Case: VITHALDAS JAGANNATH KHATRI (D) THROUGH SMT. SHAKUNTALA ALIAS SUSHMI Vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA REVENUE AND FOREST DEPARTMENT

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. 1. The socialistic agenda of the nascently formed Indian State with large landless poor population was given an impetus inter alia by a number of State legislations for re-distribution of agricultural land, by putting a ceiling limit on the same, and then allotting it to the landless poor. We are concerned here with the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). The said Act also went through many amendments top fine tune different aspects, most importantly the aspect of plugging loopholes, whereby owners having land in excess of the ceiling limit would endeavour to somehow re-distribute it among the family to bring it within the ceiling limit, or at least, to reduce the excess land. The objective of the said Act can well be deciphered from its preamble, which reads as under: An Act to impose a maximum limit (or ceiling) on the holding of agricultural land in the State of Maharashtra; to provide for the acquisition and distribution of land held in excess of such ceiling; to provide that the lands taken over from undertakings and the integrity of which is maintained in compact blocks, for ensuring the full and efficient use of the land for agriculture and its efficient management through corporations (including a company) owned or controlled by the State, be granted to such corporations or company; and for matters connected with the purposes aforesaid 2. Chapter III of the said Act made provisions restricting transfers and acquisitions and the consequences of contraventions. The relevant Sections falling in the Chapter are reproduced hereunder: Section 8 - Restriction on transfer Where a person, or as the case may be, a family unit holds land in excess of the ceiling area on or after the commencement date, such person, or as the case may be, any member of the family unit shall not, on and after that date, transfer any land, until the land in excess of the ceiling area is determined under this Act. Explanation :- In this section, transfer means transfer, whether by way of sale, gift, mortgage with possession, exchange, lease, assignment of land for maintenance, surrender of a tenancy or resumption of land by a landlord or any other disposition, whether by act of parties made inter vivos or by decree or order of a court, tribunal or authority (except where such decree or order is passed in a proceeding which is instituted in such Court, Tribunal or before such authority before the 26th day of September, 1970), but does not include transfer by way of sale or otherwise of land for the recovery of land revenue or for sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue, or acquisition of land for a public purpose under any law for the time being in force. …. …. …. …. …. Section 10 - Consequences of certain transfers and acquisitions of land (1) If - (a) any person or a member of a family unit, after the 26th day of September, 1970 but before the commencement date, transfers any land in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the object of the Amending Act, 1972, or (b) any land is transferred in contravention of section 8, then, in calculating the ceiling area which that person, or as the case may be, the family unit, is entitled to hold, the land so transferred shall be taken into consideration, and the land exceeding the ceiling area so calculated shall be deemed to be in excess of the ceiling area for that holding, notwithstanding that the land remaining with him or with the family unit may not in fact be in excess of the ceiling area. If by reason of such transfer, the holding of a person, or as the case may be, of the family unit is less than the area so calculated to be in excess of the ceiling area, then all the land of the person, or as the case may be, the family unit shall be deemed to be surplus land; and out of the land so transferred and in possession of the transferee [unless such land is liable to forfeiture under the provisions of sub-section (3)], land to the extent of such deficiency shall, subject to rules made in that behalf, also be deemed to be surplus land, notwithstanding that the holding of the transferee may not in fact be in excess of the ceiling area. Explanation :- For the purposes of clause (a) transfer has the same meaning as in section 8. All transfers made after the 26th day of September, 1970 but before the commencement date, shall be deemed (unless the contrary is proved) to have been made in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the object of the Amending Act, 1972. Explanation :- For the purposes of this sub-section, a transfer shall not be regarded as made on or before 26th September, 1970 if the document evidencing the transfer is not registered on or before that date or where it is registered after that date, it is not presented for registration on or before the said date. (2) If any land is possessed on or after the commencement date by a person, or as the case may be, a family unit in excess of the ceiling area, or if as a result of acquisition (by testamentary disposition, or devolution on death, or by operation of law) of any land on or after that date, the total area of land held by any person, or as the case may be, a family unit, exceeds the ceiling area, the land so in excess shall be surplus land. (3) Where land is acquired in wilful contravention of section 9, then as a penalty therefor, the right, title and interest of the person, or as the case may be, the family unit or any member thereof in the land so acquired or obtained shall, subject to the provisions of Chapter IV , be forfeited, and shall vest without any further assurance in the State Government: Provided that, where such land is burdened with an encumbrance, the Collector may, after holding such inquiry as he thinks fit and after hearing the holder and the person in whose favour the encumbrance is made by him, direct that the right, title and interest of the holder in some other land of the holder equal in extent to the land acquired in wilful contravention of section 9, shall be forfeited to Government. Section 11 - Restriction on partition Where any land held by a family is partitioned after the 26th day of September, 1970, the partition so made shall be deemed (unless the contrary is proved) to have been made in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the object of the Amending Act, 1972, and shall accordingly be ignored, and any land covered by such partition shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the land held by the family; and the extent of share of each person in the land held by the family shall be taken into consideration for calculating the ceiling area in accordance with the provisions of section 3. Explanation :- For the purposes of this section, partition means any division of land by act of parties made inter vivos, and includes also partition made by a decree or order of a court, tribunal or authority. 