1 REPORTABLE INTHESUPREMECOURTOFINDIA CIVILAPPELLATEJURISDICTION REVIEWPETITION(C)D.NO.40966OF2013 IN CIVILAPPEALNO.7448OF2011 UnionofIndia Appellant(s) :Versus: NareshkumarBadrikumarJagad&Ors Respondent(s) WITH M.A.NO.2714OF2018INCIVILAPPEALNO.7448OF2011 AND CONTEMPTPETITON(C)NO.550OF2014INCIVILAPPEALNO.7448 OF2011 ORDER [ENTITY],J.
1. [ENTITY] has filed this review petition seeking review of the judgment and order passed by this Court on [CASE NUMBER]:[PRECEDENT]theappellant NationalTextileCorporationLtd.(forshort[ENTITY])hasfiledan application for directions including for extension of time. Whereas, respondent Nos.1 to 6 in the review petition (for shortrespondents)whowererespondentNos.1to6inthe aforementioned civil appeal, have filed contempt petition for initiatingappropriateactionagainsttheappellant[ENTITY].During the pendency of the review petition, an Ordinance was promulgated titled as the [ACT] which later on became The [ACT] tobedecidedintheseproceedingsareoverlapping,wepropose todealwiththesamebythiscommonorder.
(2011)12SCC695
2. Briefly stated, the property in question admeasuring 12118squareyardsofland,bearingPlotNo.9inSurveyNo.73 of Lower Parel Division, N.M. Joshi Marg, Chinchpokli, Mumbai, originally belonged to one [ENTITY] and [ENTITY].Theyexecutedaleasedeedon11 thMarch, 1893infavourofoneHopeMillsLtd.Thedemisewasfor99 yearstoexpireon21stOctober,1990.Astructurewaserected tohouseacottonmillontheproperty.Theoriginalsuitland owners sold and conveyed the said land to one [ENTITY] nd February,1907.Asper the Will of [ENTITY], the property vested in a public charitable trust by the name of Seth [ENTITY] Charitable Trust (for short the Trust). The respondents are the present trustees of the said Trust. The leaseholdrightsthenstoodtransferredfromHopeMillsLtd.to Prospect Mills Ltd. andthereafter toDiamondSpinning and Weaving Co. Pvt. Ltd. By an indenture of Lease dated 25 th October, 1926, the property, namely, the said land and structuresthereon,weredemisedtoToyoPodarCottonMills Ltd. (whose name was subsequently changed to [ENTITY]) for the residue of the unexpired period of lease of 99 years commencing from 22nd October, 1891, subject to the sametermsandconditionsasintheoriginalleasedeeddated 11thMarch,1893.
3. The [ACT] includingPodarMills,pendingtheirnationalisation.Thelease grantedinfavourofPodarMillsLtd.expiredbyeffluxoftime on 21st October, 1990. However, it continued to occupy the suitpropertyasaprotectedorstatutorytenantintermsofthe Bombay Rents, Hoteland Lodging HouseRatesControl Act, 1947(forshort1947Act).TheTrustissuedalegalnotice dated2ndDecember,1994tothe[ENTITY]terminatingitstenancy qua the suit property. The Parliament enacted the [ACT] (for short 1995 Act),whichwasdeemedtohavecomeintoforceon1 stApril, 1994.
4. On 18th July, 1995, the Trust (through respondents/trustees)filedasuitforevictionbeingTERSuit 680/1568/1995, against [ENTITY] (defendant No.1), [ENTITY] (defendant No.2) and [ENTITY] (defendant No.3) undertheprovisionsofthe1947Act.Thereliefsclaimedinthe saidsuitreadthus:
ThePlaintiffs,therefore,praythat:
(a) theDefendantsNo.2&3beorderedanddecreetoquit, vacateandhandoverquiet,vacantandpeacefulpossession ofthesuitPlotNo.9,CadastralSurveyNo.73ofLowerParel DivisionsituatedatDelisleRoad,(NowknownasN.M.Joshi Marg),Bombay400011tothePlaintiffs;
(b) that the Defendants No.2 be ordered and decreed to paythemesneprofittothePlaintiffsfromthedateofthesuit tilltheDecreeattherateofRs.128.75permonth,andafter passingoftheDecreeadirectionbegiventomakeinquiryin thematterandsuchotherrate170,attherateprevailingin the market be fixed as the mesne profit payable till possessionishandedovertotheplaintiffs;
(c) thatpendingthehearingandfinaldisposalofthesuit the Defendants No.2 their servants, agents and representativesberestrainedbyanorderandinjunctionof this Honble Court from carrying out any further work of additions, alterations and/or erections of a permanent nature or committing acts of waste into or upon the suit landsviz.,PlotNo.9,CadastralSurveyNo.73ofLowerParel DivisionsituatedatDelisleRoad,(NowknownasN.M.Joshi Marg),Bombay400011;
(d) thatpendingthehearingandfinaldisposalofthesuit that the defendants No.2 their servants, agents and representativesberestrainedbyanorderandapermanent injunction of this Honble Court from subletting and/or transferring their interest in the suit premises or from creating a leave and licence in respect thereof or from inductingathirdpartythereinorfrominanyothermanner partingwiththepossessionofthesuitlands;
(e) thatinterimandadinteriminjunctionsbegrantedin termsofprayer(c)and(d)aboveduringthependencyand finaldisposalofthissuit;
(f) that a fit and proper person be appointed as a Commissioner to visit and inspect the suit premises being Plot No.9, Cadastral Survey No.73 of Lower Parel Division situatedatDelisleRoad,(NowknownasN.M.JoshiMarg), Bombay400011andtomakeandgivehisreportregarding the present position and condition of the suit lands and structuresstandingthereon;
(g) thatthestatusquoinrespectofthesuitpremisesbe maintained;
(h) forcostsofthissuit;
forsuchotherandfurtherorderasmaybejustandproper andnecessary; Thissuitwasdismissedfornonprosecutionon26 th August, 2002.
5. The Trust (through respondents/trustees) filed another suiton6thMay,1997,beingRADSuitNo.955/97,againstthe same parties ([ENTITY], Ministry of Textile (defendant No.1),[ENTITY](defendantNo.2) andPodarMillsLtd.(defendant No.3)forthefollowingreliefs:
THEPLAINTIFFSTHEREFOREPRAY: [ENTITY] Defendants No.3 were holdingoverpremisesand/orbyoperationoflawbecomethe statutorytenantofthePlaintiffsinrespectofsuitproperty beingPlotNo.9,CadastralSurveyNo.73Landadmeasuring about12,118Sq.yardswithallbuildingsstandingthereon, situated at Delisle Road, now known as N.M. Joshi Marg, Bombay400011.
B. thatitbedeclared thatontheappointeddayi.e.1 st April, 1995. The Defendants No.1, had acquired tenancy rights of the Defendants No.3, and what has vested in Defendants No.2 is the statutory tenancy of Defendants No.3,andassuchDefendantNo.2,isthestatutorytenantof thePlaintiffs,protectedunderBombayRentAct,inrespect ofthesuitpremisesbeingPlotNo.9,CadastralSurveyNo.73, landadmeasuringabout12,118Sq.yardswithallbuildings standing thereon, situated at Delisle Road, now known as N.M.JoshiMarg,Bombay400011.
C. thatitbealsodeclaredthatDefendantsNo.3,asthe statutorytenantsofthePlaintiffsinrespectofsuitpremises beingPlotNo.9,CadastralSurveyNo.73,landadmeasuring about12,118Sq.yardswithallbuildingsstandingthereon, situated at Delisle Road, now known as N.M. Joshi Marg, Bombay400011,hadnorighttoclaimand/orreceiveany compensationfromtheDefendantsNo.1and/or Defendant No.2,fortheacquirementand/orvestingoftheirstatutory tenancyright,intheDefendantsNo.1.
D. thattheDefendantsNo.1and2bedirectedtofurnish thedetailbifurcationofthepaymentmentionedinSchedule IitemNo.4ofthesaidOrdinance6of1995. E. that the Defendants No.1 be also restrained from makinganypaymenttotheextentofDefendantsNo.3,allege leaseright,title,andinterestinthesuitpropertybeingPlot No.9, Cadastral Survey No.73, land admeasuring about 12,118 sq. yards with all buildings standing thereon, situated at Delisle Road, now known as N.M. Joshi Marg, Bombay400011,fixedbytheDefendantsNo.1,and/orNo.2, astheDefendantsNo.1hadonlyacquiredstatutorytenancy rightsthereon.
F. thatitbedeclaredthattheDefendantsNo.1and2as the statutory tenant of the Plaintiffs have no right to deal with transfer, mortgage, selland/or otherwise disposed off and/or induct any third party in the suit promises, being PlotNo.9,CadastralSurveyNo.73,landadmeasuringabout 12,118 sq. yards with all buildings standing thereon, situated at Delisle Road, now known as N.M. Joshi Marg, Bombay400011.
G. Interimandadinterimreliefsintermsofprayers(d)to
(f)begranted.
H. Costs and any other and such reliefs be granted as thisHonbleCourtmaydeemfitandproper. Thissuitwaseventuallywithdrawnon22ndDecember,2004.
6. [ACT] of [ENTITY] vide notice dated 26th September, 2000. The Trust (through respondents/ trustees) filed a fresh suit on 20 th April, 2001 under the TransferofPropertyAct,1882onlyagainsttheappellant[ENTITY], intheSmallCausesCourtatBombaybeingTER311/326/01 forthefollowingreliefs:
ThePlaintiffs,therefore,pray:
(a) thattheDefendantsbeorderedanddecreetovacate andhandovertothePlaintiffsvacantpeacefulpossessionof thesuitpremisesi.e.premisesbeinglandwiththebuilding admeasuringabout12,118sq.yards(equivalentto10131.85 sq. mtrs.) bearing Plot No.9, Cadastral Survey No.73 of LowerParelDivisionsituatedatDelisleRoad,nowknownas N.M.JoshiMarg,Chinchpokli,Bombay400011;
(b) the Defendants be ordered and decree to pay to the Plaintiffsmesneprofitsatthemarketrateandatsomeother ratefixedbythisHonbleCourtfortheuseandoccupationof thesaidlandandbuildinghavingareaofabout12,118sq. yards (equivalent to 10131.85 sq. mtrs.) from November 2000 till the Defendants hand over peaceful possession of thesaidpremisesviz.landwithbuildingadmeasuringabout 12118sq.yards,bearingPlotNo.9,CadastralSurveyNo.73 ofLowerParelDivisionsituatedatDelisleRoad,nowknown as N.M. Joshi Marg, Chinchpokli, Bombay400011 to the PlaintiffsoratsuchamountasthisHonbleCourtmaydeem fitandproper,afterdueinquiryunderOrderXXRule12(c) oftheCivilProcedureCode;
(c) pending hearing and final disposal of the suit Defendantsbythemselves,theiragents,officers,servantsbe restrainedbyorderandinjunctionofthisHonbleCourtfrom partingwithpossessionoroccupationofthesuitpremises under any assignment or part in whatsoever manner of inductanythirdpartytherein;
(d) pendingthehearingandfinaldisposalofthesuitsome fitandproperpersonbeappointedReceiverwithallpower underOrder40Rule4oftheCodeofCivilProceduretotake chargeofthesuitpremises;
(e) pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit Defendants be ordered to pay to the Plaintiffs damages/equally profit at Rs.7 lacs per month subject to adjustmentofsaidamount whendamages/mesne profit is finallydeterminedbytheHonbleCourt;
(f) interimandadinterimreliefsintermsofprayers(c),
(d)and(e)above;
(g) costofthissuitbeprovidedfor;and (h) for such other and further reliefs as the nature and
circumstancesofthecasemayrequiredbegranted.
7. Theappellant[ENTITY]fileditswrittenstatementdenyingthe pleastakenbytheplaintiffs.Thesuitwasdecreedinfavourof the plaintiffs (Trust) vide judgment and decree dated 5 th August,2006byvirtueofwhichthe[ENTITY]wasdirectedtohand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suitpremisesto theplaintiffswithinfourmonths.
8. Beingaggrieved,theappellant[ENTITY]preferredAppealNo. 627 of 2006 before the Division Bench of theSmall Causes Court at Bombay on 13th November, 2006 which was dismissed by the appellate court by affirming the judgment anddecreeofthetrialcourtvidejudgmentanddecreedated 14thAugust,2008.Theappellantpreferredcivilrevisionbefore theHighCourtofBombay,whichcametobedismissedvide judgmentandorderdated3rdAugust,2009.
9. Being aggrieved, [ENTITY] assailed the aforementioned decision of the High Court before this Court by way of a Special Leave Petition converted to [CASE NUMBER], which came to be dismissed on 5th September, 2011. Thatdecisionisthesubjectmatterofthereviewpetitionfiled on20thDecember,2013bytheUnionofIndiaasathirdparty. TheprincipalgroundurgedbytheUnionofIndiaisthatthe right, title and interest in the suit property had vested absolutelyintheCentralGovernmentbyvirtueofSection3(1) of the 1995 Act. Nevertheless, in the subject suit for possession filed by the Trust, [ENTITY] had not been impleaded as a partydefendant. Notably, the Trust had impleaded [ENTITY] as a party defendant in both the previoussuitsfiledincludingforevictionundertheprovisions ofthe1947Act.Thatpresupposesthattherespondentswere cognizantoftheeffectofthestatutoryvestingofthetenancy absolutelyinfavouroftheCentralGovernment.
10. As aforementioned, during the pendency of the review petition, the [ACT] came into effect, necessitating [ENTITY] to take out an application for urging additional grounds in the pending review petition, in lightoftheprovisionscontainedinthesaidenactment.
11. ThisCourtwhiledismissingtheappealpreferredby[ENTITY], gavetimetovacateupto31stDecember,2013subjecttofiling ofusualundertakingwithinfourweeks,tohandoverpeaceful andvacantpossessiontotheTrust.TheGeneralManagerof [ENTITY]filedanaffidavitofundertakingonbehalfof[ENTITY]on3 rd October, 2011, with the approval of the [ENTITY], in complianceoftheorderdated5thSeptember,2011passedby thisCourt.
12. Before the expiry of the time to vacate, [ENTITY] filed an application for extension of time to hand over possession of thesuitpremiseson23 rdDecember,2013,forreasonsstated in the application. This Court acceded to that request vide order dated 31st January, 2014 and extended the time to vacateuntil30thJune,2014.[ENTITY]filedafreshundertakingon 24th March,2014,withtheapprovaloftheUnionofIndia,in complianceoftheorderdated31stJanuary,2014.
13. [ENTITY] has filed a fresh application on 27 th June, 2014 beforetheexpiryofthetimetovacate,[CASE NUMBER] fordirectionsandprayingforthefollowingreliefs:
PRAYERS:
(a) TogranttimetotheApplicantshereintocomplywith allthelaws,rules,regulationsasrequiredforsubdivisionof thesaidlandsothatthelandoftheRespondentaswellas Applicantcouldbedemarcatedandsubdivided;
(b) ThatthisHonbleCourtmaybepleasedtodeclarethe Orderdated5.8.2006oftheHonbleSmallCausesCourtas regardsthehandlingoverofthebuildingstructurestanding onthesaidsuitlanddoesnotimplythatthebuildingsareto behandedoverfreeofcostorthattheRespondentTrustis theownertherein;
(c) ThatinanyeventthisHonbleCourtmaybepleasedto vary the said order of the Small Cases Court dated 05.8.2006inasmuchasitdirectshandingoverofbuilding inasmuchas the said order is impossible of compliance since in the process ofsubdivision, the structureson the landoftheRespondentasalsothelandoftheApplicantwill standdemolished;
(d) ThatthisHonbleCourtmaybepleasedtodirectthe RespondentTrusttopaytotheApplicantsthesalvagevalue at the market rate/value of the demolished structure standing on the lease hold land to be handed over to the Respondent.
(e) ThatthisHonbleCourtmaybepleasedtopermitand alsoissueadirectionpermittingtheApplicanttohandover juridical possession to the Respondent Trust without handlingoverthephysicalpossessionuntilsuchtimeasthe landhasbeendemarcatedandthestructuredemolished.
(f) Passanysuchotherorder/sasmaybedeemedfitand proper.
14. The respondents havefileda contempt petition on 20 th November, 2014 including for enforcement of the directions given to [ENTITY] to vacate the suit premises and to hand over peaceful and vacantpossession thereoftothem.Theyallege thatitisacaseofwillfuldisobedienceandmoreparticularly, breach of the undertaking given to this Court by the party concernedwarrantingappropriateactionagainst[ENTITY]andits officials.
15. TherespondentswouldcontendthatUnionofIndiahas nolocustofileareviewpetitionagainstthejudgmentofthis Courtdated5th September,2011. Itisthencontendedthat thegroundsurgedbytheUnionofIndiainthereviewpetition regardingthepurportofthe1995Actwerespecificallyraised andhavebeenansweredappropriately.Secondly,thefactnow assertedbytheUnionofIndiabywayofreviewpetitionand which contention is supported by [ENTITY], namely, that the tenancyrightsinthesuitpropertyoftheerstwhilePodarMills Ltd.vestedabsolutelyintheUnionofIndiaafterthetaking overofthemanagementofthesubjectTextileUndertakingby operation of the provisions of the 1983 Act and followed by acquisition by virtue of the 1995 Act, was not specifically raisedinthewrittenstatementfiledby[ENTITY].Itistoolatein thedaytopermitUnionofIndiaor[ENTITY]toraisethatplea.It isnotopenforthereviewcourttotravelbeyondthepleadings inthewrittenstatementfiledby[ENTITY].Noevidencecanbeled either by [ENTITY] or [ENTITY] in respect of any factual matterwhichhasnotbeenpleadedinthewrittenstatement. Thepleatakenby[ENTITY]inthewrittenstatementhasbeenduly consideredrightuptothisCourt,whichculminatedintothe decisionofthisCourt.Infact,thereviewpetitionbyUnionof India is a subterfuge so as to circumvent the decree of possessionpassedagainst[ENTITY]inrespectofthesuitpremises, and moreso, indefianceoftheundertaking already givento thisCourt,withtheapprovaloftheUnionofIndia,tohand over peaceful and vacant possession. According to the respondents,thereviewpetitionbyUnionofIndiaaswellas theapplicationforextensionoftimeby[ENTITY]arenothingbut anabuseoftheprocessoftheCourtandmustbedismissed. Therespondentshavealsoinvitedourattentiontotheinterim orders passed by thisCourtinthepresent proceedingsand would contend that the Commissions Report exposes the standtakenby[ENTITY]thatthesuitpremisesarestillbeingused foritsactivities.
16. We have heard Ms. [ENTITY], learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the review petitioner, Mr. [ENTITY] & Mr. [ENTITY], learned senior counselappearingfor[ENTITY]andMr.[ENTITY],Mr.[ENTITY].[ENTITY],learnedseniorcounselappearing fortherespondents.
17. Fromthejudgmentunderreview,itisseenthatthemain ground urged by [ENTITY] in the review petition was pressedintoserviceby[ENTITY].Inparagraph7ofthejudgment, theargumentcanvassedonbehalfof[ENTITY]hasbeennotedas under:
7. Shri [ENTITY], learned Additional Solicitor General,appearingfortheappellanthassubmittedthatthe judgments and decrees of the courts below have tobe set aside as none of the courts below has taken into considerationtheeffectoftheprovisionsofthe1995Actby virtue of which the textile undertaking stood absolutely vestedintheCentralGovernmentandfurthervestedinthe appellant.Asontheexpiryoftheleaseof99yearson2210 1990,the1947Actwasinforce,thethentenant,PodarMills became the statutory tenant. Such tenancy rights stood vested absolutely in the Central Government on the commencement of the 1995 Act by operation of law. The appellant stepped in the shoes of the Central Government merely as an agent, thus, the Central Government remained the tenant. The Central Government continued to be a tenant in the suit premises and thus, would be protected in terms of Section3(1)(a)ofthe1999Actbeingpremisesletoutto the Government. The courts below failed to consider this vitallegalissue.Thesuitfiledbytherespondentswasnot maintainable. The judgments and decrees of the courts belowareliabletobesetaside. (emphasissupplied)
18. ThisCourt,afterconsideringtherivalsubmissions,held that[ENTITY]hadnotspecificallypleadedinthewrittenstatement that the tenancy stood vested absolutely in the Central Government and resultantly, no issue in that behalf was framed nor any argument was advanced before the Trial Court, Appellate Court or the Revisional Court. That contentionwastakenforthefirsttimeintheappealbeforethe Supreme Court by way of an application to urge additional grounds regarding the application of the 1995 Act, without seekingamendmenttothepleadings(writtenstatement).The Court then considered the question as to whether the Government is a tenant or whether [ENTITY] can be termed as GovernmentorGovernmentDepartmentorAgentofthe [ACT]TheCourt, inunambiguoustermsheldthat[ENTITY]couldneitherbetreated asGovernmentorGovernmentDepartmentnorcoulditbe treated as an Agent of the Central Government. Whereas, [ENTITY]wascontrolledbytheprovisionsofthe1995Actandnot by the Central Government. The Court also considered the purportoftheexpressionvestingandnotedthattheTrust hadrentedoutthesuitpremisestoPodarMillsandwhathad vestedwasthatright,titleandinterestofthePodarMillsand nothingelse.Itwillbeappositeto reproduceparagraphs42 and43ofthejudgmentunderreview,whichrejectstheclaim of[ENTITY]inthefollowingwords:
42. Itisnotpermissiblefortheappellanttocanvassthat the Central Government has any concern so far as the tenancy rights are concerned. Right vested in the Central Government stoodtransferred andvested intheappellant. Both are separate legal entities and are not synonymous. The appellant being neither the Government nor the government departmentcannot agitatethatasit hasbeen substituted in place of the Central Government, and acts merely as an agent of the Central Government, thus protection of the1999 Actisavailabletoit.Theappellant cannotbepermittedtosaythatthoughalltherightsvested in it but it merely remained the agent of the Central Government.Acceptanceofsuchasubmissionwouldrequire interpretingtheexpressionvestingasholdingonbehalfof someotherperson.Suchameaningcannotbegiventothe expressionvesting.
43. Itisasettledlegalpropositionthatanagentcannotbe suedwheretheprincipalisknown.Intheinstantcase,the appellanthasnottakenthepleabeforeeitherofthecourts below.InviewoftheprovisionsofOrder8Rule2[ACT],the appellantwasunderanobligationtotakeaspecificpleato showthatthesuitwasnotmaintainablewhichitfailedtodo so.Thevaguepleatotheextentthatthesuitwasbadfor nonjoinderand,thus,wasnotmaintainable,didnotmeet therequirementoflaw.Theappellantoughttohavetakena pleainthewrittenstatementthatitwasmerelyanagentof the Central Government, thus the suit against it was not maintainable. More so, whether A is an agent of B is a questionoffactandhastobeproperlypleadedandproved byadducingevidence.Theappellantmiserablyfailedtotake therequiredpleadingsforthepurpose.
