Case: Hindustan Lever Limited Vs. Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha & Another

T.K. CHANDRA SHEKHARA DAS, J.The petitioner challenges in this writ petition the order of the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay, passed in Complaint (ULP) No. 751 of 1982 dated 27-7-1995. By this order the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay, has allowed the complaint filed by the first respondent under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971, holding that the petitioner has committed unfair labour practice by non-implementation of the settlement dated 27-1-1971 and also by refusal to negotiate with the first respondent. The Industrial Court based on facts pleaded before it framed the following four issues."1. Does the complainant prove that respondent has committed unfair labour practice under Item No. 9 of Schedule IV by committing failure to implement settlement dated 27-1-1971 and the agreement arrived at under the correspondence entered into with the complainant in 19572. Whether the case is barred by limitation3.Whether the complaint is barred by principle of res judicata4. What order"The Industrial Court found all these issues in favour of the first respondent.2. In order to proceed further it is necessary to refer a few relevant facts for the purpose of deciding this case.3. The petitioner is a company and the first respondent is a Trade Union working in the petitioner company. It is alleged in the complaint filed by the first respondent before the Industrial Court that by correspondence exchanged between the parties in the year 1957 certain agreement has been reached between them. One of the conditions of the agreement was that the petitioner will not contest in any future dispute the status of the members of the field force such as salesman, sales supervisor, trade mark investigator, seed buyers etc. as workman. In other words, according to the said agreement, the status of the field force as workman will not be questioned by the petitioner in the matter of their service conditions and Industrial Tribunal or Court at Bombay will have jurisdiction to decide such matter relating to the field force of the first respondent. It is further alleged in the complaint that sometime in the year 1970 the Bombay Centre of the first respondent Sabha served a charter of demand on the petitioner company which not only pertains to the members of the Bombay branch field force but also to the other clerical staff in the petitioner companys Bombay Offices and the same came to be referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication and the status of the field force came to be disputed by the Company as not being workmen under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said reference is numbered as Reference (IT) No. 203 of 1970. The said reference has culminated into an award by Mr. Justice Chitale holding that the members of the field force are not workmen. This award was passed on 6-1-1975. It is to be noted that the said award was taken to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the first respondent. It is further alleged that during the pendency of this reference the petitioner company on 27-1-1971 entered into an All India settlement on the charter of demands on behalf of the members of the field force but did not implement the same as far as the Bombay Region field force was concerned since the reference was pending adjudication before the aforesaid Tribunal of Mr. Justice Chitale. It is the further contention of the first respondent that immediately on the pronouncement of the award of Mr. Justice Chitale in Reference (IT) No. 203 of 1970 the petitioner company by individual letters addressed to members of the field force and informed them that the benefit under the settlement dated 27-1-1971 has been withdrawn and it is alleged that this withdrawal has been accepted by the individual employees.4. It has been further disclosed from the pleadings of the parties that nothing has happened or heard for a considerable period about this controversy. But on 8-2-1984 the first respondent brought to the notice of the petitioner that in view of the agreement of 1957, the petitioner is bound to negotiate on the 1973 charter of demands pertaining to the members of the field force. In the meantime, a reference came to be filed before the Delhi Industrial Tribunal consequent on the termination of the service of the first respondents working President without a domestic enquiry. It was challenged before the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi. In that proceedings, the petitioner has taken up a stand that the reference was not maintainable because the said employee was not a workman, under the Industrial Disputes Act. This contention of the petitioner company was resisted by the first respondent contending that the letters exchanged between the petitioner and the first respondent on 24-1-1957, 24-4-1957 and 1-5-1957, referred to above, amount to an agreement between the parties and one of the conditions of the agreement was that the petitioner company has agreed that the members of the field force are workman and, therefore, the Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, rejected the contention of the first respondent and ultimately the matter taken upto the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in an elaborate judgment which is reported in 1984(I) L.L.J. 388 in (The Workmen of M/s. Hindustan Lever Ltd. and others v. The Management of M/s. Hindustan Lever Ltd.)1, in unequivocal terms held that the aforesaid three letters constitute a valid agreement and the said agreement continues to be valid and binding between the parties