Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1998

Summary: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1998 - Provides that, in order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce current nuclear arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials, it shall be U.S. policy to pursue certain nuclear nonproliferation objectives, including:  (1) reaching a verifiable agreement with the Russian Federation to place all fissile materials from nuclear weapons under bilateral or international controls, or both, and end the production of new types of nuclear warheads; (2) ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (calling on North Korea, India, and Pakistan to sign such treaty) and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaties; (3) beginning formal negotiations to reach a verifiable multilateral agreement to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation to within specified ranges, with lower levels for the United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, and other countries with nuclear arsenals; (4) reaching an immediate multilateral agreement with Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty member states to halt permanently the production of weapons usable fissile materials and place existing stockpiles of such materials under bilateral or international controls; (5) strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to verify that countries are complying with their nonproliferation commitments; (6) strengthening U.S. nuclear and dual-use export controls; and (7) beginning formal negotiations on START III between the United States and the Russian Federation before START II becomes effective. 
Directs the President to report annually to the Congress on implementation of the policy objectives.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act 
of 1998''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States has been a leader in seeking to 
        contain the spread of nuclear weapons technology and materials.
            (2) With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the 
        Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially 
        in countries in unstable regions, is now one of the leading 
        military threats to the national security of the United States 
        and its allies.
            (3) The United Nations Security Council declared on January 
        31, 1992, that ``proliferation of all weapons of mass 
        destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and 
        security'' and committed to taking appropriate action to 
        prevent proliferation from occurring. The establishment of the 
        United Nations Special Commission on Iraq was an important 
        precedent to that end.
            (4) Aside from the 5 declared nuclear weapon states, a 
        number of other nations have or are pursuing nuclear weapons 
        capabilities.
            (5) Regional nuclear arms races pose perhaps the most 
        likely prospect for the future use of nuclear weapons.
            (6) Deteriorating conditions at nuclear weapons complex 
        sites and nuclear bases in Russia have raised concerns about 
        Russia's ability to track its nuclear materials and account for 
        its nuclear weapons. This has increased the threat of nuclear 
        proliferation by creating the possibility that weapons, 
        materials, equipment, plans, or experts could fall into the 
        hands of potential proliferators.
            (7) Belarus signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as 
        a non-nuclear weapon state, on July 23, 1993, Kazakhstan on 
        February 14, 1994, and Ukraine on December 5, 1994.
            (8) Iraq had a substantial, clandestine nuclear weapons 
        program which went undetected by the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection process and was greatly 
        assisted by dual-use exports from western countries, including 
        the United States.
            (9) In October 1994, North Korea and the United States 
        signed an agreement to exchange North Korea's existing nuclear 
        reactors and reprocessing equipment for modern light water 
        reactor technology that is somewhat less suited to making 
        bombs. However, North Korea's history of pursuing nuclear 
        weapons capability, and the potential for political and 
        economic crisis on the peninsula, render North Korea an area 
        for nuclear proliferation concern.
            (10) Brazil and Argentina had substantial programs to build 
        nuclear weapons and South Africa has admitted developing and 
        building 6 nuclear weapons, but in response to reduced regional 
        tensions and other factors, all 3 countries have renounced 
        nuclear weapons and accepted IAEA safeguards for all of their 
        nuclear facilities, and all 3 countries have acceded to the 
        Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states.
            (11) United States security interests and current policy 
        and practices are consistent with the terms of the South 
        Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty which, like nuclear weapons 
        free zones in Latin America, South Asia, the Middle East, and 
        Africa that the United States supports, can contribute to 
        efforts to avoid regional conflicts and prevent arms races. In 
        1996, the United States signed the South Pacific Nuclear Free 
        Zone Treaty and the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty.
            (12) The IAEA is a valuable tool to counter proliferation, 
        and has taken steps to strengthen its safeguard system through 
        its Strengthened Safeguards System program, but the 
        effectiveness of its system to safeguard nuclear materials may 
be adversely affected by institutional and financial constraints.
            (13) The United States supports a policy of immobilizing 
        some plutonium as an energy source and mixing some with low-
        enriched uranium as fuel that can be burned in commercial 
        nuclear energy reactors.
            (14) Plutonium being drawn from dismantled nuclear warheads 
        creates new challenges of storage and disposal and, if in the 
        wrong hands, could be converted into fuel for nuclear warheads.
            (15) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which codifies 
        world consensus against further nuclear proliferation, has been 
        extended indefinitely, and additional steps should be taken to 
        strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.
            (16) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 declared 
        that the United States is committed to continued strong support 
        for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to a strengthened 
        and more effective IAEA, and provided that it is United States 
        policy to establish more effective controls over the transfer 
        of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology.
            (17) The goal of the United States is to end the further 
        spread of nuclear weapons capability, roll back nuclear 
        proliferation where it has occurred, and prevent the use of 
        nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. To that end the United 
        States should adopt a comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation 
        policy.

SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY.

    In order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce current nuclear 
arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials, it shall be 
the policy of the United States to pursue the following objectives:
            (1) Reach a verifiable agreement with the Russian 
        Federation to place all fissile materials from such weapons 
        under bilateral or international controls, or both.
            (2) Ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the 
        end of calendar year 1998, and press North Korea, India, and 
        Pakistan to sign that treaty.
            (3) Reach a verifiable agreement with the Russian 
        Federation to end the production of new types of nuclear 
        warheads.
            (4) Begin formal negotiations to reach a verifiable 
        multilateral agreement to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals 
        of the United States and the Russian Federation to within a 
        range of 2,000 to 2,500 each, with lower levels for the United 
        Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China.
            (5) Conclude additional enforceable multilateral agreements 
        to significantly and continuously reduce the nuclear arsenals 
        of all countries through a stage-by-stage process.
            (6) Reach an immediate multilateral agreement with Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty member states to halt permanently the 
        production of weapons usable fissile materials, and achieve 
        worldwide agreements to--
                    (A) end by January 1, 2008, the production of 
                fissile materials for any purpose;
                    (B) place existing stockpiles of such materials 
                under bilateral or international controls; and
                    (C) require all countries to place all of their 
                nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes under 
                IAEA safeguards.
            (7) Strengthen IAEA safeguards to more effectively verify 
        that countries are complying with their nonproliferation 
        commitments and provide the IAEA with the political, technical, 
        and financial support necessary to implement the necessary 
safeguard reforms.
            (8) Strengthen nuclear and dual-use export controls in the 
        United States and other nuclear supplier nations, impose 
        sanctions on individuals, companies, and countries which 
        contribute to nuclear proliferation, provide increased public 
        information on nuclear export licenses approved in the United 
        States, and ratify the model protocol of the IAEA's 
        Strengthened Safeguards System program.
            (9) Reduce incentives for countries to pursue the 
        acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to reduce regional 
        tensions and to strengthen regional security agreements, and 
        encourage the United Nations Security Council to increase its 
        role in enforcing international nuclear nonproliferation 
        agreements.
            (10) Conclude a separate agreement with the other nuclear 
        weapon states to adopt a policy of ``no first use'' and to 
        assist immediately any country which is a party to the Nuclear 
        Non-Proliferation Treaty should the use of nuclear weapons be 
        initiated against such country.
            (11) Conclude a verifiable bilateral agreement with the 
        Russian Federation under which both countries withdraw from 
        their arsenals and dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons, and 
        seek to extend to all nuclear weapon states this zero option 
        for tactical nuclear weapons.
            (12) Ratify the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and 
        the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty.
            (13) Continue to monitor North Korea's activities relating 
        to replacing its nuclear reactors with light water reactors to 
        ensure that North Korea does not resume its weapons development 
        program.
            (14) Begin formal negotiations on START III between the 
        United States and the Russian Federation before START II enters 
        into force.

SEC. 4. REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and not later than February 1 of each year thereafter, the 
President shall submit to the Congress a report on--
            (1) the actions the United States has taken during the 
        preceding 12-month period and the actions the United States 
        plans to take during the succeeding 12-month period to 
        implement each of the policy objectives set forth in this Act;
            (2) actions which have been taken by the Russian 
        Federation, by the other former Soviet republics, and by other 
        countries and institutions to achieve those policy objectives; 
        and
            (3) obstacles that have been encountered in seeking to 
        implement those policy objectives.
Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified form, with a 
classified appendix if necessary.

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

    As used in this Act--
            (1) the term ``fissile materials'' means highly enriched 
        uranium and plutonium;
            (2) the term ``highly enriched uranium'' means uranium 
        enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope U-235;
            (3) the term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency;
            (4) the term ``IAEA safeguards'' means the safeguards set 
        forth in an agreement between a country and the IAEA, as 
        authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency;
            (5) a policy of ``no first use'' of nuclear weapons means a 
        commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in a 
        conflict;
            (6) the term ``non-nuclear weapon state'' means any country 
        that has not acquired nuclear weapons or their components;
            (7) the term ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the 
        Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at 
        Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;
            (8) the term ``nuclear weapon state'' means any country 
        that is a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX(3) of 
        the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed 
        at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;
            (9) the term ``START I treaty'' means the Treaty on the 
        Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed by the United 
        States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on July 31, 
        1991;
            (10) the term ``START II treaty'' means the Treaty on 
        Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
        signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on 
        January 3, 1993; and
            (11) the term ``START III treaty'' means the Treaty on 
        Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
        as discussed between President Clinton and President Yeltsin at 
        the summit meeting held in Helsinki, Finland in March of 1997.