JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. This is tenant's petition filed under [SECTION] of the [ACT] (for brevity The Act') challenging findings of the Appellate Authority, Barnala, recorded in its order dated 26.2.1999. It has reversed the judgment dated 7.10.1996 passed by the Rent Controller, Barnala. The Appellate Authority while accepting the appeal of the landlord-respondent has ordered ejectment of the tenant-petitioner on the principal grounds of personal necessity and that the building was unfit and unsafe for human habitation.
2. Brief facts of the case are the landlord-respondent filed an ejectment petition seeking eviction of the tenant-petitioner from the demised premises on the ground that the demised premises had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation as contemplated by [SECTION] of the Act. The: other ground pleaded was that the demised premises were required by the landlord-respondent for his own occupation and personal necessity as envisaged by [SECTION] of the Act. The Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment petition by repelling both the grounds holding that it was a case of minor repair. The Rent Controller concluded that there is no evidence on record showing that the demised premises could be declared as unfit and unsafe for human habitation merely because roof of a chaubara on the first floor had fallen. According to the Rent Controller minor cracks were liable to be ignored. The Rent Controller further found that it was probable that there was no roof and that the construction of the roof was abandoned or that it had never been laid down. The aforementioned finding has been recorded on the basis of the report of the Local Commissioner RW-2 who was an engineer because he failed to find any debris (malba) of the roof at the site. However, proceeding on the presumption that there was no roof it has been concluded that some cracks, bending of batons and dampness in the rest of the portion of the demised premises would not be sufficient to declare it as unfit and unsafe for human habitation but those were repairable.
3. The plea of the landlord-respondent in respect of personal necessity was also repelled by the Rent Controller by observing that there was no evidence brought on record showing that landlord-respondent had not vacated any building in the urban area of Barnala after the commencement of the Act. Holding that adducing of sufficient evidence on that aspect was mandatory and in the absence thereof, the necessary ingredients of [SECTION] of the Act were not fulfilled. The issue was answered against the landlord-respondent.
4. On an appeal filed by the landlord-respondent, the Appellate Authority reversed the finding recorded by the Rent Controller on the issue of unfit and unsafe as envisaged by [SECTION] of the Act. The: Appellate Authority re-appreciated the evidence and recorded its own view by reversing the findings of the Rent Controller which reads as under:-
"Both the parties had examined one expert each. On behalf of the landlord, [ENTITY] Engineer had appeared as AW-5 and stated that the premises are unfit and unsafe. Whereas on behalf of the respondent [ENTITY], RW-2, appeared and stated that the premises are unfit for human habitation. Under these circumstances, inspection made by Local Commissioner, Shri [ENTITY] who had been appointed Local Commissioner by the Court and his report is to be made basis for considering whether premises are unfit or fit for human habitation. As per report Ex.A-3 of Sh. [ENTITY], roofs of the room marked C has been given support by a girder and some balas are bent. Some balas of room mark B are also bent. The main thing in this case is that roof of the chaubara on the first floor is fallen. When there is a staircase and parapit for going on that roof of the chaubara, then it cannot be at all said that there was no roof at all or it fell before tenancy was created. None will take the premises in that shape on rent and none can continue with the roof in fallen condition for 25 years or more especially when there is staircase and parapit. It will be not a case of repairs. The tenancy was created in the year 1971 and from that also it can be presumed that the premises are old one. When the roof of the chaubara is fallen and roof of other rooms are also in bad condition, then the only conclusion can be that the premises are unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Findings of the trial Court on issue No. 1 are accordingly reversed."