3. A reading of the aforesaid provisions would show that a fiction is sought to be created (whereby a transfer made from a prior date, of 26.9.1970, is sought to be nullified, other than by way of a bona fide transaction) by the Amendment Act of 1972, by providing for the cut-off date of 26.9.1970 qua any transactions or transfers, transactions after which date being deemed to be transfers in anticipation, or in order to defeat the object of the Amendment Act of 1972. It may also be noticed that it is only by the Amendment Act of 1975 that the commencement date was specified as 2.10.1975. Thus, while normally all the relevant provisions of the legislation, having come into force from 2.10.1975, the provisions would have applied from that date, i.e. 2.10.1975, a legal fiction was created to apply the provisions retrospectively, from 26.9.1970. It does appear from the submissions that as the legislation appears to have been debated and been in contemplation for some time, the apprehension of transactions during this window of time, in anticipation of the amendments, was taken care of by the aforesaid provisions. 4. The factual matrix has to be examined in the context of the aforesaid provisions, and in the present appeal we are practically concerned with one document, which is the Partition Deed dated 31.1.1970, which has been duly registered, i.e., both the document and its registration are undisputedly before the cut-off date of 26.9.1970. 5. The Partition deed has been executed between five parties – late Shri Vithaldas Jagannath Khatri and his then minor son and three minor daughters. It may, however, be noticed that two of the minor daughters attained majority before the commencement date of 2.10.1975, though they were not major on 26.9.1970. In terms of this document, the agricultural land of the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) is sought to be divided by mentioning all the parties as part of the HUF. The lands were stated to be used jointly and shares in the lands were given to both, the minor son and the daughters stating as under: ….Party No.2 to 5 have to take the education & to see that each of them take it freely & to provide for the expenses therefore and to see that each of them will meet the expenses out of their own property and that no dispute took place between them in future, therefore we are executing & keeping with us this deed of partition….. 6. After setting out the aforesaid recital, the property falling to each of the parties is mentioned and post that, before the signatures, it is further stated as under: In this way we have partitioned over estate, the property fallen to the share of party have taken its possession & became the full owner thereof. Now nobody is concerned with the property of others. Out of us for the education & marriage purpose of party No.2 to 5 and for the benefits of our family and for the successful future, we of our free will & consideration executed & kept this deed of partition, on this 31 st day of January 1970. 7. We may also notice that the prelude to the aforesaid Partition Deed on account of an earlier Partition Deed executed between Vithaldas and his father Jagannath, on 20.1.1955, when a separate provision was also made through a Gift Deed by Jagannath, in favour of the wife of Vithaldas. 8. On the provisions of the said Act coming into force, the Surplus Lands Distribution Tribunal (for short SLDT) instituted proceedings in exercise of suo moto powers in respect of the return filed under Section 12 of the said Act by Vithaldas, which Section falls in Chapter IV , dealing with surplus land. In the course of the assessment proceedings regarding surplus land, the holdings of the entire family were taken into consideration, as in terms of Section 2 (11) of the said Act, the family would include an HUF, which is joint in estate, or possession, or residence. A family unit, under Section 11-A of the said Act, for definition, has referred to Section 4, defining land held by a family unit. In terms of order dated 19.11.1976, 60 acres and 27 gunthas of land of late Vithaldas was declared surplus. This order was assailed before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay Bench, Nagpur, which dismissed the appeal on 16.2.1977, resulting in proceedings being filed by Vithaldas, before the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench. In terms of order dated 2.3.1982, learned Single Judge of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court remitted the matter back to the SLDT for fresh inquiry, on the ground of lack of adequate opportunity provided to Vithaldas and others to present their case. 9. On remand, a fresh order was passed by the SDO, Chikhali District, Buldana on 7.5.1984. Various aspects of holding of Vithaldas were examined. On the matter being revisited in these proceedings, land measuring 59 acres and 35 gunthas was deemed surplus, under Section 3(2) of the said Act, while excluding (a) Potkharab land of Vithaldas, to the extent of 12.16 acres; (b) Field Survey No.106, which was stated to be vesting with the wife of Vithaldas, having been gifted by her father-in- law Jagannath, and found that the same continued to be in possession of Jagannath, as also recorded in the Record of Rights and crop statements; (c) the land allotted to the two major daughters of Vithaldas, Shakuntala and Durgadevi. 10. The appeal proceedings were lodged by Vithaldas, his wife, the son and the third daughter, Beladevi, under Section 33 of the said Act. The other two minor daughters, who had attained majority before 2.10.1975, however, did not file the appeal as they were apparently satisfied with the view adopted by the SDO. The State also filed cross-objections challenging the exclusion of the land by the SDO qua (b) & (c) aforesaid. Since the two elder daughters were not aggrieved, they were neither the appellant, nor the respondent before the appeal proceedings. Nor did the State take care to implead them, despite having filed cross-objections qua their land. The appeal court, however, dismissed the appeal, and allowed the cross-objections vide order dated 3.12.1984. Since the land of the two elder daughters is the only concern, in this matter, the rationale for allowing the cross-objections has been set forth. 11. The principal plea, which found favour with the appellate authority, was that the Partition Deed dated 31.1.1970 was against the principles of Hindu law to the extent it gave a share to minor daughters in ancestral land. The land is stated to have also continued in the possession of Vithaldas. Even though the Partition Deed was pre the cut-off date of 26.9.1970, it was opined that the document could be looked into, in a case like the present one, where the property was apportioned to the two daughters who were not entitled to a share. 12. The aforesaid appellate order was challenged by Vithaldas and his wife in the writ proceedings before the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, but that petition was dismissed vide oral judgment dictated over a period of 7.9.1987 to 15/16.9.1987. There were certain other aspects also urged in those proceedings, but they are not relevant for the present appeal. The High Court agreed with the finding that the daughters, not having a share in the property, a Partition Deed could not have conferred any interest on them, albeit it was before the cut-off date of 26.9.1970. 