IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALAAT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN THURSDAY,THE 6TH DAY OF APRIL 2017/16TH CHAITHRA, 1939 OP (CAT).No. 67 of 2017 (Z) AGAINST THE ORDER IN OA 810/2013 of CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL,ERNAKULAM BENCH DATED 12-07-2016 PETITIONER(S): C.UNNIKRISHNAN, AGED 62 YEARS, S/O.C.GOVINDAN, JE/II/PW/TCR, CHANGUTHODI HOUSE, SRIKRISHNAPURAM, OTTAPALAM TALUK, PALAKKAD DISTRICT, PIN-679513. BY ADV. SRI.K.RAVI (PARIYARATH) RESPONDENTS: 1. UNION OF INDIA, REP. BY THE GENERAL MANAGER, SOUTHERN RAILWAY, PARK TOWN, CHENNAI. 2. THE SENIOR DIVISIONAL PERSONNEL OFFICER, SOUTHERN RAILWAY,PALAKKAD DIVISION, PALAKKAD DISTRICT. 3. THE SENIOR DIVISIONAL PERSONNEL OFFICER, SOUTHERN RAILWAY,TRIVANDRUM DIVISION, TRIVANDRUM. BY SRI.C.S.DIAS,SC, RAILWAYS ADV. SRI.P.K.RAMKUMAR, SC, RAILWAYS THIS OP (CAT) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 27.2.2017, THE COURT ON 6.4.2017 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: OP (CAT).No. 67 of 2017 (Z) APPENDIX PETITIONER(S)' EXHIBITS EXHIBIT P1- TRUE COPY OF [CASE NUMBER], PREFERRED AT THE INSTANCE OF HE PETITIONER BEFORE THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, ERNAKULAM DATED 31/07/2013. EXHIBIT P2- TRUE COPY OF MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION FILED AS M.A.910/2013 IN [CASE NUMBER], AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PETITIONER, BEFORE THE C.A.T. DATED 31/07/2013. EXHIBIT P3- TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY FILED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE RESPONDENT IN M.A.910/2013, IN [CASE NUMBER], BEFORE THE C.A.T. DATED 25/10/2013. EXHIBIT P4- TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY STATEMENT FILED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE RESPONDENTS 2 & 3 IN [CASE NUMBER], BEFORE THE HON'BLE KERALA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DATED 16/11/2016. EXHIBIT P5- TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE HON'BLE KERALA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL THIRUVANANTHAPURAM IN [CASE NUMBER], DATED 01/12/2016. RESPONDENT(S)' EXHIBITS: NIL TRUE COPY P.S. TO JUDGE dsn "CR" [ENTITY] & [ENTITY], JJ. [CASE NUMBER] DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF APRIL, 2017 JUDGMENT
[ENTITY], J.
This Original Petition arises out of the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench dated 12.7.2015 in [CASE NUMBER]. The petitioner, an ex-service man, who joined Southern Railways on 18.7.1990 as Permanent Way Inspector Grade III at Palakkad Division has filed the said O.A. seeking for an order to set aside [SECTION], [SECTION] and [SECTION] as arbitrary and illegal. He has also sought for an order directing the respondents to submit a report with regard to the action taken on his complaint with respect to the alleged attempt of sabotage and a declaration that he is entitled to all service benefits that a Railway employee is entitled at the time of superannuation; and a declaration that he is entitled to merge his Army service with the service he had in the Railways so as to make him eligible for full pension.
2. The O.A. was filed along with [CASE NUMBER], an application seeking condonation of delay of 2216 days in preferring the O.A. before the Tribunal.
3. The respondents filed Ext.P3 reply statement opposing the miscellaneous application for condonation of delay. They have also filed Ext.P4 reply statement opposing the reliefs sought for in the O.A.
4. After considering the pleadings and materials on record, the Tribunal by Ext.P5 order dated 12.7.2016 dismissed the O.A. on merits and on the ground of limitation as well.
5. Feeling aggrieved by Ext.P5 order of the Tribunal, the petitioner/applicant is before this Court in this O.A.
6. We heard the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner/applicant and also the learned Standing Counsel for Southern Railway representing the respondents.
7. Going by the pleadings and materials on record, the petitioner, who is an ex-service man, joined Southern Railway on 18.7.1990 as Permanent Way Inspector Grade III at Palakkad Division. On 28.7.1996, while working at Mannannur Yard the petitioner reported to the Divisional Railway Manager (Works), Palakkad that 7 trains including 4 express trains were sent without issuing caution orders through his caution spot. According to the petitioner, since the above said act is one touching the safety of the passengers and it amounts to a case of sabotage, the superior authorities ought to have enquired into it. Subsequent to the said complaint, he was transferred to Trivandrum Division and no enquiry whatsoever was conducted on the reported sabotage. Since the petitioner was unable to move to Trivandrum Division for personal reasons, he submitted resignation, which was not accepted by the authorities concerned. Thereafter, he joined duty at Trivandrum Division.
