JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. These four writ applications involving common question of law and fact were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The petitioner, Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, West Bengal, being aggrieved by the orders dated December 8, 1999, December 16, 1999 and December 17, 1999 passed by the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal has filed these writ applications.
3. The fact of the matter, in short, is as follows :
On November 24, 1999 four trucks carrying 36,000 kgs. amulya milk powder and 750 kgs. of skimmed milk powder were intercepted at Chichira Check-post and detained by Commercial Tax Officer, Chichira Check-post Under [SECTION] of the [ACT] (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act") on the ground that the officer concerned had reason to believe that the said goods were being transported in contravention thereof. On November 27, 1999 a penalty proceeding was initiated by the authorities by issuing an appropriate notice. The transporter however, filed an application for release of the said goods questioning the seizure thereof in terms of [SECTION] of the [ACT], on December 8, 1999, whereupon the learned Tribunal directed that the goods as also the documents be released within 24 hours. According to Mr. [ENTITY], the said order had been passed without asking the petitioner herein to file an affidavit in support of his case and/or without giving an opportunity of hearing. On the said date, however, the matter was disposed of finally. Allegedly, in the evening of December 8, 1999, in response to a fax message sent by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Government of Gujarat, with a copy to the Gujarat Trading Company, who was the alleged consignor, it was reported by one Gujarat Industrial Corporation, whose fax number and the fax number of Gujarat Trading Company are the same, that the latter had no concern with the goods in question.
4. Upon receiving the said information, the Commercial Tax Officer, Chichira Check Post, lodged a compliant to the Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation as to the commission of offence Under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. On December 9, 1999 a formal first information report was recorded and the goods were seized by the police and the drivers of the trucks were arrested. The drivers were produced before the learned Magistrate on December 10, 1999 and were released on bail. The seizure was also reported to the learned Magistrate. However, on December 10, 1999 upon oral mentioning about the alleged inaction on the part of the concerned respondents in not complying with the order of the learned Tribunal dated December 8, 1999, upon considering the submissions of both the parties, it was directed :
"Considered the contentions of the sides. It does not appear to us that we have any jurisdiction in interfering with the criminal investigation initiated by the police for commission of any criminal offence. However, for making a detailed submission before us, Mrs. [ENTITY] prays for time till December 13, 1999. Accordingly, fix December 13, 1999 for further orders."
5. The matter was again heard on December 15, 1999 and December 16, 1999. By an order dated December 16, 1999, the learned Tribunal, inter alia, arrived at the following findings :
"Therefore, if it is found, as we will presently see, that the act of initiating a criminal proceeding is a play just to frustrate the order of this Tribunal, this Tribunal has and shall exercise jurisdiction to see that the order of this Tribunal is meaningfully honoured and not nullified by a sham criminal prosecution. Thirdly, this Court is exercising jurisdiction akin to writ jurisdiction exercisable Under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. It is true such jurisdiction of this Tribunal is confined to the State Acts as may be specified Under [SECTION] of the [ACT], but this jurisdiction is also extended to the matters connected with such Acts or incidental thereto. [ACT] is one such Act. Therefore, when it is found that an executive authority frustrates the effectiveness of an order under the cover of a sham plea of ouster of jurisdiction, this Tribunal may exercise the writ jurisdiction for an appropriate reason mandating such executive authority to meaningfully honour the order."
6. It further held that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in [ENTITY]'s case as the Tribunal is a writ court at the first instance, it has jurisdiction to see that the executive authority should not frustrate the effectiveness of its order, and for that purpose has resorted to the process of initiating a criminal proceeding with regard whereto it had competence to interfere to the required extent. The Tribunal, however, did not direct disruption of the trial so as to attract the provision of [SECTION] of the 1987 Act, whereby the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to try criminal offences is ousted. As regards the merits, it was found that the subsequent seizure purported to be on the basis of the aforementioned fax message received from Gujarat Industrial Corporation cannot be a ground for subsequent seizure. The Tribunal recorded :
"It is deplorable that the Revenue should take shelter of initiation of a criminal proceeding in order to defeat the order of this Tribunal. The entire jurisdiction of this Tribunal will be in jeopardy if the sales tax authorities concerned are permitted to flout the order of this Tribunal in that manner because in that event justice will be reduced to a mockery. If this propensity is allowed to go unhampered, every order of this Tribunal release of goods or of the like nature can be frustrated by initiating a criminal proceeding for setting up the plea of ouster of jurisdiction of this Tribunal and thereby to render the orders of the court to virtual nullity. In such a case this Tribunal cannot remain a mute spectator. Whether the action taken amounts to contempt of the order of this Tribunal by those officials who have indulged in such activities and whether for matter it should be referred to the honourable Supreme Court for a contempt proceeding is a matter we are not considering immediately. But we keep it reserved for the time being to consider in future depending upon the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the order of this Tribunal has been flouted by short circuiting the entire judicial process by setting up a plea of initiation of a criminal proceeding. Such activity is sure to destroy the very fabric of discipline in the justice delivery system. Therefore, without further indulging in the details of the matter we hope that the Revenue will act in a reasonable manner and make amends of the wrong done already. We, therefore, direct that the goods seized in the name of initiation of a criminal proceeding shall be released, we repeat, shall be released immediately by the authority/authorities, after retaining sample, if necessary. We are keeping these matters pending till tomorrow to watch the development. The learned State Representatives present in the court shall bring the purport of this order to the notice of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, and the Bureau of Investigation for compliance."
