Case: Mannalal Jain Vs. The State Of Assam And Others

S.K. Das, J. (For himself ; Sinha C. J. and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.):1. This writ petition by one Mannalal Jain was originally filed on October 17, 1960, and the order complained of was dated September 13, 1960. This was an order made by the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, Gauhati, rejecting an application made by the petitioner for the grant of a license for the year 1960 for dealing in rice and paddy under the relevant provisions of the Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1960. This writ petition was put up for hearing in this Court on February 2, 1961 The hearing was, however, adjourned sine die, because it was stated before us that the period of license for 1960 had already expired and a fresh application would have to made for a license for 1961. A fresh application was accordingly made by the petitioner on February 4, 1961. But before that date a fresh Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1961, was made by the Governor of Assam and the application made by the petitioner had to be dealt with under the new Order. No order having been made on this fresh application by the Deputy Commissioner, the petitioner moved this Court by means of a petition (C. M. P. No. 850 of 1961) asking for certain reliefs, one of which was that the respondents, namely, the licensing authorities should be directed to consider the application of the petitioner and grant him a license. On April 11, 1961, an order was made rejecting the application of the petitioner. This order which is impugned before us was in these terms :"Having regard to the existing licenses in these areas (Mangaldai and Gauhati), and the quantity of foodgrains available therein, any further license would be superfluous".When the petition was again put up for hearing on May 1, 1961, the petitioner asked for time to amend his original petition which related to the order refusing to grant him a license for 1960. This amendment became necessary by reason of the subsequent order passed on April 11, 1961, quoted earlier, by which the petitioners application for a license for 1961 was rejected. This amendment was allowed. Therefore, we have now to deal with the writ petition as amended by the petition dated May 5, 1961 (C. M.P. No. 1140 of 1961).2. It is necessary now to state the relevant facts out of which the petition has arisen. The petitioner states that he is an Indian citizen carrying on a business dealing in rice and paddy in the district of Kamrup in the State of Assam. In 1955 was enacted the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955). In exercise of the powers conferred by S. 3, of the said Act, read with a notification by which the said powers were delegated by the Central Government to the Government of Assam, the latter Government made an Order called the Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1958. The result of this was that no dealing in rice and paddy in wholesale quantities was permissible unless the petitioner obtained a license from the relevant licensing authority. The petitioner states that he obtained such a license in 1958. This license expired on December 31, 1958. The case of the petitioner is that in 1959 also he carried on his business though there is some dispute as to whether he obtained a license for that year. On November 26, 1959, the petitioner received a letter from the office of the Deputy Director of Supply, Gauhati, which said that his license would not be renewed after December 31, 1959. This communication, it is stated, was the result of a decision taken by the Government of Assam on the advice of a body called the Food Advisory Council to give a right of monopoly procurement of paddy to a co-operative society in the district of Kamrup known as the Assam Co-operative Apex Marketing Society Ltd. (respondent No. 6 before us). In a letter dated November 13, 1959, the Director of Supply, Assam, indicated the policy to be followed to give effect to the decision aforesaid in these terms :"The right of monopoly procurement in respect of Kamrup district including Mangaldai Sub-division, Taxpur Sub- division, Cachar district, Nowgong district including United Mikir and North Cachar Hills and North Lakhimpur Sub-division has been given to the Co-operative Apex Marketing Society. The Society will procure paddy from the growers though various service Co-operative Societies spread over the district or sub-division. They will procure all available surplus paddy and deliver to Supply Department the quantity required for the buffer stock for those areas. Any paddy procured by them which is not required by us may be delivered to the mills."A copy of the letter was forwarded to all licensing authorities. On January 5, 1960, the Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1960, came into force. This replaced the earlier Order of 1958. Clause 5 of the 1960 Order was in these terms :"5. Matters to be taken into consideration for granting a license. - In granting or refusing a license under this Order, the licensing authority shall among other matters have regard to the following, namely :-(a) the stock of foodgrains available in the locality for which the license is required;(b) the number of persons who have applied for and/or been granted licenses in respect of the foodgrains under this Order in the locality;(c) the business ordinarily carried on by the applicant; and(d) the past activities of the applicant as a licensee or business man/firm.Provided that the State Government may from time to time modify the conditions for granting a license."On January 28, 1960, the petitioner made his application for a license for the