JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. Can a delinquent employee facing a Domestic Enquiry participate in any such Enquiry, without demur and thereby take a chance of getting a favourable verdict, but finding that the verdict has gone against him, turn round and question the competence of the Authority initiating the Enquiry, is the short but crucial Question that falls for Consideration in this Appeal. A few facts relevant to the case need to be stated before proceeding any further:
The appellant is an Executive Engineer in the employment of the Mysore University. On the basis of a specific complaint made by one Dr. [ENTITY], a Member of the University Senate and the Syndicate, a preliminary enquiry into the allegations of misappropriation and shortage of cement and steel from the Engineering Division of the University was made. The enquiry showed that the allegations were prima facie correct based on which the Syndicate directed the framing of charges against the appellant and two others, one of whom was a Junior Engineer and the 2nd a Store Keeper. All told seven distinct Articles of Charges were framed against the appellant out of which only four, were pressed in the course of the Enquiry. Charges Nos. 1, 2, 3 & 7 pressed against the appellant were in the following terms :
"FIRSTLY, that you, Sri [ENTITY], Executive Engineer, University Engineering Division, Mysore while supervising the construction of six Lecturers' Quarters at Manasagangotri, Mysore have colluded with the Junior Engineer Sri [ENTITY], and the Store-keeper Sri [ENTITY], to get six Lecturers' Quarters constructed in Manasagangotri, Mysore during 1989 to 1991 with only 2000 bags of cement issued from the stores of the University Engineering Division as against the actual requirement of 3030 bags of cement and, further, you have admitted bills submitted by Sri [ENTITY] the concerned Contractor towards [SECTION]00 bags of cement said to have been purchased by him in open market, even though adequate cement was available in the stores on the dates of alleged purchases, and thus, you have cheated the University, and thereby committed a grave misconduct punishable under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT].
SECONDLY, that you, Sri [ENTITY], Executive Engineer, have colluded with Sri [ENTITY], Store-Keeper, to misappropriate about 15.50 MT of Steel of different diameters, worth about Rs. 2,09,[SECTION]38-[SECTION]4 p., and thereby committed a grave misconduct punishable under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT].
THIRDLY, that you Sri [ENTITY], Executive Engineer, being responsible to supervise the proper maintenance, acquisition and issue of articles from the Stores, failed in you duties, resulting in the shortage of about 15.50 MT of Steel of different diameters and is thereby responsible for the loss caused to the University to a tune of Rs. 2,09,[SECTION]38.[SECTION]4 p., due to your gross negligence, and thus committed a grave misconduct which is punishable under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT].
xxx xxx xxx SEVENTHLY, that, you, Sri [ENTITY], while so working as Executive Engineer, placed an order on 19-[SECTION]-1992 for supply of 4,000 bags of ACC cement from ACC Company and paid the full amount, and also received 4,000 bags of ACC Cement, but caused to enter in the Stock Register only 3,[SECTION]00 bags as having been received from the ACC Company, and thereby misappropriated 400 bags of cement and caused loss to the extent of about Rs. 45,000/- to the University and thus committed a grave misconduct punishable under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT].
xxx xxx xxx
2. The appellant and the other two delinquents were called upon to submit their explanations to the charges in response to which, the appellant submitted a one line reply, denying the charges and putting the respondent University to the burden of proving the same. The explanations tendered were found unsatisfactory resulting in the Syndicate of the University directing the conduct of a Joint Enquiry into the charges by Sri [ENTITY] a retired District and Sessions Judge.
3. Before the Enquiry Officer on the very first date of hearing, the appellant, sought permission to engage a Lawyer for his defence. The Enquiry Officer, instructed him to make the request to the Disciplinary Authority namely the Syndicate. A request to the Syndicate for permission to engage an Advocate was declined whereafter the petitioner filed [CASE NUMBER] in this Court, and on the concession of the respondent University was permitted to engage a Counsel.