8. According to the petitioner, on account of ill-treatment from superiors as well as co-workers, he was forced to go on leave. Later, he submitted Annexure A1 application dated 11.7.2000 seeking extension of leave, which was followed by Annexure [SECTION] application dated 2.8.2000, citing reasons which compelled him from not rejoining duty. The leave sought for in [SECTION] and [SECTION] was not sanctioned. Resultantly, for unauthorised absence, the petitioner was served with Annexure A3 memo of charges dated 8.1.2001, to which he submitted Annexure A4 reply dated 8.2.2001. After conducting an enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted Annexure A5 report dated 28.6.2001.
9. On receipt of a copy of Annexure A5 enquiry report, the petitioner submitted Annexure [SECTION] reply dated 7.7.2001. After considering Annexure [SECTION] reply, the 3rd respondent issued Annexure A7 penalty advice dated 23.8.2001, by which the petitioner was imposed with a punishment of reduction of pay scale by three stages for a period of one year (non-recurring) with effect from 1.9.2001. Accordingly, the petitioner was informed that his pay of 5900 in the scale of 5000-8000 is reduced to 5450 (by three stages) for a period of one year (non-recurring) with effect from 1.9.2001. On receipt of Annexure A7 penalty advice, the petitioner submitted Annexure [SECTION] appeal dated 12.9.2001 before the Additional Divisional Railway Manager, Trivandrum who is the appellate authority. The appellate authority, vide Annexure A9 order dated 15.11.2001, confirmed the penalty in Annexure A7.
10. The petitioner filed Annexure A10 representation dated 24.6.2003 before the Chairman of Railway Board pointing out his grievances against the penalty imposed and also the inaction on the Railway officials in giving due weightage to his complaint regarding sabotage attempt by Station Masters. In the said representation, the petitioner has also pointed out that he is keeping himself away from duty on account of Railway safety. Annexure 10 representation was followed by Annexures A11, A12 and A13 representations dated 24.11.2003 submitted before the Minister of Railways, Prime Minister and President of India, respectively.
11. Alleging unauthorised absence with effect from 9.2.2001, the petitioner was issued with Annexure A14 memo of charges dated 12.8.2004. On receipt of Annexure A14, the petitioner submitted Annexure A15 reply dated 20.8.2004. After conducting an enquiry, the petitioner was issued with Annexure A16 penalty advice dated 25.2.2005 imposing a punishment of removal from service with effect from 2.3.2005. In Annexure A16, it was also ordered that the period of absence from 9.2.2001 will be treated as absence from duty.
12. On receipt of Annexure A16 penalty advice, the petitioner approached the appellate authority by submitting Annexure A17 appeal dated 15.3.2005. However the appellate authority by Annexure [SECTION] order dated 9.6.2005 confirmed the penalty imposed in Annexure A16. Against Annexure [SECTION] order passed by the appellate authority, the petitioner filed a revision petition dated 3.7.2005, which also ended in dismissal by Annexure [SECTION] order dated 7.12.2005 of the revisional authority. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted Annexure A19 review petition dated 15.10.2006 before the Divisional Railway Manager, Trivandrum.
13. As held by the Apex Court in Mahalingam R. v.
Chairman, TNPSC [(2013) 14 SCC 379] the scope of judicial review in matters involving challenge to the disciplinary action taken by the employer is very limited. The Courts are primarily concerned with the question whether the enquiry has been held by the competent authority in accordance with the prescribed procedure and whether the rules of natural justice have been followed. The Court can also consider whether there was some tangible evidence for proving the charge against the delinquent and such evidence reasonably supports the conclusions recorded by the competent authority. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was held in consonance with the prescribed procedure and the rules of natural justice and the conclusion recorded by the disciplinary authority is supported by some tangible evidence, then there is no scope for interference with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority to impose the particular punishment, except when the same is found to be wholly disproportionate to the misconduct found proved or shocks the conscience of the Court.
14. In [PRECEDENT] the Apex Court reiterated that, in disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under [SECTION] of the [ACT], shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (i) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (ii) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (iii) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (iv) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (v) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (vi) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (vii) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (viii) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; or (ix) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
15. In the decision in [PRECEDENT]'s case (supra), the Apex Court reiterated the settled law that, under [SECTION] of the [ACT], the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; or (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
16. As a Permanent Way Inspector the petitioner was in a supervisory capacity in the Permanent Way Section of the Engineering Department in Southern Railway. As a responsible official of that status, the petitioner was not supposed to stay away from duty without proper leave sanctioned by the competent authority in advance. A bare reading of Annuxure A1 would show that it is not even a proper leave application as it does not specify the period of leave applied for or the number of days of leave required. In Annexure A1 the petitioner has stated as follows;
"I am compelled to over stay the leave and until that I may please be exempted from works involving railway safety."
