Case: Jeewan Nath Wahal and Jagat Nath Wahal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others

J.C. Shah, J.1. The State of Uttar Pradesh decided to nationalise the Delhi-Saharanpur inter-State route and published a scheme in that behalf under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. After hearing the objections of persons affected, the scheme was published in the Official Gazette of the State Government under Section 68-D(3) on 29-9-1959. Thirty-two permit-holders applied to the High Court at Allahabad for quashing the scheme.2. A Single Judge of the High Court, held that there were certain defects in the proceeding taken by the Government under Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act in sanctioning the scheme and proceeded to order that "the Notification dated 29-9-1959 under Section 68-D could not stand so far as the 32 petitioners were concerned". He proceeded then to observe:"The notification indicates that it hits about 46 persons in all. The scheme as sanctioned ought not to be enforced against the present petitioners at least. The State Government may be left to enforce it, if it is so desired, against persons other than the present petitioners."The learned Judge then ordered that:"The State Government of Uttar Pradesh is directed not to enforce the Notification dated 29-9-1959 against the 32 petitioners. The State Government will be at liberty to hold a fresh enquiry under Section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act on the basis of the original proposal in accordance with law."3. Encouraged by the order made in the petitions filed by 32 petitioners, another batch of 18 transport operators applied to the High Court of Allahabad for quashing the scheme. The same learned Judge who had dealt with the original petitions heard those petitions and passed the order that:"For reasons given in my judgment dated 31-10-1961 these 18 petitions have also to be allowed in part. It is not necessary to interfere with the notification issued under Section 68-C of the Act. It will be sufficient if the Notification dated 29-9-1959 is quashed so far as the present 18 petitioners are concerned. These 18 petitions are disposed of accordingly. The State of U.P. is directed not to enforce the Notification dated 29-9-1959 under Section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act against the present 18 petitioners."4. The two appellants in these appeals who did not hold at the relevant time any transport permits, applied on 5-2-1962 for permits on the route covered by the scheme published on 29-9-1959. Their applications were rejected by the Regional Transport Authority by order and the orders were confirmed in appeal.5. The writ petition filed against that order before the High Court of Allahabad challenging the rejection of the application for the grant of permits also did not meet with success. The appellants have appealed to this Court with special leave.6. Three contentions are raised by Mr Chagla on behalf of the appellants:(1) That by his order the learned Single Judge, who decided the two groups of writ petitions, intended to quash the entire scheme,(2) That by reason of the order the whole scheme must be treated as bad, because there can be no partial scheme of nationalisation in respect of an area; and(3) That the notification cannot be declared to be partially good and partially bad.These three contentions are practically different facets of the same argument urged before us.7. It is contended that under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act a unitary scheme is contemplated to be framed and it is that scheme which is published and considered by the State Government and that scheme alone is, either with or without modifications, approved by the State Government. If that scheme is to be cancelled wholly or in part, the procedure prescribed under Section 68-E of the Act must be followed. No such procedure was followed, and the High Court having in effect held for the reasons set out in the first judgment of the learned Single Judge that the scheme was inoperative the appellants were entitled to the grant of permits. But the learned Judge, who decided the group of 32 petitions, was careful to observe in his judgment that the notification could not be enforced against the applicants before him. He did not purport to quash the scheme in its entirety. It is unnecessary to express any opinion on the question whether on the reasons given by him the entire scheme was liable to be quashed. It is sufficient to observe that he did not pass an order quashing the entire scheme.8. In the second group of writ petitions filed before him, the learned Judge also stated that the notification was quashed so far as it affected 18 petitioners: he did not quash the notification in its entirety. The effect of the orders passed by the High Court in the two groups of writ petitions was clearly that the scheme in its essence was not affected, but it was directed that it was not liable to be enforced against the 32 petitioners who applied to the High Court in the first group of petitions and against the 18 petitioners in the second group of petitions. If that be the true effect of the order, there is in our judgment a scheme in existence which must have the statutory operation contemplated by Section 62-F (sic Section 68-F) of the Motor Vehicles Act.9. We are unable to hold that the learned Single Judge intended to quash the entire scheme. The express words used in the two judgments delivered by