Case: Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress

Sabyasachi Mukherjee, C.J. 1. These civil appeals, special leave petitions and civil miscellaneous petitions deal with the question of constitutional validity of the right of the employer to terminate the services of permanent employees without holding any inquiry in certain circumstances by reasonable notice or pay in lieu of notice. The facts involved in these matters are diverse but the central question involved in all these is one, i.e. whether the clauses permitting the employers or the authorities concerned to terminate the employment of the employees by giving reasonable notice or pay in lieu of notice but without holding any inquiry, are constitutionally valid and, if not, what would be the consequences of termination by virtue of such clauses or powers, and further whether such powers and clauses could be so read with such conditions which would make such powers constitutionally and legally valid? In order to appreciate the question the factual matrix of these cases so far as these are relevant for the determination of the aforesaid questions, will have to be borne in mind in the light of the actual legal provisions involved in the respective cases. 2. It will, therefore, be proper and appropriate to deal with the relevant facts in civil appeal No. 2876 of 1986 first. The appellant herein-the Delhi Transport Corporation, is a statutory body formed and established Under Section 3 of the Delhi Road Transport Act, 1950 read with Delhi Road Transport (Amendment) Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the Act). The appellant carries out the objects of vital public utility, according to the appellant, i.e. transport of passengers in the Union Territory of Delhi and other areas. Respondent No. 2, Sri Ishwar Singh was appointed as conductor therein on probation for a period of 1 year in 1970. The probation period was extended thereafter for a further period of one year and thereafter he was regularised in service of the appellant. Similarly, respondent No. 3-Sri Ram Phal was appointed as Assistant Traffic Incharge and after the probation period he was regularised in service. Respondent No. 4-Sri Vir Bhan was appointed as driver and after completing the probation period he was also regularised in service. It is stated that respondents Nos. 2 to 4 became, according to the appellant, inefficient in their work and started inciting other staff members not to perform their duties. They were served with termination notices on 4th June, 1985 under Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment & Service) Regulations, 1952. On" 11th June, 1985 respondents Nos. 2 to 4 and their Union being respondent No. 1- DTC Mazdoor Congress, filed writ petition No. 1422/85 in Delhi High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Act. On 11th May, 1986 the division bench of the High Court of Delhi allowed the said writ petition and struck down Regulation 9(b) of the said Regulations, and directed the appellant to pay back respondents wages and benefits within 3 months from the date of the said judgment. This is an appeal, therefrom, by special leave. The question, therefore, is, was the High Court justified in the view it took? It may be mentioned that regulations 9(a) & (b) were framed in exercise of the powers conferred Under Section 5 3 of the said Act, which enables the formulation of Regulations. Regulation 9 of the said regulations, which is material for the present controversy, reads as follows: "9. Termination of service: (a) Except as otherwise specified in the appointment orders, the services of an employee of the authority may be terminated without any notice or pay in lieu of notice: (i) During the period of probation and without assigning any reason thereof. (ii) For misconduct, (iii) On the completion of specific period of appointment. (iv) In the case of employees engaged on contract for a specific period, on the expiration of such period in accordance with the terms of appointment. (b) Where the termination is made due to reduction of establishment or in circumstances other than those mentioned at (a) above, one month notice or pay in lieu thereof will be given to all categories of employees. (c) Where a regular/temporary employee wishes to resign from his post under the authority he shall give three/one months notice in writing or pay in lieu thereof to the Authority provided that in special cases, the General Manager may relax, at his discretion, the conditions regarding the period of notice of resignation or pay in lieu thereof." 3. The said Regulation, as set out hereinbefore, deals with termination of services. Four contingencies are contemplated vide clause (a) of Regulation 9, whereupon the services of employees may be terminated without any notice or pay in lieu thereof except as otherwise provided in the appointment order. Apart from these four contingencies where termination is made due to reduction of establishment or in circumstances other than those mentioned in clause (a) above, one months notice of pay in lieu thereof is required to be given to all categories of employees. therefore, except in the said four cases, if there is reduction of establishment or there is any termination uncovered by these four contingencies referred to in clause (a) the same shall be by giving one months notice or pay in lieu thereof to all categories of employees. Clause (c) postulates when a regular or temporary employee wishes to resign from his post under the authority then in such a situation one months notice in writing or pay in lieu thereof to the authority may be provided. 4. The High Court in the judgment under appeal noted that since the filing of this petition the notices issued by D.T.C. to its various employees have been withdrawn and all these persons have been reinstated, therefore, the court was not concerned with the validity of clause (a) of Regulation 9 but respondents Nos. 2 to 4 against whom action had been taken by the appellant by issuing notices of termination under Regulation 9(b) had not been reinstated and the court considered the validity of Regulation 9(b). It was held by the court that the said provision gave absolute, unbridled and arbitrary powers to the Management to terminate the services of any permanent or temporary employee. It was contended that such power was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. In support of this contention, reliance had been placed, on which the High Court also relied upon, on the decision of this Court in Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd, and Anr. v, Hindustan Steel Ltd. and Ors. (1985)ILLJ267SC . In that case, Standing Order 31 of M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd., a public sector undertaking, had prescribed for a detailed procedure for dealing with cases of misconduct; and for imposing major penalty, the employer had to draw up a chargesheet and give an opportunity to the delinquent workman to make his representation within 7 days. If the allegations were controverted, an enquiry had to be held by an officer to be nominated by the management and in such an enquiry reasonable opportunity of explaining and defending the alleged misconduct had to be given to the workman. Suspension of the delinquent workman pending enquiry was also permitted. At the end of the enquiry, if the charges were proved, and it was provisionally decided to impose any major penalty, the delinquent workman had to be afforded a further reasonable opportunity to represent why the penalty should not be imposed on him. Standing Order 32 provided for a special procedure in case a workman was convicted for a criminal offence in a court of law or where the General Manager was satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it was inexpedient or against the interests of security to continue to employ the workmen viz. the workman could be removed or dismissed from service without following the procedure laid down in Standing Order No. 31. There the appellant was an Assistant in the respondents undertaking, who was removed from service on the ground that it was no longer expedient to employ him. The management dispensed with the departmental enquiry, after looking into the secret report of one of their officers that the appellant therein had misbehaved with the wife of an employee and that a complaint in respect thereof had been lodged with the police. In the reference to the Industrial Tribunal, the Tribunal held that as the employer dispensed with the disciplinary enquiry in exercise of the power conferred by Standing Order 32, it could not be said that the dismissal was unjustified, and that if there were allegations of misconduct, the employer was quite competent to pass an order of removal from service without holding any enquiry in view of the provisions contained in Standing Order 32, and rejected the reference. There was an appeal to this Court. This Court held that the reasons for dispensing with the enquiry do not spell out what was the nature of the misconduct alleged to have been committed by the appellant and what prompted the General Manager to dispense with the enquiry. As there was no justification for dispensing with the enquiry, imposition of penalty of dismissal without the disciplinary enquiry as contemplated by Standing Order 31 was illegal and invalid. It was directed that the respondent should recall and cancel the order dated 24th August, 1970 removing the appellant from service, and reinstate him and on the same day the appellant was directed to tender resignation of his post which should be accepted by the respondent. The respondent should pay as and by way of back wages and future wages, a sum of Rs. 1.5 lakhs to the appellant within 2 months which should be spread over from year to year commencing from the date of removal from service. It was reiterated that where an order casts a stigma or affected livelihood, before making the order, principles of natural justice of a reasonable opportunity to present ones case and controvert the adverse evidence must have full play. Even under the Constitution which permits dispensing with the inquiry under Article 311(2) a safeguard is introduced that the concerned authority must specify reasons for its decision why it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. Standing Order 32 nowhere obligates the General Manager to record reasons for dispensing with the inquiry as prescribed by Standing Order 31. On the contrary, it was held that the language of Standing Order 32 enjoins a duty upon the General Manager to record reasons for his satisfaction why it was inexpedient or against the interest of the security of the State to continue to employ; the workman. Reasons for dispensing with the enquiry and reasons for not continuing to employ the workman, stand wholly apart from each other. This Court finally observed that it was time for the public sector undertaking to recast Standing Order, and to bring it in tune with the philosophy of the Constitution failing which the vires of the said Standing Order would have to be examined in an appropriate proceeding. 6. Reliance was also placed before this Honble Court on the decision of this Court in the case of West Bengal State Electricity Board and Ors. v. Desk Bandhu Ghosh and Ors. (1985)ILLJ373SC , where this Court was concerned with regulations 33 and 34 of the West Bengal State Electricity Board. The said regulations 33(1) and 34 were as follows: 33(1) Unless otherwise specified in the appointment order in any particular case, the services of a permanent employee of the Board may be terminated without notice- (i) on his attaining the age of retirement or by reason of a declaration by the competent medical authority that he is unfit for further service; or (ii) as a result of disciplinary action; (iii) if he remains absent from duty, on leave or otherwise, for a continuous period exceeding 2 years. 34, In case of a permanent employee, his services may be terminated by serving three months notice or on payment of salary for the corresponding period in lieu thereof." 7. The High Court had come to the conclusion in that case that Regulation 34 was arbitrary in nature and suffered from the vice of enabling discrimination. The High Court, therefore, struck down the first paragraph of Regulation 34 and as a consequence quashed the order terminating the services of the first respondent therein. It was contended before this court on appeal that the Regulation 34 did not offend Article 14 of the Constitution, that Sections 18-A and 19 of the Electricity Supply Act laid down sufficient guidelines for the exercise of the power under Regulation 34 and in any case the power to terminate the services of any permanent employee was vested in high ranking officials who might be expected to exercise the same in a reasonable way. This Court was unable to accept that argument. This Court was of the view that the regulation was totally arbitrary and conferred on the Board a power which was capable of vicious discrimination. This Court was of the view that it was naked hire and fire rule, the time for banishing which, according to this Court in the said decision, altogether from employer-employee relationship was fast approaching. It is only parallel, this Court was of the view, to the Henry VIII clause so familiar to administrative lawyers. 8. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in Moti Ram Deka v. North East Frontier Railway [1985] 5 SCR 683, where Rules 148(3) and 149(3) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code had been challenged on the ground that these Rules were contrary to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The challenge was upheld though no opinion was expressed on the question whether the rule offended Article 14 of the Constitution or not since then Article 14 has been interpreted in several decisions of this Court and conferment and exercise of arbitrary power on and by the State or its instrumentalities have been frowned upon and struck down by this Court as offending Article 14 of the Constitution. 9. Indeed, it was noted in S.S. Muley v. J.R.D. Tata [1979] 2 SLR 438 by this Court that, Justice Sawant, of Bombay High Court had considered at great length Regulation 48(a) of the Air India Employees Service Regulations which conferred similar power on the Corporation as Regulation 34 confers on the Board in the present case. The learned Judge therein (Sawant, J.) had struck down that Regulation Reliance had also been placed on another decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Manohar P. Kharkhar v. Raghuraj [1981] 2 LLJ 459. This Court found it difficult to accept the reasoning therein. In that view of the matter the appeal was dismissed. 10. Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision of this Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr. (1986)IILLJ171SC There the appellant-Corporation was a Government company incorporated under the Companies Act. The majority shares of the Corporation were held by the States of West Bengal and Assam. Article 51 of the Articles of Association of the Corporation conferred upon the President of India power to issue directions/instructions regarding affairs and conduct of the business of the Corporation or of the Directors thereof as also regarding exercise and performance of its functions pertaining to national security and public interest. Article 51-A of the said articles entitled the President to call for returns, accounts etc. of the Corporation. Articles 14, 15, 16, 17 and 37 conferred on the President power to appoint and remove Chairman and the Board of Directors of the Corporation. Articles 41 and 42 were regarding the Presidents control over the working of the Corporation. Article 47 provided for appointment of the auditors of the Corporation to be made by the Central Government on the advice of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India and the nature of control to be exercised by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in the matter of audit and accounts. Since another company namely the Rivers Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. was carrying on the same business as the Corporation was doing, a Scheme of Arrangement was entered into between the Corporation and that Company for dissolution of the latter and taking over of its business and liabilities by the former. The Scheme, inter alia, stipulated that the Corporation shall take as many of the existing staff or labour as were possible and that those who could not be taken over shall be paid by the transferor company all moneys due to them under the law and all legitimate and legal compensations payable to them either under Industrial Disputes Act or otherwise legally admissible and that such moneys shall be provided by the Government of India to the transferor Company who would pay these dues. The Calcutta High Court approved the Scheme. Each of the respondents therein were in the service of the said company. Their services were taken over by the Corporation after the High Courts sanction to the Scheme of Arrangement. While the respondent Ganguly therein was appointed as the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer and was later promoted as Manager (Finance), the respondent Sengupta was appointed as Chief Engineer (River Services) and was later promoted as General Manager (River Services). Their appointment letters were in stereotype forms under which the Corporation could without any previous notice terminate their services, if the Corporation was satisfied that the employee was unfit medically or if he was guilty of any insubordination, intemperance or other misconduct, or of any breach of any rules pertaining to this service or conduct or non-performance of his duties. The letters of appointment further stipulated that they would have been subject to the rules and regulations of Corporation. Rule 9(i) of the Corporations Service, Discipline and Appeal Rules of 1979 had provided that the services of permanent employee could be terminated on three months pay plus DA to the employee or on deduction of a like amount from his salary as the case might be in lieu of the notice. By confidential letter the respondent Ganguly was asked to reply within 24 hours to the allegations of negligence made against him. After having his representation and detailed reply, a notice Under Rule 9(i) was served on him terminating his services with immediate effect by paying three months pay. Similarly a charge-sheet was issued to the respondent Sengupta intimating that a disciplinary inquiry was proposed against him under the Rules and calling upon him to file his written statement of defence. Sengupta denied the charges made against him and asked for inspection of documents and copies of statements of witnesses mentioned in the said charge-sheet. But a notice was serviced on him Under Rule 9(i) terminating his services with immediate effect of paying three months salary. Both Ganguly and Sengupta filed Writ Petitions before High Court. A Division Bench of that Court allowed the same. The Corporation filed appeals before this Court. The main questions for determination therein were (i) whether the appellant-Corporation was an instrumentality of the State so as to be covered by Article 12 and 36 of the Constitution and (ii) whether an unconscionable term a contract of employment entered into with the Corporation was void Under Section 23 of the Contract Act and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and as such whether Rule 19(i) which formed part of the contract of employment between the Corporation and its employees to whom the said Rules applied, was void? This Court confirmed the judgment of the High Court with modification in the declaration made and dismissed the Corporations appeal to this Court. This Court held that the appellant was State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. This Court further held that an unconscionable bargain or contract is one which is irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable or the terms of which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the Court. This Court was of the view that the doctrine of distributive justice is another jurisprudential concept which has affected the law of contracts. According to that doctrine, distributive fairness and justice in the possession of wealth and property could be achieved not only by taxation and regulatory control of private and contractual transactions even though this might involve some sacrifice of individual liberty. This Court referred to articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution so far as the test of reasonableness was concerned. The test of reasonableness or fairness of a clause in a contract where there was inequality of bargaining power is another theory recognised in the sphere of law of contacts. It was reiterated in that decision that the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or a clause in the contract. Reference was made to the observations of Lord Diplock in A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay (formerly Instone) [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308 and that test was: "Whether the restrictions are both reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the promisee and commensurate with the benefits secured to the promised under the contract? For the purpose of this test all the provisions of the contract must be taken into consideration." 