Case: Kamala Mills Ltd Vs. State Of Bombay


Decision:
0[ds]The Act was passed in 1946 and it came into force on March 8, 1946. At that time, the word "sale" as defined by S. 2(g) of the Act would have taken in all sales whether they were inside sales or outside sales. After the Constitution was adopted on January 26, 1950, Art. 286 came into force and it protected certain sales specified by it from the purview of State taxation. It may theoretically be true that as soon as Art. 286 became effective, the expression "sale" as defined by the Act was automatically constitutionally controlled by the limitations prescribed by it. To make this position clear, however, Bombay Ordinance 11 of 1952 was passed and by S. 3, it added S. 30 to the Act. In effect, S. 30 introduced in the Act the relevant provisions prescribed by Art. 286 of the Constitution, so as to bring the operation of the Act expressly in conformity with the said constitutional provision. Section 3 further made it clear that the addition made by it by introducing S. 30 in the Act shall be made and shall always be deemed to have been made in the said Act as so continued in force, with effect from the 26th January 1950.10. It is well known that the controversy in regard to the interpretation of Art. 286 began with the decision of this Court in State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd., 1953 SCR 1069   : (AIR 1953 SC 252  ) and ended with the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of Bengal Immunity Co., 1955-2 SCR 603   : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 661  ) (supra). In order to alleviate the economic crisis which was likely to result in view of the subsequent decision of this Court, the President promulgated the Sales Tax Validation Ordinance, 1956 on January 30, 1956, the provisions of which were later incorporated in the Sales Tax Validation Act, 1956. This Act validated sales tax collected by different States from 1-4-1951 to 6-9-1955 in accordance with the principles laid down by this Court in United Motors case, 1953 SCR 1069   : (AIR 1953 SC 252  ). The sales-tax similarly collected between 16-1-1950 to 31-3-1951 was also sought to be validated by the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950. If we had reached the stage of considering the merits about the validity of the recovery of tax in the present case, it would have become necessary for us to consider the effect of this Continuance Order.Section 20 protects "assessment made under the Act or the rules made thereunder" by appropriate authorities. There can be little doubt that the clause "an assessment made" cannot mean the assessment properly or correctly made. The said clause takes in all assessments made or purported to have been made under the Act. In its plaint, the appellant is undoubtedly calling into question the assessment order made against it, and such a challenge to the assessment order is plainly prohibited by S.20. An order of assessment, though erroneous, and though based on an incorrect finding of fact, is, nevertheless, an order of assessment within the meaning of S. 20; and S. 20, in terms provides that it will not be called in, question in any civil Court.16. This question has been recently considered by this Court in Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1964-1 SCR 752  :(AIR 1964 SC 322  ). Dealing with S. 18A of the Madras General Sales Tax Act (Act 9 of 1939), which corresponds to S. 20 with which we are concerned in the present appeal, this Court observed that the expression "any assessment made under this Act is wide enough to cover all assessments made by the appropriate authorities under this Act whether the said assessments are correct or not. It is the activity of the assessing officer acting as such officer which is intended to be protected and as soon as it is shown that exercising his jurisdiction and authority under this Act, an assessing officer has made an order of assessment, that clearly falls within the scope of S. 18A. It was also observed that whether or not an assessment has been made under this Act, will not depend on the correctness or accuracy of the order passed by the assessingis either territorial, or pecuniary, or in respect of the subject-matter. There is no difficulty about the assessing authorities territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction in the present case, what is the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the appropriate authority in respect of the subject-matter of sales tax? Has the appropriate authority been given power to examine the nature of the transaction and decide whether it is liable to tax or not. Or, can the appropriate authorities proceed to exercise its power of imposing a tax only in cases where the transaction in question is assessable to such tax? In other words, is the decision about the character of the transaction the decision of a collateral fact, the finding on which alone confers jurisdiction on the tribunal to levy the tax, or is it the decision on a question of fact which is left to be determined by the appropriate authority itself? If the jurisdiction conferred oh the appropriate authority falls under the first category, then its finding that a particular transaction is taxable under the relevant provisions of the Act, would be a finding on a collateral question of fact, and it may be permissible to a party aggrieved by the said finding to contend that the tax levied on the basis of an