Case: Saharanpur Light Railway Company, Limited Vs. Shahdara (Delhi)-Shahdara-Saharanpur Railway Worker's Union

Shelat, J.1. This appeal by special leave is by the employer and raises the question as to the scope of S.10(2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 20 of 1946, as amended by Act 36 of 1956 (referred to hereinafter as the Act).2. The standing orders of the appellant company were certified on 7 August, 1962, by the Regional Labour Commissioner, central, under S.4 of the Act. Both the company and the workmen filed appeals against the said order which were disposed of by the appellate authority under S. 6. Sometime thereafter the respondent-union applied for certain modification, some of which were certified by the Regional Labour Commissioner by his order dated 28 December, 1963. The appellant-company filed an appeal against the said order which was disposed of by the Chief Labour Commissioner in April, 1964. On 25 April, 1965 the respondent-union made a further application for modifications. The Regional Labour Commissioner, by his order dated 2 September, 1965 allowed certain modifications but rejected the rest. The union thereupon appealed against the said order. After hearing the parties, the Chief Labour Commissioner passed his impugned order dated 27 October, 1967 ordering certification of certain modifications. Though the appellant company objected at first to all the modifications, counsel pressed the appeal in respect of four modifications only. The first modification challenged is in standing order 9, Cl. (a), which, as unamended, read as follows :"The railway under the terms of employment has the right to terminate the services of a permanent workman on giving him one months notice in writing or one months pay may be paid in lieu of notice."The union claimed that the management would give reasons even when they terminated the services of an employee by a discharge simpliciter. The modification allowed directed reasons to be recorded in writing and communicated to the workman if he so desires at the time of discharge but not if the management considers it inadvisable. The second modification is in standing order 12 cl. (a), which, in its unamended form, read as follows :"when any of the penalties specified in order IX is imposed upon a workman an appeal shall lie to authority next above that imposing the penalty. An appeal shall lie to the managing agents only on original orders passed by the General Manager ..."3. The unions plea was that some time-limit was necessary for the disposal of the appeals as the managing agents who are the appellate authority against the orders of the General Manager took months to dispose of such appeals thereby delaying the workman from raising an industrial dispute in time and seek timely relief. The modification allowed was that every such appeal shall be disposed of by the appellate authority within sixty days from the date of its receipt. The third modification is in standing order 11(vii) which read as follows :"removal from service-A workman shall be liable to be removed from service in the following circumstances :(a) Inefficiency * * *The modification allowed was as follows :"In case of inefficiency due to physical unfitness the workman whom the management considers suitable for some alternative employment shall be offered the same on reasonable emolument having regard to his former emoluments."The modification contains, it will be noticed, four limitations :(1) it applies only to cases of removal on the ground of physical unfitness(2) the consideration of suitability for an alternative employment is left to the management,(3) the existence of alternative post, and(4) the question as to what reasonable emoluments should be is left to the managementThe fourth modification is in standing order 11(vii)(c), which, in its unamended form was as follows :"Every person against whom departmental enquiry is being made shall be supplied with a copy of the findings in connection with his dismissal and removal from services. The workman shall also be supplied with a copy of the proceedings of the enquiry committee as soon as possible after the conclusion of the enquiry proceedings in his case and be allowed to defend his case through unions representative."The modification allowed was as follows :"In case the management propose to remove the workman from service they shall serve on the workman separate show cause notice to that effect."4. Counsel for the company challenged the impugned order in its two facts : the scope of the power of modification under S. 10(2), and on merits on the ground that the modifications did not stand the test of reasonableness and fairness. On the first question his contention was that the jurisdiction and powers of the authorities under the Act to certify modifications of the existing standing orders are limited to cases where a change of circumstances is established. In the course of his argument, counsel, however qualified the contention by conceding that if at the time of the last certification certain circumstances were, for one reason or the other, omitted from consideration they would constitute a valid reason for modification and the modification would be granted even though in such a case a change of circumstances has not occurred. He next contended that in any case though S. 11 of the code of Civil Procedure did not apply, principles analogous to res judicata would apply to an application for modification unless such application is occasioned by new circumstances having arisen or is based on new facts. Briefly, the argument was that the object of the Act is to have conditions of service of workman in an establishment defined with precision, and therefore, to have standing orders dealing with such conditions certified. For industrial harmony and peace it is necessary that those conditions are stable and do not remain undefined or fluctuating. In pursuance