1 WA-106-2017 & WA-107-2017 THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH WA-106-2017 (THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. Vs CHANDER SHEKHAR RAJPUT & ORS.) WA-107-2017 (THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. Vs ATAR SINGH RAJPUT & ORS.) Gwalior, Dated 21.08.2018 In [CASE NUMBER] Shri [ENTITY], learned Government Advocate for the appellants/State. Shri [ENTITY], learned Assistant Solicitor General for respondent No.2.
None for respondents 1, 3 and 4.
Shri [ENTITY], learned Government Advocate for the appellants/State.
Shri [ENTITY], learned Assistant Solicitor General for respondent No.2.
Shri [ENTITY], learned counsel for respondent No.3.
None for respondent No.4.
These Writ Appeals under [SECTION] of [ACT] respectively are directed against the order dated 15/12/2010 in [CASE NUMBER] and order dated 15/12/2010 in W.P. WA-106-2017 & [CASE NUMBER]); whereby, the allocation of the petitioners to the State of Chattisgarh has been quashed.
At the outset, it is contended that similar orders were subject matter of [CASE NUMBER] decided on 13/03/2012 and [CASE NUMBER] decided on 18/10/2013; wherein, while setting aside the order passed in Writ Petitions, the matter has been relegated to the Union of India for reconsideration and decision within a specific time frame.
In present Appeals, we find that there is delay of 2149 days and 2153 days in filing the Writ Appeals and though the condonation is sought vide [CASE NUMBER] and [CASE NUMBER] and the reasons assigned in paragraph 4 of these applications are:
"4. That, thereafter OIC was appointed in the matter who has contacted in the office of Advocate General on . Thereafter the OIC was asked to get records pertaining the case for filing the appeal, he has submitted the record in the office of Advocate General on Thereafter the appeal was got prepared and same is being filed before this Hon'ble Court. Copies of relevant correspondence are WA-106-2017 & WA-107-2017 annexed herewith and marked as Annexure A/1 collectively."
Thus the State of Madhya Pradesh and its functionaries have not even taken care to fill in the blanks, though the applications are supported by affidavit of the Gazetted Officer. We expect suitable action against him for such a lackadaisical approach.
As regard to condoning the delay, it is sufficiency of cause which matters and not the length. In [PRECEDENT], wherein Their Lordships observed:
"19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC
23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] as follows:-
"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it WA-106-2017 & WA-107-2017 must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation.
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly"
28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach"; "substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show WA-106-2017 & WA-107-2017 the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.
29. Whilst considering applications for the [ACT], the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary power especially judicial powers have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers."
In the case at hand as no sufficient cause is adverted at which prevented the Appellant from filing Appeal within limitation, we are not inclined to condone the delay. Consequently, Applications i.e. [CASE NUMBER] and [CASE NUMBER] stand dismissed.
In the result, Writ Appeals are dismissed being barred by time. No costs.
([ENTITY]) ([ENTITY]) Judge Judge pwn*