year 1960. This application was rejected by an order dated February 17, 1960. The reason given for the rejection was in these terms :"You are hereby informed that as the Co-operative Apex Marketing Society has been given the right of monopoly purchase in the Kamrup district this year, your case cannot be considered for issue of the license."This reason was obviously based on the decision as to monopoly procurement which the Government of Assam had adopted.3. Against this order the petitioner moved the High Court of Assam by means of a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court allowed the petition mainly on the ground that the application of the petitioner for a license for the year 1960 was not considered on merits by the licensing authority in accordance with the provisions of Cl. 5 of the Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1960. The High Court did not go into the larger question whether the State could or could not create a monopoly in the matter of procurement of paddy under the said provisions by means of executive instructions issued to the licensing authorities. It, however quashed the order dated February 17, 1960, and issued a writ of mandamus directing the licensing authority to consider the application of the petitioner on merits and in accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Control Order. Till June 7, 1960, no order was passed by the licensing authority, and on that date the petitioner made two applications to the High Court, one for directing the licensing authority to grant him a license for 1960 and the other for taking action for contempt of court. A notice of these applications, it is stated, was served on the respondents. On June 8, 1960, the licensing authority made another order refusing to grant a license to the petitioner. This order stated that"as the Assam Co-operative Apex Marketing Society Ltd. had already, been granted a license to deal in rice and paddy, with its branches spread all over the district, it was considered unnecessary to grant further dealing licenses to individual dealers for the same area."On June 9, 1960, the applications earlier made by the petitioner to the High Court on June 7, 1960, were withdrawn and a fresh application was made on June 15, 1960, which was directed against order dated June 8, 1960. On August 10, 1960, the High Court again set aside the order and directed the licensing authority to act independently of instructions received from the Government and to apply its mind to the merits of the application and decide it in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1960, Again, no orders were made by the licensing authority till September 8, 1960, in accordance with the directions of the High Court, and the petitioner made two applications on that date : one for enforcing the direction of the High Court, and the other for initiating proceedings in contempt. These applications were admitted and it is stated that notices were served on the respondents, including the licensing authority, on that very date. On September 13, 1960, the licensing authority made another order, again rejecting the application of the petitioner. This order stated inter alia:"For the areas for which the applications have been made the Assam Co-operative Apex Marketing Society Ltd. has earlier applied for and has been granted license. This is a relevant consideration under Clause 5(b) of the Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1960, The stock of foodgrains available in the area can easily be procured by the party already given license. Being a co-operative, it has better facility in this respect.As such, I do not find it necessary to grant license to the applicant. The petition is, therefore, rejected."4. This time instead of going to the High Court of Assam, the petitioner came here and filed his writ petition on October 17, 1960 (Writ Petition No. 303 of 1960). Thereafter, certain proceedings took place in this Court to which we have earlier referred in the first paragraph of this judgment. The amended writ petition as it now stands is directed against the order of the licensing authority dated April 11, 1961, by which it rejected the application of the petitioner for a license for 1961. The provisions of the Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1960, are no longer relevant, because a fresh Order called the Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1961, was made by the Governor of Assam. We shall hereinafter call this the Control order, 1961. It is necessary to read here Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961."5. Matters to be taken into consideration for granting a license. -In granting or refusing a license under this Order, the licensing authority shall, among other matters, have regard to the following, namely :-(a) the stock of foodgrains available in the locality for which the license is required.