of this object the Act confers finality to such certified standing orders or modifications thereof under S. 6. The contention was that if modifications were allowed without any restraint there would be multiple applications specially as individual workmen have been given the right to apply for modifications. Therefore, the word "final" in S. 6, it was argued must be so read as to mean that an application for modification under S. 10(2) can only be maintainable if it is justified on the ground of a change of circumstances having occurred after the last certification, which of course, according to the concession made by the counsel, also would include cases where certain circumstances were not taken into account at the time of the last certification.The relevant provisions of the Act requiring consideration in this appeal are Ss. 4, 6 10, 11 and 12. Section 4 provides that standing orders shall be certified under the Act if:(a) a provision is made therein for every matter set out in the schedule, and(b) they are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act.The section further provides that it shall be the function of the certifying officer or the appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the standing orders. Section 6 provides that any person aggrieved by the order of the certifying officer passed under S. 5(2) may appeal to the appellate authority and the appellate authority, "whose decision shall be final." shall by an order confirm the standing orders in the form certified under S. 5(2) or amend or add thereto to render them certifiable under the Act. Section 10 whose interpretation is in question, provides by sub-sec. (1) as follows :"Standing orders finally certified under this Act shall not, except on agreement between the employer and the workmen, be liable to modification until the expiry of six months from the date on which the standing orders or the last modifications thereof came in to operation."Sub-sec. (2) runs as follows :"Subject to the provisions of Sub-sec (1) an employer or workmen may apply to the certifying officer to have the standing orders modified ..."Sub-section(3) provides that the foregoing provisions of the Act shall apply in respect of an application for modification as they apply to the certification of the first standing orders. Section 11 empowers the certifying officer and the appellate authority to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes in an order passed by them or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. Lastly, S. 12 provides that no oral evidence having the effect of adding to or otherwise varying or contradiction standing orders as finally certified under the Act shall be admitted in any court.Counsel conceded, and did so rightly, that there is no express provision in any one of these sections restricting the right to apply for modification or the power of the authorities to allow modification only on proof of a change of circumstances. The only limitations to the power are the reasonableness or fairness which of course must be established and the expiry of six months after the date of the standing orders or their last modifications coming into operation. In the absence of any such express restriction we should then ask ourselves whether there is in any of these sections anything which would indicate such a restriction by necessary implication. In that connexion the only word which can point to such a restriction, according to counsel, is the word "final" in S. 6, so that the contention reduces itself to this that by making the order of the appellate authority final under S. 6, parliament intended by necessary implication that the bar of finality can only be removed if new circumstances arises which necessitate or justify modifications.But the intention of the legislature, as observed by Lord Watson in Salmon v. A. Salmon & Co., ltd. [1897 A.C. 22 at 38] :"is a common but very slippery phrase which popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact."5. It is well-settled that the meaning which words ought to be understood to bear is not to be ascertained by any process akin to speculation and the primary duty of a Court is to find the natural meaning of the words used in the context in which they occur, that context including any other phrase in the Act which may throw light on the sense in which the makers of the Act used the words in dispute. In R. v. Wimbledon Justices [(1953) 1 Q.B. 380]. Lord Goddard said :"Although in construing an Act of Parliament the Court must always try to give effect to the intention of the Act and must look not only at the remedy provided but also at the mischief aimed at, it cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there."Similarly in R. v. Mansel Jones [(1889) 22 Q.B.D. 29 at 32] Lord Coleridge said that it was the business of the Courts to see what Parliament had said, instead of reading into an Act what ought to have been said. So too, in Latham v. Lafone [1957 L.R. 2 Ex. 115 at 121] Martin, B., said :"I think the proper rule for construing this statute is to adhere to its words strictly; and it is my strong belief that, by reasoning on long-drawn inferences and remote consequences, the Courts have pronounced many judgments affecting debts and actions in a manner that the persons who originated and prepared the Act never dreamed of."6. In the light of these principles we ought, therefore, to give a literal meaning to the language used by Parliament unless the language is ambiguous or its literal sense gives rise to an anomaly or results in something which would defeat the purpose of the Act. The Act was passed because the legislature thought that in many industrial establishments the conditions of service were not uniform and sometimes were not even reduced to writing. This led to conflicts resulting in unnecessary industrial disputes.The object of passing the Act was thus to require employers to define with