JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. By this common judgment, two [CASE NUMBER] can conveniently be disposed of together because both these petitions arise out of the same order dated 25.9.1999 passed by the learned Rent Controller, Panipat. Vide the impugned order, the learned Rent Controller dismissed the application filed by the petitioner seeking permission to lead additional evidence.
2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner asserting itself to be a registered partnership concern had filed an eviction application. The same had been contested. The petitioner submitted an application seeking permission to produce the certificate of registration of firms. The application was contested. The learned Rent Controller had dismissed the same holding that no due diligence has been shown by the petitioner. Aggrieved by the same, present petition has been filed.
3. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that no issue had been framed with respect to the said controversy. He further urged that since it is an eviction petition, it is not necessary that the petitioner firm should be registered and, therefore, the learned Rent Controller was in error in dismissing the application.
4. [SECTION] of the [ACT] (for short "the Act") read as under :-
"69. Effect of non-registration :- (1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of firms as a partner in the firm.
(2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.
5. It is abundantly clear that bar from filing a civil suit besides others only arises in case the said suit arises out of a contract. If the right accrues not from a contract bui from another statute or enactment, in that event the provisions of [SECTION] of the Act will not debar a person from claiming that right. [SECTION] of the [ACT], specifically prescribes that if there is any violation of the provisions of the Act, right to seek eviction would arise. It is a right created by the Statute. The contract may not defeat it. Therefore, [SECTION] of the [ACT], will not be a bar.
6. This question has been considered by the Patna High Court in the case of [PRECEDENT]. In the cited case it was held that suit for eviction could be filed by unregistered firm because such a suit is not enforcement of agreement.
7. In the case of [PRECEDENT], a petition for winding up was filed by a firm which was not registered. The question for consideration was as to whether the firm must be registered and if [SECTION] of the [ACT] debar the filing of eviction petition. The Delhi High Court held as under :-
"Reverting to the second objection, it has to be borne in mind that [SECTION] of the [ACT] contains only a prohibition on an unregistered firm filing a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by the said Act. The firm has to be registered and the person suing has to be a registered partner. The suit to attract [SECTION] has to be one to enforce a right arising from a contract or a right conferred by the Act. Mr. [ENTITY] has not been able to cite any judgment holding that [SECTION] would be applicable to winding up proceedings under the [ACT]. In the winding up petition primarily the Court is required to adjudicate whether the respondent is commercially solvent or insolvent and is not to enforce any right arising from a contract. The proceedings are not a "suit". No decree like a suit is passed. The petitioner in this case is only exercising a statutory right under the [ACT]. The right is not arising from a contract between the petitioner and the company. In my view, the provisions of [SECTION] have no applicability to proceedings under the [ACT] "
The conclusions drawn were as under :-
"A petition for the adjudication of a debtor as insolvent is not a proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract. The right which the creditor who files the insolvency petition against his debtor is seeking to exercise is the right of a creditor who finds his debtor in insolvent circumstances to have the assets of the debtor administered in insolvency and distributed for the benefit of the creditors as a body. This is a right which is con-ferred upon the creditors by statute and is not a right arising out of a particular contract of loan between a petitioning creditor and a debtor. The mere fact that the petitioning creditors constitute a firm and the debt is due to the firm in which the petitioners are partners and they cannot file a suit to recover the amount due to them unless the firm is registered, does not deprive the petitioners of their right to file a petition in insolvency."
8. Supreme Court considered a similar question in the case of [PRECEDENT]. The principle so enunciated was accepted that if a right accrues not out of a contract but from an enactment, [SECTION] of the [ACT] will not be a bar. In paragraph 23 of the judgment, it was held as under :-
"The net effect of this discussion, therefore, is that the plaint as framed by the plaintiff-respondent is based on a composite cause of Action consisting of two parts. One part refers to the breach of the covenant on the part of the defendant when it failed to deliver vacant possession to the plaintiff-lessor on the expiry of the lease after 15th March. 1985 and thereafter all throughout and thus it was guilty of breach of [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the lease. The second part of the cause of action, however, is based on the statutory obligation of defendant-lesser when it failed to comply with its statutory obligation under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. So far as this second pan of the cause of action is concerned it cannot certainly be said that it is arising out of the erstwhile contract."
9. Consequently, it must be held that leading of the additional evidence in this regard was irrelevant and there is no ground to interfere.
10. For these reasons, both the revision petitions, subject to the aforesaid, must fail and are accordingly dismissed.
11. Petitions dismissed.