19. RevertingtothequestionofwhetherUnionofIndiahas locustofilethereviewpetition,wemustimmediatelyadvertto [SECTION] of the [ACT] ([ACT]) which, inter alia, postulates that any person considering himself aggrieved would have locus to file a review petition. [SECTION] himselfaggrievedcanfileareviewpetition.[ENTITY], the Supreme Court exercisesreviewjurisdiction byvirtueof [SECTION] of the [ACT] which predicates that the SupremeCourtshallhavethepowertoreviewanyjudgment pronouncedorordermadebyit.Besides,theSupremeCourt hasframedRulestogovernreviewpetitions.Notably,neither [SECTION] of [ACT] nor [SECTION] of the Supreme Court Rules limits the remedy of review only to the parties to the judgment under review. Therefore, we have no hesitation in enunciatingthatevenathirdpartytotheproceedings,ifhe considershimselfanaggrievedperson,maytakerecourseto the remedy of review petition. The quintessence is that the personshouldbeaggrievedbythejudgmentandorderpassed bythisCourtinsomerespect.
20. The next question is whether [ENTITY] can be consideredasanaggrievedpersonsoastopursuetheremedy ofreviewpetition.Itisindisputablethatthemanagementof PodarMillsTextileUndertakingwastakenoverbytheCentral Government after the commencement of the 1983 Act. The scopeofmanagementwouldobviouslyincludepossessionand permissibleuseofthesuitpropertyoftheTextileUndertaking sotakenover.Induecourse,the1995Actcameintoforce.As a consequence of [SECTION] of this Act, the right, title and interest of the owners of the subject Textile Undertaking ([ENTITY]) including the statutory tenancy rights in relation to the suitproperty stoodtransferredtoandvested absolutelyintheCentralGovernment.Bythesameprovision, vide subsection (2) thereof, the Textile Undertaking which stoodvestedintheCentralGovernmentimmediatelythereafter stood transferred to and vested in the National Textile Corporation.Thatincludedsubsistingstatutorytenancyrights inrespectofthesuitpropertyenjoyedbytheconcernedTextile Undertaking.However,Section3standsamendedbyvirtueof the2014Act.Thatamendmentbyalegalfictionisdeemedto havebeeninsertedintothe1995Actw.e.f.1 stJanuary,1994. Thepurportoftheamendedsubsections(3)and(4),inserted in [SECTION] is that the leasehold rights of the Textile UndertakingwouldcontinuetoremainvestedintheCentral GovernmentandnoCourtcouldexercisejurisdictiontoorder divestmentfromthe[ENTITY]ofthepropertyvestedinitbythe CentralGovernment.Inaddition,[CASE NUMBER] has introduced [SECTION] in the 1995 Act, titled as Validation.Weshalldilateontheefficacyoftheseprovisions alittlelater.
21. Suffice it to observe that since [ENTITY] is asseverating that the suit property had vested absolutely in the Central Government and continues to so vest in it by virtueofalegalfictionintheValidationAct2014,wouldbe justifiedincontendingthatitisapersonaggrievedandhas locustopointoutthatthedecreeforpossessionofthesuit premisesagainst[ENTITY]couldnothavebeenpassedandinany case, the same could not be enforced in law. It is an inexecutable decree and including the undertaking given by [ENTITY], assuming that theconcernedcourthadjurisdiction to passsuchadecree.
22. Havingsaidthis,wemaynowturntothequestionof scope of review jurisdictiontobeexercisedbythisCourtin civil proceedings. The power to review any judgment pronouncedorordermadebythisCourtflowsfromArticle137 ofthe[ACT]ofIndia,whichreadsthus:
137.ReviewofjudgmentsorordersbytheSupremeCourt SubjecttotheprovisionsofanylawmadebyParliamentor anyrulesmadeunderArticle145,theSupremeCourtshall havepowertoreviewanyjudgmentpronouncedororder madebyit.
23. ThepowertoframerulesispositedinArticle145ofthe [ACT]. As per [SECTION] of the Supreme CourtRulesframedunderArticle145,theCourtcanreviewits judgmentororderonthegroundsmentionedinOrderXLVII, Rule1ofthe[ACT].Itwillbe,therefore,appositetoadvertto Rule1ofOrderXLVIIof[ACT].Thesamereadsthus:
ORDERXLVII REVIEW
1.Applicationforreviewofjudgement. (1)Anypersonconsideringhimselfaggrieved
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed,butfromnoappealhasbeenpreferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed,or
(c)byadecisiononareferencefromaCourtofSmall Causes, andwho,fromthediscoveryofnewandimportantmatteror evidencewhich,aftertheexerciseofduediligence,wasnot withinhisknowledgeorcouldnotbeproducedbyhimatthe time when the decree was passed or order made, or on accountofsomemistakeorerrorapparentonthefaceofthe recordorforanyothersufficientreason,desirestoobtaina reviewofthedecreepassedorordermadeagainsthim,may applyforareviewofjudgementtotheCourtwhichpassed thedecreeormadetheorder.
(2)Apartywhoisnotappealingfromadecreeorordermay apply for a review of judgement notwithstanding the pendencyofanappealbysomeotherpartyexceptwherethe groundofsuchappealiscommontotheapplicantandthe appellant,orwhen,beingrespondent,hecanpresenttothe AppellateCourtthecaseonwhichheappliesforthereview.
24. Thegroundsforreviewarespecifiedinclause(1)noted above.Thefactualscenariointhepresentcaseiscertainlynot ascribable to discovery of new or important matters or evidencewhichwasavailableorexistingatthetimeofthe decree but could not be produced despite exercise of due diligence.Inthepresentcase,theasseverationofthereview petitionerisaboutthemistakeorerrorapparentonthefaceof the record committed by the Court and more particularly founded on the effect of the subsequent enactment of [ACT] which completely changesthe statusof the parties, namely, [ENTITY] and [ENTITY] qua the suit property and bars the enforcement of any decree and includingtheundertakinggiventotheCourtby[ENTITY].
25. Ordinarily, enactment of a subsequent legislation by itself cannot be the basis to review the judgment already rendered by the Court. But the argument of the review petitioner proceeds on the premise that the subsequent legislation has completely altered the status of the parties retrospectivelyquathesuitpropertywitheffectfrom1 stApril, 1994byalegalfiction,asaresultofwhichthecauseofaction against[ENTITY]asreferredtointhesubjectsuithadbecomenon existent; and including any decree or order passed against [ENTITY],anundertakingfiledby[ENTITY]inany court or tribunal or authority has been rendered unenforceablebyoperationoflawandcannotbecontinuedor takenforward.Inotherwords,evenifavaliddecreehasbeen passed against [ENTITY], the same had become inexecutable by operationoflaw.
26. This Court in Raja Shatrunji Vs. Mohammad Azmal AzimKhanandOrs.2hadanoccasiontoconsidertheimpact of [ACT] having retrospective effect on the decree alreadypassed.Thediscussioninparagraphs11to13ofthis decisionisquiteinstructive.Itacceptstheargumentthatthe Court must give full effect to the statutory fiction, which shouldbecarriedtoitslogicalconclusionnomatterinreview jurisdiction.Thesaidparagraphsreadthus:
11. The [ACT] therefore provided that the amendment took effect as if the [ACT] had beeninforceonallmaterialdates. Theeffect ofsucha deemingclausewasstatedbythisCourtinStateofBombay v.PandurangVinayakChaphalkar3asfollows:
Whenastatuteenactsthatsomethingshallbedeemed tohavebeendone,whichinfactandtruthwasnotdone, thecourtisentitledtoascertainforwhatpurposesand between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resortedtoandfulleffectmustbegiventothestatutory fictionanditshouldbecarriedtoitslogicalconclusion. The statutory fiction was introduced to give full effect to Section4ofthe1952Actbyconferringonthedebtorsand creditorstherighttoapplytothecourtforcalculationand reductionofdebt.Itwasrealisedthatcourtsalwayspassed simpledecrees.Itwasnoticedthatmortgagedpropertywas not and could not be charged under the decree. It was (1971)2SCC200 AIR1953SC244=1953SCR773 thereforeappreciatedthatunlessthewordschargedunder the decree were deleted the section could never give any relieftoanylandlordwhoseestatehadbeenacquired.
12. This Court in the Bombay case referred to the [PRECEDENT], you mustsurely,unlessprohibitedfromdoingso,alsoimagine asrealtheconsequencesandincidentswhich,iftheputative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowedfromoraccompaniedit Thestatutesaysthatyou mustimagineacertainstateofaffairs;itdoesnotsaythat havingdoneso,youmustcauseorpermityourimagination tobogglewhenitcomestotheinevitablecorollariesofthat stateofaffairs.Theseobservationsindicatethatthewords chargedunderthedecreeinSection4(2)ofthe1952Act were never there with the inevitable consequence that the only statutory requirement is whether the mortgaged propertyconsistsofestatewhichhasbeenacquiredunder the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land ReformsAct,1950.
13. OnNovember27,1962whenthematterwasheardby the High Court, this amendment did not come into the statutebook. That is why the judgmentdebtor made an applicationtobringittothenoticeoftheHighCourtthatthe law was that the words charged under the decree were always deemed to have been deleted and this law was effectivefromthedateofcomingintoforceofthe1952Act onMay25,1953.TheHighCourtbyamajorityopinionwas oftheviewthatthejudgmentdebtorsshouldbegivenrelief underOrder47oftheCodeofCivilProceduretheprinciples ofreviewaredefinedbytheCodeandthewordsanyother sufficient reason in [SECTION] of the Code would mean a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those specified immediatelypreviouslyinthatorder.Thegroundsforreview arethediscoveryofnewmattersorevidencewhich,afterthe exercise of duediligence, was notwithin hisknowledge or couldnotbeproducedbyhimatthetimewhenthedecree was passed or order made, or the review is asked for on accountofsomemistakeorerrorapparentonthefaceofthe record.In [PRECEDENT], Lord [ENTITY] at p. 205 of the Reportsaidthatthesectiondoesnotauthorisethereviewof adecreewhichwasrightwhenitwasmadeonthegroundof thehappeningofsomesubsequentevent. Counselforthe appellant submitted that when the High Court decided thematter, theHigh Court applied thelawasitstood andasubsequentchangeoflawcouldnotbeagroundfor review.Theappellants contention isnotacceptable in thepresentcasefortwoprincipalreasons;first,itisnot asubsequentlaw.Itisthelawwhichallalongwasthere from1952.Thedeemingprovisionisfullyeffectiveand operativeasfromMay25,1953whenthe1952Actcame intoforce.Theresult isthatthe courtisto applythe legalprovisionasitalwaysstood.Itwould,therefore,be erroronthefaceoftherecord.Theerrorwouldbethat the law that was applied was not the law which is applicable. Secondly, [SECTION] of the 1952 Act confers power on the court to apply the law notwithstanding any provisioncontainedintheCodeofCivilProcedure.Therefore theapplicationthoughintituledanapplicationforreviewwas not so. The substance and not the form of the application willbedecisive. (emphasissupplied)
27. Applying the underlying principle and as jurisdictional issueshavebeenraisedwhichareessentiallyfoundedonthe law enacted by the Parliament with retrospective effect containingalegalfictionandfordoingcompletejusticetothe parties,besidesthepowerofreviewunderArticle137ofthe [ACT], it is open to thisCourt to exerciseitsplenary powerunderArticle142ofthe[ACT].
28. Revertingtothejudgmentunderreview,itisnoticedthat the provisions of the 1983 Act and 1995 Act have been generallyadvertedtowhiledealingwiththepleatakenbythe appellant[ENTITY]thatitwasinpossessionofthesuitproperty merelyasanagentoftheCentralGovernment.However,the Courtdeclinedtoentertainthatpleaof[ENTITY]asitwasnotso specificallypleadedinthewrittenstatement.TheCourtthen concluded that the appellant [ENTITY] was neither the Government nor Government Department nor Agent of the Central Government in the context of the [ACT] Indeed, the review petitioners would argue that on a fair readingoftheunamendedprovisionscontainedin1995Act and juxtaposed with the provisions of 1983 Act, the inescapableconclusionisthattheleaseholdrightscontinued to vest in the Central Government. However, we are not inclinedtocountenancethisargument.