(b) the number of persons who have applied for and those who have been granted licenses in respect of the foodgrains under this Order in the locality;(c) the business ordinarily carried on by the applicant;(d) the past activities of the applicant as a licensee or business man/firm; and(e) whether the applicant is a co-operative society,"It should be noticed that the proviso to old Cl. 5 was omitted and a new sub-cl. (e) was added. This sub-clause enables the licensing authority, in granting or refusing a license, to have regard to the consideration whether the applicant is a co-operative society. To complete the statement of facts, it may perhaps be observed that on November 10, 1960, the High Court rejected the application for proceeding against the opposite parties by way of contempt, mainly on the ground that the order made on September 13, 1960, was not before it.5. On behalf of the petitioner the order dated April 11, 1961, has been impugned on two main grounds. The first ground of attack is that sub-cl. (e) of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961, is ultra vires, because it goes beyond the powers granted to the State Government under S. 3 read with S. 5 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The second ground of attack is that even if sub-cl. (e) of cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961, is intra vires being within the power granted to the State Government, it merely allows the licensing authority to take into consideration, among other relevant matters, the circumstance that the applicant for a license is a co-operative society; it does not say that a monopoly right of procurement should be given in favour of a co-operative society by excluding all others; therefore, it was not open to the licensing authority to proceed on the footing as if that sub-clause had created a right of monopoly in favour of co-operatives. The argument is that in the present case the licensing authority instead of applying its mind lo the provisions of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961, went by the instructions issued by the State Government to grant a right of monopoly to co-operative societies and based its order on such instructions, in spite of directions to the contrary given by the High Court on earlier applications made by the petitioner. In other words, it is contended that the impugned order was a mere colourable exercise of power in the sense that instead of exercising the powers in accordance with the provisions of law by which the licensing authority had to be guided, it acted in accordance with the instructions of the State Government and granted a monopoly in favour of co-operative societies, such monopoly not being contemplated by the provisions of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961; therefore, the impugned order was bad being without any legal authority or jurisdiction, and as it took away the right of the petitioner to carry on his trade, and furthermore made a discrimination against him for the purpose of granting a monopoly to respondent No. 6 not contemplated by law, it violated the petitioners rights under Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. He is accordingly entitled to come to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution to have the order quashed. The petitioner has also claimed that for the same reasons, the grant of a license in favour of respondent No. 6 should also be quashed.6. On behalf of the respondents, the State of Assam, its officers, and the Assam Co-operative Apex Marketing Society Ltd. (respondent No. 6), it has been urged that neither of the aforesaid two grounds of attack is valid. On their behalf the argument is that sub-cl. (e) of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961, is within the authority and power granted to the State Government under S. 3 read with S. 5 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Secondly, it is contended that no monopoly has been granted to the Assam Co-operative Apex Marketing Society Ltd., and the order of the licensing authority dated April 11, 1961, is based on the considerations referred to in sub-cls. (a) and (b) of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961, and cannot be assailed on a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution.7. We proceed now to a consideration of the grounds of attack and the replies thereto. As to the first ground of attack it must be made clear at the very outset that the vires of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, have not been challenged before us. What has been contended before us is that S. 3 of the Act gives certain powers to the Central Government, which powers the Central Government has delegated to the State Government of Assam. These powers, it is contended, do not authorise the insertion of sub-cl. (e) of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961; in other words, the argument is that whether the applicant for a license is a co-operative society or not has no relevance whatsoever to the objects for which S. 3 grants the powers to the Central Government or its delegate to make certain Orders. Sub-section (1) of S. 3 is relevant to this argument and reads:"3 (1). If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, it may by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein."Sub-section (2) of S. 3 which we need not read enumerates the various categories of Orders which can be made in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. (1), but without prejudice to the generality of those powers. Now, the argument before us is that the powers under S. 3 can be exercised when the Central Government or its delegate is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient to exercise the powers to achieve two objects : (a) for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or (b) for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. It is contended that the circumstance whether the applicant for a license is a co-operative society or not has no connection whatsoever with the aforesaid two objects and therefore, sub-cl. (e) of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961, is not within the powers granted by S. 3 of the Act.8. We cannot accept this argument in the very broad terms in which it has been stated. We are satisfied that Cl. 5 of the Control order, 1961, does not provide for a monopoly in favour of co-operative societies. The clause enumerates five matters and states that the licensing authority shall have regard to those matters in granting or refusing a license. The five matters enumerated in the clause are not exhaustive of the matters which the licensing authority may consider; because the clause says that the matters enumerated therein are five "among other matters" which the licensing authority may consider. Obviously enough it is open to the licensing authority to consider all matters relevant to the grant or refusal of a license and the five matters enumerated in the clause merely highlight some of those matters. All that can be said is that sub-cl.