[CASE NUMBER] ORDER IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18589 of 2016 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18514 of 2016 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18588 of 2016 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18590 of 2016 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18592 of 2016 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18593 of 2016 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18595 of 2016 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18695 of 2016 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18696 of 2016 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18697 of 2016 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18704 of 2016 THE [ENTITY]. Versus [ENTITY] Appearance: MR [ENTITY]) for the PETITIONER(s) No. 1 DS AFF.NOT FILED (N)(11) for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 2 [ENTITY]) for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 1 NOTICE SERVED BY DS(5) for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 2 CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE [ENTITY] Date : 26/04/2018 ORAL ORDER
1. Heard Mr. [ENTITY], learned advocate for petitionerandlearnedadvocateforrespondents.
2. Inthisgroupof11petitions,thepetitioner company has challenged common award dated 11.7.2016 passed by learned Labour Court Rajkot in 11 Reference Cases i.e. [CASE NUMBER] Labour Court declared that the service of the claimants were terminated illegally. Upon such declarationthelearnedLabourCourtawardedlump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and backwages. The petitioner is aggrieved by the saiddirection.Hencecaptionedpetitions.
3. it is declared by learned advocate for the petitioner that in all petitions (captioned above), the petitioner company has prayed for almost similar relief, except with variation in respectoftherelevantreferencenumber. 3.1 Therefore, illustratively the relief prayed forinSCANo.18589/2016isquotedbelow:
"15(A) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the present petition and be pleased to quash and set aside the common award and order dated 11.07.2016 passedbytheLd.PresidingOfficer,LabourCourtNo.3, Rajkot in Ref (L.C.R) No.196 of 2002 along with other Ref.LCR,furtherdeclaringthatneithertheapplication oftherespondentno.1ismaintainablenorreliefprayed therein is grantable to the respondent no.1, in the interestofthejustice."
4. As mentioned above the award placed under challenge by means of captioned petitions is common award in respect of 11 reference cases. The party aggrieved by the award i.e. present petitioner company, is common in all petitions. Almostsimilarcontentionsagainstimpugnedaward areraisedinallpetitions,ofcoursewithsome minor variations (which are dealt in present order, separately). The sum and substance of whichisthattheawardshouldbesetaside.The respondents in all petitions are represented by same learned advocate. The learned advocate for petitioner and learned advocate for respondents haveurgedsimilarsubmissionsonbehalfoftheir respective clients in respect of all petitions. Sincesimilarandcommoncontentionsareraised, all petitions are decided by this common decision.
5. It would not be out of place to take into account the final direction passed by learned Labour Court which are challenged in present petitions. As mentioned above, after having declared thatthe termination of service ofthe claimants is illegal the learned Labour Court awardedbelowmentionedlumpsumcompensationto eachclaimants.
Name of theReference Amount Workman Number Jasmat 194/2002 Rs.45,000/ Mohanbhai Sidik 195/2002 Rs.48,000/ Husseinbhai HiraJerambhai 196/2002 Rs.70,000/ Ravjibhai 197/2002 Rs.47,000/ Mohanbhai Bhupat 198/2002 Rs.67,000/ Samantbhai [ENTITY] 203/2002 Rs.65,000/ Shaileshbhai B.204/2002 Rs.50,000/ Angola Adambhai 269/2002 Rs.45,000/ Sidikbhai Bhikhubhai 270/2002 Rs.46,000/ Mohanbhai Gulmahmad 271/2002 Rs.75,000/ Arabbhai [ENTITY] 273/2002 Rs.85,000/ [ENTITY] and [ENTITY]
6. Sofarasfactualbackgroundisconcerned,it has emerged from the award and from rival submissionsthatconcerned11workmen(employees ofpresentpetitioner)raisedindustrialdispute with the allegation that the opponent employer (presentpetitionercompany)illegallyterminated their service on 30.11.2000. Appropriate government referred the dispute, vide order of reference dated 15.7.2002, for adjudication to learned Labour Court at Rajkot. Learned Labour Court registered the said dispute as separate reference cases (i.e. reference number 194/2002 to 198/2002, 203/2002 and 204/2002 and 269/2002 to272/2002and273/2002.
7. Intheirrespectivestatementsofclaim,the claimantsallegedthattheywereemployeesofthe opponent company and wereemployed asPump man, Security man, Driver, Mistry, Chemist and Labourer. The claimants also alleged that they wereemployedbytheopponentcompanysincemany years and they were regular and permanent employees. The claimants also alleged that the companywasnotpayingsalaryregularlyandtheir unpaidwageshadaccumulatedforalmost8months. The claimants also alleged that to demand the unpaidwagestheyhadissuedanotice.According to the claimants their demand infuriated the Company and therefore the company abruptly terminated their service on 30.11.2000 by oral orderandwithoutfollowingprocedureprescribed bylawandinviolationofprincipleofnatural justice. The claimants also alleged that after terminating their service the company engaged other persons. According to the claimants the Companycommittedbreachofstatutoryprovision. With such allegations, the claimants demanded reinstatement in service with consequential benefits.Itispertinentthattheclaimantsalso placed before learned Labour Court the details with regard tototal length of service rendered bythemandthesalarypaidtothematthetime when the company terminated their service. The saiddetailsarerecapitulatedandsummarisedby learned Labour Court in Para2 of the award, whichreadsthus:
Reference Total Salary Designation No. Length of Service 194/2002 4years Rs.1200/ [ENTITY] 195/2002 5years Rs.1400/ Security Man 196/2002 8years Rs.2100/ Driver 197/2002 5years Rs.1300/ [ENTITY] 198/2002 7years Rs.2000/ Mistry 203/2002 7years Rs.1958/ Driver 204/2002 4years Rs.2000/ Chemist 269/2002 4years Rs.1200/ Labourer 270/2002 5years Rs.1200/ [ENTITY] 271/2002 12years Rs.2100/ Driver 273/2002 30years Rs.2160/ [ENTITY]
8. InresponsetotheNoticeissuedbylearned Labour Court, the opponent Company appeared beforelearnedLabourCourtandfileditsReply. The gist of the reply filed by the Company is summarised bylearned Labour Court inPara3 of the award, which gives out that the Company claimedthat:
(a) the Company was facing and passing through serious financial crises so much so that the companyhaddifficultyinpaymentofwagestothe workmen.