29. The review petitioners may be justified in pointing out thatthisCourtcommittedanerrorapparentonthefaceofthe record in observing that the appellant had never raised the issue before the courts below that the Central Government was the tenant and the appellant was holding the premises merelyasanagent;andthatavaguepleawastakenaboutthe nonjoinderoftheparties whichpleawasnotevenpursued beforetheTrialCourt.Thoseerrors,inouropinion,wouldnot affect the final conclusion recorded by this Court in the judgmentunderreview,consideringtheeffectoftheprovisions as were applicable at the relevant time in the form of un amended [SECTION] of the 1995 Act. For, by virtue of [SECTION],therightswhichhadvested absolutelyintheCentralGovernmentincludinginrespectof the suit property, stood transferred to and vested in the appellant[ENTITY]oncomingintoforceofthe1995Actw.e.f.1 st April,1994.ThatviewtakenbythisCourtdoesnotmeritany review. Resultantly, it is not necessary to dilate on the decisions in [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT], on the principle of the purport of expressionerrorapparentpostulatedintherulesgoverning thescopeofreviewjurisdiction.
30. However,thelegalsituationhasundergoneaseachange retrospectivelyafterthecomingintoforceoftheValidationAct 2014.TheValidationActmakesitexplicitthattheamendment tothe1995Actspecifiedthereinshallbedeemedtohavebeen insertedonorfromthedateofcommencementofthe1995Act i.e.1stApril,1994.ThepreambleoftheValidationActandthe relevantchapterapplicabletothecaseonhand,beingChapter IIIofthatAct,readthus:
[ACT]17thDecember,2014.] (2009)10SCC464 (2013)8SCC337 (1923)Vol.L(IA)324 AnActfurthertoamendtheSickTextileUndertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974 and the [ACT] inordertocontinuewiththe leasehold rights vested in the National Textile Corporationoncompletionoftheleaseholdtenure.
WHEREAS the National Textile Corporation subserves theinterestsofthegeneralpublicandthelandcontinueto beinpossessionofthesaidCorporation;
AND WHEREAS various other textile undertakings have been nationalised from time to time and their assetsvestedabsolutelyintheCentralGovernmentand thereafter transferred to the National Textile Corporation Limited by the Central Government free fromallencumbrances;
AND WHEREAS after the nationalisation of the textile undertakings,a largesumofmoneyhavebeeninvested with a view to making the said textile undertakings viable;
AND WHEREAS the Central Government has taken initiative to revive certain sick undertakings including the National Textile Corporation under a revival scheme sanctioned by the [ACT]
AND WHEREAS it is necessary for the proper and effective implementation of the revival scheme and to protect the public investment in the acquired textile undertakingsandtoexplicitlyclarifythestatusofsuch vesting of the leasehold rights in the Central Government.
BEitenactedbyParliamentintheSixtyfifthYearofthe RepublicofIndiaasfollows: CHAPTERI PRELIMINARY
1. (1) This Act may be called the [ACT].
(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force with effect fromthe24thOctober,2014.
CHAPTERII AMENDMENTS TO THE [ACT] AMENDMENTSTOTHETEXTILEUNDERTAKINGS (NATIONALISATION)ACT,1995
5.Onandfromthedateofcommencementofthe[ACT] (hereafter in this ChapterreferredtoastheprincipalAct),insection3,after subsection (2), the following subsections shall be inserted and shall be deemed to have been inserted, namely: "(3) Notwithstandingthetransferandvesting ofanytextileundertakingtotheNationalTextile Corporation by virtue of subsection (2), the leasehold rights of the textile undertakings shall continue to remain vested in the CentralGovernment onpaymentofleasehold rentsandshallbedischarged,forandonbehalf of that Government, by the National Textile Corporationasandwhenpaymentofsuchlease hold rents or any amount becomes due and payable.
(4) Subject to subsection (3), no court shall have jurisdiction to order divestment from the National Textile Corporation of the property vested in it by the Central Government
6. On and from the date of commencement of the principal Act, in [SECTION], [SECTION], the following subsections shall be inserted and shall be deemedtohavebeeninserted,namely: (8) Notwithstandingthefactthatthetextile operations have been discontinued in any textileundertakingbeingrevived,shallforall effects and purposes be deemed that the textileoperationsarebeingcontinuedandno suit or proceeding shall be instituted or if instituted be maintainable against the National Textile Corporation on the ground thatithasdiscontinuedsuchactivityinthe textileundertaking.
(9) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the continued deemed vesting of the leasehold land in the CentralGovernment shall not affect, impair or in any manner prejudice the rights of the National Textile Corporation to prosecute or defend any proceedingsasasubsequentvesteeinrespectof any such leasehold rights and no such proceedings shall fail only on account of the nonimpleadmentofthatGovernment
7.Aftersection38oftheprincipalAct,thefollowingsection shallbeinserted,namely: "39. Notwithstanding anything contained in anyjudgment,decreeororderofanycourt, tribunalorotherauthority,
(a) theprovisionsofthisAct,asamendedby the [ACT] shall have and shall be deemed always to have effect for all purposes as if the provisions of this Act, as amended by the said Act, had been in force at all material times;
(b) any leasehold property divested from the National Textile Corporation to any person under the provisions of this Act, as it stood immediately before the commencement of the [ACT], shall standtransferredtoandvestorcontinuetovest, free from all encumbrances, in the National Textile Corporation in the same manner as it was vested in the National Textile Corporation beforesuchdivestingofthatpropertyunderthe provisionsofthisActasiftheprovisionsofthis Act, as amended by the aforesaid Act, were in forceatallmaterialtimes;
(c)nosuitorotherproceedingsshall,without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, be maintained or continued in any court or tribunal or authority for the enforcement of any decree or order or direction given by such court or tribunal or authority, notwithstanding any undertaking filed by the National Textile Corporation in any court or tribunal or authority, directing divestmentofsuchleaseholdpropertyfromthe National Textile Corporation vested in it under [SECTION] of this Act, as it stood before the commencement of the [ACT], and such leasehold property shall continue to vest in the NationalTextileCorporationundersection3 ofthisAct,asamendedbytheaforesaidAct, as if the said section was in force at all materialtimes;
(d) any transfer of any property, vested in the National Textile Corporation, by virtue of any orderofattachment,seizureorsaleinexecution of a decree of a civil court or orders of any tribunal or other authority in respect of lease hold property vested in the National Textile Corporationwhichiscontrarytotheprovisions of this Act, as amended by the Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Laws (AmendmentandValidation)Act,2014,shallbe deemedtobenullandvoidandnotwithstanding such transfer, continue tovest inthe National TextileCorporationunderthisAct
8.(1) The [ACT] is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the [ACT],asamendedbythisAct. (emphasissupplied)
31. Wemayhastentoaddthatthevalidityoftheprovisions ofValidationAct2014isnotputinissueintheseproceedings. As is noticed, the effect of the [ACT] is to incorporate subsections (3) & (4) in [SECTION] with retrospective effect for all purposes, by a deeming provision,asifithadalwaysbeeninforceatallmaterialtimes w.e.f.1stApril,1994.Inaddition,Section39hasbeeninserted inthePrincipalAct.
32. The effect of insertion of subsections (3) & (4) in Section3ofthePrincipalActisthatSection3,ason1 stApril, 1994,wouldreadasfollows:
3.(1)Ontheappointedday,theright,titleandinterestof theownerinrelationtoeverytextileundertakingshallstand transferred to and shall and shall vest absolutely in, the CentralGovernment.
(2) Every textile undertaking which stands vested in the Central Government by virtue of subsection (1) shall immediatelyafterithassovested,standtransferredto,and vestedin,theNationalTextileCorporation. (3)Notwithstandingthetransferandvestingofanytextile undertakingtotheNationalTextileCorporationbyvirtue of subsection (2), the leasehold rights of the textile undertakings shall continue to remain vested in the Central Government on payment of leasehold rents and shallbedischarged,forandonbehalfofthatGovernment, bytheNationalTextileCorporationasandwhenpaymentof such leasehold rents or any amount becomes due and payable.
(4) Subject to subsection (3), no court shall have jurisdiction to order divestment from the National TextileCorporation ofthepropertyvestedinit bythe CentralGovernment. (emphasissupplied) Similarly,inlightoftheamendmentof2014,Section4,ason 1stApril,1994,wouldreadasfollows:
4.(1)Thetextileundertakingsreferredtoinsection3shall bedeemedtoincludeallassets,rights,leaseholds,powers, authorities and privileges and all property, movable and immovable, including lands, buildings, workshops, stores, instrumentsmachineryandequipment,cashbalances,cash on hand, reserve funds, investment and book debts pertaining to the textile undertakings and all other rights and interests in, or arising out of, such property aswere immediately before the appointed day in the ownership, possession, power or control of the textile company in relationtothesaidundertakings,whetherwithinoroutside India, and all books of account, registers and all other documentsofwhatevernaturerelatingtheretoandshallalso bedeemedtoincludetheliabilitiesandobligationsspecified insubsection(2)ofsection5.
(2)AllpropertyasaforesaidwhichhavevestedintheCentral Governmentundersubsection(1)ofsection3shall,byforce of such vesting, be freed and discharged from any trust, obligationmortgage,charge,lienandallotherincumbrances affecting it, and any attachment, injunction or decree or orderofanycourtorotherauthorityrestrictingtheuseof suchpropertyinanymannershallbedeemedtohavebeen withdrawn.
(3) Where any licence or other instrument in relation to a textileundertakinghadbeengrantedatanytimebeforethe appointeddaytotheownerbytheCentralGovernmentora State Government or any other authority, the National TextileCorporationshall,onandfromsuchdate,bedeemed to be substituted in such licence or other instrument in placeoftheownerreferredtothereinasifsuchlicenceor suchotherinstrumenthadbeengrantedtoitandshallhold such licence or the textile undertaking specified in such otherinstrumentfortheremainderoftheperiodforwhich the owner would have held such licence or the textile undertakingundersuchotherinstrument.
(4)Everymortgageeofanypropertywhichhasvestedunder thisactintheCentralGovernmentandeverypersonholding anycharge,lienorotherinterest in,orinrelationto,any such property shall give, within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, an intimation to the Commissioner of such mortgage, charge, lien or other interest.
(5)Fortheremovalofdoubts,itisherebydeclaredthatthe mortgageeofanypropertyreferred toinsubsection(2)or anyotherpersonholdinganycharge,lienorotherinterest in,orinrelationto,anysuchproperty'shallbeentitled"to claim,inaccordancewithhisrightsandinterests,payment ofthemortgagemapsorotherdues,inwholeorinpart,out oftheamountsspecifiedinrelationtosuchpropertyinthe FirstSchedule,butnosuchmortgage,charge,lienorother interestshallbeenforceableagainstanypropertywhichhas vestedintheCentralGovernment.
(6) If, on the appointed day, any suit, appeal or other proceeding of whatever nature in relation to any property whichhasvestedintheCentralGovernmentunder[SECTION],institutedorpreferredbyoragainstthetextilecompanyis pending,thesameshallnotabate,bediscontinuedorbe,in anyway,prejudicially affectedbyreasonofthetransfer of thetextileundertakingsorofanythingcontainedinthisact, butthesuit,appealorotherproceedingmaybecontinued, prosecuted or enforced by or against the National Textile Corporation.