unless and until the same have been repudiated or replaced by another agreement between the parties. Construing the judgments of the Supreme Court that it gives the parties liberty to repudiate the agreement of 1957, the petitioner unilaterally repudiated the agreement by sending a letter dated 9/14-1-1984. At the same time, it appears that the aforesaid judgment by the Supreme Court gave an impetus to the first respondent to revive their original claims about which the first respondent has slept over for about 13 years and by their letter dated 8-2-1984 optimistically urged that the petitioners are bound to implement this agreement/settlement of 27-1-71 and to start negotiations with first respondent on the charter of demand of 1973. The petitioners did not heed to this demand. Ultimately above complaint has been filed before the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay. As declared by the Supreme Court, the Industrial Court held that there was an agreement between the parties which recognise the status of the members of the field force of the petitioner company as workman. The Industrial Court issued following orders:---"Complaint is allowed. It is hereby declared that the respondent company has committed unfair labour practice under Item No. 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1972. The respondent company is hereby directed to cease and desist from engaging in unfair labour practice under Item No. 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. The respondent is hereby further ordered and directed to take such affirmative action as to implement the provisions of the agreement of 1957 and settlement of 1971 and pay out all arrears of amounts due and payable, within the period of three months, to the members of the field force. The respondent is hereby further directed to take such affirmative action as to start negotiations with the complainant Sabha on the charter of demands, dated 31-12-1973, in order to arrive at a settlement if possible on the issues covered by the said charter of demands."5. Mr. Manohar, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, strongly contended that though the Supreme Court has stated in the aforesaid judgment that the three letters constitute a binding agreement between the parties, it is no longer in force as the petitioner repudiated that contract unilaterally. He contended that there is no agreement between the parties on the date of the complaint. He argued that the Supreme Court itself indicates in its judgment that the said agreement will be valid and in force only till it is repudiated. Senior Advocate Mr. Singhvi appearing for the first respondent-Union, on the other hand, argued that in industrial law no settlement could be unilaterally terminated. Law does not envisage a vacuum in the relationship between the workmen and the employer. He submitted that a settlement can be undone or brought to an end only by another settlement between the parties. Dwelling upon this point, Mr. Manohar further argued that what normally has been in force in a settlement till another settlement is arrived at between the parties, are only the conditions of service and not in any other matter. He submitted that the three letters of 1957 does not lay down any conditions of service of the members of the field force and, therefore, the petitioner is at liberty to withdraw unilaterally from those agreement. However, we cannot accept this contention of Mr. Manohar. We see considerable force in the argument of Mr. Singhvi as far as this aspect of the matter is concerned. Ambit and the scope of those three letters were in detail examined by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. By those letters the petitioner had unmistakably conceded the status of workmen and we have no hesitation to hold that it pertains to the conditions of service. That apart, after the judgment of the Supreme Court on these letters, there is little scope for such contentions being raised at the instance of the petitioner. The Supreme Court without any pale of doubt has spoken in detail the ambit and scope of those letters constituting an agreement between the parties. Though Mr. Manohar, Counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously argued at length about termination of the agreement citing various decisions of the Supreme Court and High Court, we are not very much impressed because it is not permissible for us to take any other stand different from what was taken by the Apex Court in view of the judgment (supra) which speaks about the conditions contained in those letters. Therefore, finding recorded on Issue No. 1 by the Tribunal warrants no interference by this Court.6. Before we take up for consideration issue No. 2 with regard to limitation it is necessary to know how these letters were treated by the parties before the Supreme Court speaks about those letters. It has come out on records of the Industrial Court that Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha had been registered at Calcutta. But it had its Bombay Centre which was representing and espousing the cause of the employees at Head Office and Bombay Branch establishment of the Company located at Bombay. Prior to 1964, Bombay Centre did not have representative character. But after 1964, the Bombay Centre of the Sabha and Central Committee worked as two different and independent entities. There was even civil litigation between these two and in 1966 Central Committee had superseded Managing Committee of the Bombay Centre. After the suits came to be dismissed, Bombay Centre started representing the field force in the State of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Goa. It appears that Bombay