[CASE NUMBER] [ 1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of decision: March 02 ,2009 [CASE NUMBER] [ENTITY] and others Appellants. v. [ENTITY] and another Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BINDAL Present: Mr. [ENTITY], Advocate for the appellants.
Mr. BBS Teji, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab for the State.
[ENTITY] J.
The land owners are in appeal against the award of the learned court below, whereby the reference petition filed by them was dismissed as time-barred.
Briefly, the facts are that vide notification dated 21.2.2000, issued under [SECTION] of the [ACT] (for short, `the Act'), [ENTITY] acquired 934.81 acres of land situated in village Sohana for setting up of residential urban estate in the revenue estate of Sohana, Tehsil Mohali, District Ropar. The same was followed by notification dated 2.2.2001 issued under [SECTION] of the Act. The Land Acquisition Collector (for short, `the Collector') vide award No. 481 dated 17.5.2001, determined the market value at Rs. 10,00,000/- per acre for the area falling on the north side of Chandigarh Landran road (upto the depth of one acre) and the area falling on the left side of Chandigarh-Landran road (upto the depth of one acre) and the land touching existing Sectors 66-69 (upto the depth of one acre); Rs. 9,00,000/- per acre for chahi land and Rs. 7,50,000/- per acre for barani land. The appellants/land owners filed objections to the award which were dismissed by the learned court below as time barred.
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the impugned award passed by the learned court below, whereby the reference petition filed by them was dismissed as beyond limitation is not in conformity with law, as nothing could be pointed out on record by the respondents that the appellants were either present at the time of pronouncement of award or any intimation of the award was given to them. Once that is not there, in terms of the provisions of [SECTION] of the Act, the reference of the appellants could not be dismissed as time barred. He [CASE NUMBER] [ 2] further submitted that the Reference Court in fact did not have the jurisdiction to dismiss the reference as time barred. Once the reference is made to it, the same was required to be answered on merits, as the issue referred to the learned court was only with regard to the fair value of the acquired land and not as to whether the reference was within limitation or not. Reliance was placed upon State of Uttar Pradesh through the [PRECEDENT]; [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT].
Learned counsel for the State submitted that no illegality has been committed by the learned court below in dismissing the reference filed by the appellants as the same was time barred. The onus to show that the reference was within limitation was on the appellants, who could not prove that. The learned court below could very well go into the issue as to whether the reference was time barred or not.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Before the facts of the present case are considered, I deem it appropriate to discuss the legal position on the issue.
In [PRECEDENT]'s case (supra), this Court, while considering an identical issue, opined as under:
" After giving my thoughtful consideration to the entire matter, I am of the view that the submission of Mr. [ENTITY] merits acceptance. In view of the conceded position of the parties that no notice from the Collector was ever received either by the appellant or his father under [SECTION] of the Act, the first part of the proviso in [SECTION] would not apply. The words "in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under [SECTION], [SECTION]" i.e. the first part of the proviso in [SECTION] would only come into play in those cases where the notice has been received by a claimant from the Collector under [SECTION] of the Act. Since no notice was ever sent, the question of applicability of first part of the provision contained in [SECTION] stands ruled out. Once it is held that the first part of the proviso in [SECTION] of the Act is inapplicable, a claimant can seek reference under [SECTION] of the Act within six months from the date of the Collector's award. As regards the expiry of six months in the second part of [SECTION] of the Act, the court of law cannot give a literal and [CASE NUMBER] [ 3] mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of the Collector's award" occurring in the second part of [SECTION] of the proviso. In other words, in these circumstance it has to be held that limitation of six months would start running from the date of the knowledge of the award which was acquired by the claimant a knowledge either actual or constructive. In my opinion this is the only interpretation of [SECTION] of the Act. In support of the view which I have taken, I am fortified by the ratio laid down in [ENTITY] v. Mst. [PRECEDENT], AIR 1963 SC 1604. In Mst. [PRECEDENT]'s case (supra) the precise facts of the case were that the Collector made the award on Oct. 25, 1953 and the application for reference was made on Sept. 30,1955. The claimants in Mst. [PRECEDENT]'s case (supra) came to acquire knowledge of the award on July 22, 1955 and this was the date fixed by the court as regards the date of knowledge was concerned in the reported case before the Supreme Court. The application for reference was held to be within time by holding that knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that the award has been made. It was held by the Apex Court that knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award and that such contents may be either known actually or constructively. The following observations of the Apex Court may be reproduced with advantage:
" Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award.
These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under [SECTION] of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award.
If the findings recorded by the learned court below in the impugned [CASE NUMBER] [ 4] award are considered in the light of enunciation of law, as referred to above, the only conclusion is that the objections filed by the appellants in the present case were within limitation. It has been opined by this Court in the aforesaid case that limitation under [SECTION] of the Act is to be counted from the date of knowledge of the award which can either be actual or constructive. In the present case, in paragraph 17 of the impugned award, the learned court below has recorded the following findings:
"It does not show that the award in question was passed by the Collector in the presence of the claimants. There is nothing on the file to show that the notice envisaged in [SECTION], [SECTION] of the [ACT] was also served upon the claimants."
While recording the aforesaid findings, the learned court below committed illegality by holding that period of limitation is to be counted as six months from the date of award, whereas it had to be from the date the claimants- landowners acquired knowledge of the award.
For the reasons mentioned above, the findings of the learned court below that the objections filed by the appellants were beyond time are set aside and it is held that the same were within limitation.
As the learned court below had dismissed the reference considering the same to be time barred, the value of the acquired land was not determined in consonance with the award pertaining to the acquired land of other land owners. This Court in [CASE NUMBER] -[PRECEDENT] v. [ENTITY] and another, decided on 2.3.2009 has considered the issue of determination of fair value of the land acquired vide same notification. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in [PRECEDENT]'s case (supra), even the land owned by the appellants in the present case is also assessed in the same terms.
The appeal is disposed of in the manner indicated above.
([ENTITY]) Judge March 02, 2009 mk