ORDER [ENTITY], C.J.
1. The petitioner's application under [SECTION] of the [ACT], for recovery from the employer, namely, respondent 1, [ENTITY], of the difference in wages actually paid to him for the period from 3 September 1960 to 22 June 1961 and the wages payable to him under the [ACT], has been rejected by the labor court, Raipur, on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the application. The petitioner now seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing this determination of the labour court.
2. [SECTION] of the Act of 1947 is as follows:
33C (1). Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of [SECTION], the workman may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is to due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any bone fit which is capable of being competed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be competed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, and the amount 50 determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-section (1).
(3) * * * It was not disputed by Sri [ENTITY], learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the applicant could have applied under [SECTION] of the [ACT], within the prescribed time, to the authority under that Act for a direction to the employer to pay him the afoieeaid difference in wages, He, however, urged, on the authority of [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT] that under [SECTION] a workman could apply to the labour court for recovery of the wages due to him under [SECTION] of the [ACT], and that the remedy given to him under [SECTION] was in addition to the remedy available under [SECTION] of the [ACT].
3. We are unable to accede to this contention. It will be seen that tae claims which are dealt with by [SECTION] are claims referable to those "auder a settlement or an award or under the provisions of [SECTION] " of the Act. A claim for payment of the differance in wages actually paid to a workmen and payable to him under the [ACT]. is clearly not a claim under any settlement or an award or under the provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. [SECTION] is concerned with tae computation in terms of money of any benefit, whether monetary or non-monetary, to which a workman may be entitled and the recovery of tae amount determined of the benefit. The scope of this sub-section has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] by making the following observations-
Further, If we compare Sub-section (1) with Sub-section (2) of this section, it will appear that Sub-section (1) applies to cases where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of [SECTION] and that contemplates that the amount is already computed or calculated or at any rate there can be no dispute about the computation or calculation; while Sub-section (2) applies to cases where though the monetary benefit has been conferred on a workman under an award, it has not been calculated or computed in the award itself, and there is dispute as to its calculation or computation. It cannot, therefore, be said lot king to the words used in Sub-section (2) that it only applies to cases of non-monetary benefit which has to be converted in Exams of money, It appears to us that it can also apply to monetary benefits to which a workman may be entitled which have not been calculated or computed, say, for example, in an award and about their calculation or computation there is dispute between the workman and the employer.
4. In [PRECEDENT] (vide supra), the Supreme Court has, no doubt, pointed out that the scope of [SECTION] is not limited by the use of the wards "under a settlement or an award or udder the provisions of [SECTION]" and is thus wider than that of [SECTION]; that the three categories of claims mentioned in [SECTION] no doubt fall under [SECTION]; but it is possible that claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the Provisions of Cnap. V-A., may also be competent under [SECTION].
We are unable, however, to read the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] vide supra suggesting the possibility of claims other than those under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of [SECTION] as including a claim which could be made under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. The illustrations given in the Supreme Court's decision itself of the claims that might fall under [SECTION] abundantly indicate that the claims which would be competent under [SECTION] before a labour court, besides the claims under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of [SECTION], are those which would fall under the Act of 1947 itself. The observation of the Supreme Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] vide supra with regard to the wide scope of [SECTION] must be read so as to make it consistent with the observations of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT]. In that case, pointing out the scope of the Jurisdiction of the Authority under [ACT], the Supreme Court said:
[SECTION] confers jurisdiction on the authority appointed under the said section to hear and decide for any epecified area claims arising out of deductions from wages, or delay in payment of wages, of persons employed or paid in that area. It is thus clear that the only claims which can be entertained by the authority are claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages The jurisdiction thus conferred on the authority to deal with these two categories of claims is exclusive, for [SECTION]; of the Act provides that matters which lie within the jurisdiction of the authority are excluded from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil Courts.
(Italicizing is ours.) In the face of these observations of the Supreme Court in the case of [PRECEDENT] vide supra there is no justification what cover the reading the observations in the case of [PRECEDENT] vide supra as meaning than a claim which could have been made under [SECTION] of the [ACT], could also be made under [SECTION] of the [ACT], 1947.In our opinion, the dealsloa of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] (vide supra) concludes the question of the competency of the labour court to entertain the application under [SECTION] of the [ACT], tiled by the petitioner for recovery of the differance in wages claimed by him.
5. The matter is also concluded by the decision of a [ENTITY] of this Court in Surafmal Mihta v. Authority, [ACT] 1965-I LL J. 274. That was a case where the question arose whether the Authority under the [ACT] could entertain an application under [SECTION] of that Act for a direction to the employer to pay to its workers compensation under [SECTION] of the [ACT], While holding that the authority had no Jurisdiction to entertain the application, it was observed by this Court that:
Both the [ACT] and the [ACT] are special Acts. The first Act relates to the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and provides for matters dealt with by various provisions of that Act. The [ACT] is also a special Act because it only regulates the payment of wages to a certain class of persons employed in any industry and its main purpose it to determine all claims of workmen arising out of deductions from their wages or delay in their payment. The provisions of both these Acts cannot be construed in a manner our tailing the operation of one act by the other. That construction of [SECTION] of the [ACT] and [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT] mast be adopted which would avoid repugnancy or redundancy and which gives effect to both the enactments.
In our opinion, there is no indication whatsoever, either in [SECTION] of the [ACT] or in [SECTION] of the [ACT] or in the Supreme Court decision in the case of [PRECEDENT] (vide supra), that the scope of [SECTION] is wide enough to include claims under [SECTION] of the [ACT].
6. The decision of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] (vide supra) cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is of no assistance to the applicant. In that case, the question that was considered was whether there was any period of limitation for an application under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. While holding that there was no period of limitation, the Supreme Court said that the application of [SECTION] of the [ACT] to applications under [SECTION] was not justified and the fact that for recovery of wages limitation has been prescribed by the [ACT] would also not justify the intrcduction of considerations of limitation in regard to proceedings taken under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. In that case. certain workmen had applied to the labour court under [SECTION] for computing the benefit in terms of money to which they said they were entitled under an award and for payment of the same to them, and the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider whether the jurisdiction of the Authority under [SECTION] of the [ACT] was exclusive. The observation of the Supreme Court in the Case of [PRECEDENT] (vide supra) that the fact that for recovery of wages limitation has been prescribed by the [ACT] did not justify the introduction of considerations of limitation in regard to proceedings under [SECTION] or the [ACT], does not afford any justification whatsoever for holding that a claim, which can be made under [SECTION] of the [ACT], can also be made under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Learned counsel also referred us to the decision of the Bombay High Court in [PRECEDENT], That decision has no bearing here.
7. For all these reasons, our conclusion is that the labour court was right in holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's application under [SECTION] of the [ACT], for recovery of the difference in wages actually paid to him for the period from 3 September 1960 to 22 Jane 1961 and the wages payable to him under the [ACT]. The result is that this petition is dismissed with costs of respondent 1. Counsel's fee is fixed at Us. 100. The outstanding amount of security deposit if any, after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner,