JUDGMENT [ENTITY], J.
1. This contempt appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 29.5.1997 of a learned single Judge in [CASE NUMBER]. In the contempt petition Smt. [ENTITY]. Principal Secretary, Medical Health and Family Welfare and Dr. [ENTITY] Director General, Medical Health and Family Welfare were arrayed as opposite parties. In April, 1997, Smt. [ENTITY] was transferred and Sri [ENTITY] took over as Principal Secretary, Medical Health and Family Welfare. Dr. [ENTITY] retired soon after filing of the contempt petition and Dr. [ENTITY] was officiating as Director General. Medical Health and Family Welfare at the time of filing of the appeal. Therefore, the present appeal has been filed by Sri [ENTITY] and Dr. [ENTITY] and not by those who were arrayed as opposite parties in the contempt petition.
2. [ENTITY] Laboratory Technicians Association and two others filed [CASE NUMBER] against State of [ENTITY] through Secretary, Medical Health and Family Welfare. [ENTITY], Lucknow, Director General, Medical Health and Family Welfare and Director, Medical and Health Services with a prayer that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the respondents to give the same salary to the petitioners which is being paid to Laboratory Assistants. The writ petition was allowed by the judgment and order dated 3.2.1993 and the operative portion of the order reads as follows :
"In the circumstances of the case, the petition is allowed and I direct that the Laboratory Technicians will get the same pay scale as that of Laboratory Assistants, within two months.
Sri [ENTITY], learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Senior Laboratory Technicians should get higher pay than that of Laboratory Technicians. In the present case, I have only held that the Laboratory Technicians should be given the same pay as the Laboratory Assistants. If the Senior Laboratory Technicians are wanting higher pay then they should make a representation to this effect giving details of the nature of duties they are performing and how these duties are more arduous than those of Laboratory Assistants. If such a representation is made within a month the same shall be decided within two months thereafter by a reasoned order.
The petition is allowed. No order as to cost."
The writ petitioners, namely, [ENTITY] Laboratory Technicians Association and others filed [CASE NUMBER] under [SECTION] and [SECTION] of the [ACT] (hereinafter referred to as the Act) praying that this Court may initiate contempt proceedings against the opposite parties for having wilfully flouted the Judgment and order dated 3.2.1993 passed in [CASE NUMBER] and to suitably punish them for the same. Notice was issued to the opposite parties to show cause why they should not be punished for having committed contempt of court. The opposite parties filed counter-affidavits. After hearing counsel for the parties, the learned single Judge passed the impugned order dated 29.5.1997 against which the present Special Appeal has been filed. In order to appreciate the controversy raised in the appeal, It is necessary to reproduce certain portions of the impugned order of the learned single Judge which are as under:
"I will take up the second direction first. This Court directed the Senior Laboratory Technicians to make representation for higher pay scale within a month and the said representation was to be decided within two months. The Court did not specifically direct that the Senior Laboratory Technicians should be given better pay scale than that of the Laboratory Assistants. The Court only directed the respondents to decide the representation by a reasoned order. The representation has now been decided on 16.11.1994. A copy of the decision has been filed as Annexure-CA-3 to the supplementary counter-affidavit of Sri [ENTITY], Section Officer, dated 17.11.1994.
It is fantastic that the supplementary counter-affidavit was filed on 17.11.1994 and the decision was given on the representation only one day earlier, i.e., on 16.11.1994. It appears that this is only just to satisfy the stomach of the decision by putting something therein. The decision given by respondent No. 1 is in Hindi which if translated in English is that so far as the question of giving higher pay scale to the Senior Laboratory Technicians is concerned, it is hereby informed that the present pay scale of Senior Laboratory Technicians is Rs. 1,400-2,300 which is higher than that of the Laboratory Technicians whose present pay scale is Rs. 1,320-2,040. Therefore, there is no question of giving any more higher pay scale to the Senior Laboratory Technicians. Consequently, the representation dated 27.2.1993 is hereby rejected.
What this Court desired was that the Senior Laboratory Technicians should make a representation for higher pay scale indicating therein the nature of duties they were performing and also how their duties were more arduous than that of the Laboratory Assistants. In other words, the position of the Senior Laboratory Assistants was to be compared with the position of the Laboratory Assistants, but the decision shows that the respondent No. 1 in a hot haste manner compared the pay scale of Senior Laboratory Technicians with that of the Laboratory Technicians. The respondent No. 1 did not advert to the duties assigned to the Senior Laboratory Technicians and the Laboratory Assistants and whether the duties of the Senior Laboratory Technicians are more arduous than that of the Laboratory Assistants and by a cryptic order rejected the representation of the petitioners. In my view, the order passed by respondent No. 1 is not in conformity with the direction issued by this Court In view of what has been enumerated above, it is manifest that the order of this Court has not at all been complied with.
As regards the first direction, it is stated that the said direction too has been complied with, but a bare perusal of the order dated 16.11.1994 shows that there was only notional compliance and nothing else. The respondent No. 1 has included the personal pay in the pay scale of Laboratory Technicians and in this way equated the Laboratory Technicians with the Laboratory Assistants in the matter of pay scale. The direction issued by this Court in respect of Laboratory Technicians is crystal clear and there is no ambiguity in it. It was specifically directed that the Laboratory Technicians will get the same pay scale as that of the Laboratory Assistants, but the respondent No. 1 has calculated the personal pay also in the pay scale of the Laboratory Technicians. Personal pay is personal pay and cannot be said to be a part of the pay scale. Therefore, the first part of the direction was also not complied with.
In view of what has been discussed above, I find that respondent No. I has done mud-washing and nothing else. In my view, this is no compliance of the order passed by this Court. However, an effort has been made to show that the Government Orders have been issued in compliance of the order passed by this Court dated 3.2.93 but that is only an eye-wash. I do not want to punish the respondents at this stage but depart only with a note of sorrow and with the remark that the karta of the family should not be vindictive against-his family members and should try to provide them justice as far as possible. Justice can be done every where and the administrative officer should not think that their work is only of administrative nature. In the matter like the present one, they also exercise quasi-judicial function and while deciding a representation, they should act as a Judge.
Accordingly, the respondents are again directed to comply with the order of this Court dated 3.2.1993 in its letter and spirit. The matter has been clarified to a great extent although the order of the Court dated 3.2.1993 is specific and clear.
List this petition on 17.9.1997 for further orders. If the order dated 3.2.1993 is not complied with, respondents should appear in person in this Court on the date fixed."
Sri [ENTITY], learned counsel for the respondents in this appeal (writ petitioners and applicants in the contempt petition) has vehemently urged that the learned single Judge had not imposed any punishment and has merely called upon the appellants to comply with the judgment and order dated 3.2.1993 of the writ petition and, therefore, the present appeal is not maintainable under [SECTION] of the [ACT] or even under [SECTION]. [SECTION] of the High Court Rules. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on [PRECEDENT] ; [PRECEDENT] : [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT]. Sri [ENTITY], learned Addl. Advocate General has, on the other hand, urged that the appeal is maintainable under [SECTION] of the Act in view of the law laid down in [PRECEDENT]. [PRECEDENT] ; [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT]. [PRECEDENT]. He has further submitted that the order of the learned single Judge is ajudgment and consequently, the appeal is maintainable under [SECTION] of the Rules of the Court, in accordance with the view taken in [PRECEDENT] ; [PRECEDENT] and [ENTITY]. [ENTITY] 1996 CWN 673.
3. An appeal is the "right of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and inter-position to redress an error of the Court below" and it is a creature of Stature (See [PRECEDENT] and Sita Ram v. State of [ENTITY], AIR 1979 SC 745). [SECTION] of the Act lays down that an appeal shall He as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In [PRECEDENT]. It was held as follow :
" It is only when the Court decides to take action and Initiates a proceedings for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference Where the Court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such a decision would not, therefore, fall within the opening words of [SECTION] and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision."
The same view was taken in [PRECEDENT]. In [PRECEDENT], it was reiterated that the right of appeal is available under [SECTION] only against any decision or order of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In [ENTITY] (supra), it was observed :
"In our considered judgment an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further does not decide anything against the alleged contemnor and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under [SECTION]. In a given case special leave may be granted under [SECTION] of the [ACT] from an order initiating the proceedings but that is entirely different."
