishableunder ChapterVoftheArmsAct,1959(54of1959)."
5. Learned advocate for the detenue, placing reliance on the decisionsreportedinthecasesof(i) [PRECEDENT]; (ii) [ENTITY] v. Police Commissioner, Surat reported in 2000(1) GLH 393; and (iii) [PRECEDENT],reportedin(1995)3SCC237, submittedthat the case on hand is squarely covered by the ratio laid down in the aforesaiddecisions.Learnedcounselforthedetenuefurthersubmitsthat itisnotpossibletoholdinthefactsofthepresentcasethattheactivities ofthedetenuewithreferencetothecriminalcase/shadaffectedeven tempoofthesociety,posingathreattotheveryexistenceofthenormal androutinelifeofthepeopleatlargeorthatonthebasisofthecriminal case/s, the detenue had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, makingitdifficultforwholesystemtoexistasasystemgovernedbythe ruleoflawbydisturbingpublicorder.
6. Learned AGP for the respondentState supported the detention order passed by the authority and submitted that the detenue is a "dangerous person" and sufficient material and evidence was found during the course of investigation, which was also supplied to the detenue, indicating that the detenue is in habit of indulging into activitiesasdefinedunderSection2(c)oftheActandconsideringthe factsofthecase,thedetainingauthorityhasrightlypassedtheorderof detentionandthedetentionorderdeservestobeupheldbythisCourt.
C/SCA/2951/2014 [ENTITY],thelearnedA.G.P.tookmethroughthegrounds uponwhichthedetainingauthoritysatisfiedtodetainthepetitioner.
7. Theorderofdetentionispassedonthebasisofwhathascometo beknownasthesubjectivesatisfactionofthedetainingauthoritysuch subjectivesatisfactionhastobearrivedatontwopoints.Firstly,onthe veracityoffactsimputedtothepersontobedetainedandsecondly,on theprognosticationofthedetainingauthoritythatthepersonconcerned is likely to indulge again in the same kind of notorious activities. Whereas, normal laws are primarily concerned with the act of commission of the offence, the detention laws are concerned with characterofthepersonwhohascommittedorislikelytocommitan offence.Thedetainingauthorityhas,therefore,tobesatisfiedthatthe personsoughttobedetainedisofsuchatypethathewillcontinueto violatethelawsoftheland ifheisnotpreventivelydetained.So,the commissionofinfractionoflaw,notdoneinanorganizedorsystematic manner,maynotbesufficientforthedetainingauthoritytojustifiably come to the conclusion that there is no alternate but to preventively detainthepetitioner.
8. Havingheardlearnedcounselforthepartiesandconsideringthe facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the subjective satisfactionarrivedatbythedetainingauthoritycannotbesaidtobe legal,validandinaccordancewithlawinasmuchastheoffencesalleged intheFIR/scannothaveanybearingonthepublicordersincethelawof the land i.e. [ACT] and other relevant penal laws are sufficientenoughtotakecareofthesituationandthattheallegationsas havebeenlevelledagainstthedetenuecannotbesaidtobegermanefor thepurposeofbringingthedetenueasa"dangerousperson"withinthe meaningofSection2(c)oftheActand,unlessanduntilthematerialis [CASE NUMBER] theretomakeoutacasethatthepersonconcernedhasbecomeathreat andamenacetothesocietysoastodisturbthewholetempoofthe societyandthatthewholesocialapparatusisinperildisturbingpublic orderattheinstanceofsuchperson,itcannotbesaidthatthedetenueis a dangerous person within the meaning of [SECTION] of the Act. Exceptgeneralstatement,thereisnomaterialonrecordwhichshows thatthedetenueisactinginsuchamannerwhichisdangeroustothe publicorder.In viewof the ratiolaiddown by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of (i) [ENTITY] (Vekaria) (supra); (ii) [ENTITY] (supra); and (iii) MustakmiyaJabbarmiyaShaikh(supra),theCourtisoftheopinionthat the activities of the detenue cannot be said to be dangerous to the maintenanceofpublicorderandatthemostfallunderthemaintenance of"lawandorder." Inthisconnection,itwillbefruitfultorefertoa [PRECEDENT], where the distinction between 'law and order'and'publicorder'hasbeenclearlylaiddown.TheCourtobserved asfollows:
"Doestheexpression"publicorder"takeineverykindof infractionoforderoronlysomecategoriesthereof?It ismanifestthateveryactofassaultorinjurytospecific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two peoplequarrelandfightandassaulteachotherinsidea houseorinastreet,itmaybesaidthatthereisdisorder butnotpublicdisorder.Suchcasesaredealtwithunder thepowersvestedintheexecutiveauthoritiesunderthe provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbingpublicorder.Thecontraventionofanylaw alwaysaffectsorderbutbeforeitcanbesaidtoaffect publicorder,itmustaffectthecommunityorthepublic at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcationbetweenseriousandaggravatedformsof disorderwhichdirectlyaffectthecommunityorinjure thepublicinterestandtherelativelyminorbreachesof [CASE NUMBER] peace of a purely local significance which primarily injurespecificindividualsandonlyinasecondarysense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leadingtodisorderisthusnotnecessarilysufficientfor action under the [ACT] but a disturbancewhichwillaffectpublicordercomeswithin thescopeoftheAct."