(b) it had not terminated service of the claimants;
(c)certainclaimantshadabandonedtheservice;
(d) whereas4claimantshadvoluntarilyresigned and collected the wages and had issued receipt acknowledgingthepayment;
(e) Since the workmen had abandoned the service or submitted resignation, question of issuing notice and / or notifying senior list and/ or paymentofcompensationdidnotarise;
9. Thus, in substance, the Company emphasised that it had not terminated service of the claimantsandthattherewasnoovertactonits partandtheclaimantshadabandonedtheservice, except the 4 claimants who had (allegedly) submittedresignation.
10.Afterthepartiescompletedtheirpleadings, the claimants and the Company placed on record documents.Thedetailsofthedocumentsplacedon recordbythepetitionerCompanyisdescribedby thelearnedLabourCourtinParas6and7ofthe awardwhereasthedetailsofthedocumentsplaced onrecordbytheclaimantsarementionedinPara 4oftheaward.
11. Beforeproceedingfurther,itisrelevantto mentionatthisstagethatinPara5oftheaward thelearned Labour Court has recorded that both sides had jointly and voluntarily requested to consolidateallreferencecasesforallpurposes includingevidence.Accordinglytheclaimantsas well as the Company led oral evidence only in respect of onereference case andrequested the learned Labour Court totreat thesaid evidence as evidence for all reference cases. For an on behalf of the claimants deposition of one [ENTITY] was recorded and some claimants had filed affidavit in lieu of examinationinchief. On behalf of Company, evidenceofoneMr.[ENTITY].
12. After the contesting parties closed oral documentaryevidence,learnedLabourCourtheard rival submissions by contesting parties. Upon conclusionofthesubmissionlearnedLabourCourt considered the material available on record and the rival submissions. On consideration of materialavailableonrecord,relevantprovisions and rival submissions, learned Labour Court reachedtothefindingsoffactthattheworkmen proved that the Company illegally terminated their service and that the company failed to establish that the claimants had abandoned the serviceand/orthatsomeofthemhadsubmitted resignation. Having reached said conclusion, learned Labour Court considered the issue about appropriaterelief.LearnedLabourCourtreached to the decision that in light of facts of the case, though termination of service is found illegal,finalreliefdeservestobemouldedi.e. instead of granting reinstatement and backwages lump sum compensation should be granted. Therefore,thelearnedLabourCourtpassedabove mentioneddirections.
13. Theworkmenseemstohaveacceptedtheaward inasmuch as until now the claimants have not challenged the learned Labour Court's decision refusing the relief in form of reinstatement and/oragainstdenialofbackwages.Theworkmen have not challenged the decision granting lump sumcompensation and havealso not raised claim forenhancementofthecompensation.
14. Fromtheawardithasemergedthatoneofthe claimants died during pendency of the proceedings. His heirs/ legal representatives wereimpleadedinthependingproceedings.
15. Mr. [ENTITY], learned advocate for the Company assailedtheaward.Hesubmittedthatthelearned Labour Court failed to appreciate that the claimants, except the 4 claimants who tendered resignation, had abandoned their services. He alsosubmittedthatincaseofthe4claimants, who, according to the Company, tendered resignation, learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the said submission and the Court committed error inholding thatthe Company had terminated their service. According to learned advocate for the petitioner the conclusion by learnedLabourCourtthatitistheCompanywho hadterminated service ofthe claimants aswell as conclusion that the Company committed breach of statutory provision, is incorrect, arbitrary and unjustified. According to the learned advocate for the petitioner the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that the claimants failed to place any evidence on record to establish that they had worked for 240 days. Accordingtolearnedadvocateforpetitionerthe learned Labour Court committed error in drawing adverseinferenceagainsttheCompanywithregard to attendance of the claimants and in assuming thattheclaimantshadworkedfor240days.The learned advocate for the petitioner submitted thattheclaimantsraiseddisputeabout18months after the date of termination and that the claimants did not place any evidence on record with regard to their appointment and/ or with regardtoterminationoftheirservices.
16. Ihave considered rival submissions. I have alsoconsideredmaterialavailableonrecordand commonawardpassedbylearnedLabourCourt.
17. In all 11 claimants had raised industrial dispute and their disputes were referred to learnedLabourCourtatRajkot,foradjudication. The said claim and dispute by 11 claimants culminated into above mentioned 11 separate referencecasesbeforethelearnedLabourCourt.
18. After adjudication of said reference cases, the learned Labour Court, for the reasons recorded in common award, reached to the conclusion that the opponent employer (the company)terminatedserviceofsaid11claimants and that the Company terminated service of the said 11 claimants without following procedure prescribed. Having reached such conclusion, learned Labour Court deemed it proper to award lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and another consequential benefits. Learned LabourCourt,aftertakingintoaccountperiodof service rendered by each claimant and the claimant's status after termination of service i.e.whetherhewasgainfullyemployedelsewhere ornot,determinedtheamountofcompensation.The details are mentioned inforegoing part ofthis order.
19. So far as 11th claimant i.e. [ENTITY] is concerned, he died during proceedings. Learned LabourCourtawardedRs.85,000/towardslumpsum compensationforthesaid11thclaimant[ENTITY] and directed the respondent to pay the said amount to the heirs / legal representatives of thesaidclaimants.
20. TheCompanyisaggrievedbythecommonaward.
21. Mr. [ENTITY], learned advocate for the Company made an attempt to segregate the cases of the said 11 cases in 3 categories/ groups on the premise that the company had opposed the claims by the claimants on said 3 broad categories namely:
(a) 4 claimants (Mr. [ENTITY], Mr. [ENTITY], Mr.[ENTITY] and Mr.[ENTITY]) had settled their claim withtheCompany;
(b) 2 claimants (Mr. [ENTITY] and Mr.Sambhu)hadvoluntarilyabandonedtheservice and voluntarily stopped reporting for duty, though the Company had not terminated their service;and
(c) Names of 5 claimants (namely [ENTITY], Mr. [ENTITY], Mr. [ENTITY],Mr.[ENTITY].[ENTITY]) did not exist on the rolls of the Company and that therefore their claim against thecompanywasunjustifiedanduntenable.
22. I have considered rival submissions and material available on record. I have also consideredimpugnedaward.
23. Attheoutsetitisrelevanttodealwiththe petitioner'scontentionthatthepetitionerisa seasonal establishment. There is nothing on record even to indicate that the petitioner undertaking is and can be considered "Seasonal Establishment/Industry".Inthiscontext,itis relevant and necessary to take into account provision under [SECTION] which reads thus:
"[SECTION] inclusive shall not apply to Industrial EstablishmentstowhichChapterVBapplies,
(a) to industrial establishments in which less than fifty workmen on an average per working day have been employedintheprecedingcalendarmonth;or
(b) to industrial establishments which are of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently.