13. An intra-court appeal was preferred, which was dismissed vide impugned order dated 27.11.2007. The Division Bench agreed with the findings that the partition effected vide Partition Deed dated 31.1.1970 was unnatural as it alienated properties to minor daughters, and that a female child could not get a share in the ancestral property, even though it was effected before the relevant date of 26.9.1970. Once again, as reflected in the records, the factum of cultivation of land by late Vithaldas was taken into account. The attainment of the age of majority by the elder two daughters, before the commencement date, 2.10.1975, was also ignored as irrelevant. 14. The appellants before the Division Bench also sought to raise the issue of the two elder daughters not being arrayed as parties in the cross- objections, even though their existing rights were being affected. Further, it was argued that none of the members of the HUF had assailed the Partition Deed on any account. These pleas also did not find favour on the ground that it was late Vithaldas who sought to lose the land and, in effect, it was for him to see how to confer the rights on his two elder daughters. The two elder daughters were held to form part of the family unit. 15. The Special Leave Petition (SLP) was filed only by late Vithaldas, through his legal representatives. The two elder daughters are, thus, appellants as legal heirs of late Vithaldas, in the present proceedings. This is of significance as the contention of respondents is that the two elder daughters only stepped into the shoes of late Vithaldas, and that they cannot de novo start proceedings in their own rights. Leave was granted on 31.8.2009, and the interim order of status quo was directed to continue throughout. On 23.11.2016, during the course of hearing, an order was passed to obtain clarity, whether in pursuance of the Partition Deed, the transfer of rights was ever reported to the revenue authorities, in terms of Sections 148 & 149 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. The action, if any, taken by the revenue authorities was also not apparently reflected in the records before the Court. Time was granted to place on record the requisite material qua the developments post the execution of the Partition Deed. 16. An additional affidavit was filed on behalf of the appellants, affirmed in March, 2017. On the appellants seeking the record from the Tehsil Office of the concerned district, they received a response, informing them that records from 1970 to 1975 are in a mutilated condition and that the mutation register for the period from 1964 to 1978 is not traceable. The crop statement was not available for the period 1970-1972 for Village Mangrul, while for Village Babulgaon the crop statement was not available for the period 1970-1973, for Survey No.14. It was thus notified that the crop statement for Survey No. 12 was not available for the period 1971-1972. The records made available, however, do show that from 1972- 1976, for Survey No. 12, and from 1973-1976, as gathered for Survey No. 14, the two daughters were shown as occupants, but through their guardian. It may be noted that somehow, on attaining the age of majority, apparently no endorsement was made qua the elder two daughters on that aspect. The Record of Rights also shows a similar position. 17. The picture which emerges from the documents produced is that in pursuance of the Partition Deed, which was obviously produced, both for the Record of Rights and the Crop Register, the names of the two elder daughters were entered though through their guardian, late Jagannath (the grandfather), as they were minors at the relevant time, while the corresponding endorsement on their attaining majority, before the commencement date 2.10.1975 was seemingly not made. 18. We heard Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and Mr. N.R. Katneshwarkar, Advocate on behalf of the respondent-State. Deemed Fiction: 19. The legislation in question is a beneficial piece of legislation and, indeed, must be given the widest amplitude, the object being to distribute land among the landless. The preamble quoted aforesaid sets forth the object of the said Act. But, it is equally true that in giving wider amplitude to such legislation, it cannot be that the Court interprets the words of the statute beyond its plain reading reflecting the intent of the legislation. A preamble has its limitations insofar as being treated as an aid for the interpretation of a statute. It cannot restrict or enlarge the provisions of the Act.(Raymond Ltd. v. State of Chattisgarh (2007) 3 SCC 79 ; State of West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241 ) Thus, the provisions have to be read, to see whether there is any ambiguity, requiring any further aid for construction of those sections, or whether they are explicit and clear in their meaning.(The Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 (HL).) 20. On a reading of the provisions of Chapter III, including Sections 8, 10 & 11 of the said Act, there is no ambiguity as would require any aid to construct the meaning of those Sections. 21. The commencement date would be the date from which the provisions would come into force. However, the amendment of 1972 created a deemed fiction by inserting the provision for setting at naught transactions that may have occurred on a prior date, i.e., from 26.9.1970. The result is that the transactions or transfers in this window of about five years would also be hit by the provisions of the said Act insofar as the determination of surplus land is concerned. The object was to prevent circumvention by dubious and indirect methods.(Gurdit Singh v State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 260 ) This is the view also adopted by this Court in Gurdit Singh v. State of Punjab, but then this Court had gone on to observe that that was no reason why a construction should be put on the Section which its language could hardly bear. The legislation in question in Gurdit Singh v. State of Punjab was a similar one, The Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955. It would be difficult to accept and countenance a situation where, irrespective of limitations imposed in considering the past time period, any transaction could be so assailed. In the wisdom of the legislature, the window of five years is provided as sufficient for scrutinizing transactions which could be called dubious and indirect methods to evade the result of the said Act. This is also reinforced by the provisions of Section 18, dealing with determination of the surplus area of land where clause (b) specifically provides as under: 18. (a) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx (b) whether any land transferred between the period from 26 th day of September, 1970 and the commencement date, or any land partitioned after the 26 th day of September, 1970, should be considered or ignored in calculating the ceiling area as provided by sub-section (1) of section 10 or section 11; Thus, once again, it is clearly stated that the lands transferred between the period 26.9.1970 and the commencement date (2.10.1975) is what is to be ignored in calculating the ceiling area. 22. The effect of the aforesaid provision is that any land, even if it is obtained by partition or other transfer, after the date of 26.9.1970 would be included for the purposes of calculation of surplus land, as land of the person who so transferred the same. 23. The legislature has also taken another caution. The second Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 10 also provides that documents evidencing such transfer even before 26.9.1970 would not be exempted if they are not registered on or before that date, or even if they are registered after that date, they are not presented for registration on or before that date. The requirement is for the transfer document to be, both executed and presented for registration before the cut-off date. Thus, the possibility of evading the land ceiling limits by creating documents on a back date and subsequently producing them for registration is obviated. 