DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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'Operation Rescue: Domestic Terrorism or Legitimate Civil Rights
Protest?' Hastings Center Report, NovemberlDecember 1989, pp. 28-
32. The biblical passage quoted is from Proverbs 24: 11. The claim
by Gary Leber about the number of children saved is in his essay
'We Must Rescue Them', Hastings Center Report, NovemberlDecember
1989, pp.26-7. On Gennarelli's experiments and the events surrounding
them, see Lori Gruen and Peter Singer, Animal Liberation:
A Graphic Guide (London, 1987). On the Animal Liberation Front,
see also Philip Windeatt, 'They Clearly Now See the Link: Militant
Voices', in P. Singer (ed.), In Defence of Animals (Oxford, 1985). The
blockade of the Franklin River is vividly described by a participant
in James McQueen, The Franklin: Not Just a River (Ringwood, Victoria,
1983); on the unsuccessful earlier campaign to save Lake Peddar,
see Kevin Kiernan, 'I Saw My Temple Ransacked', in Cassandra
Pybus and Richard Flanagan (eds.), The Rest of the World Is Watching
(Sydney, 1990).
Henry Thoreau's 'Civil Disobedience' has been reprinted in several
places, among them H. A. Bedau (ed.), Civil Disobedience: Theory and
Practice (New York, 1969); the passage quoted is on p. 28 of this collection.
The immediately following quotation is from p. 18 of R. P.
Wolff's In Defense of Anarchism (New York, 1970). On the nature of
conscience, see A. Campbell Garnett, 'Conscience and Conscientiousness',
in J. Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts (Oxford, 1969).
376
Notes and References
John Locke argued for the importance of settled law in his Second
Treatise on Civil Government, especially sections 124-6.
On the sorry history of attempts to reform the law on animal experimentation,
see Richard Ryder, Victims of Science.
Mill's proposal for multiple votes for the better educated occurs in
Chapter 8 of his Representative Government. The quotation from Engels's
Condition of the Working Class in England, trans. and ed. Henderson and
Chaloner (Oxford, 1958), p. 108, lowe to John Harris, 'The Marxist
Conception of Violence', Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 3 (1974),
which argues persuasively for regarding passive violence as a genuine
form of violence. See also Harris's book, Violence and Responsibility (London,
1980); and Ted Honderich, Three Essays on Political Violence (Oxford,
1976). The quotation from Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood,
Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching (Tucson, Ariz., 1987),
appears on pp. 14 and 17.
The issues dealt with in the first three sections of this chapter are
more fully treated in my Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford, 1973).
Probably the best collection of essays in this area is still J. G. Murphy
(ed.), Civil Disobedience and Violence (Belmont, 1971), although the
anthology edited by H. A. Bedau, referred to above, is valuable for its
emphasis on the writings ofthose who practice civil disobedience rather
than theorise about it from afar.
Chapter 12: Why act morally?
For attempts to reject the title question of this chapter as an improper
question, see S. Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge,
1961), p. 162; J. Hospers, Human Conduct (London, 1963), p. 194; and
M. G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics (London, 1963), pp. 319-27. D.
H. Monro defines ethical judgments as overriding in Empiricism and
Ethics (Cambridge, 1967); see, for instance, p. 127. R. M. Hare's prescriptivist
view of ethics implies that a commitment to act is involved
in accepting a moral jUdgment, but since only universalisable judgments
count as moral judgments, this view does not have the consequence
that whatever judgment we take to be overriding is necessarily
our moral judgment. Hare's view therefore allows us to give sense to
our question. On this general issue of the definition of moral terms
and the consequences of different definitions, see my 'The Triviality of
the Debate over "Is-Ought" and the Definition of "Moral"', American
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 10 (1973).
The argument discussed in the second section is a distillation of such
377
Notes and References
sources as Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, bk. 4, par. 4; I. Kant. Groundwork
of the Metaphysic of Morals; H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative
(London, 1963), pp.245-6; J. Hospers, Human Conduct (London,
1963), pp. 584-93; and D. Gauthier, Practical Reasoning (Oxford, 1963),
p.118.
G. Carlson, 'Ethical Egoism Reconsidered', American Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 10 (1973), argues that egoism is irrational because the
individual egoist cannot defend it publicly without inconsistency; but
it is not clear why this should be a test ofrationality, since the egoist
can still defend it to himself.
Hume defends his view of practical reason in A Treatise of Human
Nature, bk. 1, pt. iii, sec. 3. T. Nagel's objections to it are in The Possibility
of Altruism (Oxford, 1970). For a more recent statement of Nagel's
position, see his The View from Nowhere (New York, 1986). Sidgwick's
observation on the rationality of egoism is on p. 498 of The Methods of
Ethics, 7th ed. (London, 1907).
Bradley's insistence on loving virtue for its own sake comes from
his Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1876; repr. 1962), pp. 61-3. The same
position can be found in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals,
chap. 1, and in D. Z. Phillips, 'Does It Pay to Be Good?' Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, vol. 64 (1964-5). Bradley and Kant are expounding
what they take to be 'the common moral consciousness'
rather than their own views. Kant himself adheres to the view of the
common moral consciousness, but later in Ethical Studies Bradley supports
a view of morality in which the subjective satisfaction involved
in the moral life plays a prominent role.
My account of why we believe that only actions done for the sake
of morality have moral worth is similar to Hume's view in his Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals. See also P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics,
pt. 3.
Maslow presents some sketchy data in support of his theory of personality
in 'Psychological Data and Value Theory', in A. H. Maslow
(ed.), New Knowledge in Human Values (New York, 1959); see also A.
H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York, 1954). Charles

