Case: Kartar Singh Vs. The Union of India

Sikri, J.1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi dismissing m limine the writ petition under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution filed by the appellant, Kartar Singh. In this petition he had prayed inter alto, for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Union of India, respondent No. 1, and the Central Board of Revenue, respondent No. 2, dated June 2, 1963, and November 27, 1961, respectively.2. These orders came to be passed in the following circumstances. One Mnkand Singh came to stay with the appellant, on November 22, 1957, in his house at 11, Samru Place, New Delhi. On November 28, 1957, a consignment of foreign air mail articles (magazines; was received from Bangkok in the Air Sorting Office, Safdarjang Airport. Out of this consignment certain articles addressed to Mukand Singh, c/o Kartar Singh, quarter No, 11, Simru Place, were detained on suspicion by the Customs Authorities and forwarded to the Foreign Post Office for examination. On November 29, 1957, each of these magazines were found to contain a gold bar clipped on some of the pages. The appellant’s premises were searched and some documents and a sum of Rs, 2700 in Indian Currency notes were recovered. Mukand Singh was arrested and he admitted the offences and revealed that he expected, to receive more gold in 58 such air mail articles (magazines). The appellant was examined by the Inspector of Customs on November 29, 1957’, and he made a statement as follows:“Shri Mukand Siogh is the son-in-law of S. Kartar Singh who is a friend-of mine and is residing in Bangkok for the last 25 years. He is not related to me in any way. I had met S. Mukand Singh previously on one occasion in a marriage party and this is the first time that Shri Mukand Singh is staying with me. I was never in correspondence with S. Mukand Singh,.....I did not ask why he was receiving such a large No. of magazines nor he disclosed the contents to-me,”On December 2, 1957, more air mail articles were received in the Foreign Post Office. 49 such articles were addressed to Mukand Singh and 9 were addressed to Kartar Singh, the appellant, at 11, Samru Place, New Delhi. These 9 parcels on opening, were found to contain 75 gold guineas. On July j8 IH58, the appellant was called upon to explain “as to why the gold guineas recovered from the 9 parcels addressers to him should not be confiscated and further penalty imposed on him under Section 167(8) of Sea Customs Act for the contravention of the restrictions imposed under Section 8(1) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, i947, read with Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act.3. By his order dated November 28, 1959, the Collector gave the appellant the benefit of doubt and dropped the charges against him. He observed:“.........in view of the scanty evidence on record to prove Kartar Singh’s (Petitioner’s) knowledge regarding the contents of the parcels it is difficult to hold him guilty. Moreover, there is documentary evidence on record that parcels were also meant for Mukand Singh who was staying with Kartar Singh (Petitioner) temporarily.....”4. On May 11, 19dl, the Central Board of Revenue called upon the appellant to show cause why the above mentioned order of the Collector be not revised by the Board under Section 190-A. Sea Customs Act, 1878, and as suitable penalty imposed on him under Section 167(8)Sea Customs Act. In this show cause notice it was alleged by the Board that the appellant had himself received nine packets containing 75 gold guineas.5. The appellant replied to this notice stating that he had never received 9 packets containing 75 gold guineas, and further that he had no knowledge about these packets H requested for the supply of co pies of the evidence on the basis of which the allegations had been made. The Board, by its letter dated July 2y, 1961, asked the Appellant to specify the documents which he required, but on October 16, 1961, another show-came notice was issued to the appellant and the previous show-cause notice dated May 11, 1961, cancelled. In this show-cause notice it was alleged, among other things that the appellant had stated on November 29, 1957 that he had been “much in correspondence with Mukand Singh while the latter was in Bangkok’. the appellant in his reply stated that what he had stated in his statement dated November 29, 1957. was that he was never in correspondence with Mukand Singh. The Board insisted that the correct version was stated in its notice dated October 18, 1981, while the appellant insisted that his version was correct. The appellant further there stated in his letter dated November 2, 1961 that he did not know how the word “much” had been substituted for the word “never”. He further submitted that: “I have no knowledge about the alleged allega­tions made out against me. Shri Mukand Singh was staying with me for a few days since he was the son-in law of one of my friends. He is not related with me in any way and I had never been in correspondence with him. The book post packets alleged to have been received in my name were only magazine packets which were meant for Shri Mukand Singh and I have no knowledge about them, fn the interest of justice I would request you kindly let me know any evidence and send copies of the documents on which you want to rely upon against me.”6. On November 27, 1961, the impugned order was passed by the Central Board of Revenue. The main part of the order reads as follows:“Shri Kartar Singh’s reply has been duly considered However, having regard to the fact that (i) Kartar Singh gave shelter to Shri Mukand Singh who was clearly a person concerned in this series of contraventions, (ii) that while residing in Kartar Singh’s house Mukand Singh received as many as 135 parcels containing contraband gold, as also ‘iii) the recovery from his house of a quantity of foreign magazines usually employed for concealment of gold in such post parcels and finally (iv) the actual recovery of 75 gold guineas from the such parcels addressed personally to Kartar Singh, the Board are unable to accept the plea that he had no connection with these importations. The Board, therefore, hereby direct that the Collector’s aforesaid order, in so far as it relates to Shri Kartar Singh, shall be revised under Section 190-A Sea Customs Act and a penalty of Rs. 2,000 (Rupees two thousand) only be imposed on Shri Kartar Singh.”7. With a view to file a revision before the Government of India, the appellant attempted to obtain copies of certain documents and to inspect the files. By its letter dated May 7, 1962, the Central Board of Revenue stated that:“the Board has accepted your version set out in your reply to the said notice (dated October 16, 1961) that there was no correspondence with Shri Mukand Singh, and the adjudication itself proceeds on other facts and circumstances admitted or proved in the case.”The appellant made an effort to elicit information regarding “ the other facts and circumstances admitted or proved in the case”.He, however, filed a revision petition to the Government of India in the absence of copies which he had been attempting to obtain and without being able to inspect the relevant files. The Government of India, by its order dated June 17, 1963, rejected the revision and stated that:“the Government of India have carefully considered all the points made by the applicant, but they regret that they do not see any justification