HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Reserved Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER DEFECTIVE No. - 480 of 2013 Petitioner :- The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Respondent :- Smt. [ENTITY] And 4 Ors. Petitioner Counsel :- [ENTITY] Respondent Counsel :- [ENTITY] Hon'ble [ENTITY], J.
Heard Sri [ENTITY], learned counsel for the appellant and Sri [ENTITY], appearing on behalf of the respondents.
This is an Appeal by the insurer of Bolero Jeep, bearing registration number, UP-55-F-5051, under [SECTION] of the [ACT].
The undisputed facts of the case are that [ENTITY], son of [ENTITY], was the Driver of the Bolero Jeep, bearing registration number UP-55-F-5051. The said vehicle met with an accident on 29th August, 2010 in which [ENTITY] died while he was on duty in the course of his employment. The Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation awarded Rs.4,72,320/= towards compensation alongwith interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of accident.
Learned counsel for the appellant is not able to demonstrate that the compensation awarded by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation is unjustified, however, he submitted that the interest from the date of accident is wholly unjustified. He submitted that under [SECTION] of the Act, the interest is to be awarded from the date, the compensation fell due. The word 'fell due' has been interpreted by the Apex Court in the cases of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. [ENTITY] and another, reported in 2009 (3) TAC 598 (SC), National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. [ENTITY] and another, reported in 2007 (2) TAC 3 (SC) and [ENTITY] vs. Divisional Controller, reported in NEKRTC wherein it has been held that the word 'fell due' is the date when the adjudication order is being passed.
I do not find substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant.
In [ENTITY]'s case it was held that the crucial expression being 'falls due' so unless the claim of the concerned workmen is adjudicated, question of an amount falling due does not arise. In [ENTITY]'s case (supra) it was observed that 'compensation u/[SECTION] of [ACT] is to be paid as soon as it falls due and in case of default in payment of the compensation due under the Act within one month from the date when it falls due, the Commissioner would be entitled to direct payment of simple on the amount of arrears @ 12 per annum or at such higher rates which do not exceed the maximum lending rates of any scheduled Bank as may be specified by the Central Government.' All these cases have been decided by a division bench of Apex Court consisting of two Hon'ble Judges.
On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of [ENTITY] Vs. Shrinivas Sabata and another, reported in AIR 1976 SC 222 and [PRECEDENT]. to support his contention that the interest under the award is to be paid to claimants from the date of accident and not from the date of award.
On perusal of the case-laws referred, hereinabove, by the learned counsel for the appellant, I would like to say that the case of [ENTITY] (supra), which was decided by the Bench consisting of Four Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Court, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-7 has observed as under:
"[SECTION] of the Act deals with the employer's liability for compensation. Sub-section (1) of that section provides that the employer shall be liable to pay compensation if 'personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out and in the course of his employment. It was not the case of the employer that the right to compensation was taken away under [SECTION] because of a suit in a civil court for damages, in respect of the injury against the employer or any other person. The employer therefore became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of an in the course of the employment. It is therefore futile to contend that the compensation did not fall due until after the Commissioner's order dated May 6, 1969 under [SECTION]. What the section provides if that if any question arises in any proceeding under the Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation or as to the amount or duration of the compensation it shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. There is therefore nothing to justify the argument that the employer's liability to pay compensation under [SECTION], in respect of the injury, was suspended until after the settlement contemplated by [SECTION]. The appellant was thus liable to pay compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury ws caused to the appellant, and there is no justification for the arguments to the contrary."
Following the principles of law laid down in the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Court in paras-11 and 12 in the case of [PRECEDENT] has observed as under:
"11. The decisions in [ENTITY] was by a four Judges Bench and in [ENTITY] by a three Judges Bench of this Court. Both the decisions were, thus, fully binding on the Court in [ENTITY] and [ENTITY], each of which was heard by two Judges. But, the earlier decisions in [ENTITY] and [ENTITY] were not brought to the notice of the Court in the two later decisions in [ENTITY] and [ENTITY].
12. In light of the decisions in [ENTITY] and [ENTITY], it is not open to contend that the payment of compensation would fall due only after the Commissioner's order or with reference to the date on which the claim application is made. The decisions in [ENTITY] and [ENTITY] insofar as they took a contrary view to the earlier decisions in [ENTITY] and [ENTITY] do not express the correct view and do not make binding precedents."
The case of [PRECEDENT] [ENTITY] K, reported in [PRECEDENT] came before the Court after amendments were introduced in the Act by [ACT] and a Bench of Apex Court consisting Three Hon'ble Judges followed the ratio given in [ENTITY] (supra). I, therefore, find that the case-law referred by the learned counsel for the appellant stood specifically over-ruled by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case, thus, it has no binding effect. Therefore, the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner in awarding interest @ 12% per annum to the respective claimant from the date of accident cannot be said to be erroneous.
In view of the discussions made above, the Appeal has no substance and it is, accordingly, dismissed.
Order Date :-15.4.2013/bgs/