Similar view was again expressed in [PRECEDENT]. Interlocutory orders pertaining purely to the procedure of the Court has been held to be not appealable under [SECTION] in Barada Kanta Misra v. Orissa High Court, AIR 1976 SC [SECTION]06 ; [PRECEDENT] ; [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT].
4. The language of [SECTION] shows that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The words "any order or decision in the exercise of its Jurisdiction to punish" have been used in contradistinction from the word "punishment" and they have to be given full meaning. If the Legislature intended to restrict the appeal only against the order of punishment, a different phraseology would have been used. It may be noticed that in [SECTION] and [SECTION], [ACT], the words used are "persons convicted on a trial". An appeal would, therefore, be maintainable not only against a specific order of punishment but also against an order or decision which has been rendered in exercise of Jurisdiction to punish. This position will be clear from the following observation in Barada Kanta Misra v. Orissa High Court, AIR 1976 SC [SECTION]06:
" Only those orders or decision in which some point is decided or finding is given in the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court to be punished for contempt are appealable under [SECTION] of the [ACT]."
Similar view was taken in [PRECEDENT] (supra) where in para 3 it was observed as follows :
" No appeal can He as a matter of right from any kind of order made by the High Court in the proceeding for contempt. The proceeding is initiated under [SECTION] by issuance of a notice. Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders passed in the said proceeding by the High Court. It could not be the intention of the Legislature to provide for an appeal to this Court as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the High Court. The order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved."
In [PRECEDENT], the Court while considering the question as to when an order can be said to be such which is appealable under [SECTION], observed as follows in para 9 of the report :
" It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable to this Court under [SECTION]. If the Court on being asked by the contemner to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being barred under [SECTION] of the Act declines to do so, it may well be that an appeal may lie under [SECTION] as some orders even though made at some Intermediate stage in the proceeding may be appealable."
In [PRECEDENT], a Division Bench considering the same question observed is under :
" From the above, it would be seen that an appeal lies from a 'decision' as well as from an 'order'. Decision. In our opinion, would be final decision of the contempt application. When a separate word 'order' has been used in the same clause, it would appear that it refers to something other than final judgment. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that an appeal is maintainable even against an order, which does not finally dispose of the contempt proceedings. However, every order passed in the contempt proceedings is not appealable under the above provision. Only that order is appealable which is passed in the exercise of Jurisdiction to punish for contempt:"
In this case, the order of the learned single Judge, holding a person guilty of contempt of court was held to be appealable under [SECTION] even though no sentence had been awarded.
5. A conspectus of the authorities referred to above would show that there is no absolute bar of an appeal against an order passed at an intermediate stage. It will depend upon the nature of the contention raised and the manner in which the same has been disposed of by the Court. In case a contention which goes to the very root of jurisdiction is raised and the same is turned down or the order or decision is such which decides some bone of contention affecting the rights of the parties aggrieved, an appeal would be maintainable under [SECTION] of the Act.
6. The question whether an appeal is maintainable under [SECTION] of the Rules of the Court at the instance of a party whose application for initiation of contempt proceeding has been dismissed and the Court declines to issue notice under [SECTION] of the Act to those who are alleged to have committed contempt of Court, has been examined in considerable detail by a Division Bench in [PRECEDENT], and it was held as follows :
" By [SECTION], the Act has created a right of appeal from an order or decision of the Court imposing punishment for contempt. There is no provision for appeal under the Act against the decision discharging the notice of contempt and/or dismissing the contempt petition. When statute provides for appeal and also lays down the order/decisions against which such an appeal can be filed, the Legislature's intention is that appeal against all other orders is barred. As [SECTION] has provided for appeal against an order or decision imposing punishment for contempt, the right to file an appeal against all other orders has been taken away by the statute. The result is that the appeal against a decision, rejecting the contempt petition is not maintainable under [SECTION] also."