erroneous decision about the nature of the transaction is without jurisdiction. If, however, the appropriate authority has been given jurisdiction to determine the nature of the transaction and proceed to levy a tax in accordance with its decision on the first issue, then the decision on the first issue cannot be said to be a decision on a collateral issue, and even if the said issue is erroneously determined by the appropriate authority, the tax levied by it in accordance with its decision cannot be said to be without jurisdiction.It would be noticed that Mr. Sastris argument that the impugned order of assessment is without jurisdiction and as such, does not fall within S. 20, proceeds on the assumption that the finding of the appropriate authority that the transactions in question were taxable under the relevant provisions of the Act, is a finding on a fact which isour opinion, the answer to this question must be in the negative.It would thus be seen that the appropriate authorities have been given power in express terms to examine the returns submitted by the dealers and to deal with the questions as to whether the transactions entered into by the dealers are liable to be assessed under the relevant provisions of the Act or not. In our opinion, it is plain that the very object of constituting appropriate authorities under the Act is to create a hierarchy of special tribunals to deal with the problem of levying assessment of sales tax as contemplated by the Act. If we examine the relevant provisions which confer jurisdiction on the appropriate authorities to levy assessment on the dealers in respect of transactions to which the charging section applies, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that all questions pertaining to the liability of the dealers to pay assessment in respect of their transactions are expressly left to be decided by the appropriate authorities under the Act as matters falling within their jurisdiction. Whether or not a return is correct; whether or not transactions which are not mentioned in the return, but about which the appropriate authority has knowledge, fall within the mischief of the charging section; what is the true and real extent of the transactions which are assessable; all these and other allied questions have to be determined by the appropriate authorities themselves; and so, we find it impossible to accept Mr. Sastris argument that the finding of the appropriate authority that a particular transaction is taxable under the provisions of the Act, is a finding on a collateral fact which gives the appropriate authority jurisdiction to take a further step and make the actual order of assessment. The whole activity of assessment beginning with the filing of the return and ending with an order of assessment, falls within the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority and no part of it can be said to constitute a collateral activity not specifically and expressly included in the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority as such. We are, therefore, satisfied that Mr. Sastri is not right when he contends that the finding of the appropriate authority that a particular transaction is taxable under the charging section of the Act, is a finding on a collateral fact and it is only if the said finding is correct that the appropriate authority can validly exercise its jurisdiction to levy a safes tax in respect of the transactions in question. In fact, what we have said about the jurisdiction of the appropriate authorities exercising their powers under the Act, would be equally true about the appropriate authorities functioning either under similar sales-tax Acts, or under the Income-taxobject in referring to the majority decision in Ujjam Bais case, 1963-1 SCR 778   : (AIR 1962 SC 1621  ) is merely to show that the tenor of the opinion expressed by the learned Juges in the said case is in support of the view that a finding recorded by a taxing authority as to the taxability of any given transaction cannot be said to be a finding on a collateral fact, but is a finding on a fact the decision of which is entrusted to the jurisdiction of suchrespect we may point out that the majority decision in Ujjam Bais case, 1963-1 SCR 778   : (AIR 1962 SC 1621  ) (supra) on which this conclusion is founded does not support that view. We ought, however, to add that in the case of State Trading Corporation of India Ltd., 1963-3 SCR 792   : (AIR 1963 SC 548  ) (supra), as in the earlier case of Ujjam Bai, 1963-1 SCR 778   : (AIR 1962 SC 1621  ), this Court was dealing with a petition filed under Art. 32; and as we have already indicated, we are not called upon to consider the extent of our jurisdiction under Art. 32 when such questions are brought before us by citizens for relief on the ground that their fundamental rights have been contravened by assessmentour opinion, this question cannot be answered in favour of Mr. Sastris contention. Whether or not such a conclusion can be challenged under Art. 226 or under Art. 32 of the Constitution, and if yes, under what circumstances, are matters with which we are not concerned in the present proceedings. For the purpose of construing S. 20, we are not prepared to hold that an assessment based on an erroneous finding about the character of the transaction, is an assessment made without jurisdiction and as such, is outside the purview of S. 20 of the Act. We would like to repeat that it is only this narrow question