Case: Pandit K. B. Parsai. and Ashoka Marketing Limited and Another. and Sahu Jain Services Limited and Another. and Bennet Coleman and Company Limited and Another Vs. Union of India and Others. and Punjab National Bank and Others and Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others


Decision:
0[ds]8. The nationalised banks have been established under the Banks Nationalisation Act, wherein the nationalised banks have been described as " corresponding new banks ". In sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Banks Nationalisation Act, it has been provided that on the commencement of the said Act, there shall be constituted such corresponding new banks as are specified in the First Schedule. In sub-section (2) of section 3, it is laid down that the paid-up capital of every corresponding new bank constituted under sub-section (1) shall, until any provision is made in this behalf in any scheme made under section 9, be equal to the paid-up capital of the existing bank in relation to which it is the corresponding new bank. Sub-section (3) of section 3 provides that the entire capital of the new bank shall stand vested in, and allotted to the Central Government. Sub-section (4) of section 3 lays down that every corresponding new bank shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of the said Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and to contract, and may sue and be sued in its name. From the aforesaid provisions contained in section 3 of the Banks Nationalisation Act it is evident that the nationalised banks have been established under the provisions of the said Act and the same are distinct juristic persons with perpetual succession and the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to contract and having the right to sue and be sued in their own name and further that the entire capital of the said banks is vested in the Central Government, meaning thereby, that the said banks are owned by the Centralfind no substance in thishas already been made to the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act which shows that the nationalised bank has been constituted as a distinct juristic person by the Act and it is owned by the Central Government. There are other provisions in the Banks Nationalisation Act which show that the general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the business of the bank is vested in a board of directors constituted by the Central Government and the Central Government has the power to remove a person from the membership of the board of directors (sections 7(2) and 7(3)) and in the discharge of its functions the bank is to be guided by such directions in regard to matters of policy involving public interest as the Central Government may, after consultation with the Governor of the Reserve Bank, give (section 8). This indicates that the nationalised bank has all the attributes of the new pattern of public corporation.Merely because the expression " body corporate " has been used in relation to the nationalised banks in section 3(4) of the Banks Nationalisation Act and the expression " corporation " has not been used, this does not mean that the nationalised bank is not a corporation. The expression " body corporate " is used in legal parlance to mean " a public or private corporation " (Blacks Law Dictionary, pagecontention is without any merit because, as noticed earlier, in the new pattern of public corporations which have developed, there are no shares and no shareholders, either public or private, and its shareholder, in the symbolic sense, is the nation represented through Government and Parliament.While construing the expression " corporation " in section 2(e)(2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act, it cannot be ignored that the object of the legislation in enlarging the definition of " public premises " in section 2(e) is to make available the machinery of the Act for evicting unauthorised occupants not only from the premises belonging to the Central Government but also from premises belonging to companies, corporations and statutory bodies in which the Central Government has a substantial interest. Under section 2(e)(2)(i) premises belonging to a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty one per cent. of the paid-up capital is held by the Central Government, are to be treated as public premises. It could not be the intention of Parliament that premises belonging to public corporations whose entire paid-up capital vests in the Central Government and who are the instrumentalities of State would be excluded from the ambit of the definition of " public premises ". In our opinion, therefore, the expression " corporation " in section 2(e)(2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act would include public corporations of the new pattern constituted under the Central Acts wherein the entire paid-up capital vests in the Centraldecision does not lend any assistance to the contention of Shri Yogeshwar Prasad.In Oriental Bank of Commerces case 1985 (55) CC 81 (Delhi), the question for consideration was, whether the chairman of a nationalised bank is a public servant and sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was necessary to prosecute him. M. L. Jain J., has held that the nationalised bank is a body corporate and not a corporation within the meaning of clause Twelfth of section 21, Indian Penal Code, and, therefore, the chairman of the nationalised bank is not a public servant under section 21, Indian Penal Code. The learned judge has further held that even if the nationalised bank is a corporation, the chairman of the said bank is not in the service or pay of the bank and further (in the facts of the case) it could not be said that the chairman was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. Sachar J. did not consider it necessary to deal with the question, as to whether the nationalised bank is a corporation because he was of the view that section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, was not attracted. For the reasons mentioned earlier, the judgment of Jain J., insofar as it draws a distinction between a " body corporate " and a " corporation " and lays down that the nationalised bank, though a " body corporate " is not a corporation, cannot be upheld. The other reason given by Jain J. is that the nationalised bank is merely a personified institution having no members and is, therefore, not a corporation. This view also cannot be sustained. We have already pointed out that in order to constitute a corporation it is not necessary that there should be shareholders or members and that in the new pattern of public corporation that has developed there are no shareholders or members.13. Keeping in view the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act we are of the opinion that the nationalised bank is a corporation established by a Central Act and it is owned and controlled by the Central Government. The premises belonging to a nationalised bank are public premises under section 2(e)(2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri Yogeshwar Prasad that premises belonging to a nationalised bank do not fall within the ambit of the definition of " public premises " contained in section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act.Shri Yogeshwar Prasad has also urged that " public premises " as defined in section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, must be confined to premises let out for residential purposes only and should not cover premises let out for commercial purposes and that if premises let out for commercial purposes are included, section 2(e) would be rendered unconstitutional as being violative of the provisions of articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 read with articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. The submission of Shri Yogeshwar Prasad is that a construction which would sustain the constitutionality of the provisions of section 2(e) should be preferred over a construction which would render them unconstitutional. We find no force in this contention.We are also unable to hold that the inclusion of premises used for commercial purposes within the ambit of the definition of " public premises ", would render the Public Premises Act violative of the right to equality guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution or the right to freedom to carry on any occupation, trade or business guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution or the right to liberty guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution. It is difficult to appreciate how a person in unauthorised occupation of a public premises used for commercial purposes, can invoke the Directive Principles under articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. As indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, the Public Premises Act has been enacted to provide for a speedy machinery for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises. It serves a public purpose, viz., making available, for use, public premises after eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation. The need to provide a speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation cannot be confined to premises used for residential purposes. There is no reason to assume that such a need will not be there in respect of premises used for commercial purposes. No distinction can, therefore, be made between premises used for residential purposes and premises used for commercial purposes in the matter of eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises and the considerations which necessitate providing a speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises apply equally to both the types of public premises. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri Yogeshwar Prasad that the definition of public premises contained in section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act should be so construed as to exclude premises used for commercial purposes from its ambit.The definition of the expression " unauthorised occupation " contained in section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act is in two parts. In the first part, the said expression has been defined to mean the occupation by any person of public premises without authority for such occupation. It implies occupation by a person who has entered into occupation of any public premises without lawful authority as well as occupation which was permissive at the inception but has ceased to be so. The second part of the definition is inclusive in nature and it expressly covers continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. This part covers a case where a person had entered into occupation legally under valid authority but who continues in occupation after the authority under which he was put in occupation has expired or has been determined. The words " whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer " in this part of the definition are wide in amplitude and would cover a lease because lease is a mode of transfer under the Transfer of Property Act. The definition of unauthorised occupation contained in section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act would, therefore, cover a case where a person has entered into occupation of the public premises legally as a tenant under a lease but whose tenancy has expired or has been determined in accordance with law.Brigadier K. K. Verma v. Union of India, 1954 AIR(Bom) 358 was decided under the provisions of the Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950, which did not contain the definition of the expression " unauthorised occupation ". In that case, it has been held that under the Indian law, the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law and although he may not have the right to continue in possession, after the termination of the tenancy, his possession is juridical and that posses sion is protected by statute, and, therefore, an erstwhile tenant can never become a trespasser and his possession cannot be regarded as unauthorised occupation. The learned judges have also observed that unless the Legislature had given indication of a clear intention that by the expression " unauthorised occupation " it meant not only persons who had no title at all but also persons who had title at the inception and whose title came to an end, it would not be proper to give an interpretation to the expres sion " unauthorised occupation " which would run counter to the principles of law which have been accepted in this country. After this decision the Legislature intervened and introduced the definition of the expression " unauthorised occupation " in the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, which definition has been reproduced in section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act and in the said definition the Legislature has taken care to make an express provision indicating that the expression " unauthorised occupation " includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. In the circumstances, the petitioners cannot derive any assistance from the decision of the Bombay High Court in Brigadier K. K. Vermas case, 1954 AIR(Bom)is true that there is no requirement in the Public Premises Act that the Estate Officer must be a person well versed in law. But, that, by itself, cannot be a ground for excluding from the ambit of the said Act premises in unauthorised occupation of persons who obtained possession of the said premises under a lease. Section 4 of the Public Premises Act requires issuing of a notice to the person in unauthorised occupation of any public premises requiring him to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made.A similar contention was raised before this court in Maganlal Chhagganlal P. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay 1975 (1) SCR 1 wherein the validity of the provisions of Chapter VA of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, and the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, were challenged before this court and the said contention was negatived. Alagiriswami J., speaking for the majority, has observed as under (at p. 2023)Even though the officers deciding these questions would be administrative officers there is provision in these Acts for giving notice to the party affected, to inform him of the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made, for the party affected to file a written statement and produce documents and be represented by lawyers. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code regarding summoning and enforcing attendance of persons and examining them on oath, and requiring the discovery and production of documents are a valuable safeguard for the person affected. So is the provision for appeal to the principal judge of the city civil court in the city of Bombay, or to a District Judge in the district who has got to deal with the matter as expeditiously as possible, also a sufficient safeguard as was recognised in Suraj Mall Mohtas case, 1954 AIR(SC) 545."a comparison of the provisions of the Public Premises Act and the Rent Control Act, it will be found thatBy virtue of section 1(2) of the Public Premises Act, the said Act is applicable throughout the territory of India, whereas, in view of section 1(2) of the Rent Control Act, the said Act is confined in its application to areas included within the limits of the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi Cantonment Board and to such urban areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi as are specified in the First Schedule and any other urban area included within the limits of the municipal corporation of Delhi to which the provisions of the said Act are extended by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette.2. Under clause (c) of section 2 of the Public Premises Act, the expression " premises " has a wider connotation and it includes open land as well as building or part of a building. Under the Rent Control Act the expression " premises " as defined in clause (i) of section 2 has a narrower connotation to mean any building or a part of building and it does not cover open land.3. In view of the definition of the expression " public premises " contained in clause (e) of section 2 of the Public Premises Act, the said Act, in addition to the premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, is applicable to premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of the companies and statutory bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of section 2(e). The Rent Control Act, on the other hand, is applicable to all premises except premises belonging to the Government or to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Government in respect of the premises taken on lease, or requisitioned, by the Government (section 3). In view of the amendment introduced in section 3, the Delhi Rent Control Act is not applicable to premises, whether residential or not, whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand and five hundred rupees and premises constructed on or after the commencement of the said Amendment Act, for a period of ten years from the date of completion of such construction.4. The provisions of the Public Premises Act are applicable to public premises in the occupation of a person having no authority for such occupation, including a person who was allowed to occupy the public premises under a grant or any other mode of transfer and who has continued in occupation after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy those premises has expired or has been terminated. The provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act are applicable only to persons who have obtained possession of the premises as tenants and whose tenancy is continuing as well as persons who after the expiration or termination of the tenancy have continued in occupation of the premises.As a result of this comparison it can be said that certain premises, viz., buildings or parts of buildings lying within the limits of the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi Cantonment Board and in urban areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, which belong to or are taken on lease by any of the companies or statutory bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act and which are in the occupation of a person who obtained possession of the said premises as a tenant and whose tenancy has expired or has been terminated but who is continuing in occupation of the same, would ex facie fall within the purview of both thethis stage, it may be mentioned that in Jain Ink Manufacturing Co. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India 1981 (1) SCR 498 , decided by a Bench of three judges, it has been held that the Public Premises Act overrides the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In that case it has been observed that the scope and object of the Public Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Control Act and while the Public Premises Act operates in a very limited field in that it applies only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to particular sets of individuals, a particular set of juristic persons like companies, corporations or the Central Government, whereas the Rent Control Act is of much wider application and it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in section 2 of the Public Premises Act and the object of the Rent Control Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a corporation nor Government or corporate bodies. It was, therefore, held that the Public Premises Act is a special Act as compared to the Rent Control Act and it overrides the provisions of the Rent Control Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners have assailed the correctness of the said decision and have submitted that it needs reconsideration.24. As regards rent control legislation enacted by the State Legislatures, the position is well settled that such legislation falls within the ambit of entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution (see Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Debi 1970 (1) SCR 443 ; V. Dhanpal Chettiars case 1980 (1) SCR 334 ; Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi v. Maman Chand Ratilal Agarwal 1980 (3) SCR 224  and Accountant and Secretarial Services P. Ltd. v. Union of India 1988 (4) SCC 324 ).The Rent Control Act has been enacted by Parliament in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi in exercise of the legislative power conferred under article 246(4) of the Constitution which empowers Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.25. The Public Premises Act deals with Government property as well as property belonging to other legal entities mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act. In so far as it relates to eviction of unauthorised occupants from premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government the Public Premises Act would fall within entry 32 of List I being law with respect to a property of the Union. The property belonging to the various legal entities mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act cannot be regarded as property of the Union and the Public Premises Act cannot be held to have been enacted under entry 32 of List I in respect of the said properties. In Accountant and Secretarial Services P. Ltd. v. Union of India 1988 (4) SCC 324, this court has held that the Public Premises Act, in relation to properties other than the properties belonging to the Central Government, has been enacted under the concurrent list. The learned Additional Solicitor-General has placed reliance on the decision of this court in Saiyada Mossarrat v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. 1989 (1) SCC 272 , wherein it has been held that with regard to the subject-matter of speedy eviction of unauthorised occupants from properties belonging to a Government company, wherein the Central Government has more than fifty one per cent. of the paid-up capital, the source of authority can be traced to entry 97 read with entry 95 of the Union List (List I). This court has, however, affirmed the decision of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in L. S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., 1980 AIR(MP) 106, wherein it has been held that in so far as the Public Premises Act deals with a lessee or licensee of premises belonging to a Government company, the subject-matter of the Act would be covered by entries 6, 7 and 46 of List III. After quoting the observations of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in this regard, this court has observed :" Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that there is any infirmity in the reasoning of the High Court."26. This shows that the decision of this court is founded on the view mentioned above. Since the Act was held to be covered by entries 6, 7 and 46 of List III, it was not necessary to invoke the residuary power of legislation under entry 97 of List I. The observations made by this court that the source of authority in the matter of speedy eviction of unauthorised occupants from properties belonging to a Government company wherein the Central Government has more than fifty one per cent. of the paid-up share capital can, in any case, be traced to entry 97 read with entry 95 of List I are obiter in nature only. There is, therefore, no inconsistency between the decisions of this court in Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India 1988 (4) SCC 324  and Smt. Saiyada Mossarrats case 1989 (1) SCC 272 , inasmuch as in both the decisions it is held that the Public Premises Act in so far as it deals with a lessee or licensee of premises other than premises belonging to the Central Government has been enacted in exercise of the legislative powers in respect of matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. We are in agreement with this view.27. This means that both the statutes, viz., the Public Premises Act and the Rent Control Act, have been enacted by the same Legislature, Parliament, in exercise of the legislative powers in respect of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor-General that the Public Premises Act, having been enacted by Parliament in exercise of legislative powers in respect of matters enumerated in the Union List would ipso facto override the provisions of the Rent Control Act enacted in exercise of the legislative powers in respect of matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. In our opinion the question as to whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act override the provisions of the Rent Control Act will have to be considered in the light of the principles of statutory interpretation applicable to laws made by the same Legislature.One such principle of statutory interpretation which is applied is contained in the latin maxim : leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws). This principle is subject to the exception embodied in the maxim : generalia specialibus non derogant (a general provision does not derogate from a special one). This means that where the literal meaning of the general enactment covers a situation for which specific provision is made by another enactment contained in an earlier Act, it is presumed that the situation was intended to continue to be dealt with by the specific provision rather than the later general one (Bennion : Statutory Interpretation, pages 433-34).The Public Premises Act is a later enactment, having been enacted on 23rd August, 1971, whereas the Rent Control Act was enacted on 31st December, 1958. It represents the later will of Parliament and should prevail over the Rent Control Act unless it can be said that the Public Premises Act is a general enactment, whereas the Rent Control Act is a special enactment and being a special enactment the Rent Control Act should prevail over the Public Premises Act.Thus, each side claims that the enactment relied upon by it is a special statute and the other enactment is general and also invokes the non obstante clause contained in the enactment relied upon.The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general law regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained in the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provision for determination of standard rent, it specifies the grounds on which a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the forum for, adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants and the procedure which has to be followed in such proceedings. The Rent Control Act can, therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union Territory of Delhi. The Public Premises Act makes provision for a speedy machinery to secure eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. As opposed to the general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery of possession of property in a competent court and for trial of such a suit in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Public Premises Act confers the power to pass an order for eviction of an unauthorised occupant in public premises on a designated officer and prescribes the procedure to be followed by the said officer before passing such an order. Therefore, the Public Premises Act is also a special statute relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. In other words, both the enactments, namely, the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act, are special statutes in relation to the matters dealt with therein. Since the Public Premises Act is a special statute and not a general enactment the exception contained in the principle that a subsequent general law cannot derogate from an earlier special law cannot be invoked and in accordance with the principle that the later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws, the Public Premises Act must prevail over the Rent Control Act.We arrive at the same conclusion by applying the principle which is followed for resolving a conflict between the provisions of two special enactments made by the same Legislature. We may in this context refer to some of the cases which have come before this court where the provisions of two enactments made by the same Legislature were found to be inconsistent and each enactment was claimed to be a special enactment and had a non obstante clause giving overriding effect to its provisions.The principle which emerges from these decisions is that in the case of inconsistency between the provisions of two enactments, both of which can be regarded as special in nature, the conflict has to be resolved by reference to the purpose and policy underlying the two enactments and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein. We propose to consider this matter in the light of this principle.The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the enactment of the Rent Control Act indicates that it has been enacted with a viewto devise a suitable machinery for expeditious adjudication of proceedings between landlords and tenants ;(b) to provide for the determination of the standard rent payable by tenants of the various categories of premises which should be fair to the tenants, and at the same time, provide incentive for keeping the existing houses in good repairs, and for further investment in house construction ; and(c) to give tenants a larger measure of protection against eviction.This indicates that the object underlying the Rent Control Act is to make provisions for expeditious adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants, determination of standard rent payable by tenants and giving protection against eviction to tenants. The premises belonging to the Government are excluded from the ambit of the Rent Control Act which means that the Act has been enacted primarily to regulate the private relationship between landlords and tenants with a view to confer certain benefits on the tenants and at the same time to balance the interest of the landlords by providing for expeditious adjudication of proceedings between landlords and tenants.It would thus appear that, while the Rent Control Act is intended to deal with the general relationship of landlords and tenants in respect of premises other than Government premises, the Public Premises Act is intended to deal with speedy recovery of possession of premises of public nature, i.e., property belonging to the Central Government, or companies in which the Central Government has substantial interest or corporations owned or controlled by the Central Government and certain corporations, institutions, autonomous bodies and local authorities. The effect of giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act over the Rent Control Act, would be that buildings belonging to companies, corporations and autonomous bodies referred to in section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act would be excluded from the ambit of the Rent Control Act in the same manner as properties belonging to the Central Government. The reason underlying the exclusion of property belonging to the Government from the ambit of the Rent Control Act, is that the Government while dealing with the citizens in respect of property belonging to it would not act for its own purpose as a private landlord but would act in public interest. What can be said with regard to the Government in relation to property belonging to it can also be said with regard to companies, corporations and other statutory bodies mentioned in section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act. In our opinion, therefore, keeping in view the object and purpose underlying both the enactments, viz., the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act, the provisions of the Public Premises Act have to be construed as overriding the provisions contained in the Rent Control Act.As regards the non obstante clauses contained in sections 14 and 22 and the provisions contained in sections 50 and 54 of the Rent Control Act, it may be stated that Parliament was aware of these provisions when it enacted the Public Premises Act containing a specific provision in section 15 barring jurisdiction of all courts (which would include the Rent Controller under the Rent Control Act). This indicates that Parliament intended that the provisions of the Public Premises Act would prevail over the provisions of the Rent Control Act in spite of the above-mentioned provisions contained in the Rent Controlsupport of this submission, reliance has been placed on Dhanapal Chettiars case, 1979 AIR(SC) 1745, wherein it has been held that in view of the special provisions contained in the State Rent Control Acts, it is no longer necessary to issue a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to terminate the tenancy because in spite of the said notice the tenant is entitled to continue in occupation by virtue of the provisions of the saidthe said case, it has been further laid down that the relationship between the landlord and tenant continues till the passing of the order of eviction in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Act, and, therefore, for the eviction of the tenant in accordance with the law, an order of the competent court under the Rent Control Act is necessary. This would mean that in order to evict a person who is continuing in occupation after the expiration or termination of his contractual tenancy in accordance with law, two proceedings will have to be initiated. First, there will be proceedings under the Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller followed by appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal and revision before the High Court. After these proceedings have ended they would be followed by proceedings under the Public Premises Act, before the Estate Officer and the appellate authority. In other words, persons in occupation of public premises would receive greater protection than tenants in premises owned by private persons. It could not be the intention of Parliament to confer this dual benefit on persons in occupation of public22 of the Rent ControlThe said special provision shows that it enables recovery of possession of premises of which the landlord is a company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution in certain circumstances, viz., if the premises are required for the use of the employees or such landlord. In the case of public institutions, possession can also be obtained under this provision if the premises are required for the furtherance of its activities. In other words, recovery of possession is permissible under this provision only in certain circumstances and for certain purposes. In spite of this provision Parliament has considered it necessary to extend the Public Premises Act to premises belonging to companies, corporations and statutory bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of section 2(e) by widening the definition of the expression " public premises " in section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act. The scope and ambit of the aforesaid power conferred under the Public Premises Act cannot be restricted by reference to the provision contained in section22 of the Rent Controlare unable to cut down the scope of the provisions of the Public Premises Act on the basis of such an apprehension because as pointed out by this court in Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay 1989 (3) SCC 293 , 306Every activity of a public authority especially in the background of the assumption on which such authority enjoys immunity from the rigour of the Rent Control Act, must be informed by reason and guided by public interest. All exercise of discretion or power by public authorities as the respondent, in respect of dealing with tenants in respect of which they have been treated separately and distinctly from other landlords on the assumption that they would not act as private landlords, must be judged by that standard."These observations were made in the context of the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates (Control) Act, 1947, whereby exemption from the provisions of the Act has been granted to premises belonging to the Bombay Port Trust. The consequence of giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act is that premises belonging to companies and statutory bodies referred to in clauses (2) and (3) of section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act would be exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The actions of the companies and statutory bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act while dealing with their properties under the Public Premises Act will, therefore, have to be judged by the same standard.42. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that the provisions contained in the Public Premises Act cannot be applied to premises which fall within the ambit of the Rent Control Act. In our opinion, the provisions of the Public Premises Act, to the extent they cover premises falling within the ambit of the Rent Control Act, override the provisions of the Rent Control Act and a person in unauthorised occupation of public premises under section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control Act.In Civil Appeal No. 3725 of 1968, Shri Yogeshwar Prasad sought to raise contentions relating to the particular facts of that case, namely, that the termination of the lease of the appellant is vitiated by mala fides and that the said appellant could not be held to be a person in unauthorised occupation of the premises and further that the proceedings have not been taken in accordance with the provisions of the Public Premises Act. We find that in this case the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court directly against the order passed by the Estate Officer without filing an appeal against the said order before the appellate authority. The High Court has held that the question of mala fides is a disputed question of fact and the same could not be gone into in proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution. We are in agreement with the said view of the High Court. As regards the other contentions we are of the view that the appellant cannot be permitted to agitate matters which could be agitated by him in appeal before the appellateorders dated August 6, 1989, which were passed by the Additional Rent Controller in the proceedings for eviction initiated by the respondent-bank under the Rent Control Act against the appellants in these appeals have been placed on record by the respondents and from the said orders it appears that in the proceedings initiated under the Rent Control Act the appellants had raised a plea that the premises in question had been declared public premises under the Public Premises Act and in view of that the proceedings under the Rent Control Act were not competent. The said orders also show that the Additional Rent Controller dismissed the proceedings for eviction under the Rent Control Act on the view that the Public Premises Act is applicable to premises in question and his jurisdiction was excluded. This would show that the proceedings which were initiated by the respondent bank for the eviction of the appellants under the Rent Control Act were dismissed as not maintainable on the ground that the Rent Control Act was not applicable to the premises and the premises are governed by the provisions of the Public Premises Act. This finding was recorded by the Additional Rent Controller in view of the objection raised by the appellants with regard to the maintainability of those proceedings. In other words, the appellants succeeded in those proceedings on the basis of their plea that the premises were not governed by the Rent Control Act and were governed by the provisions of the Public Premises Act. Having got the proceedings under the Rent Control Act dismissed the appellants are now raising the plea that the proceedings under the Public Premises Act are not maintainable and that the only remedy available is under the Rent Control Act. This conduct of the appellants would have disentitled them from invoking the jurisdiction of this court under article 136 of the Constitution. Since we are of the view that the appellants cannot succeed on the merits, we do not propose to dismiss the appeals on this preliminary ground.