'Operation Rescue: Domestic Terrorism or Legitimate Civil Rights

Protest?' Hastings Center Report, NovemberlDecember 1989, pp. 28-

32. The biblical passage quoted is from Proverbs 24: 11. The claim

by Gary Leber about the number of children saved is in his essay

'We Must Rescue Them', Hastings Center Report, NovemberlDecember

1989, pp.26-7. On Gennarelli's experiments and the events surrounding

them, see Lori Gruen and Peter Singer, Animal Liberation:

A Graphic Guide (London, 1987). On the Animal Liberation Front,

see also Philip Windeatt, 'They Clearly Now See the Link: Militant

Voices', in P. Singer (ed.), In Defence of Animals (Oxford, 1985). The

blockade of the Franklin River is vividly described by a participant

in James McQueen, The Franklin: Not Just a River (Ringwood, Victoria,

1983); on the unsuccessful earlier campaign to save Lake Peddar,

see Kevin Kiernan, 'I Saw My Temple Ransacked', in Cassandra

Pybus and Richard Flanagan (eds.), The Rest of the World Is Watching

(Sydney, 1990).

Henry Thoreau's 'Civil Disobedience' has been reprinted in several

places, among them H. A. Bedau (ed.), Civil Disobedience: Theory and

Practice (New York, 1969); the passage quoted is on p. 28 of this collection.

The immediately following quotation is from p. 18 of R. P.

Wolff's In Defense of Anarchism (New York, 1970). On the nature of

conscience, see A. Campbell Garnett, 'Conscience and Conscientiousness',

in J. Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts (Oxford, 1969).

376

Notes and References

John Locke argued for the importance of settled law in his Second

Treatise on Civil Government, especially sections 124-6.

On the sorry history of attempts to reform the law on animal experimentation,

see Richard Ryder, Victims of Science.

Mill's proposal for multiple votes for the better educated occurs in

Chapter 8 of his Representative Government. The quotation from Engels's

Condition of the Working Class in England, trans. and ed. Henderson and

Chaloner (Oxford, 1958), p. 108, lowe to John Harris, 'The Marxist

Conception of Violence', Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 3 (1974),

which argues persuasively for regarding passive violence as a genuine

form of violence. See also Harris's book, Violence and Responsibility (London,

1980); and Ted Honderich, Three Essays on Political Violence (Oxford,

1976). The quotation from Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood,

Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching (Tucson, Ariz., 1987),

appears on pp. 14 and 17.

The issues dealt with in the first three sections of this chapter are

more fully treated in my Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford, 1973).

Probably the best collection of essays in this area is still J. G. Murphy

(ed.), Civil Disobedience and Violence (Belmont, 1971), although the

anthology edited by H. A. Bedau, referred to above, is valuable for its

emphasis on the writings ofthose who practice civil disobedience rather

than theorise about it from afar.

Chapter 12: Why act morally?

For attempts to reject the title question of this chapter as an improper

question, see S. Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge,

1961), p. 162; J. Hospers, Human Conduct (London, 1963), p. 194; and

M. G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics (London, 1963), pp. 319-27. D.

H. Monro defines ethical judgments as overriding in Empiricism and

Ethics (Cambridge, 1967); see, for instance, p. 127. R. M. Hare's prescriptivist

view of ethics implies that a commitment to act is involved

in accepting a moral jUdgment, but since only universalisable judgments

count as moral judgments, this view does not have the consequence

that whatever judgment we take to be overriding is necessarily

our moral judgment. Hare's view therefore allows us to give sense to

our question. On this general issue of the definition of moral terms

and the consequences of different definitions, see my 'The Triviality of

the Debate over "Is-Ought" and the Definition of "Moral"', American

Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 10 (1973).

The argument discussed in the second section is a distillation of such

377

Notes and References

sources as Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, bk. 4, par. 4; I. Kant. Groundwork

of the Metaphysic of Morals; H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative

(London, 1963), pp.245-6; J. Hospers, Human Conduct (London,

1963), pp. 584-93; and D. Gauthier, Practical Reasoning (Oxford, 1963),

p.118.

G. Carlson, 'Ethical Egoism Reconsidered', American Philosophical

Quarterly, vol. 10 (1973), argues that egoism is irrational because the

individual egoist cannot defend it publicly without inconsistency; but

it is not clear why this should be a test ofrationality, since the egoist

can still defend it to himself.

Hume defends his view of practical reason in A Treatise of Human

Nature, bk. 1, pt. iii, sec. 3. T. Nagel's objections to it are in The Possibility

of Altruism (Oxford, 1970). For a more recent statement of Nagel's

position, see his The View from Nowhere (New York, 1986). Sidgwick's

observation on the rationality of egoism is on p. 498 of The Methods of

Ethics, 7th ed. (London, 1907).

Bradley's insistence on loving virtue for its own sake comes from

his Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1876; repr. 1962), pp. 61-3. The same

position can be found in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals,

chap. 1, and in D. Z. Phillips, 'Does It Pay to Be Good?' Proceedings of

the Aristotelian Society, vol. 64 (1964-5). Bradley and Kant are expounding

what they take to be 'the common moral consciousness'

rather than their own views. Kant himself adheres to the view of the

common moral consciousness, but later in Ethical Studies Bradley supports

a view of morality in which the subjective satisfaction involved

in the moral life plays a prominent role.

My account of why we believe that only actions done for the sake

of morality have moral worth is similar to Hume's view in his Enquiry

Concerning the Principles of Morals. See also P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics,

pt. 3.

Maslow presents some sketchy data in support of his theory of personality

in 'Psychological Data and Value Theory', in A. H. Maslow

(ed.), New Knowledge in Human Values (New York, 1959); see also A.

H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York, 1954). Charles