ORDER [ENTITY], J.
1. The petitioners are owners of Premises No. 11, Indra Kumar Karnani Street (formerly known as Premises No. 11, Jackson Lane), with effect from 4th quarter, [SECTION]78-79 the Corporation of Calcutta had determined the annual value of the said premises at Rs. 4,30,606/-. On 9th Nov., [SECTION]81 a Special Officer of the Corporation of Calcutta had disposed of their objection against the said increase in valuation made under [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 by fixing the annual value at Rupees 3,61,135/-. Being dissatisfied with the said order passed under [SECTION] of the said Act the petitioners have presented under [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51, Municipal Appeal No. 141 of [SECTION]82 in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta. The said appeal is pending.
2. The Calcutta Municipal (3rd Amendment) Act, [SECTION]76, which came into effect on 22nd June, [SECTION]76, has inserted the following Sub-section (3-A) in [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 :
"No appeal under, this section shall be entertained unless the consolidated rate payable up to the date of presentation of the appeal on the valuation determined-
(a) by an order under [SECTION], in the case of an appeal to the Court of Small Causes,
(b) by the decision of the Court of Small Causes, in the case of an appeal to the High Court, has been deposited in the municipal office and such consolidated rate is continued to be deposited until the appeal is finally decided."
The petitioners have obtained the present Rule, inter alia, challenging the vires of said [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 and also contending that the learned Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, Calcutta has no jurisdiction to call upon the petitioners to deposit consolidated rates payable up to the date of the presentation of the appeal on the valuation determined by the impugned order under [SECTION] of the [ACT] and also to continue to deposit the consolidated rate on the said valuation so determined until the appeal presented by the petitioners is finally decided
3. On January 28, [SECTION]83, I had rejected four writ applications filed by M/s. Jajodia Estates Pvt. Ltd. and others, who had, inter alia, contended that the learned Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court at Calcutta had committed error of jurisdiction by applying [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 in respect of the appeals presented by them against the orders passed under [SECTION] of the said Act My said decision has been since reposed at page 391 of the 87 Cal WN. Having given my anxious consideration to the various submissions urged on behalf of the petitioners of the instant Rule, I find no reason to revise my views regarding the scope and effect of [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51. I may, however, note that Ms. [ENTITY], learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the instant Rule, has urged several points which were not raised at the time of the disposal of the case of Jajodia Estates Pvt. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta ([SECTION]83-87 Cal WN 391) (supra).
4. Mr. [ENTITY], learned advocate for the petitioners, has not disputed the well-settled principle that right of appeal is a creature of statute and the legislature may regulate the said right. But according to Mr. [ENTITY] tha said right is not an unfettered one and the legislative action in this behalf must satisfy the test of reasonableness enshrined in [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Mr. [ENTITY] has submitted that when conditions imposed are so onerous as to deprive the right of appeal, the restrictive provision ought to be struck down as unreasonable. The contention of Mr. [ENTITY] is that the cumulative effect of [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 is to make the right of appeal under [SECTION] of the said Act nugatory and to deny the right of appeal to those who cannot pay consolidated rate determined on the basis of the valuation which is under challenge in the appeal. Mr. [ENTITY] has further submitted that [SECTION] of the said Act is also repugnant to and inconsistent with other provisions contained in the [ACT], [SECTION]51 relating to liability to pay the owner's and occupier's shares of consolidated rates and [SECTION] also amounts to an illegal exaction. After the disposal of the appeal under [SECTION] the right to obtain, retain, refund or adjustment of the excess amounts deposited under [SECTION] of the Act is practically illusory. Mr. [ENTITY] has also submitted that the right of effecity approach to Court is a Basic Right implies for enjoyment of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the [ACT]. By depriving, in effect, such right to obtain ad-dress by way of appeal against determination of annual value, [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 violates the Basic Structure of the [ACT].
5. It is now settled law that taxation laws are not beyond the pale of constitutional limitations prescribed by [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Tax Laws are also subject to Fundamental Rights (See [PRECEDENT], , [PRECEDENT],
6. [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51, according to the petitioner, is invalid not on the ground that the said sub-section denies equal protection and is therefore discriminatory but because the said provision of [ACT], [SECTION]51, is a piece of arbitrary and unreasonable legislation.
