Case: B. Banerjee Vs. Anita Pan


Decision:
1[ds]13. In the present case, indubitably the State was faced with a new, insidious and considerable situation of exploitation undermining the security of tenancy conferred by the basic Act. A large number of original landowners living in their own homes could not, under the basic Act, claim recovery of possession, being occupants of their own houses. Likewise, they could not urge the ground of recovery for rebuilding, not being financially able to invest on such a costly venture. They had to look up to modest old-time rentals as the only source of return and lest the penurious tenantry desparately inhabiting little tenements be forced to pay extortionate rents the rent control law of 1956 froze the rates at the 1940 level with gentle increases as provided therein. However, for new buildings to be constructed special incentive provision was made by deeming the contract rent as fair rent, thus ensuring a high return on building investment. The social upshot of this scheme was that the old landlords found their ownership a poor return investment, saw a new class of wealthier investors streaming into cities and towns ready to buy the premises, evict old tenants, re-let on rack-rents or re-build and reap a rich return. They had no buildings of their own and could prove plans to rebuild, thus disarming the non-evictability provision of Section 13 of the basic Act. The transferees could thus get decrees for eviction , under the basic Act. Naturally, transfers of buildings to this somewhat speculating class increased and the spectacle of eviction litigation or potential eviction proceedings was projected on the urban scene. The Legislature promptly reacted by the Amendment Act to rescue the lessees by clamping down new restrictions by way of Section 13 (3A). A three year moratorium was given to the tenants from being hunted out of their homesteads by imposing a ban on institution of suits for eviction by transferee landlords, This would both disenchant speculative purchases and provide occupants time to seek alternative housing. Presumably these objects inspired the law-makers to extend the embargo backwards to pending eviction proceedings. Quite conceivably, the tendency to create a transferee class of real estate owners gradually gathered in volume and showed up in rashes of pending actions. When Government was alerted amending legislation was proposed. Unfortunately, the States legal wing has failed to protect in court the class for whose benefit the amending law was made, by placing luscent social or statistical materials on these aspects. As earlier stated by us, Government have a duty, where social legislation to protect the weak are challenged to exhibit the same activism in the Halls of Court as in the Houses of Legislature. Failure in the former duty can be as bad as not promulgating the law. Not an elucidatory affidavit by the State nor even the Ministers explanatory speech has been filed in this Court. We make these observations because of the handicaps we have faced and the little help on facts the State has given to sustain the legislation.Since the argument, dressed differently, has been urged before us again we will briefly deal with it, agreeing as we do with the High Court. All plaintiffs whose transfers are twenty years ago or two years before the Act, are lugged together and subjected to the same ban if their suits were instituted within three years of the transfer. This blanket ban regardless of the varying periods which have elapsed after the transfers and before the Act was passed was urged to be unequal treatment or rather harshly equal subjection to restriction of unequally situated transferees. There is seeming attractiveness in this presentation. But Courts are concerned not how best to hammer out equal justice but to oversee whether the classification is without rational basis unrelated to the object of the Act. That is why we are confined to check whether the reasoning on this aspect adopted by the High Court is not tenable. We may, or may not disagree with the wisdom of the legislature in the grouping adopted or hold views about fairer ways of treatment. But our powers are judicial, not legislative and arbitrariness and irrationality are not writ large in the method of differentiation the Legislature has here chosen.The High Court has assumed that even proceedings started prior to 1956 may be affected. This, admittedly, is wrong as pre-basic Act suits will be governed by the then law as provided in Sec. 40 and the Amendment Act amends only the 1956 Act. It may also be conceded that in both the appeals before us, thanks to Indian longevity of litigation, more than three years from the date of transfer in favour of the plaintiff has passed and thus the spirit of the protection in that sense is fulfilled. Indeedcounsel for the respondents urged that the validation of the retrospective limb of the law would only drive the parties to fresh suits, thus promoting multiplicity of suits ruinous to both sides with no social gain.There is force in this submission. Its relevance to decide the constitutional issue is doubtful but its influence on our ultimate solution in this case as will be seen later, is undeniable.A just resolution of this complex situation was put by us to counsel on both sides and the learned Advocate representing the State readily agreed that the policy of the legislation and the conditions in the Amendment Act would be fulfilled if the interpretation we proposed were. to be accepted. We are satisfied that as far as possible courts must avoid multiplicity of litigation. Any interpretation of a statute which will obviate purposeless proliferation of litigation, without whittling down the effectiveness