SECTION 1. ASSESSMENT OF ACHIEVEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ OF 
              BENCHMARKS FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL 
              RECONCILIATION IN IRAQ.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-widening 
        problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence based upon 
        political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni 
        and Shia Muslims, concentrated primarily in Baghdad.
            (2) Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to 
        achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach 
        such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly 
        contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq.
            (3) The responsibility for internal security and halting 
        sectarian violence in Iraq must rest primarily with the 
        Government of Iraq, relying on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
            (4) On January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced 
        a new strategy for Iraq, which consists of three basic 
        elements: diplomatic, economic, and military. The central 
        component of the military element is an augmentation of the 
        present level of United States military forces in Iraq with 
        more than 20,000 additional United States military forces to 
        ``work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their 
        formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to 
        help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them 
        protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi 
        forces left behind are capable of providing the security that 
        Baghdad needs''.
            (5) President George W. Bush said on January 10, 2007, that 
        ``I've made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other 
        leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended'' so as to 
        dispel the contrary impression that exists.
            (6) The Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, General 
        David Petraeus, stated during his confirmation hearing before 
        the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, on January 23, 
        2007, that it is ``very important'' for Iraqis to understand 
        that they need to reach the political settlements which are 
        essential to resolve the sectarian violence and to defeat 
        insurgents.
            (7) General Petraeus acknowledged during his confirmation 
        hearing before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, 
        on January 23, 2007, that political settlement and political 
        settlement alone by the Iraqis is our ultimate way of providing 
        security and success in Iraq.
            (8) General Petraeus stated on March 8, 2007 that ``[a] 
        political resolution of various differences, of this 
        legislation, of various senses that people do not have a stake 
        in the success of the new Iraq, and so forth, that is crucial. 
        That is what will determine in the long run the success of this 
        effort''. In an April 26, 2007, news conference, General 
        Petraeus said that the situation in Iraq remains ``exceedingly 
        difficult''.
            (9) General Petraeus, as principal author of Army Field 
        Manual 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), Counterinsurgency, released in 
        December 2006, and therefore possessing the unique 
        understanding and experience regarding the principles and 
        fundamentals of pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy, states 
        that ``[i]n the end, the host nation has to win on its own. 
        Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders and 
        institutions. U.S. forces and agencies can help, but [Host 
        Nation] elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real 
        victory''.
            (10) United States military operations in Iraq should be 
        conducted alongside a comprehensive diplomatic, political, and 
        economic strategy that includes sustained engagement with 
        Iraq's neighbors and the international community for the 
        purpose of working collectively to bring stability to Iraq.
            (11) United States military personnel are currently serving 
        in Iraq with the bravery and professionalism consistent with 
        the finest traditions of the United States Armed Forces. Many 
        have lost their lives, and many more have been wounded. They 
        have and deserve the support of all Americans, and the American 
        people will always honor their sacrifices and honor their 
        families.
            (12) United States strategy in Iraq should be conditioned 
        on the meeting by the Government of Iraq of specific 
        benchmarks, as laid out by the President and in consultation 
        with Congress, and reflected in the commitments of the 
        Government of Iraq to the international community.
            (13) The meeting of these benchmarks by the Government of 
        Iraq should be viewed as the condition for continued United 
        States military and economic involvement in Iraq.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Congress 
should not take any action, including the elimination or reduction of 
funds, that will impair the mission of the United States military 
forces in the field, undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness 
in pursuing their assigned missions.
    (c) Report on Achievement of Benchmarks.--
            (1) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Commander, Multi-National Forces-
        Iraq, having consulted with relevant United States and Iraqi 
        officials, shall submit to Congress an independent report 
        setting forth the status of the achievement of the benchmarks 
        specified in paragraph (2) and stating the Commander's 
        assessment whether or not each such benchmark has been met. The 
        Commander shall prepare and submit the report in coordination 
        with the Director of National Intelligence.
            (2) Benchmarks.--The benchmarks specified in this paragraph 
        are as follows:
                    (A) The assumption by Iraq of control of its 
                military.
                    (B) The enactment and implementation of a Militia 
                Law to disarm and demobilize militias and to ensure 
                that Iraqi security forces are accountable only to the 
                central government and loyal to the constitution of 
                Iraq.
                    (C) The completion of the review of the 
                constitution of Iraq and the holding of a referendum on 
                special amendments to the constitution of Iraq to 
                ensure equitable participation in the Government of 
                Iraq without regard to religious sect or ethnicity.
                    (D) The completion of a provincial election law and 
                the commencement and specific preparation for the 
                conduct of provincial elections that ensures equitable 
                constitution of provincial representative bodies 
                without regard to religious sect or ethnicity.
                    (E) The enactment and implementation of legislation 
                to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit 
                Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi 
                citizens in an equitable manner.
                    (F) The enactment and implementation of legislation 
                that equitably reforms the de-Ba'athification process 
                in Iraq.
            (3) Testimony before congress.--Not later than 14 days 
        after the submittal to Congress of the report required by 
        paragraph (1), the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq shall 
        appear before each of the appropriate committees of Congress to 
        testify with respect to the success or failure of the 
        Government of Iraq in meeting the benchmarks specified in 
        paragraph (2). If, in the Commander's assessment as set forth 
        in the report, the Government of Iraq has failed to meet any 
        such benchmarks, the Commander shall also submit in his 
        testimony each of the following:
                    (A) Plans for the phased redeployment of United 
                States forces currently deployed to Iraq in support of 
                the Baghdad Security Plan as outlined by the President.
                    (B) Subject to paragraph (4), plans for changing 
                the mission of the remaining United States forces in 
                Iraq to--
                            (i) training and equipping Iraqi forces;
                            (ii) assisting deployed Iraqi brigades with 
                        intelligence, transportation, air support, and 
                        logistics support;
                            (iii) protecting United States and 
                        coalition personnel and infrastructure; and
                            (iv) maintaining rapid-reaction teams and 
                        special operations teams to undertake strike 
                        missions against al Qaeda in Iraq, and for 
                        other missions considered vital by the United 
                        States commander in Iraq.
            (4) The Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq shall devise 
        the plans described in paragraph (3)(B) with the objective of 
        successfully accomplishing the change in mission within six 
        months of the date of his testimony before Congress. The 
        Commander shall further indicate the number of troops needed to 
        successfully complete the changed mission and the estimated 
        duration of that mission.
            (5) Appropriate committees of congress defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; 
                and
                    (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives.
    (d) Comptroller General Assessment.--Not later than 120 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 
United States shall submit to Congress an independent report setting 
forth--
            (1) the status of the achievement of the benchmarks 
        specified in subsection (c)(2); and
            (2) the Comptroller General's assessment whether or not 
        each such benchmark has been met.
Expresses the sense of Congress against any congressional action, including the elimination or reduction of funds, that will impair the mission of the U.S. military forces in the field, undermine their safety, or harm their effectiveness.

Directs the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq to report to Congress within 120 days respecting the status of the achievement of specified benchmarks and the Commander's assessment whether or not each such benchmark has been met.
A bill to provide for an assessment of the achievement by the Government of Iraq of benchmarks for political settlement and national reconciliation in Iraq.