ORDER
1. This revision by the defendants is directed against the order dated 7-2-1992, passed by VIII Additional Civil Judge, Moradabad, deciding the preliminary issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff and holding that the person who signed and verified the plaint was properly authorised to do so.
2. Brief facts so far as relevant for the purposes of the present revision are that the plaintiff-respondent filed original suit No. 686 of 1989 in the Court of Civil Judge, Moradabad against the defendant-applicants for recovery of a sum of Rs. 7,40,553.77 paise (Rupees Seven Lacs Forty Thousand Five Hundred fifty Three and Seventy Seven Paise) along with the pendentilite and future interest. The suit is being contested by the defendant-applicants and is at present pending before the VIII Additional Civil Judge, Moradabad. n paragraph No. 1 of the plaint, the plaintiff had stated that the plaintiff was body corporate constituted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1970 and having its head office at Mandvi Baroda and Branches including the one at Chowmukhpul, Moradabad and K. N. Pandey is a Principal Officer and constituted attorney who is authorised by the plaintiff to sign and verify the pleading and to file suit and other documents including applications and affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff, n the written statement, the defendants, inter alia, denied that K. N. Pandey was a Principal Officer and constituted attorney and he was authorised by the plaintiff to sign and verify the pleadings and to file suit and other documents on behalf of the plaintiff. They further pleaded that the plaintiff is put to specific proof of the contents of the said paragraphs which were not admitted by the defendants. On the pleading of the parties, the court below framed the relevant issues and issue No. 1 was to the following effect :
"Whether Shri K. N. Pandey is authorised to sign and verify the plaint as alleged in paragraph No. 1 of the plaint ?"
3. The court below took up this issue as preliminary issue. The plaintiff examined K. N. Pandey, who had signed and verified the plaint, as P.W. 1. The said witness produced a photostat copy of the power of attorney alleged to have been executed in his favour by one Mihir Kumar Bose on 14-9-1984. It also appears that he produced the original power of attorney dated 4-9-1984 for the perusal of the Court. The court below after hearing the learned counsel for the parties had, vide the impugned order dated 7-2-1992, decided this issue in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Aggrieved, the defendant-applicants have preferred the above noted revision before this Court. I have heard Shri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the defendant-applicants and Shri V. B. Singh and Sri R. P. Agarwal, learned counsels appearing for the plaintiff-respondent. With the consent of the learned counsel, the revision on itself is being finally decided at the admission stage.
4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the applicants is that the court below has manifestly erred in placing reliance upon the photostat copy of the power of attorney in favour of K. M. Pandey which was in admissible in evidence as the original power of attorney though admittedly in the possession of the plaintiff had not been filed or placed on record. Learned counsel has contended that under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, primary evidence means the document itself and under Section 64 of the Evidence Act, the document must be proved by primary evidence except the cases mentioned in Section 65 of the said Act. The present case does not fall under the exception provided for under Section 65 of the Act. On this basis, the learned counsel has submitted that the plaintiffs has failed to prove that K. N. Pandey was duly and validly authorised to sign and verify the plaint. Consequently, this issue should have been decided against the plaintiff and the suit dismissed on this score.In support of his submissions that the secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without the non production of the original, the learned counsel has referred to certain decisions. In the case of Hira Lal v. Ganesh Prasad reported in (1882) ILR 4 All 406 where the plaintiff was relying upon an Ikrar-nama but had not produced the same the Privy Council had held that the court of first instance could not have admitted secondary evidence of its contents when the original was in the custody of the plaintiff. In the case of Krishna Kishori Chaodhurani v. Kishori Lal Roy reported in (1888) ILR 14 Cal 486, it was held by the Privy Council that secondary evidence of the contents of the documents could not be admitted without non-production of the original. In this case, the original of the alleged document was not filed on the ground that the same was burnt. The true copy was held to be in admissible as the explanation given by the plaintiff for not filing the original was seriously doubted. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Shital Dev v. Sant Ram reported in AIR 1954 SC 606. In this case, the defendants were placing reliance upon a Will dated 7-10-1911 but neither the original nor certified copy of the same was produced. Reliance was placed upon the document which was printed in the paper-book prepared for the case, on those facts it was held that no foundation was laid for reception of secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act nor can the copy produced be regarded as secondary evidence within the meaning of Section 63 of the Evidence Act. Similar observations were made by the Supreme Court in the case of Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1966 SC 1457 where original was not produced at any time and no foundation was laid for establishment of right to give secondary evidence. It was held that copies of the original were not admissible in evidence.
