To direct the President of the United States to appoint a high-level United States representative or special envoy for Iran for the purpose of ensuring that the United States pursues all diplomatic avenues to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, to avoid a war with Iran, and for other purposes.

Summary: Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons and Stop War Through Diplomacy Act - Directs the President to appoint a high-level U.S. representative or special envoy who shall: (1) seek to ease tensions and normalize relations between the United States and Iran, (2) lead U.S. diplomatic efforts with regard to Iran, and (3) act as liaison with U.S. and international intelligence agencies.

Directs the Secretary of State to: (1) rescind the no contact policy with Iran, and (2) establish an office in the Department of State to support the work of the representative or special envoy.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear 
Weapons and Stop War Through Diplomacy Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech on December 
        10, 2009, President Obama said, ``I know that engagement with 
        repressive regimes lacks the satisfying purity of indignation. 
        But I also know that sanctions without outreach--and 
        condemnation without discussion--can carry forward a crippling 
        status quo. No repressive regime can move down a new path 
        unless it has the choice of an open door.''
            (2) In his address to the American Israel Public Affairs 
        Committee on March 4, 2012, President Obama said, ``I have said 
        that when it comes to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear 
        weapon, I will take no options off the table, and I mean what I 
        say. That includes all elements of American power. A political 
        effort aimed at isolating Iran; a diplomatic effort to sustain 
        our coalition and ensure that the Iranian program is monitored; 
        an economic effort to impose crippling sanctions; and, yes, a 
        military effort to be prepared for any contingency.''
            (3) While the Obama Administration has rejected failed 
        policies of the past by engaging in negotiations with Iran 
        without preconditions, only four of such meetings have 
        occurred.
            (4) Official representatives of the United States and 
        official representatives of Iran have held only two direct, 
        bilateral meetings in over 30 years, both of which occurred in 
        October 2009, one on the sidelines of the United Nations 
        Security Council negotiations in Geneva, and one on the 
        sidelines of negotiations brokered by the United Nations 
        International Atomic Energy Agency (referred to in this Act as 
        the ``IAEA'') in Vienna.
            (5) All of the outstanding issues between the United States 
        and Iran cannot be resolved instantaneously. Resolving such 
        issues will require a robust, sustained effort.
            (6) Under the Department of State's current ``no contact'' 
        policy, officers and employees of the Department of State are 
        not permitted to make any direct contact with official 
        representatives of the Government of Iran without express prior 
        authorization from the Secretary of State.
            (7) On September 20, 2011, then-Chairman of the Joint 
        Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, called for establishing 
        direct communications with Iran, stating, ``I'm talking about 
        any channel that's open. We've not had a direct link of 
        communication with Iran since 1979. And I think that has 
        planted many seeds for miscalculation. When you miscalculate, 
        you can escalate and misunderstand.''
            (8) On November 8, 2011, the IAEA issued a report about 
        Iran's nuclear program and expressed concerns about Iran's past 
        and ongoing nuclear activities.
            (9) On December 2, 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 
        warned that an attack on Iran would result in ``an escalation 
        that would take place that would not only involve many lives, 
        but I think it could consume the Middle East in a confrontation 
        and a conflict that we would regret.''