(2) If a question arises whether an industrial establishmentisofaseasonalcharacterorwhetherwork is performed thereinonlyintermittently,thedecision oftheappropriateGovernmentthereonshallbefinal."
24. Thepetitionerdidnotpelad/didnotprove such claim before thelearned Labour Court. Any document (Certificate) issued by appropriate governmentdeclaringthepetitionerestablishment asSeasonalundertakingwasnotplacedonrecord beforelearnedLabourCourt.
25. When learned advocate for petitioner was confrontedwiththesaidlacunaandalsowiththe findings of facts recorded by learned Labour Court in impugned award on this count, learned advocate forthe petitioner tried tochange the stance of claim and submitted that what the petitioner actually claims is not that it is a seasonal establishment but its that activities areofseasonalcharacter.
26. On this count also it is pertinent to note that the Petitioner, as recorded by learned Labour Court, failed to place any evidence on record to establish that (i) its primary and fundamental or main activities are of seasonal character and/ or the activities are performed intermittently; and (ii) the concerned workmen were exclusively employedengaged only for activity for seasonal character or activity performedintermittently.
27. Any evidence worth its name which would establishabovementionedtwobasiccriteriaand requirement was not placed before the learned LabourCourt.
28. Evenasofnowsuchevidenceisnotavailable onrecordofthisgroupofpetitions.
29. Besidesthis,thereisconspicuousabsenceof cogent evidence to establish that every year during alleged and so called "offseason" the claimantswereregularlyandofficiallyrelieved and they were, subsequently i.e. upon commencementofnewseason,againcalledforwork and/ or during such period retaining allowance waspaidtotheclaimants.
30. In absence of any evidence which would establish above mentioned 2 basic criteria to determineastowhethertheindustryisseasonal industryand/orwhetherthemainandprincipal activities of the industry/ establishment are seasonal and are carried on intermittently and whethertheclaimantswereengagedonlyforsuch seasonal activities or the activities which are undertaken intermittently, such bold and unsubstantial claim and contention cannot be entertained and accepted atthis stage, more so when there is no evidence material on record which would support and substantiate and prove saidstatementandsubmission.
31. Itispertinentthateveninpurelyseasonal industry there are several jobs which are undertaken through out the year irrespective of thefactthatthemainactivityoftheindustry gets suspended during offseason (e.g. work of sweeper/ cleaner and work related repairs and maintenance/ work administrative and accounts department as well as other post manufacturing activities,etc.)
32. Inthisviewofthematterandinabsenceof anyevidencesuchbare,boldandunsubstantiated defence that the concerned establishment is seasonalindustryoritisengagedinactivities which are seasonal and are undertaken intermittently, cannot be accepted and that therefore itcannot be saidthat learned Labour Court committed any error in the award/ its decision.
33. Inthiscontextitisalsorelevanttonote that on one hand the petitioner tried to claim that itisaseasonal industry andsubsequently thepetitionertriedtochangethestancebefore thisCourtandclaimedthatitsactivitiesareof seasonal character and undertaken intermittent. Having raised such two distinct contention, the petitioner also tried to contend that the claimants had not worked for 240 days which is minimum requirement for invoking protection available under [SECTION] of the Act. In the said process i.e. while raising the said 2nd contentionthepetitionerlostsightofthefact that according to the provisions under [SECTION] of the Act the requirement of 240 days would not be relevant in case of "seasonal industry" or intermittent activities where workmenarenotengagedduringoffseason.
34. Under the circumstances, the petitioner's contention raised on the ground of seasonal industry or intermittent activities cannot be sustained. The submissions and contentions on saidpremisedeservetoberejectedandtheyare hereby,accordingly,rejected.Itcannotbesaid thatlearnedLabourCourtcommittedanyerroron thiscount.
35. As mentioned above, in respect of certain groupofclaimants/workmen(moreparticularlyin respectofclaimantMr.[ENTITY] claimantMr.[ENTITY]Motibhai)thepetitioner claimed and alleged that the said claimants voluntarilyabandonedthework.
36. Inthiscontext,itisnecessarytotakeinto account the undisputed fact that the petitioner failed topoint out anyprovision from standing orders (either the petitioner's own settled/ certified standing order or Model standing orders)thatthereisaprovision/Ruleunderthe standing orders which provide that continuous absence for more than specified number of days wouldresultintolostoflien.
37. Inabsenceofsuchprovisionstherecouldnot beanypresumptionaboutvoluntaryabandonmentof work.
38. Even if it is assumed that the claimants remained unauthorisedly absence for more number of days then at the most it can be treated as misconduct. When unauthorised absence of the concernedworkmenisconsideredmisconduct,then appropriate disciplinary proceedings in accordancewithprovisionsunderstandingorders should be carried out and the employer should complyprinciplesofnaturaljustice.Inpresent casesuchproceedingsshouldhavebeenconducted. Itisanundisputedfactthatinpresentcasethe petitioner did not conduct domestic inquiry in accordance with provision under standing orders anddid notgrant opportunity ofhearing before deleting the names of the claimants from the register and before assuming that the claimants voluntarilyabandonedtheirservices.
