SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress makes the following findings:
        (1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution of 
    the war against areas outside of its control, which has already 
    cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than 
    4,000,000 people.
        (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored 
    peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best 
    chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of human 
    rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
        (3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian relief 
    operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to bring 
    an end to the war.
        (4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
        (5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas of 
    Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the 
    absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major 
    impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people and 
    to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process. It is 
    critical that credible civil authority and institutions play an 
    important role in the reconstruction of post-war Sudan.
        (6) Through the manipulation of traditional rivalries among 
    peoples in areas outside of its full control, the Government of 
    Sudan has used divide-and-conquer techniques effectively to 
    subjugate its population. However, internationally sponsored 
    reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing 
    human suffering and the effectiveness of this tactic.
        (7) The Government of Sudan utilizes and organizes militias, 
    Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units for raiding and 
    enslaving parties in areas outside of the control of the Government 
    of Sudan in an effort to disrupt severely the ability of the 
    populations in those areas to sustain themselves. The tactic helps 
    minimize the Government of Sudan's accountability internationally.
        (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it 
    intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to 
    increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas 
    outside of its control.
        (9) By regularly banning air transport relief flights by the 
    United Nations relief operation OLS, the Government of Sudan has 
    been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese 
    people from the United States and other donor countries as a 
    devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government 
    of Sudan to starve targeted groups and subdue areas of Sudan 
    outside of the Government's control.
        (10) The acts of the Government of Sudan, including the acts 
    described in this section, constitute genocide as defined by the 
    Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
    Genocide (78 U.N.T.S. 277).
        (11) The efforts of the United States and other donors in 
    delivering relief and assistance through means outside of OLS have 
    played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS and 
    offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food donations to 
    advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
        (12) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan 
    facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the 
    population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the 
    Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of 
    their ability to sustain themselves.
        (13) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal and 
    the Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions have been excluded 
    completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing 
    their populations at increased risk of famine.
        (14) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per day, 
    and with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food 
    needs of the recipients, the current international relief 
    operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long term.
        (15) The ability of populations to defend themselves against 
    attack in areas outside of the control of the Government of Sudan 
    has been severely compromised by the disengagement of the front-
    line states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, fostering the belief 
    among officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the 
    battlefield can be achieved.
        (16) The United States should use all means of pressure 
    available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war in 
    Sudan, including--
            (A) the multilateralization of economic and diplomatic 
        tools to compel the Government of Sudan to enter into a good 
        faith peace process;
            (B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil 
        authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside of 
        government control;
            (C) continued active support of people-to-people 
        reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside of 
        government control;
            (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide 
        humanitarian relief to those areas; and
            (E) cooperation among the trading partners of the United 
        States and within multilateral institutions toward those ends.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
        (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
    ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
    International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 
    Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
        (2) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan'' 
    means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
        (3) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief 
    operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and 
    participating relief organizations known as ``Operation Lifeline 
    Sudan''.

SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS 
              OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

    The Congress hereby--
        (1) condemns--
            (A) violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict 
        in Sudan;
            (B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights record, 
        with regard to both the prosecution of the war and the denial 
        of basic human and political rights to all Sudanese;
            (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role of the 
        Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating the practice;
            (D) the Government of Sudan's use and organization of 
        ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', Popular Defense Forces, and 
        regular Sudanese Army units into organized and coordinated 
        raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba 
        Mountains, and the Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions; and
            (E) aerial bombardment of civilian targets that is 
        sponsored by the Government of Sudan; and
        (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air transport 
    relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of raiding and 
    slaving parties is a tool for creating food shortages and is used 
    as a systematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and 
    economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in a policy of low-
    intensity ethnic cleansing.

SEC. 5. ASSISTANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE.

    (a) Assistance to Sudan.--The President is authorized to provide 
increased assistance to the areas of Sudan that are not controlled by 
the Government of Sudan to prepare the population for peace and 
democratic governance, including support for civil administration, 
communications infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--
        (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the 
    President to carry out the activities described in subsection (a) 
    of this section $100,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2003, 
    2004, and 2005.
        (2) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the 
    authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1) of this 
    subsection are authorized to remain available until expended.