11. Justice Madon of this Court in the said decision found that this was in consonance with right and reason, intended to secure social and economic justice and conformed to the mandate of the equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution. It was further recognised that there might be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. The Court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances. The above principle would apply, this Court reiterated, where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties or where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not or where the weaker party is in a position in which he could obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them or where a man had no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however, unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable clause in that contract or form or rules might be. This Court, however, reiterated that this principle would not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This principle would not apply where both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction. The contracts of this type to which the principle formulated above applied were not contracts which were tainted with illegality but were contracts which contained terms which were so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the Court. In the vast majority of cases such contracts are entered into by the weaker party under pressure of circumstances, generally economic, which results in inequality of bargaining power. Such contracts will not fall within the four corners of the definition of "undue influence" given in Section 16(1) of the Contract Act, even though at times they are between parties one of whom holds a real or apparent authority over the other. Contracts in prescribed or standard forms or which embody a set of rules as part of the contract are entered into by the party with superior bargaining power with large number of persons or a group of persons, if they are unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable, are injurious to the public interest, should be adjudged void according to Justice Madon, Under Section 23 of the Contract Act on the ground of being opposed to public policy. Public policy, it was reiterated, is not the policy of any particular Government. It connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public interest. The principles governing public policy must be and are capable on proper occasion, of expansion or modification. If there is no head of public policy which covers a case, then the Court must in consonance with public conscience and in keeping with public goods and public interest declare such practice to be opposed to public policy. In any case which is not covered by authority, courts should be guided by the Preamble to the Constitution and the principles underlying the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles. Rule 9(i) can aptly be called the Henry VIII Clause" this Court opined therein. It confers an absolute, arbitrary and unguided power upon the Corporation to exercise that power. This Court was concerned with the "Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. Service Discipline and Appeal Rules" framed by the Corporation. The relevant provisions of the said Rule 9 relating to permanent employees therein were as follows: "9. Termination of employment for Acts other than misdemeanour- (i) The employment of a permanent employee shall be subject to termination on three months notice on either side. The notice shall be in writing on either side. The Company may pay the equivalent of three months basic pay and dearness allowances, if any, in lieu of notice or may deduct a like amount when the employee has failed to give due notice. (ii) The services of a permanent employee can be terminated on the grounds of "services no longer required in the interest of the Company" without assigning any reason. A permanent employee whose services are terminated under this clause shall be paid 15 days basic pay and dearness allowance for each completed year of continuous service in the Company as compensation. In addition he will be entitled to encashment of leave to his credit." This Court found that Rule 9(i) can be called the Henry VIII Clause. It confers an absolute, arbitrary and unguided power upon the Corporation. It does not even say who on behalf of the Corporation was to exercise that power. While the Rules provided for four different modes in which the services of a permanent employee could be terminated earlier than his attaining the age of superannuation, namely, Rules 9(i), 9(ii), 36(iv)(b) read with 38 and 37, Rule 9(i) is the only rule which does not state in what circumstances the power conferred by that rule is to be exercised. Thus even where the Corporation could proceed under a regular disciplinary inquiry, it is free to resort instead to Rule 9(i) in order to avoid the trouble of an inquiry. No opportunity of a hearing was at all intended to be afforded to the permanent employee whose service was being terminated in the exercise of that power. It violated audi alteram partem rule of natural justice also which was implicit in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is not covered by any of the situations which would justify the total exclusion of the audi alteram partem rule. The view that the Board of Directors would not exercise this power arbitrarily or capriciously as it consisted of responsible and highly placed persons ignored, it was held, the fact that however highly placed a person might be, he must necessarily possess human frailties and "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." It was, however, held that Rule 9(i) was also discriminatory for the Corporation was given power to discriminate between employee and employee. It was stated that it could back up one employee and apply to him Rule 9 (i). It could pick up another employee and apply to him Rule 9 (ii). It was further reiterated that the Corporation was a large organisation. The said Rules formed part of the contract of employment between the Corporation and its employees who were not workmen. These employees had no powerful Union to support them. They had no voice in the framing of the said Rules. They had no choice but to accept the said Rules as part of their contract of employment. There was gross disparity between the Corporation and its employees, whether they be workmen or officers. The Corporation could afford to dispense with the services of an officer and will find many others to take his place but an officer cannot afford to lose his job because if he does so, there are not many jobs waiting for him. It was, therefore, held that Clause 9(i) of the said regulation was against right and reasons and it was wholly unconscionable. It had been entered into between parties between whom there was gross inequality of bargaining power. Rule 9(i) was a term of the contract between the Corporation and all its officers, it was noted. It affected a large number of persons and it squarely fell within the principle stated earlier. The Government and its agencies and instrumentalities constitute the largest employer in the country. A clause such as Rule 9 (1) in & contract of employment, it was noted, affecting large sections of the public was harmful and injurious to the public interest for it tended to create a sense of insecurity in the minds of those to whom it applied and consequently against public good. Such a clause, therefore, was opposed to public policy and as such it is void Under Section 23 of the Contract Act, it was held. It was further held that it was not possible to accept the contention that this was a contract entered into by the Corporation like any other contract entered into by it in the course of its trading activities and the Court, therefore, ought not to interfere with it. The employees could not be equated with goods which could be bought and sold, nor could a contract of employment be equated with a mercantile transaction between two businessmen much less when the contract of employment was between a powerful employer and a weak employee. Although it was reiterated that the aforesaid Rule 9(i) was supported by mutuality inasmuch as it conferred an equal right upon both the parties but considering the unequal position of the Corporation and its employees, there was no real mutuality, this Court opined. It was reiterated that the Corporation being covered by Article 12, its actions must also be in accordance with the Directive Principles prescribed by Part IV of the Constitution. Reference may be made to paragraph 39 of the aforesaid decision where this Court noted that in the working of the Constitution, it was found that some of the provisions of the Constitution were not adequate for the needs of the country or for ushering in a Welfare State and the constituent body empowered in that behalf amended the Constitution several times. By the very first amendment made in the Constitution, namely, by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 clause (6) of Article 19 was amended with retrospective effect. Under this amendment , Sub-clause (g) of Article 19(1) which guarantees to all citizens the right to carry on occupation, trade or business, was not to prevent the State from making any law relating to the carrying on by the State, or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of citizens or otherwise. This amendment also validated the operation of all existing laws insofar as these had made similar provisions. Article 298 of the Constitution, as originally enacted, provided that the executive power of the Union and of each State was to extend, subject to any law made by the appropriate legislature, to the grant, sale, disposition or mortgage of any property held for the purposes of the Union or of such State as the case may be, and to the purchase or acquisition of property for those purposes respectively, and to the making of contracts, and it further provided that all property acquired for the purposes of the Union or of State was to vest in the Union or in such State, as the case might be. This Court referred to the decision of this Court in Sukhdev v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi (1975)ILLJ399SC , "the Governing power wherever located must be subject to the fundamental constitutional limitations." 12. The High Court in the judgment under appeal was unable to accept the plea of alternative remedy and allowed the Writ Petition and declared regulation 9(b) of the Regulations to be illegal and ultra vires and as a consequence thereof the orders terminating the services of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 were quashed and these respondents were deemed to be in the service of DTC and back wages and all other benefits by way of annual increments were directed to be paid. 13. Learned Solicitor General of India contended before us that in the facts and the circumstances of this case, there was sufficient guideline in the Regulation 9(b) and the power of termination, properly read, would not be arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It may be mentioned that under the general law of contract of employment, which was commonly known as the law of master and servant, which is not termed as law of employer and employee, whether the contract of service is for a fixed period or not, if it contained a provision for its termination by notice, it could be so terminated. If there was no provision for giving notice and the contract was not for a fixed period, the law implied an obligation to give a reasonable notice. Where no notice in the first case or no reasonable notice in the second case was given and the contract was wrongfully terminated, such wrongful termination would give rise to a claim for damages. In this connection, reference may be made to the observations of this Court in the five-judge bench decision in Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsi Ram Patel [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131. This is also the position at common law. See Chitty on Contract; 26th Edition Vol. II, p. 808 or 25th Edition Vol. II p. 712, paragraph 3490. In this connection, reliance may also be placed at paragraphs 607 and 608 of Volume No. 16, 4th Edition of Halsburys Law of England. 14. Under the Industrial Law, subject to the relevant statutory provision, the services of an employee could be terminated by reasonable notice. In such a case it was always open to the Industrial Tribunal to examine whether the power of termination by reasonable notice was exercised bona fide or mala fide. If, however, the industrial Court was satisfied that the order of discharge was punitive, that it was mala fide, or that it amounted to victimisation or unfair labour practice, the industrial court was competent to set aside the order and in proper cases, direct the reinstatement of the employee. Reference may also be made to the observations of this Court in Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd, v. Workmen and Anr. (1966)IILLJ602SC If, however, the exercise of such power was challenged on the ground of being colourable or mala fide or on account of victimisation or unfair labour practice, the employer must disclose to the Court the ground of his impugned action, so that the same may be tested judicially. See the observations of this Court in L. Michael and Anr. v. Johnston Pumps India Ltd. (1975)ILLJ262SC . 15. The relationship between a statutory corporation and its employees is normally governed by the relevant rules, regulations and standing orders. A statutory Corporation is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and its action is subject to judicial review in certain cases and certain circumstances. In the facts and circumstances of these cases, we have proceeded on that basis and we are of the opinion that it is the correct basis. The exercise of such power under regulations similar to the one impugned which has been upheld in various types of cases are instructive in their variety. It may be mentioned that the exercise of power under the very same Regulation 9(b) was upheld by the Court in a matter, wherein in an action by the employee of D.T.C., this Court in Delhi Transport Corporation Undertaking v. Balbir Saran Goel (1970)IILLJ20SC held that even if the employees of the respondent thought that he was a cantankerous man and it was not desirable to retain him in service it was open to them to terminate his services in terms of Regulation 9(b) and it was not necessary to dismiss by way of punishment for misconduct. 16. Reliance was placed on this decision by the High Court in the Judgment under appeal. The High Court in our opinion rightly pointed out, however, that the decision was on a different basis and could not be availed of in deciding controversy involved in the present determination. In Air India Corporation, Bombay v. V.A. Rebellow and Anr. (1972)ILLJ501SC , this Court dealing with the power of the Air India to terminate the services of a person who was alleged to have misbehaved with air hostesses, observed on page 616 of the report that the anxiety of the Legislature to effectively achieve the object of duly protecting the workmen against victimisation of unfair labour practice consistently with the preservation of the employers bona fide right to maintain discipline and efficiency in the industry for securing the maximum production in peaceful, harmonious atmosphere is obvious from the overall scheme of these sections. This Court on page 620 of the report observed that the record merely disclosed that the appellant had suspicion about the complainants suitability for the job in which he was employed and this led to loss of confidence in him with the result that his services were terminated under Regulation 48. Loss of confidence in such circumstances could not be considered to be mala fide, it was held. Similarly in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. P.S. Malvenkar and Ors. (1978)IILLJ168SC , where it was alleged that the services of an employee of Bombay Municipal Corporation were unsatisfactory, this Court held that the powers of dismissal after an inquiry and the powers of simpliciter termination are to distinct and independent powers and as far as possible neither should be construed so as to emasculate the other or to render it ineffective. One is the power to punish an employee for misconduct while the other is the power to terminate simpliciter the service of an employee without any other adverse consequence. 17. It may be mentioned that the case of civil servants is, however, governed by their special constitutional position which accords them status; the legal relationship (between the Government and its servants) is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties of state are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. See the observations of this Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India (1968)ILLJ576SC D-E. But even then the services of a temporary civil servant (although entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution) is subject to termination by notice. But beside the above, the government may find it necessary to terminate the services of a temporary servant if it is not satisfied with his conduct or his suitability for the job and/or his work. See the observations of this Court in Champak Lal Chiman Lal Shah v. The Union of India (1964)ILLJ752SC . The services of a temporary government servant, further, may be terminated on one months notice whenever the government thinks it necessary or expedient to do so for administrative reasons. It is impossible, this Court observed, to define before hand all the circumstances in which the discretion can be exercised. The discretion was necessarily left to the Government. See observations of this Court in Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of M. P. (1970)ILLJ367SC . 18. The aforesaid position of a government servant has been analysed in depth by the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (supra), where it was reiterated that the doctrine of pleasure is not a relic of the feudal ages or based upon any special prerogative of the Crown but is based on public interest and for the public good because it is as much in public interest and for public good that government servants who are inefficient, dishonest or corrupt or have become a security risk should not continue in service and that the protection afforded to them by the Acts and the Rules made under Article 309 and by Article 311 of the Constitution be not abused by them to the detriment of the public interest and public good. It was reiterated on page 190 of the report that if in a situation as envisaged in one of the three clauses of the second proviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 arises and the relevant clause is properly applied and the disciplinary inquiry dispensed with, the concerned government servant cannot be heard to complain that he is deprived of his livelihood. This Court reiterated that the livelihood of an individual is a matter of great concern to him and his family but his livelihood is a matter of his private interest where such livelihood is provided by the public exchequer and the taking away of such livelihood is in the public interest and for the public good, and the former must yield to the latter public policy, it was reiterated, requires, public interest needs and public good demands that there should be such a doctrine. It was further reiterated that the rules of natural justice are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adopted and modified by statutes and statutory rules and also by the Constitution of the Tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such Tribunal is governed. Not only, can the principles of natural justice be modified but in exceptional cases they can even be excluded. See the observations of this Court at page 237 G of the aforesaid report. Reference was also made to the observations of this Court at pages 214-215 of the aforesaid report. Thus, the Constitution Bench laid down that even where a government servant enjoys constitutional status there can be exclusion of inquiry in the cases prescribed for termination of employment. 19. It must, however, be borne in mind that in some recent cases this Court has taken the view that a regulation providing for the termination of the service of an employee of the public corporation by notice only or pay in lieu thereof is invalid under Article 14 of the Constitution. We have referred to the decisions of the Workmen of Hindustan Steels case (supra); West Bengal State Electricity Boards case (supra) and Central Inland Water Transport Corporations case (supra). Mr. Ashok Desai, learned Solicitor General of India submitted that the decisions in the West Bengal State Electricity Boards (supra) and Central Inland Water Transport Corporations case (supra) were incorrectly decided and the decision proceeded on the theory of unconscionable bargains and that termination by notice is against public policy. He, however, drew our attention to Gheru Lal Parekh v. Mahadeodas Maiya and Ors. [1959] Su. 2 SCR 406 where it was held that though theoretically it may be permissible to evolve a new head under exceptional circumstances in a changing world, it is advisable in the interest of stability of society not to make any attempt to discover new heads of avoidance of such clauses in these days. Furthermore, as stated above, learned Solicitor General submitted that in the ordinary law of contract termination of employment by reasonable notice on either side has never been regarded as unconscionable. therefore, the learned Solicitor General submitted that this part of the above judgments was erroneous and should be overruled. 20. It must, however, be noted that in a later judgment of this Court, which followed this line of reasoning, it was recognised that a public corporation requires protection from employees who are inefficient or those who lacked probity or even made faulty policy decisions. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in O.P. Bhandari v. I.T.D.C, and Ors. (1986)IILLJ509SC where this Court held that so far as some of the higher placed employees are concerned (described as gold collar employees) public sector undertakings may be exposed to irreversible damage on account of faulty policy decisions or on account of lack of efficiency or probity of such employees and its very existence might be endangered beyond recall. A public corporation may not be able to cut the dead wood and get rid of a managerial cadre employee in case he is considered to be wanting in performance or integrity. Reference may be made to page 343 paragraph 5 (supra) of the report. It may be mentioned that in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) at p. 707 of the said report, a similar rule was considered by seven learned Judges in the context of government servants in Railway. The majority judgment did not express opinion on the question of the Railway rule being bad on the ground of unguided and uncanalised power. In his judgment, Mr. Justice Das Gupta held that the rule gave no guidance and was, therefore, violative of Article 14. (See page 769 of the report). On this point Mr. Justice Shah, as the learned Chief Justice then was, in his judgment observed at page 799-800 of the aforesaid report: "In considering the validity of an order an assumption that the power may be exercised, mala fide and on that ground discrimination may be practised is wholly out of place. Because of the absence of specific directions in Rule 148 governing the exercise of authority conferred thereby, the power to terminate employment cannot be regarded as an arbitrary power exercisable at the sweet will of the authority, when having regard to the nature of the employment and the service to be rendered, the importance of the efficient functioning of the rail transport in the scheme of our public economy, and the status of the authority invested with the exercise of power would appropriately be exercised for the protection of public interest on grounds of administrative convenience. Power to exercise discretion is not necessarily to be assumed to be a power which will invalidate the conferment of power. Conferment of power has necessarily to be coupled with the duty to exercise it bona fide and for effectuating the purpose and policy underlying the rules which provide for the exercise of the power. If in the scheme of the rule, a clear policy relating to the circumstances in which the power is to be exercised is discernible, the conferment of power must be regarded as being made in furtherance of the scheme, and is not open to attack as infringing the equality clause. It may be remembered that the rules relating to termination of employment of temporary servants and those on probation, and even those relating to compulsory retirement generally do not lay down any specific directions governing the exercise of the powers conferred thereby. The reason is obvious: the appointing authority must in all these cases be left with discretion to determine employment having regard to the exigencies of the service, suitability of the employee for absorption or continuance in the cadre, and the larger interest of the public being served by retaining the public servant concerned in service." 21. Learned Solicitor General submitted that the question is whether it is the very existence of power which is bad or the exercise is bad in any specific case. It was submitted that the Court would be entitled to obtain guidance from the preamble, the policy and the purpose of the Act and the power conferred under it and to see that the power is exercised only for that purpose. It was submitted that even if a statute makes no clarification Court would ascertain if the statute laid down any principle or policy. In such a case, the statute will be upheld although a given exercise may be struck down in particular cases. See the observations of this Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tandolkar [1959]1SCR279 . The guidance in the statute for the exercise of discretion may be found from the preamble read in the light of surrounding circumstances or even from the policy or the purpose of the enactment or generally from the object sought to be achieved. See the observations of this Court in Jyoti Prasad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi [1962]2SCR125 . Even a term like public interest can be sufficient guidance in the matter of retirement of a government employee. See the observations of this Court in Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha and Anr. (1970)IILLJ284SC and such a provision can be read into a statute even when it is not otherwise expressly there. Learned Solicitor General draw our attention to the observations of this Court in N.C. Dalwadi v. State of Gujarat : [1987]3SCR640 . It is well settled and the learned Solicitor General made a point of it that the Court will sustain the presumption of constitutionality by considering matters of common knowledge and to assume every state of facts which can be conceived and can even read down the section, it was submitted, if it becomes necessary to uphold the validity of the provision. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Indore and Ors. v. Radhakrishan and Ors. [1979]118ITR534(SC) . 22. In the case of Olga Tellis and Ors. etc. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. [1985] Su. 2 SCR 51 this Court has held that considering the scheme of the act, a section which enabled the Commissioner to remove encroachment without notice must be read to mean that notice would be given unless circumstances are such that it is not reasonably practicable to give it. This Court further held that the discretion is to be exercised in a reasonable manner so as to comply with the constitutional mandate that the procedure accompanying the performance of a public act must be fair and reasonable. We must lean in favour of that interpretation because it helps to sustain the validity of the law. 23. Learned Solicitor General submitted that the appeal involved herein the power of Delhi Transport Corporation (a statutory corporation) regarding termination of service simpliciter under Regulation 9(b). These Regulations were framed as mentioned Under Section 5 3 of the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950. The said Act was replaced by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 but the regulations have been saved and even though in 1971 a new Corporation, viz. the Delhi Transport Corporation (the appellant), was constituted under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, the regulations have been continued. 24. The guidelines for the exercise of such power, according to the Solicitor General, could be found in the statutory provisions of the 1950 Act under which the regulations have been framed, the preamble; Sections 19 and 20 (equivalent to Sections 18 and 19 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950); Section 53 (equivalent to Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950); the context of Regulation 9(b) read with 9(a) and 15. Even for the exercise of this power, reasons could be recorded although they need not be communicated. This will ensure according to the Solicitor General, a check on the arbitrary exercise of power and effective judicial review in a given case. The present regulations are parallel, to but not identical with, the exceptions carved out under Article 311(2) proviso. It was submitted that even the power of termination simpliciter under Regulation 9(b) can only be exercised in circumstances other than those in Regulation 9(a), i.e., not where the foundation of the order is misconduct. The exercise of such power can only be for purposes germane and relevant to the statute. It was submitted by the learned Solicitor General that these would include several cases which have been held by Courts to give rise to termination simpliciter including where the employee shows such incompetence or unsuitability as to make his continuance in employment detrimental in the interest of the Corporation, where the continuance of the employee ii a grave security risk making his continuance detrimental in the interest of the Corporation, if there is a justifiable lack of confidence which makes it necessary in the interest of the Corporation to immediately terminate the services. These are illustrative and not exhaustive. 25. It was submitted by the learned Solicitor General that the above guidelines of recording reasons and confining action under Regulation 9(b) for purposes germane and relevant to the statute would prevent arbitrary action by the Corporation while enabling it to run its services efficiently and in public interest. Thus, there is no vice of arbitrariness in the regulation. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, cannot and should not be upheld according to the learned Solicitor General. 26. In civil Appeal No. 2876 of 1986, the learned Attorney General urged that the settled rule judicially evolved in matters of constitutional adjudication is that in order to sustain the constitutionality of legislation, the words of a statute may be qualified, its operation limited and conditions, limitations and obligations may be implied or read into the statute in order to make it conform to constitutional requirements. The underlying rationale, according to the learned Attorney General, of this rule of interpretation, or the doctrine of reading down of a statute is that when a legislature, whose powers are not unlimited, enacts a statute, it is aware of its limitations, and in the absence of express intention or clear language to the contrary, it must be presumed to have implied into the statute the requisite limitations and conditions to immunize it from the virus of unconstitutionality. From what the learned Attorney General submitted and what appears to be the correct that every legislature intends to act within its powers. therefore, in a limited Government, the legislature attempts to function within its limited powers. It would not, therefore, be expected to have intended to transgress its limits. In Re The Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act [1941] FCR 12, the question before the Federal Court was about the meaning of the word property in the Act. The Court limited the operation of the word property to property other than agricultural land because otherwise the Central Legislature would have had no competence to enact the statute. The Court observed at pages 26 and 27 of the Report as follows: "No doubt if the Act does affect agricultural land in the Governors Provinces, it was beyond the competence of the Legislature to enact it: and whether or not it does so much depend upon the meaning which is to be given to the word property in the Act. If that word necessarily and inevitably comprises all forms of property, including agricultural land, then clearly the Act went beyond the powers of the Legislature; but when a Legislature with limited and restricted powers makes use of a word of such wide and general import, the presumption must surely be that it is using it with reference to that kind of property with respect to which it is competent to legislate and to no other. The question is thus one of construction, and unless the Act is to be regarded as wholly meaningless and ineffective, the Court is bound to construe the word property as referring only to those forms of property with respect to which the Legislature which enacted the Act was competent to legislate; that is to say, the property other than agricultural land..." 27. See also the observations of Chief Justice Gwyer at pages 27 to 29 of the Report on how legislations of legislature with limited powers should be construed. See also the observations of this Court in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India [1957]1SCR930 . There Section 2(d) of Prize Competitions Act, 1955 defined prize competition as meaning any competition in which prizes are offered for the solution of any puzzle. As defined, the statute covered not only competition in which success depended on chance but also those which involved substantial degree of skill. It was conceded that the Act would be violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution if competitions which involved substantial degree of skill were included in the statutory definition. See the observations of this Court at p. 935 of the report. This Court rejected the argument of the petitioners therein that since the language of the definition of prize competition was wide and unqualified, it was not open to the Court to read into it a limitation which was not there. This principle was reiterated and applied by this Court in the case of Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar [1962] Su. (2) SCR 769. The question before this Court was about the validity of Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code. This Court in order to sustain the validity of the section on the touch-stone of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, limited its application only to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder, or disturbance of law and order, or incitement to violence. This Court held that it was well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the Constitution, and Anr. interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. The provisions of the sections read as a whole, along with the explanations, make it reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence. 28. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1964]6SCR784 where the question was about the Constitutionality of Section 41(aa) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962. This Court upheld the validity of the section following the principle of interpreting the said rule in a way which would be consistent with the Constitution. See the observations of this Court at p. 797 of the said report. 29. The technique of reading down has been adopted in numerous cases to sustain the validity of the provision. For example, in Jagdish Pandey v. The Chancellor, University of Bihar and Anr. [1968]1SCR231 , this Court made resort to Section 4 of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1962. It was observed that Section 4 so read literally it did appear to give uncanalised powers to the Chancellor to do what he liked on the recommendation of the Commission with respect to teachers covered by it. But this Court was of the opinion that the legislature did not intend to give such an arbitrary power to the Chancellor and was of the opinion that Section 4 should be read down and if it is read down, there was no reason to hold that the legislature was conferring a naked arbitrary power on the Chancellor and that power cannot be struck down as discriminatory under Article 14 of the Constitution. See the observations of this Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and Ors. 1978CriLJ1741 . There the constitutionality of Section 30, Sub-section (2) and Section 56 of the Prisons Act, 1894 was in question. Krishna Iyer, J, speaking for this Court at p. 511, para 34, of the report observed that the Court does not rush in to demolish provisions where judicial endeavour, amelioratively interpretational, may achieve both constitutionality and compassionate resurrection. This salutary strategy, the learned Judge observed, of sustaining the validity of the law and softening its application was of lovely dexterity. The semantic technique of updating the living sense of a dated legislation is, in our view, perfectly legitimate. Semantic readjustments are necessary to obviate allegorical sequel and a validation-oriented approach becomes the philosophy of statutory construction sometimes. Similar observations were made in N.C. Dalwadi State of Gujarat, (supra). In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd, v. State of Assam and Ors. AIR1990SC123 , this Court upheld the validity of sections 9 and 10 of the Act by reading in several matters by necessary implication in order to sustain the validity of the sections. In Charan Lal Sahu and Ors. v. Union of India [1989] Su. SCALE 1, paras 101 as well as p. 61, para 114, it was observed that this principle of reading down has been adopted in U.S. Supreme Court in several cases. See also United States of America v. Edward A. Rumely, 97 L E 770. The principle as enunciated in Rumelys case (supra) has been approved by this Court in Shah & Co. v. State of Maharashtra [1967]3SCR466 . This principle of reading down or placing limited construction has been adopted by courts in England in deciding the validity of bye-laws and regulations. See Reg. v. Sadlers Co. 10 H.L.C. 404 and Faramus v. Film Artists Association 1962 QB 527. The courts must iron out the creases, as said Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates [1949] 2 KB 481. This Court has also on numerous occasions followed this practice. See the observations of this Court in M. Pentiah and Ors. v. Veera-Mallappa and Ors. [1961]2SCR295 ; Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board etc. v. A. Rajappa and Ors. (1978)ILLJ349SC . See also H.M. Seervais Constitutional Law of India, 3rd Edn. Vol. I, pages 119-120. In the background of this, the learned Attorney General also drew our attention that the present regulation, as mentioned herein before, should be read and construed in the said manner and the reasons and conditions of its exercise can be spelt out and it may be so construed. He submitted that it should be spelt out that the regulation requires reasons to be there, reasons which are germane and relevant, 30. The principles of natural justice or holding of an enquiry is neither a universal principle of justice nor inflexible dogma. The principles of natural justice are not incapable of exclusion in a given situation. For example, Article 311(2) of the Constitution which essentially embodies the concept of natural justice, itself contemplates that there may be situations which warrant or permit the non-applicability of the principles underlying Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the second proviso to Article 311 of the Constitution. This court has also recognised that the rule of audi alteram partem can be excluded where having regard to the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provision, fairness in action does not demand its application and even warrants its exclusion. If importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands, natural justice could be avoided. See the observations of this Court in Maneka Gandhis case at p. 681 of the report (supra). This Court in Tulsi Ram Patels case (supra) had in terms ruled that not only, therefore, can the principles of natural justice be modified but in exceptional cases they can even be excluded. But the principles of natural justice must not be displaced save in exceptional cases. Consequently, the learned Attorney General submitted that the words "where it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry" may be imported into the regulations. It was submitted by the learned Attorney General that the exclusion of audi alteram partem rule in circumstances which are circumscribed and coupled with the safeguard of recording of reasons which are germane and relevant, the termination in such a situation would not render the regulation unreasonable or arbitrary. Then it could not be said that the power was uncanalised or unguided if the regulation is construed and read down in the manner indicated above, according to the learned Attorney General. The reading down, the learned Attorney General conceded cannot, however, be done where there was no valid reason and where it would be contrary to proclaimed purpose. See the observations of this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [1981]1SCR206 . 31. On behalf of the workmen of the respondent DTC, Shri Ramamurthi, submitted that the Constitutional questions of great public importance arising in the present appeal, have to be examined in the light of the law laid down by the Full Court in the case of R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [1970]3SCR530 and by larger Constitution Benches in the cases of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (supra), Moti Ram Deka v. Union of India (supra), State of West Bengal v. Union of India, (supra) and the Constitution Bench decisions in the cases of Olga Tellis and Ors v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. (supra), Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) Sindri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [1981] 2 SCR, Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel and Ors. (supra), Sukhdev Singh and Ors. v. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and Anr. (supra) and Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors. etc. (1981)ILLJ103SC . According to Shri Ramamurthi these decisions are authority for the following propositions: (a) The declarations in the provisions contained in the Fundamental Rights Chapter involve an obligation imposed not merely upon the "State" but upon all persons to respect the rights declared, unless the context indicates otherwise, against every person or agency seeking to infringe them. See the observations of this Court in State of West Bengal v. Union of India [1964]1SCR371 : (b) Part III of the Constitution weaves a pattern of guarantee on the texture of basic human rights. The guarantees delimit the protection of those rights in their allotted field. They do not attempt to enunciate distinct right. [See R.C. Coopers case (supra) [at p. 577 of the report]. The extent of protection against impairment of a fundamental right is determined not by the object of the Legislature nor by the form of the action, but by its direct operation upon the individuals rights. (c) Any person who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life, conferred by Article 21. See the observations of this Court in Olga Telliss case (supra) [at 80-81 and 85 of the report. therefore, the holding to the contrary in A.V. Nachane and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. (1982)ILLJ110SC is no longer good law. 32. In any event Counsel is right that the observations made at p. 259 of the report (supra) were in a different context and the challenge based on Articles 19(1)(g) and 31 does not appear to have any substance in resolving the present controversy before us. Mr. Ramamurthi submitted that provision of any Rule that service shall be liable to termination on notice for the period prescribed therein contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution as arbitrary and uncontrolled power is left in the authority to select at its will any person against whom action will be taken. See the observations of this Court in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) at p. 770 and 751 of the report. 33. It was submitted that Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution are inter-related and the law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and even if there is a law providing a procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty (this will equally apply to life) and there is, consequently, no infringement of fundamental right conferred by Article 21, such law in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of the Article. See the observations of this Court in Maneka Gandhis case (supra). Article 19(1)(g), it was urged, confers a broad and general right which is available to all persons to do work of any particular kind and of their choice. See the observations in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Unions case (supra) at p. 60-61 of the report. 34. According to Mr. Ramamurthi, there is a distinction between Public Employment or service and "pure master and servant cases", He referred to the observations of this Court in India Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Bhavanipore and Ors. [1975] 2 SCR 619; followed in A.L. Kalra v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., (1984)IILLJ186SC ; Whenever, therefore, according to Shri Ramamurthi, there is arbitrariness in State Action whether it be of the Legislature or of the Executive or of an authority under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action. In fact, the concept of reasonableness and non/arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the Constitution. See the observations of this Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors. [1984] 2 SCR 79. A violation of a principle of natural justice by State action is a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, which can be excluded only in exceptional circumstances. See "the observations of this Court in Tulsi Ram Patels case (supra) at 229, and at 233 of the report. 35. It was, therefore, submitted that a clause authorising the employer to terminate the services of an employee whose contract of service is for an indefinite period or till the age of retirement, by serving notice violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution for Article 21 is violated when right to livelihood is taken away by termination of service of a person; employed for an indefinite period or till the age of retirement except for proved misconduct. Assuming, it was argued, that in such a case right to livelihood can be taken away by termination of service by giving notice, nonetheless it could be validly done only, according to Shri Ramamurthi, if: (i) There is a fair and just procedure by way of-(1) recording of reasons and (2) notice to show cause; (ii) And the right to terminate is restricted to exceptional grounds. 36. When the service of a person employed for an indefinite period or till the age of retirement is terminated, Shri Ramamurthi assets, then Article 14 is violated when there is no guidance for the exercise of power and reasons are not required to be recorded and principles of natural justice are abrogated. Similarly Article 19(1)(g) is violated, according to him, for the reasons that there is no guidance, no requirement of reasons to be recorded and there is violation of the principles of natural justice. 37. Shri Ramamurthi reminded us that before India became independent in 1947, the Indian Contract Act 1872 was applicable only to British India on its own force. By Merged State Laws Act, 1949 it was extended to the new provinces and merged States to the States of Manipur, Tripura by Vindhya Pradesh by Union territories Law Act 1950. It was also extended to the States merged in the States of Bombay and Punjab by Bombay Act 4 of 1950 and Punjab Act 5 of 1950. With the promulgation of the Constitution, the Indian Contract Act 1872 extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Shi Ramamurthi asserted the whatever might have been the position in regard to the provinces comprised in British India before independence, as far as other areas, forming part of the Union of India under the Constitution are concerned, only the Indian Contract Act 1872 is applicable. By Article 372 of the Constitution, this Act has been continued in operation even after the Constitution came into force subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. 38. A contract of service, according to Shri Ramamurthi is a species of contract and will, therefore, be governed by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act 1872. This Act has been held to be an Amending as well as a Consolidating Act. therefore, there can be no question of common law of England, as made applicable in India during the British Rule, being the basis for deciding any question relating to contract of employment after 1950. In any event any provisions of either the Indian Contract Act, 1872, or of the English Common Law Applicable in British India before the Constitution came into force would be void by reason of Article 13 of the Constitution if it infringed any of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution, pleaded Mr. Ramamurthi before us. Under Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 an agreement (including an agreement of service) becomes a contract only when it is enforceable by law. If it is not enforceable in law, it would be void by reason of Section 2(g) of the Contract Act. The question for consideration would, therefore, be whether a clause in an agreement of service when it is for an indefinite period or till the age of retirement providing for termination by giving notice would be enforceable? It was submitted by the workers union that it would not be enforceable if it violates the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. See the observations of this Court in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) at 709 of the Report. It was submitted that the broader submission was that under our Constitution there can be no contract of employment providing for termination of service by an employer of an employee by giving notice, when the employment is for indefinite period or till the age of retirement. In any event, such a clause cannot find a place either in the contract of service or in the statutory provisions governing the conditions of service in the case of public employment under the state as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution. 39. Shri Ramamurthi urged that the observations contained in the judgment of this Court in Tulsiram Patels case (supra) at 166 of the report, regarding the ordinary law of master and servant cannot be construed as laying down the proposition that under the Indian law, even if a contract of service is for an indefinite period or till the age of retirement, it can still be terminated by giving reasonable period of notice. In any event, even in the Common Law of England, a distinction is made between public employment and "pure master and servant cases" [See the observations of this Court in Sukhdev Singhs case (supra) at page 657 of the report. 40. Mr. Ramamurthi submitted that the doctrine of pleasure advanced by the learned Solicitor General of India was confined to employment under the Union of India and States dealt with under Part XIV, Chapter I of the Constitution and cannot and do not extend to employment under local or other authorities referred to under Article 12 of the Constitution. There cannot be any pleasure by such authority in respect of employment of the permanent employee. It was submitted by Shri Ramamurthi further that even in cases of employment under the Union and the States, the pleasure doctrine is limited by the express provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. For that reason, according to him, it has lost some of its majesty and power. He referred us to the observations of this Court in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) at p. 704 and Tulsi Ram Patelss case (supra) at page 196. 