JUDGMENT [ENTITY], C.J.
1. These appeals are directed against the order of the learned single Judge dated October 18, 2000 in [CASE NUMBER] and dated October 19, 2000 in [CASE NUMBER] and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order as they raise identical question of law. The facts giving rise to the appeals are as follows:
The appellants were employed by the State in various capacities on daily wages. After a short period their services were terminated. The following chart indicates the dates of appointment and the dates of termination of the appellants except appellants [ENTITY] and [ENTITY].
Appeal Name of Date of Date of Appellant Appointment termination 494/2001 [ENTITY] January 1, April 1, 1990 393/2001 [ENTITY] April 1, 1983 December 1, 33/2001 [ENTITY]. January 1, October 31, 1983 1993
As regards [ENTITY], he was initially appointed as Cattle Guard on February 1, 1980, subsequently, his services were terminated in February, 1984. He raised an industrial dispute but the matter was compromised and [ENTITY] was reinstated on October 1, 1987. Thereafter his services were again terminated but was again appointed on December 1, 1992. Finally, his services were terminated on October 12, 1993.
2. Appellant [ENTITY] (in [CASE NUMBER]) was appointed in January, 1986. He worked till October 18, 1990. Thereafter he remained absent. On November 1, 1990 he produced a medical certificate to resume work, but he was not allowed to do so.
3. The aforesaid appellants raised industrial disputes and the matters were referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. The Labour Court found that the services of the appellants were terminated in violation of [SECTION] of the [ACT]. However, the Labour Court awarded compensation to the appellants in lieu of reinstatement. The appellants being aggrieved by the award of the Labour Court filed separate writ petitions which were dismissed by the learned single Judge:
4. The point in issue is whether the Labour Court was justified in awarding compensation to the appellants in lieu of reinstatement. It needs to be pointed out that the appellants [ENTITY], [ENTITY] and [ENTITY]. worked only for short periods of time ranging between 8 months to 2 years, before their services were terminated. As regards [ENTITY], he was being employed intermittently. But he was last appointed on December 1, 1992 but his services were terminated within a period often months. In so far as [ENTITY] is concerned, he worked for about four years whereafter he absented himself.
5. The appellants did not go through a process of selection and were merely appointed on daily wage basis. The time lag in each case between the passing of the award and the date of termination is quite a substantial one. Again between date of termination of services of the appellants and as of now several years have gone by. In the circumstances the Labour Court and the learned single Judge were right in not foisting the appellants on the employers after such long spells of time. The appellants cannot be directed to be reinstated now as they have been out of touch with their respective jobs for long. It is well known that faculties rust when they are not used for long. An employee who is out of job for number of years, loses his proficiency, productivity and efficiency. In case the appellants are directed to be reinstated after several years it will lead to complex I situations. Not only question of their seniority, promotion and emoluments would arise, it will also affect the seniority and chances of promotion of employees who have been working continuously with respondents after the termination of the services of the appellants.
6. We are conscious of the fact that the normal rule is to direct reinstatement of a workman whose services have been terminated in violation of the Industrial law, but reinstatement cannot be directed in every case. The question whether an employee should be reinstated or not depends upon various factors viz. (1) The nature of employment; (2) the period between the date of appointment and date of termination i.e. length of service; (3) the period between the date of termination and date of award; (4) the period between the date of termination and the conclusion of the proceedings. In case a person is appointed for a short period of time without making him go through a process of selection and the gap between the date of termination and the award/conclusion of proceedings is a large one, ordinarily the employee should be awarded compensation in lieu of reinstatement when it is found that his termination was in violation of the provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT].
7. In [PRECEDENT], the Supreme Court while keeping in view the long gap between the date of termination of the services of workman in violation of [SECTION] of the [ACT] and the date of conclusion of the proceedings, awarded compensation in lieu of reinstatement with back wages. The Supreme Court in this regard directed as follows at p. 552 of LLJ:
"3. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court directing reinstatement in service with full back wages and instead direct that the appellant-Corporation shall pay a sum of Rs. 75,000 to the respondent in lieu of reinstatement with back wages and in full and final satisfaction of all his claims. We may, however, clarify that if he has any claim in regard to provident fund, the same may be refunded to him, if not done so far. The amount of compensation will be paid within two months from today, failing which interest will run at 18 per cent per annum."
8. Again, in [PRECEDENT] the Supreme Court looking to the long delay between the date of termination and the conclusion of the proceedings directed payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement in spite of the fact that it was found that the services of 4 the employee were terminated in violation of [SECTION] of the [ACT].
9. In [PRECEDENT] the Supreme Court having regard to the fact that services of the appellant were terminated 20 years back in violation of the [ACT], directed payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. While directing payment of compensation to the appellant, the Supreme Court observed as under at p. 715 of LLJ:
"3 The services of the appellant were terminated in the year 1976. Nearly 20 years have elapsed since then. In these circumstances, we are not inclined to direct reinstatement of the appellant. But having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that a consolidated sum of Rs. 25,000/- be paid to the appellant in lieu of compensation for back wages as well as reinstatement "
10. In [PRECEDENT] the Supreme Court while adopting the same principle held as follows:
"Considering the fact that the-respondent has not been in employment of the appellant since 1975 for well over a quarter of a century we do not think it appropriate to put him back in service of the appellant. It would be proper that some reasonable compensation be paid to him in lieu of back wages and reinstatement. We think, in the circumstances of the case, appropriate relief to be granted is a sum of Rs. 50,000 which shall be paid to the respondent or deposited with the Labour Court within a period of one month from today to be drawn by the respondent. Award made by the Labour Court as affirmed by the High Court shall stand modified in terms stated above."
