To authorize the Space Shuttle to be flown from 2010 through 2015, and to authorize appropriations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for this purpose.

Summary: Spacefaring Priorities for America's Continued Exploration Act or SPACE Act - Prohibits the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) from relying solely on the Russian government for astronaut transport or cargo resupply services, except for the current Soyuz emergency escape services for astronauts on the International Space Station.

Authorizes appropriations to NASA for: (1) exploration systems; and (2) emergency funding for Columbia return-to-flight costs.

Requires NASA to fly at least two space shuttle missions per year for crew transport, instead of Russian crew and cargo services, for the period 2010-2015, or until Orion is operational. Authorizes appropriations to carry out such operations. Requires NASA to report to Congress on the specific costs and actions needed to extend the operation of the space shuttle.

Requires NASA, by March 31, 2011, to investigate areas of reduced operations and enhanced cost savings and implement those that do not impinge on the safe operation of the space shuttle program.

Directs NASA to define achievable and attainable requirements for the operation of such program beyond 2010, as recommended by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Requires: (1) NASA to report to Congress on such requirements; and (2) NASA to immediately begin satisfying those requirements and to satisfy all of them by March 31, 2010.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Spacefaring Priorities for America's 
Continued Exploration Act'' or the ``SPACE Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Russia is not a reliable partner.--(A) Unless Space 
        Shuttle operations are extended beyond 2010, the United States 
        will be heavily reliant on Russia to supply crew and possibly 
        cargo transport services to the International Space Station 
        during the gap period of 2010 through 2015. There will be no 
        other way to fly our astronauts into space during this period.
            (B) The United States should not increase its reliance on 
        Russia to transport American astronauts into space, given the 
        increasingly divergent views and posturing from Russia. Russia 
        opposes the United States plan to base an antimissile radar 
        system in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland 
        to deal with the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear weapons 
        and missile programs. Russia also suspended its participation 
        in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, one of the 
        most significant arms control agreements of the Cold War years. 
        Additionally, Russia continues to arm some of America's most 
        hostile adversaries, Iran and Venezuela. Despite United States 
        objections, Russia sold billions of dollars worth of weapons to 
        the regime of Hugo Chavez in 2006. Such meddling is a possible 
        violation of the Monroe Doctrine and a throwback to the Cold 
        War era. Even more troublesome is the Russian history of 
        weapons trading with Iran. Russia has supplied advanced 
        conventional arms technology, missile technology, and nuclear 
        technologies to this very anti-American regime.
            (2) Russia has abused past nasa cooperation agreements.--
        (A) In the late 1990s, Russia fell short in fulfilling its 
        commitment to the International Space Station.
            (B) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (in 
        this Act referred to as ``NASA'') was forced to transfer 
        hundreds of millions of dollars to enable the Russians to 
        complete the critical Space Station service module Zvezda, 
        without which the International Space Station could not 
        operate.
            (C) Russia delayed completion of the Zvezda service module 
        for several years. Under the International Space Station 
        agreement, the Russian government had committed to fund as well 
        as build the Zvezda service module. Subsequent transfers from 
        the United States, in order to complete the module, reflect 
        serious Russian mismanagement in the field of space.
            (D) In 2000, while Russia was failing to meet its 
        commitment to the International Space Station, Russia was 
        diverting financial and human resources away from fulfilling 
        its International Space Station commitments in order to keep 
        the Russian's Mir Space Station aloft.
            (E) Russia's past shortcomings in fulfilling commitments to 
        its international space partners should serve as a warning to 
        the United States as we consider increased reliance on Russian 
        space services in the future. It is not prudent for the United 
        States to depend on Russia for access to space given our past 
        experience with this relationship.
            (3) American space science should not be dependent on 
        russian support.--(A) The United States has already invested 
        billions of dollars in the International Space Station program 
        since its inception.
            (B) There is much research of great value being conducted 
        in space, and on the International Space Station, that may 
        yield tremendous gains. Research being conducted on the 
        International Space Station may help scientists back on Earth 
        develop medicines to treat diseases and help us better 
        understand the Earth's climate. Many scientists believe that 
        the microgravity environment of space will enable the 
        development of new drugs, vaccines, and other therapies. 
        Equipment on the International Space Station will monitor 
        stratospheric gases, and investigate ozone chemistry.
            (4) The united states must have assured access to space.--
        (A) To ensure that the United States realizes the dividends 
        from the considerable investment we have made in the 
        International Space Station, we need to ensure continued access 
        to space for our astronauts. However, NASA's plan for transport 
        of crew to and from the International Space Station fails to 
        provide necessary redundancies to provide assured access to 
        space.
            (B) NASA anticipates that the Russian Soyuz spacecraft will 
        be the only vehicle for astronaut crew rotation to the 
        International Space Station after 2010. From 2011 until the 
        planned operation of Orion in 2015, NASA likely has no other 
        option for transporting American astronauts to space other than 
        on Russian vehicles.
            (C) NASA has conceded that without the Space Shuttle, it 
        will be unable to transport the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer 
        (AMS) to the International Space Station. Scientists involved 
        in the development of the AMS acknowledge that it will enhance 
        scientific discoveries. While the AMS has cost over 
        $1,500,000,000 to develop and build, NASA has stated that the 
        remaining Space Shuttle manifest does not allow for transport 
        of the AMS and that it will not be an option to retrofit 
        another launch vehicle in order to fly it into space. Only by 
        extending Space Shuttle operations beyond 2010 will NASA be 
        able to transport the AMS to the International Space Station. 
        As long as the AMS meets all required standards to verify its 
        validity and justify its transport on the Space Shuttle, NASA 
        should fulfill its obligation to the Department of Energy and 
        our international partners.
            (D) In addition, the Japanese Centrifuge Accommodation 
        Module, which can only fly to the International Space Station 
        on the Space Shuttle, will also be unable to reach the Space 
        Station absent extending Space Shuttle operations.
            (5) A better approach.--(A) Due to NASA's lack of a backup 
        plan for reliance on the Russians for transport of American 
        astronauts to space, the United States needs a better approach. 
        The best approach is the Space Shuttle, a proven, domestic 
        source of space transport for assured access to space, 
        including the International Space Station, for crew and cargo 
        transport.
            (B) With 2 Shuttle missions per year during the human 
        spaceflight program flight gap between Shuttle and Orion, 
        currently scheduled from 2010 through 2015, we can replace our 
        need to rely on the Russians for crew rotation for the 
        International Space Station.
            (C) Savings from replacing Russian transport services to 
        the International Space Station with the Space Shuttle would 
        pay for a portion of the costs for flying 2 Space Shuttle 
        missions per year.
            (D) Only by closing the gap between 2010 and 2015, or until 
        the Orion is operational, will our Nation be able to keep our 
        Nation's highly skilled and critically important spaceworkers 
        and engineers gainfully employed, and mitigate the loss of 
        critical skills.
            (E) By extending Space Shuttle operations, NASA may realize 
        considerable savings by no longer having to pay retention 
        bonuses to critical space workers. But retention bonuses would 
        not be the only added costs associated with the end of Space 
        Shuttle operations when critical skilled workers leave NASA or 
        its contractors. Recruitment incentives for new workers and 
        contract cost increases could also be incurred by NASA since 
        the majority of the Kennedy Space Center's workforce are 
        contractors.
            (F) The success of the Constellation program will depend on 
        having the most skilled and experienced workforce possible. The 
        workforce gap, as currently envisioned by NASA, will jeopardize 
        this. NASA has acknowledged that thousands of critical space 
        workers will lose their jobs in the transition from the Space 
        Shuttle to the Constellation program. Continued operation of 
        the Space Shuttle, but on a reduced flight requirement, while 
        also integrating these workers into the Orion program, is the 
        best way to retain many of these critical workers and skill 
        sets.
            (G) An August 2007 study by the Government Accountability 
        Office, ``NASA Progress Made on Strategic Human Capital 
        Management, but Future Program Challenges Remain,'' stated that 
        ``the agency as a whole faces challenges in recruiting and 
        retaining highly experienced senior-level engineers in certain 
        specialties. NASA's principal workforce challenge will be faced 
        in the transition to the next generation of human space flight 
        systems.''.
            (H) This Act authorizes for NASA additional funding under 
        section 4 to fully restore the appropriation shortfalls in 
        fiscal years 2007 and 2008 compared to the funds that were 
        authorized for NASA. An additional $1,000,000,000 is authorized 
        in section 4(b) to reimburse NASA for the costs incurred by 
        NASA from the Space Shuttle return-to-flight efforts following 
        the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster.

SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON USE OF RUSSIAN SPACE SERVICES.

    NASA shall not rely solely on the Russian government for astronaut 
transport or cargo resupply services. This prohibition does not apply 
to the current Soyuz emergency escape services for astronauts on the 
International Space Station.

SEC. 4. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR NASA.

    (a) Additional Authorization for Fiscal Year 2007 Shortfall.--There 
are authorized to be appropriated to NASA $1,648,000,000, 41.6 percent 
of which shall be for Exploration Systems, and 28.7 percent of which 
shall be available for Space Operations.
    (b) Columbia Return-to-Flight.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to NASA $1,000,000,000 for emergency funding to reimburse 
for Columbia return-to-flight costs, of which the Exploration Systems 
and Space Operations Accounts shall receive funding at the rate 
proportional to the amounts used to pay the costs associated with the 
Space Shuttle return-to-flight efforts.
    (c) Additional Authorization for Fiscal Year 2008 Shortfall.--There 
are authorized to be appropriated to NASA $1,064,000,000, 41.7 percent 
of which shall be for Exploration Systems.
    (d) Preservation of Funding for Programs.--NASA shall not take any 
funding from its Exploration Systems account or the Constellation 
program in order to fund the continued operation of the Space Shuttle 
program as required in this Act.

SEC. 5. EXTENDING SPACE SHUTTLE OPERATIONS.

    (a) Use of Space Shuttle for Access to Space.--NASA shall fly at 
least 2 Space Shuttle missions per year for crew transport, instead of 
Russian crew and cargo services, for the period of 2010 through 2015, 
or until Orion is operational. There are authorized to be appropriated 
to NASA such sums as may be necessary, in addition to amounts otherwise 
authorized, to carry out this subsection, including for the production 
of more external tanks as may be needed.
    (b) Insufficient Funding.--Except as provided under subsection (c), 
the requirements of this Act shall have effect only to the extent that 
sufficient funding is appropriated, as authorized under subsection (a). 
Sufficient funding is defined as funds required to fully or partially 
comply with the requirements of this Act.
    (c) Report to Congress.--NASA shall report to Congress not later 
than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act on the specific 
costs and actions needed to extend the operation of the Space Shuttle 
in accordance with this Act.
    (d) Operational Efficiencies.--As soon as possible, but no later 
than March 31, 2011, NASA shall investigate areas of reduced operations 
and enhanced cost savings and implement those that do not impinge the 
safe operation of the Space Shuttle program, including the following:
            (1) The possible retirement of one Space Shuttle orbiter, 
        leaving 2 to remain operational, in a manner that ensures the 
        safe operation of the Space Shuttle program.
            (2) Significantly reducing changes to the design of the 
        Space Shuttle orbiters, in a manner that ensures the safe 
        operation of the Space Shuttle program. This shall include 
        changes to the Space Shuttle software systems.
            (3) Significantly reducing Space Shuttle orbiter 
        configuration operations and payload configuration operations, 
        in a manner that ensures the safe operation of the Space 
        Shuttle program.
            (4) Maximizing the use of shared personnel between the 
        continued operation of the Space Shuttle and Constellation and 
        other NASA programs.
    (e) Facilities.--If conflicts arise in NASA's efforts to allocate 
facilities, personnel, and other resources in order to fly the Space 
Shuttle as well as continue the development of Constellation, then NASA 
shall identify in a report to Congress in advance such conflicts, along 
with recommendations as to how they can be mitigated.

SEC. 6. SHUTTLE RECERTIFICATION.

    Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, 
NASA shall define achievable and attainable requirements for operation 
of the Space Shuttle program beyond 2010, as recommended by the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board. NASA shall transmit these 
requirements to Congress in the form of a report. NASA shall then 
immediately begin the process of satisfying these requirements and 
shall satisfy all requirements no later than March 31, 2010.