certainty the conditions of service in their establishments and to require them to reduce them to writing and to get them compulsorily certified. The matters in respect of which the conditions of employment had to be certified were specified in the schedule to the Act. As the Act stood prior to its amendment in 1956, S. 3 required the employer to submit to the certifying officer draft standing orders proposed by him for adoption in his establishment. Section 4 provided that standing orders shall be certifiable if(a) provision is made therein for every matter set out in the schedule, and(b) that they were otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act.The section, however, expressly provided that it shall not be the function of the certifying officer or the appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the standing orders. Under S. 5, the certifying officer was required to send a copy of the draft standing orders to the union, if any, or in its absence to the workmen in the manner prescribed together with a notice calling for objections by them, if any, and to give opportunity to the employer and the workmen of being heard and then to decide whether or not any modification of or addition to the draft standing orders was necessary to render them certifiable under the Act. Section 6 provided for an appeal by any person aggrieved by the order passed under S. 5. The appellate authority, whose decision was made final, had the power to confirm or amend or add to the standing orders passed by the certifying officer to render them certifiable under the Act. Though the order passed by the appellate authority was made final under S. 6. S. 10 provided for modification. Sub-section (1) of S. 10 provided that standing orders finally certified under this Act shall not, except on agreement between the employer and the workmen, be liable to modification until expiry of six months from the date on which they or the last modification thereof came into operation. Sub-section (2) read as follows :"An employer desiring to modify his standing orders shall apply to the certifying officer in that behalf ..."Sub-section(3) provided that the foregoing provisions of the Act shall apply in respect of an application under Sub-sec. (2) as they apply to the certification of the first standing orders. As the Act stood prior to 1956, there was thus a prohibition against the certifying officer going into the question of reasonableness or fairness of the draft standing orders submitted to him by the employer. His only function was to see that the draft made provisions for all matters contained in the schedule and that it was otherwise certifiable under the Act. Therefore, though the workmen through the union or otherwise were served with the copy of the draft and had the right to raise objections, the objections could be of limited character, namely, that the draft did not provide for all matters in the schedule or that it was not otherwise certifiable under the Act. Even in an appeal under S. 6, the only objection they could raise were limited to the two aforesaid questions. The workmen thus could not object that the draft standing orders were not reasonable or fair. Under S. 10. The right to apply for modification was conferred on the employer alone and in view of Sub-sec. (3) the only consideration which the certifying authority could apply to such modification was the one which he could apply under Ss. 4 and 6. Therefore, no question whether the modification was fair or reasonable could be raised. It is thus clear that the workman had very little say in the matter even if he felt that the standing orders or their modifications were either not reasonable or fair. They could, of course, raise an industrial dispute. But that remedy was hardly satisfactory. Such a dispute had to be first sponsored by a union or at least a substantial number of workmen; it had next to go through the process of conciliation and lastly the appropriate Government may or may not be prepared to refer such a dispute to industrial adjudication. Even if it did, the entire process was a protracted one.In 1956, Parliament effected radical changes in the Act widening its scope and altering its very complexion. Section 4, as amended by Act 36 of 1956, entrusted the authorities under the Act with the duty to adjudicate upon fairness and reasonableness of the standing orders. The enquiry when such standing orders are submitted for certification is now twofold :(1) whether the standing orders are in consonance with the model standing orders, and(2) whether they are fair and reasonable.7. The workmen, therefore, can raise an objection as to the reasonableness or fairness of the draft standing orders submitted for certification. By amending S. 10(2) both the workmen and the employer are given the right to apply for modification and by reason of the change mad in S. 4 a modification has also now to be tested by the yardstick of fairness and reasonableness. The Act provides a speedy and cheap remedy available to the individual workman to have his conditions of service determined and also for their modifications. By amending Ss. 4 and 10, Parliament not only broadened the scope of the Act but also gave a clear expression to the change in its legislative policy. Parliament knew that the workmen even as the unamended Act stood, had the right to raise an industrial dispute, yet, not satisfied with such a remedy, it conferred by amending Ss. 4 and 10 the right to individual workman to contest the draft standing orders submitted by the employer for certification on the ground that they are either not fair or reasonable, and more important still, the right to apply for their modification despite the finality of the order of the appellate authority under S. 6. Parliament thus deliberately gave a dual remedy to the workmen both under this Act and under the Industrial Disputes Act. This fact has in recent decisions been recognized by this Court - of. Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Company, Ltd. v. their workmen and another [1968 - I L.L.J. 555]; Buckingham and Carnatic Company, Ltd. v. their workmen [Civil Application No. 674 of 1968 dated 25 July, 1968] and Hindustan Brown Boveri, Ltd. v. their workmen and another [1968 - I L.L.J. 571].It will be pertinent, while examining the question whether there is a restriction, as suggested by counsel, to the right to apply for modifications, to bear in mind the charge in the legislative policy reflected in the amendments of Ss. 4 and 10. It will be noticed that S. 10 does not state that once a standing order is modified and the modification is certified, no further modification is permissible except upon proof that new circumstances have arisen since the last modification. As a matter of fact the legislature has not incorporated any words in the sub-section restricting the right to apply for modification except of course the time-limit of six months in Sub-sec. (1). Section 6 no doubt lays down that the order of the appellate authority in an appeal against the order of the certifying officer under S. 5 is final but that finality is itself subject to the right to apply for modification under S. 10(2). Even so, it was urged that the finality of the order under S. 6 was indicative of a condition precedent to the jurisdiction under S. 10(2) to entertain an application for modification on a new set of circumstances having arisen in the meantime. The question is whether such is the position.8. The finality to the order passed under S. 6 really means that there is no further appeal or revision against that order and no more. This view finds support from S. 12 which lays down that once the standing orders are finally certified, no oral evidence can be led in any Court which has the effect of adding to or otherwise varying or contradicting such standing orders. Section 6, when read with S. 12 indicates that the finality given to the certification by the appellate authority is against a challenge thereof in a civil Court. But the finality given to the appellate authoritys order is subject to the modification of those very standing orders certified by him. As already stated, S. 10 itself does not lay down any restriction to the right to apply for modification. Apart from the right to apply for modification under the Act, the workmen can raise an industrial dispute with regard to the standing orders.There is nothing in the Industrial Disputes Act restricting the right to raise such a dispute only when a new set of circumstances has arisen. If that right is unrestricted, can it be possible that the very legislature which passed both the Acts could have, while conferring the right on the workmen individually, restricted that right as suggested by counsel ? To illustrate, a new industrial establishment is set up and workmen are engaged therein. Either there is no union or if there is one it is not yet properly organized. The standing orders of the establishment are certified under the Act. At the time of certification, the union or the workmens representatives had raised either no objections or only certain objections. If subsequently the workmen feel that further objections could have been raised and if so raised the authority under the Act would have taken them into consideration, does it mean that because new circumstances have since then not arisen, the workmen would be barred from applying for modification ? Let us take another illustration. Where, after the standing orders or their modifications are certified, it strikes a workman after they have been in operation for some time that a further improvement in his conditions of service is desirable, would he be debarred from applying for a further modification on the ground that no change of circumstances in the meantime has taken place ? Where the standing orders provide ten festival holidays, if counsel were right, the workmen can never apply for an addition in their number as they would be faced with the contention that the festivals existed at the time of the last certification and there was therefore no changes of circumstances.The Act is a beneficent piece of legislation and therefore unless compelled by any words in it we would not be justified in importing in S. 10 through inference only a restriction to the right conferred by it on account of a supposed danger of multiplicity of applications. The policy of S. 10 is clear that a modification should not be allowed within six months from the date when the standing orders or the last modifications thereof came into operation. The object of providing the time-limit was that the standing orders or their modifications should be allowed to work for sufficiently long time to see whether they work properly or not. Even that time-limit is not rigid because a modification even before six months is permissible if there is an agreement between the parties.9. The ground for urging that a restriction should be read in S. 10 was the apprehension that since workmen individually have the right to apply for modifications there would be multiple applications which an employer would have to face. Secondly, that an application without a change of circumstances would be tantamount to a review by the same authority of his previous order of certification. It was said that if no restriction is read in S. 10 it would mean that the same authority, who, on satisfaction of the fairness and reasonableness of a standing order or its last modification had certified it would be called upon to review his previous decision on reasonableness and fairness. Such a review, it was argued, is permissible only on well recognized grounds, namely, discovery of new and important matter or evidence, a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason.10. As application for modification would ordinarily be made where:(1) a change of