Annexure A1 was followed by Annexure [SECTION], in which the petitioner has stated as follows;
"I request your kind honour to sanction me leave until the problems (1) enquire into the sabotage matters and (2) provision of suitable railway accommodation are sorted out."
17. In [SECTION], [SECTION] and [SECTION] replies, the petitioner has admitted the fact that he absented himself from duty without the sanction of the competent authority in advance. In Annexure A4 the petitioner says 'I absented myself'; in Annexure [SECTION] he says 'I am absenting from duty'; and in Annexure [SECTION] he says 'I absented myself' and 'regularise my absence period'. In Ext.P5 order, the Tribunal found that, the documents from Annexures A1 to A9 to the extent of the charge of unauthorised absence from 10.7.2000 do not require a fresh look, since the petitioner has not challenged the penalty imposed vide Annexure A7 order of the disciplinary authority, which was confirmed by the appellate authority in Annexure A9 order.
18. In the O.A. filed before the Tribunal, the petitioner challenged [SECTION], [SECTION] and [SECTION] and sought for various reliefs. From the pleadings and materials on record, the Tribunal found that, the petitioner again absented himself from duty with effect from 9.2.2001, for which Annexure A14 memo of charges was issued on 12.8.2004, to which he submitted Annexure A15 reply. An enquiry was conducted and the enquiry report was sent to him on 12.11.2004. This was replied by him on 2.12.2004 giving no sound reasons for being away from duty for 4 years. The disciplinary authority, therefore, by Annexure A16 imposed the penalty of removal from service. The appeal filed by the petitioner was considered by the competent authority who confirmed the penalty imposed on him, by Annexure [SECTION] order. The revisional authority who considered the revision petition, had clearly remarked in Annexure [SECTION] order that, while probing the records and verifying the past service of the petitioner, it was found that he was not at all interested in working in the category for which he had applied for and got regularised, hence, the penalty was confirmed. After considering the materials on record, the Tribunal held that, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner is in relation to a charge of unauthorized absence for 4 years and cannot be taken leniently.
19. In [PRECEDENT] the Apex Court held that, remaining absent for a long time in public utility services cannot be said to be a minor misconduct, which cannot be treated lightly. Para.8 of the judgment reads thus;
"8. Remaining absent for a long time, in our opinion, cannot be said to be a minor misconduct. The appellant runs a fleet of buses. It is a statutory organisation. It has to provide public utility services. For running the buses, the service of the conductor is imperative. No employer running a fleet of buses can allow an employee to remain absent for a long time. The respondent had been given opportunities to resume his duties. Despite such notices, he remained absent. He was found not only to have remained absent for a period of more than three years, his leave records were seen and it was found that he remained unauthorisedly absent on several occasions. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the misconduct committed by the respondent herein has to be treated lightly."
20. In several decisions the Apex Court upheld the order of the disciplinary authority imposing the punishment of removal or dismissal of an employee on the ground of long absence or overstay of leave.
21. In [PRECEDENT] the appellant who was constable in Railway Protection Special Force left duty without leave being granted and returned after 25 days and then sought leave. The order of removal from service passed by the authorities was set aside by a learned Single Judge in a writ petition filed by the employee, directing that some punishment other than order of removal or dismissal or compulsory retirement from service may be passed. The Division Bench of the High Court restored the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the said judgment was affirmed by the Apex Court in appeal on the ground that the scope of interference with punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority is very limited and unless the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, the court cannot interfere with the same and the employee having failed to show any mitigating circumstances in his favour, the punishment awarded by the authorities could not be characterised as disproportionate or shocking.
22. In [PRECEDENT] the order of removal from service passed against the respondent, who was a constable in CRPF on the ground that he had overstayed his leave by 315 days was affirmed by the Apex Court reversing the decision of the High Court, by which it was held that the misconduct alleged called for a minor punishment and not a punishment of removal from service.
23. In [PRECEDENT] while upholding removal of an employee of the Cooperative Department who remained absent for about 3 years, the Apex Court held that, while considering the quantum of punishment, the role of administrative authority is primary and that of a court is secondary, confined to see if discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority caused extensive infringement of rights.
24. In [PRECEDENT] the Apex Court held that, in a case involving overstay of leave and absence from duty, granting time to join duty amounts to not only giving premium to indiscipline but is wholly subversive of the work culture in the organization. The Apex Court held further that, [SECTION] of the [ACT] lays down that it shall be the duty of every citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. This cannot be achieved unless the employees maintain discipline and devotion to duty. Courts should not pass such orders which instead of achieving the underlying spirit and objects of [SECTION] of the [ACT] has the tendency to negate or destroy the same.