In [PRECEDENT], a Division Bench of Madras High Court speaking through Dr. [ENTITY], C.J. (as his Lordship then was) has held that no appeal is maintainable under clause 15 of Letters Patent against an order refusing to initiate proceedings for contempt of court. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in the aforesaid decisions that no appeal is maintainable under [SECTION] of the Rules of the Court against any order passed in proceedings under [ACT] as it is a self-contained Code and it also provides for a remedy of appeal under [SECTION] though only against specified type of orders or decisions.
7. As the preamble shows, the [ACT], has been enacted to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempts of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. The scheme of the Act would show that it provides for the procedure for proceeding against such persons who are alleged to have committed contempt of courts and for awarding punishment to them. While exercising Jurisdiction under the Act, the High Court may either discharge an accused or award punishment to him. The Act does not contemplate of either making a declaration or issuing a direction regarding merits of the claim of the parties. The power of a Court to pass orders is circumscribed by the jurisdiction conferred upon it under the Act under which it is deciding a lis or is proceeding against the parties before it. A civil court while trying a civil suit for cancellation of a document on the ground of forgery after arriving at a conclusion on the basis of evidence adduced that the document is forged, can only pass a decree for cancellation of the document but cannot convict or sentence the person who is involved in commission of the forgery. A criminal court while trying a person accused of having prepared a forged document can only record a finding of conviction and impose a sentence, but cannot pass a decree for cancellation of the document. In [PRECEDENT], a suit which was otherwise cognizable by a District Court was instituted in the High Court and an order of temporary injunction was passed. In appeal, the Apex Court set aside the order with the following observation :
" But if the learned Judge, as reported in the summary of the Judgment was of the opinion that the High Court is competent to assume to itself Jurisdiction which it does not otherwise possess, merely because an "extraordinary situation" has arisen, with respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to approve of that view. By "jurisdiction" is meant the extent of the power which is conferred upon the Court by its [ACT] to try a proceeding ; its exercise cannot be enlarged because what the learned Judge calls an extraordinary situation "requires" the Court to exercise it."
In A. R. [ENTITY] v. R. S. Naik, AIR 1988 SC 1531, the Apex Court while reviewing its earlier decision of transferring a case under [SECTION] of the [ACT] against Shri [ENTITY] to the High Court made the following observation :
"The Supreme Court, by its directions, could not confer jurisdiction on the High Court to try any case when it did not possess such jurisdiction under the scheme of the 1952 Act."
While dealing with a matter under the [ACT], the Apex Court in [PRECEDENT], observed as follows in para 10 of the report:
"There can be no doubt that whenever a Court, tribunal or authority is vested with a jurisdiction to decide a matter, such jurisdiction can be exercised in deciding the matter in favour or against a person. For example, a civil court is conferred with the jurisdiction to decide a suit ; the civil court will have undoubtedly the Jurisdiction to decree the suit or dismiss the same. But when a Court is conferred with the power or jurisdiction to act in a particular manner, the exercise of Jurisdiction or the power will involve the acting in that particular manner and in no other. [SECTION] confers jurisdiction or power on the High Court to punish for contempt. The High Court can exercise its jurisdiction only by punishing for contempt."
In [PRECEDENT]. [PRECEDENT], a single Judge of the High Court while hearing a petition under [ACT] issued a direction to redraw a seniority list and with regard to this direction, the Apex Court made the following observation :
" In other words, the learned single Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings- It would not be permissible under [SECTION] of the [ACT] "
Thus there can be no doubt that in any proceeding initiated under the [ACT], the High Court can either punish or discharge the alleged contemner and in doing so, it can pass all such ancillary orders which are necessary for exercise of such power but it cannot issue any directions or orders regarding the main dispute or controversy between the parties which has led to the filing of writ petition by either of the parties. However, if any order or direction is made by the Court concerning the merit of the controversy or dispute between the parties, or for implementation of any judgment or order, it will be de hors the provision of [ACT] and they can only be deemed to have been issued in exercise of power conferred by [SECTION] of the [ACT]. Such direction would, therefore, be amenable to an appeal under [SECTION] of the Rules of the Court as they are not issued in exercise of any power conferred by the Act. The view which we are taking finds support from [PRECEDENT] (supra) where the correctness of the order passed by the Division Bench, which set aside the order passed by the learned single Judge to redraw the seniority list, was assailed on the ground that no appeal was maintainable as no order has been passed imposing punishment. The order of the Division Bench was affirmed on the round that it had exercised power under [SECTION] of the [ACT] being a judgment or order of the single Judge.
8. Under the impugned order, learned single Judge has recorded a clear finding that the directions issued in the writ petition had not been complied with but he did not want to punish the appellants at this stage. He has issued a further direction to the appellants to comply with the order passed in the writ petition in its letter and spirit. In view of what we have held above, this appeal is maintainable under-[SECTION] of the Act against the finding regarding non-compliance of the order which amounts to a 'civil contempt' within the meaning of [SECTION] of the Act. The appeal will also be maintainable under [SECTION] of the Rules of the Court against the directions issued in the impugned order which are regarding the merit of the claim made by the respondents in the writ petition.
9. The judgment of the writ petition dated 3.2.1993 shows that a direction was issued that the Laboratory Technicians will get the same pay scale as that of Laboratory Assistants and further if the Senior Laboratory Technicians want a higher pay, they should make a representation which shall be decided within two months by a reasoned order. Sri [ENTITY], learned Addl. Advocate General has submitted that there has been no wilful disobedience of the directions issued in the writ petition and the same had been complied with and the view to the contrary taken by the learned single Judge that the appellants have committed contempt of court is not correct. The facts which emerge out of the affidavits filed by, the parties show that in the State four different systems of Medicines, namely. Allopathic, [ENTITY], [ENTITY] and Homoeopathic are recognised and there are separate colleges imparting education in these systems. Initially only one department of the State Government was dealing with all the aforesaid systems of Medicines. Subsequently a bifurcation was made into two departments. The Allopathic system is dealt with by the department of Medical and Family Welfare The department of Medical Education deals with all kind of medical education as well as service matters of persons employed in [ENTITY]. [ENTITY] and Homoeopathic system of medicines. There are separate Secretaries for both the departments. There is a post of Laboratory Technician in the Allopathic system of medicines. There is also a promotional post of Senior Laboratory Technicians, recruitment to which is made from amongst Laboratory Technicians on the basis of seniority subject to rejection of unfit. The pay scale of Laboratory Technicians was fixed at Rs. 400-615 and that of Senior Laboratory Technicians at Rs. 515-860 w.e.f. 1.7.1979. In [ENTITY] and [ENTITY] system of medicines, there is a post of Laboratory Assistant/ Technicals Assistant. They were granted the pay scale of Rs. 400-615 by the G.O. dated [SECTION].5.1987. These persons, namely, Laboratory Assistant/Technical Assistant (Ayurvedlc and [ENTITY] System) filed [CASE NUMBER] claiming parity in pay scale with Modellers who were employed in State [ENTITY] and [ENTITY] Hospitals and also with Senior Laboratory Technician (Allopathic system). The writ petition was allowed on 21.1.1988 and by the order dated 3.2.1989, their pay scale was increased to Rs. 515-860. On the recommendation of Fourth Pay Commission, the Central Government enhanced the pay scale of its employees and a corresponding demand was made by the employees of the State Government. The State Government constituted an Equivalence Committee and according to its report, Laboratory Assistant/Technical Assistant (Ayurvedlc and [ENTITY] System) were held entitled to the scale of Rs. 1,320-2,040 and a Senior Laboratory Technician (Allopathic System) to the pay scale of Rs. 1.400-2,300. However, in view of the decision dated 21.1.1989 in [CASE NUMBER], the Laboratory Assistant/Technical Assistant ([ENTITY] and [ENTITY] System) were entitled to pay scale of Senior Laboratory Technician (Allopathic System). Such persons were given the personal pay scale of Rs. 1,400-2,300 but the pay scale of regular cadre of Laboratory Assistant/Technical Assistant ([ENTITY] and [ENTITY] System) was fixed at Rs. 1,320-2,040. The Laboratory Technicians (Allopathic System) were initially in a grade which was higher than the grade of Laboratory Assistant/Technical Assistant ([ENTITY] and [ENTITY] System) but by the G.O. dated [SECTION].5.1987, the latter had been put in the same pay scale. It was in these circumstances that Laboratory Technicians (Allopathic System) filed [CASE NUMBER] which was allowed on 3.2.1993 and a direction was issued which has been quoted in the earlier part of the judgment.