39. In absence of disciplinary action and when the conduct of alleged unauthorised absence is not treated as misconduct but treated on assumptionasabandonmentofservice,theaction oftreatingworkman'sserviceshavingcometoan end would amount to retrenchment. In this context,referencecanbehadtothedecisionin case[ENTITY].JMAIndustriesLtd.[(1993) 3 SCC 259] wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observedandheld,interalia,that:
"4. In [PRECEDENT], the Constitution Bench considered the scope of the word 'retrenchment' definedbySection2(oo)andheldinpara71atpage716 that"analysingthedefinitionofretrenchmentin[SECTION] we find that termination by the employer of the serviceofaworkmanwouldnototherwisehavecoveredthe casesexcludedinclauses(a)and(b)namely,voluntary retirementandretirementonreachingthestipulatedage ofretirementoronthegroundsofcontinuedillhealth. There would be no violational element of the employer. Their express exclusion implies that those would otherwisehavebeenincluded.Inpara77atpage719it was further held that "right of the employer and the contractofemploymenthasbeeneffectedbyintroducing [SECTION]". The contention of the management to terminatetheserviceofanemployeeunderthecertified StandingOrdersandunderthecontractsofemploymentwas negatived holding that the right of the management has been effected by introduction of [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the Act. The second view was that the rightassuchhasnotbeenaffected ortakenaway,but onlyanadditionalsocialobligationhasbeenimposedon theemployertoabide bythemandate of[SECTION]of the Act to tide over the financial difficulty which subserves the social policy. This Court relied on the maximStatproratione valuntas populi :thewillof thepeoplestandsinplaceofareason.Inparagraph82 atpage722thisCourtconcludedthatthedefinitionin [SECTION] of the Act of retrenchment means "the terminationbytheemployeroftheserviceofaworkman foranyreasonwhatsoeverexceptthoseexpresslyexcluded inthesection".Sameviewwastakenbythreebenchesof threeJudgesofthisCourtinStateBankofIndiav.N. Sundara Mani, (1976) 3 SCR 160 : (AIR 1976 SC 1111); [PRECEDENT] [PRECEDENT] [PRECEDENT] [PRECEDENT]Therefore,we find force in the contention of Sri [ENTITY], the learned Senior counsel for the appellant that the definition 'retrenchment' in [SECTION] is a comprehensive one intended to cover any action of the managementtoputanendtotheemploymentofanemployee foranyreasonwhatsoever.Weneednot,however,restour conclusion on this point as in our considered view it could be decided on the other contention raised by Sri [ENTITY] that the order is violative of the principles of natural justice. We are impressed with that argument. Before dealing with it, it is necessary to dispose of interrelatedcontentionsraisedbyDr.[ENTITY].
5. The Contention of Dr. [ENTITY] that since the appeal was deleted from the constitution bench to be dealt with separately, the finding of the constitution bench deprived the respondent of putting forth the contentionbasedonclause(13)ofthecertifiedstanding order to support impugned action and the respondent is entitledtocanvassafreshthecorrectnessoftheviewof theConstitutionBenchisdevoidofforce.Itissettled lawthatanauthoritativelawlaidafterconsideringall therelevantprovisionsandthepreviousprecedents,it is no longer open to be recanvassed the same on new groundsorreasonsthatmaybeputforthinitssupport unlesstheCourtdeemedappropriatetorefertoalarger benchinthelargerpublicinteresttoadvancethecause ofjustice.Theconstitutionbenchinfactwentintothe selfsamequestionvisavistherightoftheemployerto fall back upon the relevant provision of the certified Standing Orders to terminate the service of the workman/employee.ByoperationofSection2(oo)theright oftheemployerunderClause13(2)(iv),andthecontract of employment has been effected. More over in [PRECEDENT] at Pp. 176465, paras5and6)aConstitutionBenchheldthateverynew discoveryorargumentativenoveltycannotundoorcompel reconsideration of binding precedent. It does not lose its authority 'merely' because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned. In thatcasetheratioofthisCourtonArticle31Adecided by 13 Judges bench in [PRECEDENT] was sought to be reopened but this Court negativedthesame.
6.Hiscontentionthatexpiryofeightdays'absencefrom duty brings automatic loss of lien on the post and nothing moreneedbedonebythemanagementtopassan orderterminatingtheserviceandperforcetermination isautomatic,bearsnosubstance.Theconstitutionbench specifically held that the right of the employer given under the standing Orders gets effected by statutory operation.InRobertD'Souza'scaseinpara7,thisCourt rejected the contention that on expiry of leave the terminationofserviceisautomaticandnothingfurther couldbedone.Itwasfurtherheldthatstrikingoffthe name from the rolls for unauthorised absence from duty amountedtoterminationofserviceandabsencefromduty for 8 consecutive days amounts to mis conduct and terminationofserviceonsuchgroundswithoutcomplying withminimumprinciplesofnaturaljusticewouldnotbe justified. In [ENTITY]'s case threeJudge bench held thatstrikingoffthenameoftheworkmanforabsenceof leaveitselfamountedtoretrenchment.[PRECEDENT]thisCourtheldthatstrikingoff thenamefromtherollsamountstoanarbitraryaction. [ENTITY].WorkmenatwoJudgebenchof this Court to which one of us, [ENTITY],J. was a member was to consider the effect of discharge on one month'snoticeorpayinlieuthereof.Itwasheldthat it was not a discharge simpliciter or a simple termination of service but one camouflaged for serious misconduct.ThisCourtliftedtheveilandlookedbeyond theapparenttenoroftheorderanditseffect. Itwas heldthattheactionwasnotvalidinlaw.
7.Theprinciplequestioniswhethertheimpugnedaction isviolativeofprinciplesofnaturaljustice.[PRECEDENT] a constitution bench of this Court held that the distinction between quasi judicial andadministrativeorderhasgraduallybecomethin.Now it is totally eclipsed and obliterated. The aim of the ruleofnaturaljusticeistosecurejusticeortoputit negativelytopreventmiscarriageofjustice.Theserules operativeintheareanotcoveredbylawvalidlymadeor expresslyexcludedasheldinUnionofIndiav.N.Singh. It is settled law that certified standing orders have statutory force which do not expressly exclude the application of the principles of natural justice. ConverselytheActmadeexceptionsfortheapplicationof principles of natural justice by necessary implication from specific provisions in the Act like [SECTION], [SECTION], [SECTION] etc., the need for temporary hands to cope with sudden and temporary spurt of work demands appointment temporarily to a service of such temporary workmentomeetsuchexigenciesandassoonasthework orservicesarecompleted,theneedtodispensewiththe servicesmayarise.Inthatsituation,oncomplianceof the provisions of [SECTION] resort could be had to retrenchtheemployeesinconformitytherewithparticular statute or statutory rules or orders having statutory flavour may also exclude the application of the principlesofnaturaljusticeexpresslyorbynecessary implication.Inotherrespectstheprinciplesofnatural justice would apply unless the employer should justify its exclusion on given special and exceptional exigencies.
8. The cardinal point that has to be born in mind, in everycase,iswhetherthepersonconcernedshouldhavea reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially.Itisnotsomuchtoactjudiciallybutis to act fairly, namely, the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reason able in the particular circumstancesofthecase.Inotherwordsapplicationof theprinciplesofnaturaljusticethatnomanshouldbe condemnedunheardintendstopreventtheauthoritytoact arbitrarilyeffectingtherightsoftheconcernedperson.