(7) Any person who, on the date on which the [ACT] was promulgated,wasinpossessionof,orhadunderhiscustody orcontrol,thewholeoranypartofanytextileundertaking referredtoinsection3,themanagementofwhichcouldnot betakenoverbytheCentralGovernmentbyreasonofany decree,orderorinjunctionofanycourtorotherwise,shall deliverforthwiththepossessionofsuchundertakingorpart andallbooksofaccount,registersandallotherdocuments ofwhatever naturerelatingtosuchundertakingorpartto theCentralGovernmentortheNationalTextileCorporation, asthecasemaybe,mayspecifyinthisbehalf.
(8) Notwithstandingthefactthatthetextileoperations havebeendiscontinuedinanytextileundertakingbeing revived,shallforalleffectsandpurposesbedeemedthat thetextileoperationsarebeingcontinuedandnosuitor proceeding shall be instituted or if instituted be maintainableagainsttheNationalTextileCorporationon thegroundthatithasdiscontinuedsuchactivityinthe textileundertaking.
(9)Fortheremovalofdoubts,itisherebydeclaredthatthe continued deemed vesting of the leasehold land in the Central Government shall not affect, impair or in any manner prejudice the rights of the National Textile Corporation to prosecute or defend any proceedings as a subsequentvesteeinrespectofanysuchleaseholdrights and no such proceedings shall fail only on account of the nonimpleadmentofthatGovernment. (emphasissupplied)
33. Reverting to [SECTION] as amended and which by operationoflawhadcomeintoforcewitheffectfrom1 stApril, 1994,theright,titleandinterestofPodarMillsLtd.inrelation to the Textile Undertaking including in respect of the suit property, stood transferred to and vested absolutely in the Central Government. By virtue of subsection (2), all such right,titleandinterestofPodarMillsasvestedintheCentral Government under subsection (1), immediately stood transferred to and vested in the appellant [ENTITY] except the leasehold rights in the suit property which continued to remainvestedintheCentralGovernment.For,theamended [SECTION] explicitly postulatesthat theleaseholdrightsof the Textile Undertaking (Podar Mills) in respect of the suit propertyason1st April,1994,continuedtoremainvestedin theCentralGovernment.Thatrightwasnevertransferredto [ENTITY]byoperationoflaw.Itpresupposesthatonlytheother rights of the Textile Undertaking as vested in the Central Governmentintermsofsubsection(1),stoodtransferredto andvestedinthe[ENTITY]undersubsection(2).
34. Inthepresentcase,themanagementofPodarMillswas takenoverbytheCentralGovernmentinexerciseofpowers under 1983 Act whereafter the lease in respect of the suit propertyexpiredon21stOctober,1990.Onexpiryofthelease term,indisputably,PodarMillsbecametheprotectedtenantor statutory tenant within the purview of the [ACT]). [SECTION] of the said Act defines the term tenant,asunder:
(11) tenant means any person by whom or any whose accountrentispayableforanypremisesandincludes,
(a)suchsubtenantsandotherpersonsashavederivedtitle underatenantbeforethe1stdayofFebruary1973; (aa) any person to whom interest in premises, has been assigned or transferred as permitted or deemed to be permitted,undersection15;
(b) any person remaining after the determination of the lease, in possession, with or without the assent of the landlord,ofthetitle[beforethefirstdayofFebruary1973;] [(bb)suchlicenseesassharedeemedtobetenantsforthe purposesofthisActbysection15A] [(bba) the State Government, or as the case may be, the Governmentallottee,referredtoinsubclause(b)ofclause (1A),deemedtobeatenant,forthepurposesofthisActby section15B;].
[(c)(i)inrelationtoanypremisesletforresidence,whenthe tenantdies,whetherthedeathhasoccurredbeforeorafter thecommencementoftheBombayRents,HotelandLodging HouseRatesControl(Amendment)Act,1978,anymemberof thetenantsfamilyresidingwiththetenantatthetimeofhis death or, inthe absence of such member, any heir of the deceasedtenant,asmaybedecidedindefaultofagreement bytheCourt;
(ii) in relation to any permission let for the purposes of education,business,tradeorstorage,whenthetenantdies, whether the death has occurred before or after the commencementofthesaidAct,anymemberofthetenants familyusingthepremisesforthepurposesofeducationof carryingonbusiness,tradeorstorageinthepremises,with the tenant at the time of his death, or, in the absence of suchmember,anyheirofthedeceasedtenant,asmaybe decidedindefaultofagreementbytheCourt. Explanation.theprovisionsofthisclausefortransmission oftenancy,shallnotberestrictedtothedeathoftheoriginal tenant,butshallapply,andshallbedeemedalwaystohave applied,evenonthedeathofanysubsequenttenant,who becomestenantundertheseprovisionsonthedeathofthe lastprecedingtenant.] Inthe1999Acttheexpressiontenanthasbeendefinedin Section7(15)asfollows:
(15) tenant means any person by whom or on whose accountrentispayableforanypremisesandincludes,
(a) suchperson,
(i) whoisatenant,or
(ii) whoisadeemedtenant,or
(iii) who is a subtenant as permitted under a contractorbythepermissionorconsentofthelandlord,or
(iv) whohasderivedtitleunderatenant,or
(v)towhominterestinpremiseshasbeenassignedor transferredaspermitted, byvirtueof,orundertheprovisionsof,anyoftherepealed Acts;
(b)apersonwhoisdeemedtobeatenantunder section25;
(c) a person to whom interest in premises has been assignedortransferredaspermittedundersection26;
(d)inrelationtoanypremises,whenthetenantdies, whether the death occurred before or after the commencement of this Act, any member of the tenants family,who,
(i)wheretheyareletforresidence,isresiding,or
(ii)wheretheyareletforeducation,business,tradeor storage,isusingthepremisesforanysuchpurpose, withthetenantatthetimeofhisdeath,or,intheabsenceof suchmember,anyheirofthedeceasedtenant,asmaybe decidedintheabsenceofagreement,bythecourt.
Explanation.Theprovisionsofthisclausefortransmission oftenancyshallnotberestrictedtothedeathoftheoriginal tenant,butshallapplyevenonthedeathofanysubsequent tenant,whobecomestenantundertheseprovisionsonthe deathofthelastprecedingtenant.
35. Beingaprotectedorstatutorytenant,PodarMillscould bedispossessedfromthesuitpremisesbytheTrustonlyon thegroundspermissibleunderthatActbyinstitutingeviction proceedingsbeforethecompetentRentCourthavingexclusive jurisdictiontoentertainthedisputebetweenthelandlordand tenant,whointurnwouldthenhavetorecorditssatisfaction abouttheentitlementofthelandlordtorecoverpossessionof thesuitproperty.TherightsoenjoyedbythePodarMillsLtd. stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government with effect from 1st April, 1994. Further, by virtue of amendedSection3ofthe1995Act,byoperationoflaw,the rights of the Textile Undertaking, in respect of the suit property,ofbeingastatutoryorprotectedtenant,continuedto vest in the Central Government even after the coming into forceofthe1999Actandrepealofthe1947Act.Resultantly, theprovisionsofthe1999Actwouldsquarelyapplytothesuit propertyintermsofSections2&3ofthesaidAct.Thesaid provisionsreadthus:
2. Application. (1) This Act shall, in the first instance, apply to premises let for the purposes of residence, education,business,tradeorstorageintheareasspecified inScheduleIandScheduleII.
(2)Notwithstandinganythingcontainedinsubsection(1),it shall also apply to the premises or, as the case may be, houses let out in the areas to which the [ACT] or the [ACT] [ACT] were extended and applied before the date of commencement of this Act and such premises or houses continuetobesoletonthatdateinsuchareaswhichare specifiedinSchedule1tothisAct,notwithstandingthatthe areaceasestobeofthedescriptionthereinspecified.
(3)Itshallalsoapply tothepremises letfor thepurposes specifiedinsubsection(1)insuchofthecitiesortownsas specifiedinScheduleII.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained hereinabove, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,directthat
(a)thisActshallnotapplytoanyoftheareas specifiedinScheduleIorScheduleIIorthatit shall not apply to any one or all purposes specifiedinsubsection(1);
(b) this Act shallapply toany premises let for anyorallpurposesspecifiedinsubsection(1) in the areas other than those specified in Schedule1andScheduleII.
3.Exemption.(1)ThisActshallnotapply
(a)toanypremisesbelongingtotheGovernmentoralocal authority or apply as against the Government to any tenancy,licenceorotherlikerelationshipcreatedbyagrant from or a licence given by the Government in respect of premisesrequisitionedortakenonleaseoronlicencebythe Government,includinganypremisestakenonbehalfofthe Government onthe basisof tenancy or oflicence or other like relationship by, or in the name of any officer subordinate to the Government authorised in this behalf, butitshallapplyinrespectofpremiseslet,orgivenon licence,totheGovernmentoralocalauthorityortaken onbehalfoftheGovernmentonsuchbasisby,orinthe nameof,suchofficer;
(b) to any premises let or sublet to banks, or any Public Sector Undertakings or any Corporation established by or under any Central or State Act, or foreign missions, internationalagencies,multinationalcompanies,andprivate limited companies and public limited companies having a paidupsharecapitalofmorethanrupeeonecroreormore. Explanation.Forthepurposeofthisclausetheexpression "bank"means,(i)theStateBankofIndiaconstitutedunder theStateBankofIndiaAct,1955;(ii)asubsidiarybankas defined [ACT]; (iii) a corresponding new bank constituted under [SECTION] of the [ACT]; or (iv) any other bank, being a scheduledbankasdefinedinclause(e)ofsection2ofthe ReserveBankofIndiaAct,1934.
(2)TheStateGovernmentmaydirectthatalloranyofthe provisionsofthisActshall,subjecttosuchconditionsand termsasitmayspecify,notapply
(i) to premises used for public purposes of a charitable natureortoanyclassofpremisesusedforsuchpurposes;
(ii) to premises held by a public trust for a religious or charitablepurposeandletatanominalorconcessionalrent;
(iii) to premises held by a public trust for a religious or charitablepurposeandadministeredbyalocalauthority;or
(iv) to premises belonging to or vested in an university establishedbyanylawforthetimebeinginforce. Providedthat,beforeissuinganydirectionunderthissub section,theStateGovernmentshallensurethatthetenancy rightsoftheexistingtenantsarenotadverselyaffected. (3)Theexpression"premisesbelongingtotheGovernmentor a local authority" in subsection (1) shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said subsection or in any judgment,decreeororderofacourt,notincludeabuilding erected on any land held by any person from the Governmentoralocalauthorityunderanagreement,lease, licence or other grant, although having regard to the provisions of such agreement, lease, licence or grant the buildingsoerectedmaybelongorcontinuetobelongtothe Governmentorthelocalauthority,asthecasemaybe,and suchpersonshallbeentitledtocreateatenancyinrespect ofsuchbuildingorapartthereof. (emphasissupplied) [SECTION] oralocalauthorityortakenonbehalfoftheGovernmenton suchbasisby,orinthenameof,suchofficer.
36. As aforementioned, since the Central Government continued to remain as the protectedor statutory tenant in respectofthesuitpropertyw.e.f.1 stApril,1994,thefactthat theappellant[ENTITY]wascarryingonitsactivitiesthereinwould not extricate the landlord (Trust) from initiating eviction proceedings against the real tenant, namely, the Central GovernmentorUnionofIndia;andsuchevictionproceedings couldbemaintainedonlybeforethejurisdictionalRentCourt having exclusive jurisdiction to decide any dispute between thelandlordandtenant.Thepresentsuit,however,cametobe filedonlyagainsttheappellant[ENTITY]andthattoobeforethe jurisdictionalcivilcourtundertheTransferofPropertyAct.It is obvious that the Trust acted on the legal advice and instituted the present suit, despite having filed two suits (namely,[CASE NUMBER]) inearlierpointoftime,forpossessionofthesuitproperty,in bothofwhichUnionofIndiawasmadepartydefendant.But thosesuitswereeventuallydismissedfornonprosecutionand withdrawn, respectively, during the pendency of the subject suit,forreasonsbestknowntotheTrust.
