:1: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 25th DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE B.VEERAPPA WRIT PETITION NO.109707/2015 (LR) BETWEEN: 1. DADIMA W/O ABDULMUNAFASAB TOTEGAR, AGE: 48 YEARS, R/O. NARASAPURA, ASHRAYA COLONOY, BETAGERI, GADAG DISTRICT. 2. BIBI JAN W/O IMAMSAB HANAGI AGE : 50 YEARS, R/O. HAMLAR FLAT BEHIND PANDURANGA VITTALA TEMPLE, KOPPAL, KOPPAL DISTRICT 3. FATHIMABI W/O KHAJASAB KINNAL AGE : 65 YEARS, R/O. AT VIVEKANANDA ROAD, 1ST CROSS, NEAR EIDGA COMPLEX, ASHRAYA COLONY, GADAG, GADAG DISTRICT. 4. RAJABI W/O SRI. BABUSAB KINNAL AGE : 60 YEARS, R/O AT VIVEKANANDA ROAD, 1ST CROSS, NEAR EIDGA COMPLEX, ASHRAYA COLONY, GADAG, GADAG DISTRICT :2: 5. KHAJABI W/O SRI.KHAJASAB SARDAR AGE : 62 YEARS, R/O AT SARADAR GALLI KOPPALA, KOPPALA DISTRICT. PETITIONERS (BY SRI. H N GULARADDI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE LAND TRIBUNAL KOPPAL, KOPPAL DISTRICT 2. MALLANA GOWDA S/O VEERANAGOWDA PATIL @ ADOOR R/O AT F.C.I. WEAR HOUSE OPP. PSI HOUSE KINNAL ROAD, KOPPAL KOPPALA DIST. 3. GANGAMMA W/O SHANKARAGOWDA PATIL @ ADOOR AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS R/O. AT NEAR HITTNAGIRANI KALIDAS NAGAR, KUSTAGI ROAD, KOPPAL, KOPPAL DISTRICT. 4. SHEKARAGOWDA S/O BASALINGANAGOWDA PATIL @ ADOOR C/O. AT TALUKA MINOR IRRIGATION DEPARTMENT, KUSTAGI, KUSTAGI TALUK KOPPAL DISTRICT. RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. K. VIDYAVATHI, AGA FOR R1) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH AND SET-ASIDE THE ORDER DATED:08.10.1976 BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-A. :3: THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING: ORDER
The petitioners, who are claiming to be the Legal Representatives of Smt. [ENTITY], the original owner of the property in question, filed the present writ petition challenging the order passed by the Land Tribunal dated 08.10.1976, as per Annexure-A.
2. It is the contention of the petitioners that, one late [ENTITY] has made an application for grant of occupancy rights in respect of 1 acre 10 guntas in Old Sy.No.261 of Koppal village, Koppal Taluk and District, subsequently resurveyed as Re- sy.No.205/A, measuring 3 acres 10 guntas and the original owner was in possession and enjoyment of the property in question. After the death of the original owner, the present petitioners were in possession and enjoyment of the said property. They further contended that, though [ENTITY], the father of respondents 3 and 4 never cultivated the land and he was not a tenant. In spite of the same, the Tribunal, without considering the material on record, proceeded to grant occupancy rights in favour of the father of the respondents 3 and 4 to an extent of 1 acre 10 guntas. Hence the petitioners are before this Court.
3. Sri. [ENTITY], learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal granting occupancy rights is arbitrary and contrary to law, and the late [ENTITY] never cultivated the land as tenant and no documents were produced before the Tribunal for granting of occupancy rights, and the material on record clearly discloses that the property belongs to the petitioners and they are in possession and enjoyment of the same and the impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal is without giving an opportunity to the petitioners and therefore, he sought to quash the impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal by allowing the writ petition.
4. Per contra, the learned AGA sought to justify the impugned order and contended that the very writ petition filed by the petitioners is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches and therefore, sought for dismissal of the writ petition.
5. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on record.
6. It is an admitted fact that the Tribunal granted occupancy rights in favour of one [ENTITY], the father of the respondents 3 and 4, as long back as on 08.10.1976 and the present writ petition is filed after a lapse of more than 39 years. Though an attempt is made in para 6 of the writ petition to explain the inordinate delay of 39 years, the explanation offered is not acceptable and there is no sufficient cause shown for the delay of 39 years. It is also not in dispute that, in terms of the order passed by the Land Tribunal, as long back as on 08.10.1976, the revenue entries are also in the name of the tenant from 1976. Till today, as could be seen from the RTC extract produced by the petitioners themselves.
7. In the absence of any sufficient reasons assigned in the writ petition for delay, the writ petition cannot be entertained at this stage, after lapse of nearly four decades, which will cause injustice to the tenant. On that ground alone, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
8. The Apex Court while considering the principle of law that 'delay defeats equity' in the case of [PRECEDENT] at para-17 has held as under:
"17. It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". Government Order was issued on 15.1.2002. Appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage. In [PRECEDENT], this Court held:
"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction."
9. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT] in the case of [PRECEDENT] at para 46 and 54 has held as under:
"46. Delay and laches is one of the factors that requires to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary power under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. In an appropriate case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his rights taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances"
"54. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under [SECTION] of the [ACT] is now well settled. They are:
(1) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts.
(2) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners.
(3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under [SECTION] is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy.
(4) No hard-and-fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts.
(5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay."
10. In view of the admitted fact of delay of 39 years and in view of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, stated supra, the petitioners have not made out any ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed mainly on the ground of delay and latches.
JUDGE gab