9.Itisafundamentalruleoflawthatnodecisionmust be taken which will affect the right of any person withoutfirstbeinginformedofthecaseandbegivenhim her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. An order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. In [PRECEDENT],the Constitution Bench held that 'civil consequence' covers infractionofnotmerelypropertyorpersonalrightbut of civil liberties material deprivations and non pecuniarydamages.Initscomprehensiveconnotationevery thingthataffectsacitizeninhiscivillifeinflictsa civil consequence. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, page 1487 defined civil rights are such as belong to every citizen of the state or country they include rightscapableofbeingenforcedorredressedina civil action In [PRECEDENT],thisCourtheldthatevenanadministrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The person concerned must be informed of the case, the evidenceinsupportthereofsuppliedandmustbegivena fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decisionistaken.Sincenosuchopportunitywasgivenit was held that superannuation was in violation of principlesofnaturaljustice.
10. In [PRECEDENT], per majority, a seven Judge bench held that the rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purviewofArticle14oftheConstitutionasanyruleof substantive law. In [PRECEDENT], anotherbenchofsevenjudgesheldthatthesubstantive andprocedurallawsandactiontakenunderthemwillhave topassthetestunderArticle14.Thetestofreasonand justicecannotbeabstract.Theycannotbedivorcedfrom theneedsofthenation.Thetestshavetobepragmatic otherwise they would cease to be reasonable. The procedure prescribed must be just, fair and reasonable eventhoughthereisnospecificprovisioninastatute orrulesmadethereunderforshowingcauseagainstaction proposedtobetakenagainstanindividual,whichaffects therightofthatindividual.Thedutytogivereasonable opportunitytobeheardwillbeimpliedfromthenature of the function to be performed by the authority which hasthepowertotakepunitiveordamagingaction.Even executive authorities which take administrative action involvinganydeprivationoforrestrictiononinherent fundamental rights of citizens, must care to see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done.Theyhaveadutytoproceedinawaywhichisfree from even the appearance of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness. They have to act in a manner which is patently impartial and meets the requirementsofnaturaljustice.
11. The law must therefore be now taken to be well settledthatprocedureprescribedfordeprivingaperson oflivelihoodmustmeetthechallengeofArticle14and such law would be liable to be tested on the anvil of Article14andtheprocedureprescribedbyastatuteor statutory rule or rules or orders effecting the civil rights or result in civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of [SECTION]. So it must be right, just and fair and not arbitrary fanciful or oppressive.Therecanbenodistinctionbetweenaquasi judicialfunctionandanadministrativefunctionforthe purposeofprinciplesofnaturaljustice.Theaimofboth administrative inquiry as well as the quasijudicial enquiryistoarriveatajustdecisionandifaruleof naturaljusticeiscalculatedtosecurejusticeortoput it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable only to quasijudicialenquiryandnottoadministrativeenquiry. Itmustlogicallyapplytoboth.
15.Inthiscaseadmittedlynoopportunitywasgivento the appellant and no enquiry was held. The appellant's plea put forth at the earliest was that despite his reporting to duty on December 3, 1980 and on all subsequent days and readiness to join duty he was preventedtoreporttoduty,norhebepermittedtosign theattendanceregister.TheTribunaldidnotrecordany conclusivefindinginthisbehalf.Itconcludedthatthe managementhadpowerunderClause(13)ofthecertified Standing Order to terminate with the service of the appellant. Therefore, we hold that the principles of naturaljusticemustbereadintotheStandingOrderNo. 13(2)(iv). Otherwise it would become arbitrary, unjust and unfair violating [SECTION]. When so read the impugnedactionisviolativeoftheprinciplesofnatural justice.
16.Thisconclusionleadsustothequestionastowhat relieftheappellantisentitledto.Themanagementdid notconductanydomesticenquirynorgiventheappellant any opportunity to put forth his case. Equally the appellant is to blame himself for the impugned action. Underthosecircumstances50percentofthebackwages wouldmeettheendsofjustice.Theappealisaccordingly allowed.TheawardoftheLabourCourtissetasideand the letter dated December 12, 1980 of the management quashed.Thereshallbeadirectiontotherespondentto reinstatetheappellantforthwithandpayhimbackwages within a period of three months from the date of the receiptofthisorder.Theappealisallowedaccordingly. Thepartieswouldbeartheirowncosts." 39.1 On this count, profitable reference can also be had to decision in case of [PRECEDENT]. [PRECEDENT]
40. On one hand, it is established that the petitioner did nottreat the alleged conduct of theworkmenasmisconductandthepetitionerdid notconductanydisciplinaryproceedingsagainst the said workmen for alleged absence. On the other hand, the employer did not comply the conditionprescribedunderSection25F.Thusits decision and action of treating the alleged conduct of the workmen as voluntary abandonment ofserviceanditsconductofcancelingworkmen's name from the register would amount to retrenchment as held by Hon'ble Apex Court in abovementioneddecision.
41. Thus,frombothperspectivethepetitioner's action against the said workmen should fail it being illegal and contrary to the provisions undertheAct/StandingOrders.
42. Besides above mentioned two perspectives which emerged from petitioner's allegation that the said workmen voluntarily abandoned their service, a more important and relevant aspect which also emerges from the record is that actuallythepetitionerfailedtoestablishthat thesaidworkmenwerenotreportingfordutyand/ or they remained absent from duty and their serviceswerenotterminatedbythecompany.
