Case: Tata Steel Ltd Vs. State of Jharkhand & Others


Decision:
1[ds]It must be noted here that Sections 6(1) and (2) authorise the Authority only to deal with industrial area but not development area.3 authorises the State Government to entrust the Authority with any other work connected with the responsibilities mentioned in Section 6(1) and (2) with respect to the industrial areas.he Authority shall have the powers of the Commissioner of a Municipality as specified in Sections 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201 and 202 of Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922, for purposes of removal of encroachment on roads, houses, gullies, any land in the development area and properties of theon the other hand expressly confers on the Authority certain powers enumerated in the various sections of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922 with regard to the development area. Remainingdeal with other matters, the details of which are not necessary for the present purpose, except noticing that the duties and powers of the Authorities are not common with respect to "industrial area" and "development area" under the Act.25. It is in the background of the abovementioned Scheme of the Act, the various issues involved in this appeal are required to be examined. The second Respondent AUTHORITY was constituted by notification dated 29.06.1972 under the Ordinance which preceded the ACT. Bydated 18.7.1973, the Government of Bihar transferred an area of 1266 acres of land alongwith structures, appurtenance etc. in favour of the AUTHORITY "to own, possess and hold the same for the purposes of the development of industries of that area". The Appellant disputes that the land transferred to them underis not part of the1266 acres of land. The second Respondent AUTHORITY asserts to the contra. However, the High Court (("Para 20. Learned Counsel for the AIADA vehemently submitted that the question of identity of the property which has been handed over to the AIADA or the plea that the lease land of the Petitioner is not included in the notification was never raised by the Petitioner before any authority even after several notices to the Petitioner and, therefore, this question of fact cannot be raised in the writ jurisdiction that too, without laying down the factual foundation for which particularly the Petitioner did not even annex the map which was part of the lease deed by which the lease was granted to the writ Petitioner, reference of which map is already there in the lease deed.")) declined to go into that question on the ground that it is a question of fact which was never raised by the Appellant herein any time earlier. We see no reason to take a different view.26. We, therefore, proceed on the basis that the land in dispute is part of the 1266 acres of the land covered by thedated 18.7.1973. But the question still remains whether the land in question is a part of either the "industrial area" or the "development area" or beyond both the areas. We do not find any material on the record to reach any definite conclusion on the above question. It goes without saying that the responsibility to establish that fact is on the Respondents by producing the appropriate notification. Unfortunately, none is produced. Therefore, we proceed on the presumption that the land in dispute is not part of any notified industrial or development area.The first submission made on behalf of the Appellant is that a transfer of land such as the once evidenced bycould not have been legally made insofar as the property in dispute is concerned without the State of Bihar first resuming the lands which are in the possession of the Appellant pursuant toIn our opinion, the said submission is required to be rejected for the reason that though the State of Bihar did not have possession of the land in dispute when it made thein favour of the AUTHORITY, the second grantee (i.e. the AUTHORITY) takes the property covered by thesubject to the rights of the earlier grantee. There is no need in law for the termination of the interest created underin favour of the Appellant, before the State of Bihar chose to transfer the property covered by theBecause the interest created underwas a limited interest and the title of the property still vested with the State of Bihar.30.The next submission that is required to be examinedthe second Respondent AUTHORITY can exercise the power vested in it by the ACTthe lands in dispute as the said land is held by it only by virtue ofWe have already recorded that there is nothing on record to establish that the land in question is part of either "industrial area" or "development area".31. This question assumes importance because thenotice dated 15.01.2002 issued by the AUTHORITY invokes the powers both Under Sectionof the ACT and Clause 4 (xiv) ofand the final order dated 17.11.2008 relied upon Clause 4(xiv) ofand Section 6(2)(a) and 2(b) of the ACT.The substance of the four clauses is that Appellant would be obliged to transfer the property by virtue of Condition No. 4(iv) when a part of the property covered byis needed for a public purpose. Such stipulation perhaps implies an obligation on the part of the Appellant to give possession of the property without the need for the State to resort to a civil court for recovering the possession. We do not wish to give any final opinion in this regard as this issue does not arise in this case and not argued before us. In the contingency contemplated under Condition No. 4 (v), since it would be a transfer at the instance of the Appellant, obviously the question of the mode of recovery of possession does not arise as it would be a voluntary act of the Appellant. On the other hand, in the contingencies contemplated under condition Nos. 4 (xiv) and 4 (xvii), the language of the grant expressly authorizes the AUTHORITY "to evict the lessee from the lands" or "resume and enter upon the whole of the land". Whether such right "to evict" or "resume", of the AUTHORITY includes the right to recover possession without the need to resort to a civil suit is also a question we need not decide in this case as that issue does not arise.40. We have discussed the Scheme ofWe have already set out the four clauses underin paragraph 34 supra which deal with the termination of the grant made in favour of the Appellant. The only clause, invoked in the show cause notice dated 15.1.2002 of the AUTHORITY is Clause (xiv).42. Even the Respondents do no claim that the impugned action could be justified under the other three clauses. Clause (xiv) purports to enable the AUTHORITY to terminate theand evict the Appellant in only one contingency. At the cost of repetition, we extract Clause (xiv)Clause (xiv) stipulates that in the event of the Appellant failing to "use the land for the specified purpose within a period of one year from the date of the lease"the same may be terminated and the Appellant be evicted from the lands without notice. It is an undisputed fact that the Appellant was given the land in dispute for the purpose of establishing "alloy tool and special steel plants and the roll foundry" project. That is the purpose specified under the GRANT. Admittedly, the Appellant utilized 200 acres of land out of 350 acres of land for the establishment of the said project.In our view, the answer must be in the negative for the followingTo understand the meaning and scope of Clause (xiv), the following factors are required to be examined; (i) purpose for which the GRANT was made, (ii) the terms and conditions upon which the GRANT was made, (iii) the various contingencies under which the GRANT could be terminated in full or in part etc. (iv) the scheme of the GRANT.(ii) The land in dispute was transferred to the Appellant for a specific purpose underThe Appellant did in fact establish the industry for the establishment of which thewas made and has been successfully running the industry for the last about 40 years (approximately). For the said purpose, the Appellant utilised a substantial portion of the land covered by the GRANT and therefore, it cannot be said that the Appellant did not utilise the land for the purpose specified under theSuch a GRANT was made for a consideration (Salami of Rs.apart from an annual rent for the land which the Appellant has admittedly been paying.(iii) Analysis of the scheme of Clauses (iv), (v), (xiv) and (xvii), reveals that only Clauses (iv) and (v) speak about "any part" or "parts" of the land which the Appellant is liable to transfer on demand by the AUTHORITY under Clause (iv) or voluntarily under Clause (v). Clause (xvii) stipulates the right of the second Respondent "to resume and enter upon the whole of the said land" in the event of breach by the Appellant of any of the terms and conditions ofwhereas Clause (xiv) significantly does not employ the expression "part" or "parts of the land".(iv) Clause (xiv) does not contemplate taking possession of parts of the land into Clauses (iv) and (v). It only contemplates the termination of thein the event of the failure on the part of the Appellant to use the land for the specified purpose and eviction of the Appellant from the land. In our opinion, the language of the clause is significant. It can only be invoked in the case of total failure to utilise the land for the specified purpose. Clause (xiv) read with the right of the Appellant under Clause (v) to sell a part of the land covered by thewhich is no longer required by him, can lead to only one conclusion that it was never intended by thethat every inch of the land must be utilised for the purpose of the establishment of the industry. Any other construction of Clause (xiv) would simply render the Clause (v) meaningless and destructive of the right created thereunder in favour of the Appellant. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the second Respondent is not entitled to invoke Clause (xiv) in support of its impugned decision.In view of the above conclusion, the other submission of the Appellant need not be examined.