5. Even on the issue of personal necessity, the Appellate Authority on re-appreciation of evidence found that the landlord-respondent had two married sons and each son has three children. The site plan Ex.A-4 of the house occupied by the landlord-respondent was proved by [ENTITY], AW-2. The ration card was also proved by [ENTITY], AW-3 a witness from the Food and Supplies Department which shows that the applicant and his other family members are residing in the same house. The landlord-respondent himself appeared as his own witness and deposed that he did not have any other house and that his two married sons with their wives along with three children each were residing with him in that house. It was further deposed that one married daughter who was suffering from some physical problem had also started living with him. It was claimed by him that the available accommodation with him was insufficient. In the cross-examination, landlord-respondent had admitted that there was a shop in the [ENTITY] but denied that one of the sons was living in the room at first floor (Chaubara) in that shop because the first floor accommodation was being used as a go-down and not as residence. Copies of the ration cards Exs.AW-3/A, 3/B 3/C and 3/D have been found to show that all those persons were living in House No.B-1/697. Similarly copies of the voters list of the year 1990-91 of Ward No. 16 prove that they were living in the same house. The house had two bed rooms, two kitchens, one dining room, one guest room, one drawing room on the first floor and two bed rooms on the first floor as is shown in the site plan Ex.A-4 or the site plans prepared by the tenant Exs.R-5 and R-6. On the basis of the afore-mentioned evidence, the Id. Appellate Authority, concluded that the Rent Controller committed a grave error in opining that the landlord-respondent did not require the demised premises for his own occupation and necessity or that there was non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Act.
6. The Appellate Authority also examined the issue whether [ENTITY] son of landlord-respondent had shifted to the first floor of the shop situated in [ENTITY] and found as under:
"It is admitted position that the property in [ENTITY] is a shop. According to the applicant first floor is being used as godown and not as residence. Moreover the landlord is "the judge of his own requirement and the premises in dispute which are residential premises may be more suitable to the applicant-landlord for the living of his own son rather than the shop in [ENTITY], The tenancy was granted long back in the year 1971. During all his period the requirement of the landlord with the marriage of the sons and then children of the sons and their families have increased. When landlord has two married sons with three children each and his own wife is living and the sons have also their wives, then it will be natural for the landlord to think of shifting one son and ask for vacation of tenancy premises for the residence of that son. Under these circumstances, I hold applicant-landlord required the premises for his own bona fide use and occupation. Findings of the Rent Controller on Issue No. 2 are reversed."
7. Shri [ENTITY], learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner has vehemently argued that as a matter of fact there is no such deterioration in the demised premises which may warrant the conclusion that it has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. The learned counsel has made an attempt to resurrect the same argument which prevailed with the Rent Controller and asserted that in fact there was no roof. Elaborating his argument the learned counsel has submitted that if the roof had fallen then it was bound to leave marks on the side of the walls. Referring to the findings of the Rent Controller in paras 7 and 8 of the judgment, the learned counsel has submitted that the building was not unfit and unsafe for human habitation. He also referred to Ex.A-3 at page 57 of the record which is the report submitted by [ENTITY], Advocate, who was appointed as Local Commissioner by the Court. The learned counsel has emphasised on the contents of paras 4 and 6 of the report to show that in room "B" battens are although bending but four battens were replaced by new ones. With regard to room "C" it is also pointed out that 5 battens were bending down and were broken. However, there was iron girder to support the bending battens. It is further shown that four walls of the first floor room were intact without a roof and visual reflection showed that roof had fallen long back. He has also referred to another report Ex.A-6 in support of his submission.
8. On the basis of aforementioned evidence, the learned counsel has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of [ENTITY] v. Kewal Krishan Chopra, 1988 H.R.R. 502 to submit that if the roof on the first floor is presumed to have fallen then until and unless the findings are recorded that the ground floor structure is also unfit and unsafe no ejectment cold be ordered. He has also placed reliance on judgments of this Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT] and argued that there was no evidence brought on record showing that the ground floor building is unfit and unsafe. He has submitted that mere age of the demised premises cannot constitute a ground for the conclusion that the same was unfit and unsafe or that appearance of mere cracks would make it unfit and unsafe for human habitation.