him did not indicate any such intention and it cannot be implied from the language used by him, nor are we able to hold that by prohibiting the enforcement of the scheme as against the two sets of petitioners, the scheme must be deemed to have become ineffective.10. It is true that as pointed out by this Court in Nehru Motor Transport Coop. Society Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1098 : 1964 (1) SCR 220 a draft scheme under Section 68-C has to be considered as a whole and all objections to it have to be decided before it can be approved by the State Government or by the officer appointed in that behalf, and the Act does not envisage approving of a scheme in part. But in the present case there has been no attempt to approve the scheme in part.11. Mr Chagla asks us to read the judgments of the learned Judge in the two sets of petitions as implying that the whole scheme was declared to be bad and its enforcement on that account was prohibited against all persons affected by the scheme. We are unable to read the judgment of the learned Single Judge in that manner. For reasons given by him, he held that the scheme was not unenforceable against the two groups of petitioners and he expressly stated that it would be open to the Government to enforce it as against the other persons who were not parties to the petitions. That view he appears to have expressed also in another matter which was brought before him in Writ Petition No. 3097 of 1959, in which he observed:"All that was decided in the previous writ petitions was that the Government Notification dated 29-9-1959 should not be enforced. In other respects, the scheme was allowed to stand. It is not, therefore, correct to say that, as a result of this Courts judgment dated 31-10-1961, the entire scheme stands cancelled."12. It was urged by Mr Chagla that a scheme framed under Section 68-C and confirmed under Section 68-D has the force of law and once a competent authority declares the scheme had (sic) no partial invalidity can be ascribed to that law. The counsel invites our attention to the observations made by this Court in H.C. Narayanappa v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 1073 : 1960 (3) SCR 742. It was held by this Court in Narayanappa case, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 1073 : 1960 (3) SCR 742 that for the purpose of protecting the guarantee of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution a scheme framed under the Motor Vehicles Act is to be deemed law within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution. But the argument advanced by Mr Chagla is that if we are satisfied that the scheme was declared invalid by the learned Single Judge in his previous judgment, we would be bound to give effect to that judgment, but, on a consideration of the order made by the learned Judge, we agree with the High Court from which this appeal is preferred that it was only intended to prohibit the enforcement of the scheme as against the two groups of petitioners, who had approached the High Court challenging the validity of the orders sanctioning the scheme.

Decision:
0[ds]It is contended that under Sectionof the Motor Vehicles Act a unitary scheme is contemplated to be framed and it is that scheme which is published and considered by the State Government and that scheme alone is, either with or without modifications, approved by the State Government.If that scheme is to be cancelled wholly or in part, the procedure prescribed under Sectionof the Act must be followed. No such procedure was followed, and the High Court having in effect held for the reasons set out in the first judgment of the learned Single Judge that the scheme was inoperative the appellants were entitled to the grant of permits. But the learned Judge, who decided the group of 32 petitions, was careful to observe in his judgment that the notification could not be enforced against the applicants before him. He did not purport to quash the scheme in its entirety. It is unnecessary to express any opinion on the question whether on the reasons given by him the entire scheme was liable to be quashed. It is sufficient to observe that he did not pass an order quashing the entire scheme.We are unable to hold that the learned Single Judge intended to quash the entire scheme. The express words used in the two judgments delivered by him did not indicate any such intention and it cannot be implied from the language used by him, nor are we able to hold that by prohibiting the enforcement of the scheme as against the two sets of petitioners, the scheme must be deemed to have becomewas held by this Court in Narayanappa case, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 1073 : 1960 (3) SCR 742     that for the purpose of protecting the guarantee of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution a scheme framed under the Motor Vehicles Act is to be deemed law within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution. But the argument advanced by Mr Chagla is that if we are satisfied that the scheme was declared invalid by the learned Single Judge in his previous judgment, we would be bound to give effect to that judgment, but, on a consideration of the order made by the learned Judge, we agree with the High Court from which this appeal is preferred that it was only intended to prohibit the enforcement of the scheme as against the two groups of petitioners, who had approached the High Court challenging the validity of the orders sanctioning the scheme.