SECTION 1. CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE.

    (a) Findings.--
            (1) The critical electric infrastructure of the United 
        States and Canada has more than $1 trillion in asset value, 
        more than 200,000 miles of transmission lines, and more than 
        800,000 megawatts of generating capability, serving over 300 
        million people.
            (2) The effective functioning of this infrastructure is 
        highly dependent on computer-based control systems that are 
        used to monitor and manage sensitive processes and physical 
        functions.
            (3) These control systems are becoming increasingly 
        connected to open networks, such as corporate intranets and the 
        Internet. According to the Department of Homeland Security's 
        United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (``US-CERT''), 
        this transition towards widely used technologies and open 
        connectivity exposes control systems to the ever-present cyber 
        risks that exist in the information technology world in 
        addition to control system specific risks.
            (4) Malicious actors pose a significant risk to this 
        infrastructure. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI'') 
        has identified multiple sources of threats, including foreign 
        nation states, domestic criminals and hackers, and disgruntled 
        employees.
            (5) Intentional or naturally occurring Electromagnetic 
        Pulse (``EMP'') events also threaten critical electric 
        infrastructure. The Commission to Assess the Threat to the 
        United States from EMP Attack reported in 2008 that an EMP 
        attack could cause significant damage or disruption to critical 
        electric infrastructure and other critical infrastructure due 
        to the widespread use of Supervisory Control and Data 
        Acquisition (``SCADA'') systems. The National Academy of 
        Sciences also reported in 2008 that Severe Space Weather Events 
        could produce similar results.
            (6) The Department of Homeland Security's Control Systems 
        Security Program is designed to increase the reliability, 
        security, and resilience of control systems to guard against 
        and enhance domestic preparedness for and collective response 
        to a cyber attack by a terrorist or other person. This is done 
        by developing voluntary cyber risk reduction products, 
        supporting the Department of Homeland Security's Industrial 
        Control Systems Computer Emergency Response Team (``ICS-CERT'') 
        in developing vulnerability mitigation recommendations and 
        strategies, and coordinating and leveraging activities for 
        improving the Nation's critical infrastructure security 
        posture.
            (7) According to recent news reports, the electronic 
        control systems of the electrical system in the United States 
        have been routinely penetrated and compromised. According to 
        current and former national security officials, cyber spies 
        from China, Russia, and other countries have penetrated the 
        United States electrical system in order to map the system, and 
        have left behind software programs that could be used to 
        disrupt and disable the system.
            (8) In the interest of national security, and to enhance 
        domestic preparedness for and collective response to a cyber 
        attack by a terrorist or other person, a statutory mechanism is 
        necessary to protect the critical electric infrastructure 
        against cyber threats.
            (9) In spite of existing mandatory cybersecurity standards, 
        a report from the North American Electric Reliability 
        Corporation (``NERC'') suggests that many utilities are 
        underreporting their assets, potentially to avoid compliance 
        requirements. In April 2009, NERC reported that only 23 percent 
        of responding utilities identified a ``Critical Cyber Asset'' 
        as required by NERC Reliability Standard 002-1. According to 
        NERC, the results of this survey suggest that utilities may not 
        have identified certain qualifying assets as ``Critical''. NERC 
        requested that entities take a fresh, comprehensive look at 
        their methodology in order to identify and secure more Critical 
        Cyber Assets.
            (10) On May 21, 2008, in testimony before the House 
        Committee on Homeland Security, Joseph Kelliher, then-Chairman 
        of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (``the 
        Commission''), stated that his agency is in need of additional 
        legal authorities to adequately protect the electric power 
        system against cyber attack.
    (b) Research on Cyber Compromise of Critical Electric 
Infrastructure.--(1) Pursuant to section 201 of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) and in furtherance of domestic preparedness 
for and collective response to a cyber attack by a terrorist or other 
person, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with other national 
security and intelligence agencies, shall conduct research and 
determine if the security of federally owned programmable electronic 
devices and communication networks (including hardware, software, and 
data) essential to the reliable operation of critical electric 
infrastructure have been compromised.
    (2) The scope of the research referred to in paragraph (1) shall 
include: the extent of compromise, identification of attackers, the 
method of penetration, ramifications of the compromise on future 
operations of critical electric infrastructure, secondary ramifications 
of the compromise on other critical infrastructure sectors and the 
functioning of civil society, ramifications of compromise on national 
security, including war fighting capability, and recommended mitigation 
activities.
    (3) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall report the findings to 
the appropriate committees of Congress, including the Committee on 
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the Senate. The report 
may contain a classified annex.
    (c) Federal Power Act Amendment.--Part II of the Federal Power Act 
(16 U.S.C. 791a and following) is amended by adding the following new 
sections at the end thereof:

``SEC. 224 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

    ``(a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
            ``(1) Critical electric infrastructure.--The term `critical 
        electric infrastructure' means systems and assets, whether 
        physical or cyber used for the generation, transmission, 
        distribution, or metering of electric energy that, in the 
        determination of the Commission, in consultation with the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security and other national security 
        agencies, are so vital to the United States that the incapacity 
        or destruction of such systems and assets, either alone or in 
        combination with the failure of other assets, would cause 
        significant harm to the security, national or regional economic 
        security, or national or regional public health or safety.
            ``(2) Critical electric infrastructure information.--The 
        term `critical electric infrastructure information' means 
        critical infrastructure information related to critical 
        electric infrastructure.
            ``(3) Critical infrastructure information.--The term 
        `critical infrastructure information' has the same meaning as 
        is given that term in section 212(3) of the Critical 
        Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 131(3)).
            ``(4) Cyber threat.--The term `cyber threat' means any act 
        by a terrorist or other person that disrupts, attempts to 
        disrupt, or poses a significant risk of disruption to the 
        operation of programmable electronic devices and communication 
        networks (including hardware, software, and data) essential to 
        the reliable operation of critical electric infrastructure.
            ``(5) Cyber vulnerability.--The term `cyber vulnerability' 
        means any weakness that, if exploited by a terrorist or other 
        person, poses a significant risk of disruption to the operation 
        of programmable electronic devices and communication networks 
        (including hardware, software, and data) essential to the 
        reliable operation of critical electric infrastructure.
    ``(b) Assessment, Report, and Determination.--
            ``(1) In general.--Pursuant to section 201 of the Homeland 
        Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121), the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security shall assess cyber vulnerabilities or threats to 
        critical infrastructure, including critical electric 
        infrastructure and advanced metering infrastructure, on an 
        ongoing basis and produce reports, including recommendations, 
        on a periodic basis for the purposes of homeland security, 
        including the enhancement of domestic preparedness for and 
        collective response to a cyber attack by a terrorist, nation-
        state, or other person, and for other purposes.
            ``(2) Elements of the report.--The Secretary shall--
                    ``(A) include in the reports under this section 
                findings regarding a cyber vulnerability or terrorist 
                threat or potential terrorist threat, and a nation-
                state threat or potential threat to critical electric 
                infrastructure; and
                    ``(B) provide recommendations regarding actions 
                that may be performed to enhance individualized and 
                collective domestic preparedness and response to the 
                cyber vulnerability or terrorist or nation-state.
            ``(3) Transmittal of report.--The Secretary of Homeland 
        Security shall transmit reports prepared in response to the 
        cyber vulnerability or threat to the Commission and the 
        appropriate committees of Congress, including the Committee on 
        Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the 
        Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the 
        Senate, of the Secretary's determinations under this section. 
        Each such report may contain a classified annex.
            ``(4) Timely determination.--If, in carrying out the 
        assessment required under paragraph (1), the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security determines that a significant cyber 
        vulnerability or threat to critical electric infrastructure has 
        been identified, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        communicate such a determination to the Commission in a timely 
        manner. The Secretary of Homeland Security may incorporate 
        intelligence or information received from other national 
        security or intelligence agencies in making such determination.
    ``(c) Commission Authority.--
            ``(1) Issuance of rules or orders.--Following receipt of a 
        finding under subsection (b), the Commission shall issue (and 
        from time to time thereafter amend) such rules or orders as are 
        necessary to protect critical electric infrastructure against 
        vulnerabilities or threats.
            ``(2) Emergency procedures.--The Commission may issue, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, a rule or 
        order under this section without prior notice or hearing if it 
        determines the rule or order must be issued immediately to 
        protect critical electric infrastructure from an imminent 
        threat or vulnerability.
    ``(d) Duration of Emergency Rules or Orders.--Any rule or order 
issued by the Commission without prior notice or hearing under 
subsection (c)(2) shall remain effective for not more than 90 days 
unless, during such 90 days, the Commission gives interested persons an 
opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments (with or 
without opportunity for oral presentation) and affirms, amends, or 
repeals the rule or order.
    ``(e) Jurisdiction.--Notwithstanding section 201, the provisions of 
this section shall apply to any entity that owns, controls, or operates 
critical electric infrastructure, and such entities shall be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Commission for purposes of carrying out this 
section and for purposes of applying the enforcement authorities of 
this Act with respect to such provisions, but shall not make an 
electric utility or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission for any other purposes.
    ``(f) Protection of Critical Electric Infrastructure Information.--
The provisions of section 214 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 133) shall apply to critical electric infrastructure information 
submitted to the Commission under this section to the same extent that 
they apply to critical infrastructure information voluntarily submitted 
to the Department of Homeland Security under that Act (6 U.S.C. 101 and 
following).

