SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IRAQ.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) We respect the constitutional authorities given a 
        President in Article II, Section 2, which states that ``The 
        President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of 
        the United States;'' it is not the intent of this Act to 
        question or contravene such authority, but to accept the offer 
        to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007, that, 
        ``if members have improvements that can be made, we will make 
        them. If circumstances change, we will adjust''.
            (2) The United States' strategy and operations in Iraq can 
        only be sustained and achieved with support from the American 
        people and with a level of bipartisanship.
            (3) Over 137,000 American military personnel are currently 
        serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since March 2003, 
        with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest 
        traditions of the United States armed forces, and are deserving 
        of the support of all Americans, which they have strongly.
            (4) Many American service personnel have lost their lives, 
        and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the American 
        people will always honor their sacrifices and honor their 
        families.
            (5) The U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their Reserve 
        and National Guard organizations, together with components of 
        the other branches of the military, are under enormous strain 
        from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.
            (6) These deployments, and those that will follow, will 
        have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention and 
        readiness of our nation's all volunteer force.
            (7) In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
        Year 2006, the Congress stated that ``calendar year 2006 should 
        be a period of significant transition to full sovereignty, with 
        Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a 
        free and sovereign Iraq''.
            (8) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, 
        approved November 28, 2006, ``determin[ed] that the situation 
        in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international peace 
        and security''.
            (9) Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-widening 
        problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence based upon 
        political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni 
        and Shia Muslims.
            (10) Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to 
        achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach 
        such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly 
        contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq.
            (11) The responsibility for Iraq's internal security and 
        halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the 
        Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces.
            (12) U.S. Central Command Commander General John Abizaid 
        testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, ``I met with every 
        divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps Commander, [and] 
        General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, in your 
        professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American 
        troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve 
        success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, 
        because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis 
        to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American 
        forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more 
        responsibility for their own future''.
            (13) Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on 
        November 27, 2006, that ``The crisis is political, and the ones 
        who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of 
        innocents are the politicians''.
            (14) There is growing evidence that Iraqi public sentiment 
        opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, much less 
        increasing the troop level.
            (15) In the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration and 
        Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private sector, 
        began to express concern that the situation in Iraq was 
        deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as a 
        consequence, the Administration began an intensive, 
        comprehensive review by all components of the Executive branch 
        to devise a new strategy.
            (16) In December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group 
        issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy 
        that includes ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political 
        efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary 
        mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United 
        States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq 
        responsibly''.
            (17) On January 10, 2007, following consultations with the 
        Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new strategy 
        (hereinafter referred to as the ``plan''), which consists of 
        three basic elements: diplomatic, economic, and military; the 
        central component of the military element is an augmentation of 
        the present level of U.S. military forces through additional 
        deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S. military troops to 
        Iraq.
            (18) On January 10, 2007, the President said that the 
        ``Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two 
        deputy military commanders for their capital'' and that U.S. 
        forces will ``be embedded in their formations;'' and in 
        subsequent testimony before the Armed Services Committee on 
        January 25, 2007, by the retired former Vice Chief of the Army, 
        it was learned that there will also be a comparable U.S. 
        command in Baghdad, and that this dual chain of command may be 
        problematic because ``the Iraqis are going to be able to move 
        their forces around at times where we will disagree with that 
        movement,'' and called for clarification.
            (19) This proposed level of troop augmentation far exceeds 
        the expectations of many of us as to the reinforcements that 
        would be necessary to implement the various options for a new 
        strategy, and led many members of Congress to express outright 
        opposition to augmenting our troops by 21,500.
            (20) The Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to 
        assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband 
        militias, consider Constitutional amendments and enact laws to 
        reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality of 
        essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite those 
        promises, little has been achieved.
            (21) The President said on January 10, 2007, that ``I've 
        made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders 
        that America's commitment is not open-ended'' so as to dispel 
        the contrary impression that exists.