(e) enables the licensing authority to prefer a co-operative society in certain circumstances in the matter of granting a license; in other words, there may be cases or localities where the consideration set out in sub-cl. (e) may override other considerations in the matter of granting a license. We do not think that sub-cl. (e) has any more far-reaching effect. Indeed, the learned Attorney-General appearing for the respondents conceded that sub-cl. (e) of Cl. 5 did not have the effect of creating a monopoly in favour of co-operative societies.9. Proceeding, therefore, on the footing that sub-cl. (e) of Cl. 5 does not provide for the creation of a monopoly can it be said that it is outside the powers conferred on the State Government by S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 ? It is not disputed before us that sub-cls. (a) to (d) fall within the powers conferred by S. 3. Matters such as the stock of foodgrains available in the locality for which the license is required the number of persons who have applied for and those who have been granted licenses in the locality, the business ordinarily carried on by the applicant, and the past activities of the applicant as a licensee or businessman, are undoubtedly matters which have relation to the two objects mentioned in S. 3. Can it be said that the fifth matter mentioned in sub-cl. (e), viz., whether the applicant is a co-operative society, is completely unrelated to those two objects? We are unable to say that it is. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents it has been stated that co-operative societies have better facilities for procuring food grains and are in a position to ensure scheduled prices to the farmers who grow paddy. It has been further stated that amongst the co-operative societies are primary societies which consist of the growers of paddy; there are also co-operative societies called supply co-operatives, which are in a position to eliminate middle-mans profits. In para. 4 it was stated that the National Development Council decided that the State should take over wholesale trade in foodgrains with a view to maintaining price levels which are fair to the producer and the consumer and reduce to the minimum the disparity between the prices received by the farmer and the prices paid by the consumer throughout the year. It was also decided that an adequate number of primary marketing societies should be set up and linked with village co-operatives which should serve as agencies for collection and sale of foodgrains at assured prices at the village level. The affidavit then stated :"In view of the decision of the National Development Council the Government of Assam in consultation with their State Food Advisory Council decided that in making procurement of rice and paddy in the State, preference should be given to the co-operative societies wherever they have resources and facilities."We are of the view that by reason of the position which co-operative societies may occupy in the village economy of a particular area, it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that sub-cl. (e) of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961, is unrelated to the objects mentioned in S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. There may be places or areas where co-operative societies are in a better position for maintaining or increasing supplies of rice and paddy and even for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. We must, therefore, repel the very broadly stated contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that sub-cl. (e) of Cl. 5 of the Control Order 1961, can have no relation whatsoever to the two objects mentioned in S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed on the decision in Ramanlal Nagardas v. M. S. Palnitkar, AIR 1961 Gujarat 38. That was a case in which the validity of State action in entrusting wholesale distribution of sugar which is an essential commodity under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, to Co-operative Societies only and excluding other dealers holding similar licenses like the co-operative societies from such distribution, was challenged and arose for consideration. It was held that a State could make a classification for the purpose of achieving particular legislative objects but the classification must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be founded on intelligible differentia, and (2) the differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved. The question was considered from the point of view of Art. 14 of the Constitution and it was held that the action of the State Government in entrusting wholesale distribution of sugar to co-operative societies to the exclusion of other licence-holders amounted to a discrimination which violated the right guaranteed under Art. 14. The principles underlying Art. 14 of the Constitution are now well-settled and have been enunciated and explained in a number of decisions of this Court and we consider it unnecessary to refer to those principles it detail. In the case under our consideration no discrimination has been made between one class of license-holders and another class of