Smarter Approach to Nuclear Expenditures Act

Summary: Smarter Approach to Nuclear Expenditures Act This bill prohibits the obligation or expenditure of Department of Defense (DOD) funds: (1) for procuring more than eight Columbia-class submarines; (2) to maintain more than 150 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles; or (3) through FY2024, for the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&amp;E) or the procurement of the B-21 long-range penetrating bomber aircraft. The bill prohibits the obligation or expenditure of DOD or Department of Energy (DOE) funds:   to maintain more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads, as counted under the New START Treaty;   to make the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons;  for extending the life of tactical versions of the B61 gravity bomb;  for the RDT&amp;E or procurement of a new air-launched cruise missile or for the W80 warhead life extension program;  for the RDT&amp;E or procurement of the ground-based strategic deterrent or any new intercontinental ballistic missile;  for the IW-1 life extension program;  for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility project at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina; or  for the Uranium Processing Facility located at the Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.  DOD and DOE must report to Congress on the plans for, and the estimated cost savings from, carrying out this bill.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Smarter Approach to Nuclear 
Expenditures Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the Soviet Union no 
        longer exists, and the Cold War is over. The nature of threats 
        to the national security and military interests of the United 
        States has changed. However, the United States continues to 
        maintain an excessively large and costly arsenal of nuclear 
        weapons and delivery systems that are a holdover from the Cold 
        War.
            (2) The current nuclear arsenal of the United States 
        includes approximately 4,000 total nuclear warheads in its 
        military stockpile, of which approximately 1,750 are deployed 
        with five delivery components: land-based intercontinental 
        ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 
        long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed with nuclear gravity 
        bombs, long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed with nuclear-
        armed air-launched cruise missiles, and short-range fighter 
        aircraft that can deliver nuclear gravity bombs. The strategic 
        bomber fleet of the United States comprises 89 B-52 and 20 B-2 
        aircraft, of which 60 are believed to contribute to the nuclear 
        mission. The United States maintains approximately 400 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles. The United States also 
        maintains 14 Ohio-class submarines, up to 12 of which are 
        deployed at sea. Each of those submarines is armed with 
        approximately 80 independently targetable nuclear warheads.
            (3) The maintenance of this force comes at significant 
        cost. Between fiscal years 2017 and 2026, the United States 
        will spend approximately $400,000,000 to maintain and 
        recapitalize its nuclear force, according to a February 2017 
        report from the Congressional Budget Office. Over 30 years, 
        spending on nuclear forces could exceed $1,000,000,000,000.
            (4) Numerous United States Government officials have warned 
        of the affordability problem posed by the current nuclear 
        weapons sustainment plans, cautioning that those plans cannot 
        be executed in the absence of significant long-term increases 
        to defense spending or cuts to other military priorities. For 
        example, Brian McKeon, former Principal Deputy Under Secretary 
        of Defense stated in October 2015, ``We're looking at that big 
        bow wave [in nuclear weapons spending] and wondering how the 
        heck we're going to pay for it, and probably thanking our lucky 
        stars we won't be here to answer the question.''.
            (5) An April 2017 Government Accountability Office report 
        found that there is a significant mismatch between the 25-year 
        plan of the Department of Energy to refurbish the Nation's 
        nuclear warheads and supporting infrastructure, and the 
        Department's budget estimates. The report also found that key 
        warhead life extension programs are likely underfunded.
            (6) According to the Congressional Budget Office's 2017 
        long-term budget outlook report, discretionary spending, 
        including national defense spending, is likely to continue to 
        be constrained even after the expiration of sequestration under 
        part C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
        of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 900 et seq.), as amended by the Budget 
        Control Act of 2011 (Public Law 112-25; 125 Stat. 240), as a 
        result of an aging population, rising health care costs, and 
        the rising interest on the national debt.
            (7) A substantial decrease in spending on the nuclear 
        arsenal of the United States is prudent for both the budget and 
        national security. The current plans to sustain the United 
        States nuclear arsenal assume that the United States will 
        maintain a nuclear arsenal like the one it has now for decades 
        to come. However, the Department of Defense's June 2013 nuclear 
        policy guidance entitled, ``Report on Nuclear Employment 
        Strategy of the United States'' found that force levels under 
        the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
        of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and 
        entered into force on February 5, 2011 (commonly known as the 
        ``New START Treaty''), ``are more than adequate for what the 
        United States needs to fulfill its national security 
        objectives'' and can be reduced by up to one-third below levels 
        under the New START Treaty to 1,000 to 1,100 warheads.
            (8) A December 2016 Congressional Budget Office report 
        showed that at least 10 percent of the projected costs of 
        nuclear forces over the next decade can be saved by trimming 
        back the current plans, while still maintaining a triad of 
        delivery systems. Even larger savings would accrue over the 
        subsequent decade.
            (9) Even without additional reductions below the New START 
        Treaty limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, the United 
        States can save tens of billions of dollars by deploying those 
        warheads more efficiently on delivery systems and by deferring 
        production of new delivery systems until they are needed.
            (10) As it undertakes its Nuclear Posture Review in 2017, 
        President Donald Trump must seriously examine options to 
        reshape and rescale the plans and adequately fund a smaller 
        number of projects that would still leave the United States 
        with a capable and credible deterrent.