4. The Enquiry Officer then proceeded to record the evidence adduced on both the sides, and by his Report dated 14th May 1994, found the charges proved against the delinquents. On receipt of the report the Registrar of the University, in his capacity as the Ex-Officio Secretary to the Syndicate issued a Memo dated [SECTION]-5-1994 to the delinquents calling upon them to submit a representation against the Report, so that the same could be placed for consideration before the Disciplinary Authority together with the Report in question. A copy of the Report was also sent to the delinquents along with the Memo. It was in response to this Memo that the appellant for the first time, by his letter dated 1-[SECTION]-1994, pointed out, that the Joint Enquiry instituted by the orders of the Syndicate was legally incompetent and a nullity in the eye of the law and so also the proceedings conducted by the Enquiry Officer. The appellant desired that the question of the legality of the Enquiry be decided before he could submit his reply to the report on merits. On receipt of this letter from the appellant, the Registrar wrote back to say that the appellant may submit his reply to the Report within a further period of 3 days failing which it will be presumed that he had nothing to say against the same. A reply to this was sent by the appellant on the 13th of June 1994, shortly whereafter he filed Writ Petition No. 1[SECTION]90[SECTION]/1994, in this Court. In the Writ Petition the appellant, simply challenged the legality and competence of the Joint Enquiry into the charges framed against the delinquents. The appellant relied upon [SECTION] of the [ACT] under the Karnataka State Universities Act 197[SECTION], to urge that a Joint Enquiry against three persons one of whom was a Government of Karnataka employee on deputation with the University was permissible only under the orders of the Chancellor and not the Syndicate. [SECTION] reads thus:-
"Joint Enquiry: (1) Where two or more employees are concerned in any case, the Chancellor or any other disciplinary authority competent to impose the penalty of dismissal from service on all such employees, may make an order directing that disciplinary action against all of them may be taken in a common proceedings:
Provided that if the authorities competent to impose the penalty of dismissal on such employees are different, an order for taking disciplinary action in a common proceeding shall be made by the Chancellor."
5. A learned Single Judge of this Court ([ENTITY], J.,) by his Judgment dated 5th of July, 1994, dismissed the Writ Petition, holding that [SECTION] (supra) had no application to the case, in hand as the same applied only when all those facing the Enquiry were employees of the University and not otherwise. The learned Single Judge also held that the appellant not having objected to the holding of a Joint Enquiry and having participated in the same, must be deemed to have acquiesced in the same and is therefore estopped from challenging the Enquiry at this stage.
[SECTION]. The appellant is aggrieved of the aforesaid Judgment and Order of the learned Single Judge and has filed the present Writ Appeal, challenging the correctness of the same.
7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length.
8. Shri. [ENTITY], learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge upon the provisions of [SECTION], was erroneous and irrational. He contended that, according to the view taken by the learned Single Judge, if only two University employees were involved in a given case, a Joint Enquiry against them would require the order of the highest of the University authorities namely the Chancellor, whereas, if a third delinquent was also to be proceeded against in any such Enquiry, the authority competent to institute the enquiry would be a lower authority like the Syndicate merely because the third delinquent was a Government employee on deputation with the University. This according to Mr. [ENTITY] was wholly illogical and any interpretation of [SECTION] which would lead to such an anomalous situation had to be avoided. He argued that if for holding a Joint Enquiry against two University employees the authority competent to direct such an Enquiry was the Chancellor, of the University, there was no reason why for the same Enquiry a lower body like the Syndicate should be held competent merely because apart from the two University employees a third employee not belonging to the University was also joined as a delinquent. He also, questioned the view taken by the learned Single Judge, that the appellant had acquiesced in the Enquiry and was therefore estopped from challenging the validity of the same. He urged that acquiescence could not confer jurisdiction upon the Syndicate to order a Joint Enquiry; or the Enquiry Officer to conduct the same, and therefore the dismissal of the Writ Petition of the appellant on that ground was improper.
9. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent-University on the other hand while supporting the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge for holding [SECTION] to be inapplicable, strenuously urged that the Writ Petition filed by the appellant was liable to be dismissed as the appellant had acquiesced in the jurisdiction and the competence of the Syndicate and the Inquiry Officer. He further urged that the appellant had not suffered any prejudice on account of holding of a Joint Enquiry and the technical objection raised by him should not be allowed to reverse the process leading to the finding of guilt returned against the appellant.
[SECTION]. Two Questions arise for our Consideration in this Appeal namely : (i) What is the true and correct interpretation of [SECTION] of the University Statutes and in particular whether the provisions thereof are attracted only to cases where all the employees facing the Domestic Enquiry are employees of the University as held by the learned Single Judge or the same would apply even to other cases as argued by the appellant? (ii) Whether the petitioner appellant herein had acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Syndicate to order a Joint Enquiry and the competence of the Enquiry Officer to conduct the same? If so, whether acquiescence on his part would be sufficient by itself to refuse to him a Writ of Certiorari against the said proceedings?
