ORDER
The petitioner is running a Soda and Cool drink stall in Rajampet bus station. It is under the administrative control of the respondent herein. The petitioner has been awarded a licence for a period of three years commencing from 1-4-1999 to 31-3-2002 on payment of a monthly licence fee of Rs.8,009/-. Under the terms of agreement governing the relationship between the parties dated 30-4-1999 there are incorporated various rights and obligation of the respective parties.
2. By the order of the respondent dated 24-2-2001, the licence awarded to the petitioner has been terminated with immediate effect and the security deposit lying in credit with the Corporation has been directed to be forfeited after adjusting the licence fee due from the petitioner to the Corporation. This order has been passed on the ground that a notice dated 21-12-2000 has been served on the petitioner for breach of the terms and conditions set out in the deed of licence and that despite receipt of notice, the petitioner neither offered explanation nor improved the performance i.e., payment of licence fee without any dues.
3. After termination of the licence in favour of the petitioner, the respondent is stated to have issued a tender notification dated 3-3-2001 calling for tenders in respect of the Soda and Cool drink stall for which licence has been granted to the petitioner, as already stated.
4. After receipt of the order of termination of licence dated 24-2-2001, the petitioner approached the respondent and informed that he has not been served any show-cause notice as asserted in the order of termination and sought furnishing of a copy of the said show-cause notice. A xerox copy of the said show-cause notice was thereupon furnished to the petitioner by the respondent. Thereafter the petitioner paid a sum of Rs. 16,018/- towards arrears of licence fee on 9-2-2001 and again offered to pay further sum of Rs.42,548/- by way of two demand drafts dated 14-3-2001 towards arrears of licence fee and the licence fee of March 2001. These were, however, refused by the respondent.
5. Asserting that as on date he is not in arrears of any licence fee, that the show-cause notice dated 21-12-2000 has not been received by him, that there are no particulars in the show-cause notice as to the month for which he is in arrears, that the exercise of power of termination by the respondent is contrary to the terms of agreement between the parties qua which he. has been granted the licence, the petitioner is before this Court for appropriate relief.
6. It is strenuously asserted by Sri [ENTITY], learned Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent being an instrumentality of the State is bound in all facets of its functioning by the [ACT]al and Public Law injunctions in particular to act fairly in its dealings with the public. Every action of a State instrumentality is bound to answer to the requirements of non-arbitrariness and fair dealing with the public, qua the equality injunctions of the [ACT] which are emanations of [SECTION] of the [ACT] is the contention. It is asserted by Sri [ENTITY] that the question whether the relationship between the parties arises out of a statutory instrument or a non-statutory instrument like a commercial contract or even a licence for that matter, is irrelevant to determine whether the conduct of the respondent would fall to be considered under the parameters of public law or need to be adjudicated before a private law forum such as the Court of competent civil jurisdiction. On these empirical assertions, the petitioner seeks relief under the rubric of [SECTION] of the [ACT].
7. As early as in [ENTITY] v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496, the Apex Court had an occasion to set various parameters in the matter of contractual relations of a State or instrumentality of State for the purpose of analysing the species of conduct of a State authority which may appropriately be considered within the public law domain. The Supreme Court held that actions of a State or instrumentality of State at the threshold of entering into a contract fall to be considered in public law parameters and are reviewable under [SECTION] of the [ACT] on the touch stone of the substantive obligations and limitations enjoined on such State action under various [ACT]al edicts. In post threshold non-slatutory areas of commercial contract between the State and a citizen or a member of the public where the lis is as to the obligations of either of the parties under the terms of such contract, the Supreme Court has categorically held that the remedy under [SECTION] of the [ACT] cannot be resorted to.
8. This broad theme and principle enunicated by the Supreme Court in [ENTITY]s 's case (supra) and even earlier, has broadly been asserted since then and is the current governing principle. This is so particularly in case of commercial contracts entered into between the State and a citizen. Other areas like a contract of service have developed on distinct and discreet principles marking a slight departure from this principle but so far as the commercial contracts are concerned, the principle has been broadly consistent with the ratio enunciated in [ENTITY] vide [PRECEDENT], ; [PRECEDENT], ; [PRECEDENT], ; and [PRECEDENT], .
9. In the case on hand, the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent, is manifestly not traceable to the statutory power of the respondent in its classical form, may be it is a facet of the general executive power of the respondent to enter into a contract, as is the case of power available to a State to enter into a contract under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Even in respect of the power to enter into a contract available to a State under the presents of the [ACT], the Supreme Court had an occasion to make observations that the contractual relations may not be amenable to judicial scrutiny vide [PRECEDENT], . There is thus a broad linear principle emerging, that post threshold contractual activities of State or its instrumentality are not amenable to judicial scrutiny in the public law area.
10. In the circumstances above, I am not inclined to exercise the discretion to adjudicate the dispute of the petitioner. It is not as if the petitioner is without a remedy. He has a plenitude of remedies available by way of recourse to the competent Court of civil jurisdiction by way of appropriate civil proceedings.
11. In the totality of the circumstances, I see no merit in the writ petition, dismissed. No order as to costs.