7. Mr. [ENTITY], learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, inter alia, submitted that the impugned orders are wholly illegal and without jurisdiction in so far as the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to direct release of seized articles in connection with a criminal case. It was further submitted that the learned Tribunal had no jurisdiction to invoke its incidental power after disposal of a proceeding. In any event, it was submitted that such an order could not have been passed on oral application.
8. Mrs. [ENTITY], learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that in the instant case, [SECTION] of the [ACT] has to be given a wide meaning, inasmuch as, the Bureau of Investigation to whom the complaint and/or first information report was made, being itself a creature in terms of 1994 Act, the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the matter. [SECTION] of the [ACT], reads thus :
"6. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Tribunal shall exercise, with effect from such date as may be specified by the State Government by notification in this behalf, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts including the High Court but excluding the Supreme Court of India for adjudication or trial of disputes or complaints or offences with respect to all matters of levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax under any specified State Act and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto :
Provided that where the matter relates to disposal of question of constitutional validity of any provision of any specified State Act, the matter shall be decided by a Bench constituted of at least three Members of which the Chairman shall be one.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act, all proceedings triable by any Court or Courts in accordance with the provisions of the [ACT], shall continue to be tried by such court, and the Tribunal, shall have no jurisdiction to try such proceedings."
9. The Tribunal, although exercises a wide power, but it being a creature of a statute, although framed by the State in exercise of its power Under [SECTION] of the [ACT], must exercise its jurisdiction within the four corners of the statute. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal as is evident from [SECTION] of the Act must be exercised in terms of the notification issued by the State. Such notification can be issued only in respect of matters relating to levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax under any specified State Act and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. [SECTION] clearly ousts the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to deal with any proceeding triable by any court or courts in accordance with the provisions of the [ACT]. It is not in dispute that the stand of the petitioner herein was that in terms of the order passed by the Tribunal on December 8, 1999, goods were released and the said goods were seized again and the drivers were arrested pursuant to the F.I.R. lodged on December 9, 1999. Thus, according to the petitioner herein, a fresh cause of action had arisen. It has also not been disputed that the matter relating to seizure has been reported to the Magistrate. The drivers who were arrested had also been produced before the Magistrate and they have been released on bail. It is further not in dispute that on December 10, 1999, only an oral prayer was made. No application was filed either invoking the original jurisdiction of the Tribunal or its contempt jurisdiction. The Tribunal was thus not in seisin of the matter on December 10, 1999, it having finally disposed of the matter on December 8, 1999 itself. It is a well-settled principles of law that after a matter is finally disposed of, a court or a Tribunal becomes functus officio, and thus, it, in absence of any specific power conferred upon it in this regard, cannot exercise any jurisdiction, far less any jurisdiction incidental to the power conferred upon it under [SECTION] of the Act. Such an incidental power, as is well-known, must be exercised, as an adjunct of the main matter in a proceeding pending before it, and not after a proceeding has been disposed of. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, committed a grave error in holding that its order could not have been nullified by a sham criminal prosecution. The question as to whether a criminal proceeding is a sham one, or not, was beyond the purview of the scope of [SECTION] of the Act. The Tribunal immediately realised its mistake by observing that it had no jurisdiction in view of the ouster clause contained in [SECTION] of the Act in relation to matters over which courts exercise jurisdiction under the [ACT]. The aforementioned findings are absolutely contradictory in nature. Only a court which has taken cognizance of the seizure is competent to release goods and/or vehicles in exercise of its power Under [SECTION] of the [ACT], and thus, as the said power was to be exercised by a Magistrate having jurisdiction to deal therewith under the provision of the [ACT], in terms of [SECTION] of the [ACT], its jurisdiction was expressly ousted. It is a well-settled principles of law that even a right decision taken by a court or Tribunal having no jurisdiction would become coram non judice (See [PRECEDENT] ). In our opinion, the Tribunal also committed a grave error in issuing the impugned direction after disposal of the main matter, which it could not have done even on the basis of a miscellaneous application. ([PRECEDENT], ).
10. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the impugned orders cannot be sustained, we, however, make it clear we do not want to interfere with that part of the order dated December 8, 1999 whereby and whereunder the goods were directed to be released by the learned Tribunal, in asmuch as, the said order, according to the petitioner himself, has already been complied with. The impugned order cannot be said to have been passed also in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction of the Tribunal, inasmuch as, the same does not conform to the requirement of [SECTION] of the [ACT].
11. For the reasons aforementioned, we quash the order dated December 16, 1999 and consequently the consequent order dated December 17, 1999. This order shall not, however, preclude the respondent herein to move the appropriate criminal court for release of the goods and the vehicles and/ or for any further order.
12. Liberty is given to the learned counsel for the parties to take gist of the order and communicate the same to the authorities concerned.
13. Xerox certified copy of the order be supplied on priority basis.
[ENTITY], J.
14. I agree.