11. Since a finding on the second Question formulated above if returned against the appellant is bound to render a decision on the first question unnecessary, we propose to deal with second Question first.
12. Acquiescence on the part of an individual implies participation in proceedings without taking objections to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It suggests assent of the person acquiescing or his submission to the authority or jurisdiction of any such Tribunal. It is therefore necessary to look to the essential facts of each case suggestive of any such acceptance, assent or submission on the part of the person concerned to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or its nominee.
13. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the Syndicate had in exercise of its powers as Disciplinary Authority of the appellant passed a Resolution on the 27th of February 1993 to conduct a Joint Enquiry against the appellant and two others, which Resolution was later followed by another Resolution dated the 13th April, 1993, appointing Shri [ENTITY], retired District Judge, Bangalore as an Inquiry Officer. The fact that the charges framed against the appellant were drawn up by the order and in the name of the University/Syndicate, has also not been disputed as indeed the Memorandum of Charges served upon the appellant itself suggests that the same have been drawn in the name of the Syndicate.
14. Upon the commencement of the Inquiry proceedings, the appellant admittedly made an application before the Enquiry Officer seeking his permission to be defended by an Advocate. This application was turned down by the Inquiry Officer and the appellant was instructed to move the Disciplinary Authority, namely the Syndicate. The appellant, thereafter made a representation dated 21st May 1993 to the Syndicate seeking its permission to be defended by a Counsel before the Inquiry Officer. The Syndicate considered the said request and declined the same, as is apparent from the communication dated 28-[SECTION]-1993 sent to the appellant by the Registrar of the University.
15. Aggrieved by the refusal of the permission prayed for by the appellant, he filed [CASE NUMBER] in this Court, in which the appellant did not make any grievance either against the competence of the Syndicate who ordered the Joint Enquiry or the Inquiry Officer appointed to conduct the same. The appellant's grievance was limited only to the grant of permission to him to defend himself through a Lawyer. Upon the concession of the University, however, this privilege was granted to the appellant, who was thereafter defended before the Inquiry Officer by a Senior Advocate from Mysore. During the course of the Enquiry proceedings, at no stage did the appellant suggest either in writing or even orally that the Syndicate did not have the jurisdiction to order a Joint Enquiry against the delinquent or that in terms of [SECTION] (supra) such an Enquiry could be ordered only by the Chancellor. On the contrary, the appellant availed of the fullest opportunity before the Inquiry Officer to cross-examine the witnesses produced against him and adduce his own defence. It was only after the Registrar sent his communication dated 28-[SECTION]-1993 asking the appellant to make a representation if he so wanted against the Report submitted by the Inquiry Officer that the appellant for the first time came up with the plea that the Syndicate did not have any jurisdiction to order a Joint Enquiry in view of the provisions of [SECTION] as by that time the appellant had already known the result of the Enquiry and the findings of the Inquiry Officer. It is therefore, apparent that the challenge to the jurisdiction of the Syndicate and the Inquiry Officer came even though belatedly only after the appellant had known that the verdict of the Inquiry Officer had gone against him. All these facts have remained undisputed before us as also before the learned Single Judge, which if seen collectively clearly suggest that the appellant had acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Syndicate to order and the competence of the Inquiry Officer to hold a Joint Enquiry against him and the two others facing the charges with him. There is indeed no reason why if the appellant had any reservation about the competence of the Syndicate to order a Joint Enquiry, could such a plea be not raised by him in the Writ Petition which he filed in this Court seeking the assistance of a Lawyer for appearing before the Enquiry Officer in the very same Joint Enquiry. That was perhaps the most ideal stage for the appellant to raise this plea for not only was the Enquiry at an initial stage but even the appellant would have been justified in raising the plea without being accused of having acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Syndicate, this, however, did not happen. The appellant not only accepted the jurisdiction of the Syndicate to order a Joint enquiry against him but even sought its permission to defend himself at the stage of enquiry with the assistance of a Lawyer.