Centre started independent negotiations with management. They did not even rely upon those letters of 1957 exchanged between the Central Committee and the Management. They even ignored these letters and agreed for an independent reference to the Tribunal which exercise jurisdiction over Bombay region. That is how the award of Mr. Justice Chitale in Reference (IT) No. 203 of 1970 came to be passed in which the question whether the field staff is a workman or not was allowed to be adjudicated by both parties, dehors the letters of 1957. The award of Mr. Justice Chitale was passed on 6-1-1975. It has come out in evidence that this award, at the instance of union, was challenged before the Supreme Court by way of a S.L.P. which was rejected by the Apex Court on 1-10-1975. Thereafter both parties reconciled with the position that the Award of Mr. Justice Chitale has become final. By conduct of the parties it can be referred that as far as Bombay Centre of Sabha and field staff of the Bombay region were concerned, Award of Mr. Justice Chitale concluded the issue. The fact that Bombay Centre Committee and Central Committee were acting as two independent and separate units is evident from the records. The statement of Mr. Shaikh who was examined on behalf of the first respondent Union is the simple testimony for this position. In cross-examination he says:-"I was the Member of the Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay Unit. It is correct that there were separate units registered separately under the Trade Unions Act."The petitioner examined Balkrishna Babulal Nagar. He served the petitioner company from May 1, 1952 to February 29, 1994. His affidavit dated March 8, 1988 was treated as examination-in-chief. He stated that after the award dated January 6, 1975 passed by Mr. Justice Chitale the petitioner company revised the service conditions of the field force and offered fresh terms and conditions by their letter dated June 30, 1975. Out of about 400 field force, except for one per cent, all others constituting 99 per cent of the field force accepted the terms and conditions including Mr. Shaikh and Mr. Pai. All field force employees attached with the Bombay Branch accepted the fresh terms and conditions offered by the company. By this revision, the terms and conditions of service were revised upward with retrospective effect from May 1, 1970 with regard to the field force in Bombay Branch. Thereafter till date, the service conditions of the field force have been revised about 14 times and substantial benefits have been given to the field force and they have always accepted these benefits and enjoyed these benefits. Several new allowances were also introduced after 1975, namely House Rent Allowance, Leave Travel Allowance, Medical benefits etc. The agreement of 1971 was not applicable to the field force employed in the Bombay Branch. The field force voluntarily accepted the terms and conditions offered to them by letter dated June 30, 1975 as also the benefits by subsequent revisions. It is relevant to reproduce his affidavit in its entirety and the same reads thus:"I, Shri Balkrishna Babulal Nagar, residing at 503, Mangal Varsha, West Avenue Road, Santacruz (West), Bombay - 400 054, aged about 64 years, state on solemn affirmation as under:1. I say that I was working with Hindustan Lever Limited, the respondent abovenamed, from 1st May, 1952 to 29th February, 1984 and I retired as Senior Industrial Relations Manager of the Company. I am fully conversant with the terms and conditions of the field force as they were then and as they were revised from time to time.2. I say that I have read the written statement filed by the company dated 23rd January, 1985 and I confirm that the contents of the said written statement are true and correct and I adopt the same and the same may be treated as part of this affidavit as if the entire written statement has been set out herein.3. I say that Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha has different centres located at different locations and each centre functions with a distinct identity as an independent Unit of the Union. I say that HLMS had a Bombay Centre of the Sabha which represented the employees in Head Office and Bombay Branch establishments of the Company located at Bombay. Prior to 1964, the Bombay Centre of the Sabha did not seek any representative character or status qua the field force employees who were represented by the Central Committee of the Sabha which negotiated for the field force members all over India. However, sometime after 1964, differences surfaced between the Bombay Centre of the Sabha and the Central Committee of the Sabha. In 1966 the Central Committee of the Sabha suspended the Managing Committee of the Bombay Centre of the Sabha which was disputed by the Managing Committee of the Bombay Centre. The Central Committee of the Sabha thereafter preferred a Civil Suit bearing No. 5458 of 1966 before the City Civil Court at Bombay seeking certain reliefs by way of declaration and injunction against the Central Committee of the Sabha at Bombay. While the Company was not a direct party to the said proceedings, it was subsequently understood from the Central Committee of the Bombay Centre of the Sabha that the suit had been dismissed and they continued to be representative body for the employees of the Head Office and Bombay Branch establishments i.e. including the field force employed in the State of Maharashtra, Gujarat, M.P. and the Union Territory of Goa and that the Company should continue to deal with them.4. I say that differences grew so much so that in the year 1969, the Bombay Centre of the complainant submitted a charter of demands which, inter