41. In dealing with the question of validity of rules authorising the Government to terminate the services of temporary servants as upheld by this court in Champaklal Chimanlal Shahs case (supra) and Ram Gopal Chaturvedis case (supra) it was submitted that it is important to note that the validity of the rules was challenged on the ground of denial of equality of opportunity in employment under the State guaranteed by Article 16 of the Constitution. In that context this Court observed at p. 201 (supra) of the report that there can also be no doubt, if such a class of temporary servants could be recruited, there could be nothing discriminatory or violative of equal opportunity if the conditions of service of such servants are different from those of permanent employees. It is thus apparent that this Court, it was submitted, had no occasion to consider the reasonableness of a provision for termination of service on giving notice under Article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, this decision can be of no assistance to the appellants. Shri Ramamurthi submitted that since, audi alteram partem is a requirement of Article 14, in view of recent decisions of this Court, and conferment of arbitrary power itself is contrary to Article 14, the rule in question can, according to Shri Ramamurthi, no larger be sustained as valid. 42. As far as the decision in Ram Gopal Chaturvedis case (supra) was concerned, Shri Ramamurthi submitted that the reasons given for rejecting the argument that the rule confers an arbitrary and unguided power are not valid for in Moti Ram Deka case (supra), where the view of two learned judges of this Court who had held similar power to be arbitrary had not ever been noticed. The observation that it is impossible to define before hand all the circumstances in which the discretion can be exercised and the discretion had necessarily to be left to the Government, has not taken into consideration the circumstance that the denial of audi alteram partem which is a requirement of Article 14, can be only in exceptional circumstances and, therefore, such circumstances have necessarily to be spelt out. This Court had no occasion, according to Shri Ramamurthi, to consider the cumulative impact of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. 43. Shri Ramamurthi sought to urge before us that industrial law recognises the right of the employer to exercise, bona fide, the power to terminate the services of workman by giving notice, except in case of misconduct, which is unlike the law of master and servant. Shri Ramamurthi urged that it is important to note that in all cases under industrial law, decisions have been rendered by industrial tribunal when disputes had been raised by workmen challenging the action of the employer terminating their services by giving notice, under the terms of the contract of service or the Certified Standing Orders. The question was never raised, nor could it be raised, before the Tribunals that the very term in the contract of service or in Standing Orders would have to stand the test of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. Further a Constitution bench of this Court had rejected the contention that Industrial Tribunals should make a distinction between public sector and private sector industries. Reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. v. The Workmen and Ors. [1987] 1 SCR 652. On the consideration of the relevant material placed before us, we are asked to come to the conclusion that the same principles evolved by industrial adjudication in regard to private sector undertakings will govern those in the public sector undertakings having a distinct corporate existence. therefore, all the decisions referred to by the appellant, it was argued, and interveners, were all concerned with applying the industrial law even though some of them dealt with employees, working in statutory corporations or public sector undertakings. It was, therefore, submitted by Shri Ramamurthi that these decisions could afford no assistance to the Court, in deciding the issues raised in the present case, where the validity of a term of employment, permitting the employer to terminate the services of a permanent employee by simply giving notice, is challenged on the ground that such a term violates fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. It was submitted further that the constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution are for all persons and there can be no basis for making a distinction between workmen to whom the Industrial Disputes Act and other industrial laws apply and those who are outside their purview. The laws applicable to the former can only add to and not detract from the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. 44. It was important to note that all the decisions so far rendered by this Court striking down rules and regulations or a provision in the contract of service, authorising termination of service of permanent employees by giving notice relate to cases of non-workman and we were referred to the decisions in West Bengal State Electricity Boards case (supra), Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd.s case (supra) and O.P.Bhandaris case (supra). There is the theory that possibility of abuse of power is no ground for striking down the law. Attention may be drawn to the observations of this Court in The Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty [1962] 3 SCR 786 and Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Radhakrishan and Ors. (supra). However, these decisions, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents, would have no relevance for the present case because the power to terminate the services of a person employed to serve indefinitely or till the age of retirement can be exercised only in cases of proved misconduct or exceptional circumstances having regard to the Constitutional guarantee available under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. Unless the exceptional circumstances are spelt out the power to terminate the services would cover both permissible and impermissible grounds rendering it wholly invalid, it was urged. This was particularly so because the requirement of audi alteram partem which is a part of the guarantee of Article 14 is sought to be excluded. There can be no guidance available in the body of the law itself because the purpose for which an undertaking is established and the provisions dealing with the same in the law can provide no guidance regarding exceptional circumstances under which alone the power can be exercised. The question involved, Shri Ramamurthi emphasised, in these cases is not the exercise of power which an employer possesses to terminate the services of his employee but the extent of that power. 45. Shri Ramamurthi drew our attention to the award and referred to paragraph 5.6 of the Shastri Award and other provisions of the award defining misconduct and also paragraph 522 of the Award dealing with the procedure for termination of employment and 523 onwards. Mr. Ramamurthi further submitted that provisions of Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952 cannot be rendered constitutional by reading the requirement of recording reasons and confining it to cases where it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry and reading it down further as being applicable to only exceptional cases would not be permissible construction and proper. 46. Shri Ramamurthi drew our attention to the true scope of Regulation 9(b) of the aforesaid Regulations in the light of the judgment of this Court in Balbir Saran Goels case (supra). This rule, it has to be borne in mind, according to him, has been interpreted as applicable to all cases of termination including termination for misconduct as defined in the Standing Orders. In the aforesaid decision, at p. 761 of the report, this Court observed that: "Regulation 9(b) clearly provides for termination of services in two modes: the first is where the services may be terminated without any notice or pay in lieu of notice. This can be done among other reasons for misconduct. The second mode is of terminating the services owning to reduction of establishment or in circumstances other than those mentioned in clause (a) which relate to termination without notice. When termination is made under clause (b) one months notice or pay in lieu thereof is to be given to the employee. Thus it is clear that if the employer chooses to terminate the services in accordance with clause (b) after giving one months notice or pay in lieu thereof it cannot amount to termination of service for misconduct within the meaning of clause (a). It is only when some punishment is inflicted of the nature specified in Regulation 15 for misconduct that the procedure laid down therein for an enquiry etc. becomes applicable." 47. If this was the true scope of the Regulation, Shri Ramamurthi contended, then it was obvious that it leaves the choice entirely to the DTC Management either to proceed against the person for misconduct by holding an enquiry or for the same misconduct terminate his services by giving one months notice. It is the conferment of such a power that has been held to be unguided and arbitrary in all decisions from Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) to the more recent decisions of this Court such as West Bengal Electricity Boards case (supra), etc. therefore, it was submitted that the argument based on the assumption that Regulation 9(b) was confined to cases under than misconduct really overlooked the interpretation placed upon this Regulation by this Court. 48. Shri Ramamurthi further submitted that if regulation 9(b) confers this arbitrary power of leaving it to the DTC management to pick and choose then it is plain that there is nothing in the provisions of the Act or the regulations from which the DTC management can find any guidance. It was, therefore, the submission of the respondents that in order to conform to the Constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court, the first and foremost the regulation will have to make a distinction between cases where services are sought to be terminated for misconduct and cases of termination on grounds other than what would constitute misconduct. As far as termination or dismissal on ground of misconduct is concerned, ordinarily the detailed procedure for establishing misconduct had to be followed. In cases where it is not possible to follow the detailed procedure, then at least the minimum procedure of issuing a show cause notice should be followed after recording reasons why it is not practicable to hold a full-fledged enquiry. In cases where even this requirement of the elementary principles of natural justice is not to be followed, then the regulation must itself indicate those cases in which principles of natural justice can be totally abrogated after recording reasons. 49. As far as termination of service of a permanent employee on grounds which do not constitute misconduct is concerned, assuming that this is held to be permissible, it can be only in very exceptional cases and that too after observing at least the elementary principle of natural justice of asking for explanation before terminating the services and also recording reasons. Shri Ramamurthi urged that to read all this into the regulations would literally mean re-writing the regulations which is not permissible under any of the decisions or the law. 50. As one of the cases cover termination under The Punjab civil Services Rules, 1952, Shri Ramamurthi drew our attention to some of the provisions of these rules. He drew our attention to Rule 3 .12 which provides that unless in any case it be otherwise provided in those rules, a Government employee on substantive appointment to any permanent post acquired a lien on that post and ceased to hold any lien previously acquired on any other post. He also drew our attention to Rule 3 .15(a) which provided that except as provided in clause (b) and (c) of that rule and in note Under Rule 3 .13, a Government employees lien on a post may, in no circumstances, be terminated, even with his consent, if the result would be to leave him without a lien or a suspended lien upon a permanent post. Clause (b) of Rule 3 .15 provided that notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 3 .14(a), the lien of a Government employee holding substantively a permanent post shall be terminated while on refused leave granted after the date of compulsory retirement Under Rule 6 .21; or on his appointment substantively to the post of Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department. And clause (c) of this rule provided that a Government employees lien on a permanent post, shall stand terminated on his acquiring a lien on a permanent post (whether under the Central Government or a State Government) outside the cadre on which he is borne. Note Under Rule 3 .13 speaks about a Government employee holding substantially the post of a Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department, taking leave immediately on vacating his post he then shall during the leave be left without a lien on any permanent post. The expression vacate used in the note refers only to vacation as a result of completion of tenure of attainment of superannuation. 51. Mr. R.K. Garg, appearing for the respondents in C.A. No. 4073 of 1986 stated that the Attorney General had rightly pointed out that employees services were terminated under Para 522 of the Shastri Award merely because he had failed to mention a loan of Rs. 1.5 lakhs taken from another Branch of the Bank. Mr. Garg pointed out that the loan had been repaid. The failure to mention this loan had deprived the appellant of his livelihood. The use of this power claimed under Para 522 of the Shastri Award was not defended by the Attorney General in this case. We had fairly conceded that he might not support this termination when the case is heard on merits. But, that does not derogate from the wide amplitude of this uncontrolled, arbitrary power claimed by the management under Para 522 of the Shastri Award. Powers claimed under Para 522 must, therefore, be examined in the background of the facts and circumstances of this Appeal. It was submitted that this Court must hold that nothing in Para 522 of the Shastri Award confers on the management power so far as they can get rid of permanent employees of the Banks merely after service of notice on the imaginary belief that they were doing so for "efficient Management" of the Banks. Mr. Garg reminded us that it is common knowledge that all despots act as tyrants in the firm belief that the intolerable indignities and atrocities they inflict, were necessary in public interest and to save the Society. Mr. Garg submitted that the rule of law cannot be preserved if absolute, uncontrolled powers are tolerated and fundamental rights or Directive Principles are allowed to be reduced to a "dead letter". 52. Mr. Garg urged that the fundamental requirements of natural justice are not dispensable luxury. The express language of Para 522 of the Shastri Award is totally destructive of this requirement. 53. The express language as mentioned hereinbefore of Para 522 of the Shastri Award provides: "(1) In cases not involving disciplinary action for misconduct and subject to clause (6) below. The employment of a permanent employee may be terminated by three months notice or on payment of three months pay and allowances in lieu of notice. The services of a probationer may be terminated by one months notice or on payment of a months pay and allowances in lieu of notice." Rule 148(3) reads: "(3) Other (non-pensionable) railway servants shall be liable to termination on notice on either side for the periods shown below. Such notice is not, however, required in cases of dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the provisions of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, and termination of service due to mental or physical incapacity. Note: The appointing authorities are empowered to reduce or waive, at their discretion, the stipulated period of notice to be given by an employee, but the reason justifying their action should be recorded." Rule 148(4) reads: "In lieu of the notice prescribed in this rule, it shall be permissible on the part of the Railway Administration to terminate the service of a railway servant by paying him the pay for the period of notice." Rule 149(3) reads: "Other railway servants: The services of other railway servants shall be liable to termination on notice on either side for the periods shown below. Such notice is not however, required in cases of dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the provisions of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, and termination of service due to mental or physical incapacity." 54. It was urged by Mr. Garg that the services of a permanent bank employee cannot be terminated without charge of misconduct and without an enquiry and the aforesaid paragraph gives no indication as to on what conditions this arbitrary uncontrolled power can be used to get rid of one or more permanent employees for "efficient management of Banks" on subjective opinions or suspicion not tested in enquiry into facts. It was further urged that this provision provides for "insecurity of tenure" for lakhs of permanent employees, Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and the integrated protection of these Fundamental Rights excludes the "doctrine of pleasure" and insists on security of tenure "during good behaviour". The right to livelihood cannot be rendered precarious or reduced to a glorious uncertainty", it was urged by Mr. Garg. Mr. Garg submitted that the right to "hire and fire" was the prerogative claimed by the employer in the days of uncontrolled "laissez faire." This was the "doctrine of pleasure of the Crown" in case of Government servants, who held office during the pleasure of the King who had absolute powers over his subjects. Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 secure the rights of the citizen and act as limits on the powers of the "State" in Democratic Republic of India. Unjust, arbitrary, uncontrolled power of "premature" termination of services of permanent employees should not be tolerated according to Mr. Garg by the Constitution of free India. 55. In case of Government servants, Articles 311(1) and 311(2) of the Constitution expressly restrict the "doctrine of pleasure" contained in Article 310. Article 14 also insists on natural justice as was provided in Article 311(2), in order to prevent arbitrary use of power of termination. Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 read together require just, fair and reasonable procedure for termination of services for good cause. Without these safeguards, employees are reduced to the status of slaves of their masters. Employers are no longer masters as in the days of slavery of feudal relations, Mr. Garg tried to emphasise. He submitted that Article 14 of the Constitution did not permit permanent railway employees to be exposed to termination of their services on notice without charge of misconduct or a reasonable opportunity to answer the charge. Rules 148 and 149 of the Railway Establishment Code which have been set only hereinbefore have the same effect, as is the effect of para 522 of the Shastry Award, and both these Rules were declared unconstitutional in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) by a seven-Judges Bench, according to Mr. Garg. 56. Rules 148 and 149 were found violative of Article 14 for two reasons, it was submitted: (i) Railway servants in the matter of termination of service could not form a separate Class from other Government servants (As per majority view, in the Judgment of Justice Gajendragadkar, in Mati Ram Dekas case (1964)IILLJ467SC . (ii) Rule 148 conferred unguided, uncontrolled power of termination and, therefore, was hit by Article 14. (As per Justice Subba Rao and Justice Das Gupta, in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra). 57. Mr. Garg sought to urge that this binding decision of seven Judges Bench in Moti Ram Dekas (supra) was applied in Gurdev Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab and Anr. (1965)ILLJ323SC by the Constitution Bench of five Judges to strike down a Service Rule which permitted compulsory retirement on completion of 10 years Services on the ground of inefficiency etc. This Court held that Compulsory retirement could not be tolerated even after 10 years of service in view of such retirement being not based on relevant considerations, including expected longevity of life of the employees in India. If the power of removal by way of compulsory retirement even after ten years was held unconstitutional in Gurdev Singhs case (supra) para 522 of the Shastri Award was far more arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable , it was urged before us. 58. It was reiterated before us that in view of the binding decision of seven Judges in Moti Ram Dekas Case and its application by five Judges in Case of compulsory retirement after 10 years in Gurdev Singhs Case (supra), it is not open to the employees to submit that similar powers claimed under paragraph 522 of the Shastri Award, even without 10 years service for removal without charge of misconduct and without enquiry, can be upheld as constitutional on any grounds whatsoever. It cannot be upheld as constitutional on any grounds whatsoever. It cannot be done without over-ruling Moti Ram Dekas case or without an express constitutional provision like second Proviso (a), (b) or (c) to Article 311(2), which was adopted by the Constituent Assembly, not by a court of law, it was reiterated before us. 59. It was submitted that no principle of interpretation permits reading down a provision so as to make it into a different provision altogether different from what was intended by the legislature or its delegate. (R.M.D.C. s case (supra). 60. It was urged that it was established law that on reading down a provision, Court cannot preserve a power for a purpose which is just the opposite of what the legislature had intended. Para 522 of the Shastri Award was not at all intended to be used within limits expressed or implied. The Court must not legislate conditions such as were adopted by the Constituent Assembly in case of second Proviso to Article 311(2) in the Constitution of India. Even Parliament could not graft such limitations on Article 311(2), if second Proviso to Article 311 was not there in the Constitution. This Court cannot and ought, it was submitted not to arrogate powers to legislate what was patently outside even the competence of Parliament of India. 61. It was submitted that in Tulsi Ram Patels Case, the majority decision could not hold second Proviso to Article 311(2) unconstitutional. In order to give effect to the express language of second Proviso to Article 311(2), Court denied the protection of Article 14 to permit the President to terminate the services without following principles of natural justice in cases covered by the said Proviso. In every other case, natural justice is the command of Article 311(2) of the Constitution was submitted. 62. The operation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 311(2) of the Constitution does not permit Courts to lay down essential legislative policy, such as was laid down by the Constituent Assembly to over-ride 311(2) of the Constitution. 63. Mr. Garg, therefore, submitted that the requirement of defining misconduct in the Standing Orders and providing by meticulous provisions for a just, fair and reasonable enquiry into charges of misconduct are the mandatory requirement of Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act. (U.P State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar Jain [1979] 1 SCR 355. 