[CASE NUMBER] :1: IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Civil Writ Petition No.14512 of 2013 Date of decision: 12.2.2015 [ENTITY] Petitioner Versus [ENTITY] and others Respondents Civil Writ Petition No.15562 of 2013 [ENTITY] Petitioner Versus [ENTITY] and others Respondents Civil Writ Petition No.15566 of 2013 Date of decision: 12.2.2015 [ENTITY] Petitioner Versus [ENTITY] and others Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE [ENTITY] Present: Mr.[ENTITY], Advocate, for the petitioner. [ENTITY] Mr.[ENTITY], Addl. AG, Punjab. 2015.03.02 10:35 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [CASE NUMBER] :2: 1. To be referred to the Reporters or not? Yes. 2. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes. [ENTITY], J.
This order will dispose of the three above captioned writ petitions as common questions of law and fact are involved in all of them which can be conveniently disposed of by a common order. The facts are taken from [CASE NUMBER] for convenience.
2. The petitioner's ad hoc promotion as Assistant Sub Inspector in Punjab Police with effect from 23rd May, 1992 vide order dated 1st June, 1992 was faulted and his ad hoc rank was withdrawn vide order dated 6th May, 2000 converting his status on the promotional post on own rank and pay (ORP). This resulted from a fall out of the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Court in a batch of cases including [CASE NUMBER], titled SI Swaran Singh and another v. [ENTITY] with judgment delivered on 21st April, 1998, the extract of which direction are reproduced in paragraph 2 of the preliminary submissions in the reply by way of counter affidavit filed by the State. The petitioner did not agitate the reversion before a court of law or before the bureaucrat. Punjab Government framed a policy on 29th November, 2012 [R-1] granting promotional benefits to the persons who had done work on the anti-terrorist front. The policy laid down guidelines to deal with requests coming from the police officials for giving them the benefits which were devised to be dealt in the manner prescribed.
3. The petitioner's was informed that his case did not fall within the terms of the policy for want of satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) which conferred special benefits to officials who were injured in anti-terrorist [CASE NUMBER] operations and were not given any service benefit on account of it. Also, officials who had lost their family members at the hands of terrorists who had not been given any service benefits thus far. A yardstick was laid down that in order to maintain uniformity in implementation, the benefits given in the past to such similarly placed officials may be kept in mind and their cases be dealt with accordingly and appropriate benefits may be given to those who fell in the terms of the policy. The case of the petitioner for retention of ad hoc rank of ASI, at par with an ASI (OPR), namely, [ENTITY] and 9 others were not found similar since in those cases, restoration of ad hoc rank was ordered in the year 2000 with the approval of the Council of Ministers but the petitioner did not express any grievance of it and accepted the position, till after over a decade, in the present petition. In the meanwhile, the Supreme Court issued directions on 12th April, 2004 in [CASE NUMBER] in [ENTITY] and others v. Ram Charan and others which read as follows:-
"We are of the opinion that those officials who are promoted within the 10% limit of [SECTION] could be given regular promotion and those who are beyond the 10% limit of [SECTION] could be given ORP promotion which is designated to encourage and reward the good work of meritorious officers without excessively burdening the exchequer."
4. It is stated in paragraph 6 of the reply that Government of Punjab had granted a one-time relaxation for regularization of ad hoc promotions to the 10 petitioners in [CASE NUMBER]; ASI [ENTITY] and others v. [ENTITY] (supra). Accordingly, the Supreme Court was informed that [ENTITY] etc. had been given the benefits and consequently their SLP was disposed of as having been rendered [CASE NUMBER] infructuous.
5. Taking a clue from those proceedings, one [ENTITY] ASI and 42 others, whose ad hoc promotions were converted into ORP ranks in the year 1998-99 [subsequent to the orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court in [CASE NUMBER]] made a grievance that the conversion was flawed and their status as ad hoc ASIs should be restored to them. This brought forth [CASE NUMBER] before this Court demanding the same relief as was granted to ASI [ENTITY] and 9 others before the Supreme Court. This Court disposed of the bunch of petitions in terms of ASI [ENTITY]'s SLP. This led to filing of two review applications, i.e., [CASE NUMBER] on the ground that the petitioners cannot claim ad hoc ranks at par with [ENTITY] and others which were given only to 10 petitioners in the year 2001. Both these review applications were decided in favour of the State by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment [R-2] where it was ordered : -
"The decision of the State Govt. which led to the order passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in [ENTITY]'s case as infructuous cannot be claimed by other officials so as to perpetuate an illegality. The benefit given to [ENTITY] and others is not in accordance with rules. Such benefits will not confer any right in other police officials to claim substantive promotion other than on ORP basis in terms of [ENTITY]'s case (supra).
In view of the above, the claim of the petitioner is not maintainable."
6. In this conspectus of facts, the present petition has been filed on the heels of a legal notice served by the petitioner on the respondents on 25th December, 2012 which has been replied to rejecting the pleas raised in the legal notice denying regular promotion with effect from 29th May, 1992 [CASE NUMBER] instead of 10th January, 2006 on the rank of ASI.
7. It may be noted that State admits that the petitioner was promoted on ad hoc service as ASI on 29th May, 1992 and further to the post of Sub Inspector on 10th April, 1999 also on ad hoc basis for his commendable work on the anti-terrorist front. However, as noted above, that ad hoc promotion was withdrawn on 6th May, 2000 and he was instead given ORP rank. The petitioner finally earned regular promotion as ASI with effect from 10th January, 2006 on the recommendations of the Committee for his commendable work on the anti-terrorist front. It is against this order that the present petition was filed in July, 2013.
8. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this petition may be disposed of with directions in the same terms as in [CASE NUMBER] decided on 18th May, 2010, [ENTITY] and others v. [ENTITY] and others. The directions issued by the learned Single Judge in [ENTITY] case on 18th May, 2010 are as follows : -
"1. The petitioners are Head Constables in Punjab Police and are aggrieved at the withdrawal of their adhoc ranks. They assert that in view of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ASI [ENTITY] etc. vs [ENTITY] etc. (SLP No.12979 of 2002), they are entitled to hold these ranks.
2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that notwithstanding the stand taken by the respondents in their counter-affidavit, the claim of the petitioners deserves to be independently considered by the Officer's Committee which has been constituted vide order dated 4.3.2010 passed in [CASE NUMBER] titled as Ranjit Singh and others Vs [ENTITY] and others, comprising two Senior Police Officers duly assisted by an Additional Advocate General, Punjab, to redress the grievances of the police personnel.
3. The needful shall be done within a period of four [CASE NUMBER] months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order."
9. I am afraid, the contention based on the aforesaid directions is misplaced and is not acceptable. The petitioner is not a Head Constable and the question of limitation, delay and laches may not have arisen in [ENTITY] case as it does in the present one. The petitioner has slumbered over his rights for 13 years without making a grievance or raising a dispute either by way of a representation/legal notice demanding justice at any point prior to the legal notice dated 25th December, 2012 or by recourse to a remedy in a court of law for relief.
10. The burning issue of relief which may be granted to similarly situated persons following Court orders has been exhaustively considered by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh & others v. [ENTITY] & others (Civil Appeal No.9849 of 2014) decided on 17.10.2014. The Supreme Court have culled out in the judgment the legal principles which emerge from noticing a large number of earlier precedents of the Supreme Court and have summed up the legal position in paragraph 23 of the judgment holding: -
"(1) Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
[CASE NUMBER] (2) However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
(3) However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like(see [PRECEDENT] [supra- [PRECEDENT]]. On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence"
11. The petitioner is a classic fence-sitter. By long delay and laches, he has rusted his rights to relief, if any. If he has an actionable claim, the remedy is taken away by applying the principles in [ENTITY] and the principles which can be culled out in the dicta in [PRECEDENT]. The issues of [CASE NUMBER] promotion, seniority etc. deserve to be agitated within a reasonable time.
Where resort to remedy by bringing suit to seek relief is barred by limitation, then ordinarily the writ court would refuse to interfere and unsettle matters which have long settled, one way or the other. Still further, the matter can be looked into on the plea of delay and laches obstructing maintainibility of the petition from the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] observing:-
" A person aggrieved by an order promoting a junior over his head should approach the court within six months, or at the most, within a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under [SECTION] nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under [SECTION] in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal."
12. There is no explanation whatsoever in the instant petition for the delay in approaching Court highly belatedly nor has any sufficient cause been shown sufficient to explain the delay and laches warranting entertainment of the petition at this enormous distance of time. There are no directions present in the earlier litigation from where rights can be said to be [CASE NUMBER] determined in rem or may stand frozen to be thawed by the normal rule, that similarly placed persons should be treated alike, although they be separated by inordinate passage of time, the limitations having run out their remedies.
13. The petition is consequently dismissed for want of maintainability and the parties are left to bear their own costs.
([ENTITY]) JUDGE February 12, 2015 [ENTITY]