we are considering in the present appeal.28. Reverting then to S. 20, it seems to as plain that the words used in this Section are so wide that even erroneous orders of assessment made would be entitled to claim its protection against the institution of a civil suit.In Releigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council, 74 Ind App 50 at pp. 6263 : (AIR 1947 PC 78   at p. 80), section 67 of the Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922) which barred a suit, fell to be considered. The Privy Council held that the said provision barred a suit where the plaintiff sought to challenge an assessment order made by the appropriate tax authorities under the provisions of the said Act. In construing the effect of the words "no suit shall be brought in any civil Court to set aside or modify any assessment made under this Act", the Privy Council thought it necessary to enquire whether the Act contained machinery which enabled an assessee effectively to raise in the courts the question whether a particular provision of the Income-tax Act bearing on the assessment made is or is not ultra vires. "The presence of such machinery" observed the Privy Council, "though by no means conclusive, marches with a construction of the section which denies an alternative jurisdiction to enquire into the same subject-matter. The absence of such machinery would greatly assist the appellant on the question of construction and, indeed, it may be added that, if there were no such machinery, and if the section affected to preclude the High Court in its ordinary civil jurisdiction from considering a point of ultra vires, there would be a serious question whether the opening part of the section, so far as it debarred the question of ultra vires being debated, fell within the competence of the legislature". In other words, these observations indicate that the Privy Council took the view that where an appropriate authority is exercising its jurisdiction to levy a tax in respect of any transaction, it would be competent to such an authority to consider the validity of the taxing provisions themselves. We do not think it is necessary for us to examine this aspect of the matter in the present appeal, because the validity of the charging section is not impeached in the present proceedings. It is true that Mr. Sastri has challenged the validity of S. 20, but the said section has no bearing on the assessment made, and so, that plea has no relevance to the point which the Privy Council was considering in the observations to which we have justsought to add that this decision was based on the fact that the said Act at the relevant time did not contain S. 18A which came into force on May 15, 1951; and it was S. 18A which was construed by this Court in Firm of llluri Subbayya Chetty and Sons, 1964-1 SCR 752   : (AIR 1964 SC 322  ) (supra).We do not think Mr. Sastri can successfully advance his case before us by relying on these two decisions. After all, as the privy Council observed in the case of Mask and Co., 67 Ind App 222 : (AIR 1940 PC 105  ) (supra), the determination of the question as to whether S. 20 bars the present suit, must rest on the terms of S. 20 themselves, because that is the provision under consideration and decisions on other statutory provisions are not of material assistance, except in so far as general principles of construction are laid down" (p. 237 of Ind App) : (at p. 1 10 of AIR). Besides, in regard to these two decisions, we may, with respect, point out that they do not purport to lay down a general rule that the jurisdiction of a civil Court cannot be excluded unless it is specifically provided that a suit in a civil Court would not lie. In fact as the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Mask and Co., 67 Ind App 222 : (AIR1940 PC 105) (supra) shows, the jurisdiction of a civil Court can be excluded even without such an express provision. In every case, the question about the exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil Courts either expressly or by necessary implication must be considered in the light of the words used in the statutory provision on which the plea is rested, the scheme of the relevant provisions, their object and their purpose. We would also like to make it clear that we do not think it is necessary in the present case to consider whether the majority opinion in the case of Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 600 of 1964 dated 26-3.1965(SC) (supra) was justified in casting a doubt on certain observations made by the Privy Council in Raleigh Investment Cos case, 74 Ind App 50 : (AIR 1947 PC 78  ) (supra), or on the validity or the propriety of the conclusion in respect of the effect of S. 67 of the Income-tax Act.34. Mr. Sastri has also invited our attention to the decision of the House of Lords in Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government,1960 AC 260   at p. 286. In that case, the House of Lords repelled the preliminary objection raised by the respondents that the Court had no jurisdiction to grant the declarations asked for, since by the combined effect of Sections 15 and 17 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, the decision of the Minister on an application to determine whether permission was required was made final and the only method of determining such a question was that provided by S. 17(1); and that the wide, discretion conferred by S. 14 on he Minister to impose conditions disentitled