64. Shri Garg urged that the I.L.O. Conventions, accepted by India, required all employers to frame Standing Orders. He further urged that the demands of natural justice, which form part of Article 14 of the Constitution have been raised to the status of public policy controlling Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. On that basis, clauses in contract of employment which provide for removal from service on the will of the employer have been condemned as The Henry VIII Clause (see the observations of this Court in Central Inland Water Transports case (supra) against the ethos of the Constitution of Socialist Democratic Republic of India. In this connection, reference was made to the decision of this Court in Central Inland Water Transports case (supra) and Maneka Gandhis case (supra). In India, Shri Garg submitted, workers have a right to participate in the management. The participation in the management cannot exclude the power to be heard and thus participate in a decision to remove a permanent employee. Government alone has power to refer to the industrial tribunal, Shri Garg submitted. He was against any reading down which is contrary to the principles of interpretation. He referred to the observations of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmads case AIR 1936 PC 253 (1). He submitted that if two provisions exist, firstly, to remove from service after holding an enquiry on a charge of a misconduct; and secondly without serving a charge-sheet or holding an enquiry all provisions for holding enquiry will be rendered otiose and will be reduced to a mere redundancy. Such an interpretation will expose workers to harsher treatment than those guilty of misconduct, who will enjoy greater protection than those who have committed no misconduct. Such powers are patently discriminatory. 65. Reference Under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act would serve no purpose, submitted Mr. Garg. Court has a duty, according to him, to correct wrongs even if orders have been made which are later found to be violative of any fundamental right and to recall its orders to avoid injustice. He referred to the decision of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr. 1988CriLJ1661 . He reminded us that no draft had been submitted by the Attorney General or the Solicitor General, which could be added as a proviso to para 522 of the Shastri Award by this Court as a piece of judicial legislation to amend the impugned para 522. Substantive provision of para 522 could not be controlled or curtailed effectively so that its operation could be confined within narrow constitutional limits. Mr. Garg reminded us that it is not the duty of the court to condone the constitutional delinquencies of those limited by the Constitution if they arrogate uncontrolled unconstitutional powers, which are neither necessary nor germane for supposed efficiency of services in the Banks as a business enterprise. Mr. Garg submitted that in a system governed by rule of law, discretion when conferred upon executive authorities must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. Law can only reach its finest moments when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion, of ruler. He referred to the observations of this Court in S.C. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors. [1967]65ITR34(SC) . 66. On behalf of the Interveners in civil Appeal No. 2876, Mr. P.P. Rao submitted that the aforesaid decision in Tulsi Ram Patels case (supra) was an authority for the proposition that but for clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the principles of natural justice could not have been excluded from the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was urged by him that the said second proviso to Article 311(2) being itself a constitutional provision, such exclusion was upheld by this Court in the said Tulsi Ram Patels case (supra), page 237 and at last para to p. 242. Mr. Rao drew our attention to the well-settled rule of interpretation and submitted that where two interpretations are possible, one of which would preserve and save the constitutionality of the particular statutory provision while the other would render it unconstitutional and void, the one which saves, and preserves its constitutionality should be adopted and the other should be rejected. He, further, submitted that unless, the provision of the Constitution, itself excludes the principles, of natural justice, they continue to be applicable as an integral part of the right to equality guaranteed by the Constitution. 67. It was further reiterated that as the employees of the DTC were not Government employees, Article 311(2) of the Constitution was not applicable. Consequently, the second proviso thereof was also not applicable, with the result that Article 14 of the Constitution fully applied to them and it included the principles of natural justice as, held in Tulsi Ram Patels (supra) itself at p. 233, last paragraph, Mr. Rao submitted that it is not permissible read down Statutory provisions when the avowed purpose is to confer power on an authority without any limitation, whatever. That would be reading down contrary to the expressed or manifest intention of the legislature. He drew our attention to the observations of this Court in Minerva Mills Limited v, Union of India and Ors. [1981]1SCR206 of the report, it was reiterated that the principles of reading down could not be distorted even when words of width are used inadvertently. In the instant case, Mr. Rao submitted, reading down would amount to distortion of the right to equality conferred by Article 14, which was regarded as a basic feature of the Constitution. Nothing short of an amendment of the Constitution could cut down the scope of the basic principle of equality, submitted Mr. Rao then referred to us Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [1973] Su. 1 S.C.R. 1 and submitted that any constitutional amendment which impairs the doctrine of equality would be liable to be declared unconstitutional on the ground of violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. 68. In the instant case, Mr. Rao submitted, regulation 9(b) deliberately conferred wide power of termination of service without giving a reasonable opportunity to an employee even if he is a regular Or permanent employee, in addition to regulation 15 which provided for dismissal or removal after a disciplinary enquiry. therefore, the intention of the regulation-making authority was clear and unambiguous. The provision is not capable of two interpretations. Consequently, the question of reading down did not arise. Mr. Rao drew our attention to the observations of the Supreme Court of America in Elliott Ashton Welsh, II v. United States, 26 Lawyers Edition 2nd, 308 at 327. Mr. Rao submitted that the decisions referred to by the learned Attorney General were not applicable to the instant case. He submitted that the decision of the Federal Court in Re The Hindu Womens Rights to Property Acts case (supra) involved the interpretation of a single word in the context of legislative competence. That was not the context of the present controversy, submitted Mr. Rao. Mr. Rao submitted that R.M.D. Chamarbaughwallas case (supra) was a case on severability. That was a case where the word competition was interpreted. In the present case, the suggested reading down involves, according to Mr. Rao, not interpretation of any single word in regulation 9(b) but adding a whole clause to it which amounted to rewriting the provisions. Courts have refused to rewrite legislation to make up for the omissions of the legislature. Reliance was placed by Mr. Rao on Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Holder and Ors. [1953]4SCR533 . Mr Rao referred to the observations of this Court in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, (supra) involving the interpretation of Section 124A IPC in the context of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The content of Article 19(1)(a) was not cut down. In the present case, the suggested reading down would inevitably drain out Article 14 of its vitality. 69. Shri Rao drew our attention to the decision of this Court in R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (supra) and submitted that the said decision did not involve cutting down the scope of a fundamental right. He also drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Jagdish Pandey v. The Chancellor, University of Bihar (supra) which did not involve reading down so as to sacrifice the principle of natural justice which are considered an essential part of the rule of law. In Municipal Committee, Amritsar and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. [1969]3SCR447 , this Court was concerned with the intention of the legislature and interpreted the Act consistent with the said intention. In the instant case, the intention was to confer power of termination of services of all categories of employees without any further enquiry. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (supra) was again a decision where this Court found that the intention of the legislature was not to confer arbitrary power. In the instant case, the intention was different. N.C. Dalwadi v. State of Gujarat, (supra) was a case of giving reasonable interpretation to a provision which was capable of such an interpretation. In the scheme of DTC Regulations, regulation 9(b) was not susceptible to two interpretations, submitted Mr. Rao. According to Mr. Rao, the principle of reading down was not applicable where the intention of the law maker was to confer too wide a power intended to be exercised without giving an opportunity to the affected party to be heard. It was, therefore, submitted that the principle of reading down was not applicable and if applied would amount to cutting down the scope of Article 14 and subjecting permanent employees of the DTC to a tremendous sense of insecurity which is against the philosophy and scheme of the Constitution. 70. Mr Nayar, appearing in civil Appeal No. 1115 of 1976-(Shri Satnam Singh v. Zila Parishad Ferozepure) for the respondent, drew our attention to the fact that the appellant, Shri Satnam Singh was appointed by the respondent vide letter of appointment dated 9th March, 1961 the appellant ceased to work for the respondent, when his services were terminated simpliciter vide Resolution dated 26th November, 1965. He, therefore, had worked for the respondent only for a short period of less than four years. The services of the appellant ceased on the basis of the contract, the terms of which were mutually agreed between the parties. In case he had continued to work, he would have reached the age of superannuation in the year 1984. His total emoluments with effect from 1st November, 1964 to 30th September, 1984 would have been approximately Rs.2,46,464. Mr. Nayar filed a detailed statement and stated that the appellant ceased to work for the respondent with effect from 26th November, 1964 when he was discharged from service. 71. In this case, it is necessary to bear in mind that the appellant, Shri Satnam Singh was appointed by the respondent, Zila Parishad, Ferozepure by letter of appointments dated 9th March, 1961. The Board approved his terms of appointment and the same were duly accepted by the appellant. The relevant clause of Contract between the parties for present purposes was Clause 4 which was as follows: "His services will be terminated on one months notice on either side provided it will be open to pay him his salary for the period by which the notice falls short of one month. Similarly, if he wishes to resign he may do so by depositing with the District Board his salary for the period by which the notice given by him falls short of one month." 72. The appellant, however, was continued to be governed by the Statutory Rules, known as District Board Rules, 1926. According to the respondent, the appellant did not cooperate inasmuch as he was not available in the Headquarters and presumably left without permission and without handing over important record and documents of the District Board, etc. But the appellants version, as stated in the grounds of appeal, was entirely different. He urged that it was on account of vindictive attitude on the part of some of the employees of the respondent, which had produced his termination order without enquiry. The District Board resolved that in terms of condition 4 of the terms of appointment, his services should be terminated on one months notice or pay in lieu thereof. 73. Mr. Nayar submitted that Rule 1(i) of District Board Rules, 1926, Part V also gave right to both the parties to terminate the contract of employment on one months notice, etc. The said rule reads as follows: "In the absence of a written contract to the contrary every officer or servant employed by a District Board shall be entitled to one months notice before discharge or to one months wages in lieu thereof, unless he is discharged during the period of probation or for misconduct or was engaged for a specified term and discharged at the end of it." 74. The services of the appellant were terminated vide Resolution dated 26th November, 1964 of the Board and he was discharged by allowing him one months salary in lieu of notice. The termination order was dated 14th December, 1964. The appellant, Shri Satnam Singh filed a suit for declaration in the Court of Senior Sub-Judge, Ferozepure, challenging the order of termination dated 14th December, 1964 as illegal, void, ultra vires, etc. The Senior Sub-Judge, Ferozepure, vide judgment and decree dated 9th January, 1969 held that the discharge of the appellant amounted to dismissal and as clearly no enquiry was held against him, the termination simpliciter was bad in law. The respondent, Zila Parishad filed an appeal in the Court of 3rd Additional District Judge, Ferozepure, who vide order dated 22nd December, 1969 affirmed the decision of the trial Judge and dismissed the appeal of the respondent. The respondent filed regular appeal in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, inter alia, pleading that the appellant was validly discharged in terms of his appointment order and Rule 1(i), Part V-A of the District Board Rules, 1926. 75. The learned Single Judge of the High Court considered the matter in detail and referred to various judgments of this Court and held that it could not be said that the action of termination prima facie amounted to an order of dismissal even though the appellant was at the time a confirmed employee of the respondent. The learned Single Judge found that the respondent had a contractual right to terminate the services of the appellant by giving a months notice or a months salary in lieu of notice. According to Shri Garg, the removal of the appellant from service was in accordance with the terms governing his appointment. Merely because on the 7th of November, 1964, the respondent resolved to charge sheet the appellant for acts of omission and commission and ordered an enquiry, and such an enquiry never commenced, would certainly not be enough reason to hold that the termination of the appellants services, was ordered by way of punishment and therefore, amounted to his dismissal, argued Mr. Nayar. It was submitted by Mr. Nayar that the appellant had conceded that condition No. 4 was legally good but he had argued that it was not meant to be effective after the appellant had been confirmed. 76. Aggrieved by the order mentioned above, the appellant had filed Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court by an order dated 13th September, 1972 referred the question of law for the decision of the full bench. The full bench of the High Court reframed the question of law as under: "Whether, the termination of services of a permanent District Board Employee by giving him one months notice or pay in lieu thereof in terms of the conditions of his appointment and/or Rule 1 in part V-A of the District Board Rules, 1926, is bad in law and cannot be made?" 77. The majority of the learned Judges, inter alia, held that the appellant not being a government servant cannot have the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution as he was not a civil servant under the Central Government of the State Government. He was an employee of the District Board and his tenure of appointment was governed by the provisions of the District Boards Act, 1883 and the rules framed thereunder as well as by the terms and conditions of his appointment. The condition No. 4 gave mutual right to the District Board as well as to the appellant to terminate the service by giving one months notice or pay in lieu of notice, etc. The condition in the appointment letter shall not be deemed to have been abrogated by the Punjab civil Services Rules. The Court held further that the condition stated in the letter of appointment of the appellant continued to bind the parties even after the appellants confirmation and his services could be terminated by an order of discharge simpliciter in accordance with the condition No. 4 thereof as this condition was almost in the same terms as Rule I in Part V-A of the Rules. It was further held by the full bench of the High Court that the Punjab civil Service Rules had no over-riding effect and these rules were to apply in respect of matters for which no provision had been made anywhere else because of the phrase used "so far as may be". Rule 8.1 of the Business Rules reads as under: "In all matters relating to the conditions of service of its employees the Board shall so far as may be follow the rules from time to time in force for servants of the Punjab Government." 78. The finding of the Letters Patent Bench in this regard was as under: "According to Rule 8.1 ibid, the Punjab civil Services Rules were to apply in respect of matters for which no provision had been made anywhere else because of the phrase used "so far as may be". Naturally, if a provision was made anywhere else, which went counter to the Punjab civil Services Rules, the application of the latter rules stood excluded. It thus follows that the Punjab civil Services Rules were not to apply to the appellant in respect of matters for which specific provision was made in his letter of appointment, which constituted the contract of service between him and the District Board, as he joined service on those terms after accepting the same." 79. The learned Chief Justice of Punjab & Haryana High Court, however, dissented. The answer to the question, therefore, was given in the negative vide order dated 3rd April, 1974. The Division Bench of the High Court which heard the matter after the question of law was answered by the Full Bench, dismissed the appeal of the appellant vide order dated 28th October, 1974 and this appeal to this Court arises from this order. 80. The appellant in civil Appeal No. 1115/76, who appeared in person before us reiterated the relevant facts and urged that his removal was bad and the rule under which he was removed may be quashed. It may be mentioned that as regards letter of Shri Kuldip Singh Virk to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ferozepure regarding the charges of corruption against the appellant, a case Under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered. The appellant was tried for the said alleged offence and acquitted of the charges by the Special Judge Ferozepure. A further case was registered Under Sections 381/ 409 of IPC against the appellant. Accordingly, the appellant was tried by the Judicial Magistrate Ferozepure. The charge was framed by the Judicial Magistrate against the appellant. Against the aforesaid, the appellant filed a petition in the High Court and the charge and the proceedings in question were thereupon quashed by the High Court in July/August, 1967. There were three more cases tried by the Special Judge, Ferozepure and acquitted. 81. The appellant filed a document in this Court claiming the monetary claim on the basis that his termination was wrongful. According to the appellant, he was entitled to recover Rs.4,83,061.90 paise. However, according to the statement filed by Shri Nayar, learned counsel for the respondents in this case, the appellant was entitled to withdraw from the District Board Rs.2,46,464.46 paise, in case he would have been in service before his date of superannuation, i.e., 30th September, 1984. There is no evidence from either side as to whether the appellant had worked somewhere else though the appellant did not work with the respondent because of his suspension. The appellant had, however, stated that he did not so work. In that view of the matter, if the contentions of the appellant are accepted that the clause under which the terms of employment of the appellant was agreed and under which the termination was effected without any enquiry and further in view of the fact that the learned trial Judge before whom the appellant had filed the suit first and decreed the suit declaring the appellant to be entitled to be in service, the appellant, in our opinion. should rightly be granted a monetary claim for Rs.4,83,061.90 paise and further interest at 6% from 30th September, 1984. This would be in consonance with justice and equity in the facts and the circumstances of this case. This order, however, will have to be passed if we accept the contention on behalf of the appellant herein on the construction of the clause. 82. In the matter of M/s. Indian Airlines, which is the subject-matter of the Application for Intervention No. 1 of 1990 in civil Appeal No. 2846 of 1986, Mr. Lalit Bhasin, on behalf of the interveners contended that there has been distinction between the discharge simpliciter and dismissal from service by way of punishment. According to Mr. Bhasin the effect of the judgments of this Court in the Central Inland Waters case (supra) and West Bengals (supra) was to take away the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee by way of discharge simpliciter. According to Mr. Bhasin, this Court had recognised the existence of the inherent right of an employer to terminate the services of an employee in terms of the contract of employment and also under the various labour enactments. 83. Attention of this Court was invited to the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, which applies to all industrial establishments whether in the public or private sector. Under and as a part of the said Act, model standing orders are set out and Standing Order No. 13 provides for simple termination of employment by giving one months notice etc. Similarly, there are provisions under various Shops and Establishments Acts of different States providing for termination of employment of permanent employee after giving one months notice or pay in lieu of notice. Attention of this Court was invited to Section 30 of Delhi Shops and Establishments Act. 84. The Industrial Disputes Act itself makes distinction between discharge and dismissal and attention of this Court was invited to Section 3(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which defines retrenchment. This section expressly excludes termination of services as a result of non-renewal of contract of employment. Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines workman to include any person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched. Section 2A distinguishes discharge, dismissal and retrenchment. 85. It is pertinent to point out that the Original Regulation 13 of Indian Airlines Employees Service Regulations was set out as under: "13. The services of an employee are terminable at 30 days on either side or basic pay in lieu: Provided however, the Corporation will be at liberty to refuse to accept the termination of his service by an employee where such termination is sought in order to avoid disciplinary action contemplated or taken by the Management." 86. After the decisions of this Court in Central Inland Waters case (supra), Indian Airlines initiated steps to amend its Regulation 13 and bring it in line with Article 311(2) of the Constitution as directed by this Court in Hindustan Steels Ltd case (supra). It appears that the Board of Directors of Indian Airlines had accordingly approved of the amendments to Regulation 13 and the amended Regulation reads as under: (a) The services of an employee may be terminated without assigning any reasons to him/her and without any prior notice but only on the following grounds not amounting to misconduct under the Standing Orders, namely: (i) If he/she is, in the opinion of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Indian Airlines) incompetent and unsuitable for continued employment with the Corporation and such incompetence and unsuitability is such as to make his/her continuance in employment detrimental to the interest of the Corporation; OR If his/her continuance in employment constitutes, in the opinion of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Indian Airlines), a grave security risk making his/her continuance in a service detrimental to the interests of the Corporation; OR if in the opinion of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Indian Airlines) there is such a justifiable lack of confidence which, having regard to the nature of duties performed, would make it necessary in the interest of the Corporation, to immediately terminate his/her services. (b) The employee can seek termination of his/her employment by giving 30 days notice or basic pay in lieu: "Provided however the Corporation will be at liberty to refuse to accept the termination of his/her service by an employee where such termination is sought in order to avoid disciplinary action contemplated or taken by the Management." 