of the protection for the parties sought to be helped by the legislation, should be preferred to any literal pedantic, legalistic or technically correct alternative. On this footing we are prepared to interpret. Section 13 of the Amendment Act and give effect to S. 4 of that Act. How do we work it out? We do it by directing the plaintiffs in the two cases to file fresh pleadings setting out their grounds under cls. (f) and/or (ff) of sub-s. (1) if they so wish. On such pleading being filed we may legitimately hold that the transferee landlord institutes his suit on grounds mentioned in cls. (f) or (ff) of sub-sec. (1)on that date. It is only when he puts in such a pleading setting out the specific ground covered by sub-sec. (3A) of Section 13 that we can say he has begun or instituted a suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on that ground. Institution of a suit earlier has to be ignored for this purpose since that was not based on ground covered by cls. (f) and/or (ff) and is not attracted by sub-section (3A). He begins proceedings on these new grounds only when he puts in his pleading setting out these grounds. In spirit and in letter he institutes his suit for recovery on the new grounds only on the date on which he puts in his new pleading. We cannot be ritualistic in insisting that a return of the plaint and a representation thereof incorporating amendments is the sacred requirement of the law. On the other hand social Justice, and the substance of the matter find fulfilment when the fresh pleadings are put in, subject of course to the three-year interval between the transfer and the filing of the additional pleading. Section 13 of the Amendment. Act speaks of suits including appeals. It thus follows that these fresh pleadings can be put in by the plaintiff either in the suit if that is pending, or in appeal or second appeal, "if that is pending. Thereupon, the opposite party, tenant, will be given an opportunity to file his written statement and the Court will dispose of it after giving both sides the right to lead additional evidence. It may certainly be open to the appellate Court either to take evidence directly or to call for a finding. Expeditious disposal of belated litigation will undoubtedly be a consideration with the court in exercising this discretion. The proviso to sub-sec. (3A) can also be complied with if the plaintiff gets the permission of the Rent Controller in the manner laid down therein before filing his fresh pleading.29. We are conscious that to shorten litigation we are straining language to the little extent of interpreting the expression institution of the suit as amounting to filing of fresh pleading. By this construction we do no violence to language but on the other hand, promote public justice and social gain, without in the least imperilling the protection conferred by the Amendment Act.30. Ruinous protraction of litigation, whoever may temporarily seem to benefit by delay, bankrupts both in the end and inflicts wounds on society by sterile misuse of money. Tenant passengers who prolong their expensive flight on the litigation rocket, are buying tickets for financial crash, drugged though they be by the seeming blessings of laws delays. Courts, by interpreting the expression institution of suits cannot authorize reincarnation, all over again, of litigation for eviction. We save the tenant by applying it to pending cases and save him also from litigative waste.31. This consideration is itself germane to the larger concept of justice which it is the duty of Courts to promote. Law finds its finest hour when it speaks to justice in on fair terms. In the present case our interpretative endeavour has been imbued with this spirit. In the process of interpretation where alternatives are possible, the man in the law influences the law in the man may be and the construction on Ss. 4 and 13 of the Amendment Act herein adopted we admit, appeals to us as more humane. The calculus of statutory construction relating to complex problems of the community cannot be hide-bound by orthodox text book canons.It was noticed in the course of argument that a later Amending , Act of 1970 purporting to give relief to tenants against whom decrees for eviction had been passed but dispossession had not ensued had been put on the statute book. It is surprising that counsel on either side did not choose to address us any arguments on the basis of those provisions. We therefore do not go into the impact of that Act on situations where eviction has been ordered by Courts.34.We therefore allow the appeals with costs but direct the High Court to dispose of the cases in the light of the directions and observations we have made. It will be open to the Court seized of the matter to direct, in its discretion, award of costs to be incurredobservations become necessary in limine since counsel for the respondents dismissed the concept of social justice as extraneous to an insightful understanding of the section invalidated by the High Court, while we think that judicial conscience is not a mere matter of citations of precedents but of activist appraisal of social tears to wipe out which the state is obligated under thewe draftsmen of legislation, may be counsels submission could have had more potency. But our limited power is to examine the reasonableness of the restriction, not by substituting our personal notions but by interfering if the Legislature has gone haywire in unreasonably hamstringingby dismissing their suits brought long before the legislative bill was in the womb ofis force in this submission. Its relevance to decide the constitutional issue is doubtful but its influence on our ultimate solution in this case as will be seen later, is undeniable.