37. To put it differently, the present suit instituted by the Trust under the provisions of the [ACT], whichculminatedwiththedecreeofeviction,affirmedupto this Court vide judgment under review, has been rendered without jurisdiction, by operation of law. This being the positionaftercomingintoforceoftheValidationAct2014and inparticular,thepurportofSection39asinserted,thedecree sopassedorundertakinggivenby[ENTITY]cannotbecontinued orenforced.
38. Accordingtothelearnedcounselfortherespondents,the amendedprovisionintroducedbytheValidationAct2014has noapplicationtothepresentcase.Thiscontentionisfounded ontheinterpretationoftheexpressionleaseholdrightsofthe Textile Undertaking. It is argued that this expression pre supposes that there must be an existing or subsisting leasehold rights. Only such right would be governed by the amended provision. To buttress this submission, reliance is placedonSection4ofthe1995Actwhichexplicitlyadvertsto different types of rights enjoyed by the Textile Undertaking. Leaseholds is one suchrightseparatelynoted.Sincethere wasnosubsistingleaseholdrightenuringinfavourofPodar Mills, inevitably no such right vested in the Central Government.Whereas,therighttransferredtoandvestedin theCentralGovernmentundersubsection(1)isonlythatofa protected or statutory tenant enjoyed by Podar Mills at the relevant time i.e. 1st April, 1994. That right vested in the CentralGovernmentisnotsavedintermsofsubsection(3). Resultantly,therightofaprotectedorstatutorytenantvested inCentralGovernmentstoodtransferredtoandvestedin[ENTITY] intermsofsubsection(2)andcontinuedtoremainsovested inthe[ENTITY].Ifso,thereliefofevictionorpossessioncouldbe pursuedbytheTrustonlyagainst[ENTITY].Further,admittedly, [ENTITY]didnotenjoythestatusofastatutoryorprotectedtenant aftercomingintoforceofthe1999Actandrepealofthe1947 Act.Inthatsituation,thesubjectsuitforpossessionagainst theappellant[ENTITY]cametobejustlyfiledbeforethecivilcourt undertheprovisionsoftheTransferofPropertyAct.
39. This argument, in our opinion, isan attemptto over simplifythepurportof[SECTION],ifnotindulginginhair splitting of the contextual meaning of the expression leaseholdrightsthereinandinSection4(1)orelsewherein the1995Act.Section3(1)referstoright,titleandinterestof the owner of the Textile Undertaking generally. That encompassesalltherightsasarespeltoutinSection4(1)of theAct.Onesuchrightcanbeleaseholdrights.Concededly, the expressionleaseholdrightsmentioned inthe1995Act must be construed as referring to the rights under the TransferofPropertyAct,1882aswellasundertheapplicable RentActrecognizingtenancyrightswithoutexception.The expressionleaseholdrightshasnotbeendefinedinthe1983 Act or in the 1995 Actor for that matter,in the concerned RentAct.Thatexpressioncanbediscernedfromthe[ACT], 1882. The expression lease is defined in Section105thereofwhichreadsthus:
105. Lease defined. A lease of immoveable property is a transferofarighttoenjoysuchproperty,madeforacertain time,expressorimplied,orinperpetuity,inconsiderationof a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodicallyoronspecifiedoccasionstothetransferorbythe transferee,whoacceptsthetransferonsuchterms.
Lessor,lessee,premiumandrentdefined.thetransferor iscalledthelessor, thetransferee iscalledthelessee, the priceiscalledthepremium,andthemoney,share,serviceor otherthingtobesorenderediscalledtherent. ChapterVoftheTransferofPropertyActdealswithmatters concerning Leases of Immovable Property. The rights and liabilitiesofalessorandlesseearespecifiedinSection108.
Theprovisionregardingdeterminationofaleasecanbeculled out from [SECTION] and the effect of holding over in the event of a lessee or underlesseeofapropertyremaining in possessionthereofafterthedeterminationoftheleasegranted tothelessee,isprovidedinSection116,whichreadsthus:
116.Effectofholdingover.ifalesseeorunderlesseeof property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessororhislegalrepresentativeacceptsrentfromthelessee orunderlessee,orlessororhislegalrepresentativeaccepts rentfromthelesseeorunderlessee,orotherwiseassentsto hiscontinuinginpossession,theleaseis,intheabsenceof anagreementtothecontrary,renewedfromyeartoyear,or from monthtomonth,according to the purpose for which thepropertyisleased,asspecifiedinsection106.
Illustrations
(a) A lets a house to B for five years. B underlets the house to C at a monthly rent of Rs.100. The five years expire,butCcontinuesinpossessionofthehouseandpays therenttoA.Csleaseisrenewedfrommonthtomonth.
(b) A lets a farm to B for the life of C. C dies, but B continuesinpossessionwithAsassent.Bsleaseisrenewed fromyeartoyear.
40. Wemustquotewithprofitthemeaningoftheexpression lease,leasehold,leaseholdinterest,tenancy,andtenancy at sufferance; as predicated in Blacks Law Dictionary (9 th Edn.).Thesamereadasfollows:
Lease,n.(14c)1Acontractbywhicharightfulpossessorof real property conveys the right to use and occupy the propertyinexchangeforconsideration,usu.rent.Thelease canbeforafixedperiod,orforaperiodterminableatwill. [Cases:LandlordandTenant20.]2Suchaconveyanceplus all covenants attached to it. 3 The written instrument memorializing such a conveyance and its covenants. all termedleaseagreement;leasecontract.4Thepriceofreal property so conveyed. 5 A contact by which the rightful possessorofpersonalpropertyconveystherighttousethat propertyinexchangeforconsideration.[Cases:Bailment1.] Leasehold,n.(18c)Atenantspossessoryestateinlandor premises, the four types being the tenancy for years, the periodic tenancy, the tenancy at will, and the tenancy at sufferance. Although a leasehold has some of the characteristics of real property, it has historically been classifiedasachattelreal.Alsotermedleasehold estate; leasehold interest. See TENANCY. Cf. FREEHOLD. [Cases:
LandlordandTenant70,113,117.] Leaseholdinterest.(18c)1LEASEHOLD;esp.forpurposes ofeminent domain,thelessees interest inthelease itself, measuredbydifferencebetweenthetotalremainingrentand therentthelesseewouldpayforsimilarspaceforthesame period.[Cases:EminentDomain147]2Lessorsorlessees interest under a lease contract.[Cases: Bailment7] 3. WORKINGINTEREST.[Cases:LandlordandTenant20.] Tenancy. (16c) 1. The possession or occupancy of land under a lease; a leasehold interest in real estate. 2. The period of such possession or occupancy. See ESTATE (1). [Cases:LandlordandTenant20]3.Thepossessionofrealor personal property by right or title, esp. under a conveying instrumentsuchasadeedorwill.
Tenancy at sufferance. (18c) A tenancy arising when a person who has been in lawful possession of property wrongfullyremainsasaholdoverafterhisorherinteresthas expired.Atenancyatsufferancetakestheformofeithera tenancyatwilloraperiodictenancy.Alsotermedholdover tenancy; estate at sufferance. See HOLDING OVER (1). [Cases:LandlordandTenant117,119.] A tenancy at sufferance arises where a tenant, having entered upon land under a valid tenancy, holds over without the landlords assent or dissent. Such a tenant differs from a trespasser in that his original entry was lawful,andfromatenantatwillinthathistenancyexists withoutthelandlordsassent.Norent,assuch,ispayable, butthetenantisliabletopaycompensationforhisuseand occupation of the land. The tenancy may be determined [i.e.,terminated]atanytime,andmaybeconvertedintoa yearlyorotherperiodictenancyintheusualway,e.g.,if rent is paid and accepted with reference to a year in circumstances where the parties intended there to be a tenancy.[ENTITY],AManualof theLawofRealProperty319(6thed.1993).
ItwillbeusefultoalsoadverttotheexpressionTenantand Holdover Tenant in Blacks Law Dictionary which are as follows:
Tenant, n. (14c) 1. One who holds or possesses lands or tenements by any kind of right or title. See TENANCY. [Cases:LandlordandTenant1] Holdover tenant: A person who remains in possession of real property after a previous tenancy (esp. one under a lease)expires,thusgivingrisetoatenancyatsufferance. Sometimesshortenedtoholdover.Seetenancyatsufferance underTENANCY.[Cases:LandlordandTenant119(2).]
41. Indeed,ifthematterinissueistobedecideddehorsthe provisionsoftheapplicableRentAct,thenitispossibletosay that the expression leasehold rights would be limited to a subsistinglease.However,inthepresentcase,wearerequired toreckonthestatusoftheUnionofIndiaand[ENTITY]quathe suitpropertyinthecontextoftherightsaccruedintermsof theprovisionoftheRentActof1947and1999,respectively. Theexpressionleaseholdrightsin1995Act,obviously,must receive wider meaning so as to encompass tenancy rights flowing from the applicable [ACT]. For, the expression tenancyrightsaccruingundertheRentActisanalogousto and interchangeable with the expression leasehold rights. Thereisnoreasontoexcludetheexpressionstatutoryright soenjoyedbytheownersoftheTextileUndertakingfromthe expressionleaseholdrightsreferredtoinsubsection(3),so longasithasnotbeensoexpresslyexcluded.
42. Considering the legislativeintent for enacting the1995 ActandtheValidationAct2014also,itisnotpossibletogive a restricted meaning to the expression leasehold rights occurring in [SECTION], as amended, or elsewhere in the said enactment. Thus, the expression leasehold rights in 1995 Act must include tenancy rights flowingfromtheprovisionsoftheapplicablerentlegislation. Any other interpretation would be doing violence to the legislativeintentandbeapedanticapproach.
43. Accordingtotherespondents,thestatusofPodarMills and resultantly, of theUnion ofIndiaisthat ofatenant at sufferance.Wehavealreadyadvertedtotheprovisionsofthe concernedRentAct.Fromtheschemeofthe1947Actasalso inthe1999Act,itisindisputablethatafterdeterminationof theleaseperiod,thestatusofPodarMillshadbecomethatof aprotectedorstatutorytenantundertheRentAct.Thus,it wouldcontinue toenjoytenancyrightsstipulatedunderthe concerned RentAct. Oncethatstatushasbeenacquiredby the Central Government by operation of law, the action of eviction, could be only as per the prescribed dispensation undertheconcernedRentAct.
44. Ourattentionwasinvitedtoparagraph9in [ENTITY].Govt.ofIndiaandOthers7,whereintheessential ingredientsofleasehavebeendelineatedasunder:
9.Section105oftheTransferofPropertyAct,1882defines leaseasfollows:
Thus, the essential ingredients of a lease are: (a) there should be a transfer of a right to enjoy an immovable property;(b)suchtransfermaybeforacertaintermorin perpetuity;(c)thetransfershouldbeinconsiderationofa premium or rent; (d) the transfer should be a bilateral transaction,thetransfereeacceptingthetermsoftransfer. Relyingontheseingredients,itwasarguedthattheleasehold rights of Podar Mills had expired by efflux of time on 21 st October,1990.Since,PodarMillshadnosubsistingleasehold rights,thevestingofright,titleandinterestofPodarMillsin thesuitpropertyason1st April,1994byvirtueof1995Act was of other than leasehold rights. Whereas, [SECTION] including the amended provision subsection (3) could be invoked only in respect of a subsisting leasehold rights (2007)5SCC745 acquiredunderthe1995Act.Wehavealreadyobservedthat eventhoughtheleaseholdrightsofPodarMillshadexpiredon 21st October, 1990, it continued to enjoy the rights of a protected or statutory tenant in terms of the 1947 Act and ascribableto leaseholdrights referred toin [SECTION] of 1995 Act. Therefore, the argument of holding over or tenantat sufferance, willbeinapplicableastherightsofa protected or statutory tenant under the 1947 Act would be governedbythatActandsuchatenantcouldbeevictedonly onthegroundspostulatedundertheRentActuponanorder passedbythejurisdictionalRentCourtinthatregard.
