1 [CASE NUMBER] IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 1909 OF 2010 [ENTITY] ] Indian Inhabitant having his address at ] Nirlon House, Dr. Annie Besant Road, ] Worli, Mumbai 400 030 ] Petitioner Versus 1. The [ENTITY], a Society registered under the Tamil Nadu ] ] Societies Registration Act, having its ] headquarters at Cricket Centre, ] Wankhede Stadium, Mumai 400020 ] 2. Mr. [ENTITY], ] Member Disciplinary Committee ] Alembic Limited, Alembic Road, Vadodara, ] Gujarat 390 003 3. Mr. [ENTITY], ] Member Disciplinary Committee, ] A-44, Kailash Colony, New Delhi 110 044 ] 4. Mr. [ENTITY], ] Member, Disciplinary Committee, ] 27, Safdarjang Road, New Delhi 110 011. ] Respondents Mr. [ENTITY], Senior Advocate, Mr. [ENTITY], Senior Advocate, Mr. [ENTITY], Senior Advocate, Mr. [ENTITY], Senior Advocate, Mr. [ENTITY], Senior Advocate, Mr. [ENTITY], Mr.[ENTITY], Mr. [ENTITY] and Mr. [ENTITY] i/by M/s. Wadia Ghandy & Co. for the Petitioner Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:25:47 2 [CASE NUMBER] Mr. [ENTITY], Senior Advocate, Mr. [ENTITY] and Ms. [ENTITY] i/by M/s. Thakore Jariwala & Associates for Respondent No.1 Mr. [ENTITY], Senior Advocate, Mr. [ENTITY] and Ms. [ENTITY] i/by M/s. Thakore Jariwala & Associates for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 Mr. [ENTITY], Senior Advocate, Mr.[ENTITY] and Mr. [ENTITY] i/by M/s. Thakore Jariwala & Associates for Respondent No.4. CORAM: MOHIT S. SHAH, C.J., AND ig DR. [ENTITY], J. DATE: SEPTEMBER 15, 2010 ORAL JUDGMENT (Per [ENTITY], C.J.):-
By this petition under [SECTION] of the [ACT], the petitioner challenges the order dated 11th August, 2010 of the Disciplinary Committee of the [ENTITY] (for short, 'BCCI'), rejecting the petitioner's request for recusal of certain members of the Disciplinary Committee.
2. Initially, the Disciplinary Committee constituted under [SECTION] of the Memorandum, Rules and Regulations of BCCI comprised the following honorary members:-
(1) President of BCCI, Mr. [ENTITY],
3 [CASE NUMBER] (2) Vice President of BCCI, Mr. [ENTITY] (respondent No.2), and (3) Mr. [ENTITY] (respondent No.3), a member of Governing Council of BCCI
3. The Honorary Secretary of BCCI issued notices dated 26th April, 6th May and 31st May, 2010 to the petitioner in respect of the petitioner's conduct as the Commissioner of the Indian Premier League (IPL). The petitioner replied to the said show-cause notices.
The petitioner, by his letter dated 26th May, 2010 to the President, BCCI, Mr. [ENTITY], made the following requests:-
"(a) The Hon'ble President of BCCI may consider excluding / recusing himself from the decision making process relating to the Show Cause Notice dated 26.4.2010.
(b) The Hon'ble Honorary Secretary, Mr. [ENTITY] may also be excluded from any further proceedings in relation to the notice dated 26.4.2010."
In the said letter, the petitioner also requested for appointment of a body comprising of independent persons for adjudicating as well as determining whether the cause shown by him is sufficient or not. His case for 4 [CASE NUMBER] comprising the Disciplinary Committee of 'independent persons' was that several decisions taken by him were approved by the Governing Council of IPL and BCCI and, therefore, persons representing affiliated members of BCCI may not be associated with the adjudication of the said Show Cause Notices.
4. The President, BCCI, decided to recuse himself from the Disciplinary Committee, and thereupon, the Governing Council re-constituted the Disciplinary Committee as under:-
(1) Mr. [ENTITY], Vice President, BCCI, and President, Delhi Cricket Association (respondent No.3 herein);
(2) Mr. [ENTITY], Vice President of BCCI and President, Baroda Cricket Association (respondent No.2 herein); and (3) Mr. [ENTITY], President, Madhya Pradesh Cricket Association (respondent No. 4 herein).
5. Thereafter, the petitioner served another letter on BCCI and members of the newly constituted Disciplinary Committee on 6th July, 5 [CASE NUMBER] 2010, in which he raised objections with regard to some members of the Disciplinary Committee, particularly with regard to respondent No.2, Mr. [ENTITY]. The petitioner also filed a Writ Petition in this Court against BCCI, its President, Secretary and Members of the Disciplinary Committee for various reliefs. In this Writ Petition, his allegations against respondent No.2, Mr. [ENTITY], were reiterated. With regard to present respondent Nos. 3 and 4 (Mr. [ENTITY] and Mr. [ENTITY]), who were respondent Nos. 5 and 6 in the said Writ Petition, the petitioner stated that he was not making any personal allegations of personal bias or malice against them and the other respondents. The Division Bench, which heard the said Writ Petition, referred to various allegations in the show-cause notices issued to the petitioner and also the petitioner's plea of bias. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the Division Bench made the following observations:-
"In this petition, filed under [SECTION] of the [ACT], a host of reliefs have been prayed for, but having regard to the petitioner's representation dated 6/7/2010, we confined the arguments of the respective parties only on the prayer for reconstitution of the Disciplinary Committee and we made it clear that we are not inclined to consider the other reliefs as prayed for in the petition at such interlocutory stage."
6 [CASE NUMBER]
6. After examining the scheme of the Regulations of BCCI and the petitioner's contentions, the Division Bench referred to the decision of the President of BCCI to recuse himself from the inquiry, and then made the following observations:-
"Whether the same course should be followed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 or any one of them should, in our opinion, be left to the very same members when they meet on 16/7/2010 and even if none of the members withdraw from the Disciplinary Committee, nothing stops the petitioner in challenging the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee along with the challenge he may raise against the final order of punishment, if any, as it is well settled by a catena of decisions that when a challenge is raised to the final action of punishment on the basis of an enquiry by a domestic tribunal, the challenge could be raised to the constitution of the very same tribunal and its proceedings. It is for the Disciplinary Committee and the Board to address the requirements of [SECTION] of the Rules and Regulations and the issue of recusal on moral grounds or with an intention to act in fairness or for any other grounds, should be left to the decision of the members of the Disciplinary Committee."
7 [CASE NUMBER] The Division Bench, accordingly, disposed of the petition, leaving all the issues raised in the representation dated 6th July, 2010 to be considered and decided by the Disciplinary Committee at its next meeting, leaving all the rights and contentions of the parties open.
7. The Disciplinary Committee comprising respondent Nos. 3, 2 and 4 herein, accordingly, heard the petitioner's learned counsel, and by the impugned order dated 11th August, 2010, rejected the petitioner's request for exclusion of certain members of the Disciplinary Committee.
Against the aforesaid order, the present petition is moved under [SECTION] of the [ACT].
8. Mr. [ENTITY], learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has advanced the following contentions for assailing the above order of the Disciplinary Committee:-
8.1 The Disciplinary Committee has applied the erroneous test of "Real Danger of Bias", instead of applying the correct test of "Real Likelihood of Bias". Relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in [PRECEDENT], [PRECEDENT] and [PRECEDENT] [PRECEDENT], the learned senior counsel submitted that for more than 50 years, the Apex Court has consistently applied the test of real likelihood of bias, which requires that the test to be applied is not whether the concerned person having quasi-
judicial powers is biased against the delinquent, but whether the delinquent has a reasonable apprehension that the Committee or a member of the Tribunal may be having a bias. It is submitted that by applying the incorrect test of "real danger of bias", the Disciplinary Committee acted illegally, and on this ground alone, the order deserves to be set aside.
8.2 On facts, the learned senior counsel submitted that vide communication dated 28th June, 2010, the Secretary, BCCI, has informed World Sports Group (India) Pvt. Ltd. [WSG(I)] that the Agreement dated 25th March, 2009 between the petitioner and WSG(I) purportedly executed by the petitioner was a document, which was vitiated by fraud perpetrated by WSG(I) in conspiracy with WSG (Mauritius) Ltd. and the petitioner, and that the Agreement was, on the face of it, vitiated by fraud.
It was also mentioned in the said communication that BCCI believed that the Agreement was signed by WSG(I) and the petitioner to defraud BCCI 9 [CASE NUMBER] of the amount of at least $80 Million; and that the petitioner was never authorised to enter into such an Agreement with WSG(I). It is submitted that having called for the rescission of the said Agreement on the ground of all pervasive fraud, the members of the Governing Council of BCCI are disqualified from holding any enquiry against the petitioner, as any finding in the enquiry different from the stand as reflected in the communication dated 28th June, 2010 would go against BCCI in pending litigations.
It was, therefore, submitted that all the three members of the Disciplinary Committee, being members of BCCI, and two of them being members of the Governing Council, are disqualified on the ground of bias.
8.3 The learned senior counsel heavily relied on the decision of the Apex Court in [ENTITY] & Anr. v. Netaji Cricket Club and Ors., reported in (2005) 4 SCC 741 in support of the contention that the Writ Petition is maintainable.
8.4 Coming to the case against respondent No. 2, Mr. [ENTITY], it is contended by the learned senior counsel that the petitioner had specifically contended in his letter dated 6th July, 2010 and at the hearing before the Disciplinary Committee that the petitioner had exposed 10 [CASE NUMBER] Mr. [ENTITY]'s interest in the bid dated 21st March, 2010, which had taken place after cancellation of the bids dated 7th March, 2010. In view of the above, respondent No.2, Mr. [ENTITY], was likely to be prejudiced against the petitioner, and the petitioner could not be expected to have impartial decision of the Disciplinary Committee, which was going into the question of rigging of the bids which were cancelled on 7th March, 2010.
9. On the other hand, the petition is opposed by Mr. [ENTITY], learned Senior Counsel appearing for BCCI.
10. Mr. [ENTITY], learned senior counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3, i.e., two members of the Disciplinary Committee, submitted that he has no submissions to make, as the members of the Disciplinary Committee have already passed the order dated 11th August, 2010, which is impugned in the petition.
11. Mr. [ENTITY], learned Senior Counsel appearing for BCCI, has raised the following preliminary objections to maintainability of the petition:-
11 [CASE NUMBER] 11.1 The petition is not maintainable, as the Division Bench, while deciding the previous petition, had already observed in the judgment dated 15th July, 2010 that the petitioner ought to raise the issue of bias before the Disciplinary Committee and in case the issue was decided against the petitioner, nothing stopped the petitioner from challenging the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee along with the challenge he might raise against the final order of punishment, if any.
11.2 A writ would lie against BCCI only when it is acting in public domain and its activities have a public law element. Hence, a Writ Petition would lie against BCCI when it has awarded contracts, but no writ petition under [SECTION] of the [ACT] would lie against BCCI when it is acting within the domain of internal management of BCCI, which is in the nature of a club.
12. On merits, Mr. [ENTITY], learned senior counsel for BCCI, made the following submissions:-
12 [CASE NUMBER] 12.1 The Disciplinary Committee is a mere fact finding committee, and the findings of the committee would be merely recommendatory in nature and not binding on BCCI, and therefore also, the allegations of bias are not required to be entertained. Hence, the challenge to the constitution of the committee on the ground of bias is not required to be entertained.
12.2 The learned senior counsel for BCCI relied on the following decisions in support of the submission that the Disciplinary Committee had applied the correct test of real danger of bias:-
(a) [ENTITY] Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girija Shankar Pant & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 182;
(b) [PRECEDENT]; and
(c) [PRECEDENT].
12.3 Mr. [ENTITY] relied on the decision of the Apex Court in [PRECEDENT]., reported in 13 [CASE NUMBER] AIR 1963 SC 1144, wherein the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following observations made by [ENTITY], J. in [ENTITY] v. Workers' Union, reported in [PRECEDENT]:-
"A person who joins an association governed by rules under which he may be expelled, has in my judgment no legal right of redress if he be expelled according to the rules, however unfair and unjust the rules or the action of the expelling tribunal may be, provided that it acts in good faith The phrase, 'the principles of natural justice', can only mean in this connection the principles of fair play so deeply rooted in the minds of modern Englishmen that a provision for an inquiry necessarily imports that the accused should be given his chance of defence and explanation. On that point there is no difficulty. Nor do I doubt that in most cases it is a reasonable inference from the rules that if there is anything of the nature of a lis between two persons, neither of them should sit on the tribunal."