43. In absence of any evidence on this count, more particularly the evidence to support the allegationsthattheworkmenvoluntarilyremained absentfromdutyandthatintimation/instruction toreportforandresumedutieswereissuedabove mentioned2situations,would,actuallynotarise in present case. Nonetheless, even if it is assumed that there was substance in the petitioner company's claim then also above mentioned 2 aspects make out clear that the terminationoftheserviceofthesaidclaimants wasnotinaccordancewithlawandthattherefore the findings and conclusion by learned Labour Court holding that the said persons were illegallyterminatedcannotbefaulted.Inlight ofthedecisionbyHon'bleApexCourtincaseof Punjab Land Development and Reclamation CorporationLtd(Supra)andthedecisionincase [PRECEDENT] (Supra) and decisionbyHon'bleApexCourtincaseofSBIv. N.SudaraMoney[(1976)1SCC822),theposition whichemergesistotheeffectthatinabsenceof anyprovisionunderStandingOrderwhichentails terminationofserviceongroundoflossoflien incasewheretheemployeeabstainsfromservice for long period the employer has option of treating prolong absence of an employee as misconduct. In such case the employer would be obliged to comply principles of natural justice andtakedisciplinaryactionforsuchmisconduct, inaccordancewithlawandprinciplesofnatural justice if the said cause of action is not followed and the employer invokes the right to assume that employee has abandoned the service and accordingly the service of the employee is deemed tohave been abandoned, then such action of the employer would amount to retrenchment which would entail obligation to comply the conditions prescribed under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Inpresent case ithas emerged from the foregoing discussion that the employer failed on both counts inasmuch as the petitionerneithertreatedtheallegedabsenceof theconcernedemployeesasmisconductanddidnot take disciplinary action in accordance with law and principles of natural justice. The said failure branded the employer's decision namely treatingtheallegedabsenceoftheemployeesas abandonmentofservice,asretrenchment([SECTION] read with [SECTION] of [ACT]. However the petitioner did not comply the condition under [SECTION] Therefore, learned Court is right and justified inholdingthepetitioner'sactionasillegaland in breach of statutory provisions. The said decisionbylearnedCourtcannotbefaulted,more particularlyinlightofundisputedfactthatthe petitioner did not comply the condition under [SECTION] and the petitioner neither took disciplinary action in accordance with law and principlesofnaturaljustice.
44. In respect of about 5 workmenclaimants namely Mr. [ENTITY], Mr. [ENTITY], Mr. [ENTITY], Mr. [ENTITY] and Mr. [ENTITY], learned advocate for the petitioner company tried to contendthattheirnameswerenotontheregister of the Company on the date of dispute and that thereforetherewasnojustificationtoconsider themworkmenofthecompanyanditcouldnothave beenassumedthatthesaidclaimantswereworkmen ofthepetitionercompany.
45. Inthiscontextitispertinenttonotethat thepetitioner,undisputedly,hasinstallationat 2 sites namely Varsha Medhi and Lavanpur. The learned Labour Court, after examining the records, detected that the Company maintained separate record/ registers for thesaid 2sites anditconvenientlychangedthenamesofworkmen from oneregister toanother i.e.from register pertainingtoVarshaMedhitoregisterpertaining to Lavanpur and viceaversa. Learned Labour Court also detected that the Company had placed onrecord, thedocuments pertaining to onesite for certain period and for other period the Companyplacedonrecordtheregisterspertaining to other site. Differently put the Company, as observedbythelearnedCourt,didnotplaceon recordalldocuments/registerofbothsitesfor entire period in question. The learned Labour Court has recorded findings of fact that by placingonrecordthedocumentsofonesitefor certain period and documents related to other siteforotherperiodtheCompanykeptbackthe detailsandrecordrelatedtoconcerned5persons soastocreateanimpressionthatnamesofthe saidpersonsarenotonitsrecord.Despitesuch attempt by theCompany thelearned Labour Court could trace names of some of the concerned persons in some of the registers placed on record. These aspects are elaborately mentioned andconsidered bylearned Labour Court inPara 13(E)oftheaward.
46. There is nothing on record, neither any material nor justification in any other form, which can convince this Court to hold that the findingsoffactrecordedbylearnedLabourCourt areperverse.
47. The said allegation is considered and dealt with, in considerable detail, by the learned LabourCourtandrelevantdiscussionisfoundin Para13(E)oftheaward.
48. On reading the award and more particularly thediscussioninPara13,itbecomesclearthat learned Labour Court has recorded findings of facts which are supported by sufficient discussionandsufficientaswellassatisfactory reasons which, in turn, supported by cogent evidenceavailableonrecord.
49. By any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that the findings of fact recorded by learned Labour Court in Para13, more particularly in Para13(E), so far as above mentioned defence and allegations of the petitioner Company are concerned, are not supportedbyevidenceonrecordand/orthatthe saidfactsarecontrarytotheevidenceonrecord and/orsaidfindingsoffactsareperverse.
50. The petitioner has failed to point out any material from record which would convince this Courttoholdthatthefindingsoffactrecorded by learned Labour Court in Para13 more particularly in Para13(E) so far as this particular contention is concerned, are not sustainable.
51. Inthisviewofthematter,thesaidfindings offact recorded bylearned Labour Court cannot befaultedandthereisnobasisorjustification to interfere with the said finding of fact in exercise of writ jurisdiction/ supervisory jurisdiction. Therefore, the said contention shouldalsofail.
52. In respect ofclaimants Mr. [ENTITY], Mr.[ENTITY],Mr.[ENTITY] Mr. [ENTITY], learned advocate for petitioner tried to contend that the said claimantshadsettledtheirfinalaccountandhad voluntarily left the service after accepting/ settling their account finally and after acceptingofduespayabletothem.
53. This aspect is elaborately and exhaustively adjudicatedanddealtwithbythelearnedLabour Courtintheaward,moreparticularlybyfindings offact recorded inPara13[Para13(D)] ofthe award. Even the said findings of fact are supported by sufficient discussion and satisfactory reasons which, in turn, are supportedbycogentevidenceavailableonrecord.
54. By any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that the findings of fact recorded by learned Labour Court in Para13, more particularly in Para13(D), so far as above mentioned defence and allegations of the petitioner Company are concerned, are not supportedbyevidenceonrecordand/orthatthe saidfactsarecontrarytotheevidenceonrecord and/orsaidfindingsoffactsareperverse.The petitioner has failed topoint out anymaterial from record of present petition which would convincethisCourttoholdthatthefindingof factrecordedbylearnedLabourCourtinPara13 more particularly in Para13(D) so far as this particular contention is concerned, are not sustainable.
55. Inthisviewofthematter,thesaidfindings offact recorded bylearned Labour Court cannot befaultedandthereisnobasisorjustification to interfere with the said finding of fact in exercise of writ jurisdiction/ supervisory jurisdiction. Therefore, the said contention shouldalsofail.
56. Thedocumentonwhichthepetitionercompany placed reliance before learned Labour Court and so also before this Court to substantiate the said defence/ submission with regard to above mentionedworkmenviz.socalledresignationsis placed on record. On reading the said document i.e. socalled resignation and/or statement of Account, in any manner do not reflect that the claimantssettledtheiraccountwhileleavingthe service or that the said claimants tendered resignationandsettledtheiraccountfinally.