24. Section 11 specifically talks about the partition deed in a similar manner and, thus, not only transfers whether by way of sale, gift, mortgage with possession, exchange, lease, assignment of land for maintenance, surrender of a tenancy or resumption of land by a landlord or any other disposition, are included, even the avenue by way of a partition deed has been shut out, unless it has been executed prior to the cut-off date. There is no doubt that in the present case, the partition deed was executed before the cut-off date of 26.9.1970 and registered even prior to that date. 25. On behalf of the appellants, a number of judgments have been referred to, on how a deemed fiction should be construed. Thus, a legal fiction is to be limited for the purpose for which it is created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field Bengal Immunity Co Ltd. v. State of Bihar: (1955) 2 SCR 603 . There are a number of judgments referred to in the context of taxing statutes, but then the rules of interpretation of taxing statutes, to be construed strictly, would be different and there is no purpose in referring to these judicial pronouncements. In the context of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964, the issue of legal fiction was, once again, examined Mancheri Puthusseri Ahmed v. Kuthiravattam Estate Receiver (1996) 6 SCC 185 . The same proposition was, once again, reiterated while observing that a legal fiction is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created, and that it cannot be extended by importing another fiction. In the context of Section 4A of that Act, it was held to be circumscribed by express words – a mortgagee in possession was stated to be one who, for a continuous period of not less than 50 years immediately preceding the commencement of that Section held that capacity. The words immediately preceding the commencement were required to be given their ordinary and full meaning as reflecting the legislative intent and thus, only such type of cases where a mortgagee was in possession, immediately preceding the commencement of the Section, was extendable for a period of 50 years in the past alone. It was further observed as under: ….However beneficial may be the scope and ambit of the legal fiction created by the legislature while enacting Section 4-A such fiction can arise only when the express language of the section laying down the conditions precedent for raising of such a fiction is complied with by the mortgagee-in-possession concerned seeking the benefit of such a deeming fiction. Such a fiction cannot be extended by the court on analogy or by addition or deleting words not contemplated by the legislature. 26. This judgment has found support in a subsequent judgment of this Court in Raj Kumar Johri v. State of M.P . (2002) 3 SCC 732 Thus, the aforesaid being the manner of interpreting a provision for deeming fiction, the relevant dates provided, of 26.9.1970 and 2.10.1975, giving a window of five years for the State to take action and prevent any dubious transaction during this period of time, cannot be expanded to an unlimited prior period of time. 27. This Court, in Uttar Chand v. State of Maharashtra, (1980) 2 SCC 292 while dealing with the very statute has opined that the cut-off date would be sacrosanct. The factual contours dealt with partition before the cut-off date, as also sale of land. Once the cut-off date is provided, it was observed that they fell completely outside the ambit of the provisions of the Act and, thus, the High Court would not be justified in presuming that the transfers made were either collusive or fraudulent. The appellate authority allowing the cross-objections: 28. The order passed by the competent authority, being the SDO, insofar as the two elder daughters are concerned, held in their favour as far as the lands vested in them, in pursuance of the Partition Deed. There was, thus, no occasion for them to file an appeal, nor did they so file an appeal. Other members of the family, who filed the appeal, did not implead them as parties. Once again, naturally so, as they would not be the interested parties, or even pro forma parties in that behalf. However, once the State decided to file cross-objections and, in that, impugned even that portion of the order of the SDO which held in favour of the two elder daughters, there is no hesitation in stating that they were necessary parties to those proceedings. It is no answer to say that since the effect of the land ceiling would be to restrict the area of their father, late Vithaldas, it is for Vithaldas to see how he can benefit his daughters. This fundamental defect cannot be cured in the subsequent proceedings, as the right of appeal is a statutory right and an important one. This aforesaid view is reinforced by a catena of judicial pronouncements. It has been held that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not contemplate filing of cross-objections against a party who is not a party to the appeal Rajendra Nath Chatterjee v. Moheshata Debi AIR 1926 Cal 533 . In case such objections have to be filed two distinct operations are necessary. He must implead the persons as parties qua whom he intends to file cross-objections then he must file the memorandum of cross-objections Venkatapathi v. Veerayya AIR (30) 1943 Madras 609 . The position would be no different qua a judicial or quasi-judicial authority as a party to be effected must get a right of hearing Udit Narayan Singh Malpharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar AIR 1963 SC 786 (WS) . Thus, unqualified imprimatur can be lent to this view. 29. Thus, for the aforesaid reason also the cross-objection could not have disturbed the status of the two elder daughters. Unmarried daughters claim in HUF property: 30. It has already been observed that non-impleadment of the two elder daughters would be fatal to the appellate proceedings. But, they are fatal for more than that reason. In fact, the view taken by both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench would equally fall foul of the legal treatise, enunciating the rights of an unmarried daughter. The view taken is that since these lands were given to minor unmarried daughters, they having no share in the HUF property, such grant is contrary to law at that point of time. 31. It may be noticed, of course, that the lis has been pending, and the current scenario is one where even daughters have been given rights in the ancestral/HUF property, in terms of the amendment made to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The State of Maharashtra, where the land is located was a step ahead inasmuch as vide Maharashtra Act 39 of 1994, which was brought into force on 22.6.1994, such rights were conferred on women by making them also a coparcener by birth. However, even on the date when the Partition Deed was executed, the legal position was not as has been enunciated. 