45. Inthepresentcase,admittedly,theTrustproceededona clearunderstandingthattherightsenjoyedbyPodarMillsLtd. afterdeterminationofleaseperiodwasthatofaprotectedor statutory tenant within the meaning of the rent legislation (1947Act).Thatrighthadbeentransferredtoandvestedin theCentralGovernmentbyvirtueofSection3(1)ofthe1995 Act and continues to so vest in it in terms of [SECTION] whichhadcomeintoforcew.e.f.1st April,1994anddeemed alwaystohaveeffectforallpurposesasifithadbeeninforce atallmaterialtimes.
46. RelyingonthedictuminShreeChamundiMopedsLtd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras8, it was contended that Podar Mills having continued in occupation ofthesuitproperty only by virtue of the protection of the then applicable [ACT], namely,[ACT]evenafter21stOctober,1990,ithadno subsistingrightwhatsoever.Relianceisplacedonparagraph Nos.13and15ofthesaiddecision,whichreadthus:
13.Wearealsounabletoagreewiththecontentionofthe learned counsel for the appellantcompany that the leasehold interest of the appellantcompany in premises leasedouttoitispropertyforthepurposeofSection22(1). Itisnodoubttruethatleaseholdinterestofthelesseein the premises leased out to him is property which can be transferredandthesaidinterestcanalsobeattachedand soldbywayofexecutioninsatisfactionofadecreeagainsta lessee. In that sense, it can be said that the leasehold interest ofa company isitsproperty. But thequestion is whether the same is true in respect of the interest of a company which is in occupation of the premises as a statutorytenantbyvirtueoftheprotectionconferredbythe relevantrentlawbecauseintheinstantcaseonthedateof reference to the Board the proceedings for eviction of the appellantcompany were pending and the appellant company was in occupation of the premises only as a statutory tenant governed by the provisions of the [ACT][ENTITY].[ENTITY] (1992)3SCC1 Kumar1thisCourthaslaiddownthattheterminationofa contractualtenancydoesnotbringaboutachangeinthe status and legal position of the tenant unless there are contraryprovisionintherelevantRentActandthetenant, notwithstandingtheterminationoftenancy,doesenjoyan estateorinterestinthetenantedpremises.Itisfurtherlaid downthatthisinterestorestatewhichthetenantcontinues to enjoy despite termination of the contractual tenancy createsaheritableinterestintheabsenceofanyprovision tothecontrary.ThisCourthasalsoheldthatthelegislature which by the [ACT] seeks toconfer the benefit on the tenantsandtoaffordprotectionagainsteviction,isperfectly competent to make appropriate provision regulating the nature of protection and the manner and extent of enjoyment of such tenancy rights after the termination of contractualtenancyofthetenantincludingtherightsand the nature of protection of the heirs on the death of the tenant. 15. Fromtheseprovisions,itwouldappearthatexceptin cases covered by the two provisos to [SECTION], there is a prohibition for a tenant to sublet wholeoranypartofthepremiseslettohimortoassignor transfer in any other manner his interest therein. This prohibition is, however, subject to a contract to the contrary.Atenantwhosubletsorassignsortransfersthe premises in contravention of this prohibition loses the protectionoflawandcanbeevictedbythelandlordunder [SECTION]. In the case of a statutory tenant, the relationship is not governed by contract. The prohibition againstassignmentandtransferis,therefore,absoluteand theinterest ofastatutorytenantcanneither beassigned nor transferred. This means that the interest of the statutory tenant in the premises in his occupation, as governed by the [ACT] is a limited interestwhichenablesthesurvivingspouseoranysonor daughterorfatherormotherofadeceasedtenantwhohad beenlivingwiththetenantinthepremisesasamemberof the tenants family up to the death of the tenant and a personcontinuinginpossessionaftertheterminationofthe tenancyinhisfavour,toinherittheinterestofthetenanton hisdeath.Thesaidinterestofthetenantis,however,not assignableortransferableand,therefore,theinterest ofa companywhichiscontinuinginoccupationofthepremises asastatutorytenantbyvirtueoftheprotectionconferred bytheKarnatakaRentControlAct,cannotberegardedas propertyofthecompanyforthepurposeofsubsection(1) of Section 22 of the Act and for that reason also the provisionsofSection22(1)werenotattractedtotheeviction proceedings instituted by the respondents against the appellantcompany.TheprovisionsofSection22(1)didnot, therefore,bartheprosecutionofthesaidproceedingsbythe respondents and the order dated September 30, 1989 passedbytheXIIAdditionalSmallCausesJudge,Bangalore allowingtheevictionpetitioncannotbeheldtohavebeen passedincontraventionoftheprovisionsofSection22(1)of theAct.CivilAppealNo.2553of1991also,therefore,fails andisliabletobedismissed. Theissueexaminedinthispartofthereportedjudgmentisin the context of the provisions of the [ACT], the purport of Section 22 of the [ACT] regarding suspension of legal proceedingsetc.Inthepresentcase,itisnotanassignmentor transfer of interest by the statutory tenant but a case of involuntarytransferandvestingoftheright,titleandinterest ofthestatutorytenantinrespectofthesuitpremisesinthe Central Government by operation of law made by the Parliament. The purpose of retrospective insertion of sub section(3)ofSection3ofthe1995Actisintendedtotakeaway thebasisofthestatusacquiredbytheappellant[ENTITY]quathe suit property or the rightstobeenjoyedinrelation thereto.
Solongastheamendedprovisionsofthe1995Actorof the [ACT] are in force by operation of law, interest of Podar Mills as that of a statutory tenant stood transferred to and vested absolutely in the Central Government and would continue to so vest in it. The concomitantofthisindisputablefactualpositionisthatthe TrustcouldandoughttoseekevictionoftheUnionofIndia from the suit property if it intends to do so, on grounds permissible under and in the manner prescribed for in the municipalRentLegislationasapplicableattherelevanttime.
47. Reliancewasthenplacedontheexpositioninparagraph Nos.14to18inBhoolchandandAnotherVs.KayPeeCee Investments and Another9. The Court noted the factual position of that case andthesubmissions ofthecounselin (1991)1SCC343 paragraphs14to16;andthenproceededtoconsiderthesame inparagraphs17and18,whichreadasfollow: 17. The decision in [ENTITY] case and others in the same line related primarily to the question of heritable interestinthepremisesofthelegalrepresentativesofthe deceased tenant who was in occupation as statutory tenant.Pointingoutthattheconceptofstatutorytenancy undertheEnglishRentActsandunderIndianstatuteslike the one with which we are concerned rests on different foundations, it was held that the statutory tenant had a heritableinterestinthepremiseswhichwasnotmerelya personalinterestbutaninterestintheestatelikethatofa contractual tenant. On this conclusion, the right of legal representatives of the statutory tenant to protect the possessionandprosecutetheappealagainstevictionorder wasupheld.Themainquestionfordecisionin [ENTITY] casewastheheritablenatureofthestatutorytenancyand itwasinthiscontext thatthetermsandconditions ofa statutorytenancywereheldtobethesameasthoseofthe contractual tenancy preceding it. No question arose in [ENTITY]caseoftherightofastatutorytenanttocreate asubtenancyafterreplacementofthecontractualtenancy withthestatutorytenancy.Theobservationsmadeandthe decisionrenderedin [ENTITY]case cannot,therefore,be construedasholdingthatastatutorytenanthasarightto create a subtenancy during subsistence of statutory tenancy after expiry ofthecontractualtenancy when the RentActsgivethesameprotectionagainstevictiontothe tenant except on one or more of the specified grounds. Obviously, theprotectiontothestatutorytenantandthe heritable nature of the statutory tenancy providing the sameprotectionagainstevictiontothetenantsheirsdoes notfurtherrequireconferraloftherightofinductingasub tenantwhichisnotnecessaryforenjoymentofthetenancy andtheprotectionagainstevictiongivenbytheRentActs. There is no rationale for inferring or extending the landlordswrittenconsentforsublettingbeyondtheperiod of contractual tenancy for which alone it is given. No separatediscussionforthelaterdecisionsinthesameline isnecessarybecauseofthesamedistinctioninallofthem.
18. One decision which requires specific mention and is obviously nearest on factsto the present case is [ENTITY] Verma v. Surinder Kaur. In that case, the contractual tenancy was for a period of one month from April1,1974toApril30,1974withthelandlordsconsent for subletting. The tenant continued to occupy the premises even after expiry of the contractual tenancy on April 30, 1974 and inducted therein a subtenant. The landlord sued for eviction of the tenant on the ground of unlawfulsublettingofthepremiseswhichwasagroundfor eviction under the relevant [ACT]. There was some dispute about the time of induction of the subtenant, it beingclaimedbythetenantthattheinductionofthesub tenantwasinthemonthofApril1974duringsubsistenceof thecontractualtenancywhilethelandlordcontendedthat the subletting was after the month of April 1974. It was foundasafactthatthetenanthadsubletinthemonthof April 1974 when the written consent of the landlord subsistedandnotsubsequenttoitinMayasclaimedbythe landlord.Thecruxofthequestionfordecisionthereinwas statedthus:(SCCp.269,para24) Thecruxofthequestion,therefore,iswhether the subletting by the tenant with the written consentoflandlordduringthecurrencyofthe tenancy becomes unlawful and illegal on the determination of the tenancy and furnishes a ground for eviction within the meaning of Section13(2)(ii)(a)oftheAct. On the finding that the subtenant had been inducted duringtheperiodofcontractualtenancyonthebasisofthe written consent for subletting given by the landlord, the subletting did not become unlawful merely because the contractualtenancyofthetenantcametoanendandthe protection against eviction to the tenant as a statutory tenantalsoenuredtothebenefitofthelawfulsubtenant recognised by the statute. It was held as under: ([CASE NUMBER] Subletting lawfully done with the written consent of the landlord does not become unlawful merely on the ground that the contractualtenancyhascometoanend.Sub lettingtoconstituteavalidgroundforeviction mustbewithouttheconsent inwritingofthe landlord at the time when the tenant sublets anyportiontothesubtenant.