1[SECTION]. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the appellant had acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Syndicate and the Inquiry Officer to order and conduct a Joint Enquiry against him. He took a calculated chance to take a verdict in his favour in such a Joint Enquiry. Learned Counsel for appellant however, submitted by reference to an observation made by the Inquiry Officer that the validity of the Resolution of the Syndicate had been questioned by the appellant before the Inquiry Officer. In particular he relied upon the following few lines appearing in the Report submitted by the Inquiry Officer:-
"The learned Advocate for DELINQUENT No. 1 no doubt stated that the resolution itself is invalid resolution and that basis of disciplinary proceedings is invalid. It is not within my jurisdiction to find out whether the resolution is invalid nor is it my jurisdiction to question the legality of the proceedings. All that I am required to do is to find out facts which are the subject matter of the charges."
17. We are unable to read the above observations of the Inquiry Officer to mean a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Syndicate to direct a Joint Enquiry. All that the observations suggest is that some sort of objection to the validity of the Resolution of the Syndicate has been taken by the delinquent. There is, however, no elaboration of the objection nor does it appear to have been spelt out at any stage. The fact that the validity of the Resolution was questioned does not by itself suggest that the appellant had questioned the jurisdiction of the Syndicate to order a Joint Enquiry under [SECTION] (supra).
18. The question then is: what precisely is the legal effect of the acquiescence of the appellant? Mr. [ENTITY] contended before us that the Syndicate's action of instituting a Joint enquiry against the appellant, being inherently without jurisdiction, it did not matter whether an objection to the lack of its competence to have done so was taken at the first instance or at a belated stage like a Writ Petition, in the High Court. He urged that consent of the appellant, could not confer jurisdiction upon the Syndicate if it was found that it had no such jurisdiction otherwise, and therefore it was wholly immaterial whether or not the appellant had submitted or consented to the authority of the Syndicate. The argument does seem attractive on its face value, but fails to hold ground when given a closer look.
19. It is true, that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, of the parties where it does not otherwise inhere in the authority concerned; but it is equally true that the High Court can while exercising its extraordinary and discretionary powers under [SECTION] of the [ACT] decline to interfere with an order of a subordinate authority if it is satisfied that an objection relating to a defect of procedure or jurisdiction which would have been and ought to have been raised at the earliest opportunity was not so raised by the party complaining before it. The Rule that acquiescence of the party belatedly making a grievance about the jurisdiction of the subordinate authority disentitles him to invoke the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court, does not rest on the foundation that acquiescence, confers jurisdiction but on the rationale that the High Court will be justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a person who has either by reason of lack of diligence or by design remained on the fence, allowed the authority to pass an order and seeing that the same has gone against him turned round to challenge its competence, to have done so.
20. In any such situation, it would be reasonable to infer that the party making the grievance about the competence of the subordinate authority, acted unfairly in not raising the objection at the very outset; It would also be reasonable to assume that he did so, deliberately hoping that the final order to be passed by the authority would be in his favour, but finding it go against him, he attacks the same as being without jurisdiction. In other words the person concerned indulges in what may be termed as 'diluted deception' by keeping quite, when he was, in fairness to all those concerned with the proceedings before the authority, under an obligation to speak out. He attempts by his silence to secure a favourable verdict, which if given, would have buried for ever the question of competence of the authority to handle the subject matter. It is this trickery which the Courts have frowned upon by declining to interfere with the actions of subordinate authorities, where acquiescence or acceptance of their jurisdiction is manifested by the facts of a given case.
21. [ENTITY] in his Book "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" 3rd edition at pages-372-373 has brought out the distinction between the two situations namely cases where the decisions are, void for want of jurisdiction and could be avoided and others were even though they are void but with which the Court will not interfere on account of the applicant's conduct. The Author states thus:-
"A decision made without jurisdiction is void, and it cannot be validated by the express or implied consent of a party to the proceedings. It does not always follow, however, that a party adversely affected by a void decision will be able to have it set aside. As we have seen, certiorari and prohibition are, in general, discretionary remedies, and the conduct of the applicant may have been such as to desentitle him to a remedy."
"Whether the tribunal lacked jurisdiction is one question; whether the court, having regard to the applicant's conduct, ought in its discretion to set aside the proceedings is another. The confused state of the present law is due largely to a failure to recognise that these are two separate questions."