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It should be the policy of the United States--
            (1) to prevent Iran from pursuing or acquiring a nuclear 
        weapon and to resolve the concerns of the United States and of 
        the international community about Iran's nuclear program and 
        Iran's human rights obligations under international and Iranian 
        law;
            (2) to ensure inspection of cargo to or from Iran, as well 
        as the seizure and disposal of prohibited items, as authorized 
        by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (June 9, 
        2010);
            (3) to pursue sustained, direct, bilateral negotiations 
        with the Government of Iran without preconditions in order to 
        reduce tensions, prevent war, prevent nuclear proliferation, 
        support human rights, and seek resolutions to issues that 
        concern the United States and the international community;
            (4) to utilize all diplomatic tools, including direct 
        talks, targeted sanctions, Track II diplomacy, creating a 
        special envoy described in section 4, and enlisting the support 
        of all interested parties, for the purpose of establishing an 
        agreement with Iran to put in place a program that includes 
        international safeguards, guarantees, and robust transparency 
        measures that provide for full IAEA oversight of Iran's nuclear 
        program, including rigorous, ongoing inspections, in order to 
        verify that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful 
        purposes and that Iran is not engaged in nuclear weapons work;
            (5) to pursue opportunities to build mutual trust and to 
        foster sustained negotiations in good faith with Iran, 
        including pursuing a fuel swap deal to remove quantities of low 
        enriched uranium from Iran and to refuel the Tehran Research 
        Reactor, similar to the structure of the deal that the IAEA, 
        the United States, China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, 
        and Germany first proposed in October 2009;
            (6) to explore areas of mutual benefit to both Iran and the 
        United States, such as regional security, the long-term 
        stabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan, the establishment of a 
        framework for peaceful nuclear energy production, other 
        peaceful energy modernization programs, and counter-narcotics 
        efforts; and
            (7) that no funds appropriated or otherwise made available 
        to any executive agency of the Government of the United States 
        may be used to carry out any military operation or activity 
        against Iran unless the President determines that a military 
        operation or activity is warranted and seeks express prior 
        authorization by Congress, as required under article I, section 
        8, clause 2 of the United States Constitution, which grants 
        Congress the sole authority to declare war, except that this 
        requirement shall not apply to a military operation or 
        activity--
                    (A) to directly repel an offensive military action 
                launched from within the territory of Iran against the 
                United States or any ally with whom the United States 
                has a mutual defense assistance agreement;
                    (B) in hot pursuit of forces that engage in an 
                offensive military action outside the territory of Iran 
                against United States forces or an ally with whom the 
                United States has a mutual defense assistance agreement 
                and then enter into the territory of Iran; or
                    (C) to directly thwart an imminent offensive 
                military action to be launched from within the 
                territory of Iran against United States forces or an 
                ally with whom the United States has a mutual defense 
                assistance agreement.

SEC. 4. APPOINTMENT OF HIGH-LEVEL U.S. REPRESENTATIVE OR SPECIAL ENVOY.

    (a) Appointment.--At the earliest possible date, the President, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall appoint a high-level 
United States representative or special envoy for Iran.
    (b) Criteria for Appointment.--The President shall appoint an 
individual under subsection (a) on the basis of the individual's 
knowledge and understanding of the issues regarding Iran's nuclear 
program, experience in conducting international negotiations, and 
ability to conduct negotiations under subsection (c) with the respect 
and trust of the parties involved in the negotiations.
    (c) Duties.--The high-level United States representative or special 
envoy for Iran shall--
            (1) seek to facilitate direct, unconditional, bilateral 
        negotiations with Iran for the purpose of easing tensions and 
        normalizing relations between the United States and Iran;
            (2) lead the diplomatic efforts of the Government of the 
        United States with regard to Iran;
            (3) consult with other countries and international 
        organizations, including countries in the region, where 
        appropriate and when necessary to achieve the purpose set forth 
        in paragraph (1);
            (4) act as liaison with United States and international 
        intelligence agencies where appropriate and when necessary to 
        achieve the purpose set for in paragraph (1); and
            (5) ensure that the bilateral negotiations under paragraph 
        (1) complement the ongoing international negotiations with 
        Iran.

SEC. 5. DUTIES OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

    (a) Elimination of ``No Contact'' Policy.--Not later than 30 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
rescind the ``no contact'' policy that prevents officers and employees 
of the Department of State from making any direct contact with official 
representatives of the Government of Iran without express prior 
authorization from the Secretary of State.
    (b) Office of High-Level U.S. Representative or Special Envoy.--Not 
later than 30 days after the appointment of a high-level United States 
representative or special envoy under section 4(a), the Secretary of 
State shall establish an office in the Department of State for the 
purpose of supporting the work of the representative or special envoy.

SEC. 6. REPORTING TO CONGRESS.

    (a) Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the high-level United 
States representative or special envoy for Iran is appointed under 
section 4, and every 180 days thereafter, the United States 
representative or special envoy shall report to the committees set 
forth in subsection (b) on the steps that have been taken to facilitate 
direct, bilateral diplomacy with the government of Iran under section 
4(c). Each such report may, when necessary or appropriate, be submitted 
in classified and unclassified form.
    (b) Committees.--The committees referred to in subsection (a) are--
            (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
        Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
        Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act such 
sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 2012 and 2013.