9. Assailing the finding concerning the grounds of personal necessity, the learned counsel has argued that the Appellate Authority has failed to consider the property occupied by one of the sons of the landlord-respondent in [ENTITY]. He has also referred to the averments made in [CASE NUMBER] which was filed during the pendency of the instant petition. According to the learned counsel, the landlord-respondent has rented out the property situated at [ENTITY], Barnala to one [ENTITY]. In support of the application even notice issued by the Municipal Council, Barnala (An-nexure P.I) has been relied upon. The afore-mentioned application has been opposed by the landlord-respondent wherein it has been pointed out that the property bearing No. B-1/57 is a shop owned by the landlord-respondent and it was never let out to [ENTITY] for residential purposes. It has further been asserted that notice Annexure P-l is totally false which has been manipulated by the tenant-petitioner during the pendency of the instant petition. The landlord-respondent has further asserted that in that shop he is running his wholesale business of selling sugar, gur, ghee etc. and that the room on the first floor is being used for storing the aforementioned articles. Reply to the notice (Annexure PI) sent by the Municipal Council has also been given explaining that the building was a non-residential building and the same was never rented out to any one which was being used for business purposes. It is further averred in the reply that order Annexure R-2 dated 17.2.1999 has been passed which determines the annual rental value of the property B-l/57, it shows that the building was self-occupied commercial property and the room on the first floor was never shown in possession of Sat Pal as was mentioned in the notice dated 11.5.1998 (Annexure P-l).
10. The learned counsel has then argued that ration cards are incorrect as [ENTITY] AW-3 was not able to satisfy with regard to the dates mentioned in the forms on which application for obtaining ration cards were made. The learned counsel has submitted that there are valid doubts with regard to the authenticity of the ration cards which appear to have been fabricated for creating evidence for the ejectment petition. According to the learned counsel it is fanciful and mere wish of the landlord-respondent to seek ejectment of the tenant-petitioner which is full of greed rather than need. He has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court reported as [PRECEDENT].
11. Shri [ENTITY], learned counsel for the landlord-respondent has vehemently controverted the submissions made by the learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner and argued that the report of the Local Commissioner [ENTITY] Ex.A-3 and the other report Ex.AW 5/A submitted by Sh. [ENTITY] conclusively show that the building has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. According to the learned counsel, marks on the four walls of the room on the first floor of the demised premises are unlikely to be witnessed as the roof was at the ends of the wall. After falling of roof no marks would survive as the ends of the walls alongwith the roof must have come crumbling down. On that basis he has submitted that there is no substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner that marks should have been left on the wall after the fall of the roof. The learned counsel has emphasised that the findings of the Appellate Authority do not deserve to be interfered with by this Court as there is no mis-reading or non-reading of any material piece of documentary evidence or any oral testimony.
12. On the ground of personal necessity, the learned counsel has drawn my attention to the averments made by the landlord-respondent in paras 4 and 5 of the ejectment petition showing that the landlord-respondent has two married sons namely [ENTITY] and [ENTITY] who have three children each and the whole family resides together in one house bearing Municipal No.B-1/697. On the basis of the averments made in para 5 it has been argued that all the ingredients of [SECTION] of the Act have been pleaded by asserting therein that the landlord-respondent has not vacated any house nor he has any other house in his possession. He has also referred to the replication wherein possession in respect of shops situated at [ENTITY] bearing No.B-1/57 has been explained by asserting that the landlord-respondent has been doing his business by using the room on the first floor by storing various items like ghee, leaf tea, sugar and gur etc. The learned counsel has also argued that there is no discrepancy, which may warrant discarding of ration cards Ex.AW3/A to AW4/D.
13. The learned counsel has then argued that the tenant-petitioner had acquired his own house being B-10/219 as is stated by the landlord-respondent when he appeared as AW-6. The learned counsel has also made reference to the statement of [ENTITY] RW-1 at page 19 of the record where during cross-examination he has admitted the aforementioned fact.
