SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    The Act may be cited as the ``Protect Our Troops and Our 
Constitution Act of 2008''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) On November 26, 2007, by signing the Declaration of 
        Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and 
        Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States 
        of America (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the 
        ``Declaration of Principles''), the President of the United 
        States pledged to negotiate by July 2008 an agreement to 
        replace the United Nations mandate that currently provides 
        international legal authority as well as immunity from Iraqi 
        prosecution for United States Armed Forces and other Coalition 
        forces operating in Iraq.
            (2) In the Declaration of Principles, the President pledged 
        that this agreement would include the following security 
        commitments by the United States:
                    (A) ``Supporting the Republic of Iraq in defending 
                its democratic system against internal and external 
                threats.''.
                    (B) ``Providing security assurances and commitments 
                to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression 
                against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and 
                integrity of its territories, waters, or airspace.''.
                    (C) ``Supporting the Republic of Iraq in its 
                efforts to combat all terrorist groups, at the 
                forefront of which is Al-Qaeda, Saddamists, and all 
                other outlaw groups regardless of affiliation, and 
                destroy their logistical networks and their sources of 
                finance, and defeat and uproot them from Iraq.''.
            (3) However, in testimony before the United States Senate 
        on February 6, 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
        effectively renounced this pledge by the President when he 
        said, ``[T]he status of forces agreement that is being 
        discussed will not contain a commitment to defend Iraq, and 
        neither will any strategic framework agreement. My 
        understanding is--and it's, frankly, a clearer point than I 
        made earlier--and we certainly do not consider the declaration 
        of principles a security commitment to the Iraqis.''.
            (4) On November 26, 2007, the President's Deputy National 
        Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, General Douglas 
        Lute, stated in a press briefing that permanent United States 
        military bases in Iraq ``will certainly be a key item for 
        negotiation next year''. On January 28, 2008, when signing into 
        law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
        2008, which includes a ban on permanent United States military 
        bases in Iraq, President George W. Bush indicated in a signing 
        statement accompanying the bill that he would not be bound by a 
        provision of that law that prohibits the United States from 
        establishing permanent military bases in Iraq.
            (5) However, in testimony before the Senate on February 6, 
        2008, Secretary of Defense Gates stated, ``The fact is, in 
        every meeting that I've taken part in, it has been affirmed 
        from the president on down that we do not want permanent bases 
        in Iraq.''.
            (6) General Lute stated in a press briefing on November 26, 
        2007, in response to a question as to whether the 
        Administration would seek congressional input into the 
        agreement, ``We don't anticipate now that these negotiations 
        will lead to the status of a formal treaty which would then 
        bring us to formal negotiations or formal inputs from the 
        Congress.''. However, the Department of State has failed to 
        consult with congressional leaders on the Declaration of 
        Principles as required by the Department of State's Circular 
        175 procedure, which implements United States law regarding the 
        conduct of negotiations for international agreements.
            (7) However, in testimony before the Senate on February 6, 
        2008, Secretary of Defense Gates stated, ``My view is that 
        there ought to be a great deal of openness and transparency to 
        the Congress as we negotiate this status of forces agreement so 
        that you can satisfy yourselves that those kinds of commitments 
        are not being made, and that there are no surprises in this.''.
            (8) According to the Congressional Research Service, while 
        the primary purpose of a status of forces agreement between the 
        United States and another country or organization is typically 
        to provide United States Armed Forces with immunity from local 
        prosecution, and no existing status of forces agreement 
        authorizes offensive combat operations by United States Armed 
        Forces (absent reference to a treaty, law, or United Nations 
        Security Council resolution), Secretary of Defense Gates and 
        Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have written in an opinion 
        piece published February 13, 2008, in the Washington Post that 
        it is the intention of the Administration to have the status of 
        forces agreement with Iraq include the ``authority to fight'' 
        for United States Armed Forces engaged in combat operations.
            (9) The inconsistencies between the various statements and 
        pledges described in paragraphs (1) through (8) raise 
        significant questions about the Administration's objectives in 
        seeking new agreements with Iraq.
            (10)(A) Since August 6, 2004, United States Armed Forces 
        and other Coalition forces in Iraq have had international legal 
        authority to operate in Iraq under the United Nations mandate 
        for the Multinational Force-Iraq, most recently renewed in 
        December 2007 until December 31, 2008, and have had immunity 
        from local prosecution under an Iraqi law known as CPA Order 
        17, which is dependent on that mandate.
            (B) The Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, Samir 
        Sumaidaie, said on February 5, 2008, ``If we cannot have an 
        agreement by that time [December 31, 2008,] we would have no 
        choice but to go back to the Security Council. Basically, we 
        need to have some legal cover for foreign forces.''.

SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.

    No funds appropriated or otherwise made available to any department 
or agency of the United States may be used--
            (1) to establish or maintain any permanent or long-term 
        United States military base or facility in Iraq; or
            (2) to implement any agreement that is consistent with the 
        security commitments of the United States to Iraq under the 
        Declaration of Principles, including the security commitments 
        described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of section 1(2) of 
        this Act, or any agreement that provides ``authority to fight'' 
        for United States Armed Forces engaged in combat operations, 
        other than for self-defense purposes, unless the agreement is 
        in the form of a treaty with respect to which the Senate has 
        given its advice and consent to ratification under Article II 
        of the Constitution of the United States or the agreement is 
        approved by an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) long-term relations between the United States and Iraq 
        should be determined by the United States Administration taking 
        office on January 20, 2009;
            (2) in determining its policy toward Iraq, the United 
        States Administration referred to in paragraph (1) should 
        consult fully with the United States Congress, the Government 
        of Iraq, Coalition partners, and Iraq's neighbors; and
            (3) to maintain current international legal authority as 
        well as immunity from Iraqi prosecution for United States Armed 
        Forces and other Coalition forces operating in Iraq while the 
        United States Administration referred to in paragraph (1) 
        determines United States policy toward Iraq, the current United 
        States Administration should encourage the Government of Iraq 
        to request the renewal of the United Nations mandate for Iraq 
        beyond December 31, 2008.
Protect Our Troops and Our Constitution Act of 2008 - Prohibits funds from being used to: (1) establish or maintain any permanent or long-term U.S. military base or facility in Iraq; or (2) implement any agreement that is consistent with U.S. security commitments to Iraq under the Declaration of Principles or any agreement that provides "authority to fight" for U.S. Armed Forces engaged in combat operations other than for self-defense purposes, unless the agreement is an Article II treaty with respect to which the Senate has given its advice and consent to ratification or the agreement is approved by an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) long-term U.S.-Iraq relations should be determined by the U.S. Administration taking office on January 20, 2009; (2) in determining its policy toward Iraq such Administration should consult with Congress, the government of Iraq, Coalition partners, and Iraq's neighbors; and (3) to maintain international legal authority as well as immunity from Iraqi prosecution for U.S. Armed Forces and other Coalition forces operating in Iraq while such Administration determines policy toward Iraq the current U.S. Administration should encourage the government of Iraq to request renewal of the U.N. mandate for Iraq beyond December 31, 2008.
To reassert the constitutional role of Congress in making long-term security commitments, to defer significant long-term security commitments to Iraq to the next Administration and Congress, and to maintain international legal authority and immunity for United States Armed Forces in Iraq by promoting the extension of the United Nations mandate.