25. In the instant case, the petitioner has not pointed out any procedural irregularity in the disciplinary proceeding initiated against him, which culminated in Annexure A16 penalty advice imposing the penalty of removal from service, which order was confirmed by the appellate and revisional authorities in Exts.[SECTION] and [SECTION] orders. At any rate, the misconduct of the petitioner in remaining absent for a long time in a public utility service cannot be said to be a minor misconduct. When the enquiry was held in consonance with the prescribed procedure and the rules of natural justice and the conclusion recorded by the disciplinary authority is supported by some tangible evidence, there is no scope for interference with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority to impose the particular punishment, except when the same is found to be wholly disproportionate to the misconduct found proved or shocks the conscience of the court. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot be found fault with in declining interference on the penalty imposed on the petitioner vide [SECTION], [SECTION] and [SECTION] orders. The reasoning of the Tribunal in this regard in Ext.P5 order is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting an interference of this court under [SECTION] of the [ACT].
26. In the O.A. the petitioner made a belated challenge against the punishment imposed vide [SECTION], [SECTION] and [SECTION] orders. The O.A. was filed along with [CASE NUMBER], an application seeking condonation of delay of 2216 days. The said application is supported by a medical certificate dated 30.5.2013 issued by Dr.[ENTITY], Ninan's Clinic, Mettupalayam Street, Palakkad-678 001 certifying that the petitioner is suffering from paranoid illness and is under her treatment from June, 2005. There is nothing in the said medical certificate or in the affidavit accompanying the application to satisfactorily explain the inordinate delay of 2216 days in filing the O.A.
27. [SECTION] of the [ACT] deals with limitation. [SECTION] of the Act provides that, the Tribunal shall not admit an application, in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in [SECTION] has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made. However, [SECTION] provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.
28. It is well settled that, the law of limitation is founded on public policy to ensure that the parties to a litigation do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek legal remedy without delay. In an application filed under [SECTION] of the Act, the Tribunal can condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown. Adopting a liberal approach in condoning the delay is one of the guiding principles, but such liberal approach cannot be equated with a licence to approach the Tribunal-at-will disregarding the time limit fixed in [SECTION] of the Act. The acts of negligence or inaction on the part of a litigant do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Therefore, in the matter of condonation of delay, sufficient cause is required to be shown thereby explaining the sequence of events and the circumstances that led to the delay. In the instant case, same is absent. The reason stated in the affidavit accompanying to [CASE NUMBER] is not at all a sufficient cause for condonation of the inordinate delay of 2216 days in filing the O.A.
29. A reading of the affidavit in support of [CASE NUMBER] would show that, the said affidavit has been drafted harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. Though, the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature in [SECTION] of the Act is adequately elastic to enable the Tribunal to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
30. In [PRECEDENT] the Apex Court while summarising the principles applicable while dealing with an application for condonation of delay under [SECTION] of the [ACT] has stated in categorical terms that, there is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days; for the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
31. In the instant case, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation offered by the petitioner for condonation of the inordinate delay of 2216 days, the Tribunal cannot be found fault with in rejecting the O.A. on the ground of delay as well. The reasoning of the Tribunal in this regard in Ext.P5 order is also neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting an interference of this court under [SECTION] of the [ACT].
32. It is trite law that, while testing the correctness or otherwise of an order passed by a Tribunal or any other quasi-judicial authority, in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the [ACT], this Court plays only a limited role. As has been repeatedly held by the Apex Court, the function of the High Court, in such proceeding is not appellate in nature and as such, finding of a fact arrived at by a Tribunal or a quasi-judicial authority cannot be interfered with upon re-appreciation of evidence. In such matters, the High Court is concerned with the determination of the question as to whether the Tribunal has or has not acted within the limits of its jurisdiction, or has acted in breach of the principles of natural justice in exercise of its jurisdiction, or whether the order of the Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority is vitiated by mala fides or perversity. In that view of the matter, it is not open to this Court, while exercising the writ jurisdiction under [SECTION] of the [ACT], to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine the correctness of Ext.P5 order of the Tribunal or decide the appropriate view to be taken or the order to be made.
In the result, the Original Petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
[ENTITY], JUDGE Sd/-
[ENTITY], JUDGE dsn True copy P.S. to Judge The words "[SECTION]" occurring in the third sentence in paragraph 27, in the second sentence in paragraph 28 and in the second sentence in paragraph 29 of the judgment dated 6.4.2017 in [CASE NUMBER] are corrected and substituted by the words "[SECTION]" as per order dated 24.5.2017 in [CASE NUMBER].
Registrar (Judicial)