Case: M.C.MEHTA Vs. UNION OF INDIA


Decision:
1[ds]75. We may mention, without comment, that the purpose of issuing a notification under the PLP Act is to ensure that in the closed area there is no activity such as cultivation, pasturing of sheep and goats, erection of buildings, herding, pasturing or retaining cattle etc. Therefore, the notification is a clear indication that such closed areas must be forest land or treated as forest land so that such objectionableactivities are not carried out therein and that activities that are not normally carried out in forests are prohibited in forest land, so as to preserve and protect such forest land. A notification under the PLP Act does not convert land into forest land but recognizes it as such or at least requires it to be treated as such.In our opinion, there is nothing in these applications before us to remotely suggest that the various orders passed by this Court need any clarification or modification or recall. All issues raised by the applicants have been considered threadbare by several Benches of this Court and allof them have arrived at a similar conclusion namely that the environmental and ecological degradation of the Aravalli hills must stop and that everybody is bound by the terms of the notification issued under the provisions of the PLP Act and that closed land under the notification dated 18th August, 1992 is a forest and should be treated as a forest.That apart, the view expressed by this Court in Gurdip Singh Uban cannot be limited only to applications for modification, clarification or recall. There is a growing tendency to provide different nomenclatures to applications tothe rigours and limitations imposed on an applicant and the Court in dealing with a review petition. Applications can be and are titled as applications for directions, rehearing, reconsideration, revisiting etc. etc. One has only to open a thesaurus and find an equivalent word and give an application an appropriate nomenclature so that it could be taken up for consideration in open Court and on its merits and not as a review petition by circulation. In our opinion, the nomenclature given to an application is of absolutely no consequencewhat is of importance is the substance of the application and if it is found, in substance, to be an application for review, it should be dealt with by the Court as such, and by circulation.Considering the substantive applications filed by the applicant, we are of the clear opinion that these applications are nothing but disguisedreview petitions and they should not have been listed for hearing in open Court without an appropriate order passed by this Court. They should have first been circulated and dealt with as review petitions and if the concerned Bench was of the view that they were required to be heard in open Court, only then should they have been listed for hearing in open Court. However, we are not detaining ourselves any further in this regard since we propose to deal with these applications on merits, treating them as applications for clarification, modification, recall, reconsideration etc. of the orders passed by this Court from time to. We are unable to appreciate the relevance of this submission for the reason that, as per the Statement of Objects and Reasons, there was a multiplicity of local authorities in thearea with the result that integrated development of this area was not possible. Consequently, it was essential to devise a set up for administration of this area which would meet the objectives of rapid and integrated development and eliminate haphazard development. The said Act was intended to achieve this objective. Quite clearly, this has nothing to do with the notification dated 18th August, 1992. Moreover, Section 29(1) of the said Act related to any law for the time being in forcethe notification dated 18 th August, 1992came much later and was not in force when the said Act was enacted.. It was then contendedthat the exemption granted on 17th April, 1984 under the provisions of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 exempted the applicant or in any case Kant Enclave from all the provisions of the said Act.While this may be so, we do not see how the said Act exempts the applicant or Kant Enclave from the prohibitions imposed by the subsequent notification dated 18th August, 1992. The said Act has no relevance or reference to the provisions of the PLP Act.Learned counsel for the applicants also contended that in view of the decision rendered by this Court in Sandhu, the subject land ought to have been an existing forest as on 25th October, 1980 when the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 came into force.In our opinion, this is not at all a correct interpretation of the decision rendered by this Court in Sandhu. It is nobody?s case, and indeed it cannot be anybody?s case that no area can be declared as a forest after 25th October, 1980. If this were the interpretation given, then the entire purpose of the order dated 12th December, 1996 passed by this Court would be rendered meaningless since it was in terms of this order that forest land was directed to be identified, even if that land was not so recognised as forest land. Acceptance of the interpretation sought to be given by learned counsel would also emasculate the PLP Act.In this regard, it must be appreciated that the order dated 17th March, 1997 as modified on 13th May, 1998 permitted construction only in accordance with law and not de hors the notification dated 18th August, 1992. It is not the case of any of the applicants before us, and indeed it cannot be their case, that the orders of this Court gave a complete go by to the notification and virtually quashed it even though it was never under challenge at that point of time or even today. It appears that very large residential complexes have been constructed despite the orders of this Court, which did not give any blanket permission to the applicants to make constructions, according to their whims and fancies. For reasons that are not at all clear, such constructions were permitted by the concerned authorities despite the orders of this Court and even though the notification dated 18th August, 1992 prohibited breaking up of the land. It is difficult, under the circumstances, to take the view that the applicants and the concerned authorities had acted bona fide.As far as the second category of persons is concerned, as submittedby Shri Dharam Vir, Chief Secretary of the State of Haryana in his affidavit of 15th March, 2009 there is an available, reasonable and appropriate course of action to adopt. This course of action is to save or allow to exist constructions made in Kant Enclave pursuant to the exemption granted to the applicant (R. Kant & Co.) on 17th April, 1984 under Section 23 of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 but before 18th August, 1992 when the notification under the provisions of the PLP Act came into force. Any construction made after 18th August, 1992 is clearly illegal and contrary to law and must be demolished as recommended by the Central Empoweredthe present case of Kant Enclave, wellmeaning citizens have been virtually duped into investing huge amounts despite R. Kant & Co. and the Town & Country Department of the State of Haryana being fully aware of the statutory notification dated 18 th August, 1992 and the restrictions placed by the notification. R. Kant & Co. and the Town & Country Department of the State of Haryana were also fully aware that Kant Enclave is a forest or forest land or treated as a forest or forest land, and therefore any construction made on the land or utilisation of the land forpurposes, without the prior approval of the Central Government, would be illegal and violative of the provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. Notwithstanding this, constructions were made (or allowed to be made) in Kant Enclave with the support, tacit or otherwise, of R. Kant & Co. and the Town & Country Department of the State of Haryana. They must pay for this. This is not to suggest that those who have made constructions after 18th August, 1992 are completely innocent. Nevertheless, it is necessary to compensate them in view of the role played by the Town & Country Planning Department of the State of Haryana.The Polluter Pays Principle is a wholesome principle that has been universally accepted and also adopted and applied in our country through several decisions of this Court. In this context, we may draw attention to among two of the earliest decisions rendered by this Court, namely, Indian Council forAction v. Union of IndiaWelfare Forum v. Union of India.The law having been settled for more than two decades, we are of the view that it must be applied in a case such as the present. The damage caused to the Aravalli hills, as already noted, is irreversible. However, perhaps some of the damage could be remediedat least we hope so. According to R. Kant & Co. it has expended ? 50 crore in developing Kant Enclave. We do not know the exact or accurate figure but proceed on the basis as stated.