alia, contained demands in respect of employees in the category of field force attached to the Bombay Branch establishment working in the above mentioned political States. The Central Committee of the Sabha has in the past submitted a charter of demands in respect of field force employees all over India and sought negotiations. In view of the rival contentions between the Bombay Centre of the Sabha and the Central Committee of the Sabha seeking to represent the employees in the category of field force attached to the Bombay Branch, the company sought assistance of the Maharashtra Labour Department in identifying the representative body in respect of the field force attached to the Bombay Branch. The Company by its letter dated 8th August, 1969 addressed to the Asstt. Labour Commissioner, Maharashtra, wrote as follows:"This has reference to the preliminary proceedings held on 29th July, 1969 before you in connection with the letter dated 22nd July, 1968 from the Bombay Centre of the Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha raising certain demands in respect of field force employees attached to our Bombay Branch. On our objection about the competence of the applicants to raise a dispute on behalf of the field force employees referred to above, you had directed the Centre Secretary of the Sabha to produce before you the relevant letters of authority from the concerned employees to enable you to give a ruling on our aforesaid objection.We have now received a letter from the Centre Secretary of the Bombay Centre of Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha stating that he has already produced individual authority letters from the members of the field force and other relevant papers before you as per your direction. In order to enable us to decide our future course of action, we would request you to let us know your decision on the question whether the Bombay Centre of the Hindustan Lever Mazdoor is representative of the members of the field force attached to our Bombay Branch. We understand from Mr. Joshi, Centre Secretary of the Sabha, that the next hearing is fixed for 18th August, 1969. Kindly confirm."The Asstt. Commissioner of Labour, Maharashtra, vide her letter dated 13th August, 1969 replied as follows:"Please refer to your letter dated 8th August, 1969 on the above subject. The Centre Secretary of the Bombay Centre of the Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha has produced necessary individual letters from the members of the field force attached to the Bombay Branch before the undersigned and the undersigned has satisfied herself that the Bombay Centre of the Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha is competent to represent the members of the field force attached to the Bombay Centre."This confirmed that the field force employees attached to the Bombay Branch had loyalty and commitment to the Bombay Centre of the Sabha and not to the Central Committee of the Sabha and it was only the former viz. Bombay Centre of the Sabha, which had a true representative character qua the employees of the Bombay Centre. Accordingly, Mr. Rindani, Personnel Manager at that time, wrote a letter to the Central Committee that negotiations would take place with them only in respect of field force excluding that in Bombay Branch. It was, therefore, in these circumstances that while the Company could settle the charter of demands submitted by the Central Committee of the Sabha in respect of field force attached to the Delhi, Calcutta and Madras Branches of the Company. Since it failed to arrive at a settlement with the Bombay Centre of the Sabha in respect of their charter of demands in respect of field force employees attached to the Bombay Branch that the said charter of demands got to be referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra, being Ref. No. 203 of 1970.5. I say that since 1969 the company has not receive any formal communication either from the Bombay Centre of the Sabha or from the Central Committee of the Sabha recording that the field force employed in the Bombay Branch of the company has transferred its loyalty and commitment to the Central Committee of the Sabha in preference to the Bombay Centre of the Sabha which was verified by the Labour Department of Maharashtra. In the absence of such a communication regarding reversion of the Central Committee of the Sabha to the status of a representative body in relation to the field force of the company attached to its Bombay Branch, there is no basis for the Central Committee of the Sabha to file and agitate the present complaint. If at all, such a complaint could have been filed by the Bombay Centre of the Sabha.6. I say that to the best of the companys knowledge, no elections have been held to the Central Committee of the Sabha for the past more than a decade and, as such, the status of the self-styled office-bearers of the Central Committee to file and maintain the present complaint before this Honble Court is questionable and the complaint is not maintainable.7. The reference to its application to field force employees was restricted to the field force attached to the Bombay Branch of the Company. With regard to the field force employees at the other places i.e. Delhi, Calcutta and Madras ( apart from Bombay), a settlement came to be signed on 27th January, 1971 by the Central Committee of the Sabha and was implemented in respect of the members of the field force attached to Delhi, Calcutta and Madras branches establishments. This settlement did not apply to the field force at Bombay Branch because their reference was pending adjudicate on, that is IT-203/1970, and the settlement was, therefore, not implemented in respect