SEC. 6. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED PEACE PROCESS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress hereby--
        (1) recognizes that--
            (A) a single, viable internationally and regionally 
        sanctioned peace process holds the greatest opportunity to 
        promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan; 
        and
            (B) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best made 
        through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles 
        reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994, and on the 
        Machakos Protocol in July 2002; and
        (2) commends the efforts of Special Presidential Envoy, Senator 
    Danforth and his team in working to assist the parties to the 
    conflict in Sudan in finding a just, permanent peace to the 
    conflict in Sudan.
    (b) Measures of Certain Conditions Not Met.--
        (1) Presidential determination.--
            (A) The President shall make a determination and certify in 
        writing to the appropriate congressional committees within 6 
        months after the date of enactment of this Act, and each 6 
        months thereafter, that the Government of Sudan and the Sudan 
        People's Liberation Movement are negotiating in good faith and 
        that negotiations should continue.
            (B) If, under subparagraph (A) the President determines and 
        certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that the Government of Sudan has not engaged in good 
        faith negotiations to achieve a permanent, just, and equitable 
        peace agreement, or has unreasonably interfered with 
        humanitarian efforts, then the President, after consultation 
        with the Congress, shall implement the measures set forth in 
        paragraph (2).
            (C) If, under paragraph (A) the President determines and 
        certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that the Sudan People's Liberation Movement has not 
        engaged in good faith negotiations to achieve a permanent, 
        just, and equitable peace agreement, then paragraph (2) shall 
        not apply to the Government of Sudan.
            (D) If the President certifies to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that the Government of Sudan is not in 
        compliance with the terms of a permanent peace agreement 
        between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's 
        Liberation Movement, then the President, after consultation 
        with the Congress, shall implement the measures set forth in 
        paragraph (2).
            (E) If, at any time after the President has made a 
        certification under subparagraph (B), the President makes a 
        determination and certifies in writing to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that the Government of Sudan has 
        resumed good faith negotiations, or makes a determination and 
        certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that the Government of Sudan is in compliance with a 
        peace agreement, then paragraph (2) shall not apply to the 
        Government of Sudan.
        (2) Measures in support of the peace process.--Subject to the 
    provisions of paragraph (1), the President--
            (A) shall, through the Secretary of the Treasury, instruct 
        the United States executive directors to each international 
        financial institution to continue to vote against and actively 
        oppose any extension by the respective institution of any loan, 
        credit, or guarantee to the Government of Sudan;
            (B) should consider downgrading or suspending diplomatic 
        relations between the United States and the Government of 
        Sudan;
            (C) shall take all necessary and appropriate steps, 
        including through multilateral efforts, to deny the Government 
        of Sudan access to oil revenues to ensure that the Government 
        of Sudan neither directly nor indirectly utilizes any oil 
        revenues to purchase or acquire military equipment or to 
        finance any military activities; and
            (D) shall seek a United Nations Security Council Resolution 
        to impose an arms embargo on the Government of Sudan.
    (c) Report on the Status of Negotiations.--If, at any time after 
the President has made a certification under subsection (b)(1)(A), the 
Government of Sudan discontinues negotiations with the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement for a 14-day period, then the President shall 
submit a quarterly report to the appropriate congressional committees 
on the status of the peace process until negotiations resume.
    (d) Report on United States Opposition To Financing by 
International Financial Institutions.--The Secretary of the Treasury 
shall submit a semiannual report to the appropriate congressional 
committees describing the steps taken by the United States to oppose 
the extension of a loan, credit, or guarantee if, after the Secretary 
of the Treasury gives the instructions described in subsection 
(b)(2)(A), such financing is extended.
    (e) Report on Efforts To Deny Oil Revenues.--Not later than 45 days 
after the President takes an action under subsection (b)(2)(C), the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
comprehensive plan for implementing the actions described in such 
subsection.
    (f) Definition.--In this section, the term ``international 
financial institution'' means the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, the International Development Association, the 
International Monetary Fund, the African Development Bank, and the 
African Development Fund.

SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
        (1) the United Nations should help facilitate peace and 
    recovery in Sudan;
        (2) the President, acting through the United States Permanent 
    Representative to the United Nations, should seek to end the veto 
    power of the Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for air 
    transport relief flights and, by doing so, to end the manipulation 
    of the delivery of relief supplies to the advantage of the 
    Government of Sudan on the battlefield; and
        (3) the President should take appropriate measures, including 
    the implementation of recommendations of the International Eminent 
    Persons Commission contained in the report issued on May 22, 2002, 
    to end slavery and aerial bombardment of civilians by the 
    Government of Sudan.