circumstances has occurred, or(2) where experience of the working of the standing orders last certified results in inconvenience, hardship, anomaly, etc., or(3) where some fact was lost sight of at the time of certification, or(4) where the applicant feels that a modification will be more beneficial.In category (1) there would be no difficulty as a change of circumstances has taken place. But in cases falling under the rest of the categories there will be no change of circumstances. Does it mean that though the implementation of the standing orders has resulted in hardship, inconvenience or anomaly, no modification can be asked for because there is no change of circumstances ? As to multiplicity of applications we think that there is no justification for any such apprehension, for, unless there is a justification for modification the authorities under the Act would reject them on the ground that they are frivolous and therefore neither fair nor reasonable. Lastly, as to such an application being a review of the last certifying order an application under S. 10 is not a review. An application for review would be made in the proceedings in which the judgment or order sought to be reviewed is passed. That would not be so in the case of an application under S. 10(2). Such an application is independent of the proceedings in which the last certifying order was passed and is made in the exercise of an independent right conferred upon the applicant by S. 10(2). In an application for modification the issue before the authority would be not as to the reasonableness or fairness of the standing order or their last modification, but whether the modification now applied for is fair and reasonable. Therefore, the contention that a change of circumstances is a condition precedent to the maintainability of an application under S. 10(2) or that an application for modification without proof of such a change amounts to review by the same authority of its previous order is not correct.It was then argued that assuming that a modification without a change of circumstances is permissible though S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to industrial matters, sound policy dictates that principles analogous to res judicata must be applied and it must be held that unless circumstances have changed an application for modification would be barred. For this, counsel relied on Burn & Co. v. their employees [1957 - I L.L.J. 226]. There the demand was for wage-scales fixed in an award by the Mercantile Tribunal instead of the scales in accordance with the scheme of the Bengal Chamber of commerce. In a dispute previously raised by labour an award was made in 1950 which accepted the wage-scales according to the scheme of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and rejected the demand for the scales according to those awarded by the Mercantile Tribunal which were more favourable. It was in these circumstances that this Court expressed the view that an award fixing wage-scales should have fairly long-range operation and should not be unsettled unless a change of circumstances has occurred justifying fresh adjudication. But with the constant spiralling of prices the principle would appear to have lost must of it efficacy. The trend in recent decisions is that application of technical rules such as res judicata, acquiescence, estoppel, etc., are not appropriate to industrial adjudication. In Guest, Keen, Williams (Private), Ltd. v. Sterling (P. J.) and others [1959 - II L.L.J. 405] a modification of a standing order relating to the age of superannuation was sought by raising an Industrial dispute. It was contended that the reference of that dispute was barred by acquiescence and laches. That contention was rejected, the Court observing that industrial tribunals should be slow and circumspect in applying technical principles such a acquiescence and estoppel. In Workmen of Balmer Lawrie & Co., Ltd. v. balmer Lawrie & C., Ltd., and another [1964 - I L.L.J. 380] also it was observed that the question to revision of wage-scales must be examined on the merits of each individual case and technical considerations of res judicata should not be allowed to hamper the discretion of industrial adjudication. It is, therefore, doubtful whether principles analogous to res judicata can properly be applied to industrial adjudication.On merits, Sri Gokhale argued that the four modifications to which he objected were neither fair nor reasonable and that therefore we should set them aside. The question is whether in an appeal under Art. 136 we would be justified in interfering with conclusions as to reasonableness and fairness by authorities empowered by the Act to arrive at such conclusions. In Rohtak and Hissar Districts Electric Supply Company, Ltd., and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [1966 - II L.L.J. 330] this Court prevented counsel for the employer from canvassing such a question on the ground that the matter of fairness and reasonableness was left by the legislature to the authorities constituted under the Act. In Hindustan Antibiotics, Ltd. v. their workmen [1967 - I L. L.J. 114] this Court repeated what it had earlier stated in Bengal chemical and Pharmaceutical Works, Ltd. v. their employees [1959 - I L.L.J. 413] that though Art. 136 is couched in widest terms, it is necessary to exercise discretionary jurisdiction of this Court only in cases where awards are made in violation of the principles of natural justice or are made in a manner causing grave injustice to parties or raise an important principle of industrial law requiring elucidation by this Court or disclose exceptional or special circumstances which merit consideration by this Court.11. As aforesaid, the modifications objected by the appellant company are :(1) giving reasons and communicating them to the workman concerned even in cases of discharge simpliciter,(2) insertion of time-limit of sixty days in