Case: Union of India Vs. Jiwajirao Sugar Company Limited and Others

1. Leave granted. 2. The challenge in Civil Appeal No. ... of 1997 [arising out of SLP (C) No. 7764 of 1981] and the connected matters is to the judgment of the High Court dated 3-4-1981 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 707 of 1978. Both sides are partly aggrieved by the judgment. The challenge in the appeals filed by the owners of the sugar factories is only to the construction of clause 3(1)(e) of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 while the challenge by the Union of India is on two other points relating to the method of rounding off and the rebate which has been rejected by the High Court. There is nothing shown to us in the appeals of the Union of India to suggest any infirmity in the High Courts order on the two points of rounding off and rebate. The appeals of Union of India must, therefore, fail3. The only surviving question for decision is in the appeals of the owners of the sugar factories relating to the meaning of the expression "the recovery of the sugar from sugarcane" in clause 3(1)(e). The view taken by the High Court following the earlier decision is that the best period for crushing of sugarcane from the point of view of yield of sugar is admittedly from December to March and therefore, the percentage of recovery of sugar from sugarcane during that period ought to be taken into account in fixation of minimum price of sugarcane payable by the producers of sugar to the cane-growers in accordance with clause 3. Learned counsel for the appellant-factory owner placed reliance on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Shervani Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India 1979 AIR(all) 394] in support of his contention that the average percentage of recovery of sugar for the entire crushing season should be taken into account and not merely the period from December to March when the yield is the maximum. It was submitted that there are no words of limitation in clause 3(1)(e) to restrict the period only to that during which the yield of sugar was maximum from the sugarcane. We are unable to accept this contention. We are in agreement with the reasons given by the High Court for taking the view that the period from December to March, when the yield of sugar is maximum, could be taken into account in price fixation and that such an opinion of the Central Government cannot be said to be irrelevant or unreasonable. This is so because clause 3(1)(e) of the order does not specifically provide that the entire crushing season or year should be taken into account for the purpose of this provision and moreover the construction made by the High Court is beneficial to the cane-grower which promotes the object of the enactment of that provision. It cannot be said that the view taken by the High Court is not a permissible view on the language used in clause 3(1)(e). That being so, even if the other construction, suggested by the learned counsel for factory owners, be a possible construction of the provision, the former has to be preferred because it promotes the object of the provision being beneficial to the cane-growers as against the factory owners. This alone is sufficient to affirm the view taken by the High Court. We find no ground to interfere even in the. appeals filed by the factory owners. Consequently, all these appeals - of the Union of India as well as those of the factory owners - are dismissed. No costsIAs Nos. 2-4 of 1997 in CAs Nos. 2217-2219 of 1979

Decision:
0[ds]We are unable to accept this contention. We are in agreement with the reasons given by the High Court for taking the view that the period from December to March, when the yield of sugar is maximum, could be taken into account in price fixation and that such an opinion of the Central Government cannot be said to be irrelevant or unreasonable. This is so because clause 3(1)(e) of the order does not specifically provide that the entire crushing season or year should be taken into account for the purpose of this provision and moreover the construction made by the High Court is beneficial to thewhich promotes the object of the enactment of that provision. It cannot be said that the view taken by the High Court is not a permissible view on the language used in clause 3(1)(e). That being so, even if the other construction, suggested by the learned counsel for factory owners, be a possible construction of the provision, the former has to be preferred because it promotes the object of the provision being beneficial to theas against the factory owners. This alone is sufficient to affirm the view taken by the High Court. We find no ground to interfere even in the. appeals filed by the factory owners. Consequently, all these appealsof the Union of India as well as those of the factory ownersare dismissed. No costsIAs Nos.of 1997 in CAs Nos.