JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the appellant on the application under [SECTION] of the [ACT] for condonation of delay of 20 days in filing the second appeal as well as on merits of the second appeal also.
2. This is plaintiff's second appeal in a suit for permanent injunction in respect of property, in dispute, which has been dismissed by both the Courts below.
3. The case of plaintiff was that he purchased the property, in dispute, by way of agreement (Exhibit-1) from [ENTITY] and he is in possession of the same. It was further contended that he has water, electricity and telephone connection over the land, in dispute. The trial Court has observed that it is correct that the defendants have not filed any written-statement, but it is a duty of the plaintiff to prove his own case. The plaintiff has not placed on the record allotment-letter issued by the Custodian Department in favour of [ENTITY], from whom the plaintiff is alleged to have purchased the land in dispute, through agreement. The agreement is not a registered agreement also. The telephone, water and electricity bills have also not been placed on the record by the plaintiff. The trial Court, therefore, recorded a finding that the plaintiff is neither the owner nor in possession of the land in dispute, and consequently dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Being aggrieved with the same, an appeal was preferred, but without success.
4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and, after considering his submissions in the light of findings of both the Courts below, I find that the reasons assigned by both the Courts below while dismissing the suit of the plaintiff for injunction, is absolutely justified in the eyes of law. It is a settled law that plaintiff has to prove its own case and he cannot be allowed to take the benefit of the weakness of the opposite-party. The plaintiff admitted that there is water, electricity and telephone connection in disputed property, therefore, the bills thereof were material and relevant and the same could have been produced to prove his possession over disputed property, but plaintiff failed to file all these relevant and material documentary evidence in support of its case. The so-called agreement executed by [ENTITY] in his favour was also not registered. The allotment letter in favour of [ENTITY] has also not been placed on record to show that he entered into an agreement to purchase the disputed property from the lawful owner. The issue relating to possession over disputed property has been decided by both the Courts below against the plaintiff and in these circumstances no injunction has been granted in his favour. The question of possession, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is purely a question of fact and there is concurrent finding of fact by both the Courts below, which cannot be interfered with by this Court in second appeal under [SECTION] of the [ACT]. I am also satisfied that no substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed.
5. A three-Judges-Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] , considered the effect of amendment made in [SECTION] of the [ACT] in 1976, and held as under:
The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the Courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the Courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT]. , considered the true import, scope and ambit of [SECTION] [ACT] by referring the [SECTION] [ACT], before and after amendment of 1976, various declarations of law by Privy Council and Supreme Court, Legislative background in the 54th Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in 1973, Historical perspective, Rational behind permitting second appeal on substantial question of law, and held as under:
62. The question could perhaps be asked, why the litigant who wishes to have justice from the highest Court of the State should be denied the opportunity to do so, at least where there is a flaw in the conclusion on facts reached by the trial Court or by the Court of first appeal. The answer is obvious that even litigants have to be protected against two persistent a pursuit of their goal of perfectly satisfactory justice. An unqualified right of first appeal may be necessary of the satisfaction of the defeated litigant; but a wide right of second appeal is more in the nature of a luxury.
73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous findings of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, and they added a note of warning that no Court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in [SECTION].
81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of [SECTION] has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the amendment of [SECTION] [ACT] in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of [SECTION] [ACT]. The judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of [SECTION] and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention.
82. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallized by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs.
7. I have also considered the reasons assigned in the application for condonation of delay and, after considering the same, I am not satisfied that any sufficient ground is made out for condonation of delay of 20 days in filing the second appeal. The application under [SECTION] of the [ACT] is liable to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the second appeal is dismissed being barred by limitation as well as on merits and further that no Substantial question of law is involved therein.