JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. This appeal is directed against an order dated December 16, 1998 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court, whereby and whereunder the writ application filed by the appellant herein was dismissed. The fact of the matter is as follows:
On November 11, 1983, a tripartite settlement was arrived at wherein it was provided that those who would opt for the existing system should be entitled to ad hoc increased pay of Rs. 56/- per month with effect from January 1, 1981 and those who would opt to retain the existing system of D.A. should also be entitled to one lumpsum amount of Rupees 1,000/-. It was further provided that there would be no revision in the existing pay nor they would be entitled to any benefit in their wages or total emoluments. The time for exercising such option under the settlement was November 30, 1983. By a notice dated November 27, 1983, the period of exercising option was extended till December 10, 1983. The appellants-writ-petitioners did not exercise their option and continued to enjoy the benefit of the settlement earmarked for those who did not opt for normative scale pay. By another notice dated January 1, 1984, the period of exercising option was further extended till January 8, 1984. The writ petitioners appellants however, did not avail for exercising such option. In the month of September 1984, a writ application being [CASE NUMBER] was filed by some employees challenging the settlement as not binding on them. However, the period of operation of the settlement dated November 11, 1983 expired on December 31, 1984 and consequent thereto on October 14, 1985 a fresh charter of demand was filed by the employees union. On March 18, 1988, a draft agreement was executed between the management and the Union which was made applicable to those who opted for normative pay scale. On October 7, 1988, a second tripartite agreement was arrived at wherein the draft agreement dated March 18, 1988 was incorporated. In the said tripartite settlement, which was made effective from January 1, 1985, it was mentioned that those who exercised option and did not have any legal impediment at the material time would be allowed to have the benefit of second tripartite settlement from January 1, 1985. The said second tripartite settlement was applicable in respect of the employees who were on normative scale of pay and were enjoying [PRECEDENT]. Since the writ petitioners appellants did not exercise for the tripartite settlement dated November 11, 1983, they would not be enjoying the normative AICPI pattern of D.A. On October 11, 1988, a writ application being [CASE NUMBER] was filed by some workmen including the writ petitioners appellants challenging the first tripartite settlement and the draft agreement dated March 18, 1988. The second tripartite settlement expired on December 31, 1989 and thereafter a fresh charter of demands have been filed by the Employees' Union, Employees Association and Diploma Engineering Association on August 21, 1990, December 4, 1990 and June 30, 1991 respectively. A writ application being [CASE NUMBER] was moved challenging the first tripartite settlement and notices dated November 27, 1983 and January 1, 1984 and by an order dated September 6, 1990, Justice [ENTITY] (as His Lordship then was) disposed of the said writ application holding that the petitioners were not entitled to any remedy under writ jurisdiction and the said order passed was without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner therein to raise dispute in appropriate forum, i.e. raising industrial dispute and the application under [SECTION] of the [ACT] was not contemplated by the order of the Hon'ble Court. The writ petitioners appellants approached the respondent company for converting their D.A. patterns to AICPI pattern of D.A. on December 14, 1990 and December 16, 1990 respectively. On May 5, 1991, the writ petitioners appellants gave undertaking to the effect that they would get their name expunged and should not file any further suit or dispute. On such undertaking given by the writ petitioners appellants, they were afforded normative scale of pay with effect from April 1, 1991. After having the normative scale on the basis of the undertaking the writ petitioners appellants, on December 9, 1992 filed an application under [SECTION] of the [ACT] claiming Rs. 60,000/- and Rs. 95,000/- respectively being the arrear on the basis of the wages for the period from January 1, 1981 and March 3, 1991. The learned Labour Court by an order dated March 8, 1994, held that the application was devoid of any merit and as such, the same was dismissed. Thereafter on June 27, 1994, the present writ application was moved by the writ petitioners appellants wherein the order impugned has been passed.
2. The learned trial Judge upon consideration of the rival contentions raised before it and having regard to various decisions of the Apex Court framed two questions namely (1) whether the proceeding under [SECTION] of the [ACT] is maintainable for the purpose of adjudication as to the entitlement to the claim of the petitioners for such normative pay scale with effect from January 1, 1981 and (2) whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of money claim for arrears salaries and other dues on the basis of normative pay scale for the period from January 1, 1981 to March 31, 1991.