32. It has been observed that a father can make a gift within reasonable limits of ancestral immovable property to his daughter as part of his moral obligations, at the time of her marriage or even thereafter. In fact, there is an observation made that gift made of 1/6 th of the total holding of the ancestral property is valid Pugalia Vettorammal and Anr. v. Vettor Goundan (1912) 22 MLJ 321. This is in view of the fact that such gifts made are for pious purposes, but the alienation must be by an act inter vivos R. Kuppayee v. Raja Gounder (2004) 1 SCC 295 33. In Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh v. Mallappa Chanbasappa & Ors. 16 , the legal position has been summarized as under: 15… In Madhaviya, pp. 41 and 42, a text of Katyayana is cited authorizing the gift of immovable property by a father to his daughters besides a gift of movables up to the amount of 2000 phanams a year… …Manu says To the unmarried daughters by the same mother let their brothers give portions out of their allotments respectively, according to the class of their several mothers. Let each give one-fourth part of his own distinct share and those who refuse to give it shall be degraded.These and similar other texts indicate that Hindu law texts not only sanction the giving of property to daughters at the time of partition or at the time of their marriage, as the case may be, but also condemn the dereliction of the said duty in unequivocal terms. It is true that these Hindu law texts have become obsolete. The daughter has lost her right to a share in the family property at the time of its partition. But though the right has been crystallized into a moral obligation on the part of the father to provide for the daughter either by way of marriage provision or subsequently… …The decision in Kudutamma v. Narasimhacharyalu [(1907) 17 MLJ 528] is rather instructive. There, it was held that a Hindu father was entitled to make gifts by way of marriage portions to his daughters out of the family property to a reasonable extent… …Wallis, J. in his judgment pointed out that unmarried daughters were formerly entitled to share on partition and that right fell into desuetude, a gift made to a daughter was sustained by courts as a provision for the married couple. The learned Judge summarised the position thus, at p. 532: … although the joint family and its representative, the father or other managing member, may no longer be legally bound to provide an endowment for the bride on the occasion of her marriage, they are still morally bound to do so, at any rate when the circumstances of the case make it reasonably necessary. …Another Division Bench of the Madras High Court considered the question in Sundaramya v. Seethamma [(1911) 21 MLJ 695, 699] and declared the validity of a gift of 8 acres of ancestral land by a Hindu father to his daughter after marriage when the family was possessed of 200 acres of land. The marriage took place about forty years before the gift. There was no evidence that the father then had any intention to give any property to the daughter. The legal position was thus expounded by the learned Judges. Munro and Sankran Nair, JJ.: The father or the widow is not bound to give any property. There may be no legal but only a moral obligation. It is also true that in the case before us the father did not make any gift and discharge that moral obligation at the time of the marriage. But it is difficult to see why the moral obligation does not sustain a gift because it was not made to the daughter at the time of marriage but only some time later. The moral obligation of the plaintiffs father continued in force till it was discharged by the gift in 1899....Venkataramana Rao, J. in Sithamahalakshmamma v. Kotayya [(1936) 71 MLJ 259] had to deal with the question of validity of a gift made by a Hindu father of a reasonable portion of ancestral immovable property to his daughter without reference to his son. Therein, the learned Judge observed at p. 262: There can be no doubt that the father is under a moral obligation to make a gift of a reasonable portion of the family property as a marriage portion to his daughters on the occasion of their marriages. It has also been held that it is a continuing obligation till it is discharged by fulfilment thereof. It is on this principle a gift of a small portion of immovable property by a father has been held to be binding on the members of the joint family.Adverting to the question of the extent of property he can gift, the learned Judge proceeded to State: The question whether a particular gift is reasonable or not will have to be judged according to the State of the family at the time of the gift, the extent of the family immovable property, the indebtedness of the family, and the paramount charges which the family was under an obligation to provide for, and after having regard to these circumstances if the gift can be held to be reasonable, such a gift will be binding on the joint family members irrespective of the consent of the members of the family.This decision was followed by Chandra Reddy, J. of the Madras High Court in Annamalai v. Sundarathammal [(1952) II MLJ 782, 784]… 16… The legal position may be summarized thus: the Hindu law tests conferred a right upon a daughter or a sister, as the case may be, to have a share in the family property at the time of partition. That right was lost by efflux of time. But, it became, crystallized into a moral obligation. The father or his representative can make a valid gift, by way of reasonable provision for the maintenance of the daughter regard being had to the financial and other relevant circumstances of the family. By custom or by convenience, such gifts are made at the time of marriage, but the right of the father or his representative to make such a gift is not confined to the marriage occasion. It is a normal obligation and it continues to subsist till it is discharged. Marriage is only a customary occasion for such a gift. But the obligation can be discharged at any time, either during the lifetime of the father or thereafter. It is not possible to lay down a hard and fast rule, prescribing the quantitative limits of such a gift as that would depend on the facts of each case and it can only be decided by courts, regard being had to the overall picture of the extent of the family estate, the number of daughters to be provided for and other paramount charges and other similar circumstances...… In the aforesaid case, a discussion took place in respect of a Gift Deed executed with respect to a daughter. The acceptability of gifting of a reasonable part of the ancestral property, in favour of daughters, for marriage purposes, was held to be valid, and in accordance with Mitakshara law. There is a discussion of even the Manusmriti to conclude that, though it may not reflect the current legal position, but consistently, the Hindu texts not only sanction the giving of properties to daughters at the time of partition, or at the time of marriage, but even provisions can be made in advance, for the same. 34. The judicial pronouncement in Annamalai Ammal v. Sundarathammal & Ors. AIR 1953 Mad 404 may also be noticed, where it has been observed as under: 5. If the obligation is moral and continuing one and could be made long after the marriage, could it be said that it is not within the competence of a father to make such a gift before the marriage? In my opinion, there is not much difference in principle between a gift after the marriage, and a gift before the marriage, the object of such a gift being to make a future provision for the bridal couple. 