of them. In respect of travelling allowances, the company without waiting for the award of the Tribunal, by signing minutes with the Bombay Centre of the Sabha, applied the allowance not only which were the subject matter of Ref. No. IT No. 36 of 1971 and 516 of 1969 but other allowances as well to Bombay Branch as applicable in other Branches.8. By an Award dated 6th January, 1975 Justice Chitale held that the field force employed by the Company were not workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Sabhas appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court.9. After this award, the company revised the service conditions of the field force and offered fresh terms and conditions by their letter dated 30-6-1975. Out of about 400 field force, except for about 1%, all the others constituting 99% of the field force accepted the terms and conditions, including Mr. Shaikh and Mr. Pai. All field force employees attached to the Bombay Branch accepted the fresh terms and conditions offered by the company. By this revision, the terms and conditions of service were revised upward with retrospective effect from 1st May, 1970 with regard to the field force in Bombay Branch. By this letter, the basic salary was revised, gratuity scheme was improved, a field allowance was introduced, the daily allowance was revised. I say that this was as and by way of a total package deal which was given to the field force and was voluntarily accepted by an over whelming majority of 99% of the field force. The balance 1% (who were all outside Maharashtra), were covered by the company with a view to maintain uniformity and on the principle that what was accepted by an over whelming majority was also fair for the minority. Thereafter, till date, the service conditions of the field force have been revised about 12 times and substantial benefits have been given to the field force and they have always accepted these benefit and enjoyed these benefits. Several new allowances were also introduced after 1975, namely, House rent allowance, Leave Travel Allowance, Medical Benefits etc. I am herewith annexing as Annexure A a statement which gives the benefits that the field force, namely salesmen, have received since 1975 till date.10. Annexure C to the complaint, namely, settlement dated 27th January, 1971 which was entered into with the Central Committee of HLMS, was not applicable to the field force employed in the Bombay Branch as they had placed a separate charter of demands and the same was pending adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal of Justice Chitale. However, as stated above, in 1975 the field force employed in Bombay branch were given benefits with retrospective effect from 1st May, 1970 though the company was not obviated to do so, in view of the award of the Chitale Tribunal.11. I say that on or about 1981, the Union raised before the Labour Department of the Maharashtra Government certain issues concerning settling days, terminal leave, transfer allowance, etc. The Company responded to the Labour Department pointing out that the Industrial Tribunal presided over by His Honour M.G. Chitale had held field force employed by the Company as non-workmen and that the alleged grievance on the above matters were sought to be raised as a belated stage.The Company also explained its case with regard to the alleged complaints on merits. The Labour Directorate Maharashtra, wrote to the parties advising that in the circumstances of the case, they did not wish to intervene in the matter. I say that is therefore incorrect to suggest that the issues forming the subject matter of the present complaint being Complaint (ULP) No. 751/1984 is sought to be raised for the first time and have not been raised in the past.12. I knew one Mr. R.L. Gupta who was working in our Delhi Branch, whose services came to be terminated. After the judgment of the Supreme Court given in his case, by our letter dated 13th January 1984 we terminated the arrangements which was existing by virtue of correspondence dated 24-1, 24-4, 1-5-57. This correspondence covered only procedural aspects such as the recognition of the Union status for raising certain kinds of disputes and the companys concession not to raise the question of status of field force as non-workmen in certain circumstances. After the Supreme Court judgment, this arrangement has been terminated as stated above by our letter dated 13th January, 1984.13. I knew Shri Prem Mehta and Minoo Patel who were working as A.S. Ms. They are no longer in the service of the company.14. I deny that the company has failed to implement the settlement dated 27-1-1971. As stated above, the said settlement did not apply to the field force working in Bombay Branch as their charter was pending before the Industrial Tribunal being IT No. 203/70, before Justice Chitale. I further deny that we failed to implement the agreement arrived at pursuant to the correspondence entered into with the complainant unit in 1957. As stated above, I say that the said correspondence only provided for certain procedural arrangements which also came to be terminated by the Companys letter dated 13-1-1964.15. I say that there was no question of negotiating on the charter presented on 31st December, 1973 as the said charter of demands related to field force employed in places other than in Bombay Branch as in respect of the field force in Bombay Branch a reference being Ref. IT 203/70 which was pending before the Tribunal constituting Justice Chitale was pending. I say that the Bombay Branch had severed connection with the All India settlement and they had presented a separate charter of demands in 1969 which became the subject matter of adjudication