14. In support of his submission that the building has become unfit and unsafe, the learned counsel has placed reliance on three judgments of this Court in the cases of [PRECEDENT]. [PRECEDENT]; [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT] and argued that the reports of the Local Commissioner Ex.AW 5/A and AW-3 have been rightly considered by the Appellate Authority proving the fact that the roof on the first floor has fallen and the ground floor is in dilapidated condition and therefore the entire building has been rendered unfit and unsafe for human habitation. He has then argued that the landlord-respondent is the best judge of his need/personal necessity and in that regard has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of [ENTITY] Kshirsagar (Mrs.) v. Traders and Agencies and Anr., . He has also referred to two judgments of this Court in the cases of [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT]. The learned counsel has also urged that there are numerous precedents of this Court where married sons along with children were found to occupying and sharing the premises with their parents and grand-parents and this Court has granted their prayer under [SECTION] of the Act. He has placed reliance on judgments reported as [PRECEDENT]; [PRECEDENT]; [PRECEDENT] and a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of [ENTITY] v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002-2)131 P.L.R. 625 (S.C.). On the basis of the judgment in the case of [ENTITY] (supra) it has been argued that wider construction has to be adopted for the expression used in [SECTION] of the Act 'for his own use' and no tenant can compel the landlord to share accommodation with his married sons and daughter-in-laws. Therefore, the learned counsel has submitted that the instant petition of the tenant-petitioner is liable to be dismissed.
15. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length and perusing the record, 1 am of the considered view that this petition is liable to be dismissed because the Appellate Authority, after detailed examination of the evidence, has concluded that the demised premises had been rendered unfit and unsafe for human habitation which is a ground of ejectment of a tenant under [SECTION] of the Act. In para 9 of its judgment, which has already been reproduced above, in the proceeding paras, the Id. Appellate Authority has concluded that when the roof of the room on the first floor (chaubara) had fallen and other rooms were also in bad condition then the conclusion is that the demised premises had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. It is not a case where independent of the fallen roof, the finding has been recorded that the other rooms were fit and sound for human habitation warranting the application of the judgment of the Supreme Court in [ENTITY]'s case (supra). In that case independent of the fallen roof on one of the rooms, the finding was receded that the other building was safe and therefore, the ejectment was not ordered. Similarly, categorical findings have also been recorded that the landlord-respondent has two sons with three children each. One of his daughters who suffers from physical problem had also started living with him. Taking into consideration the accommodation available at his House B-I/697, the Appellate Authority has come to the positive conclusion that the landlord-respondent requires the building for his own use and occupation as he required to settle his married sons in the demised premises. It is well settled that this Court while exercising jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the Act would not interfere in the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below unless the findings are sought to be perverse or it is concluded that a reasonable person on the basis of the evidence available would not record such a finding. In this regard reliance can be placed on [PRECEDENT] wherein it has been held that revisional jurisdiction of this Court under [SECTION] of the Act could be exercised if this Court is not satisfied with the legality and propriety of the order challenged in the revision petition. If the need of the landlord-respondent is not found to be genuine, real, honest and sincere in that case alone such a finding could be interfered with. In this regard reliance could be placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of [ENTITY] v. Mukhtiar Singh, (2003-1)133 P.L.R. 371 (S.C.). In the afore-mentioned judgment, the Supreme Court has followed the earlier judgments in the cases of [PRECEDENT]; [PRECEDENT], ; [PRECEDENT], and [PRECEDENT], . The views of the Supreme Court on the provisions of [SECTION] of the Act as expressed in [ENTITY]'s case (supra) are discernible from paras 13 and 14 which read as under:
"13. Simply because a different Judge of Court of facts could have been persuaded to change opinion and draw a different inference from set of facts is not the ection 15 of the Act, is to enable it satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of an order made by the Controller or the proceedings before him. In [PRECEDENT] (supra), it was held that nature and scope of revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court shall have to be determined on the language of the statute investing the jurisdiction. In [PRECEDENT], a three Judge Bench held that the revisional power referable to [SECTION] of the [ACT] is not as narrow as the revisional power under [SECTION] of the [ACT] and it is also not so wide as an appellate power. Having kept the legal principles in view and on an objective determination and on a proper appreciation of the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances a conclusion as to the need of the demised premises for user by the landlord and his bona fides shall not be liable to be interfered with in exercise of revisional power. In [PRECEDENT] this Court made a comparative study of the provisions contained in [SECTION] [ACT] in juxtaposition with [SECTION] of the [ACT] and held that the High Court cannot appreciate or reappreciated evidence dictated by its mere inclination to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. A conclusion arrived at which is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material law or deriving such conclusions from the established facts as betray a lack of reason and/or objectivity would render the finding "not according to law" calling for an interference under [SECTION] proviso by the High Court. [PRECEDENT], and [PRECEDENT] take the same view. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the Act is similar, that is, confined to testing the legality or propriety of order or proceedings of the Controller."
16. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the question which requires determination is whether the findings recorded by the Id. Appellate Authority on the issue of unfit and unsafe and the personal bonafide necessity are legal and proper as this Court has to satisfy itself as to the legality and propriety of such finding within the meaning of [SECTION] of the Act. In para 9 of the judgment, as reproduced above, a categorical finding after examining the statement of Dr. [ENTITY], AW-5, [ENTITY] AW-2 as well as the report of the Local Commissioner Ex.A-8 has been recorded that the premises are unfit and unsafe for human habitation which is a ground for ejectment of a tenant under [SECTION] of the Act. Similarly, ground of personal necessity is also substantiated by adducing cogent evidence in the form of ration cards Exs.AW3-A, 3-B, 3-C, 3-D. In all the ration cards, the landlord-respondent along-with his sons and even of daughter [ENTITY] shows that all these persons were living in House No.B-1/617. Even there is evidence in the form of voters list of the year 1990-91 of Ward No. 16 further providing that landlord-respondent alongwith his sons was living in that house. The site plan Ex.A-4 has given the details of the accommodation available at B-l/617 which comprised two bed rooms, two kitchens, one dining room, one guest room, one drawing room on the ground floor and two bed rooms on the first floor. The site plan Ex.A-4 is identical to the site plans Ex.R-6 and R-5 which were produced by the tenant-petitioner. Therefore, I am satisfied that the aforementioned findings Have been recorded in accordance with law and do not suffer from any illegality or impropriety. Hence, there is no room to interfere in those findings.
17. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the findings concerning ground of personal necessity either raising doubts to the authenticity of ration card or with regard to occupation of rooms on the first floor shop of [ENTITY] do not require any detailed consideration because firstly there is adequate evidence on record to sustain the findings that the landlord-respondent is living in his house with his two married sons and daughter-in-laws, who have three children each. Even one of his daughter, who had some physical problem was found to be living with him. The trial Court has rejected the plea of the landlord-respondent on the ground that he had failed to prove as a fact that he did not vacate any building after the commencement of the Act. There are ample pleadings in this regard in paras 4 and 5 the ejectment petition and there is no specific denial of the tenant-petitioner. Moreover, nothing could be extracted from the landlord-respondent, whom he was permitted to be cross-examined by the tenant-petitioner.
18. It had further concluded that landlord-respondent did not require the demised premises for his own use and occupation. The Rent Controller adopted a very narrow interpretation of the 'for his own use' in [SECTION] of the Act, which now has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of [ENTITY] (supra). Recommending a wider interpretation of those words and over-ruling the view taken by this Court in [PRECEDENT], their Lordships observed as under:-
"24. We are of the opinion that the expression "for his own use" as occurring in [SECTION] of the Act cannot be narrowly construed. The expression must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning. The requirement is not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself require the accommodation and to fulfill the requirement he must himself physically occupy the premises. The requirement of a member of the family or of a person on which the landlord is dependent or who is dependent on the landlord can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord for his own use. In the several decided cases referred to hereinabove, we have found the part materia provisions being interpreted so as to include the requirement of the wife, husband, sister, children including son, daughter, a widowed daughter and her son, nephew, coparceners, members of family and dependents and kith and kin in the requirement of landlord as "his" or "his own" requirement and user. Keeping in view the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be the obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. If the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person other than the landlord himself the court shall with circumspection inquire: (i) whether the requirement of such person can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and (ii) whether there is a close interrelation or identity nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query. Applying the abovesaid tests to the facts of the present case it is clear that the tenancy premises are required for the office of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and to contribute his best to see him economically independent. The landlord is not going to let out the premises to his son and though the son would run his office in the premises the possession would continue with the landlord and in a sense the actual occupation by the son would be the occupation by the landlord himself. It is the landlord who requires the premises for his son and in substance the user would be the landlord for his sons' office. The case squarely falls within the scope of [SECTION] of the Act
33. Our conclusions are crystallised as under:
(i) The words "for his own use" as occurring in [SECTION] of the [ACT] must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction.