22. He also states in the same Book that a person who though aware of the defect or lack of jurisdiction does not raise any objection on that account and acquiesces and takes a chance of getting a decision in his favour will be disentitled to a Writ of Certiorari. It is fruitful to reproduce the following passage from the Book:-
"The right to certiorari or prohibition may be lost by acquiescence of implied waiver. Acquiescence means participation in proceedings without taking objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal once the facts giving ground for raising the objection are fully known. It may take the form of failing to object to the statutory qualification of a member of the tribunal, or (exceptionally) appealing to a higher tribunal against the decision of the tribunal of first instance without raising the question of jurisdiction."
23. Let us now examine the Judgments that were cited at the Bar by the learned Counsel for the parties.
24. In [PRECEDENT] , one of the objections raised to the maintainability of the Writ Petition was that the plea of lack of jurisdiction of State Government to sit in appeal over the decision of the State Transport Authority had not been raised before the Government. It was contended that the petitioners were quite content to permit the Government to hear the appeal preferred before it and that if the Government had decided in favour of the petitioners nothing would have been heard further about the jurisdiction of the Government to hear the appeals from the order in question. But since the GOVErnment had decided against the petitioners, they challenged the decision as being without jurisdiction. Dealing with this argument, the Division Bench held that under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT], the High Court does not exercise an ordinary jurisdiction. It was always open to the petitioner to assert his rights in a suit properly filed but when he chooses to assert his rights by calling upon the High Court to exercise its special jurisdiction, the High Court must itself lay down certain principles for the exercise of that jurisdiction and must not make the exercise of that jurisdiction a matter of ordinary occurrence. The Court pointed out the distinction between issues pertaining to jurisdiction raised before an ordinary Civil Court and those raised before the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary Writ powers. It was pointed out that a defendant may not raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance, he may not raise the question of jurisdiction in the appellate Court, he may postpone raising the question of jurisdiction even upto the stage of the Privy Council or the Supreme Court, yet if the Court has no jurisdiction the Highest Court in the land will allow the point to be raised and decide it in favour of the defendant. But the principle with regard to the exercise of the Writ jurisdiction, were held to be different. [ENTITY] C.J., in his characteristic style observed thus:-
"The Court must tell the petitioner; 'It was open to you to raise that point before the tribunal whose order you are challenging. You have sat on the fence, you have taken a chance of the tribunal deciding in your favour, and it is not open to you now to come to us' and ask for a writ."
"As we have already pointed out, the question is not that if the Government's decision was without jurisdiction it became a competent decision merely because the petitioners did not object to the jurisdiction. But the question is whether the petitioners not having challenged the jurisdiction of the Government, this Court will give them relief by exercising ' its very special and discretionary jurisdiction."
25. Again in [PRECEDENT] , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the petitioners had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to whom their cases were transferred. Having so surrendered to the jurisdiction, the petitioners questioned the Authority of the Income-tax Officer, by way of a Writ Petition filed before the Supreme Court under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. The Supreme Court declined to permit the petitioners to raise the plea and observed thus:-
"If they (petitioners) acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their cases were transferred, they were certainly not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under [SECTION]. It is well settled that such conduct of the petitioners would disentitle them to any relief at the hands of this Court."
2[SECTION]. A Division Bench of this Court in C.R. GOWDA v. THE MYSORE REVENUE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL BANGALORE AND ORS., AIR 19[SECTION]5 Mysore 41. had an occasion to deal with a similar situation. In that case, the constitution of the Regional Transport Authority was challenged and so also the proceedings conducted by it as being void. The question that arose was whether such a plea could be raised belatedly by the petitioner in Writ proceedings before the High Court after he had submitted to the jurisdiction of the authority, taken a chance for a favourable Judgment but lost. This Court relying upon an earlier Judgment in Civil Petition No. 419/19[SECTION]1 decided on 23rd of August, 19[SECTION]3, by another Division Bench, held that the power of the High Court in terms of [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT] was discretionary and a party who had not challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal but submitted to it and taken a chance for a favourable decision, cannot be allowed to turn round when the decision goes against him to challenge the jurisdiction of the very Tribunal. It is fruitful to quote the relevant passage from the Judgment in Civil Petition No. 419 of 19[SECTION]1:-
"By refusing to exercise its discretionary power under [SECTION] & [SECTION] of the [ACT], it is plain that the High Court is not holding that the petitioner by not challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal confers jurisdiction upon it if that Tribunal has, in fact, no jurisdiction, but simply tells him that he by his own conduct is precluded from invoking its discretionary powers under the writ jurisdiction, no matter whether the proceedings which he seeks to quash are without jurisdiction. If they are without jurisdiction, it is true that no conduct of the party will make them with jurisdiction. But such considerations do not affect the principle on whom the Court acts in granting or refusing to grant the writ of certiorari."