5. So far as the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid cases are concerned. It is well settled and is not open to doubt. However, in the present case, the facts are quite different. It has come in evidence that K. N. Pandey who had signed and verified the plaint in case of the plaintiff-Bank was the Senior Branch Manager of the Moradabad Branch of the Bank. He appeared in the witness box as PW 1 and has deposed that a power of attorney in his favour was duly executed by Shri Mihir Kumar Bose who was the Deputy General Manager of the plaintiff-Bank on 14-9-1984 and the said power of attorney was duly authenticated by public notary. He had fileu the photostat copy of the original power to attorney and has further deposed that he had brought the original power of attorney. He has further stated that the original bears signature of Mihir Kumar Bose with which he is well acquainted on the evidence given by P.W. 1, the court below had marked the phtostat copy of the original as exhibit 1 and has held in the impugned order that the original was pro duced before him and the document (paper No. 57C) has been proved from the original. Consequently, it was exhibited. It has not been stated by the defendant-applicants in the memo of revision that the said observation made by the court below with regard to the documents exhibit 1 being proved was based upon mis-reading or under mis-apprehension. The present is, therefore, not a case in which the original was not produced or that the plaintiff was relying upon secondary evidence without laying the foundation with regards to the non-production of the original. I therefore, do not find any substance in the first submission made by the learned counsel for the applicants.
6.It was then contended on behalf of the applicants that in the power of attorney executed by M. K. Bose in favour of K. N. Pandey, It has been stated that the plaintiff-Bank had by means of a power of attorney dated 21 -9-1978 appointed Sri Bose as its true and lawful attorney on behalf of the Bank having the power to substitute or appoint one or more attorney. However, the said power of attorney dated 21-9-1978 has not been produced or filed before the Court. Unless the said power of attorney in favour of Sri Bose was filed it could not be inferred that he had any authority on behalf of the palintiff-Bank to appiont K. M. Pandey as his substituted attorney. It has been further contended that in his evidence PW 1 has deposed that now Sri Bose has retired and as such also the agency if any, in favour of K. M. Pandey stands terminated. Learned counsel has further contended that under Section 182 of the Contract Act the status of Sri Bose was that of an agent and it has to be proved whether the authority conferred upon Sri Bose was express or implied and whether he was authorised to appoint any. Sub Agent. For the said purpose evidence has to be tendered by the plaintiff which is lacking and therefore, the power of attorney in favour of K. N. Pandey is of no avail for proving his authority to sign-and varify the plaint. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel had referred to the provisions of Sections 182, 186, 188 to 194 and Section 210 of the Contract Act. He has also placed certain passages from the text Law of Agency "by V. G. Rama Chandran (1985 Edition). I have considered the submissions by the learned counsel for the applicants but I am of the view that the same are merely academic so far as the present case is concerned and it is not necessary for me to refer to the same for the purpose of the present case.
7-8. Order VI, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that the every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader and in the absence of the party by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same. It has been held in the case of All India Reporter Limited, Bombay v. R. D. Datar, reported in AIR 1961 Bombay 292 that in the case of a company plaint can be signed by the Principal Officer under Order XXIX, Rule 1 C.P.C. or by any person duly authorised by the company under Order XI, Rule 14. The words" duly authorised in Order VI, Rule 14, need not be restricted to mean authorised by proper written authority or by power of attorney. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of United Bank of India v. P. C. Dey, reported in AIR 1977 Cal 55 has held that the agent of the Bank who had signed and verified the plaint being acquianted with the facts of the case could sign and verify the plaint on behalf of the Bank being Principal Officer of the Bank. A similar view has been taken by the Orissa High Court in the case of Umesh Chandra Misra v. State Bank of India reported in AIR 1987 Orissa 67 in the said case the suit was filed by the State Bank of India and the plaint was signed and verified by the Branch Manager, Relying upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in AIR 1977 Cal 55 (supra) and the decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of State Bank of India v. The Kashmir An Printing Press, reported in AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana, 188 and several other decisions it was held that the Branch Manager was competent to sign and verify the plaint and file the same in Court. The Court had relied upon the provisions of Order VI, Rule 14, C.P.C. and Order XXIX, Rule 1, C.P.C. which lays down that in suit by or against a Corporation any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the Corporation by the Secretary or by any Director or other Principal Officer of the Corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Syndicate Bank v. Krishna reported, in 1990 Bankers Journal 1. Following the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of All India Reporter Limited v. Rama Chandran (supra) held that the suit filed by the Principal Officer of the Bank was valid as authorisation to sign and verify the plaint and file the suit can be implied and even no authorisation in writing is requried.