6. This leads me to the next question whether the circumstance that a gift is not described as a marriage provision under the document renders it an invalid one? To my mind, it appears it does not affect the validity of the gift. When a father makes a gift of a reasonable portion of the property to an unmarried daughter it may be assumed that it was meant to be a marriage provision. It is to be observed in this case that under Ex. P. 1 the plaintiff was given only a vested remainder and the gift in her favour would take effect only after the lifetime of the first defendant. 35. The aforesaid judgment received the imprimatur of this Court in Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh & Ors. v. Mallappa Chanbasappa & Ors.. 36. The legal view, thus, is very clear: a. A provision for marriage of unmarried daughters can be made out of ancestral property. b. Such provision can be made before, at the time, or even after the marriage. c. The provision is being made out of pious obligation, though the right of women got diluted over a period of time. However, with the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, in 2005, a specific right is now conferred on women to get a share on partition of ancestral property, including the right to claim partition. As mentioned above this change was brought about in Maharashtra in 1994, itself. 37. If the facts of the present case are averted to, the aforesaid is exactly what has been done under the Partition Deed. A provision was made for the marriage of the daughters. In fact, the provision is for education and marriage purposes. In the context of where the society is today, such an endeavour should be commended as salutary, rather than be frowned upon. It was sustainable in law then, and it is more than just merely sustainable in law now. Thus, there is no doubt that there was nothing prohibiting such a provision from being made. If the law permits so, it can hardly be called fraudulent. Thus, the very premise of allowing the cross-objection has no sustenance in law. 38. It may also be noticed the fact that the two elder daughters, whose rights have been debated actually, even attained majority before the commencement date, i.e., they were major unmarried daughters on the date when the amendments came into force. They were, thus, not included even in the family unit in terms of the definition contained under Section 4, which reads as under: Section 4 - Land held by family unit (1) All land held by each member of a family unit, whether jointly or separately, shall for the purposes of determining the ceiling area of the family unit, be deemed to be held by the family unit. Explanation :- A family unit means,- (a) a person and his spouse (or more than one spouse) and their minor sons and minor unmarried daughters, if any; or (b) where any spouse is dead, the surviving spouse or spouses, and the minor sons and minor unmarried daughters; or (c) where the spouses are dead, the minor sons and minor unmarried daughters of such deceased spouses. (2) For the purposes of this section, all declarations of dissolution of marriage made by a Court after the 26th day of September, 1970, and all dissolutions of marriage by custom, or duly made, pronounced or declared on or after that date shall, for the purposes of determining the ceiling area to be held by a family unit, be ignored; and accordingly, the land held by each spouse shall be taken into consideration for that purpose, as if no dissolution had taken place. But, if a proceeding for dissolution of marriage has commenced before any Court before the aforesaid date, then the dissolution of marriage shall have full effect (whether the marriage is dissolved before or after that date), and shall be taken into consideration in determining the ceiling area of a family unit. The question of including the daughters would only arise if the document of partition deed was found to be fraudulent. Thus, for this reason also, the property cannot be included and clubbed with the land of late Vithaldas. 39. As observed above, the form of the document is not important in this behalf. Such provision can be made in a partition deed. It may be in the nature of a gift. So what? None of the members of the family have ever sought to assail or challenge the same. It is with the consensus of the family, apart from the legality of the same. The judgment of the Kerala High Court in Ponnu & Anr. v. Taluk Land Board, Chittur & Ors. (1981) KLT 780 may also be referred to, where, while dealing with the issue of a ceiling case, the conferring of rights on the son, under a partition deed, was held to be valid as being capable of being construed as a gift. The provisions of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the TP Act), read with Section 123, were discussed. A gift, being a transfer of property made voluntarily and without consideration, has to be made by a registered instrument. A gift is essentially a transfer. Thus, even if there were no pre-existing rights, it could be a valid gift, so long as the said requirements are met. In the facts of that case, the partition deed was not even between the joint owners or co-owners, but between the persons who owned the land exclusively and another person who held no existing title or right. It was held that a tribunal could go behind and look at the real nature of the transaction. Reliance was placed on Made Gouda v. Chenne Gowda, AIR 1925 Mad 1174 where a person who was not a co-owner was also a party to a transaction, and it was held that the transaction in regard to that particular item of property was really a gift and, thus, the requirements of a valid gift deed should be met. Similarly, in Ramaswami Pattamali v. Lakshmi AIR 1962 Ker 313 , on a proper understanding of a transaction, the document was construed as a composite deed of partition and assignment. Also, in Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi & Ors. (1996) 9 SCC 388 , while deciding whether the document in question was a will or a settlement, it was held held that the nomenclature of the document is not conclusive, and instead its substance would be determinative . In a nutshell, the view is that too much importance should not be attached to the nomenclature of a document and one can look behind the façade of the document to decipher the true nature of the transaction. 40. The aforesaid enunciation of the law reflects the correct legal position. In the given facts of the case it is not in dispute that the Deed was a registered document. Thus, even if one construes it as a partition- cum-gift deed, it would make no difference as the requirements of a gift deed, under Sections 122 & 123 of the TP Act stand satisfied. 41. Legal position in the context of the facts of the present case, thus, show that even if the document is effectively a gift deed, and Hindu Law permits the making of a provision for the daughter for her marriage, the execution of a partition deed, which has the effect of such a gift would not nullify the effect of the deed. This is so as a provision made for the daughter out of the ancestral property would be in compliance of the pious obligation. 42. In the end, it may be noted that the only aspect on which the debate occurred was the share of the two elder daughters, and the right to retain the land as their separate land, without it being adjusted with the lands of late Vithaldas. The findings above, thus, lead to the conclusion that the view taken by the SDO vide order dated 7.5.1984, regarding the land of the two elder daughters, is the correct view, and the subsequent view by the appellate authority faulted on more than one reason, as mentioned aforesaid. The further imprimatur of that view by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, thus, also cannot be sustained.