Asublettingbythetenantwiththeconsentin writing of the landlord does not become unlawful on the expiry of the contractual tenancyofthetenant,unlessthereisanyfresh subletting by the tenant without the written consent of the landlord. Mere continuance in possession of a subtenant lawfully inducted does not amount to any fresh or further sub letting. We are, therefore, satisfied that in the instant case the tenant has not sublet any portion without the written consent of the landladyafterthecommencementoftheAct. Mere continuance of possession by the sub tenantslawfullyinductedbythetenantwiththe written consent of the landlady contained in rent note does not afford any ground to the landlady for eviction of the tenant on the ground of subletting, as the tenant has not sublet after the commencement of the Act any portion without the consent in writing of the landlady. (emphasissupplied) Of all the decisions cited at the bar, this decision is, admittedly, nearest on facts to the present case with the onlydifferencethatthesublettinginthepresentcasewas after expiry of the contractual tenancy and after the commencement of the Act prohibiting subletting without the written consent of the landlord when it was made on April1,1948,whilethesublettinginMahabirPrasadcase was during the period of contractual tenancy when the expresswrittenconsentofthelandlordforsublettingwas available.Theprincipleforapplication,however,isthesame with the only difference in the result since in [ENTITY] the contractual tenancy with the written consent of the landlord. It is significant that the judgment in [ENTITY]J.whoalsowrotetheopinion in [ENTITY] case relied on by Dr [ENTITY] as one of the decisionsinlinewith [ENTITY]case.ItisclearthatA.N. Sen, J., who wrote the opinion of the bench in [ENTITY] aswellasin [ENTITY] didnotconstrue the earlier decisions starting with [ENTITY] case in the mannerreadbyDr[ENTITY].[ENTITY] inhis submission on this point, then the entire emphasis in MahabirPrasadcase onthesublettingbeingmadeduring the period of contractual tenancy in April 1974 and not thereafter being decisive of the validity of subletting was misplacedandafutileexercise.Inouropinionthiswasnot soandthecorrectpremiseisthatlandlordswrittenconsent for subletting during the period of contractual tenancy cannotbeconstruedashisconsentsubsistingafterexpiry of the contractual tenancy. The submission of learned counselfortheappellantsrunscountertothecleardecision inMahabirPrasadcasewhich,inouropinion,isinnoway contrarytothedecisionsstartingwith [ENTITY]case,the observationswhereinareinthecontextofheritabilityofthe statutorytenancy.Infact,itisrightlynotevencontended by Dr [ENTITY] that the decision in [ENTITY] case runs counter to [ENTITY] case and other decisions following them. This is sufficient to indicate that the appellantscontentionisuntenable. Wefailtounderstandastohowtheprincipleexpoundedin thereporteddecisionwillbeofanyavailtotherespondents (Trust).Asalreadynoted,itisnotacaseofsublettingbythe statutory tenant ([ENTITY]) but instead a case of involuntarytransferandvestingofrightsandinterestofthe statutoryorprotectedtenantinrespectofthesuitpropertyin theCentralGovernmentbyoperationoflaw. Inanycase,if theTrustintendstoproceedagainstthe statutorytenanton thegroundofunlawfulsublettingorsuchotherground,itwill beobligedtoinitiateevictionproceedingsagainsttheUnionof IndiabeforethecompetentjurisdictionalRentCourtonthat count. In the present case,the subject suitfor eviction has beeninstitutedagainst[ENTITY]only.Sufficeittoobservethatthe subjectsuitnothavingbeenfiledagainsttheUnionofIndia, thestatutorytenantasonthedateoffilingofthesuit;andnot invokingthejurisdictionoftheRentCourtforseekingeviction ofthestatutorytenant,thedecreeaspassedbythecivilcourt isrenderedunenforceableagainsttheUnionofIndiaand,in anycase,inexecutableduetolegalfiction.
48. Therespondents(Trust)maybejustifiedinpointingout thatthejudgmentanddecreerenderedbythisCourthasnot beennullifiedbytheValidationAct2014assuch.However, the said decree is not against the real tenant in whom the rightsofthestatutorytenanthadvestedandcontinuetovest. That right could be snapped only by resorting to the dispensation prescribed for in the rent legislation, as the concernedRentActcontinuedtoapplytothesuitproperty consequenttovestingoftherightsandinterestthereininthe CentralGovernment.
49. Thattakesustothenextargumentoftherespondents thatSection39insertedinthe1995Actoperatesprospectively andwouldnotimpactthejudgmentdeliveredbythisCourton 5th September, 2011. Second, the said provision applies to only subsisting leasehold rights. Taking the last argument first,thesameneedstoberejectedonthebasisoftheview alreadytakenbyusthattheexpressionleaseholdrightsor leaseholdpropertywouldincludetenancyrightsortenanted property inoccupation ofastatutory or protectedtenantas per the applicable municipal rent legislation at the relevant time.[ENTITY],Section39openswithanonobstante clauseandmakesitmoreexplicitthattheprovisionsofthe AmendmentAct,2014shallhaveandshallbedeemedalways tohaveeffectforallpurposesasiftheprovisionsoftheAct havebeenamendedbythesaidAct,hadbeeninforceatall material times. It then predicates that no suit or other proceedingsshallbemaintainedorcontinuedinanycourtfor the enforcement of any decree or order or direction notwithstanding any undertaking filed by the [ENTITY] in any court.HavingobservedthatSection3hasbeenamendedw.e.f. 1stApril,1994andupongivingfulleffecttotheamendment,it must necessarily follow that the Central Government had acquiredthestatusofprotectedorstatutorytenantquathe suitpropertyfromthatdateandcontinuetoremainso,and could be evicted only in the manner prescribed by the concernedrentlegislation.Thedecreepassedagainst[ENTITY]is ontheassumptionthatthe1999Acthadnoapplicationtothe suitpropertyastherighthadvestedin[ENTITY]whichdidnot enjoy the protection of the 1999 Act. Resultantly, it must followthatthesubjectsuitandtheproceedingsarisingfromor inrelationtheretocannotproceedinlawandmoresobecause [ENTITY]isnottherealtenant.Further,asthetenancyrightsin relation to the suit property continue to vest in the Central Government by operation oflaw, theprovisions of the1999 Act will be attracted,warranting suit for eviction to befiled againsttheUnionofIndiabeforethejurisdictionalRentCourt havingexclusivejurisdictiontodecidethedisputebetweenthe landlordandtenant.Wemusthastentoaddthatthevalidity oftheprovisionsoftheValidationAct2014isnotputinissue inthepresentproceedingsandwedonotintendtodealwith thesame.Allquestionsinthatbehalfarekeptopen.
50. ReliancewasplacedonStateofTamilNaduVs.State ofKeralaandAnother10,(inparagraphNos.127,148and
149) to buttress the argument that a judicial decision rendered by recording a finding of fact cannot be made ineffectivebyenactingavalidatinglaw,therebyfundamentally altering or changing its character retrospectively. On a bare perusal of relevant paragraphs of this decision, the Court unambiguously found that the judgment was given by this Courtinthecontextofdisputedfactualpositionbetweenthe two States in respectof the safety of aDam for raising the waterlevel.TheCourtwentontoobservethatsuchdecision mustbebindinguponthepartiesandenforceableaccordingto the decision being a plain and simple decision on the fact ([CASE NUMBER] which cannot be altered by the legislative decision. In that case,thevalidityoftheamendedActwasputinissue.Inthe presentcase,however,wearenotcalledupontoexaminethe validityoftheprovisionsoftheValidationAct2014.Whether suchalegislationisvalidorinexcessoflegislativecompetence canbeexaminedinanappropriateproceeding. Itisopento the respondents (Trust) to challenge the validity of the ValidationAct2014,iftheysodesire. Forthesamereason, thedecisionsin MadanMohanPathakandOrs.Vs.[ENTITY] Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and Ors. Vs. [ENTITY] respondents.
51. Inviewoftheabove,wehavenohesitationinconcluding that it is not a case for taking contempt action for non compliance of the direction of this Court inasmuch as the basis for issuing such direction has become nonexistent in law. Similarly, the fact that [ENTITY] has already filed two (1978)2SCC50 (1969)2SCC283 undertakingswiththeapprovaloftheUnionofIndia,assuring tovacatethesuitproperty,willbeofnoeffectandcannotbe enforced by operation of law. Further, the decree though validly passed at the relevant time by the concerned Court, wouldbeofnoavailnorcoulditbeenforcedagainsttheUnion ofIndiainwhomtherightsoftheprotectedorstatutorytenant stood transferred to and vested in w.e.f 1st April, 1994. The Trustmayhavetotakerecoursetoappropriateremedyunder theprovisionsoftheapplicablerentlegislationtoevictthereal tenant,theCentralGovernment.Thoseproceedingswillhave to be decided on their own merits in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observation made in the proceedings which have culminated in the judgment under review.
52. Considering the above,wearenot inclinedto continue withthecontemptproceedingorforthatmatterapplicationfor extensionoftimefiledby[ENTITY].Asaresult,thedictumofthis [PRECEDENT] (ParagraphNos.9to22.), [PRECEDENT] (ParagraphNos.5and6)andNoorali BabulThanewalaVs.K.M.M.ShettyandOrs.15(Paragraph
11),willbeofnoavail.
53. The respondents are seriously opposed to showing any indulgenceto[ENTITY]inthegarbofReviewPetitionbytheUnion ofIndia.For,thereviewpetitionishopelesslytimebarredas thereisdelayof837dayscoupledwithconductofUnionof India in according approval to [ENTITY] for filing two successive undertakingsincomplianceofthedirectionofthisCourt.The objection appears to be attractive at the first blush but it cannot be taken forward, because of the legal fiction introduced by the amendment Act and giving retrospective effect to the event of vesting of the rights of the statutory tenant in respect of the suit property in the Central Governmentandalsorenderingthedecreeandorderincluding theundertakinggivenby[ENTITY]unenforceable.Asaresult,the decision in the case of Office of The Chief Post Master (1989)Supp.(2)SCC418 (1990)1SCC259 General and Ors.Vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Ors. 16 (ParagraphNos.27to29),neednotdetainus.
54. Considering theabove,wedonotdeem itnecessary to dilateonothersubmissionsurgedbythepartiesasitwould nothaveanybearingontheconclusionthatwehavealready reached.
55. Tosumup,weholdthataspertheamendedSection3 ofthe1995Actw.e.f.1stApril,1994,byoperationoflawthe statutoryor protectedtenancy rightsofPodarMillsLtd.in respectofthesuitpropertystoodtransferredtoandvested intheCentralGovernmentanditcontinuestosovestinitand thatthedecreeagainst[ENTITY]includingtheundertakinggiven by [ENTITY] has been rendered unenforceable by a legal fiction. Asaresult, theTrustbeingthelandlordis obliged totake recourse to remedy against the Central Government (UnionofIndia)togetbackpossessionofthesuitproperty,as per the dispensation specified in the concerned Rent Legislation, if it so desires. It is open to the respondents [CASE NUMBER] (Trust)tochallengethevalidityoftheValidationAct2014,if theysodesire.
56. We further deem it appropriate to grant liberty to the Trusttorevivethecontemptactionintheeventthechallenge tothevalidityoftheprovisionsoftheValidationAct2014is upheldandasaresultwhereofthatActisstruckdown. We saysobecause,itiscommongroundthatthechallengetothat ActispendingconsiderationbeforetheBombayHighCourtat theinstanceofathirdpartyinWritPetitionNo.526of2015 ([PRECEDENT].Vs.UnionofIndia&Ors.) Ifthatchallengesucceeds,thepositionasitstoodbeforethe comingintoforceoftheValidationAct2014wouldgetrevived andthenthejudgmentofthisCourtdatedSeptember5,2011 inCivilAppealNo.7448of2011canbetakentoitslogicalend againstthe[ENTITY]. Forthesamereason,itisnotnecessaryto continuewiththeapplicationforextensionoftimefiledbythe [ENTITY].
57. Accordingly, we dispose of these proceedings in the followingterms:
(i) Application for condonation of delay in filing review petitionisallowed;
(ii)Applicationforurgingadditionalgroundsinthereview petitionisallowed;
(iii)Thereviewpetitionisdisposedofwithlibertytothe respondents(Trust)topursueotherappropriatelegalremedy asperlaw;
(iv)Contemptpetitionstandsdisposedofwithlibertyto therespondentsasaforementioned;
(v) Application for direction filed by the [ENTITY] is also disposedofintheaboveterms;
(vi)Allapplicationsaredisposedofintheaboveterms.
Thereshallbenoorderastocosts.
J. ([ENTITY]) J. ([ENTITY]) NewDelhi;
November28,2018.