license-holders as in the case of AIR 1961 Gujarat 38. What has happened in the present case is that licenses have been granted only to co-operative societies and a license has been denied to the petitioner, the licensing authority proceeding on the footing that a monopoly must be created in favour of co-operative societies. A discrimination has indeed taken place as against, the petitioner, a discrimination which is not justified by the provisions of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961. In dealing with the application of the petitioner the licensing authority has made a discrimination which is not justified by Cl. 5. That would take us to the second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, but on his first argument the decision in AIR 1961 Guj. 38 is of no assistance. Sub-clause (e) of Cl. 5, we have already stated, enables the licensing authority to give preference to a co-operative society in certain circumstances, but it does not create a monopoly in favour of co-operative societies. The preference given has a reasonable relation to the objects of the legislation set out in S. 3 of the Act; therefore, sub-cl. (e) of Cl. (5) of the Control Order, 1961, cannot be held to be bad on the ground of class legislation, but the passing of an order under the sub-clause for a purpose not contemplated by it will amount to discrimination and denial of the guarantee of equal protection of the law.10. This brings us to the second argument urged on behalf of the petitioner and here we think that the learned counsel for the petitioner is on much surer ground. It was open to the licensing authority to give preference to co-operative societies if it was of the opinion that granting a license to a co-operative society in a particular locality would facilitate the objects of S. 3 of the Act. This is not what the licensing authority did. He repeatedly refused a license to the petitioner, for the only reason and purpose of granting a monopoly to co-operative societies. In other words, the discrimination that has been made by the licensing authority is really in the administration of the law. It has been administered in a discriminatory manner and for the purpose of achieving an ulterior object, namely, the creation of a monopoly in favour of co-operatives, an object which, clearly enough, is not within sub-cl. (e) of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961. We have quoted earlier the various orders which the licensing authority had passed. Those orders clearly show that the licensing authority refused a license to the petitioner not on grounds referred to in sub-cls. (a) and (b) of Cl. 5 but on the ground that the State Government had decided to introduce a right of monopoly procurement of paddy in favour of co-operative societies and therefore, no licenses should be granted to individual dealers other than co-operative societies. Judged against the background of facts to which we have earlier referred in this judgment, the impugned order dated April 11 1961, appears to us to have been based on the same ground, namely, the creation of a monopoly in favour of co-operatives, even though the order refers to existing licenses and the quantity of foodgrains available in the locality. In the course of the hearing before us, the case was adjourned in order to give the parties an opportunity of filing necessary affidavits to show whether individual dealers other than co-operatives have been completely excluded in the whole of the State in the matter of dealing in paddy. The affidavits show that private dealers have been completely excluded. In the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, it has been stated in para. 4:"It is not denied that in the year 1961 licenses for the procurement of paddy have been issued to the co-operatives in all the paddy producing districts in Assam."To show however that no monopoly has been created in favour of a particular co-operative society like respondent No. 6, it has been stated that a number of co-operative societies have been or are being granted licenses for the procurement of paddy. In our view these statements in the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents show only one and one object, viz., creation of a monopoly in favour of co-operatives. To achieve that object the State Government has resorted to an indirect method. Instead of making an order authorising such monopoly (if the State was competent to make such an Order under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, as to which we express no opinion), it has chosen to adopt the indirect method of issuing instructions to the licensing authorities in all the districts to grant licenses to co-operatives only. The vice of the impugned order lies in the licensing authority accepting such instructions and passing an order in accordance therewith. The duty of the licensing authority was to pass orders in accordance with Cl. 5 of the Control order, 1961. Instead of doing that, it passed an order in accordance with the instructions given to it on behalf of the State Government, instructions which appear to us to be not in consonance with sub-cl. (e) of Cl. 5; because sub-cl. (e) contemplates a preference to co-operative societies in certain circumstances, but not a monopoly in their favour.11. We accordingly hold that the impugned order is bad as violating the rights of the petitioner guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. We must, therefore, quash the order of the licensing authority dated April 11, 1961. We must also quash the order by which the licensing authority granted a license in favour of respondent No. 6.The licensing authority must now consider the application of the petitioner for a