The Supreme Court further observed as under:-
"Another difficulty that one is confronted with in proceedings held by committees constituted by clubs is to demarcate precisely the line between the prosecutor and the Judge. [ENTITY] J. noticed this difficulty and
14 [CASE NUMBER] observed in [ENTITY]'s case, [PRECEDENT] at p. 626 thus:
'In many cases the tribunal is necessarily entrusted with the duty of appearing to act as prosecutors as well as that of judges; for there is no one else to prosecute. For example, in a case where a council is charged with the duty of considering the conduct of any member whose conduct is disgraceful and of expelling him if found guilty of such an offence, it constantly occurs that the matter is brought to the attention of the council by a report of legal proceedings in the press. The member is summoned to appear before the council. The council's duty is to cause him to appear and to explain his conduct. It may be that in so acting the council are the prosecutors. In one sense they are; but if the regulations show that the council is bound to act as I have mentioned and to that extent to act as prosecutors, it seems to be clear that the council is not disqualified from taking the further steps which the rules require.' "
12.4 Mr. [ENTITY] further submitted that the show-cause notices clearly mention that it was the prima facie opinion of BCCI that the petitioner had committed the alleged acts of misconduct. Any body initiating disciplinary proceedings has to arrive at some prima facie
15 [CASE NUMBER] opinion before initiating departmental inquiry against a member of a club and merely because the Governing Council of BCCI had arrived at such a prima facie opinion, as reflected from the show-cause notices, it cannot be said that the members of the Governing Council had any bias or prejudice against the petitioner.
12.5 As regards the communication dated 28th June, 2010 of BCCI to WSG(I), Mr. [ENTITY] submitted that while terminating the contract with WSG(I), obviously, BCCI could not have taken such action by referring to a prima facie opinion, and the question of rescission of contract between BCCI and WSG(I) stood on a different footing.
The learned senior counsel relied on the observations made by the Disciplinary Committee in the impugned order to the effect that BCCI's decision to terminate its contract with WSG(I) was a decision taken in the commercial interest, and was independent of, and unrelated to, the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The decision terminating the contract is not a subject-matter of proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee.
16 [CASE NUMBER] 12.6 Mr. [ENTITY] for BCCI further submitted that cancellation of bids on 7th March, 2010 is also not a subject-matter of issue before the Disciplinary Committee. The issue before the Disciplinary Committee relates to alleged unreasonableness of the conditions introduced and the fact that they were unauthorised. It is open to the petitioner, during the course of the enquiry, to contend that the conditions were reasonable and that they were authorised. Hence, the fact that the Governing Council has unanimously decided to cancel the bids on 7th March, 2010 does not, in any manner, reflect upon the Governing Council or every member of the Governing Council, including Mr. [ENTITY]. The Minutes of the Disciplinary Committee show that he was not present in the meeting held on 7th March, 2010, and he had only given his consent telephonically to the President of BCCI.
12.7 Coming to the allegations made against respondent No.2, Mr. [ENTITY], Mr. [ENTITY] submitted that there was no question of the petitioner having exposed Mr. [ENTITY]'s interest in the bid dated 31st March, 2010, for the simple reason that as per [SECTION] of the [ACT], there was no prohibition against an 17 [CASE NUMBER] administrator having, directly or indirectly, any commercial interest in events like IPL or Champions League Twenty20. It is further submitted that all that had happened was that Mr. [ENTITY] had merely agreed to hold up to 10% stake in City Corporation's bid for an IPL franchise for Pune, if it was successful. City Corporation failed in the bid held on 21st March, 2010, and was unsuccessful. No issue of the bid of 21st March, 2010 was a subject-matter of the enquiry before the Disciplinary Committee.
12.8 The learned senior counsel further submitted that merely because respondent No.2, Mr. [ENTITY], was appointed as interim Chairman, no allegation of bias can be made against him.
13. In rejoinder, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the test to be applied in quasi-judicial enquiries still continues to be the test of a "real likelihood of bias" and not the test of a "real danger of bias", which may be applicable in administrative matters, as was the case in M.P. Special Police Establishment (supra).
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14. Having heard the learned senior counsel for the parties, we have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions.
15. In the first place, we find considerable substance in the first preliminary objection raised by Mr.[ENTITY], learned senior counsel for BCCI, that while disposing of [CASE NUMBER] in the judgment dated 15th July, 2010, the Division Bench had specifically observed that in case the Disciplinary Committee did not accept the petitioner's objection on the ground of bias, nothing stopped the petitioner from challenging the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee along with the challenge he might raise against the final order of punishment, if any.
16. A similar view is taken by the Apex Court in various matters such as under industrial adjudication and arbitration matters. For instance, [SECTION] of the [ACT], provides that appointment of an arbitrator may be challenged on the ground that circumstances exist that would give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence and impartiality; but even while providing for such ground of challenge, the procedure prescribed in [SECTION] of the Act is that such objection may be raised before the arbitral Tribunal itself and unless the 19 [CASE NUMBER] arbitrator passes an order or the other party agrees to the challenge, the arbitral Tribunal shall decide on the challenge, and if such a challenge is not successful, the arbitral Tribunal shall continue the arbitration proceedings and make an arbitral award. It is at such a stage, after the arbitral award is made, that a party would make an application for setting aside such an arbitral award on the ground that the arbitrator was not independent or impartial. The above statutory provisions clearly indicate the legislative intent that even when a party challenges the appointment of an arbitrator on the ground of bias, it is for the arbitrator to decide such an objection, and in case the objection is not upheld, the arbitrator continues with the arbitral proceedings, and makes an arbitral award, and it is thereafter that the unsuccessful party can challenge the award on the ground of bias of the arbitrator. A similar view is taken by the Apex Court in industrial adjudication. The underlying principle is that piecemeal challenges should not be entertained.
17. The Division Bench, which decided the previous petition on 15th July, 2010, had, therefore, clearly indicated that as well-settled by catena of decisions, when a challenge is raised to the final action of punishment on the basis of an enquiry by a domestic tribunal, the 20 [CASE NUMBER] challenge could also be raised to the constitution of the very same tribunal and its proceedings.
18. Mr. [ENTITY], learned senior counsel for the petitioner, when he was called upon to address the Court on this aspect, submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the allegations of bias made by the petitioner are so clear and unanswerable that the Court must entertain this petition on merits, and give its findings on such allegations.
19. It is in view of the above submission that, without expressing any final opinion on the controversy sought to be raised in the petition, we have examined the matter only for the limited purpose of considering whether the petitioner's allegations are so clear and unanswerable that the petitioner's request that the members of the Disciplinary Committee should recuse themselves ought to have been examined.
20. Mr. [ENTITY]'s contention is that the present Writ Petition in respect of the challenge to the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee would not be maintainable, as there is no public law element. We are not inclined to reject this petition on the said ground alone. In [PRECEDENT]. (supra), the Apex Court has held 21 [CASE NUMBER] that though the Board is not created by a statute, and cannot be considered to be an authority within the meaning of [SECTION] of the [ACT], but nevertheless, when a body has a public duty to perform, the Court may entertain Writ Petition under [SECTION] of the [ACT].
21. The matter was again examined by the Apex Court in [ENTITY] & Anr. v. Netaji Cricket Club & Ors., reported in (2005) 4 SCC 741, and was dealt with in the following observations:-
"80. The Board (BCCI) is a society registered under the [ACT]. It enjoys a monopoly status as regards regulation of the sport of cricket in terms of its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association. It controls the sport of cricket and lays down the law therefor. It inter alia enjoys benefits by way of tax exemption and right to use stadia at nominal annual rent. It earns a huge revenue not only by selling tickets to viewers but also selling right to exhibit films live on TV and broadcasting the same. Ordinarily, its full members are the State associations except Association of Indian Universities, Railway Sports Control Board and Services Sports Control Board. As a member of ICC, it represents the country in the international fora. It exercises enormous public functions. It has the authority to select players,
22 [CASE NUMBER] umpires and officials to represent the country in the international fora. It exercises total control over the players, umpires and other officers. The Rules of the Board clearly demonstrate that without its recognition no competitive cricket can be hosted either within or outside the country. Its control over the sport of competitive cricket is deeply pervasive and complete.
"81. In law, there cannot be any dispute that having regard to the enormity of power exercised by it, the Board is bound to follow the doctrine of 'fairness' and 'good faith' in all its activities. Having regard to the fact that it has to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of millions, it has a duty to act reasonably. It cannot act arbitrarily, whimsically or capriciously. As the Board controls the profession of cricketers, its actions are required to be judged and viewed by higher standards."
22. In view of the above decision where the Apex Court entertained the petition challenging the election of office-bearers of BCCI, the second preliminary objection of Mr. [ENTITY] need not detain us further. In our view, the constitution of a Disciplinary Committee and the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of BCCI rejecting the petitioner's request for recusal of some members from the Disciplinary 23 [CASE NUMBER] Committee are matters which could be subject-matter of judicial scrutiny in Writ Jurisdiction.
23. Coming to the question whether the Disciplinary Committee applied the correct test of bias, we must take note of the decision of a [ACT] Bench of Apex Court in [PRECEDENT], and particularly of the discussion in paragraphs 14 and 21 thereof, where the Apex Court has held as under (paragraph 14):-
"The question in such cases would not be whether they would be biased. The question wold be whether there is reasonable ground for believing that there is likelihood of apparent bias. The principle of real likelihood of bias has now taken a tilt to 'real danger of bias' and 'suspicion of bias'." [See [ENTITY] Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girija Shankar Pant & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 182 paragraphs 27, 33 and 35, and Judicial Review of Adm. Actions by [ENTITY] (5th Edn. p 527), where two different spectra of the doctrine have been considered.] In paragraph 21, the Supreme Court again referred to [ENTITY]'s case and observed that in that case the Court held that mere apprehension of bias was not sufficient, but that there must be real danger of bias.
It was held that surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom.
24 [CASE NUMBER]
24. Though Mr. [ENTITY] would submit that the above tilt would be applicable only to administrative functions and not to quasi-
judicial functions, we do not feel called upon to express any final opinion on the issue, because we have considered the questions whether, even on the application of the "real apprehension of bias" test, the petitioner's allegations of bias are so clear and unanswerable that the members of the Disciplinary Committee ought to have accepted the request for recusal.
25. As regards the contention of Mr. [ENTITY] that the members of the Governing Council of BCCI are disqualified from holding the enquiry in question against the petitioner because of the stand already taken by BCCI in the communication dated 28th June, 2010 to WSG(I), in our view, the Disciplinary Committee has rightly held that the subject-
matter of enquiry is not the legality or otherwise of the decision of BCCI to rescind the contract in question. We also find considerable substance in the submission of Mr. [ENTITY] that BCCI was of the prima facie view that the petitioner had committed several irregularities and illegalities and in its communications to WSG(I), BCCI could not have rescinded the contract on the ground that it was prima facie satisfied that the Agreement was occasioned by fraud of the other party. Hence, the members of the Governing Council of BCCI or others connected with BCCI cannot be 25 [CASE NUMBER] said to have been disqualified on the ground of bias. The decision of BCCI in its commercial interest to rescind the contract with WSG(I) could be the subject-matter of litigation and BCCI may naturally be interested in supporting such a decision. That would not mean that all members of the Governing Council of BCCI would, per se, be disqualified to hold an enquiry against the petitioner. Even when a public authority holds an enquiry against its officer or employee, the Disciplinary Authority would arrive at some finding in a preliminary enquiry. On the basis of such a preliminary enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority would issue a chargesheet to the delinquent officer. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority would conduct an enquiry itself or through an enquiry officer, and arrive at a finding on whether the delinquent is guilty of the alleged misconduct, after observing the principles of natural justice. Similarly, the Disciplinary Committee will hold an enquiry into the alleged irregularities committed by the petitioner, and a report will be placed before BCCI. Merely because the Governing Council of BCCI has rescinded the contract with WSG(I) albeit on the ground of fraud, it would not mean that BCCI will not be in a position to hold an enquiry against the petitioner in an impartial manner. As held by the Apex Court, there has to be some material on record to support the allegation of bias or apprehension of bias. In fact, in 26 [CASE NUMBER] the recent decisions relied upon by Mr. [ENTITY], the test adopted is a real danger of bias and not merely an apprehension of bias.
26. Coming to the allegation of bias against Mr. [ENTITY], respondent No. 2 herein, Mr. [ENTITY], learned senior counsel for the petitioner, submitted that Mr. [ENTITY] was personally interested in the matter, as he had expressed a desire to have a 10% stake in the bid of franchise of City Corporation Ltd., and that the petitioner had exposed such interest of Mr. [ENTITY].
27. However, the impugned order dated 11th August, 2010 makes it clear that the subject-matter of the enquiry is the cancellation of two bids on 7th March, 2010 on the ground that the petitioner had imposed unreasonable conditions. It was after the cancellation of the said bids that BCCI had gone for other bids on 21st March, 2010, and the bid of City Corporation Ltd. for an IPL franchise for Pune was unsuccessful, as it was only the 5th highest bid. Hence, there was no occasion for Mr. [ENTITY] to have any conflict of interest.
28. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that the allegations of bias made by the petitioner against the members of the Disciplinary Committee of BCCI are not such that they cannot be 27 [CASE NUMBER] examined in proceedings which the petitioner may institute, if at all the findings of the Disciplinary Committee and, subsequently, the final decision of BCCI go against the petitioner.
29. Subject to the above clarification, the petition is dismissed.
CHIEF JUSTICE DR. [ENTITY], J.