87. According to Mr. Bhasin, in the amended Regulation 13, Indian Airlines had taken care to set out the circumstances in which the services of an employee can be terminated by way of discharge and without holding enquiry. Mr. Bhasin urged that these are eventualities which do not constitute misconduct and yet retention of an employee in the service by the management for any one of the grounds mentioned in the aforesaid Regulation might be considered as detrimental for the management or against public interest. Mr. Bhasin submitted that the power has been vested with the Board of Directors and not with any individual. According to Mr. Bhasin, plain reading of Regulation 13, as amended, would clearly establish that the vice, if any, or arbitrariness is completely removed and sufficient guidelines are made available to the highest functionary, namely, the Board of Directors to exercise the restricted and limited power now available to the employer under these Regulations. 88. Similar submissions have been made on behalf of Air India, who are interveners. Submissions made hereinbefore were alternative submissions. The original Regulation 48 of Air India Employees Service Regulations was as follows: "Termination: The services of an employee may be terminated without assigning any reason, as under: (a) of a permanent employee by giving him 30 days notice in writing or pay in lieu of notice; (b) of any employee on probation by giving him 7 days notice in writing or pay in lieu of notice: (c) of a temporary employee by giving him 24 hours notice in writing or pay in lieu of notice. Explanation: For the purposes of the regulation, the word "pay" shall include all emoluments which would be admissible if he were on privilege leave." 89. After the decisions of this Court declaring the aforesaid Regulation as void in civil Appeal No. 19 of 1982 in the Case of Manohar P. Kharkhar and Anr. v. Raghu Raj and Anr. Air India amended the aforesaid Regulation, which now reads as under: (a) The services of a permanent employee may be terminated without assigning any reasons to him/her and without any prior notice but only to the following grounds not amounting to misconduct under Service Regulation 42, namely: "(i) if he/she is, in the opinion of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Air India) incompetent and unsuitable for continued employment with the Corporation and such incompetence and unsuitability is such as to make his/her continuance in employment detrimental to the interests of the Corporation;" OR If his/her continuance in employment constitutes, in the opinion of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Air India), a grave security risk making his/her continuance in service detrimental) to the interests of the Corporation; OR If, in the opinion of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Air India), there is such a justifiable lack of confidence which, having regard to the nature of duties performed, would make it necessary, in the interest of the Corporation, to immediately terminate his/her services. (b) The services of an employee on probation may be terminated without assigning any reason to him/her but on giving 30 days notice in writing or pay in lieu thereof. (c) The services of a temporary employee may be terminated without assigning any reason to him/her but on giving 15 days notice in writing or pay in lieu thereof. Explanation For the purpose of this Regulation the word "pay" shall include all emoluments which would be admissible it he were on privilege leave. 90. The question regarding justification of the action taken by the management was touched by this Court, but since the action was based on the old Regulation 48, it had to be quashed. It was submitted on behalf of the Air India that care had been taken to suit the circumstances in which the services of an employee could be terminated by way of discharge simpliciter and without holding enquiry. These are eventualities which do not constitute misconduct and yet retention of an employee in the service of the management for any one of the grounds mentioned in the said Regulation might be considered as detrimental for the management or against public interest. It was submitted that the said regulation 48 has to be read with Regulation 44(A) which reads as under: "44(A)(i) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Regulations and if, in the opinion of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Air India), it is not possible or practicable to hold an enquiry under the relevant provisions of these Regulations, the Corporation may, if satisfied that the employee has been guilty of any misconduct, any one of the punishment mentioned in Regulation 43 on the employee concerned. Provided that before exercising his extra ordinary power, the Board shall give 30 days prior notice to the employee concerned of the act of misconduct that the reasons why it is not possible or practicable to hold an enquiry into such misconduct, and the punishment proposed by the Board and the employee shall be entitled to make a full written representation to the Board in response to such notice. (ii) No action shall be taken under the Regulation until the Board has taken into consideration the representation made by the concerned employee under the proviso to Section (i) within the notice period." 91. The original regulation 44 was also modified. According to the interveners, the cumulative reading of regulation 48, as amended, and regulation 44, as amended, would clearly establish that the vice, if any, of arbitrariness is completely removed and sufficient guidelines are made available to the Board of Directors to exercise the restricted and limited power now available to the employer under these Regulations. 92. In C.M.P. No. 30309 of 1988, on behalf of the New India Assurance Co., the intervention application was filed. It was stated that in the courts below the writ petition No. 835 of 1975 was filed by the employee challenging his termination and the appeal filed thereon were decided on grounds available to the petitioner at that time. A special leave petition was filed by the employee concerned which has now become C.A. No. 655 of 1984. After the judgment in the Central Inland Waters case (supra), an additional ground is now being taken to contend that a contract entered into way back in the sixties when the employee concerned was an employee of the Orissa Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd., Cuttack could not be enforced now and the same ought to be declared void in view of the Central Inland Waters case (supra). 93. The intervention was allowed on 24th January, 1990 and Smt. Shyamla Pappu, Senior Advocate submitted written submissions. It was submitted that adjudication on the merits and the consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case may be left to the Bench hearing the matter after the decision of the question of law referred to the Constitution Bench. 94. In this connection, it may, however, be noted that the General Insurance was nationalised under the provisions of the General Insurance Provisions (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and the said Act came into force on 20th September, 1972. Prior to this, General Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 was passed under the provisions of which Act all undertakings of all Insurers vested in the Central Government with effect from 13th May, 1971. This was pending nationalisation which took place in 1972 as aforesaid. 95. Section 7(1) of the said Act which provided for the takeover of former employees reads as under: "Every whole-time officer or other employee of an existing Insurer other than an Indian Insurance Company, who was employed by that insurer, wholly or mainly with his general insurance business immediately before the appointed day, shall, on the appointed day, become an officer or other employee, as the case may be, of the Insurance Company, in which the Undertaking to which the service of the officer or other employee relates has vested and shall hold his office or service on the same terms and conditions and with the same rights to pension, gratuity and other matters as would have been admissible to him if there had been no such vesting and shall continue to do so until his employment in the Indian Insurance Company in which the undertaking or part has vested, is terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions are duly altered by that Indian Insurance Company." 96. The original terms and conditions had not been altered and the employees like the appellant in C.A. No. 855/84 continued to be governed by the original terms and conditions of the contract at the time of termination. The original terms and conditions of employment, therefore, continued in force. The contract of service was entered into when the appellant joined the Orissa Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. way back in 1961 and at the time of take-over by the Central Government was the Divisional Manager of the said society. After the take over by the Central Government of general insurance in 1972, a great deal of reorganisation had to be effected in order to tone up the system of general insurance which had become unwieldy due to the mushroom growth of societies with no control whatsoever when insurance was in private hands. 97. It was submitted by Smt. Shyamla Pappu that there are many such cases where action was taken soon after nationalisation of general insurance in 1972. If such orders are set aside today, Smt. Shyamla Pappu posed the question, what would be the result? Would the order set aside, at this stage give the employee a right to be reinstated? If the answer to the above is in the affirmative, would it be conducive to efficiency in the conduct of a public utility such as general insurance, Smt. Pappu raised the question. Would it not hamper the Companys business considering that the reduction/reorganisation of staff was essential for the effective functioning of the public service? Smt. Pappu asked the question would the public service not be saddled with unnecessary and/or incompetent staff, thus, burdening the public utility/service with unmanageable costs and staff that is ineffective? It was urged that the New India Assurance Company had a clause, in the contract at the relevant time, which was as follows: "in the event of the society not having any further need of any employees services, whether permanent or temporary, which shall be decided by the board, the Principal Officer shall give 30 days notice in writing for termination of his services or in lieu thereof pay such employee a sum equivalent to one month pay including allowance upto the period of notice." 98. The above clause covered cases of retrenchment, abolition of posts and other situations which had been adjudicated upon by this Court. If, however, the Central Inland Waters case (supra) is applied, Smt. Shyamla Pappu submitted, then the management of the Intervener Company will be powerless even in a case of abolition of posts or retrenchment or any other allied situation. It is seen that the power to terminate an employee is co-existent with the power to appoint. Smt. Shyamla Pappu relied on the General Clauses Act and submitted that the Central Inland Waters case (supra) was erroneous in so far as it made a complete negation of this power. Then, it was submitted by her that in case of an employer who had made all the necessary investigation and the employee concerned has been fully heard before the order of termination and if the decision of Central Inland Waters case was applied, then even such a case would be a case of illegal termination, considering that there would be no power to terminate. It was submitted that the Central Inland Waters case had to be read down because paras 77, 92 and 93 of the report take in even private employment. The sweep of the judgment cannot hold good and had to be curtailed. 99. According to Smt. Pappu, what then was the position of terminations effected when the law was different? It cannot be said that they are entitled to relief now. It should be clarified that the judgment of this Court would apply prospectively, it was submitted. Past cases might be treated as concluded in view of the law prevailing at that time and also in view of the contentions urged by the parties in the courts below at various stages. In the event, this Court comes to the conclusion that even old cases would be covered by the judgment now rendered, the orders already passed may be upheld and a post-decisional hearing might be directed so that the management concerned has the opportunity of showing that there existed good reasons for termination though the same were not communicated to the employee concerned because the law then existing did not require such a communication. In the interest of justice, we should allow such a course. 100. In the light of the provisions and in the facts and the circumstances of the case, it is, therefore, necessary to consider the validity of the power of termination of employment by the employers or authorities of the employees without holding any enquiry in the circumstances noted in the several civil appeals and applications herein. 101. In these civil appeals, the question of actual user of power is not the main issue, but the validity of clauses or regulations containing the aforesaid power. The instances of actual user of power, however, are not wholly irrelevant on the question of the validity or extent of the power because these explain the extent and content of power and/or occasion for such user. Firstly, we have to, in view of the facts and the circumstances of the civil Appeal No. 2876 of 1986, consider the amplitude of the power under clause (b) of Regulation 9 of the Regulations concerned. We have noted the contents of that Regulation. We have also noted the amplitude of the expression of that power as was canvassed before the High Court in the matter under appeal and as noticed by the decision of this Court in Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Balbir Saran Goels case (supra). A survey of the several authorities of law and the development of law from time to time would lead one to the conclusion that the philosophy of the Indian Constitution, as it has evolved, from precedent to precedent, has broaden the horizons of the right of the employees and they have been assured security of tenures and ensured protection against arbitrariness and discrimination in discharge or termination of his employment. This is the basic concept of the evolution from the different angles of law of master and servant or in the evolution of employer and employee relationship. It is true that the law has travelled in different channels, government servants or servants or employees having status have to be differentiated from those whose relationships are guided by contractual obligations. 102. But it has to be borne in mind that we are concerned in these matters with the employees either of semi-Government or statutory corporations or public undertakings who enjoy the rights, privileges, limitations and inhibitions of institutions who come within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution. It is in the background of these parameters that we must consider the question essentially and basically posed in these matters. The basic and the fundamental question to be judged is. in what manner and to what extent, the employees of these bodies or corporations or institutions could be affected in their security of tenure by the employers consistent with the rights evolved over the years and rights emanating from the philosophy of the Constitution as at present understood and accepted. 103. We have noted the exhaustive and the learned analysis of the background of the diverse facts projected in the several cases and appeals before us. 104. Efficiency of the administration of these undertakings is very vital and relevant consideration. Production must continue, services must be maintained and run. Efficacy of the services can be manned only by the disciplined employees or workers. Discipline, decency and order will have to be maintained. Employees should have sense of participation and involvement and necessarily sense of security in semi-permanent or quasi-permanent or permanent employment. There must be scope for encouragement for good work. In what manner and in what measure, this should be planned and ensured within the framework of the Constitution and, power mingled with obligations, and duties enjoined with rights, are matters of constitutional adjustment at any particular evolved stage of the philosophy of our Constitution. 105. We have noted several decisions, numerous as these are, and the diverse facts, as we have found. We have noted that in some cases arbitrary action or whimsical action or discriminatory action can flow or follow by the preponderance of these powers. The fact that the power so entrusted with a high ranking authority or body is not always a safe or sound insurance against misuse. At least, it does not always ensure against erosion of credibility in the exercise of the power in particular contingency. Yet, discipline has to be maintained, efficiency of the institution has to be ensured. It has to be recognised that quick actions are very often necessary in running of an institution or public service or public utility and public concern. It is not always possible to have enquiry because disclosure is difficult; evidence is hesitant and difficult, often impossible. In those circumstances, what should be the approach to the location of power and what should be the content and extent of power, possession and exercise of which is essential for efficient running of the industries or services? It has to be a matter both of balancing and adjustment on which one can wager the salvation of rights and liberties of the employees concerned and the future of the industries or the services involved. 106. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles and objects, it appears to us that the power to terminate the employment of permanent employment must be there. Efficiency and expediency and the necessity of running an industry or service make it imperative to have these powers. Power must, therefore, with authorities to take decision quickly, objectively and independently. Power must be assumed with certain conditions of duty. The preamble, the policy, purpose of the enacting provision delimit the occasions or the contingencies for the need for the exercise of the power and these should limit the occasions of exercise of such powers. The manner in which such exercise of power should be made should ensure fairness, avoid arbitrariness and mala fide and create credibility in the decisions arrived at or by exercise of the power. All these are essential to ensure that power is fairly exercised and there is fair play in action. Reasons, good and sound, must control the exercise of power. 107. We have noted the rival submissions. Learned Attorney General of India and the learned Solicitor General and others appearing for those who sought for sustaining the power by the employers or the authorities, contend that for efficiency of the industry, for the attainment of the very purpose for which institutions are created, there should be power to terminate the employment of undesirable, inefficient, corrupt, indolent, disobedient employees in those cases where holding of enquiry or prolonging these employees for that purpose should be detrimental, difficult and frustrating. It is in this context that we should examine the power under the aforesaid Regulation 9(b). The power must be there, the power must be utilised by person or authority, high ranking enough or senior enough who can be trusted or who can be presumed to be able to act fairly, objectively and independently. The occasion for the exercise of the power must be delimited with precision, clarity or objectivity. And those occasions must be correlated to the purpose for which the powers are sought to be exercised. In concrete terms, for the running of the industry or the service, efficiently, quickly and in a better manner or to avoid deadlocks or inefficiency or friction, the vesting of the power in circumstances must be such that will evoke creditability and confidence. Reasons must be there, reasons must be perceptible, reasons must be relevant and the reasons must be of authority independently, fairly and objectively arrived at. 108. Notice of hearing may or may not be given, opportunity in the form of an enquiry may or not be given, yet arbitrariness and discrimination and acting whimsically must be avoided. These power must, therefore, be so read that the powers can be exercised on reasons, reasons should be recorded, reasons need not always be communicated, must be by authorities who are competent and are expected to act fairly, objectively and independently. The occasion for the use of power must be clearly circumscribed in the above limits. These must also circumscribe that the need for exercise of those power without holding a detailed or prolonged enquiry is there. 109. As we have noted, a good deal of controversy was that these inhibitions or limitations or conditions are not there in the amplitude or the extent of the power enumerated or stated in Regulation 9(b) of the aforesaid Regulations concerned or of similar provisions that we have examined in these cases. 110. We have noted the argument, learned and interesting, on the question of judicial law making imputing to the legislatures what these have not articulated. Should the courts say or can say what the legislatures have not said? We have noted the controversy of how should legislation of limited legislatures, Parliaments or rule making bodies, who are not expected or enjoined to make rules or laws contrary to or in derogation or the constitutional prohibitions and inhibitions be read. We have been tempted to read down in the path of judicial law making on the plea that legislature could not have intended to give powers to the authorities or employers which would be violative of fundamental rights of the persons involved in the exercise of those powers and, therefore, should be attributed those powers on conditions which will only make these legal or valid. Our law making bodies are not law into themselves and cannot create or make all laws. They can only confer powers or make laws for the conferment of powers on authorities which are legal and valid. Such powers conferred must conform to the constitutional inhibitions. The question, therefore, is-is it possible or desirable to read down the power conferred under Regulation 9(b) or similar regulations permitting employer or the authority to terminate the employment of the employees by giving reasonable notice or pay in lieu of notice without holding enquiry with the conditions indicated or mentioned hereinbefore? Will it or will it not amount to making laws of stating which the legislature or the law making body has not stated? 111. We have been reminded that judges should not make laws. But the question is-can the judges articulate what is inarticulate and what can be reasonably and plainly found to be inherent on the presumption that a legislature or a law making body with the limited authority would act only within limitations so as to make the legislation or law valid and the legislature must be presumed to act with certain amount of knowledge and fairness protecting the rights of people concerned and aiming at fairness in action? 112. We have noted the rival contentions. We have noted the submission that Mr. Garg, Mr. Ramamurthi and others invited us not to read down and against legislating positively with conditions. But the question is-are those conditions which we are invited to attribute to the legislature or the law making bodies contrary to or against the manifest intention of the legislature? 113. Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from experience of evils. But its general language should not, therefore, necessarily be confined to the form that evil had taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes and new awareness of limitations. therefore, a principle to be valid must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is particularly true of the constitutional constructions. Constitutions are not ephemeral enactments designed to meet passing occasions. These are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.... In the application of a Constitutional limitation or inhibition, our interpretation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. See the observations of this Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (supra). Where, therefore, in the interpretation of the provisions of an Act, two constructions are possible, one which leads towards constitutionality of the legislation would be preferred to that which has the effect of destroying it. If we do not read the conferment of the power in the manner we have envisaged before, the power is liable to be struck down as bad. This, we say in spite of the argument by many including learned Solicitor General of India and Smt. Shyamla Pappu that in contractual obligations while institutions or organisations or authorities, who come within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution are free to contract on the basis of hire and fire and the theory of the concept of unequal bargain and the power conferred subject to constitutional limitations would not be applicable. We are not impressed and not agreeable to accept that proposition at this stage of the evolution of the constitutional philosophy of master and servant framework or if you would like to call it employer or employee relationship. therefore, these conferment of the powers on the employer must be judged on the constitutional peg and so judged without the limitations indicated aforesaid, the power is liable to be considered as arbitrary and struck down. 114. Whenever a statute comes up for consideration, it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language, and for that matter any language in use today, is not an instrument of mathematical precision. It has been said that our literature would have been much the poorer if it were Leaving, however, the question of richness or poverty of our literature apart, we must proceed on the assumption that human mind cannot foresee everything. It has, therefore, been said that when a question arises whether the power has been properly conferred and even if so, the extent of it. Lord Denning has opined that a Judge in such a situation cannot simply fold his hand and blame the draftsmen and look for new enactment. Lord Denning invites us to set to work on the construction task of finding the intention of the Parliament or the law making body and we must, however, do this not only from the language of the statute, because, as we have seen, language is an imperfect medium and very often thoughts are perpetually in search of broken language. But the judge must also do it from a consideration of the social conditions which give rise to it, and of the mischief which it was intended to remedy and also in the light of the constitutional inhibitions and then supplant the written words and add to it end give force and life to the intention and purpose of the legislature or the law making authority. A judge must not alter the material of which a law or an instrument is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases and if one may venture to say, make articulate the inarticulate premise but make articulate only which follow from necessary compulsions of the situations and the constitutional position. See in this connection the observations of Lord Denning in " The Discipline of Law" at p. 12. 115. It is true that judicial jealously of legislature in law making has long been outdrawn, but the strict construction remains still an established rule. It is generally accepted principle that judges in interpreting statutes, should give effect to the legislators intent. By doing so, the courts do recognise their subordinate position and their obligation to help the legislature to achieve its purpose. But in that effort, creativity is essential. There have been differences of opinion on the practices that the courts may employ in attempting to discover the legislative intent. In the beginning, conventional practice was only to look to the words of the statutes. Now the entire spectrum has to be examined. It has been said that judges are not unfettered glossators. 116. It is true that there is no actual expression used enabling the legislation or the statute in question indicating the limitations or conditions as aforesaid. But it must proceed on the premise that the law making authority intended to make a valid law to confer power validly or which will be valid. The freedom, therefore, to search the spirit of the enactment or what is intended to obtain or to find the intention of the Parliament gives the Court the power to supplant and supplement the expressions used to say what was left unsaid. This is a power which is an important branch of judicial power, the concession of which it taken to the extreme is dangerous, but denial of that power would be ruinous and this is not contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature or the implied purpose of the legislation. It was not as Shri Ramamurthi tried to argue that legislature wanted to give an uncontrolled and absolute power to discharge employees on the part of the employers without any enquiry in all circumstances. That cannot be and that was not intended to be as can be implied from all the circumstances. 117. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I would sustain the constitutionality of this conferment of power by reading that the power must be exercised on reasons relevant for the efficient running of the services or performing of the job by the societies or the bodies. It should be done objectively, the reasons should be recorded, it should record this and the basis that it is not feasible or possible reasonably to hold any enquiry without disclosing the evidence which in the circumstances of the case would be hampering the running of the institution. The reasons should be recorded, it need not be communicated and only for the purpose of the running of the institution, there should be factors which hamper the running of the institution without the termination of the employment of the employee concerned at that particular time either because he is a surplus, inefficient, disobedient and dangerous. 118. Construction or interpretation of legislative or rule provisions proceeds on the assumption that courts must seek to discover and translate the intention of the legislature or the rule-making body. This is one of the legal fictions upon the hypothesis of which the framework of adjudication of the intention of a piece of legislation or rule proceeds. But these are fictional myths to a large extent as experience should tell us. In most of the cases legislature, that is to say, vast majority of the people who are supposed to represent the views and opinions of the people, do not have any intention, even if they have, they cannot and do not articulate those intentions. On most of these issues their is no comprehension or understanding. Reality would reveal that it is only those who are able to exert their viewpoints, in a common parliamentary jargon, the power lobby, gets what it wants, and the machinery is of a bureaucratic set up who draft the legislation or rule or law. So, therefore, what is passed on very often as the will of the people in a particular enactment is the handy work of a bureaucratic machine produced at the behest of a power lobby controlling the corridors of power in a particular situation. This takes the methodical shape of the intention of the people in the form of legislation. Again, very often, the bureaucratic machine is not able to correctly and properly transmute what was intended to be conveyed. In such a situation, is it or is it not better, one would ponder to ask, whether the courts should attribute to the law-making body the knowledge of the values and limitations of the Constitution, and knowledge of the evils that should be remedied at a particular time and in a situation that should be met by a particular piece of legislation, and the court with the experience and knowledge of law, with the assistance of lawyers trained in this behalf, should endeavour to find out what will be the correct and appropriate solution, and construe the rule of the legislation within the ambit of constitutional limitations and upon reasonable judgment of what should have been expressed. In reality, that happens in most of the cases. Can it be condemned as judicial usurpation of law-making functions of the legislature thereby depriving the people of their right to express their will? This is a practical dilemma which Judges must always, in cases of interpretation and construction, face and a question which they must answer. 119. I have noted the guidelines for the exercise of the power, preamble, relevant sections from which the reasons should be inferred and recorded, although they need not be communicate. These should be recorded in order to ensure effective judicial review in a given case. Termination simpliciter under Regulation 9(b) or similar powers can be exercised only in circumstances other than those in regulation 9(a). The exercise of such powers can only be for purposes germane and relevant to the statute. There are several illustrations of that, namely, the employee is incompetent or unsuitable so as to make his continuance in the employment detrimental to the interest of the institution, where the continuance of the employee is a grave security risk making his continuance detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and where because of the conduct of the employee, there is lack of confidence in the employee which makes it necessary in the interest of the Corporation to immediately terminate the services of the employee. These, however, are illustrative and not exhaustive. therefore, each case of the conferment of the power involved should be decided on the aforesaid basis. 120. I am conscious that clear intention as indicated in a legislation cannot be permitted to be defeated by means of construction. It has been said that if the legislature has manifested a clear intention to exercise an unlimited power, it is impermissible to read down the amplitude of that power so as to make it limited. I do not agree. Our legislatures are limited by the constitutional inhibitions and it is time, in my opinion, that we should read their Acts and enactments with the attribute that they know their limits and could not have intended to violate the Constitution. It is true that where there are clear, unambiguous and positive terms in a legislation, the Court should be loath to read down. It should proceed with a straight-forward method of striking down such legislations. But where the statute is silent or not expressive or inarticulate, the Court must read down in the silence of the statute and in the in articulation of its provisions, the constitutional inhibitions and transmute the major inarticulate premise into a reality and read down the statute accordingly. It is true perhaps, as has been said, that in the history of constitutional law, statutes are seldom read down to mean what they say and intend. It is begging the question. If the statutes are seldom read down to mean what they say and intend. It is begging the question. If the statute does not specifically say, in such circumstances, as to how do we find the intention to transgress the constitutional limitations. At least, the relevant provisions of the relevant statutes and the rules, mentioned hereinbefore, are, in my opinion, on these points, not expressive enough to betray an intention transgress constitutional limitations. I am afraid that reference to Elliott Ashton Welsh, II v. United States 398 US 333 : 26 L.Ed. 2d 308 is inept in the background of the principles we are confronted with. The plain thrust of legislative enactment has to be found out in the inarticulate expressions and in the silence of the legislation. In doing so, to say what the legislature did not specifically say, is not distortion to avert any constitutional collision. In the language of the relevant provisions with which we are confronted, I do not find that intention of the legislature to flout the constitutional limitations. 121. I am also unable to accept the contention of Mr. Garg as well as Mr. Ramamurthi that it is clear as a result of the constitutional position of the security of tenure of the employees as well as the expressed language of the provisions of several enactments that there is no valid power of the termination of employment of the permanent employees without holding an enquiry or giving an opportunity to the employees to rebut the charges on the grounds of termination in all circumstances. It was contended, as I have noted, by Shri R.K. Garg that no principle of interpretation permitted reading down a provision so as to make it into a different provision altogether different from what was intended by the legislature or its delegate. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in R.M.D.C.s case (supra). I am unable to accept this contention. It is not that the reading down is used for a purpose which is just the opposite which the legislature had intended. Legislature had not intended arbitrary or uncontrolled or whimsical power. Indeed it considered. This is not the proper way to read that power in the said Regulation 9(b). Para 522 of the Shastri Award, read properly, must be circumscribed with the conditions indicated above as a necessary corollary or consequence of that power. It is also not reading to the legislature conditions which were not there in the second proviso Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In view of the ratio of the five-judge Bench decision of this Court in Tulsirams case (supra), which had examined all the relevant decisions, I am unable to accept the submission of Shri R.K. Garg and Mr. Ramamurthi. Absolute powers, it is true, cannot be regulated without essential legislative policy, but here properly read, absolute power was not there. Power that was only constitutionally valid, that power can be presumed to have been given and if that presumption is made, conditions indicated above inevitably attach. 122. We are not concerned with the concept of industrial democracy sought to be propounded by Mr. Garg in this case. The validity and the propriety of having industrial democracy is not in issue. What is in issue is demonstrable fair play and justice, as sought for by Mr. Garg, in the exercise of the power which must be conceded as an essential attribute for proper functioning of the institution. 123. It is true that no drafts as such have been submitted by the learned Attorney General or by the learned Solicitor General nor by any counsel appearing for the management. But these conditions, which we have noted, are necessary corollary flowing from the conferment of the power of termination in a constitutional manner for the smooth, proper and efficient running of the industry. 124. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I am unable to accept the submissions of Mr. Garg and Mr. Ramamurthi. The power must be there, the power must be read down in the manner and to the extent indicated above, in my opinion, of terminating the services of permanent employees without holding any enquiry in the stated contingencies and this would be by either virtue of the silence of the provision indicating the contingencies of termination or by virtue of constitutional inhibitions. That reading would not violate the theory that judges should not make laws.

Decision:
0[ds]It may be mentioned that under the general law of contract of employment, which was commonly known as the law of master and servant, which is not termed as law of employer and employee, whether the contract of service is for a fixed period or not, if it contained a provision for its termination by notice, it could be so terminated. If there was no provision for giving notice and the contract was not for a fixed period, the law implied an obligation to give a reasonable notice. Where no notice in the first case or no reasonable notice in the second case was given and the contract was wrongfully terminated, such wrongful termination would give rise to a claim for damages. In this connection, reference may be made to the observations of this Court in the five-judge bench decision in Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsi Ram Patel [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131. This is also the position at common law15. The relationship between a statutory corporation and its employees is normally governed by the relevant rules, regulations and standing orders. A statutory Corporation is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and its action is subject to judicial review in certain cases and certain circumstances. In the facts and circumstances of these cases, we have proceeded on that basis and we are of the opinion that it is the correct basis. The exercise of such power under regulations similar to the one impugned which has been upheld in various types of cases are instructive in their variety. It may be mentioned that the exercise of power under the very same Regulation 9(b) was upheld by the Court in a matter, wherein in an action by the employee of D.T.C., this Court in Delhi Transport Corporation Undertaking v. Balbir Saran Goel (1970)IILLJ20SC held that even if the employees of the respondent thought that he was a cantankerous man and it was not desirable to retain him in service it was open to them to terminate his services in terms of Regulation 9(b) and it was not necessary to dismiss by way of punishment for misconduct16. Reliance was placed on this decision by the High Court in the Judgment under appeal. The High Court in our opinion rightly pointed out, however, that the decision was on a different basis and could not be availed of in deciding controversy involved in the present determination17. It may be mentioned that the case of civil servants is, however, governed by their special constitutional position which accords them status; the legal relationship (between the Government and its servants) is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties of state are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. See the observations of this Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India (1968)ILLJ576SC D-E. But even then the services of a temporary civil servant (although entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution) is subject to termination by notice. But beside the above, the government may find it necessary to terminate the services of a temporary servant if it is not satisfied with his conduct or his suitability for the job and/or his work. See the observations of this Court in Champak Lal Chiman Lal Shah v. The Union of India (1964)ILLJ752SC . The services of a temporary government servant, further, may be terminated on one months notice whenever the government thinks it necessary or expedient to do so for administrative reasons. It is impossible, this Court observed, to define before hand all the circumstances in which the discretion can be exercised. The discretion was necessarily left to the Government. See observations of this Court in Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of M. P. (1970)ILLJ367SC19. It must, however, be borne in mind that in some recent cases this Court has taken the view that a regulation providing for the termination of the service of an employee of the public corporation by notice only or pay in lieu thereof is invalid under Article 14 of the Constitution. We have referred to the decisions of the Workmen of Hindustan Steels case (supra); West Bengal State Electricity Boards case (supra) and Central Inland Water Transport Corporations case (supra)We must lean in favour of that interpretation because it helps to sustain the validity of the lawFrom what the learned Attorney General submitted and what appears to be the correct that every legislature intends to act within its powers. therefore, in a limited Government, the legislature attempts to function within its limited powers. It would not, therefore, be expected to have intended to transgress its limitsThe provisions of the sections read as a whole, along with the explanations, make it reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence30. The principles of natural justice or holding of an enquiry is neither a universal principle of justice nor inflexible dogma. The principles of natural justice are not incapable of exclusion in a given situation. For example, Article 311(2) of the Constitution which essentially embodies the concept of natural justice, itself contemplates that there may be situations which warrant or permit the non-applicability of the principles underlying Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the second proviso to Article 311 of the Constitution. This court has also recognised that the rule of audi alteram partem can be excluded where having regard to the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provision, fairness in action does not demand its application and even warrants its exclusion. If importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands, natural justice could be avoided. See the observations of this Court in Maneka Gandhis case at p. 681 of the report (supra). This Court in Tulsi Ram Patels case (supra) had in terms ruled that not only, therefore, can the principles of natural justice be modified but in exceptional cases they can even be excluded. But the principles of natural justice must not be displaced save in exceptional casesThe reading down, the learned Attorney General conceded cannot, however, be done where there was no valid reason and where it would be contrary to proclaimed purpose. See the observations of this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [1981]1SCR20632. In any event Counsel is right that the observations made at p. 259 of the report (supra) were in a different context and the challenge based on Articles 19(1)(g) and 31 does not appear to have any substance in resolving the present controversy before usThere is no evidence from either side as to whether the appellant had worked somewhere else though the appellant did not work with the respondent because of his suspension. The appellant had, however, stated that he did not so work. In that view of the matter, if the contentions of the appellant are accepted that the clause under which the terms of employment of the appellant was agreed and under which the termination was effected without any enquiry and further in view of the fact that the learned trial Judge before whom the appellant had filed the suit first and decreed the suit declaring the appellant to be entitled to be in service, the appellant, in our opinion. should rightly be granted a monetary claim for Rs.4,83,061.90 paise and further interest at 6% from 30th September, 1984. This would be in consonance with justice and equity in the facts and the circumstances of this case. This order, however, will have to be passed if we accept the contention on behalf of the appellant herein on the construction of the clause94. In this connection, it may, however, be noted that the General Insurance was nationalised under the provisions of the General Insurance Provisions (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and the said Act came into force on 20th September, 1972. Prior to this, General Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 was passed under the provisions of which Act all undertakings of all Insurers vested in the Central Government with effect from 13th May, 1971. This was pending nationalisation which took place in 1972 as aforesaid96. The original terms and conditions had not been altered and the employees like the appellant in C.A. No. 855/84 continued to be governed by the original terms and conditions of the contract at the time of termination. The original terms and conditions of employment, therefore, continued in force. The contract of service was entered into when the appellant joined the Orissa Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. way back in 1961 and at the time of take-over by the Central Government was the Divisional Manager of the said society. After the take over by the Central Government of general insurance in 1972, a great deal of reorganisation had to be effected in order to tone up the system of general insurance which had become unwieldy due to the mushroom growth of societies with no control whatsoever when insurance was in private hands98. The above clause covered cases of retrenchment, abolition of posts and other situations which had been adjudicated upon by this Court. If, however, the Central Inland Waters case (supra) is applied, Smt. Shyamla Pappu submitted, then the management of the