11. In [PRECEDENT] a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court taking stock of various judgments rendered by the Supreme Court, took the following view at p. 404:
"14. In the instant case, the appellant had barely worked in the establishment of the respondent as an Accounts Clerk for a period of about 240 days when his services were terminated in the year 1988. Between the date of termination and as of now about 13 years have gone by. The same considerations as are detailed in para 28 of the decision of this Court in [PRECEDENT] are applicable to the instant case. The learned single Judge was, therefore, entirely right in directing payment of compensation instead of reinstatement with back wages."
12. In [PRECEDENT], decided on April 24, 2003, a Division Bench of this Court has taken a similar view and has held as follows:
"In [PRECEDENT] a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court considered the same question as has arisen in the instant case. Keeping in view the judgments of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] [PRECEDENT] Delhi High Court held as follows:
"We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. The only question which needs to be decided is whether the learned single Judge was legally justified in modifying the award of the Tribunal by directing the respondents to pay a sum of Rs. 60,000/- to the appellant in lieu of reinstatement and back wages. It appears to us that the view taken by the learned single Judge is supported not only by a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in [PRECEDENT] Officer (supra), but also by the decisions of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] (supra), and [PRECEDENT] (supra). In [PRECEDENT] Officer (supra), the Division Bench was dealing with the case of a workman who at the time of termination of his services by the Delhi Transport Corporation was working as a conductor on probation for one year. The probation period was extended till October 31, 1968. Three days before the expiry of the extended period of probation, on October 29, 1968 his services were terminated by the Delhi Transport Corporation in exercise of the power conferred by [SECTION] of the [ACT] without assigning any reasons therefor. The workman aggrieved by the order of termination raised an industrial dispute. The appropriate Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal answered the reference by holding that termination of the workman's services were proper and valid and he was not entitled to any relief. The award was thereafter challenged by the workman by means of a writ petition. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition holding that the termination of the services of the workman was void ab initio and inoperative. While holding so, the learned single Judge directed the reinstatement of the workman with back wages. Thereupon, the Delhi Transport Corporation filed a Letters Patent Appeal. The Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal did not disturb the finding of the learned single Judge that the termination of services of the workman was contrary to [SECTION] of the [ACT], but it did not endorse the direction of the learned single Judge to continue him in service with full back wages. The Division Bench on review of a large number of authorities and the facts of the case awarded compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages to the workman. The reasoning of the Division Bench for declining reinstatement of the workman is as follows:
"27. We find from the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the 1970s and 1980s that reinstatement with back wages was the norm in cases where the termination of the services of the workman was held inoperative. The decisions rendered in the 1990s, including the decision of the Constitution Bench in the [PRECEDENT], [PRECEDENT] to suggest that compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages is now the norm. In any case, since we are bound to follow the decision of the Constitution Bench, we, therefore, conclude that reinstatement is not the inevitable consequence of quashing an order of termination; compensation can be awarded in lieu of reinstatement and back wages. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, referred us to the judgments of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT]. The aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court turn on its own facts and has no application in the instant case.
28. Considering the facts of this case, we are persuaded to award compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages to the workman. The reasons are that if the workman is to be reinstated then it has to be as a Conductor on probation. Since his services were terminated in October, 1968, it would be impossible for anybody to hazard a guess what his career profile would have been over the last 31 years. By directing his reinstatement, we may be inviting a host of hypothetical questions such as seniority, promotions, etc. Moreover, the reason for the termination of the services of the workman was that the appellant was not satisfied with his work. Under these circumstances, we feel that it may be unfair to the appellant if the workman is thrust upon it, especially when the workman can be given adequate compensation."
In [PRECEDENT] (supra), where termination of services of the workman was made without complying with the provisions of [SECTION] of the [ACT], the Supreme Court instead ordered payment of Rs. 25,000/- in lieu of reinstatement and back wages. In this regard the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"We find merit in the said submission of Shri Ashri. From the dates mentioned in the judgment of the First Appellate Court dated January 22, 1985, it appears that the appellant had continuously worked for more than 240 days in a year. Since he was a workman, he was entitled to the protection of [SECTION] of the Act and the said protection could not be denied to him on the ground that he was a daily rated worker. It is not the case of the respondents that the provisions of [SECTION] of the Act were complied with while terminating the services of the appellant. In these circumstances, the termination of services of the appellant cannot be upheld and has to be set aside. The services of the appellant were terminated in the year 1976. Nearly 20 years have elapsed since then. In these circumstances, we are not inclined to direct reinstatement of the appellant. But having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that a consolidated sum of Rs. 25,000/- be paid to the appellant in lieu of compensation for back wages as well as reinstatement. This amount is being paid in full and final settlement of all the claims of the appellant. The said amount shall be paid within two months. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs."
13. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in [PRECEDENT] [PRECEDENT] [PRECEDENT] These decisions are of no avail to the appellants as they turn on their own peculiar facts.
14. Accordingly, the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. No costs.