Decision:
1[ds]19. The legislation in question is a beneficial piece of legislation and, indeed, must be given the widest amplitude, the object being to distribute land among the landless. The preamble quoted aforesaid sets forth the object of the said Act. But, it is equally true that in giving wider amplitude to such legislation, it cannot be that the Court interprets the words of the statute beyond its plain reading reflecting the intent of the legislation. A preamble has its limitations insofar as being treated as an aid for the interpretation of a statute. It cannot restrict or enlarge the provisions of the Act.(Raymond Ltd. v. State of Chattisgarh (2007) 3 SCC 79 ; State of West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241 ) Thus, the provisions have to be read, to see whether there is any ambiguity, requiring any further aid for construction of those sections, or whether they are explicit and clear in their meaning.(The Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 (HL).)20. On a reading of the provisions of Chapter III, including Sections 8, 10 & 11 of the said Act, there is no ambiguity as would require any aid to construct the meaning of those Sections21. The commencement date would be the date from which the provisions would come into force. However, the amendment of 1972 created a deemed fiction by inserting the provision for setting at naught transactions that may have occurred on a prior date, i.e., from 26.9.1970. The result is that the transactions or transfers in this window of about five years would also be hit by the provisions of the said Act insofar as the determination of surplus land is concerned. The object was to prevent circumvention by dubious and indirect methods.(Gurdit Singh v State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 260 )This is the view also adopted by this Court in Gurdit Singh v. State of Punjab, but then this Court had gone on to observe that that was no reason why a construction should be put on the Section which its language could hardly bear. The legislation in question in Gurdit Singh v. State of Punjab was a similar one, The Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955. It would be difficult to accept and countenance a situation where, irrespective of limitations imposed in considering the past time period, any transaction could be so assailed. In the wisdom of the legislature, the window of five years is provided as sufficient for scrutinizing transactions which could be called dubious and indirect methods to evade the result of the said ActThus, once again, it is clearly stated that the lands transferred between the period 26.9.1970 and the commencement date (2.10.1975) is what is to be ignored in calculating the ceiling area22. The effect of the aforesaid provision is that any land, even if it is obtained by partition or other transfer, after the date of 26.9.1970 would be included for the purposes of calculation of surplus land, as land of the person who so transferred the same23. The legislature has also taken another caution. The second Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 10 also provides that documents evidencing such transfer even before 26.9.1970 would not be exempted if they are not registered on or before that date, or even if they are registered after that date, they are not presented for registration on or before that date. The requirement is for the transfer document to be, both executed and presented for registration before the cut-off date. Thus, the possibility of evading the land ceiling limits by creating documents on a back date and subsequently producing them for registration is obviated24. Section 11 specifically talks about the partition deed in a similar manner and, thus, not only transfers whether by way of sale, gift, mortgage with possession, exchange, lease, assignment of land for maintenance, surrender of a tenancy or resumption of land by a landlord or any other disposition, are included, even the avenue by way of a partition deed has been shut out, unless it has been executed prior to the cut-off date. There is no doubt that in the present case, the partition deed was executed before the cut-off date of 26.9.1970 and registered even prior to that date25. On behalf of the appellants, a number of judgments have been referred to, on how a deemed fiction should be construed. Thus, a legal fiction is to be limited for the purpose for which it is created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field Bengal Immunity Co Ltd. v. State of Bihar: (1955) 2 SCR 603 . There are a number of judgments referred to in the context of taxing statutes, but then the rules of interpretation of taxing statutes, to be construed strictly, would be different and there is no purpose in referring to these judicial pronouncements. In the context of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964, the issue of legal fiction was, once again, examined Mancheri Puthusseri Ahmed v. Kuthiravattam Estate Receiver (1996) 6 SCC 185 . The same proposition was, once again, reiterated while observing that a legal fiction is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created, and that it cannot be extended by importing another fiction. In the context of Section 4A of that Act, it was held to be circumscribed by express words – a mortgagee in possession was stated to be one who, for a continuous period of not less than 50 years immediately preceding the commencement of that Section held that capacity. The words immediately preceding the commencement were required to be given their ordinary and full meaning as reflecting the legislative intent and thus, only such type of cases where a mortgagee was in possession, immediately preceding the commencement of the Section, was extendable for a period of 50 years in the past alone. It was further observed as under:….However beneficial may be the scope and ambit of the legal fiction created by the legislature while enacting Section 4-A such fiction can arise only when the express language of the section laying down the conditions precedent for raising of such a fiction is complied with by the mortgagee-in-possession concerned seeking the benefit of such a deeming fiction. Such a fiction cannot be extended by the court on analogy or by addition or deleting words not contemplated by the legislature26. This judgment has found support in a subsequent judgment of this Court in Raj Kumar Johri v. State of M.P . (2002) 3 SCC 732 Thus, the aforesaid being the manner of interpreting a provision for deeming fiction, the relevant dates provided, of 26.9.1970 and 2.10.1975, giving a window of five years for the State to take action and prevent any dubious transaction during this period of time, cannot be expanded to an unlimited prior period of time27. This Court, in Uttar Chand v. State of Maharashtra, (1980) 2 SCC 292  while dealing with the very statute