Intervener Company will be powerless even in a case of abolition of posts or retrenchment or any other allied situation. It is seen that the power to terminate an employee is co-existent with the power to appoint. Smt. Shyamla Pappu relied on the General Clauses Act and submitted that the Central Inland Waters case (supra) was erroneous in so far as it made a complete negation of this power. Then, it was submitted by her that in case of an employer who had made all the necessary investigation and the employee concerned has been fully heard before the order of termination and if the decision of Central Inland Waters case was applied, then even such a case would be a case of illegal termination, considering that there would be no power to terminate. It was submitted that the Central Inland Waters case had to be read down because paras 77, 92 and 93 of the report take in even private employment. The sweep of the judgment cannot hold good and had to be curtailed99. According to Smt. Pappu, what then was the position of terminations effected when the law was different? It cannot be said that they are entitled to relief now. It should be clarified that the judgment of this Court would apply prospectively, it was submitted. Past cases might be treated as concluded in view of the law prevailing at that time and also in view of the contentions urged by the parties in the courts below at various stages. In the event, this Court comes to the conclusion that even old cases would be covered by the judgment now rendered, the orders already passed may be upheld and a post-decisional hearing might be directed so that the management concerned has the opportunity of showing that there existed good reasons for termination though the same were not communicated to the employee concerned because the law then existing did not require such a communication. In the interest of justice, we should allow such a courseThe instances of actual user of power, however, are not wholly irrelevant on the question of the validity or extent of the power because these explain the extent and content of power and/or occasion for such user. Firstly, we have to, in view of the facts and the circumstances of the civil Appeal No. 2876 of 1986, consider the amplitude of the power under clause (b) of Regulation 9 of the Regulations concerned. We have noted the contents of that Regulation. We have also noted the amplitude of the expression of that power as was canvassed before the High Court in the matter under appeal and as noticed by the decision of this Court in Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Balbir Saran Goels case (supra). A survey of the several authorities of law and the development of law from time to time would lead one to the conclusion that the philosophy of the Indian Constitution, as it has evolved, from precedent to precedent, has broaden the horizons of the right of the employees and they have been assured security of tenures and ensured protection against arbitrariness and discrimination in discharge or termination of his employment. This is the basic concept of the evolution from the different angles of law of master and servant or in the evolution of employer and employee relationship. It is true that the law has travelled in different channels, government servants or servants or employees having status have to be differentiated from those whose relationships are guided by contractual obligations102. But it has to be borne in mind that we are concerned in these matters with the employees either of semi-Government or statutory corporations or public undertakings who enjoy the rights, privileges, limitations and inhibitions of institutions who come within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution103. We have noted the exhaustive and the learned analysis of the background of the diverse facts projected in the several cases and appeals before us105. We have noted several decisions, numerous as these are, and the diverse facts, as we have found. We have noted that in some cases arbitrary action or whimsical action or discriminatory action can flow or follow by the preponderance of these powers. The fact that the power so entrusted with a high ranking authority or body is not always a safe or sound insurance against misuse. At least, it does not always ensure against erosion of credibility in the exercise of the power in particular contingency. Yet, discipline has to be maintained, efficiency of the institution has to be ensured. It has to be recognised that quick actions are very often necessary in running of an institution or public service or public utility and public concern. It is not always possible to have enquiry because disclosure is difficult; evidence is hesitant and difficult, often impossible. In those circumstances, what should be the approach to the location of power and what should be the content and extent of power, possession and exercise of which is essential for efficient running of the industries or services? It has to be a matter both of balancing and adjustment on which one can wager the salvation of rights and liberties of the employees concerned and the future of the industries or the services involved106. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles and objects, it appears to us that the power to terminate the employment of permanent employment must be there. Efficiency and expediency and the necessity of running an industry or service make it imperative to have these powers. Power must, therefore, with authorities to take decision quickly, objectively and independently. Power must be assumed with certain conditions of duty. The preamble, the policy, purpose of the enacting provision delimit the occasions or the contingencies for the need for the exercise of the power and these should limit the occasions of exercise of such powers. The manner in which such exercise of power should be made should ensure fairness, avoid arbitrariness and mala fide and create credibility in the decisions arrived at or by exercise of the power. All these are essential to ensure that power is fairly exercised and there is fair play in action. Reasons, good and sound, must control the exercise of power108. Notice of hearing may or may not be given, opportunity in the form of an enquiry may or not be given, yet arbitrariness and discrimination and acting whimsically must be avoided. These power must, therefore, be so read that the powers can be exercised on reasons, reasons should be recorded, reasons need not always be communicated, must be by authorities who are competent and are expected to act fairly, objectively and independently. The occasion for the use of power must be clearly circumscribed in the above limits. These must also circumscribe that the need for exercise of those power without holding a detailed or prolonged enquiry is there109. As we have noted, a good deal of controversy was that these inhibitions or limitations or conditions are not there in the amplitude or the extent of the power enumerated or stated in Regulation 9(b) of the aforesaid Regulations concerned or of similar provisions that we have examined in these casesIf we do not read the conferment of the power in the manner we have envisaged before, the power is liable to be struck down as bad. This, we say in spite of the argument by many including learned Solicitor General of India and Smt. Shyamla Pappu that in contractual obligations while institutions or organisations or authorities, who come within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution are free to contract on the basis of hire and fire and the theory of the concept of unequal bargain and the power conferred subject to constitutional limitations would not be applicable. We are not impressed and not agreeable to accept that proposition at this stage of the evolution of the constitutional philosophy of master and servant framework or if you would like to call it employer or employee relationship. therefore, these conferment of the powers on the employer must be judged on the constitutional peg and so judged without the limitations indicated aforesaid, the power is liable to be considered as arbitrary and struck down114. Whenever a statute comes up for consideration, it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language, and for that matter any language in use today, is not an instrument of mathematical precision. It has been said that our literature would have been much the poorer if it were Leaving, however, the question of richness or poverty of our literature apart, we must proceed on the assumption that human mind cannot foresee everything. It has, therefore, been said that when a question arises whether the power has been properly conferred and even if so, the extent of it. Lord Denning has opined that a Judge in such a situation cannot simply fold his hand and blame the draftsmen and look for new enactment. Lord Denning invites us to set to work on the construction task of finding the intention of the Parliament or the law making body and we must, however, do this not only from the language of the statute, because, as we have seen, language is an imperfect medium and very often thoughts are perpetually in search of broken language. But the judge must also do it from a consideration of the social conditions which give rise to it, and of the mischief which it was intended to remedy and also in the light of the constitutional inhibitions and then supplant the written words and add to it end give force and life to the intention and purpose of the legislature or the law making authority. A judge must not alter the material of which a law or an instrument is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases and if one may venture to say, make articulate the inarticulate premise but make articulate only which follow from necessary compulsions of the situations and the constitutional position. See in this connection the observations of Lord Denning in " The Discipline of Law" at p. 12115. It is true that judicial jealously of legislature in law making has long been outdrawn, but the strict construction remains still an established rule. It is generally accepted principle that judges in interpreting statutes, should give effect to the legislators intent. By doing so, the courts do recognise their subordinate position and their obligation to help the legislature to achieve its purpose. But in that effort, creativity is essential. There have been differences of opinion on the practices that the courts may employ in attempting to discover the legislative intent. In the beginning, conventional practice was only to look to the words of the statutes. Now the entire spectrum has to be examined. It has been said that judges are not unfettered glossators116. It is true that there is no actual expression used enabling the legislation or the statute in question indicating the limitations or conditions as aforesaid. But it must proceed on the premise that the law making authority intended to make a valid law to confer power validly or which will be valid. The freedom, therefore, to search the spirit of the enactment or what is intended to obtain or to find the intention of the Parliament gives the Court the power to supplant and supplement the expressions used to say what was left unsaid. This is a power which is an important branch of judicial power, the concession of which it taken to the extreme is dangerous, but denial of that power would be ruinous and this is not contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature or the implied purpose of the legislation. It was not as Shri Ramamurthi tried to argue that legislature wanted to give an uncontrolled and absolute power to discharge employees on the part of the employers without any enquiry in all circumstances. That cannot be and that was not intended to be as can be implied from all the circumstances117. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I would sustain the constitutionality of this conferment of power by reading that the power must be exercised on reasons relevant for the efficient running of the services or performing of the job by the societies or the bodies. It should be done objectively, the reasons should be recorded, it should record this and the basis that it is not feasible or possible reasonably to hold any enquiry without disclosing the evidence which in the circumstances of the case would be hampering the running of the institution. The reasons should be recorded, it need not be communicated and only for the purpose of the running of the institution, there should be factors which hamper the running of the institution without the termination of the employment of the employee concerned at that particular time either because he is a surplus, inefficient, disobedient and dangerous119. I have noted the guidelines for the exercise of the power, preamble, relevant sections from which the reasons should be inferred and recorded, although they need not be communicate. These should be recorded in order to ensure effective judicial review in a given case. Termination simpliciter under Regulation 9(b) or similar powers can be exercised only in circumstances other than those in regulation 9(a). The exercise of such powers can only be for purposes germane and relevant to the statute. There are several illustrations of that, namely, the employee is incompetent or unsuitable so as to make his continuance in the employment detrimental to the interest of the institution, where the continuance of the employee is a grave security risk making his continuance detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and where because of the conduct of the employee, there is lack of confidence in the employee which makes it necessary in the interest of the Corporation to immediately terminate the services of the employee. These, however, are illustrative and not exhaustive. therefore, each case of the conferment of the power involved should be decided on the aforesaid basis120. I am conscious that clear intention as indicated in a legislation cannot be permitted to be defeated by means of construction. It has been said that if the legislature has manifested a clear intention to exercise an unlimited power, it is impermissible to read down the amplitude of that power so as to make it limited. I do not agree. Our legislatures are limited by the constitutional inhibitions and it is time, in my opinion, that we should read their Acts and enactments with the attribute that they know their limits and could not have intended to violate the Constitution. It is true that where there are clear, unambiguous and positive terms in a legislation, the Court should be loath to read down. It should proceed with a straight-forward method of striking down such legislations. But where the statute is silent or not expressive or inarticulate, the Court must read down in the silence of the statute and in the in articulation of its provisions, the constitutional inhibitions and transmute the major inarticulate premise into a reality and read down the statute accordingly. It is true perhaps, as has been said, that in the history of constitutional law, statutes are seldom read down to mean what they say and intend. It is begging the question. If the statutes are seldom read down to mean what they say and intend. It is begging the question. If the statute does not specifically say, in such circumstances, as to how do we find the intention to transgress the constitutional limitations. At least, the relevant provisions of the relevant statutes and the rules, mentioned hereinbefore, are, in my opinion, on these points, not expressive enough to betray an intention transgress constitutional limitations. I am afraid that reference to Elliott Ashton Welsh, II v. United States 398 US 333 : 26 L.Ed. 2d 308 is inept in the background of the principles we are confronted with. The plain thrust of legislative enactment has to be found out in the inarticulate expressions and in the silence of the legislation. In doing so, to say what the legislature did not specifically say, is not distortion to avert any constitutional collision. In the language of the relevant provisions with which we are confronted, I do not find that intention of the legislature to flout the constitutional limitations121. I am also unable to accept the contention of Mr. Garg as well as Mr. Ramamurthi that it is clear as a result of the constitutional position of the security of tenure of the employees as well as the expressed language of the provisions of several enactments that there is no valid power of the termination of employment of the permanent employees without holding an enquiry or giving an opportunity to the employees to rebut the charges on the grounds of termination in all circumstances. It was contended, as I have noted, by Shri R.K. Garg that no principle of interpretation permitted reading down a provision so as to make it into a different provision altogether different from what was intended by the legislature or its delegate. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in R.M.D.C.s case (supra). I am unable to accept this contention. It is not that the reading down is used for a purpose which is just the opposite which the legislature had intended. Legislature had not intended arbitrary or uncontrolled or whimsical power. Indeed it considered. This is not the proper way to read that power in the said Regulation 9(b). Para 522 of the Shastri Award, read properly, must be circumscribed with the conditions indicated above as a necessary corollary or consequence of that power. It is also not reading to the legislature conditions which were not there in the second proviso Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In view of the ratio of the five-judge Bench decision of this Court in Tulsirams case (supra), which had examined all the relevant decisions, I am unable to accept the submission of Shri R.K. Garg and Mr. Ramamurthi. Absolute powers, it is true, cannot be regulated without essential legislative policy, but here properly read, absolute power was not there. Power that was only constitutionally valid, that power can be presumed to have been given and if that presumption is made, conditions indicated above inevitably attach122. We are not concerned with the concept of industrial democracy sought to be propounded by Mr. Garg in this case. The validity and the propriety of having industrial democracy is not in issue. What is in issue is demonstrable fair play and justice, as sought for by Mr. Garg, in the exercise of the power which must be conceded as an essential attribute for proper functioning of the institution123. It is true that no drafts as such have been submitted by the learned Attorney General or by the learned Solicitor General nor by any counsel appearing for the management. But these conditions, which we have noted, are necessary corollary flowing from the conferment of the power of termination in a constitutional manner for the smooth, proper and efficient running of the industry124. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I am unable to accept the submissions of Mr. Garg and Mr. Ramamurthi. The power must be there, the power must be read down in the manner and to the extent indicated above, in my opinion, of terminating the services of permanent employees without holding any enquiry in the stated contingencies and this would be by either virtue of the silence of the provision indicating the contingencies of termination or by virtue of constitutional inhibitions. That reading would not violate the theory that judges should not make laws125. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I direct that whenever question of exercise of the power of termination of permanent employees by reasonable notice without holding any enquiry arises, the extent of the power should be read in the manner indicated above and we reiterate that such powers can be exercised for the purposes of the Act which will be determinable by the preamble and by relevant enacting provisions and the contingencies for the exercise of the power must be specified and powers should be exercised by authority competent and independent enough and should be articulated by reasons stated even if not communicated. These are the limitations inherent and latent in the framework of our Constitution and the power with these limitations is valid126. Having regard to the aforesaid view, I will have to dispose of the appeals in terms of the aforesaid principlesHaving regard to the finality of the position of law and having regard to the theory that parties have adjusted their rights on the understanding of the law as it was, in our opinion, justice of the situation would be met if we declare and hold that pending litigations should be examined in the light of the aforesaid principles and dispose of in the aforesaid light, namely, where issues of damages or consequences of termination by virtue of exercise of the power are still pending adjudication in any forum and have not been finally adjudicated, these should be re-examined by the appropriate authorities before whom these issues are pending in the light of these principles, that is say, the exercise of the power should be judged on these conditions and in the light of those conditions. If in the light of these conditions, the exercise of the power is valid, the termination should be held to be valid, if on the other hand, there was exercise without compliance with these conditions, the termination would be invalid and consequences in law of damages or reinstatement or others will follow. But previous terminations where the his is no longer pending before any authority will not be reopened. To that extent. I will declare this to be the law prospectively128. I had, after circulating the draft judgment herein, the advantage of the views of my learned brothers. They do not agree with me. With respect, I am definitely of the opinion that time has come for the judicial interpretation to play far more active, creative and purposeful role in deciding what is "according to law". Law as evolved in India today, in my opinion, makes the limitations on user of power quite clear and distinct, in this branch. These are constitutional limitations. therefore, every provision in any legislation by limited legislatures, in my opinion, should be judged bearing in mind that the legislature and the law-making authorities were aware and are bound by these constitutional limitations. These inhibitions must be read into these provisions so that law becomes effective, purposeful and legal. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that we should approach the question of constitutional limitations or inhibitions in our interpretation in deciding in each individual cases by not what has been but what may be. This is the role and purpose of constitutional interpretation by the apex Court of the country. I know that this view of mine is not shared in this decision by my learned brothers. I respect their views, but I would like to hope that one day or the other this Court would be mature enough to fulfil what is purposeful and I believe to be the true role and purpose of the Court in interpretation in the light of constitutional inhibitions. Having had the advantage of the views of my learned brothers, I regret, with respect, I cannot join them in their views. I am the loser for the same, but I will fondly hope only for the time being129. I believe that we must do away with the childish fiction that law is not made by the judiciary. Austin in his Jurisprudent at page 65, 4th edn. has described the Blackstones principle of finding the law as the childish fiction. Chief Justice K. Subba Rao in I.C. Golak Nath and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. [1967]2SCR762 has referred to these observations. This Court under Article 141 of the Constitution is enjoined to declare law. The expression declared is wider than the words found or made. To declare is to announce opinion. Indeed, the latter involves the process, while the former expresses result. Interpretation, ascertainment and evolution are parts of the process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is declared as law. The law declared by this Court is the law of the land. To deny this power to this Court on the basis of some outmoded theory that the Court only finds law but does not make it, is to make ineffective the powerful instrument of justice placed in the hands of the highest judiciary of this country. See the observations of Chief Justice K. Subba Rao in I.C. Golak Nath and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. (supra at pp. 813/14). I would, therefore, plead for a more active and creative role for the courts in declaring what the law is.