57. On the contrary, as rightly recorded by learned Labour Court, it emerges from plain readingofthesaiddocument/sthattheworkmen issued said receipt/s in acknowledgment of the paymenttowardsunpaidsalaryfortheperiodupto 2000 (which was paid in February, 2001). The said document is merely an acknowledgment of payment of unpaid salary and by any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that the said document is letter of resignation or that by accepting the said payment the claimants had settledtheiraccountfinallywiththepetitioner companysoastorelinquishtheservice.
58. Onstrengthofthesaiddocumentitcannotbe concluded,ratheritcannotbeevenassumedthat thesaidclaimantlefttheserviceontheirown volition and settled their Account with the employer.
59. Except the said document/s the petitioner failedtoplace/showanymaterialonrecordto demonstratethatthesaidclaimantshadtendered resignationand/ortheyhadvoluntarilygivenup theserviceand/orthattheyhadsettledtheir accountbyacceptingfullandfinalpayment.
60. The learned Labour Court has, as mentioned above, elaborately discussed this aspect in the award and recorded the findings which are duly supportedwithcogentreasoninPara13(D)ofthe award.
61. As mentioned above, there is nothing on record to convince this Court to disagree with thesaidfindingoffactortodisturbthesaid findings of fact or to hold that the said findings are perverse therefore said contention shouldalsofail.
62. Foregoing discussion has brought out that threeprincipallineofdefenceurgedbylearned advocate for the petitioner by segregating the claimants in three groups, is without substance andmerits.Thereisnomaterialonrecordwhich would support and justify the said distinction amongst the claimants sought to be made by the petitioner and/or to support and justify the contentions against theaward in respect ofthe claimantssegregatedinthesaidthreegroupsby learnedadvocateforthepetitioner.
63. As mentioned earlier, learned advocate for thepetitioneralsosubmittedthattheclaimants had not worked for 240 days. One part of the said contentions is dealt with in foregoing discussionviz.ifthepetitionerwantstoclaim that its industry is seasonal industry or that the claimants were engaged exclusively for the activities whichwere undertaken intermittently, thentherequirementofminimumattendanceof240 dayswouldnotbeapplicableincasetheworkmen whoarenotengagedduringoffseasonand/orwho areworking inseasonal industry and/or whoare engaged for activities which are essentially on intermittentnature.
64. On the other hand, it is pertinent to note that the claimants specifically contended that they had worked continuously and regularly without any break and that they had worked for morethan240days.
65. Itwasanundisputedfactbeforethelearned LabourCourtthatthepetitionercompanydidnot issuewageslipand/orattendancecardandthat, therefore,theclaimantswereunabletoplaceany document on record. The said documents, i.e. wage register / attendance register were in exclusive possession of the company. In the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of [PRECEDENT]etcanddoesnotplaceonrecord the pay and wage Registers for the relevant period then the obligation to prove that the workmendidnotworkfor240daysinpreceding12 months shifts to the employer. In present case thepetitionerfailedtoplacerelevantmaterial on record and to demonstrate that none of the claimantshadworkedfor240daysinpreceding12 monthsorinanyyear.
66. At this stage, it is relevant to note that such segregation ofthe workmen in three groups andthecontentionswhichareaccordinglyraised bylearnedadvocateforthepetitionerareraised and put forward in absence of any pleading to thateffect.
67. During hearing of this group of petitions, thisCourtspecificallyaskedlearnedadvocateto clarify as to whether the company had filed separatewrittenstatement(reply)inrespectof each reference case with specific and different contention as regards each claimant or common reply/writtenstatementwasfiled.Inreplyto thequerybytheCourtlearnedadvocateforthe petitioners declared and clarified that though separate written statement (reply) were filed, however all replies contained identical details andcontentionswithreferencetoallclaimants.
68. From the said fact with regard to written statement and fair declaration by the learned advocate for the petitioners, it becomes clear thatthepetitioners'attemptofsegregatingthe workmeninthreegroupswhichisurgedbylearned advocate for the petitioners before this Court, wasneverraisedorsubmittedbeforethelearned Labour Court and the written statement is completelysilentonthiscount.
69. Thewrittenstatementfiledbythecompanyis found on the record of the petition. From the saidwrittenstatement,itcomesoutthatanyof the contentions were not even raised in the writtenstatementandwerenotevenurgedbefore theCourtduringthesubmissions.
70. Even the allegation/ contention that the claimants had not worked for 240 days was not even raised in the reply. The company never disputedthesaidfactum.
71. Under the circumstances, actually, for the workmen, thequestion toprove that they worked for240days,didnotarise(sincethesaidfact was not even disputed by the petitioner in its reply).
72. The only contention / defence which the companyraisedinrespectofallclaimantsinits separatebutidenticalwrittenstatementwasthat all claimants had voluntarily left service, the companydidnotterminatethembuttheclaimants stopped reporting for work and that, therefore, question of preparing and publishing seniority listand/orpaymentofretrenchmentcompensation didnotarise.
73. Ofcourse,onedefencebesidesthedefenceon groundofvoluntaryabandonmentviz.thatcertain workmen had tendered resignation and accepted final settlement of accounts was raised by the company.
74. However, so far as the said contention is concerned,foregoingdiscussioninpresentorder [as well as discussion by the learned Labour Courtinparas13(B)and13(D)]hasbroughtout that the said allegation and defence of the company is without merits and substance and contrarytothedocumentsplacedonrecordbythe company.
75. On reading the award it comes out clearly thatitisaftercarefulanddetailedevaluation and appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Labour Court reached to and recorded specificfindingsoffactthat
(a) the company failed to prove that the claimantsvoluntarilyabandonedtheservice;
(b) the claimants proved that the Company terminated their service and that they had not voluntarilyabandonedtheserviceand/orhadnot submitted resignations, as alleged by the Company;
(c) that the company had, undisputedly, not followed the procedure prescribed under [SECTION] of the Act inasmuch as the notice as contemplated under [SECTION] was not issued and/or notice pay and retrenchment compensation werenotpaidbythecompany;
(d) that the company failed to comply the requirementunderRule81ofIndustrialDisputes (Gujarat) Rules inasmuch asthecompany didnot prepareandpublishsenioritylist7daysbefore the date on which the service of the claimants cametobediscontinued;
(e) the company failed to prove its allegation andclaimthatsomeoftheworkmenhadtendered resignation and finally settled their accounts;
(f)thecompanycommittedviolationofprinciples ofnaturaljustice;
(g)thecompanycommittedbreachofsection25F.