SEC. 3. REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES.

    (a) Reduction of Nuclear-Armed Submarines.--Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated 
or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2017 or any fiscal year 
thereafter for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended 
for procuring more than eight Columbia-class submarines.
    (b) Reduction of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.--
Notwithstanding section 1667 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328) or any other provision of 
law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
available for fiscal year 2017 or any fiscal year thereafter for the 
Department of Defense may be obligated or expended to maintain more 
than 150 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles.
    (c) Reduction of Deployed Strategic Warheads.--Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated 
or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2017 or any fiscal year 
thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy 
may be obligated or expended to maintain more than 1,000 deployed 
strategic warheads, as counted under the New START Treaty (as defined 
in section 495(e) of title 10, United States Code).
    (d) Prohibition on New Long-Range Penetrating Bomber Aircraft.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds 
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for any of 
fiscal years 2017 through 2024 for the Department of Defense may be 
obligated or expended for the research, development, test, and 
evaluation or the procurement of the B-21 long-range penetrating bomber 
aircraft.
    (e) Prohibition on F-35 Nuclear Mission.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or 
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2017 or any fiscal year 
thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy 
may be used to make the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft capable of 
carrying nuclear weapons.
    (f) Reduction in the B61 Life Extension Program.--Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be 
appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2017 or any 
fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department 
of Energy may obligated or expended for extending the life of tactical 
versions of the B61 gravity bomb.
    (g) Prohibition on New Air-Launched Cruise Missile.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds 
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal 
year 2017 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense 
or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the 
research, development, test, and evaluation or the procurement of a new 
air-launched cruise missile or for the W80 warhead life extension 
program.
    (h) Prohibition on New Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds 
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal 
year 2017 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense 
may be obligated or expended for the research, development, test, and 
evaluation or the procurement of the ground-based strategic deterrent 
or any new intercontinental ballistic missile.
    (i) Termination of IW-1 Life Extension Program.--Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be 
appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2017 or any 
fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department 
of Energy may be obligated or expended for the IW-1 life extension 
program.
    (j) Termination of Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Project.--
Notwithstanding section 3116 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328) or any other provision of 
law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
available for fiscal year 2017 or any fiscal year thereafter for the 
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or 
expended for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility project at the 
Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
    (k) Termination of Uranium Processing Facility.--Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be 
appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2017 or any 
fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department 
of Energy may be obligated or expended for the Uranium Processing 
Facility located at the Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee.

SEC. 4. REPORTS REQUIRED.

    (a) Initial Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
report outlining the plan of each Secretary to carry out section 3.
    (b) Annual Report.--Not later than March 1, 2018, and annually 
thereafter, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall 
jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
outlining the plan of each Secretary to carry out section 3, including 
any updates to previously submitted reports.
    (c) Annual Nuclear Weapons Accounting.--Not later than September 
30, 2017, and annually thereafter, the President shall transmit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report containing a comprehensive 
accounting by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget of 
the amounts obligated and expended by the Federal Government for each 
nuclear weapon and related nuclear program during--
            (1) the fiscal year covered by the report; and
            (2) the life cycle of such weapon or program.
    (d) Cost Estimate Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report outlining the estimated cost savings that result 
from carrying out section 3.
    (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the 
        Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee 
        on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Natural Resources 
        of the House of Representatives.