            (22) The recommendations in this Act should not be 
        interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in, or 
        withdrawal of, the present level of forces.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Senate disagrees with the ``plan'' to augment our 
        forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider 
        all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic goals 
        set forth below;
            (2) the Senate believes that the United States should 
        continue vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically 
        for the purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements 
        associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists a 
        safe haven;
            (3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq would 
        present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-term 
        security interests of the United States are best served by an 
        Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and serve as 
        an ally in the war against extremists;
            (4) the Congress should not take any action that will 
        endanger United States military forces in the field, including 
        the elimination or reduction of funds for troops in the field, 
        as such action with respect to funding would undermine their 
        safety or harm their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned 
        missions;
            (5) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in 
        Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political 
        compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen the 
        unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in the 
        security situation;
            (6) the military part of this strategy should focus on 
        maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying 
        international terrorists a safe haven, conducting 
        counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, 
        supporting Iraqi efforts to bring greater security to Baghdad, 
        and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full 
        responsibility for their own security;
            (7) United States military operations should, as much as 
        possible, be confined to these goals, and should charge the 
        Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian 
        violence;
            (8) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should 
        reflect this delineation of responsibilities, and the Secretary 
        of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should 
        clarify the command and control arrangements in Baghdad;
            (9) the United States Government should transfer to the 
        Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as is 
        necessary;
            (10) the United States Government should engage selected 
        nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, 
        internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process for 
        Iraq;
            (11) the Administration should provide regular updates to 
        the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States 
        Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the 
        progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward this 
        end; and
            (12) our overall military, diplomatic and economic strategy 
        should not be regarded as an ``open-ended'' or unconditional 
        commitment, but rather as a new strategy that hereafter should 
        be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's meeting benchmarks 
        that must be delineated in writing and agreed to by the Iraqi 
        Prime Minister. Such benchmarks should include, but not be 
        limited to, the deployment of that number of additional Iraqi 
        security forces as specified in the plan in Baghdad, ensuring 
        equitable distribution of the resources of the Government of 
        Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, 
        enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the oil 
        resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and 
        other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner, and the authority 
        of Iraqi commanders to make tactical and operational decisions 
        without political intervention.
    (c) Frequency of Reports on Certain Aspects of Policy and 
Operations.--The United States Policy in Iraq Act (section 1227 of 
Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3465; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) is amended by 
adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(d) Frequency of Reports on Certain Aspects of United States 
Policy and Military Operations in Iraq.--Not later than 30 days after 
the date of the enactment of this subsection, and every 30 days 
thereafter until all United States combat brigades have redeployed from 
Iraq, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the matters 
set forth in paragraphs (1)(A), (1)(B), and (2) of subsection (c). To 
the maximum extent practicable each report shall be unclassified, with 
a classified annex if necessary.''.
Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) the Senate disagrees with the plan to augment our forces in Iraq by 21,500 and urges the President to consider all options for achieving the strategic goals set forth below; (2) the Senate believes the United States should continue operations in Anbar province, specifically for the purpose of combating an insurgency, including Al Qaeda associated elements, and denying terrorists a safe haven; (3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-term U.S. security interests are best served by an Iraq that can govern and defend itself and serve as an ally in the war against extremists; (4) Congress should not take any action that will endanger U.S. military forces in the field, including the elimination or reduction of funds for such troops; (5) the primary objective of U.S. strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that will strengthen the unity government and lead to security improvements; (6) the military part of this strategy should focus on maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, supporting Iraqi efforts to bring greater security to Baghdad, and training and equipping Iraqi forces; (7) U.S. military operations should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals and should charge the Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian violence; (8) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should reflect this delineation of responsibilities and the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should clarify the command and control arrangements in Baghdad; (9) the U.S. government should transfer necessary military equipment to the Iraqi military; (10) the U.S. government should engage selected nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process for Iraq; (11) the Administration should provide regular updates to Congress; and (12) our overall military, diplomatic, and economic strategy should not be regarded as open-ended but rather as a new strategy conditioned upon the Iraqi government's meeting delineated benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi Prime Minister.

Amends the United States Policy in Iraq Act to require the President to report monthly to Congress respecting specified aspects of U.S. policy and military operations in Iraq until U.S. combat troops are redeployed from Iraq.
A bill to express the sense of Congress on Iraq.