Relying upon the aforesaid observations, this Court held thus:-
"The petitioner must have been all along aware of the alleged defect in the constitution of the R.T.A. Yet, he did not raise any objection on that score, but took a chance of his succeeding in the proceedings before it. If the petitioner had succeeded before the R.T.A., we would not have heard any thing further from him about any defect in the constitution of that body. Having regard to the principles discussed above, it is clear that he is precluded by his own conduct, from now putting forward the contention that the R.T.A. had not been properly constituted. Therefore, the last ground of attack also cannot, in any way, be helpful to the petitioner."
27. An identical question once again arose before another Division Bench of this Court in SAYED HASSAN ALI, HYDERABAD v. STATE OF MYSORE AND ORS., AIR 19[SECTION]5 Mysore 283 : 19[SECTION]5(1) Mys.L.J. 22, where their Lordships once again declined to allow the question of jurisdiction urged before it on the ground that the petitioner had not raised the said point at the earliest available opportunity and had taken a chance to get a verdict in his favour. This Court observed thus:-
"Even assuming that the Enquiry Officer has not been properly nominated, we are of opinion that the petitioner having acquiesced and submitted to the jurisdiction and having taken part in the enquiry without objecting to the same, should not be permitted, at this stage, to turn round and contend that the Enquiry Officer was not competent to hold the enquiry. When the enquiry started, the petitioner should have raised this point and objected to the enquiry being held by the said officer. The petitioner has not done so. The records show that the petitioner objected to the enquiry being held by Sri. [ENTITY]. He never contended that the Enquiry Officer was not competent to hold the enquiry. At his request another Enquiry Officer was nominated. The petitioner willingly went through the enquiry without any objection. 30 witnesses were examined for the prosecution and the petitioner himself examined 5 D.Ws. It is not open to the petitioner, after the whole enquiry is over and after the Enquiry Officer has found against him, to now turn round and contend that the officer was not competent to hold the enquiry."
28. In [PRECEDENT]., , the challenge to the consolidation proceedings initiated by the Consolidation Officer appointed retrospectively failed before the High Court on the ground that the petitioner had not questioned the power of the Consolidation Officer or his appointment at the appropriate stage. In an Appeal to the Supreme Court, the grounds of challenge were reiterated but the Court held that even when there was substance in the challenge to the validity of the retrospective appointment of the Consolidation Officer, the High Court had rightly declined to allow the petitioner to urge the said ground. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held thus:-
"There seems to be substance in the first two points. It seems to us clear before a person can start acting as a Consolidation Officer he must be appointed as such. Before he is appointed he has no authority to exercise any of the functions of a Consolidation Officer. What he does purporting to act as a Consolidation Officer has no binding force on the owners and other persons affected in the estate. The Government cannot by appointing him retrospectively clothe him with authority retrospectively. This can be done only by the Legislature subject to the provisions of the [ACT].
But the appellant cannot succeed on these grounds because the High Court in its discretion, has held that the appellant is not entitled to rely on these objections because of laches. We cannot say that the discretion has been exercised wrongly. After the notification was published on May 11, 19[SECTION]2, appointing [ENTITY] retrospectively with effect from November 4, 19[SECTION]1, it must have been clear to the appellant that [ENTITY] had not been appointed Consolidation Officer before he started preparing consolidation proceedings. No adequate explanation has been given for the delay. Further it has not been shown that there has been any manifest injustice."
29. In [PRECEDENT]. , the validity of the notification under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT], were challenged after the entire Acquisition process had been completed. The question was whether such a challenge could be allowed to succeed. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the notifications in question holding that a challenge to these notifications after the acquisition had been completed would amount to putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The Court observed thus:-
"to have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under [SECTION] and the declaration under [SECTION] were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics."
30. Learned Counsel for appellant however, urged on the authority of a Judgment of the Single Judge of this Court in [PRECEDENT], that a Joint Enquiry if ordered by a person not competent to do so, could be avoided even when the challenge to the jurisdiction of the authority instituting such inquiry was raised at a stage after the conclusion of the Enquiry proceedings. In that case the Joint Enquiry had been instituted contrary to the provisions of [SECTION] of the Rules framed under the [ACT]. After the conclusion of the enquiry against the delinquent, he filed an appeal in which he questioned the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Police to order a Joint Enquiry. In the peculiar facts of that case, this Court held that the plea regarding the competence of the Superintendent of Police to institute a Joint Enquiry having been raised before the Appellate Authority namely the Inspector General of Police, the Appellate Authority ought to have examined the said plea and directed a de novo Enquiry. The argument advanced before the learned Single Judge that the petitioner had acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Police, who ordered a Joint Enquiry did not find favour with him nor was the ratio in [ENTITY] v. State of Mysore followed. In our opinion, the case in hand is close in analogy to the facts of [ENTITY]'s case. The Judgment in [ENTITY]'s case, does not in our opinion deal with the argument of acquiescence in depth and is therefore not an authority for the proposition that the delinquent employee can even after acquiescing in the jurisdiction of the authority and having taken a chance of getting a favourable verdict turn round and question the said jurisdiction in Writ proceedings.
31. The above Judgment was followed by the same learned Single Judge ([ENTITY] J., as His Lordship then was) in a subsequent case reported in [PRECEDENT]. The later Judgment does not make any additional contribution to the line of reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge in [ENTITY]'s case. Both these Judgments in our opinion, therefore are confined to the facts of the two cases in which they were delivered and would not provide any assistance to the appellant in the instant case.
32. There is yet another aspect of the matter to which we must advert at this stage. This pertains to the absence of any prejudice to the appellant on account of the holding of a Joint Enquiry. It is not in dispute that the Syndicate is the Disciplinary Authority so far as the appellant is concerned. The initiation of an enquiry and the imposition of a punishment in so far as appellant is concerned rests with the Syndicate alone. It is only because of the Enquiry being joint so far as the appellant and two others are concerned that the question of jurisdiction of Syndicate to order such an enquiry has arisen. What is significant to note is that so far as the appellant is concerned he did not face an enquiry nor is he being punished on the basis of any such Enquiry ordered by an authority other than the authority competent to proceed against him if the Enquiry was to be held against him individually. It is not therefore a case where prejudice may be implicit on account of an authority incompetent to order an enquiry or impose a punishment having taken some action against the delinquent employee. That apart, the appellant has not claimed any prejudice either in the Writ Petition or in Appeal before us by reason of holding of a Joint Enquiry. In the course of the hearing of this Appeal we specifically asked the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant as to whether the appellant had been prejudiced in any manner by reason of the conduct of a Joint Enquiry against him, His answer was in the negative. He, however, contended that it was not a case where the appellant claimed relief on the basis of any prejudice caused to him. The appellant's case, contended the learned Counsel, rests entirely on lack of jurisdiction in the Syndicate to order a Joint Enquiry against him. In other words, the appellant banks more on the letter of the provisions of the [SECTION] of the University Statutes, than any prejudice which he may have suffered. That being so, even assuming that [SECTION] was of any assistance to the appellant, on the interpretation placed by him, the absence of any prejudice by reason of holding of a Joint Enquiry, supports the view taken by us that the appellant had wavied his objection as to the competence of the Syndicate to order a Joint Enquiry. The appellant cannot therefore, after the Enquiry result has gone against him make a grievance on the ground that the Joint Enquiry was ordered without jurisdiction.
33. Before parting with the discussion on this point we may also observe that if the appellant had taken up the contention regarding legality of a Joint Enquiry at the initial stages of the Enquiry, the respondent-authorities could have easily put their house in order and got the necessary approval from the Chancellor. Even assuming that [SECTION] was attracted, that opportunity was lost to the respondent by the non-raising of such a contention by the appellant at the initial stages of the Enquiry. On the other hand, as noted earlier he allowed the Enquiry to merrily proceed to its logical end took a chance of a favourable verdict and ultimately having found that the Report had gone against him, he turned-round and sought to challenge the Report on such a technical plea. This conduct on the part of the appellant has resulted in the respondent irritrievably changing their position to their detriment and consequently even on the ground of estoppel the appellant cannot raise such a contention after the gamut of the entire enquiry is order and the Report has gone against him.
34. In that view of the matter, we find no reason to interfere with the Judgment impugned nor do we consider it necessary to pronounce upon the question as to the true scope and ambit of [SECTION]. We leave that question open.
35. In the result this Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.