7. Mr. [ENTITY], learned advocate for the petitioner, has relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in the case of [PRECEDENT], , [PRECEDENT], and [PRECEDENT], and has submitted that "the content and reach of [SECTION] of the [ACT] have been now extended and where a legislative or executive action is arbitrary, it is unequal and, therefore, violative of [SECTION]. Further natural justice has assumed greater importance in the fields of administrative law and executive action."
8. Since the Supreme Court in the case of [PRECEDENT], (commonly called Bank Nationalisation case) disagreed with tha majority decision in [PRECEDENT], and held as correct the minority view in [PRECEDENT] (supra) that a law infringing personal liberty must also satisfy the tests laid down in [SECTION], Right to Equality has acquired new dimensions. [SECTION], [SECTION] and [SECTION] are no longer considered mutually exclusive. Procedure of reasonableness is to be projected in considering vires of laws restricting rights under [SECTION] and [SECTION] (vide the decision of [ENTITY], J. in [PRECEDENT] (supra). When any of the fundamental rights is abridged or interfered with by legislative or executive action, the Court has to decide whether or not the impugned action is fair, just and reasonable and not fanciful, oppressive and arbitrary.
9. The considerations about the extended ambit of [SECTION] would not be relevant when we examine the constitutional validity of [SECTION] of the [ACT] because the said provision has no impact on enjoyment of fundamental rights. The petitioners do not question the legislative competence of the West Bengal Legislature to enact Calcutta Municipal 3rd Amendment Act, [SECTION]76 which inserted aforesaid Sub-section (3-A) in [SECTION] of the principal Act. The petitioners have impugned the validity of the aforesaid sub-section on the ground that it is repugnant to [SECTION]. But validity of a taxing or rating law cannot be challenged merely on the ground that it imposes an unreasonably high burden or that the provision is harsh (vide [PRECEDENT], . It is for the legislature to decide on what objects to levy what rate of tax. The said [SECTION] of the [ACT] neither gives uncanalised discretionary powers to the authorities nor the Act seeks to make any differentiation or classification. Persons who may feel aggrieved by orders passed under [SECTION] of the Act, prefer appeals under [SECTION], from one class and they have been equally treated. All appellants under [SECTION] of the Act required to fulfil the condition imposed by [SECTION] of the Act in order to avail of the opportunity of hearing before the Small Causes Court.
10. In deciding the reasonableness of taxing statutes the Court is also bound to give due consideration to the principle that power of taxing people and property is an essential attribute of the Government. The quantum of tax levied by the taxing statute, the conditions subject to which it is taxed, the manner in which it is sought to be recovered are all within the legislative competence and in dealing with those questions the Court is always circumspect and cautious (vide [PRECEDENT] ) (supra), [PRECEDENT] (supra), [PRECEDENT], . A statute ought to be read so as to make it valid and if possible an interpretation leading to the contrary position should be avoided. In these matters the needs of the taxing body for carrying out its functions under the Statute for which the taxing power is given may afford sufficient guidance ([PRECEDENT], .
11. The petitioners themselves do not claim the above sub-section to be a colourable piece of legislation and as such a fraud on the legislative power. The provision for deposit of consolidated rate contained in [SECTION] of the [ACT] is subject to obtaining refund or adjustment in the manner and to the extent specified in [SECTION] of the said Act. Therefore, the said Sub-section (3-A) could not be pronounced as a device or cloak to confiscate the amount required to be deposited under the said [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]81.
12. The said [SECTION] of the [ACT] was inserted by the Calcutta Municipal 3rd Amendment Act, [SECTION]76. Undisputedly, the said sub-section by imposing the condition for deposit of consolidated rate affected substantive right of appeal under [SECTION] of the principal Act. Such impairment of the right of appeal by putting restrictions thereon or imposing more onerous condition has not been expressly or impliedly given retrospective effect. The impugned valuation of the petitioner's holding was revised after the commencement of the aforesaid amendment Act of [SECTION]76 and, therefore, unless the said [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION][SECTION] is declared ultra vires, the petitioners are bound to comply with the said condition for deposit mainly because the [SECTION]? of the Act imposes such onerous condition and thereby restricts the right of appeal under [SECTION] of the Act. But merely because the said [SECTION] of the said Act impairs the right of appeal by imposing an onerous condition. I am also unable to hold that the said [SECTION] of the Act is unfair, fanciful, oppressive and arbitrary.