license for the year 1961 on merits along with the application of respondent No. 6 and such other applications as may be still pending. In dealing with these applications the licensing authority must have regard to the provisions of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961, and such other provisions of law as have a bearing on them, in the light of the observations made in this judgment. It would be the duty of the licensing authority to ignore all instructions which are not, in consonance with the provisions of law by which it is to be guided. As the year 1961 will come to an end within a few months, the applications should be dealt with as expeditiously as possible so that the right of the petitioner may not be rendered anfractuous by reason of the delay made in disposing of the applications.12. Before we part with this case we must express our deep concern over the manner in which the State Government or its officers have issued instructions in the matter of granting of licenses, instructions which clearly enough are not in consonance with the provisions of law governing the grant of such licenses. We doubt the wisdom of issuing executive instructions in matters which are governed by provisions of law; even if it be considered necessary to issue instructions in such a matter, the instructions cannot be so framed or utilised as to override the provisions of law. Such a method will destroy the very basis of the rule of law and strike at the very root of orderly administration of law.We have thought it necessary to refer to this matter because we feel that the instructions which the State Government or its officers have issued in the matter of granting of licenses for the procurement of paddy are not in consonance with the provisions of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961.

Decision:
1[ds]Obviously enough it is open to the licensing authority to consider all matters relevant to the grant or refusal of a license and the five matters enumerated in the clause merely highlight some of those matters. All that can be said is that sub-cl.(e) enables the licensing authority to prefer a co-operative society in certain circumstances in the matter of granting a license; in other words, there may be cases or localities where the consideration set out in sub-cl. (e) may override other considerations in the matter of granting a license. We do not think that sub-cl. (e) has any more far-reaching effect. Indeed, the learned Attorney-General appearing for the respondents conceded that sub-cl. (e) of Cl. 5 did not have the effect of creating a monopoly in favour of co-operativeprinciples underlying Art. 14 of the Constitution are now well-settled and have been enunciated and explained in a number of decisions of this Court and we consider it unnecessary to refer to those principles it detail. In the case under our consideration no discrimination has been made between one class of license-holders and another class of license-holders as in the case of AIR 1961 Gujarat 38. What has happened in the present case is that licenses have been granted only to co-operative societies and a license has been denied to the petitioner, the licensing authority proceeding on the footing that a monopoly must be created in favour of co-operative societies. A discrimination has indeed taken place as against, the petitioner, a discrimination which is not justified by the provisions of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961.We accordingly hold that the impugned order is bad as violating the rights of the petitioner guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. We must, therefore, quash the order of the licensing authority dated April 11, 1961. We must also quash the order by which the licensing authority granted a license in favour of respondent No. 6.The licensing authority must now consider the application of the petitioner for a license for the year 1961 on merits along with the application of respondent No. 6 and such other applications as may be still pending. In dealing with these applications the licensing authority must have regard to the provisions of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961, and such other provisions of law as have a bearing on them, in the light of the observations made in this judgment. It would be the duty of the licensing authority to ignore all instructions which are not, in consonance with the provisions of law by which it is to be guided. As the year 1961 will come to an end within a few months, the applications should be dealt with as expeditiously as possible so that the right of the petitioner may not be rendered anfractuous by reason of the delay made in disposing of the applications.12. Before we part with this case we must express our deep concern over the manner in which the State Government or its officers have issued instructions in the matter of granting of licenses, instructions which clearly enough are not in consonance with the provisions of law governing the grant of such licenses. We doubt the wisdom of issuing executive instructions in matters which are governed by provisions of law; even if it be considered necessary to issue instructions in such a matter, the instructions cannot be so framed or utilised as to override the provisions of law. Such a method will destroy the very basis of the rule of law and strike at the very root of orderly administration of law.We have thought it necessary to refer to this matter because we feel that the instructions which the State Government or its officers have issued in the matter of granting of licenses for the procurement of paddy are not in consonance with the provisions of Cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961.