HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D. B. Criminal Appeal No. 32/1985 [ENTITY] through Public Prosecutor.
Appellant Versus
1. [ENTITY] son of Narain Singh by Caste Rajput, resident of Gram Chandlai, Police Station Chaksu, District Jaipur.
2. [ENTITY] son of Madho Singh, Masalchi, Niroj Hotel, Jaipur.
3. [ENTITY] son of Abdul Sattar, by Caste Musalman, resident of Khajano Walon Ka Rasta
4. [ENTITY] son of Narain Lal by Caste Brahmin, resident of Bala Nandji Ka Mandir, Jaipur.
Accused-Respondents For Appellants : Mr. [ENTITY], Public Prosecutor.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. [ENTITY] Mr. [ENTITY] on behalf of Mr. [ENTITY].
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SABINA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NARENDRA SINGH DHADDHA Judgment 18/12/2019 Appellant State has filed this appeal challenging judgment/order dated 17.12.1982 passed by the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Trial Court'), whereby, respondents were acquitted of the charges framed against them under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of [ACT] (hereinafter referred to as '[ACT]').
Learned State counsel has submitted that Respondent No. 1 had died during pendency of the appeal.
Hence, appeal qua Respondent No. 1 stands abated and is disposed of accordingly.
(2 of 4) [[CASE NUMBER]] Prosecution story, in brief, is that on 07.09.1980 at about 12.00 mid night, complainant reached the staff room after completing his duty. His colleagues namely, [ENTITY], [ENTITY], [ENTITY], [ENTITY], [ENTITY] and [ENTITY] were also present in the room. At that time one car bearing No. RST 258 came there. Three persons got down from the car and entered the room. One person was wearing a police uniform. Said persons started giving beatings to them after closing the door. The person, who was in police uniform, was armed with a stick. Then, the said persons took away, in all, Rs. 917/- from the complainant and his companions.
After completion of investigation and necessary formalities, challan was presented against the respondents and their co-accused [ENTITY].
Trial Court vide impugned judgment/order dated 17.12.1982 ordered acquittal of the respondents. Hence, present appeal by the State.
[ENTITY] died during trial, whereas, Respondent No. 1 had died during penency of this appeal.
We have heard learned State counsel and learned counsel for Respondents No. 2 to 4 and have gone through the record available on the file carefully.
So far as prosecution case is concerned, the same rests on the statement of the complainant, P.W.11 [ENTITY] and P.W.17 [ENTITY]. Learned Trial Court, while ordering acquittal of the respondents, has held that no reliance could be placed on the identification parade conducted during investigation to establish the identity of the accused. Accused as well as the witnesses, who were (3 of 4) [[CASE NUMBER]] to identify the accused, had been taken by the police to jail at 3.30 P.M. It has also been noticed by the Trial Court that the specific identification marks of the accused, which were noticeable, had not been mentioned by the witnesses. At the time of identification parade, as per the witnesses, police was present there. All the witnesses were present together at the time of identification parade.
A perusal of Exhibit P-2 recovery memo reveals that the uniform recovered from accused [ENTITY] was of Rajasthan Home Guard. One stick was also recovered at his instance. Recovery of Rs. 583/- was effected from [ENTITY], as is evident from Exhibit P-
15. Thus, in the present case, no recovery was effected from Respondent No. 2 to 4. Recovery of part of the looted amount was effected from accused [ENTITY], who has since died.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT], has held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one which favours the accused, has to be adopted by the Court.
Similarly, in [PRECEDENT], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after looking into various judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under:
"It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power (4 of 4) [[CASE NUMBER]] and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons", for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed"
After carefully going through the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Trial Court, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is a possible view.
Hence, no ground for interference by this court is made out.
Dismissed.
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