13. I find no substance in the petitioner's submission that [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 in any way affects the basic structure of the [ACT]. Decisions in the cases of [PRECEDENT], , [PRECEDENT], and Fertilizer Corporation, [PRECEDENT], AIR [SECTION]81 SC 344, inter alia considered the extent of the Parliament's power to amend the [ACT] affecting its basic structure. These reported cases do not at all warrant the view that the right to file an appeal under a municipal law is a part of the basic structure of the [ACT]. [ENTITY], J. in his separate judgment in the case of Fertilizer Corporation, [PRECEDENT] (supra), had referred to the right of effective access to justice in the context of the question whether or not a registered union of workers of a factory can maintain a writ application under [SECTION] of the [ACT] challenging the sale of a plant and its equipment In Fertilizar Corporation's case (AIR [SECTION]81 SC 344) (supra), the Court upheld the maintainability of the writ petition but discharged the petition on other grounds. I may point out that right to constitutional remedy under [SECTION] itself is a Fundamental Right. Every High Court has power under [SECTION] of the [ACT] to issue writs for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by [SECTION] and for any other purposes subject to territorial limitations as regards the location of the authorities and place of accrual of the cause of action. I accept the submission made on behalf of the respondents that the Courts which are subordinate to the High Court are not constituted under the [ACT] and therefore access to such subordinate Courts may be lawfully abridged or made subject to the fulfilment of conditions imposed by law. Therefore, I cannot subscribe to the view that the right to file an appeal under [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 ought to be treated as an un-articulated right implicit for enjoyment of the Fundamental Rights.
14. A right of appeal is not a natural or inherent right attaching to every litigation and the right of appeal does not exist and cannot be assumed unless expressly given by statute (see Rangoon Botatung Co. Ltd, v. Collector. Rangoon, ([SECTION]03) 30 Ind App [SECTION]7 : ILR 40 Cal [SECTION], [PRECEDENT], , [PRECEDENT], . Therefore, the provision, viz., [SECTION] which conferred upon the petitioners right to prefer appeal against the Order disposing of their objection under [SECTION] of the [ACT], could be lawfully amended by inserting a provision imposing the above condition for deposit for entertaining their appeal.
15. The condition laid down by [SECTION] of the [ACT] is not something which is without any parallel. Both Mr. [ENTITY], learned advocate for the petitioner, and Mr. [ENTITY], learned advocate for the respondents, has drawn my attention to nearly similar provisions for deposit of disputed tax duty and rates contained in various other taxing, municipal and fiscal laws. Mr. [ENTITY], however, submitted that unless the appellate authority is given discretionary powers to relax or modify such condition for deposit of the disputed amount, the condition precedent ought to be pronounced as unreasonable. In my view, the observations made in para 40 of the Supreme Court decision in [PRECEDENT]. , are directly against the above submission of the petitioners. With reference to [SECTION] of the [ACT], the Supreme Court upheld the power of the legislature to impose similar condition for deposit while granting right of appeal. According to the Supreme Court, there was no legal or constitutional impediment to imposition of such a condition. I respectfully agree and apply the aforesaid observations in upholding the validity of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. I am unable to accept Mr. [ENTITY]'s submission, that, the Court's power under [SECTION] of the [ACT] to relax the condition for deposit the tax due had at all weighed with the Supreme Court in making the aforesaid observations in [PRECEDENT] (supra). The ratio of the said decision is that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and while granting the right of appeal the legislature can impose conditions for exercise of such right and there is no constitutional or legal impediment to imposition of such a condition for deposit of tax. The Supreme Court in their subsequent decision in the case of [PRECEDENT], , had followed their earlier decision in [PRECEDENT] (supra). The Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] (supra), had rejected similar argument that conditions imposed on right of appeal were onerous because no discretion had been given to the appellate or revisional authority to relax or waive the said condition in view of subjects for imposing such a condition.
16. The [SECTION] of the Act does not make the appellate provision under [SECTION] nugatory or illusory but by his own default to comply with the condition for deposit the appellant himself may fail to avail of the remedy by way of appeal under [SECTION] of the Act. A law cannot be declared unconstitutional because an alleged possibility which may occur in future. Therefore, I find no substance in the petitioner's apprehension that in a given case the consolidated rate determined according to the new valuation may be so high that it might be impossible for the appellant under [SECTION] to deposit the consolidated rate according to the said new valuation is not a relevant point for deciding the validity of the statute. It is presumed that the power to determine valuation and to assess consolidated rate would be reasonably exercised and in case said powers arbitrarily or capriciously exercised, the person aggrieved without availing of the remedy under [SECTION] of the Act, may seek redress in other appropriate forum.
17. It is also well settled that an appeal shall not operate as stay of the operation of the order appealed against, but in the absence of any provision to the contrary, the appellate Court may grant stay of the execution of the decree or order appealed against. [SECTION] clearly manifests such contrary intention and therefore unless the appellant deposits up to date consolidated rate payable by him according to new valuation, his appeal under [SECTION] cannot be entertained. I may also refer to the following observations of Sir [ENTITY], J. in Juscurn Boid v. Pirthichand Lal, ([SECTION][SECTION]) 46 Ind App 52 : ILR 46 Cal 670 (678-679) : (AIR [SECTION]18 PC 151), whatever be the theory, under the system of law under the Indian Law and procedure, an original decree or order is not suspended by presentation of an appeal. I may point out that only when the appellate decision is given, the trial Court's judgment or decree merges in the appellate judgment and decree. This theory of merger further does not override the concept that the filing of the appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but until it is reversed or modified, it remains effective. The person who makes an objection under [SECTION] of the [ACT] has been given right to pay according to the previous valuation pending disposal of the said objection (vide [SECTION] of the Act). I find nothing unreasonable when [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 enjoins that during pending of all appeals against an order disposing of an objection under [SECTION] of the Act, no further stay shall be granted of realization of consolidated rate payable on the valuation determined under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. As a condition for entertaining his appeal, the appellant must deposit such consolidated rate according to the valuation determined, subject to his right to obtain refund or adjustment under [SECTION] of the [ACT].
18. I also find no substance to the petitioners contention that [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 is repugnant to and inconsistent with the provisions of [SECTION] or any other provision of the [ACT], [SECTION]51. [SECTION] of the said Act, inter alia, provides that one-half of the consolidated rate shall be payable by the owner of the lands and buildings and the other half by the occupier thereof. The payment shall be made in quarterly instalments. The Commissioner under [SECTION] of the said Act has power to levy the entire consolidated rate from the owner of a land or building which is ordinarily occupied by more than one person holding in severally or is valued at less than Rs. 500/-. The provisions contained in [SECTION] of the [ACT] prescribe the different methods of recovery of consolidated rate and other taxes from the persons liable. Subject to the special provisions, the owner of a land or building is liable for the owner's share of consolidated rate and the balance half of the consolidated rate is payable by the occupier.
[SECTION]. [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 requires the "consolidated rate payable" ft, be deposited by the person who prefers an appeal under [SECTION] of the Act. Mr. [ENTITY]. learned advocate for the respondents, has rightly submitted that the Court should see to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the statute by endeavouring to harmonise and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. Often by considering the enactment in its entirety what appears to be on its face a conflict may be cleared up and the provisions reconciled (vide Crawfords' Statutory Construction, [SECTION]40, para 116, pages 262-263). After examining the relevant provisions of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 I find no inconsistency between them. The term "payable" has two meanings: (1) owing, and (2) payable at a particular point of time. In the context of [SECTION] of the [ACT], the expression "payable" obviously means the share of the consolidated rate payable by the person who prefers an appeal, i. e., owing and due from him. The expression "any person dissatisfied" in [SECTION] of the Act obviously includes both owner and the occupier of the land or building in respect Of which an order under [SECTION] of the Act has been passed. According to [SECTION], pre-condition for entertaining an appeal is that the appellant must deposit his share of the consolidated rate payable up to the date of the presentation on the valuation determined under [SECTION] or by the Court of Small Causes as the case might be and the appellant must also continue to deposit his share of the consolidated rate until his appeal is finally decided. In other words, [SECTION] does not create any new or additional liability for payment of consolidated rate by a person who prefers an appeal under [SECTION] of the Act, but requires the appellant to deposit up-to-date consolidated rate which he is liable to pay under [SECTION] or which might be otherwise lawfully recoverable from him under the provisions contained in [SECTION] of the Act. Thus, I conclude the expression "consolidated rate payable" in [SECTION] of the Act is identical with the amount which the appellant would be lawfully liable to pay under the other relevant provisions of the [ACT], [SECTION]51.
