SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

    The Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Potassium iodide long has been shown to have prevented 
        radiation-induced thyroid diseases with negligible side 
        effects.
            (2) The American Thyroid Association and a broad array of 
        other experts on radiation protection and thyroid cancers have 
        consistently recommended making potassium iodide available for 
        use in the case of a radiological catastrophe. The experience 
        of the Chernobyl accident in 1985 and its aftermath have 
        confirmed the safety and efficacy of potassium iodide in 
        preventing radiation-induced thyroid cancers.
            (3) Despite the clear and compelling evidence that 
        potassium iodide is a safe, effective, and inexpensive means of 
        preventing radiation-induced thyroid cancers, the Nuclear 
        Regulatory Commission and its staff have, through their 
        inaction, delayed the stockpiling and distribution of this 
        substance for the last 22 years.
            (4) The safety and efficacy of potassium iodide was 
        formally established as a matter of Federal policy when, on 
        December 15, 1978, the Food and Drug Administration concluded 
        that potassium iodide is a safe and effective means by which to 
        block uptake of radioactive iodine by the thyroid gland in a 
        radiological catastrophe, and approved its over-the-counter 
        sale.
            (5) In November 1979, after the Three Mile Island accident 
        revealed shortages in availability of potassium iodide and the 
        Presidents Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island 
        criticized the Federal Government's failure to stockpile it, 
        the Nuclear Regulatory Commission first declared that it would 
        require potassium iodide stockpiling ``a necessary part of an 
        acceptable State emergency response plan'' in the event of a 
        future nuclear accident. Despite this statement, the Commission 
        failed to take prompt action to make potassium iodide 
        available.
            (6) On September 27, 1982, the Nuclear Regulatory 
        Commission staff recommended that the Commission approve a 
        policy endorsing use of potassium iodide as a ``useful 
        protective action''. However, on October 15, 1982, the 
        Commission staff reversed itself, noting that the Federal 
        Emergency Management Agency had dropped plans to stockpile a 
        large quantity of potassium iodide and stating that the staff 
        now planned to prepare a new paper that would recommend against 
        stockpiling and distribution of potassium iodide on cost-
        benefit grounds.
            (7) On November 22, 1982, public briefing of the Nuclear 
        Regulatory Commission, the staff inexplicably argued against 
        stockpiling of potassium iodide on cost-benefit grounds, 
        suggesting that even though potassium iodide is inexpensive, it 
        would be even cheaper in the long run to treat radiation-
        induced thyroid cancers than to prevent them.
            (8) On July 24, 1985, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
        issued a national policy on potassium iodide which reversed the 
        Commission's previous support for stockpiling and distribution. 
        Referring to the Commission staff's ``cost-benefit analysis'', 
        it rejected the notion of distributing potassium iodide as 
        ``not worthwhile''.
            (9) On June 16, 1989, a Nuclear Energy Commission employee 
        filed a Differing Professional Opinion challenging the Nuclear 
        Regulatory Commission's potassium iodide policy.
            (10) On March 29, 1994, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
        staff recommended to the Commission that stockpiling potassium 
        iodide in the vicinity of nuclear power plants ``appears 
        prudent'' and urged a new policy of purchasing potassium iodide 
        and encouraging the States to establish stockpiles. However, a 
        deadlocked 2-2 vote by the Commission prevented adoption of the 
        proposed new policy.
            (11) On September 9, 1995, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
        employee filed, as a private citizen, a petition for rulemaking 
        asking the Commission to require that potassium iodide be 
        included in State emergency plans.
            (12) On June 16, 1997, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
        staff proposed a draft policy statement to the Commission which 
        would make potassium iodide available at Federal expense to 
        those States who request it, while also stating that there is 
        ``no new information'' warranting a change in existing policy--
        despite the experience from the Chernobyl accident regarding 
        the effectiveness of potassium iodide in preventing thyroid 
        cancers.
            (13) On March 31, 1998, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
        staff recommended to the Commission that it deny the petition 
        for rulemaking filed by one of its employees in a private 
        capacity, on the basis of spurious arguments about the 
        purported side effects of potassium iodide and the potential 
        for liability relating to such purported side effects.
            (14) On April 9, 1998, the Federal Emergency Management 
        Agency wrote the Commission to point  out ``misleading'' 
characterizations being made about its position on potassium iodide by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff and a nuclear industry trade 
association.
            (15) On July 1, 1998, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
        announced that it had voted 3-1 to reject the recommendation by 
        the staff and grant the petition for rulemaking and to require 
        States to consider potassium iodide, along with evacuation and 
        sheltering, in emergency planning for nuclear power plant 
        accidents. Despite this action, no rulemaking was immediately 
        forthcoming.
            (16) In January 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
        finally revised a portion of its emergency response regulations 
        to require that consideration be given to including potassium 
        iodide as a protective measure for the general public to 
        supplement sheltering and evacuation in the event of a severe 
        nuclear power plant accident. In doing so, the Commission found 
        that potassium iodide is ``a reasonable, prudent, and 
        inexpensive supplement to evacuation and sheltering for 
        specific local conditions''.
            (17) On October 16, 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
        stated that while it had decided to fund the initial purchases 
        of potassium iodide as a supplemental measure, it had not 
        formulated a concrete plan for its distribution, preferring 
        instead to leave it to the States to decide whether to make 
        potassium iodide available to its citizens.
            (18) The events of September 11, 2001, have underscored the 
        need to undertake immediate measures to protect the public 
        against other possible terrorist attacks, including terrorist 
        attacks against nuclear power plants. Such preparations must 
        include the immediate establishment of a uniform national 
        policy to be established with respect to the stockpiling and 
        distribution of potassium iodide, rather than deferring to the 
        States on the question of whether it should be stockpiled. In 
        order to establish such a uniform national policy, the Nuclear 
        Regulatory Commission and all other applicable Federal agencies 
        must remove all further obstacles to the immediate stockpiling 
        and distribution of potassium iodide on a national basis.

SEC. 2. RULEMAKING.

    (a) Amendment.--Chapter 19 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
U.S.C. 2015 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 241 the 
following new section:
    ``Sec. 242. Potassium Iodide.--Not later than 6 months after the 
date of the enactment of this section, the Commission shall--
            ``(1) ensure that stockpiles of potassium iodide tablets 
        sufficient to provide adequate protection to the population 
        have been established in individual homes and at public 
        facilities such as schools and hospitals within 50 miles of a 
        nuclear power plant;
            ``(2) ensure that stockpiles of potassium iodide tablets 
        sufficient to provide adequate protection to the population 
        have been established at public facilities such as schools and 
        hospitals within the area between 50 and 200 miles of a nuclear 
        power plant;
            ``(3) establish a plan to provide for the utilization of 
        the stockpiles described in paragraphs (1) and (2) by 
        individuals located within 200 miles of a nuclear power plant 
        in the event of a release of radionuclides, other than a 
        release of amounts having no significant public health 
        consequences; and
            ``(4) transmit to the Congress a report--
                    ``(A) on whether stockpiles have been established 
                as required by paragraphs (1) and (2); and
                    ``(B) on the utilization plan required under 
                paragraph (3).''.
    (b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents of chapter 
19 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is amended by inserting after the 
item relating to section 241 the following new item:

``Sec. 242. Potassium iodide.''.
Amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to instruct the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure establishment, in individual homes and at public facilities within 50 miles of nuclear power plants, of stockpiles of potassium iodide tablets sufficient to provide adequate protection to the affected population.
To require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure that sufficient stockpiles of potassium iodide tablets have been established near nuclear power plants and that appropriate plans for their utilization exist.