the disposal of appeals,(3) insertion in standing order 11 of a clause that where a workman is removed on the ground of inefficiency due to physical unfitness, the management should offer to such a workman alternative employment on reasonable emoluments, and(4) insertion of the clause requiring a second show-cause notice at the stage when the decision of suitable punishment has to be made.So far as modifications (2) and (3) are concerned, clearly no principle is involved and there would be no justification for us to interfere with the conclusion of the appellate authority on the question of their being fair and reasonable. As regards the first modification, the contention was that an employer has, under the law of master and servant, the right to terminate the services of his employee by a discharge simpliciter after giving a months notice or a months wages in lieu thereof, and is not required to give reasons for such an order. The Industrial Disputes Act also does not lay down any fetter to that right by requiring him to give reasons to the employee concerned and industrial adjudication has so far recognized such a right. To impose such a fetter by a change in the standing orders is therefore not warranted by any statute, and, therefore, cannot be said to be either fair or reasonable. It must, however, be borne in mind that the right to contract in industrial matters is no longer an absolute right and statutes dealing with industrial matters abound with restrictions on the absolute right to contract. The doctrine of hire and fire, for instance, is now completely abrogated both by statutes and by industrial adjudication, and even where the services of an employee are terminated by an order of discharge simpliciter the legality and propriety of such an order can be challenged in industrial tribunals. These restrictions on the absolute right to contract are imposed evidently because security of employment is more and more regarded as one of the necessities for industrial peace and harmony and the contentment it brings about a prerequisite of social justice. During the last decade or so statutes have been passed such as the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953, which require a reasonable cause for dispensing with the services of an employee by an order of discharge simpliciter. If reasons for discharging an employee are furnished to the employee concerned, he not only has the satisfaction of knowing why his services are dispensed with but it becomes easy for him in appropriate cases to challenge the order on the ground that it is either not legal or proper which in the absence of knowledge of those reasons it may be difficult, if not impossible for him to do. In these circumstances, if the authorities under the Act have come to the conclusion that such a modification is fair and reasonable, we would hardly be justified to interfere with such a decision.As regards the modification requiring a second show-cause notice, neither the ordinary law of the land nor the industrial law requires an employer to give such a notice. In none of the decisions given by Courts or the tribunals such a second show-cause notice in case of removal has ever been demanded or considered necessary. The only class of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary are those arising under Art. 311. Even that has now been removed by the recent amendment of that article. To import such a requirement from Art. 311 in industrial matters does not appear to be either necessary or proper and would be equating industrial employees with civil servants. In our view, there is no justification on any principle for such equation. Besides, such a requirement would unnecessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in as short a time as possible. In our view it is not possible to consider this modification as justifiable either on the ground of reasonableness or fairness and should therefore be set aside.12.

Decision:
1[ds]5. It isthat the meaning which words ought to be understood to bear is not to be ascertained by any process akin to speculation and the primary duty of a Court is to find the natural meaning of the words used in the context in which they occur, that context including any other phrase in the Act which may throw light on the sense in which the makers of the Act used the words in dispute. In R. v. Wimbledon Justices [(1953) 1 Q.B. 380]. Lord Goddard saidin construing an Act of Parliament the Court must always try to give effect to the intention of the Act and must look not only at the remedy provided but also at the mischief aimed at, it cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there.In the light of these principles we ought, therefore, to give a literal meaning to the language used by Parliament unless the language is ambiguous or its literal sense gives rise to an anomaly or results in something which would defeat the purpose of the Act.will be pertinent, while examining the question whether there is a restriction, as suggested by counsel, to the right to apply for modifications, to bear in mind the charge in the legislative policy reflected in the amendments of Ss. 4 and 10. It will be noticed that S. 10 does not state that once a standing order is modified and the modification is certified, no further modification is permissible except upon proof that new circumstances have arisen since the last modification. As a matter of fact the legislature has not incorporated any words in therestricting the right to apply for modification except of course theof six months in(1). Section 6 no doubt lays down that the order of the appellate authority in an appeal against the order of the certifying officer under S. 5 is final but that finality is itself subject to the right to apply for modification under S. 10(2). Evenso, it was urged that the finality of the order under S. 6 was indicative of a condition precedent to the jurisdiction