the company from coming to the court for a declaration that the conditions were invalid. In coming to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was not excluded, the House of Lords noticed that there was nothing in S.17 or in the Act which excluded the jurisdiction of the Court to grant declarations; S. 17 merely provided an alternative method of having the question determined by the Minister. "It is a principle not by any means to be whittled down", Said Viscount Simonds, "that the subjects recourse to Her Majestys courts for the determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words. That is, as McNair J, called it in Francis v. Yiewsley and West Drayton Urban District Council, 1957-2 QB 136 at p.148, a "fundamental rule" from which I would not for my part sanction any departure". Approaching the task of construing S. 17 from this point of view, his Lordship came to the conclusion that them was nothing in S. 17 which excluded the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the claim in question. We do not see how this decision can afford any assistance to the appellant.35. There is one more aspect of the matter which must be considered before we finally determine the question as to whether S. 20 excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court in entertaining the present suit. Whenever it is urged before a civil court that its jurisdiction is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication to entertain claims of a civil nature, the Court naturally feels inclined to consider whether the remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by a special statute is sufficient or adequate. In cases where the exclusion of the civil courts jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive. But where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary inplication, such considerations would be very important, and in conceivable circumstances, might even become decisive. If it appears that a statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and liability to be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in that behalf, and it further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, it becomes pertinent to enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. The relevance of this enquiry was accepted by the Privy Council in dealing with S. 67 of the Income-tax Act in Releigh Investment Co.s case, 74 Ind App 50 : (AIR 1947 PC 78  ) (supra) and that is the test which is usually applied by all civil courts.36. In the present case, the appellant wants relief of refund of tax which is alleged to have been illegally recovered from it by the respondent, and the ground on which the said relief is claimed is that at the time when the tax was recovered, the appellant was under a mistake of fact and law. According to the appellant, even the respondent might have been labouring under the same mistake of fact and law, because the true constitutional and legal position in and to the jurisdiction and authority of different States to recover sales tax in respect of different States to recover sales tax in respect of outside sales was not correctly appreciated until this Court pronounced its decision in Bengal Immunity Co.s case, 1955-2 SCR 603   : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 661  ) (supra). That being so, can it be said that the Act provides an appropriate remedy for recovering a tax alleged to have been illegally levied and collected, where the party asking for the said relief pleads a mistake of fact and law? It would be noticed that the inquiry may, have some relevance in construing the terms of S. 20, and it would be both relevant and material in considering the question of the constitutionality of S. 20. That is the two-fold purpose which such an inquiry would serve in the present case. If we are satisfied that the Act provides for no remedy to make a claim for the recovery of illegally collected tax and yet S. 20 prohibits such a claim being made before an ordinary civil court, the Court may hesitate to construe S. 20 as creating an absolute bar, or if such a construction "is not reasonably possible, the Court may seriously examine the question about the constitutionality of such express exclusion of the civil courts jurisdiction having regard to the provisions of Arts. 19 and 31 of the Constitution. It is with this two-fold object that this aspect of the matter must now be examined.37. Before proceeding to examine this matter, we ought to refer to the decision of this Court in the Sales Tax Officer, Banaras v. Kanhaiya Lal Mukundlal Saraf, 1959 SCR 1350  : (AIR 1959 SC 135  ). In that case, this Court has held that the term "mistake" in S. 72 of the Indian Contract Act comprises within its scope a mistake of law as well as a mistake of fact and that, under that section a party is entitled to recover money paid by mistake or under coercion, and if it is established that the payment, even though it be of a tax, has been made by the party labouring under a mistake of law, the party receiving the money is bound to repay or return it though it might have been paid voluntarily, subject, however, to questions of estoppel, waiver, limitation or the like. Basing himself on this decision, Mr. Sastri contends, that since the Act does not provide for adequate remedy to recover illegally collected tax from the respondent, we should either put a narrow construction on S. 20 so as to permit institution of a suit like