in the said Reference i.e. 203/70. I repeat that the charter dated 31-12-1973 was not in respect of the field force employed in Bombay Branch and neither was the settlement dated 27th January, 1971 in relation to the said workmen.16. I say that by various revisions on 12 occasions since 1975 various benefits have been given, more particularly stated in Annexure A and, therefore, it is now not permissible for the complainant to re-open the question of DA as the same was part of an entire package which was offered to the field force and which was accepted by them from time to time and benefits availed of by them during the last more than 13 years. I say that the demands of the field force working in Bombay Branch were covered by IT Nos. 36/71 and 516/69 which, while they were pending, came to be revised and disposed off. I deny that the service conditions offered to the employees by Companys letter dated 30-6-1975 were prejudicial to the members of the field force. I say that the said terms and conditions were better and that retrospective wage revision was given from 1970 and as such an over whelming majority of the members of the field force accepted the said terms and conditions of service. I say that the terms and conditions of the field force in Bombay Branch as they stood prior to 1st May, 1970 stood superseded terminated on acceptance of the terms and conditions of service offered by our letter dated 30th June, 1975 and which terms and conditions came to be accepted by all but four out of the 400 members of the field force all over the country, I say that it will not be out of place to mention here that the entire field force have uniform terms and conditions.17. I deny that there was any question of IMP, lamenting the arrangement entered into by correspondence in 1957 as this arrangement came to be terminated by our letter dated 13th January, 1984. I further say that there is no question of paying any arrears of DA and that a fresh scheme of DA was voluntarily accepted by members of the field force as a package deal together with several benefits which they got by virtue of the terms and conditions offered to them by letter dated 30-6-1975 and the various subsequent revisions made during the last 13 years. I deny that there was any adverse change in the service conditions regarding terminal leave as the members of the field force were allowed to take leave once a week as also at the end of their travel cycle, if necessary, with the prior approval of the area managers. I deny that there was any failure to implement the 1971 agreement or that there was any failure to implement any agreement by refusing to negotiate with the Sabha on the charter of demands pending with the company as the said charter was not applicable to the workmen employed as field force of Bombay Branch. I further say that nothing survived out of the 1973 charter of demands after the members of the field force voluntarily accepted the terms and conditions offered by them by letter dated 30-6-1975 as also the benefits by the subsequent revisions."The witness was cross-examined but the essential part of his statement that the terms and conditions of the field force in Bombay as they stood prior to May 1, 1970 stood superseded and terminated on acceptance of the terms and conditions offered by letter dated June 30, 1975 and which terms and conditions came to be accepted by all but four out of the 400 members of the field force all over the country. After the package deal offered under letter dated June 30, 1975 there were subsequent revisions during the last 13 years and the benefits under the revisions have been given to the members of the field force. His statement in the examination-in-chief was that the settlement which came to be signed on January 27, 1971 by the Central Committee of the Sabha and was implemented in respect of the members of the field force attached to Delhi, Calcutta and Madras Branches establishments but did not apply to the field force at Bombay Branch was not challenged in cross-examination. The sum and substance of this evidence is that the field force employees of Bombay region have been independently negotiating for the revision of pay scale and this fact is testified and was not challenged in cross-examination. These terms and conditions were accepted by all the employees except one or two and thereafter there were revision of pay scales during the preceding 13 years. Under these revisions substantial benefits have been given to the field force. From this historical background it can be seen that the issue was for a long time given a quitous by both parties. Even the pronouncement of the Supreme Court (supra) about the three letters came about not consequential and incidental to the award of Mr. Justice Chitale. Those three letters came to be interpreted by the Apex Court in a different context and background. In other words, the controversy involved in this case in its original face and shape re-emerged only after the verdict of Supreme Court decision on 5-1-1984. Therefore, we think that considerable importance is to be given to these long history of the case when we deal with the issue of limitation in this case.7. According to us, the learned Industrial Court has not considered this aspect of the matter in its right perspective. As we pointed out earlier, those three letters of 1957 constitute a valid agreement between the parties and there was no legal bar on the part of the employees union to insist to implement the settlement of 1971. As far as the members of the field force in the Bombay Centre are concerned they did not insist to implement these letters and settlement till the decision of the Supreme Court in 1984. It is clear