under S. 10(2) to entertain an application for modification on a new set of circumstances having arisen in the meantime.8. The finality to the order passed under S. 6 really means that there is no further appeal or revision against that order and no more. This view finds support from S. 12 which lays down that once the standing orders are finally certified, no oral evidence can be led in any Court which has the effect of adding to or otherwise varying or contradicting such standing orders. Section 6, when read with S. 12 indicates that the finality given to the certification by the appellate authority is against a challenge thereof in a civil Court. But the finality given to the appellate authoritys order is subject to the modification of those very standing orders certified by him. As already stated, S. 10 itself does not lay down any restriction to the right to apply for modification. Apart from the right to apply for modification under the Act, the workmen can raise an industrial dispute with regard to the standing orders.There is nothing in the Industrial Disputes Act restricting the right to raise such a dispute only when a new set of circumstances hasn category (1) there would be no difficulty as a change of circumstances has taken place. But in cases falling under the rest of the categories there will be no change ofto multiplicity of applications we think that there is no justification for any such apprehension, for, unless there is a justification for modification the authorities under the Act would reject them on the ground that they are frivolous and therefore neither fair nor reasonable. Lastly, as to such an application being a review of the last certifying order an application under S. 10 is not a review. An application for review would be made in the proceedings in which the judgment or order sought to be reviewed is passed. That would not be so in the case of an application under S. 10(2). Such an application is independent of the proceedings in which the last certifying order was passed and is made in the exercise of an independent right conferred upon the applicant by S. 10(2). In an application for modification the issue before the authority would be not as to the reasonableness or fairness of the standing order or their last modification, but whether the modification now applied for is fair and reasonable. Therefore, the contention that a change of circumstances is a condition precedent to the maintainability of an application under S. 10(2) or that an application for modification without proof of such a change amounts to review by the same authority of its previous order is not correct.As aforesaid, the modifications objected by the appellant company aregiving reasons and communicating them to the workman concerned even in cases of discharge simpliciter,(2) insertion ofof sixty days in the disposal of appeals,(3) insertion in standing order 11 of a clause that where a workman is removed on the ground of inefficiency due to physical unfitness, the management should offer to such a workman alternative employment on reasonable emoluments,insertion of the clause requiring a secondnotice at the stage when the decision of suitable punishment has to befar as modifications (2) and (3) are concerned, clearly no principle is involved and there would be no justification for us to interfere with the conclusion of the appellate authority on the question of their being fair and reasonable. Asregards the first modification, the contention was that an employer has, under the law of master and servant, the right to terminate the services of his employee by a discharge simpliciter after giving a months notice or a months wages in lieu thereof, and is not required to give reasons for such an order.The Industrial Disputes Act also does not lay down any fetter to that right by requiring him to give reasons to the employee concerned and industrial adjudication has so far recognized such a right. To impose such a fetter by a change in the standing orders is therefore not warranted by any statute, and, therefore, cannot be said to be either fair orthe last decade or so statutes have been passed such as the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953, which require a reasonable cause for dispensing with the services of an employee by an order of discharge simpliciter. If reasons for discharging an employee are furnished to the employee concerned, he not only has the satisfaction of knowing why his services are dispensed with but it becomes easy for him in appropriate cases to challenge the order on the ground that it is either not legal or proper which in the absence of knowledge of those reasons it may be difficult, if not impossible for him to do. In these circumstances, if the authorities under the Act have come to the conclusion that such a modification is fair and reasonable, we would hardly be justified to interfere with such a decision.As regards the modification requiring a secondnotice, neither the ordinary law of the land nor the industrial law requires an employer to give such a notice. In none of the decisions given by Courts or the tribunals such a secondnotice in case of removal has ever been demanded or considered necessary. The only class of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary are those arising under Art. 311. Even that has now been removed by the recent amendment of that article. To import such a requirement from Art. 311 in industrial matters does not appear to be either necessary or proper and would be equating industrial employees with civil servants. In our view, there is no justification on any principle for such equation. Besides, such a requirement would unnecessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in as short a time as possible. In our view it is not possible to consider this modification as justifiable either on the ground of reasonableness or fairness and should therefore be set aside.