76. Fromtheaward,itclearlyemergesthatthe learned Labour Court has recorded specific detailed, cogent and satisfactory reasons in supportofaforesaidconclusionsandthefindings offactrecordedbythelearnedLabourCourtand that thereasons recorded by thelearned Labour Court are supported by oral as well as documentaryevidenceonrecord.
77. Thefindingsoffactrecordedbythelearned Labour Court cannot be termed perverse or even contrarytoevidenceonrecordorwithoutsupport ofanyevidence.
78. The petitioner has failed to show any material from the document to demonstrate that and to convince this Court to hold that the findings offact recorded by thelearned Labour Court are perverse or that they warrant interferencebythisCourt.
79. Itisalsorelevanttonotethatthecompany claimed, in its written statement, that since longtime,thecompanyhadbeenfacingfinancial crises and its financial position was weak and thecompanydidnothavefundseventopaysalary tothe workmen. The said submission /statement in the written statement clarifies and supports thefactthatthecompanyhadpaidunpaidsalary (upto October, 2000) to some of the workmen in February2001whichwasdueandpayable.
80. Atthisstageitwouldbeappropriatetodeal with thedecision onwhich the learned advocate forthepetitionerplacedreliancesoastoclaim that since some of the workmen abstained from duty, provision of retrenchment will not be applicable and learned Labour Court committed errorinapplyingtheprovisionsofretrenchment incaseofpersonswhoabstainedfromduty.
81. The learned advocate placed reliance on [PRECEDENT]. Inthefacts and circumstances ofthecasethesaiddecisiondoesnotrenderany assistancetothepetitioners.Inthiscontextit is also relevant and necessary to consider the observation by Hon'ble Apex Court inParas4 to 11andParas.15and16ofthedecisionincase [ENTITY].[PRECEDENT] in case of [PRECEDENT]]. In lightoftheobservationbyHon'bleApexCourtin thesaid decisions, the cited decision doesnot helpthepetitioners.Besidesthis,whenfactual aspectsinvolvedintheciteddecisionaretaken into account then it comes out clearly that on that ground also the cited decisions does not help the petitioners because the facts involved inpresentcasearemateriallydifferent.
82. Fromtheciteddecisionitemergesthatthe concerned workman had abstained from duty continuously for more than 2 years and that inspite of large number of letters, which were forwardedbytheCompanytotheconcernedworkman instructing him to report for duty and also notifying that failure toreport forduty would entail consequences, the concerned workman continuedtoabstainfromdutyanddidnotresume his duty. Besides writing several letters and instructiontotheconcernedworkman,theCompany had even issued various notices asking the workmantojoindutyandpublishedthenoticein the newspaper. Despite such efforts by the Company the workman neither cared to join the duty norcontacted the company and continued to remainabsent.
83. Inpresentcasethepetitionerhasfailedto show that such attempts were ever made by the petitionerinrespectoftheconcernedpersons.
84. Besides this, the petitioner could not establish before the learned Labour Court that the concerned workmen had remained absent, that tooforsuchlongperiod.
85. Under the circumstances, even on factual backdrop the decision does not render any assistancetothepetitioner.
86. Likewise,inlightofthedecisionbyHon'ble Apex Court in case of of D.K.Yadav v. JMA IndustriesLtd.[(1993)3SCC259]aswellasin case of [PRECEDENT]] the other decision on whichthelearnedadvocateforpetitionerplaced reliance (i.e. decision by Bombay High Court in case of [PRECEDENT] [ENTITY]
87. Besides this, even on factual backdrop the said decision does not render anyassistance to the petitioner because in the said 2nd decision also the concerned workman had abstained from dutyforalmost3yearsi.e.fromJuly,1979to June,1982.Itisalsorelevanttonotethatin the said 2nd decision on which learned advocate for petitioner placed reliance, the Court has observedthat:
"In the end everything ultimately depends on the establishedfactsandcircumstancesofeachcaseandit is not possible to lay down a rigid proposition of universalapplication".
88. TheHon'bleCourtalsoclarifiedthatwhatis heldbythelearnedSingleJudgemustnecessarily be restricted strictly and only to the facts concurrently found therein and established and that it would not be the intention of learned SingleJudgetolaydownanyprincipleoflawor anylegal test contrary toorinconsistent with the legal position laid down by Apex Court in [ENTITY], SouthernRailwayandanother.
89. Inlightofsaidobservationitwouldalsobe relevant to take into account observation by [PRECEDENT] (which is reproduced bytheHon'bleCourtintheciteddecision).The relevant observation inthe decision incase of [PRECEDENT]:
"This Court has consistently held in The [PRECEDENT]., Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa and OthersandDelhiClothandGeneralMillsLtd.Vs.[ENTITY] and Others, that the expression 'termination of service for any reason whatsoever' now coverseverykindofterminationofserviceexceptthose notexpresslyincludedinSection25Fornotexpressly provided for by other provisions of the Act such as Section[SECTION]and[SECTION]."andfurther "Therefore,weadoptasbindingthewellsettledposition in law that if termination of service of a workman is brought about for any reason whatsoever, it would be retrenchmentexceptifthecasefallswithinanyofthe excepted categories i.e. (i) termination by way of punishment inflicted pursuant to disciplinary action;
(ii) voluntary retirement of the workman; (iii) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuationifthecontractofemploymentbetweenthe employerandtheworkmanconcernedcontainsastipulation inthatbehalf;(iv)orterminationoftheserviceonthe ground of continued illhealth (pages 333 and 334 respectivelyofthereport)
90. InlightofthesaidobservationbyHon'ble Apex Court in case of [PRECEDENT], the cited decisions even otherwise does not renderanyassistancetothepetitioner.
91. Inlightofforegoingdiscussion,itbecomes clear that the award impugned in present petitions is neither erroneous nor perverse and theawarddoesnotsufferfromanyerroroflaw orjurisdiction.
92. There is no justification to interfere with theimpugnedawardandanycaseforinterference isnotmadeout.
93. Onoverallconsiderationofrivalcontentions and material available on record, the petitions failanddonotdeservetobeaccepted.Thereis nojustificationtoholdthatthelearnedLabour Courthasnotcommittedanyerrorand/orthatthe awardisdefective.Therefore,thepetitionsare not accepted. The captioned petitions are accordinglyrejected.Noticeineachpetitionis discharged.
([ENTITY], J) saj