10. The State Government then issued two orders one on 6.9.1994 and the other on 19.9.1994. By the first order, Laboratory Technicians were granted the pay scale of Rs. 515-860 w.e.f. 18.7.1981 and by the second order, they were granted personal pay scale of Rs. 1,400-2,300. though the scale of the post was fixed at Rs. 1,320-2,040. It was further provided that the personal pay scale of Rs. 1,400-2.300 would be given to only those employees who were given the benefit of the pay scale of Rs. 515-860 by the order dated 6.9.1994. After issuance of the aforesaid Government Order, the Laboratory Technicians (Allopathic System) have been put in the same scale of pay as that of Laboratory Assistant/Technical Assistant ([ENTITY] and [ENTITY] System) in accordance with the direction issued by the judgment and order dated 3.2.1993 in [CASE NUMBER]. Of course, there has been delay on the part of the State Government in not passing appropriate order within the time fixed in the Judgment. The explanation offered is that the State Government filed special leave petition against the Judgment and order dated 3.2.1993 in the Supreme Court and after its dismissal on 29.3.1994, the necessary Government Orders were issued. There does not appear to be a very long delay subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in issuing the Government Orders. Granting of a higher pay scale to a large number of persons involves a heavy financial burden which requires thorough examination by the finance and other concerning departments. In the circumstances of the case, the delay has been properly explained. Thus, the direction issued in the writ petition for granting same pay scale to Laboratory Technicians (Allopathic System) as that of Laboratory Assistant/Technical Assistant ([ENTITY] and [ENTITY] System) has been complied with. It is stated in para 10 of the affidavit filed in the appeal that benefit of revised pay scale has also given to all the Laboratory Technicians (Allopathic System) who are working in Institutes and Centres other than Government hospitals. Thus, it cannot be held that the appellants have committed any wilful disobedience of the judgment rendered in the writ petition.
11. Regarding the other direction issued in the Judgment and order dated 3.2.1993, it is not in dispute that the representation made by Senior Laboratory Technicians on 27.2.1993 has been disposed of by the Government on 16.11.1994. No doubt, there has been a delay but the fact remains that the representation has been decided by a reasoned order. Thus, except for the time period fixed in the judgment, the second direction issued therein has also been complied with.
[SECTION]. The learned single Judge held that while disposing of the representation, the Special Secretary Medical Health and Family Welfare did not advert to the duties assigned to the Senior Laboratory Technicians and the Laboratory Assistants and also whether the duties of former were more arduous than that of the latter. He has further held that the order was not in conformity with the directions issued by the Court. In the order dated 16.11.1994 by which the representation was rejected, it has been observed that the present scale of pay of Senior Laboratory Technicians was Rs. 1,400-2,300 which was higher than the pay scale of Rs. 1,320-2,040 which was admissible to the Laboratory Technicians and, therefore, there was no justification for giving them still higher pay scale. The only direction issued in the writ petition was to decide the representation by a reasoned order which has been done. If the reasons given in the decision are not very elaborate or convincing, it would not mean that there has been a deliberate disobedience of the order passed by this Court and it will not be a ground to hold them guilty of having committed contempt of court The view taken by the learned single Judge that the first part of the direction issued in the judgment and order dated 3.2.1993 has not been complied with, with respects, does not appear to be correct. The Laboratory Technicians (Allopathic) claimed parity with Laboratory Assistants ([ENTITY] and [ENTITY]) and after passing of the Government Orders dated 6.9.1994 and 19.9.1994 both the categories of employees are getting the same pay scales. We are, therefore, of the considered view that on the material placed on record, the opposite parties in the contempt petition cannot be held to have committed deliberate disobedience of the judgment and order dated 3.2.1993 in [CASE NUMBER] and they cannot be held to have committed contempt of court which may Justify any action against them.
13. For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned Judgment and order dated 29.5.1997 of the teamed Single Judge is set aside.