9. Itisgenerallyseenthatthoughsomeoftheaccusedarerepeatedly detainedondifferentoccasionsfordifferentoffences,onlybecauseof nondisclosureofproperinformationandinallsuchdetentionorders, suchordersaregenerallyquashedandsetasidebytheCourt.Itisalso seenthatbecauseofquashingofpreviousdetentionorder,competent authoritycouldnotconsiderthegroundsofdetentionundersuchorder which is already quashed as a ground for detention for subsequent offencesbythesamedetenue.However,whencompetentauthoritiesare notabidingallother citedcaseswhile passingtheorderofdetention baseduponoffences,itissurprisingtonotethatatnopointoftimethey challenged the observation of any Courtthat when previous order of detention has been quashed, it cannot be considered in subsequent detention.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatifaparticulardetenuecontinuous to commit the similar offence repeatedly, and if he is required to be detainedrepeatedlythenatleastatsomepointoftime,thecompetent authorityshallcompilealltheinformationandshallconsideritforfresh detention order as and when necessary and shall produce all such information before the Court so as to avoid the quashing of such detentionorder.Ifcompetentauthorityfailstotakecareofsuchexercise and when in impugned order of detention all such facts were not disclosedorconsideredforpassingsuchorder,the detention orderis required to be dealt with as it is without considering the additional disclosureinaffidavitinreplybytherespondents.
[CASE NUMBER] 9.1 Inviewofabovefactsandcircumstances,itwouldbenecessaryto
observe that the competent authority is not precluded to disclose all materialfactswhiledetainingthepetitionerifsorequireforanyoffence that he might commit hereinafter. In other words, though impugned orderisquashedandsetasideatpresent,itwouldnotcomeinwayof thecompetentauthorityforquotingsuchFIRsandorderofdetention, therebytotreatpetitionerasahabitualoffenderincaseofcommission ofoffencerepeatedly.
9.2 No doubt, neither the possibility of launching of a criminal proceedingsnorpendencyofanycriminalproceedingsisanabsolutebar to an order of preventive detention. But, failure of the detaining authoritytoconsiderthepossibilityofeitherlaunchingorpendencyof criminalproceedingsmay,inthe circumstancesofacase,leadtothe conclusionsthatthethedetainingauthorityhasnotapplieditsmindto the vital question whether it was necessary to make an order of preventive detention. Since there is an allegation that the order of detention is issued in a mechanical manner without keeping in mind whether it was necessary to make such an order when an ordinary criminal proceedings could well serve the purpose. The detaining authoritymustsatisfythecourtthatthequestiontoowasborneinmind before the order of detention was made. In the case on hand, the detainingauthorityfailedtosatisfythecourtthatthedetainingauthority so bore the question in mind and, therefore, the court is justified in drawing the inference that there was no application of mind by detaining authority to the vital question whether it was necessary to preventivelydetainthedetenue.Itisalsofruitfultorefertothedecision oftheHon'bleApexCourtrenderedinthecaseof RekhaV/s.Stateof TamilNaduthroughSecretarytoGovernmentandanotherreportedin [PRECEDENT]itisobservedbytheHon'bleApexCourtthat [CASE NUMBER] ifapersonisliabletobetried,orisactuallybeingtriedforacriminal offencebuttheordinarycriminallawwillnotbeabletodealwiththe situation,thenandonlythen,preventivedetentionbetakenrecourseto.
10. Asaresultofhearingandperusaloftherecord,itappearsthatthe onlymaterialthatwasavailablewiththedetainingauthoritywasthe offencesregisteredagainstthe detenuandonthatbasis,itcannotbe said that the activity of the detenu has become a threat to the maintenanceof'publicorder'and'publichealth'.Mereinvolvementof thedetenuinsuchactivitymaynotamounttodangerousactivitybythe detenuandmerementionofthem,unlesssupportedbyanyevidence, cannotbesaidtobematerialgermaneforthepurposeofarrivingatthe subjectivesatisfactionthattheactivityofthedetenuisprejudicialtothe maintenance of 'public order' and 'public health'. For the sake of repetition,thecommissionofoffence does notexhibitordisclosethat the petitioner isdoinginfractionoflawinanorganizedorsystematic mannersoastocometotheconclusionthatthereisnoalternatebutto preventivelydetainthepetitioner.
11. Inviewoftheabove,Iaminclinedtoallowthispetitionbecause simplicitorregistrationofFIR/sbyitselfcannothaveanynexuswiththe breach of maintenance of public order and the authority can take recourseundertheIndianPenalCodeandnootherrelevantorcogent materialexistsforinvokingpowersunderSection3(2)oftheAct.
12. In the result, this Special Civil Application is allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 10.12.2013 passed by the respondentauthority isherebyquashedandsetaside.Thedetenueis orderedtobesetatlibertyforthwithifnotrequiredinanyothercase. Ruleismadeabsoluteaccordingly.DirectServiceispermitted.
[CASE NUMBER] ([ENTITY], J.) VATSAL