3. As regards the first issue, the learned trial Judge held, "But the issue in this proceedings is whether the benefit of such normative scale of pay, which however, was not denied to the petitioners should have the effect from the date as per the aforesaid tripartite settlements. The benefit therefore claimed in the proceeding under [SECTION] of the said Act is incidental to the entitlement of normative pay scale. Therefore, it cannot be said that the proceedings is altogether beyond the scope of [SECTION] of the said Act." However, as regards second issue, it was held, "As the allegations that the petitioners withdrew from the pending writ petition under duress and there was an assurance in this regard by the Respondent/Company were not established so the grant of such normative pay scale to the petitioners on and from April 1, 1991 with notional fixation from January 1, 1981 pursuant to the written undertaking of the petitioners was in substance a modification, alteration and/or a variation of the terms of the tripartite settlement as agreed between the petitioners workmen and the respondent company. The petitioners having thus agreed to such fixation of normative pay scale from any suitable date as deemed fit by the respondent company, the grant of such pay scale with effect from April 1, 1991 in respect of the petitioners was therefore pursuant to an agreement in modification of the tripartite settlement between the petitioners and the respondent/company as above and therefore, there is little scope for commanding the respondent/company to give effect to such normative pay scale with effect from the date as stipulated in the tripartite settlement dated November 11, 1983."
4. The learned trial Judge in view of the aforementioned findings upheld the order of the Labour Court dismissing the application of the writ petitioners-appellant claiming benefit of arrear salaries and other dues for the period from January 1, 1981 to March 31, 1991.
5. The moot question which falls for consideration is as to whether the applicants herein could in a proceeding under [SECTION] of the [ACT], question the validity or legality of the undertakings dated December 14, 1990 and December 16, 1990. If by reason of an undertaking given to the employer the appellants-writ petitioners had given up all their claims, in our opinion, the question as to whether they can fall back upon settlement despite the same would be a question which would be incidental to the right of the enforcement of the claim of the workmen, but the same would give rise to the question as to whether the appellants-writ-petitioners would be entitled thereto and as such can enforce their claims in terms of the provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. There cannot be any doubt that [SECTION] of the [ACT] operates within a narrow compass.
It reads thus:
"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government (within a period not exceeding three months);
Provided that where the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit."
6. The question as to what should be the interpretation of the word, "entitlement" had fallen for consideration before the Apex Court in [PRECEDENT], [PRECEDENT] , [PRECEDENT] , Chief Supdt., [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT] . A Division Bench of this Court of which one of us is a member in [PRECEDENT], by a judgment passed in Appeal from [CASE NUMBER] disposed of on April 26, 1999 relying on or on the basis of the aforementioned decisions held in [PRECEDENT]:
"28. Even assuming that the appellant did not raise the said question in the proceedings before the Labour Court, the writ application was maintainable at the instance of the appellant if it could be shown that on the basis of the materials placed before the Labour Court itself, no application under [SECTION] was maintainable. The learned Labour Court could not have thrust upon itself a jurisdiction which it did not have on the basis of the averments made in the application filed by the respondent No. 3 or on the basis of the materials produced before it. In any event, as is evident from the order passed by the Labour Court itself that such a question had been raised".
29. It is not disputed that an application under [SECTION] of the [ACT] would be maintainable provided the same is based upon a pre-existing right. A proceeding under [SECTION] is in the nature of execution proceeding. Where rights and obligations of the parties are required to be adjudicated upon, an industrial dispute has to be raised and such rights and obligations of the parties cannot be adjudicated in a proceeding under [SECTION] of the Act."
7. Whether the appellants herein had given the aforementioned undertakings either on misrepresentation or otherwise would itself be a question, the answer whereof would give rise to their entitlement to enforce the same. The right of the appellants-petitioners to claim benefit of the arrear salaries and other dues for the period from January 1, 1981 to March 31, 1991 could not be adjudicated, in the facts and circumstances of this case, in a proceeding under [SECTION] of the [ACT].
8. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the appellants' application under [SECTION] of the [ACT] as also the writ application have rightly been dismissed.
9. This appeal, therefore, being devoid of any merit is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.
10. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order if applied for may be given on priority basis.
[ENTITY], J.
11. I agree.