has opined that the cut-off date would be sacrosanct. The factual contours dealt with partition before the cut-off date, as also sale of land. Once the cut-off date is provided, it was observed that they fell completely outside the ambit of the provisions of the Act and, thus, the High Court would not be justified in presuming that the transfers made were either collusive or fraudulent28. The order passed by the competent authority, being the SDO, insofar as the two elder daughters are concerned, held in their favour as far as the lands vested in them, in pursuance of the Partition Deed. There was, thus, no occasion for them to file an appeal, nor did they so file an appeal. Other members of the family, who filed the appeal, did not implead them as parties. Once again, naturally so, as they would not be the interested parties, or even pro forma parties in that behalf. However, once the State decided to file cross-objections and, in that, impugned even that portion of the order of the SDO which held in favour of the two elder daughters, there is no hesitation in stating that they were necessary parties to those proceedings. It is no answer to say that since the effect of the land ceiling would be to restrict the area of their father, late Vithaldas, it is for Vithaldas to see how he can benefit his daughters. This fundamental defect cannot be cured in the subsequent proceedings, as the right of appeal is a statutory right and an important one. This aforesaid view is reinforced by a catena of judicial pronouncements. It has been held that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not contemplate filing of cross-objections against a party who is not a party to the appealRajendra Nath Chatterjee v. Moheshata Debi AIR 1926 Cal 533 . In case such objections have to be filed two distinct operations are necessary. He must implead the persons as parties qua whom he intends to file cross-objections then he must file the memorandum of cross-objections Venkatapathi v. Veerayya AIR (30) 1943 Madras 609 . The position would be no different qua a judicial or quasi-judicial authority as a party to be effected must get a right of hearing Udit Narayan Singh Malpharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar AIR 1963 SC 786 (WS) . Thus, unqualified imprimatur can be lent to this view29. Thus, for the aforesaid reason also the cross-objection could not have disturbed the status of the two elder daughters30. It has already been observed that non-impleadment of the two elder daughters would be fatal to the appellate proceedings. But, they are fatal for more than that reason. In fact, the view taken by both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench would equally fall foul of the legal treatise, enunciating the rights of an unmarried daughter. The view taken is that since these lands were given to minor unmarried daughters, they having no share in the HUF property, such grant is contrary to law at that point of time31. It may be noticed, of course, that the lis has been pending, and the current scenario is one where even daughters have been given rights in the ancestral/HUF property, in terms of the amendment made to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The State of Maharashtra, where the land is located was a step ahead inasmuch as vide Maharashtra Act 39 of 1994, which was brought into force on 22.6.1994, such rights were conferred on women by making them also a coparcener by birth. However, even on the date when the Partition Deed was executed, the legal position was not as has been enunciated36. The legal view, thus, is verya. A provision for marriage of unmarried daughters can be made out of ancestral propertyb. Such provision can be made before, at the time, or even after the marriagec. The provision is being made out of pious obligation, though the right of women got diluted over a period of time. However, with the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, in 2005, a specific right is now conferred on women to get a share on partition of ancestral property, including the right to claim partition. As mentioned above this change was brought about in Maharashtra in 1994, itself37. If the facts of the present case are averted to, the aforesaid is exactly what has been done under the Partition Deed. A provision was made for the marriage of the daughters. In fact, the provision is for education and marriage purposes. In the context of where the society is today, such an endeavour should be commended as salutary, rather than be frowned upon. It was sustainable in law then, and it is more than just merely sustainable in law now. Thus, there is no doubt that there was nothing prohibiting such a provision from being made. If the law permits so, it can hardly be called fraudulent. Thus, the very premise of allowing the cross-objection has no sustenance in law38. It may also be noticed the fact that the two elder daughters, whose rights have been debated actually, even attained majority before the commencement date, i.e., they were major unmarried daughters on the date when the amendments came into force. They were, thus, not included even in the family unit in terms of the definition contained under Section 4,The question of including the daughters would only arise if the document of partition deed was found to be fraudulent. Thus, for this reason also, the property cannot be included and clubbed with the land of late Vithaldas39. As observed above, the form of the document is not important in this behalf. Such provision can be made in a partition deed. It may be in the nature of a gift. So what? None of the members of the family have ever sought to assail or challenge the same. It is with the consensus of the family, apart from the legality of the sameIn a nutshell, the view is that too much importance should not be attached to the nomenclature of a document and one can look behind the façade of the document to decipher the true nature of the transaction40. The aforesaid enunciation of the law reflects the correct legal position. In the given facts of the case it is not in dispute that the Deed was a registered document. Thus, even if one construes it as a partition- cum-gift deed, it would make no difference as the requirements of a gift deed, under Sections 122 & 123 of the TP Act stand satisfied41. Legal position in the context of the facts of the present case, thus, show that even if the document is effectively a gift deed, and Hindu Law permits the making of a provision for the daughter for her marriage, the execution of a partition deed, which has the effect of such a gift would not nullify the effect of the deed. This is so as a provision made for the daughter out of the ancestral property would be in compliance of the pious obligation42. In the end, it may be noted that the only aspect on which the debate occurred was the share of the two elder daughters, and the right to retain the land as their separate land, without it being adjusted with the lands of late Vithaldas. The findings above, thus, lead to the conclusion that the view taken by the SDO vide order dated 7.5.1984, regarding the land of the two elder daughters, is the correct view, and the subsequent view by the appellate authority faulted on more than one reason, as mentioned aforesaid. The further imprimatur of that view by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, thus, also cannot be sustained