A bill to posthumously award a Congressional Gold Medal to the Reverend Oliver L. Brown.

Summary: Directs the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate to arrange for the posthumous presentation, on behalf of Congress, of a gold medal in commemoration of the Reverend Oliver L. Brown (the lead plaintiff in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education) in recognition of his and his fellow plaintiffs' enduring contributions to civil rights and American society.

SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds that--
            (1) Oliver L. Brown is the namesake of the landmark United 
        States Supreme Court decision of 1954, Brown v. Board of 
        Education (347 U.S. 483, 1954);
            (2) Oliver L. Brown is honored as the lead plaintiff in the 
        Topeka, Kansas case which posed a legal challenge to racial 
        segregation in public education;
            (3) by 1950, African-American parents began to renew their 
        efforts to challenge State laws that only permitted their 
        children to attend certain schools, and as a result, they 
        organized through the National Association for the Advancement 
        of Colored People (the NAACP), an organization founded in 1909 
        to address the issue of the unequal and discriminatory 
        treatment experienced by African-Americans throughout the 
        country;
            (4) Oliver L. Brown became part of the NAACP strategy led 
        first by Charles Houston and later by Thurgood Marshall, to 
        file suit against various school boards on behalf of such 
        parents and their children;
            (5) Oliver L. Brown was a member of a distinguished group 
        of plaintiffs in cases from Kansas (Brown v. Board of 
        Education), Delaware (Gebhart v. Belton), South Carolina 
        (Briggs v. Elliot), and Virginia (Davis v. County School Board 
        of Prince Edward County) that were combined by the United 
        States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, and in 
        Washington, D.C. (Bolling v. Sharpe), considered separately by 
        the Supreme Court with respect to the District of Columbia;
            (6) with respect to cases filed in the State of Kansas--
                    (A) there were 11 school integration cases dating 
                from 1881 to 1949, prior to Brown v. Board of Education 
                in 1954;
                    (B) in many instances, the schools for African-
                American children were substandard facilities with out-
                of-date textbooks and often no basic school supplies;
                    (C) in the fall of 1950, members of the Topeka, 
                Kansas chapter of the NAACP agreed to again challenge 
                the ``separate but equal'' doctrine governing public 
                education;
                    (D) on February 28, 1951, the NAACP filed their 
                case as Oliver L. Brown et al. v. The Board of 
                Education of Topeka Kansas (which represented a group 
                of 13 parents and 20 children);
                    (E) the district court ruled in favor of the school 
                board and the case was appealed to the United States 
                Supreme Court;
                    (F) at the Supreme Court level, the case was 
                combined with other NAACP cases from Delaware, South 
                Carolina, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. (which was 
                later heard separately); and
                    (G) the combined cases became known as Oliver L. 
                Brown et al. v. The Board of Education of Topeka, et 
                al.;
            (7) with respect to the Virginia case of Davis et al. v. 
        Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors--
                    (A) one of the few public high schools available to 
                African-Americans in the State of Virginia was Robert 
                Moton High School in Prince Edward County;
                    (B) built in 1943, it was never large enough to 
                accommodate its student population;
                    (C) the gross inadequacies of these classrooms 
                sparked a student strike in 1951;
                    (D) the NAACP soon joined their struggles and 
                challenged the inferior quality of their school 
                facilities in court; and
                    (E) although the United States District Court 
                ordered that the plaintiffs be provided with equal 
                school facilities, they were denied access to the 
                schools for white students in their area;
            (8) with respect to the South Carolina case of Briggs v. 
        R.W. Elliott--
                    (A) in Clarendon County, South Carolina, the State 
                NAACP first attempted, unsuccessfully and with a single 
                plaintiff, to take legal action in 1947 against the 
                inferior conditions that African-American students 
                experienced under South Carolina's racially segregated 
                school system;
                    (B) by 1951, community activists convinced African-
                American parents to join the NAACP efforts to file a 
                class action suit in United States District Court;
                    (C) the court found that the schools designated for 
                African-Americans were grossly inadequate in terms of 
                buildings, transportation, and teacher salaries when 
                compared to the schools provided for white students; 
                and
                    (D) an order to equalize the facilities was 
                virtually ignored by school officials, and the schools 
                were never made equal;
            (9) with respect to the Delaware cases of Belton v. Gebhart 
        and Bulah v. Gebhart--
                    (A) first petitioned in 1951, these cases 
                challenged the inferior conditions of 2 African-
                American schools;
                    (B) in the suburb of Claymont, Delaware, African-
                American children were prohibited from attending the 
                area's local high school, and in the rural community of 
                Hockessin, Delaware, African-American students were 
                forced to attend a dilapidated 1-room schoolhouse, and 
                were not provided transportation to the school, while 
                white children in the area were provided transportation 
                and a better school facility;
                    (C) both plaintiffs were represented by local NAACP 
                attorneys; and
                    (D) though the State Supreme Court ruled in favor 
                of the plaintiffs, the decision did not apply to all 
                schools in Delaware;
            (10) with respect to the District of Columbia case of 
        Bolling, et al. v. C. Melvin Sharpe, et al.--
                    (A) 11 African-American junior high school students 
                were taken on a field trip to Washington, D.C.'s new 
                John Philip Sousa School for white students only;
                    (B) the African-American students were denied 
                admittance to the school and ordered to return to their 
                inadequate school; and
                    (C) in 1951, a suit was filed on behalf of the 
                students, and after review with the Brown case in 1954, 
                the United States Supreme Court ruled that segregation 
                in the Nation's capitol was unconstitutional;
            (11) on May 17, 1954, at 12:52 p.m., the United States 
        Supreme Court ruled that the discriminatory nature of racial 
        segregation ``violates the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, 
        which guarantees all citizens equal protection of the laws'';
            (12) the decision in Brown v. Board of Education set the 
        stage for dismantling racial segregation throughout the 
        country;
            (13) the quiet courage of Oliver L. Brown and his fellow 
        plaintiffs asserted the right of African-American people to 
        have equal access to social, political, and communal 
        structures;
            (14) our country is indebted to the work of the NAACP Legal 
        Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Howard University Law 
        School, the NAACP, and the individual plaintiffs in the cases 
        considered by the Supreme Court;
            (15) Reverend Oliver L. Brown died in 1961, and because the 
        landmark United States Supreme Court decision bears his name, 
        he is remembered as an icon for justice, freedom, and equal 
        rights; and
            (16) the national importance of the Brown v. Board of 
        Education decision had a profound impact on American culture, 
        affecting families, communities, and governments by outlawing 
        racial segregation in public education, resulting in the 
        abolition of legal discrimination on any basis.

SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL GOLD MEDAL.

    (a) Presentation Authorized.--
            (1) In general.--The Speaker of the House of 
        Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate 
        shall make appropriate arrangements for the posthumous 
        presentation, on behalf of Congress, of a gold medal of 
        appropriate design in commemoration of the Reverend Oliver L. 
        Brown, in recognition of his and his fellow plaintiffs' 
        enduring contributions to civil rights and American society.
            (2) Display.--The medal presented under paragraph (1) shall 
        be maintained and displayed at the Brown Foundation of Topeka, 
        Kansas.
    (b) Design and Striking.--For purposes of the presentation referred 
to in subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury (referred to in 
this Act as the ``Secretary'') shall strike a gold medal with suitable 
emblems, devices, and inscriptions, to be determined by the Secretary.

SEC. 3. DUPLICATE MEDALS.

    The Secretary may strike and sell duplicates in bronze of the gold 
medal struck pursuant to section 2 under such regulations as the 
Secretary may prescribe, at a price sufficient to cover the cost 
thereof, including labor, materials, dies, use of machinery, and 
overhead expenses, and the cost of the gold medal.

SEC. 4. STATUS OF MEDALS.

    (a) National Medals.--The medals struck pursuant to this Act are 
national medals for purposes of chapter 51 of title 31, United States 
Code.
    (b) Numismatic Items.--For purposes of section 5134 of title 31, 
United States Code, all medals struck under this Act shall be 
considered to be numismatic items.

SEC. 5. AUTHORITY TO USE FUND AMOUNTS; PROCEEDS OF SALE.

    (a) Authority to Use Fund Amounts.--There is authorized to be 
charged against the United States Mint Public Enterprise Fund, such 
amounts as may be necessary to pay for the costs of the medals struck 
pursuant to this Act.
    (b) Proceeds of Sale.--Amounts received from the sale of duplicate 
bronze medals authorized under section 3 shall be deposited into the 
United States Mint Public Enterprise Fund.