for interfering with the order passed by the Central Board of Revenue. The revision application is, accordingly, rejected.”8 The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that (1) the appellant is not a “person concerned” within Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act; (2) that there has been violation of principles of natural justice as necessary documents were not supplied to the appellant and (31 that this is not a case which the High Court should have dismissed in limine,9. The learned Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Dhebar, sought permission to produce some additional documents but we did not accede to his request because the order of the Central Board of Revenue places reliance only on the four facts or inferences mentioned in the order and no reference was made therein to any other documents.10. It seems to us that the order of the Central Board of Revenue is liable to be quashed on the ground that no reasonable tribunal could arrive at the finding arrived at by the Central Board of Revenue. The learned Counsel points out that the first fact relied on is that Kartar Singh gave shelter to Mukand Singh, He says that either the word “shelter” has been used loosely, or if it has not been used loosely, there is no evidence to show that Kartar Sirgh knew that Mukand Singh was a person concerned in importing contraband gold. He further says that nothing follows from the second fact mentioned in the order because there is no proof that the appellant knew that the magazines contained contraband gold. He further urged that there is no evidence that these foreign magazines are usually employed for concealment of gold and that the appellant knew about this fact. He further says that the fourth fact relied on equally does not show that he knew that any parcels had been addressed to him. Mukand Singh might have told his confederates to address the parcels in the name of the appellant without having secured his consent. He further says that the Board had accepted his version that he was never in correspondence with Mukand Singh.11. There is force in the above contentions. In Radha Krishan Bhatia v. Union of India it was held, as stated in the head-note, that “the mere finding of fact recorded by the Collector of Customs in this case about the smuggled gold being recovered from the person of the ap­pellant was not sufficient to conclude that the appellant was ‘concerned’ in the illegal importation of the smuggled gold into the country and therefore liable for penalty under Section 167(8) of the Act.” That case was a stronger case for the Customs authorities. In this case no evert act on the part of Kartar Singh has been alleged or proved, and it is difficult to say that the four facts relied on can necessarily lead a reasonable tribu­nal to the conclusion that the appellant was concerned in the importation of gold within Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act.12. The learned Counsel for the respondent contends that the orders passed by the Central Board of Revenue and the Government of India are administrative orders and cannot be quashed under art 226 of the Constitution. This point is, however, concluded against him by a number of decisions of this Court. In Shawnwanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. Collector of Customs S. K. Das, J., speaking for the Court, overruled a similar contention. He observed at p. 829 as follows:“The other point relates to the view expressed by the High Court in the order under appeal that an order of confiscation or penalty under the Sea Customs Act is a mere administrative or executive act, in respect of which no application for a writ of certiorari lies. It is necessary to state that the point is now concluded by two recent decisions of this Court. In F. W. Roy v. Collector of Customs this Court held that the imposition of a fine under s. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act was really a quasijudicial act and in the later decision of Leo Roy Frey v. The Superintendent District Jail, Amritsar. It has been held that in imposing confiscation and penalties under the Sea Customs Act, the Collector acts judicially. Therefore, the view that an order of confiscation or penalties under the Sea Customs Act is a mere administrative or executive act is no longer tenable.”13 The learned Counsel relies on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sugan Chand Sarsogi v Commissioner of Income tax, Calcutta, relating to Section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act. but that decision was over­ruled by this Court in Dwarka Nath v. Income tax Officer.14. The learned Counsel then contends that the appellant should have come up in appeal under art. 136 of the Constitution if he desired to challenge the order on its merits. He says that in view of British India Steam Navigation Co. Lid. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs, only a point of jurisdiction can be raised. He relies on the following observations of Gajendragadkar, C. J.“We have heard all these matters together because they raise the same question which was raised for our decision by the appellant in C. A. No. 770 of 1962. If these matters had not been placed to­gether for hearing along with the said civil appeal, we would not have entertained them, except C.A. No. 299 of 1963. This latter appeal has been brought against the decision of the Calcutta High Court and the only point which could have been argued by the appellant would be one of jurisdiction, since the appellant had moved the said High Court under art. 226, and that too against the order of the Collector of Customs.”It seems to us that what the learned Chief Justice was saying was that on the facts of that case the only point which could have been argued would be one of jurisdiction. Apparently, on the facts of that case no other point could have arisen. But it is now well-established that under art. 226 point other than of jurisdiction can also be gone into.15. In view of our decision on the first point raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant it is not necessary to discuss the other point raised by him.

Decision:
1[ds]9. The learned Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Dhebar, sought permission to produce some additional documents but we did not accede to his request because the order of the Central Board of Revenue places reliance only on the four facts or inferences mentioned in the order and no reference was made therein to any otherIt seems to us that the order of the Central Board of Revenue is liable to be quashed on the ground that no reasonable tribunal could arrive at the finding arrived at by the Central Board ofthis case no evert act on the part of Kartar Singh has been alleged or proved, and it is difficult to say that the four facts relied on can necessarily lead a reasonableto the conclusion that the appellant was concerned in the importation of gold within Section 167(8) of the Sea Customsseems to us that what the learned Chief Justice was saying was that on the facts of that case the only point which could have been argued would be one of jurisdiction. Apparently, on the facts of that case no other point could have arisen. But it is nowthat under art. 226 point other than of jurisdiction can also be gone into.15. In view of our decision on the first point raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant it is not necessary to discuss the other point raised by him.