(ii) The expression-landlord requires for "his own use", is not confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal "emanations" of the landlord is included therein. All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical occupation or .user by someone else, would amount to occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as interrelationship and interdependence-economic or otherwise, between the landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-religious and local customs and obligations of the society or region to which they belong.
(iii) The tests to be applied are; (i) whether the requirement pleaded and proved may properly be regarded as the landlord's own requirement? and, (ii) whether on the facts and in circumstances of a given case, actual occupation and user by a person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord as "his own" occupation or user? The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the nature and degree of a relationship and/or dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as "his own" and the person who would actually use the premises;(ii) the circumstances in which the arises and is put forward; and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim. The court on being satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim, as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the landlord's claim.
(iv) While casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a practical meaningful approach guided by the realities of life.
(v) In the present case, the requirement of the landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his Chartered Accountant son is the requirement of landlord "for his own use" within the meaning of [SECTION]."
19. Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] while interpreting the provisions of [ACT]. Expressing the view that need by the landlord to occupy by himself would include the need of members of his family, their Lordships followed the view taken by the Supreme Court in [ENTITY]'s case (supra) and observed as under (A.I.R. Page 2027):-
"8. This brings us to the legal question about the meaning to be given to the word "himself used in [SECTION] of the Act. Normally, the rent legislations are meant for the benefit of the tenants but the rent statutes contain exceptions in favour of the landlord which give him a right to evict the tenant, the most important being to ensure that he gets payment of rent regularly and promptly and that in case the tenanted premises is required by him for his personal need, he is able to get its possession from the tenant. So the provision regarding eviction of tenant to meet the personal requirement of the landlord with respect to the premises is a provision for the benefit of the landlord. The question arises that should such a provision be construed strictly so as to confine it to the requirement of the landlord alone or can it be extended to include the requirement of members of the landlord's family? In the present case, the plaintiff has pleaded right from the beginning that he constitutes a joint family with his mother and brothers and sisters. It is also in evidence that the plaintiff holds the property for the benefit of the entire family. Even when the plaintiff is the sole owner of the property, it is open to him to use the property for the benefit of his larger family which includes his brothers and sisters. The respondent-tenant cannot dispute the fact about the plaintiffs constituting a joint family because it is specifically provided in the lease deed which is an admitted document. Moreover, the defendant had not led any evidence to contradict or dispute this plea. The way the case has been argued before the courts below also clearly suggests that the only objection raised on behalf of the tenant was a legal objection that the need of the brothers and sisters of the landlord cannot be considered under clause (g). The fact that the plaintiff constituted a joint family with his brothers and sisters was never disputed."
20. I am further of the view that once the landlord-respondent has proved his requirement of rented premises and its bonafide, then the tenant is nobody to regulate the requirement of the landlord. For the aforementioned proposition, reliance could be placed on a Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] and a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of [ENTITY] (supra). After citing some other judgments, Prof. [ENTITY] in his book 'Rent Matters on Trial' which is based on empirical research carried in U.T. Chandigarh has observed in this regard as under:
"Thus the settled position about the need of the landlord as seen above, is that he requires the residential building for his own purposes and this also includes the requirement of his family members. It is not necessary that the members of the family must be dependent upon him. Keeping in view the needs of the members who ordinarily live with him or want to live with him, the requirement of the landlord shall be accepted as bonafide. But neither the Courts have a right to tell the landlord that if they were in his position this is what they will or will not do not it is the right of the tenant to tell the landlord as to how and where he should live."
21. In view of the above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed with costs are which is assessed at Rs. 20,000/-.