SEC. 8. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

    Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall prepare and 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report regarding 
the conflict in Sudan. Such report shall include--
        (1) a description of the sources and current status of Sudan's 
    financing and construction of infrastructure and pipelines for oil 
    exploitation, the effects of such financing and construction on the 
    inhabitants of the regions in which the oil fields are located, and 
    the ability of the Government of Sudan to finance the war in Sudan 
    with the proceeds of the oil exploitation;
        (2) a description of the extent to which that financing was 
    secured in the United States or with involvement of United States 
    citizens;
        (3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial bombardment by 
    the Government of Sudan, including targets, frequency, and best 
    estimates of damage; and
        (4) a description of the extent to which humanitarian relief 
    has been obstructed or manipulated by the Government of Sudan or 
    other forces.

SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF EFFORTS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that the 
President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in 
the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a detailed report describing the progress made toward 
carrying out subsection (a).

SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

    (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a contingency plan to 
provide, outside the auspices of the United Nations if necessary, the 
greatest possible amount of United States Government and privately 
donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba 
Mountains and the Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions, in the event 
that the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incremental 
ban on OLS air transport relief flights.
    (b) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, in carrying out the plan developed under subsection (a), the 
President may reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for 
support of OLS operations for the purposes of the plan.

SEC. 11. INVESTIGATION OF WAR CRIMES.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall collect information 
about incidents which may constitute crimes against humanity, genocide, 
war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law by 
all parties to the conflict in Sudan, including slavery, rape, and 
aerial bombardment of civilian targets.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
shall prepare and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
detailed report on the information that the Secretary of State has 
collected under subsection (a) and any findings or determinations made 
by the Secretary on the basis of that information. The report under 
this subsection may be submitted as part of the report required under 
section 8.
    (c) Consultations With Other Departments.--In preparing the report 
required by this section, the Secretary of State shall consult and 
coordinate with all other Government officials who have information 
necessary to complete the report. Nothing contained in this section 
shall require the disclosure, on a classified or unclassified basis, of 
information that would jeopardize sensitive sources and methods or 
other vital national security interests.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
Sudan Peace Act - (Sec. 4) Condemns violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict in Sudan (including the Government of Sudan), the ongoing slave trade there, the Government's use and organization of "murahalliin" (or "mujahadeen"), Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units into raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions, and its aerial bombardment of civilian targets. Recognizes that the use of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food shortages as a systematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.(Sec. 5) Authorizes the President to provide increased assistance to areas of Sudan that are not controlled by the Government of Sudan to prepare the population for peace and democratic governance. Authorizes appropriations for FY 2003 through 2005.(Sec. 6) Declares that Congress recognizes that: (1) a single, viable internationally and regionally sanctioned peace process holds the greatest opportunity to promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan; and (2) resolution to the conflict there is best made through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994, and on the Machakos Protocol in July 2002. Commends the efforts of Special Presidential Envoy, Senator Danforth, and his team in working to assist the parties to the conflict in Sudan in finding a just, permanent peace to the conflict in Sudan.Requires the President to take specified actions against Sudan if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Sudan has not engaged in good faith negotiations with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to achieve a peace agreement, or is not in compliance with the terms of any negotiated peace agreement with the SPLM. Requires specified reports to Congress.(Sec. 7) Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) the United Nations (UN) should help facilitate peace and recovery in Sudan; and (2) the President should seek to end the Government of Sudan's veto power over relief flight plans by Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) and take appropriate measures to end slavery and aerial bombardment of civilians by the Government of Sudan.(Sec. 8) Directs the Secretary of State to report annually to the appropriate congressional committees on the conflict in Sudan.(Sec. 9) Declares the sense of Congress that the President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in relief supply distribution in southern Sudan. Requires the President to submit a progress report to the appropriate congressional committees.(Sec. 10) Directs the President to develop a contingency plan to provide, outside UN auspices, the greatest amount of U.S. Government and privately donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile regions, in the event the Government of Sudan imposes a ban on OLS air transport relief flights. Authorizes the President to reprogram up to 100 percent of funds for OLS operations for purposes of such contingency plan.(Sec. 11) Directs the Secretary to collect information and report to the appropriate congressional committees about possible war crimes by all parties to the conflict in Sudan, including slavery, rape, and aerial bombardment of civilian targets.
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan.