[CASE NUMBER] 9.10.2013 [ENTITY],learnedGovernmentAdvocateforthe petitioner. ThispetitionunderArticle226/227oftheConstitutionof Indiaisdirectedagainsttheorderdated9.6.2001,passedbythe LabourCourtRewaandorderdated27.2.2002,passedbythe Industrial Court, Rewa. The petitioner also challenges the orderdated25.7.2012and20.12.2012. By order dated 9.6.2001 Labour Court allowed the application under [SECTION] read with [SECTION] [ACT], filed by respondent, seeking
classificationaspermanentemployee,whereas,byorderdated 27.2.2002,anappealpreferredbythepetitionerhereinagainst theorderofpermanentclassification,hasbeendismissed.
Grievanceputforthbythepetitioneristhat,theLabour CourtaswellastheIndustrialCourtfailedtoappreciatethat respondentSurendraPrasadTiwariwasengagedasdailywages labourerandthesamewasnotagainstanyvacantpostnorany recruitmentprocessknowntolaw,hasbeenresortedto,while engaginghim.Itiscontendedthat,respondent/workmenwas neveremployedasaWaterman.Itisurgedthat,thisfactthat workmen was engaged on daily wages and there were no sanctioned post against which he was engaged was duly admittedbytheworkmenbeforetheLabourCourtandyetthe Labour Court while shifting the burden on the petitioner employer passed an award in favour of the respondent/workmen classifying him as a permanent employee.Itisurgedthat,eventheIndustrialCourtcommitted thesamefollyinaffirmingtheorderpassedbyLabourCourt.It iscontendedthat,interpretationbyLabourCourtaswellasthe IndustrialCourtofClause2(i)ofStatutoryStandingOrdersto theextentthat,immediatelyaftercompletionofsixmonths,a workman acquires a right to be classified as an permanent employee,suffersfromviceofperversityinabsenceofcogent proof regarding the fact that such appointment was against clearvacancyandthatworkmenhassatisfactorilydischarged hisdutiesonsuchposts.
In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitionerreliesuponthejudgmentsoftheSupremeCourtin [ENTITY].IndoreDevelopmentAuthority andothers;(2005)1SCC639,M.P.HousingBoardandanother v.ManojShrivastava;(2006)2SCC702andjudgmentofthis CourtinM.P.S.R.T.Corporation,Bhopalandothersv.Awdesh PratapSinghandothers;1979MPLJ325.
Therecanbenodoubtaboutthepropositionlaiddown bythecasesreferredtobylearnedcounselforthepetitioner thatapersonwithaviewtoobtainthestatusofanemployee,is underobligationtoestablishthattheappointmentwasagainst thevacantpost.
Intheinstantcase,however,thefactsasborneoutfrom recordwouldnotwarrantanyinterference.Therecordreveals that against the order dated 9.6.2001 passed by the Labour Court, petitioners preferred an appeal under [SECTION] of M.P.I.R.Act,1960.Thesaidappealwasdismissedon27.2.2002.
The petitioner did not challenge the order nor in furtherance thereto they classified the respondent as permanent which led the respondent to file an application under [SECTION] of [ACT] for issuance of Revenue Recovery Certificate. In a proceeding [SECTION],thepetitionershereincontested theclaimbyrespondentWorkman. TheLabourCourttaking into consideration that the respondent workmanhas already beenclassifiedaspermanentdiscardedtheobjectionraisedby petitionerandgrantedRs.6,19,366/beingdifferenceofwages anddirectedforissuanceofR.R.Cforrecoveryofthesameby order dated 25.7.2012. That, against the order passed in a proceeding under [SECTION] of [ACT], the petitioners preferredanappealbeforetheIndustrialCourt,Rewa,which cametobedismissedbyorderdated20.12.2012.
Section108of1960Actprovidesforthattheamountof any fine imposed, any costs or back wages awarded or any compensationorsubsistenceallowancedirectedtobepaidby any Court under the Act shall be recoverable by the Labour Courtinthemannerprovidedforrecoveryoffinesunderthe [ACT]
Thus, the respondent having been classified as permanentWatermanbyorderpassedon9.6.2001itwaswithin the competence of Labour Court to have computed the difference of wages and directed for recovery of difference amount through R.R.C It is at this stage that the petitioner employer has taken steps to challenge the order passed by Labour Court on 9.6.2001, affirmed in appeal decided on 27.2.2002. The question is when the right in favour of a workmanhasbeencrystallized,anemployercanbepermitted todestabilizethesameatabelatedstage.
Trite it is that delay and laches which lead to crystallization of right in favour of a person, disentitles the othertoseekremedyintheCourtofLaw.DivisionBenchofthis CourtinFocusEnergyLtd.(M/s)v.GovernmentofIndia,(DB) I.L.R.(2011)M.P.53;relyinguponjudgmentsoftheApexCourt observed "10 Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible conclusion that appellant is guilty of delay and laches. Its conduct disentitles it to any relief. In [PRECEDENT] exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In [PRECEDENT] the Supreme Court has observed that discretionaryreliefcanbeprovidedtoonewhohas not by his act or conduct given a gobye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolentlitigant.[PRECEDENT] it has been held thatwherethirdpartyrightsarecreated,theHigh Court should not interfere. Similarly, in [ENTITY] (supra) it has been held that the Court exercising public law jurisdiction does notencourageagitationofstateclaimswherethe right of third parties crystallizes in the interregnum."
Inviewofabove,whilenotdisputingthepropositionof lawlaiddowninthecasesofMahendraL.Jain(supra),M.P. HousingBoard(supra)andM.P.S.R.T.Corporation(supra),we dismissthepetitiononthegroundofdelayandlaches.
In the result, petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Howevernocosts.
([ENTITY]) JUDGE [ENTITY]