Case: Babua Ram Vs. State of U.P


Decision:
1[ds]Let us consider the meaning of the words ``an award under this part referred to in Sectionwhich is Part III of the Act. The heading to that part begins by reference to court and its procedure. The ``court means a principal civil court of original jurisdiction or a special judicial officer appointed to perform the functions of the court under the Act as becomes clear as is noticed already. What are the matters to be considered in determining the compensation on a reference made to it under Section 18, is detailed in Section 23 while matters to be neglected in determining such compensation is indicated in Section 24. By operation of(2) of Section 26, the award made determining the amount of compensation shall be deemed to be a decree while the statement of the grounds of every such award is deemed to be the judgment, for the purpose of Code of Civil Procedure. The above perspectives from Part III make it clear that the award of the court is that of the civil court of original jurisdiction in that part. It is a decree for the purpose of an appeal under Section 54 which falls in part VIII of the Act (Miscellaneous). The decree as defined in Section 2(2) C.P.C. is the decree of the High Court, which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court under Articles 132, 133 and 136 read with Order 45 C.P.C.. Hence, the award of the court referred to in(1) of Section 28Ais only the award of the civil court of original jurisdiction or of judicial officer performing the functions of such court under the Act on reference received by it under Section 18 and an award and decree pronounced under Section 26 of the Act. Since, the judgment and decree of the High Court under Section 54 or of this Court do not come in Part III of the Act, they stand excluded from an award envisaged under(1) of SectionThe aggrieved interested person, therefore, is entitled to the right and remedy of making an application under Section28A for redetermination ofcompensation for his acquired land only on the basis of the award of the civil court or judicial officer which is a judgment and decree under Section 26 when such award grants compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. When such an application is made in writing by the aggrieved person, notwithstanding the fact of his having received compensation under Section 31 without protest and of not availing the right and remedy of the reference under Section 18, the redetermination of the compensation under Section 28A(1) is required to bebare reading of(1) along with its proviso would indicate that the making of the award by the civil court or judicial officer which becomes the judgment and decree under Section 26, is the starting point from which the period of limitation allowed for making an application under Section 28A. However, the person aggrieved in computing the period of three months allowed for making an application under Sectionwould be entitled to exclude the day on which the award was pronounced by the court or the judicial officer and the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy of the award which is a judgment and decree under Section 26. In other words, the proviso to sub) of Sectionexcludes the requisite time taken for obtaining the copy of the award and in computation of the period of three months from the date of the award, the time required to obtain a certified copy of the award should be excluded. Limitation begins to run from the date the award was pronounced by the court under Section 26. It isthat the law of limitation limits the time after which a suit or other proceeding cannot be entertained in a court of justice or before appropriate authority, though it does not affect the substantive rights of the parties. Once the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the court. Explanation to Section 11 provides internal evidence in this behalf to make the point poignantly clear which states that in computing two years period to make award under Section 11, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 is stayed by an order of a court, should be excluded. The legislature prescribed three months limitation to quicken diligence like caveat emptor and provided to aright to redetermination provided the application in writing is made to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the civil court of original jurisdiction, excluding the requisite time taken to obtain a copy of the award. In other words, the right and remedy provided by Sectionstands extinguished with the expiry of three months from the date of the award under Section 26. It is true that in a given set of facts, there could be more than one reference under Section 18 at the behest of different claimants of the lands covered by Section 4(1) Notification and the court may make successive awards at various times. Compensation given in the respective awards may vary and may be higher than the one given in an earliest award. In the teeth of the express language in) of Sectionlimitation of three months once expires in respect of earliest award by efflux of time, none of the later awards could provide any assistance to revive the lapsed time under Sectionnor provide fresh cause of action or successive causes of action when multiple awards are made at different times or dates. Application under Sectionmay be made at the instance of theperson or different persons. Any other interpretation would amount tothe proviso to) of SectionThe judgment and decree of the Court of appeal either under Section 54 or under Section 96 of CPC or under Articles 132, 133 or 136 of the Constitution does not furnish fresh cause of action nor provide fresh limitation to make application under Sectionof the Act as has already been held in that they are not covered under Part III of the Act. May be that they are continuation of original decree made in Section 26(2) and in law the executable decree is that of the Supreme Court or the High Courts. But the legislature has conferred right of reopening the award under Section 11 only when the civil court under Section 26 awarded higher compensation in Part III to a person having an interest in the land covered by the same Notification under Section 4(1) and an application in writing if made within limitation.Now we consider the external aid to get at the crux of the question. When the language is not only plain but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. Such language best declares, without more, the intention of the legislature and is decisive on it. Therefore, when the language is clear and capable of only one meaning, anything enacted by the legislature, must be enforced, even though it be absurd or result in startling consequences. The endeavour, therefore, must be to collect the meaning of the statute from the expressions used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just or expedient. When two interpretations are possible, the task of the court would be to find which one or the other interpretation would promote the object of the statute, serves its purpose, preserve its smooth working and prefer the one which subserves or promotes the object to the other which introduces inconvenience or uncertainty in the working of its system.The purpose of interpretation is, therefore, to ascertain the intentions of the legislature and to make it effective. If the statute is ambiguous or its meaning is uncertain, interpretation is resorted to for ascertaining what the legislature meant by the words in the statute, although they do not express the legislative interest clearly and perfectly. In other words, if the statute is plain, certain and free from ambiguity, abare reading ofit suffices and its interpretation can never arise. In discovering the legislative intent, courts are not exercising legislative power but apply the rules of common sense applying certain legal principles.) of Sectionreads that where an award under this part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the person interested in all other lands covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of the compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of the compensation awarded by the Court. A person interested becomes aggrieved, when for other lands covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, the court awards compensation in excess of the compensation awarded under Section 11 to him for his land and to others for their land. Such aggrieved persons who had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18 earlier becomes entitled to invoke SectionTherefore, the verb `allows indicates that the right to an aggrieved person under Sectionarises only when the reference court grants compensation in excess of the amount awarded under Section 11 i.e. after September 24, 1984. It is prospective in operation after the Act had come into force. The amount ``awarded speaks of past tense. In other words there must be an award in existence under Section 26 made after the Amendment Act come into force. The right and remedy to claim redetermination accrues to an interested aggrieved persons after September 24, 1984. The proviso amplifies it when it speaks of exclusion of the time taken to obtain copy of the award under Section 26 till it is supplied, i.e. it operates in future. It is, therefore, clear that Sectiondoes not apply to an award under Section 26 made prior to September 24, 1984.