20. There is also no repugnancy between [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51. [SECTION] clearly indicates how the payment of consolidated rate shall be affected when an objection to a valuation has been made under [SECTION] of the Act In view of the opening words of [SECTION] "when an objection to a valuation has been made under [SECTION]", Mr. [ENTITY], learned advocate for the respondents, with some force has submitted that the other expression "pending final determination of the objection" means that up to the date of the disposal of such objection by an order passed under [SECTION], the objector would pay according to the consolidated rate according to the previous valuation. [SECTION] does not further indicate how payment of consolidated rate would be affected by filing an appeal under [SECTION] of the Act. [SECTION], as already stated, makes specific provisions in this behalf. It may be noted that Calcutta Municipal (3rd Amendment) Act, [SECTION]76 had inserted the words "or deposited" in Clause (a) of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Thus, [SECTION] of the [ACT] as may be appropriate, would be attracted after the challenge to the new valuation is finally disposed of either under [SECTION] or [SECTION] of the Act. When any sum has been, paid in excess, the same may be refunded or allowed to be set off against present or future demand of the Corporation. In case, pending disposal of objection under [SECTION] of the Act, the entire consolidated rate or a part thereof had not been paid, sum due shall be payable and recoverable according to the provisions of the [ACT]. On the other hand, if pending disposal of an appeal under [SECTION] of the Act the appellant had deposited consolidated rate at the figure determined under [SECTION] of the Act and by the appellate order, the valuation is reduced, any sum paid or deposited as consolidated rate in excess up to the date of the disposal of the appeal shall be liable to be refunded or set off against present or future demand of the Corporation. There is no basis for the petitioner's contention that such excess sums deposited under [SECTION] might become irrecoverable and the Corporation has been given an arbitrary power to decide whether the excess sum paid would be refunded or adjusted against its present or future demands. [SECTION] imposes a duty upon the Corporation and Mr. [ENTITY] himself has conceded that the person who has paid the excess sum has the choice whether he would claim refund or allow the excess sum to be adjusted against demands of the Corporation. The expression "demand" in [SECTION] obviously means demand of consolidated rate which could be lawfully made upon the person who has paid or deposits is entitled to refund or may allow the excess sum paid or deposited by him to be set off and adjusted against his liability for past or future demands by the Corporation. The expressions "presented"
and "presentation" used respectively in [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 have been obviously used in their ordinary meaning of "filing" or "instituting". The other expression "entertained" in the context of [SECTION] of the Act clearly carries a meaning different from that of the word "presented". In the context, the word "entertained" means "to admit for consideration". In other words, the said expression "entertained" in [SECTION] means to decide or to dispose of on merits. Unless an appellant complies with the conditions of [SECTION] of the Act, his appeal against an order under [SECTION] of the Act would not be decided on merits.
[SECTION]. I find no substance in the contention that [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 is unworkable and the person who intends to prefer an appeal under [SECTION] of the Act would be unable to comply with the condition mentioned in said [SECTION] of the Act because the Corporation itself may not calculate and enter into the record the consolidated rates payable according to the valuation fixed by an order disposing of an objection under [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51.