9. Learned counsel for the applicants has, However, placed reliance upon a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeal No. 35 of 1984 decided on 7-9-1988, Bank of Baroda v. Kailash Chandra reported in All India Banking L. J. 1989 (2) 172.In that case, the suit was dismissed on the ground that the Branch Manager had failed to file any document to show that he was authorised to file the suit and, therefore, the provisions of Order XXIX, Rule 1, C.P.C. remained un complied with. I have carefully perused the said decision. The Bank in the said case had filed a copy of the power of attorney which was neither signed nor attested to be a true copy. The evidence had closed and subsequently, an application was filed under Section 151, C.P.C. for comparing the original power of attorney with the copy filed in the Court. However, even at that stage, the original was not produced. This application was rejected by the trial court as the evidence of the parties had already closed. In appeal before the High Court also the original power of attorney was not produced and the court noted that there were serious laches on the part of the Bank which did not even care to produce the original power of attorney at any stage even at the time when the appeal was being heard by the High Court. In the case before me the facts are totally different. The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Bank of Baroda (supra), therefore, does not help the learned counsel for the applicants.
10. There is another aspect of the matter, Section 85 of the Evidence Act lays down as follows:
"85. Presumption as to powers of attorney. The court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power of attorney and to have been executed before, and authenticated by a notary public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice Consul or representative of the Central Government was so executed and authenticated."
11. Under the aforesaid provisions, it would also be presumed that the person "executing the power of attorney on behalf of a' corporate body was competent, to do so. In the present case Sri M.K. Bose had executed the power of attorney in favour of K.N. Pandey which was duly authenticated by a notary public as mentioned in Section 85. The Court is, therefore, bound to presume that the power of attorney was duly executed and authenticated. This presumption, however, is a rebuttable presumption and it was open to the defendants to challenge the authority of the attorney or to prove that the power of attorney was invalid or that the person acting on the basis of such power of attorney was not duly authorised. No such evidence has come from the side of the defendants. On the contrary PW. 1 K.N. Pandey had deposed that (sic)the Senior Branch Manager and was authorised to sign and verify the plaint and to file the suit. There being no evidence in rebuttal the court below was, therefore, justified in holding that K.N. Pandey was authorised to sign and verify the plaint.
12.In the case of City Bank, N.K. New Delhi v. J. K. Jute Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur reported in AIR 1982 Delhi 487, where the facts were somewhat similar to the case at hand a power of attorney was executed by two officers of the Bank in favour of one Mr. Williams who executed a power of attorney in favour of one N.K. Bahl who was the Assistant Branch Manager of the Bank. On the basis of the powers conferred on him by the power of attorney which was duly authenticated by a notary public, the said Mr. Bahl had filed the suit. An argument was raised that no presumption could be raised that the concerned officers were competent to, execute the power of attorney on behalf of the plaintiff Bank. Relying upon certain decisions of the Delhi High Court in the cases of National Grindlays Bank v. Radio Electronics Corporation Pvt. Ltd. reported in 1978 Rajdhani LR 217 and the case of Bank of India v. Ajayab Singh Pritam Singh, reported in AIR 1979 NOC 199. It was held that authentication of the power of attorney by a notary public raised a legal presumption that the same has been duly executed and the person or persons who had executed had the authority to do so.It was further held that the presumption was rebuttable and the other party was entitled to disprove such resumption. The Court had held that the consistent view was that under Section 85 of the Evidence Act would also be presumed that a person executing powers of attorney on behalf of a corporate body was competent to do so. In view of what has been stated above, the argument of the learned counsel for the applicants that it has not been proved that Mihir Kumar Bose was competent to execute the power of attorney in favour of K.N. Pandey cannot be legally sustained. The validity of the same could be presumed under the provisions of Section 85 of the Evidence Act and it could further be presumed that M.K. Bose was competent to execute the power of attorney. It was open to the defendants to disprove the said presumption but no evidence has been led by the defendants to this effect.
13. As a result of the aforesaid discussions, I do not find any merit in this revision and the same is consequently dismissed with costs. The court below is directed to proceed with the trial of the suit as expeditiously as possible.
14. Revision dismissed.