``SEC. 224B. PROTECTION AGAINST KNOWN CYBER VULNERABILITIES OR THREATS 
              TO THE CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE.

    ``(a) Interim Measures.--After notice and opportunity for comment, 
the Commission shall establish, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, by rule or order, within 120 days of enactment of 
this section, such mandatory interim measures as are necessary to 
protect against known cyber vulnerabilities or threats to the reliable 
operation of the critical electric infrastructure in the United States. 
Such interim reliability measures:
            ``(1) shall serve to supplement, replace, or modify 
        cybersecurity reliability standards that, as of the date of 
        enactment of this section, were in effect pursuant to section 
        215, but that are determined by the Commission, in consultation 
        with the Secretary of Homeland Security and other national 
        security agencies, to be inadequate to address known cyber 
        vulnerabilities or threats; and
            ``(2) may be replaced by new cybersecurity reliability 
        standards that are developed and approved pursuant to section 
        215 following the date of enactment of this section.
    ``(b) Plans.--The rule or order issued under this subsection may 
require any owner, user or operator of critical electric infrastructure 
in the United States to develop a plan to address cyber vulnerabilities 
or threats identified by the Commission and to submit such plan to the 
Commission for approval.''.

SEC. 2. EVALUATION OF EXISTING AUTHORITIES.

    Section 214 of title II, subtitle B of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 (6 U.S.C. 133(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(i) Review of Authorities To Protect Critical Infrastructure.--
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall evaluate the capacity and 
authority of the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal 
agencies to ensure the security and resilience of electronic devices 
and communication networks essential to each of the critical 
infrastructure sectors identified pursuant to Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7 against a cyber attack by a terrorist, nation-
state, or other person, for the purpose of enhancing domestic 
preparedness for, and collective response to, a cyber attack by a 
terrorist, nation-state, or other person and to enhance the Nation's 
homeland security posture.''.
Directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with other national security and intelligence agencies, to conduct research and determine if the security of federally owned programmable electronic devices and communication networks (including hardware, software, and data) essential to the operation of critical electric infrastructure has been compromised.

Amends the Federal Power Act to direct the Secretary to make ongoing assessments and provide periodic reports with respect to: (1) cyber vulnerabilities or threats to critical infrastructure, including critical electric infrastructure and advanced metering infrastructure; and (2) the enhancement of domestic preparedness for a cyber attack.

Directs the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to establish mandatory interim measures to protect against known cyber vulnerabilities or threats to the operation of the critical electric infrastructure in the United States.

Amends the the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to direct the Secretary to evaluate the capacity and authority of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies to ensure the security against a cyber attack and resilience of electronic devices and communication networks essential to the critical infrastructure sectors.
To amend the Federal Power Act to provide additional authorities to adequately protect the critical electric infrastructure against cyber attack, and for other purposes.