the present or, in the alternative, should strike it down as constitutionally invalid. If a citizen is deprived of his property illegally by recovering from him unauthorisedly an amount of tax where no such tax is recoverable from him, he ought to have a proper and appropriate remedy to ventilate his grievance against the State. Normally, such a remedy would be in the form of a suit brought before an ordinary civil Court: it may even be a proceeding before a specially appointed tribunal under the provisions of a tax statute; and it can also be an appropriate proceeding either under Art. 226, or under Art. 32 of theis thus clear that the appellant could have either appealed or applied for revision and prayed for condonation of delay on the ground that the mistake which was responsible for the recovery of the tax illegally levied, was discovered on the 6th September, 1955, because such a plea would have been perfectly competent under S. 22B.40. In other words, if the appellant had pursued a remedy available to it under S. 21 or S. 22 read with S. 22B, its case would have been considered by the appropriate authority and the validity of the grounds set up by it for the refund of the tax in question would have been legally examined. Therefore, it cannot be said that even for the claim which the appellant seeks to make in the present suit, there is no alternative remedy prescribed by the Act. This conclusion serves a double purpose; It makes it easier to construe the wide words used in S. 20 and held that they constitute an absolute bar against the institution of the present suit, and it also helps the respondent to repel the plea of the appellant that S. 20 if it is so widely construed, is unconstitutional. Our conclusion, therefore, is that S. 20 should be construed in the same manner in which S. 18A of the Madras General Sales Tax Act was construed by this Court in Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty and Sons, 1964-1 SCR 752   : (AIR 1964 SC 322  ) (supra) and that even on this wide construction, the said section is constitutionally valid.41. This conclusion, however, does not finally dispose of the appeal. Though the appellants suit may be incompetent in so far as the appellant seeks for a decree for refund, it still remains to be considered whether its suit can be said to be incompetent in so far as it seeks to challenge the validity of S. 20 itself. It would be recalled that the alternative claim made by the appellant in its plaint was that S. 20 on which a plea of bar is raised by the respondent, is invalid. The High Court has not considered this aspect of the matter; but since the appellant has been allowed to raise the point about the validity of Section 20, we must deal with it.42. This point presents no difficulty whatever. The bar created by S. 20 cannot obviously be pleaded where the validity of S. 20 itself is challenged. That can of course be done by a separate suit. In terms, S. 20 is confined to cases where the validity of assessment orders made under the Act is challenged. The said provision cannot take in a challenge to the validity of S. 20 itself, and so, we must hold that technically, the appellants suit is competent in so far as it seeks to challenge the validity of S. 20. This finding, however, is of no material assistance to the appellant, because even after it succeeds on this point, it has still to face the plea of the respondent that on the merits, the suit is barred; and on that plea, the appellant must fail, because S. 20 is a bar to the appellants claim that the amount in question which is alleged to have been illegally recovered from it should be refunded to it. That is a matter which falls directly within the mischief of S.Act under which tax was recovered from the appellant is valid and so is the charging section valid; the appropriate authorities dealt with the matter in regard to the taxability of the impugned transactions in accordance with the provisions of the Act and in consequence, tax in question was recovered on the basis that the said transactions were taxable under the Act. The appellant contends that the transactions were outside sales and they did not and could not fall under the charging section because of Art. 286, and it argues that the tax was levied because both the appellant and the appropriate authorities committed a mistake of fact as well as law in dealing with the question. Assuming that such a mistake was committed, the conclusion that the transactions in question fell within the purview of the charging section cannot be said to be without jurisdiction or a nullity and the assessment based even on such an erroneous conclusion would claim the protection of S. 20. If, after discovering the mistake, the appellant had moved the appropriate authorities under the relevant provisions of the Act, its claim for refund would have been considered on the merits. Having failed to take recourse to the said remedy, it may have been open to the appellant to move the High Court under Art. 226. Whether or not in such a case, the jurisdiction of the High Court could have been effectively invoked, is a matter on which we propose to express no opinion. As we have pointed out during the course of this judgment, we are not dealing with the scope and effect of the High Courts jurisdiction under Art. 226 as well as the scope and effect of this Courts jurisdiction under Art. 32 vis-a-vis such claims for refund of tax alleged to have been illegally recovered.