that as we indicated above, after the award was passed in the reference by Mr. Justice Chitale nothing has been done on that score by the first respondent. No materials have been produced before the Labour Court that the first respondent was pressing for the implementation of settlement of 1971 in respect of Bombay Centres. As we see when Mr. Justice Chitales Award categorically declared that they are not workmen which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No, 27109/95, the first respondent was reconciled with that position and did not make any move to implement the settlement of 1971 or to enforce the letters of 1957. Only when the Supreme Court decided on the legal consequences of these letters, the first respondent become alert and filed the above complaint.8. Incidentally, we have seen from the judgment of the Industrial Court that the issues were framed in 1994 even though the complaint was filed in 1984 and the witnesses were examined in 1986. It is always desirable for the Court of facts or Tribunal to frame issues first, before going to the evidence so that the attention of the parties and the Tribunal will be focussed on the relevant controversies involved in this case. The question of limitation has been raised by the parties in the pleadings and issue pertains to the limitation has been framed very late which according to us, is not at all a regular procedure. Reverting back to the question of limitation, the pleadings in respect of limitation as quoted by the Industrial Court is required to be repeated here."According to him, the present complaint essentially is with regard to the non-implementation of settlement dated 21-1-1971 and failure to negotiate on the charter of demands dated 31-12-1973. Undisputedly the present complaint is filed on 4-4-1984. It is urged that even though the cause of action to file the present complaint had arisen on 21-1-1971 and 31-12-1973, but it has been filed after the period of 12 years that too without application for condonation of delay."It is evident that there is a delay of more than 12 years and it is also conceded that there was no sufficient explanation for that delay and in Reference (IT) No. 203 of 1970 the main issue viz. whether the member of the field staff is a workman or not has been agitated and considered by the Tribunal. On a careful reading of the impugned order it can be seen that the Industrial Court was under a misconception that the judgment of the Supreme Court gives a fresh cause of action to the first respondent to make the present complaint. Paragraph 20 of the impugned order reads as follows:"Suffice to state that even though the Company did not implement the settlement dated 27-1-1971 as far as Bombay Branch field force was concerned on the ground that dispute was pending adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal, and even though Ref. (IT) No. 203 of 1970 was decided against the concerned employees, still the cause of action to claim the implementation of the said agreement or settlement had arisen for the first time after the decision given by the Honble Supreme Court of India in C.A. No. 1865/82 dated 5-1-1984. Therefore, the complaint filed on 4-4-1984 cannot be said to be barred by limitation at all.Had the Honble Supreme Court not declared the correspondence (Annexure-A) to be agreement in between the parties, the controversy about the field force being not workmen had already come to an end."The judgment of the Supreme Court does not give any cause of action to the first respondent. The Supreme Court only interpreted the three letters and affirmed the rights of the parties emerging from those letters. In other words, the Supreme Court has upheld the view of the first respondent as regards the interpretation of three letters are concerned. Therefore, the observations of the Industrial Court that the Supreme Court judgment gives the first respondent a fresh cause of action cannot be accepted. As we pointed out earlier, the Supreme Court judgment may give some impetus to file the complaint in question before the Industrial Court. It is common knowledge that a judgment of a Court will not give a cause of action to a litigant. Cause of action for a litigation arises out of a wrong committed by the opposite party. Moreover, a judgment of a Court cannot infuse life to a cause of action which was already dead. It is a cardinal principle of law of limitation that once the limitation starts to run nobody can stop it unless and until a competent Court stops its running. So also a cause of action once obliterated by operation of law of limitation cannot be re-built. In this context we cannot appreciate the finding of the Industrial Court that the non-implementation of a settlement is a continuing process. It is clear from the facts of this case, but for the Chitales Award and consequent rejection of the SLP by the Supreme Court, perhaps Industrial Court may be right in making such observations. But when a competent Court has given a finding, rightly or wrongly, and the parties have accepted it for a long time, one cannot conceive of a position that it is a continuing wrong. In the absence of a valid explanation for keeping the matter in cold storage for 13 years from 1971 to 1984 the present complaint is barred by limitation before the Industrial Court. As observed by the Industrial Court but for the Supreme Court decision the entire matter would have been considered as closed. Merely because Supreme Court has made the observation first respondent cannot save limitation.9. As is well known the object of statutes of limitation is founded on public policy. It is to compel the litigants to prosecute their case diligently. Such a policy is necessary to secure quiet and repose of the community. Another consideration is that one should not be complacent on his own rights. The old maxim "Interest reipublices ut sit finis litium" is quite relevant in these days also. A party who is insensible to his remedies or who does not assert his own claims with promptitude has no rights to seek the aid of the State.10. When we closely watched the conduct of the first respondent it can be seen that there was no room for any doubt that it has acquiesced on the award of Mr. Justice Chitale by keeping silence for a long time. The doctrine acquiescence is based on the conduct of the parties with knowledge of its legal rights. Acquiescence amounts to absolute or positive waiver of the rights of a person who acquiesced. Though it is quite different from delay or laches, but in the factual context of the case it is very relevant here. If a person having a right, stands by and see another deals with the rights inconsistent with that rights, watched it for considerable long time say, 12 years or more, he cannot afterwards complain. Under Indian Law of Limitation generally even rights over immovable property loses after 12 years where it was not properly exercised. Here the complainant knows that under section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 period of 3 years was prescribed for ventilating their grievance. No explanation worth consideration has been put forward by the first respondent. According to us, the Industrial Court committed serious miscarriage of justice in disposing of the issue of limitation. Under the circumstances we have no doubt that the complaint of the first respondent is barred by limitation.

Decision:
1[ds]We see considerable force in the argument of Mr. Singhvi as far as this aspect of the matter is concerned. Ambit and the scope of those three letters were in detail examined by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. By those letters the petitioner had unmistakably conceded the status of workmen and we have no hesitation to hold that it pertains to the conditions of service. That apart, after the judgment of the Supreme Court on these letters, there is little scope for such contentions being raised at the instance of the petitioner. The Supreme Court without any pale of doubt has spoken in detail the ambit and scope of those letters constituting an agreement between the parties. Though Mr. Manohar, Counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously argued at length about termination of the agreement citing various decisions of the Supreme Court and High Court, we are not very much impressed because it is not permissible for us to take any other stand different from what was taken by the Apex Court in view of the judgment (supra) which speaks about the conditions contained in those letters. Therefore, finding recorded on Issue No. 1 by the Tribunal warrants no interference by thiswe think that considerable importance is to be given to these long history of the case when we deal with the issue of limitation in thiswe see when Mr. Justice Chitales Award categorically declared that they are not workmen which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No, 27109/95, the first respondent was reconciled with that position and did not make any move to implement the settlement of 1971 or to enforce the letters of 1957. Only when the Supreme Court decided on the legal consequences of these letters, the first respondent become alert and filed the abovethis context we cannot appreciate the finding of the Industrial Court that theof a settlement is a continuing process. It is clear from the facts of this case, but for the Chitales Award and consequent rejection of the SLP by the Supreme Court, perhaps Industrial Court may be right in making such observations. But when a competent Court has given a finding, rightly or wrongly, and the parties have accepted it for a long time, one cannot conceive of a position that it is a continuing wrong. In the absence of a valid explanation for keeping the matter in cold storage for 13 years from 1971 to 1984 the present complaint is barred by limitation before the Industrial Court. As observed by the Industrial Court but for the Supreme Court decision the entire matter would have been considered as closed. Merely because Supreme Court has made the observation first respondent cannot save limitation.When we closely watched the conduct of the first respondent it can be seen that there was no room for any doubt that it has acquiesced on the award of Mr. Justice Chitale by keeping silence for a long time. The doctrine acquiescence is based on the conduct of the parties with knowledge of its legal rights. Acquiescence amounts to absolute or positive waiver of the rights of a person who acquiesced. Though it is quite different from delay or laches, but in the factual context of the case it is very relevant here. If a person having a right, stands by and see another deals with the rights inconsistent with that rights, watched it for considerable long time say, 12 years or more, he cannot afterwards complain. Under Indian Law of Limitation generally even rights over immovable property loses after 12 years where it was not properly exercised. Here the complainant knows that under section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 period of 3 years was prescribed for ventilating their grievance. No explanation worth consideration has been put forward by the first respondent. According to us, the Industrial Court committed serious miscarriage of justice in disposing of the issue of limitation. Under the circumstances we have no doubt that the complaint of the first respondent is barred by limitation.