22. The Corporation under [SECTION] of the [ACT] imposes graduated consolidated rate on the annual valuation of all lands and buildings determined in the manner laid down in Chap. XI of the [ACT], [SECTION]51. The [SECTION] of the said Act specify the maximum limits of such graduated consolidated rate. Such percentages under [SECTION] of the Act are fitted annually. For assessment of lands and buildings to the consolidated rates, their annual values are determined in the prescribed manner. A general revision of valuation is made for successive periods of six years (vide [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51). The [SECTION] of the Act also specifies the cases in which intermediate revaluation can be made. [SECTION] of the Act confers a right to prefer objection within the prescribed time against valuation made under [SECTION] of the Act. Any person dissatisfied with an order disposing of his said objection filed under [SECTION] of the Act may appeal under [SECTION] of the Act to the Court of Small Causes having jurisdiction over the land on which the building is situated. Appeal from the decision of the Court of Small Causes lies to the High Court.
23. The annual valuations fixed arc entered in the Assessment Books kept under [SECTION] of the Act at the municipal office. The said Assessment Books under [SECTION], inter alia, also record the amount payable quarterly on account of the consolidated rate. The said Assessment Books are public documents and certified copies of the entries made in the said Books may be obtained by a person who intends to prefer an appeal under [SECTION] of the Act. Secondly, [SECTION], inter alia, provides that a copy of the order together with a copy of the reasons for the Order shall be sent by registered post to the person who gave the notice of objection under [SECTION] of the Act within a fortnight from the date of the order and the order shall also be supplied on an application made in this behalf accompanied by a fee of Re. 1/- to every owner and occupier of the building who is affected by the order. I have perused the original records of Municipal Appeal No. 141 of [SECTION]82 presented by the petitioners in the [ACT]. I find that the petitioners have annexed to their said Memorandum of Appeal a copy of the said order under [SECTION] of the Act served upon them. The said order is in Form No. 1 37A, para 137 of the Assessment Manual which is, however, not statutory. On the reverse side of the postcard quarterly rate in each share on the decided valuation has been mentioned. A copy of the said same has been kept with the records of this Rule.
24. Mr. [ENTITY], learned advocate for the respondent, has pointed out that the appellant had paid on his Memorandum of Appeal an ad valorem, court-fees on the difference between the previous valuation and the valuation fixed under [SECTION] of the Act. In this connection, Mr. [ENTITY] has drawn our attention to the decision of [ENTITY] and [ENTITY], JJ., in N. Dutta Majumdar v. Corporation of Calcutta, ([SECTION]56) 60 Cal WN [SECTION]4, which held that the notification published under [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]23, according to [SECTION] of the [ACT] shall have been made under [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51. Therefore, an appellant under [SECTION] of the Act has to pay court-fees on the amount of what would be payable as consolidated rate on the excess of valuation against which the appeal is preferred over the valuation which the appellant seeks to have substituted therefor Therefore, on the basis of the relevant law and also upon the facts of this case, J conclude that quarterly consolidated rate payable according to the valuation made under [SECTION] of the Act was known to the petitioners who have prima facie paid court-fees on their memo on the said basis. There is no substance in the submission that right of appeal under [SECTION] has been made dependent on the occurrence of an event which may take place in future or may not take place at all.
25. At one stage of his submission, Mr. [ENTITY] also submitted that when the West Bengal Legislature had enacted the Calcutta Municipal (3rd Amendment) Act, [SECTION]76, [SECTION] was still in force and [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 was void ab initio because the same unreasonably infringed the Fundamental Right of citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property. According to Mr. [ENTITY], by reason of the omission of Sub-clause (f) of Clause (1) of Article 39 of the [ACT] (44th Amendment) Act, [SECTION]78, the [SECTION] of the [ACT] did not revive and again become void. As I am of the view that the restrictions on the right of appeal imposed by [SECTION] of the [ACT] did not unreasonably infringe the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, it is not necessary for me to examine the further question whether omission of [SECTION] of the [ACT] (44th Amendment) Act, [SECTION]78, would result in reviving any post-constitutional law which at the date of its enactment was repugnant to [SECTION] of the [ACT].
26. For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that [SECTION] of the [ACT], [SECTION]51 is not arbitrary or unfair and therefore does not infringe [SECTION] of the [ACT]. The said provision is also not repugnant to or inconsistent with other provisions for payment and recovery of consolidated rates contained in the [ACT] The [SECTION] of the [ACT] does not make right of appeal under [SECTION] of the Act nugatory or illusory.
27. I accordingly discharge this Rule without any order as to costs.
28. Let the operation of this order be stayed for four weeks from date.