Case: Justice Chandrashekaraiah (Retd.) Vs. Janekere C. Krishna & Others


Decision:
1[ds]We agree that for the Lokpal to be fully effective and for him to acquire power, without conflict with other functionaries under the Constitution, it would be necessary to give a constitutional status to his office, his powers, functions, etc. We feel, however, that it is not necessary for Government to wait for this to materialize before setting up the office. The Lokpal, we are confident, would be able to function in a large number of cases without the definition of his position under the Constitution. The Constitutional amendment and any consequential modification of the relevant statute can follow. In the meantime, Government can ensure that the Lokpal or Lokayukta is appointed and takes preparatory action to set up his office, to lay down his procedures, etc., and commence his work to such extent as he can without the constitutional provisions. We are confident that the necessary support will be forthcoming from theam of the view that the judgment of this Court in K. P. Mahapatra (supra) is inapplicable while construing the provisions of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, since the language employed in that Act and Section 3 of the Orissa Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 1985 are not pari materia.60. We have, therefore, to interpret the provisions of Section 3(2)(a) and (b) as it stands in the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, where the language employed, in my view, is clear and unambiguous and we have to apply the golden rule of interpretation i.e. the literal interpretation which clearly expresses the intention of the legislature which I have already indicated, supports the objects and reasons, the preamble, as well as various other related provisions of the Act.61. Tindal, C.J., as early as 1844, has said thatthe words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such case best declare the intent of theIn other words, when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Viscount Simonds, L.C. in Empror v. Benoarilal Sarma AIR 1945 PC 48 has saidconstruing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the languageBlackstone, in Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol.1 page 59 has saidmost fair and rational method for interpreting a statute is by exploring the intention of the Legislature through the most natural and probable signs which are either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reasons of the law. In Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan AIR 1957 SC 907 , Justice Gajendragadkar stated that,the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of theIt is unnecessary to multiply that principle with decided cases, as the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself.62. Section 3(2)(a) and (b) when read literally and contextually admits of not doubt that the Governor of the State can appoint Lokayukta or Upa Lokayukta only on the advice tendered by the Chief Minister and that the Chief Justice of the High Court is only one of the consultees and his views have no primacy. The Governor, as per the statute, can appoint only on the advice tendered by the Chief Minister and not on the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice or any of thescheme of Section 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Act and however, much we strain, nothing spells out from the language used in Section 3(2)(a) and (b) to hold that primacy be attached to the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka. I am, therefore, of the view that the various directions given by the High Court holding that the views of the Chief Justice has got primacy, is beyond the scope of the Act and the High Court has indulged in a legislative exercise which is impermissible in law. I, therefore, set aside all the directions issued by the High Court, since they are beyond the scope of the Act.66. The Chief Minister, in my view, has however committed an error in not consulting the Chief Justice of the High Court in the matter of appointment of Justice Chandrashekaraiah as Upa Lokayukta. Records indicate that there was no meaningful and effective consultation or discussion of the names suggested among the consultees before advising the Governor for appointment to the post of Upa Lokayukta. The appointment of Justice Chandrashekaraiah as Upa Lokayukta, therefore, is in violation of Section 3(2)(b) of the Act since the Chief Justice of the High Court was not consulted nor was the name deliberated upon before advising or appointing him as Upa Lokayukta, consequently, the appointment of Justice Chandrasekharaiah as Upa Lokayukta cannot stand in the eye of law and he has no authority to continue or hold the post of Upa Lokayukta of theprocess of appointment of the Upa-lokayukta commenced with a letter written by the Chief Minister to the Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court on 18th October 2011 for suggestingpanel of eligible persons for appointment as Karnataka Upa Lokayukta on or before 24th October, 2011 so as to fill up the post of UpaI cannot fault the Chief Minister for this. He did not initiate the appointment process as understood in the decisions referred to above by recommending any candidate for appointment – he merely invited recommendations. He also did not err in law in inviting a panel of names since the consultation process involved more than one person. It was for the persons concerned to recommend a panel of names or make one recommendation or make no recommendation at all. As far as the Chief Justice was concerned, in keeping with the general view expressed by this Court in Kannadasan it was proper and appropriate for him to have recommended only one name to the Chief Minister and, as required by propriety, he correctly did so by recommending only one person for appointment as theam, therefore, not in agreement with the High Court that the recommendation for appointing the Upa-lokayukta under the Act must emanate only from the Chief Justice and only the name recommended by him should be considered. To this extent, the decision of the High Court is set aside. It is made clear that this view does not apply to judicial appointments.