Crime Doesn't Pay Prison Act

Summary: Crime Doesn't Pay Prison Act - Prohibits a court from granting relief in an action or proceeding challenging conditions of confinement of a correctional institution, unless such conditions constitute the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain due to the deliberate indifference of the administrators of the institution such that inmates are deprived of the minimum civilized measure of life's necessities. 
Establishes a presumption that if an institution makes a per-inmate expenditure equal to or exceeding the poverty guideline level, the administrators are not deliberately indifferent to the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and the deprivation of the minimum civilized measure of life's necessities, which may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 
Specifies that a failure to make a per-inmate expenditure equal to or exceeding the poverty guideline level does not give rise to a presumption that the conditions of confinement of an institution are unconstitutional.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Crime Doesn't Pay Prison Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does 
        not mandate comfortable prison conditions; only those 
        deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's 
        necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an 
        eighth amendment violation. Wilson v. Seiter, 115 L. Ed. 2d 
        271, (1991) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)).
            (2) An inmate should not be able to successfully challenge 
        conditions of confinement of an institution unless the inmate 
        establishes both that the condition is contrary to the current 
        standards of decency of society and that prison officials are 
        deliberately indifferent to the plight of the inmate. Wilson v. 
        Seiter, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991).
            (3) Expenditures on prisons in excess of levels necessary 
        to meet constitutionally mandated conditions of confinement 
        increase the cost of building and administering institutions, 
        thereby diverting funds which could be used to expand current 
        prison capacity throughout the country. Additional prison beds 
        are desperately needed to stop the early release of repeat and 
        violent offenders due to insufficient prison capacity.
            (4) Public funds that could go to assist the law-abiding 
        poor are being expended to provide facilities and services for 
        inmates at a level exceeding the minimum standard of living for 
        the law-abiding poor and exceeding the conditions mandated by 
        the Constitution.
            (5) There is a need for Congress, on behalf of the people, 
        to express and codify a national standard of minimum decency 
        for prison conditions. Inmates should not be entitled, by 
        virtue of their imprisonment, to live better than law-abiding 
        persons living at the poverty guideline level of income as 
        determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
            (6) Federal courts have been besieged by frivolous 
        litigation brought by inmates incarcerated in institutions. 
        Lacking a legislative expression of the contemporary standards 
        of decency relating to prison conditions, Federal courts have 
        become unduly involved in the micromanagement of correctional 
        facilities, a role for which the Supreme Court recognizes 
        courts are ill-suited and which is better left to the expertise 
        of prison administrators. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 
        404-05 (1974).
    (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are--
            (1) to articulate an objective national standard for 
        measuring the minimum decency of prison conditions;
            (2) to ensure that criminal punishments reflect the 
        seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, 
        provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and 
        protect the public from further crimes by requiring that 
        inmates do not live better than law-abiding persons living at 
        the poverty level;
            (3) to ensure that State governments are required to spend 
        only that amount necessary to achieve the minimum standard for 
        conditions of confinement mandated by the Constitution; and
            (4) to ensure that Federal courts require only that prison 
        conditions do not constitute the unnecessary and wanton 
        infliction of pain due to the deliberate indifference of 
        institutional administrators, such that inmates are deprived of 
        the minimum civilized measure of life's necessities. Hudson v. 
        McMillan, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 115 L. 
        Ed. 2d 271 (1991); Whitely v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); 
        Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).

SEC. 3. JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR PRISON CONDITIONS.

    Section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988) is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
    ``(d)(1) In any action or proceeding challenging conditions of 
confinement of an institution, a court may not grant any relief unless 
the conditions challenged constitute the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain due to the deliberate indifference of the 
administrators of the institution such that inmates are deprived of the 
minimum civilized measure of life's necessities.
    ``(2)(A) If an institution makes a per-inmate expenditure equal to 
or exceeding the poverty guideline level there is a presumption that 
the administrators of the institution are not deliberately indifferent 
to the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and the deprivation of 
the minimum civilized measure of life's necessities, which may be 
rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
    ``(B) A failure to make a per-inmate expenditure at a level equal 
to or exceeding the poverty guideline level does not give rise to a 
presumption that the conditions of confinement of an institution are 
unconstitutional.
    ``(3) In this subsection:
            ``(A) The term `conditions of confinement' means aspects of 
        confinement of an institution, which includes food, shelter, 
        clothing, medical care, goods, services and programs of an 
        institution, but does not include aspects relating to 
        institutional security.
            ``(B) The term `inmate' means a person committed to the 
        custody of an institution.
            ``(C) The term `institution' has the meaning given the term 
        in section 721.
            ``(D) The term `per-inmate expenditure' means the amount 
        equal to the quotient of--
                    ``(i) an institution's allocated expenditure for 
                providing food, shelter, clothing, medical care, goods, 
                services and programs, excluding costs specifically 
                related to institutional security during the 12-month 
                period preceding the date of the alleged violation; 
                divided by
                    ``(ii) the average number of inmates confined in 
                the institution during that 12-month period.
            ``(E) The term `poverty guideline level' means the dollar 
        allowance in the poverty guideline for additional family 
        members in the largest households, as established by the 
        Department of Health and Human Services.''.