JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. Conflicting decisions on the interpretation of [SECTION], [ACT] and its effect on [SECTION] of the [ACT], have given rise to the following question:-
Whether the period of one year prescribed in [SECTION], [ACT] is applicable to contempt proceedings under [SECTION] of the [ACT], in respect of Contempt of High Court?
2. In HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA v. Y.K. SUBBANNA (Contempt of Court Case - Criminal - 8/84) a Bench consisting of DRVJ and KBNJ framed the following questions for consideration:-
"(1) Whether the period of limitation prescribed by [SECTION] of the Act is attracted to case of contempt of the High Court which is a Court of Record initiated under [SECTION] of the [ACT]?
(2) What are the material dates for purposes for [SECTION] of the Act?"
3. It was held that the period of limitation prescribed in [SECTION] of the [ACT] applies to proceedings initiated by the High Court for contempt of itself. Consequently it was held that the limitation of one year would commence from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. This was reiteration of the view expressed in [PRECEDENT] .
4. In [PRECEDENT] , Bench consisting of Mr. [ENTITY], J and Mr. [ENTITY], J, held that the period of one year in [SECTION] applies to proceedings for contempt of subordinate Courts in which the High Court exercises power under the [ACT] and would not apply to cases under [SECTION] of the [ACT] in contempt proceedings against itself.
5. In all the above cases the 'contempt' complained of was that of this Court; hence the question which needs examinations is whether the power of this Court to initiate proceedings for contempt against itself is controlled by [SECTION] of the [ACT]. [SECTION] of the [ACT] reads thus:
"[SECTION], Limitation for action for contempt-No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
6. In the first of these cases namely, [PRECEDENT], as rightly pointed out in [ENTITY]'s case, contention relying on [SECTION], [ACT], with reference to [SECTION], [ACT] was neither raised nor considered. But it was nevertheless held that contempt proceedings arising out of proceedings in this Court initiated after one year, from the alleged date of commission, could not be entertained. The opinion of the Bench in [ENTITY]'s case finds support from similar observations in an order of (earned single Judge of Calcutta High Court in [PRECEDENT] .
7. Before considering the amplitude of this provision, as a cautious approach, it is necessary to state that a ruling of this Court or the Supreme Court is an authority for what it decides. It is the ratio of the decision which assumes the character of precedent. A reference to certain statutory provisions in the course of discussion becomes inevitable to understand the scope, ambit, application of several matters which the legislation intends to enact. The various chapters in a Statute are intended to deal with several topics and allied situations in tackling the problems for which the Act is enacted. It is axiomatic that no provision is redundant. Therefore if the legislature bearing in mind the several aspects and the object makes provisions in several Sections, the Courts are required to find out the scope and the area of operation of each Section. In this endeavour reference to a provision, which in the given context becomes necessary would not mean that the referred provision has a bearing on the question in issue. Before concluding that the provision so referred has a bearing on the issue debated, it may become necessary to scrutinize the Section and its applicability to the subject dealt with by the other statutory provisions. To infer that because the provision is referred it has a bearing or relevance to the question posed for consideration would be fallacious. In the light of this discussion, the reasoning adopted in [PRECEDENT] with reference to [ENTITY]'S CASE and [ENTITY] cannot commend acceptance. The observation of the Bench reads thus:
"The reference to [SECTION] even though the question of limitation did not arise for consideration in the case is a pointer to the conclusion that the Apex Court has taken the view that [SECTION] is applicable to cases of contempts of the High Courts also."
Again in para 87 it is observed thus:
"It is clear from the facts in the case as well the observations, excerpted above, that the Supreme Court has expressly referred to [SECTION] in connection with the powers of the High Court under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. The observations of the Supreme Court in the two cases cited supra, in our opinion, show that [SECTION] would be attracted even in respect of proceedings for contempt initiated for contempt of the High Court."
8. Having cleared this ground, let me advert to entry 41 of List III which reads:
"Contempt of Court but not including contempt of the Supreme Court."
9. The learned Judges of the Bench in [PRECEDENT]'s case (supra) held that the power to legislate in respect of "Contempt of Court" includes the initiation of proceeding by all Courts including High Court. Sustenance for this view is derived from the words "excluding the matters pertaining to contempt of Supreme Court". While these words exclude the matters pertaining to contempt of Supreme Court, they do not enlarge the interpretation of the words "Contempt of Court" to hold that the legislature can make a law to confer jurisdiction on the High Court in respect of contempt of itself, as if such power had not existed earlier.
1[SECTION]. Existence of powers of the High Court in this regard is welt established by the Judgment of Supreme Court in the following cases:-
In [PRECEDENT] it is observed thus:
" The High Court's powers for punishment of contempt have been preserved by the [ACT] and they are also inherent in a Court of Record. The learned Judges were perhaps in error in describing it as contempt in facie curiae. That is contempt of a different sort. This was contempt by disobedience of an order of the High Court which is sometimes a civil contempt punishable under the [ACT] and sometimes a criminal contempt punishable by imprisonment "
Again in [PRECEDENT] , It was observed thus:
" so far as contempt of the High Court itself is concerned, as distinguished from that of a Court subordinate to it, the [ACT] vests these rights in every High Court, and so no Act of a legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority "
11. Therefore it is clear that even without the [ACT], the High Court possesses power to take action regarding the contempt of itself.
12. Next question is, whether this power could be curtailed, abridged or restricted by legislation under the above Entry. The period of one year prescribed in [SECTION] of the [ACT] as the optimum period makes the power non-exercisable after that period. It follows that the Highest Court, in the State becomes powerless to take any action for contempt of itself by technical rule of limitation, notwithstanding the fact that it derives its power, as a Court of record and from the [ACT]. Its power in the given context could only be abridged or deprived by express provision In the [ACT] itself.
13. As observed by Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT]'s case (supra) the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under [SECTION] to punish for contempt of itself is a special one, not arising or derived from the [ACT].
14. Dealing with this question, a learned Judge of Calcutta High Court observed thus in [PRECEDENT] (supra).
" I accept the submissions of Mr. [ENTITY] and hold that [ACT] cannot define, limit or regulate the High Court's power under [SECTION] to punish for contempt of itself summarily. [SECTION] and [SECTION] are ultra vires [SECTION]. [SECTION] however, can co-exist with the summary powers of the High Courts only as an alternative or additional procedure so far as [SECTION] is concerned and non-compliances thereof will not affect High Court's power to punish. [ACT] also can co-exist as laying down the law for contempt of Courts subordinate to High Courts."
15. We respectfully agree except that we are not called upon to decide the vires of [SECTION] and [SECTION], on that question we express no opinion. Therefore our conclusion is that the period of one year in [SECTION] of the [ACT] is applicable only in respect of contempt of subordinate Courts. It has no application in cases of contempt of High Court; the power conferred under [SECTION] of the [ACT] is absolute and unfettered. It may be that in a given case Court may decline to take action due to delay but that is in exercise of its jurisdiction and 'just' discretion.
16. For the foregoing, while approving the decision in [ENTITY] v. Shivakumar, the decisions in
1. [PRECEDENT] and
2. [PRECEDENT] are overruled. Ordered accordingly.