An original bill to amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk-power system and electric infrastructure critical to the defense of the United States against cybersecurity and other threats and vulnerabilities.

Summary: Grid Cyber Security Act - (Sec. 2) Amends the Federal Power Act to direct the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to: (1) determine whether certain reliability standards are adequate to protect critical electric infrastructure from cyber security vulnerabilities, and (2) order the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) to submit a proposed reliability standard or a modification to a reliability standard that will provide adequate protection of critical electric infrastructure from cyber security vulnerabilities if FERC determines that such reliability standards are inadequate to do so.

Authorizes the Secretary of Energy to: (1) require persons subject to FERC jurisdiction to take immediate action that will best avert or mitigate the cyber security threat if necessary to protect critical electric infrastructure, and (2) coordinate with Canadian and Mexican officials responsible for the protection of cyber security of the interconnected North American electricity grid. Limits the duration of expedited or emergency rules or orders to 90 days, unless the Secretary: (1) gives interested persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments; and (2) affirms, amends, or repeals the rule or order.

Directs FERC to establish a mechanism for public utilities to recover costs prudently incurred to implement such immediate actions.

Applies this Act to any entity that owns, controls, or operates critical electric infrastructure, except Alaska and Hawaii.

Directs the Secretary of Defense (DOD) to prepare a comprehensive plan that identifies the emergency measures or actions to protect the reliability of the electric power supply of the national defense facilities located in Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.

Applies specified disclosure restrictions to critical electric infrastructure information submitted to FERC or DOE, or developed by a federal power marketing administration or the Tennessee Valley Authority, under this Act to the same extent as they apply to critical infrastructure information voluntarily submitted to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Requires FERC and DOE to establish information sharing procedures on the release of critical infrastructure information to entities subject to this Act.

Prohibits access to classified information relating to cyber security threats or vulnerabilities without the appropriate security clearances.

(Sec. 3) Includes in the bulk-power system any facilities used for the local distribution of electric energy that FERC determines to be critical electric infrastructure.

(Sec. 4) Grants the ERO limited enforcement authority over a facility used in the local distribution of electric energy if FERC determines that its incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact upon national security, national economic security, or national public health or safety.

(Sec. 5) Authorizes FERC, if immediate action is necessary to protect critical electric infrastructure for a cyber security vulnerability, to require the ERO to develop, issue, and make effective immediately temporary emergency orders addressing the vulnerabilities.

(Sec. 6) Directs the Secretary of Energy to assess: (1) the susceptibility of critical electric infrastructure to electromagnetic pulse events and geomagnetic disturbances, and (2) whether and to what extent infrastructure affecting the transmission of electric power in interstate commerce should be hardened against such events and disturbances.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Grid Cyber Security Act''.

SEC. 2. CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE.

    Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) is amended 
by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 224. CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE.

    ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
            ``(1) Critical electric infrastructure.--The term `critical 
        electric infrastructure' means systems and assets, whether 
        physical or virtual, used for the generation, transmission, or 
        distribution of electric energy affecting interstate commerce 
        that, as determined by the Commission or the Secretary (as 
        appropriate), are so vital to the United States that the 
        incapacity or destruction of the systems and assets would have 
        a debilitating impact on national security, national economic 
        security, or national public health or safety.
            ``(2) Critical electric infrastructure information.--The 
        term `critical electric infrastructure information' means 
        critical infrastructure information relating to critical 
        electric infrastructure.
            ``(3) Critical infrastructure information.--The term 
        `critical infrastructure information' has the meaning given the 
        term in section 212 of the Critical Infrastructure Information 
        Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 131).
            ``(4) Cyber security threat.--The term `cyber security 
        threat' means the imminent danger of an act that disrupts, 
        attempts to disrupt, or poses a significant risk of disrupting 
        the operation of programmable electronic devices or 
        communications networks (including hardware, software, and 
        data) essential to the reliable operation of critical electric 
        infrastructure.
            ``(5) Cyber security vulnerability.--The term `cyber 
        security vulnerability' means a weakness or flaw in the design 
        or operation of any programmable electronic device or 
        communication network that exposes critical electric 
        infrastructure to a cyber security threat.
            ``(6) Electric reliability organization.--The term 
        `Electric Reliability Organization' has the meaning given the 
        term in section 215(a).
            ``(7) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary 
        of Energy.
    ``(b) Authority of Commission.--
            ``(1) Initial determination.--Not later than 120 days after 
        the date of enactment of this section, the Commission shall 
        determine whether reliability standards established pursuant to 
        section 215 are adequate to protect critical electric 
        infrastructure from cyber security vulnerabilities.
            ``(2) Initial order.--Unless the Commission determines that 
        the reliability standards established pursuant to section 215 
        are adequate to protect critical electric infrastructure from 
        cyber security vulnerabilities within 120 days after the date 
        of enactment of this section, the Commission shall order the 
        Electric Reliability Organization to submit to the Commission, 
        not later than 180 days after the date of issuance of the 
        order, a proposed reliability standard or a modification to a 
        reliability standard that will provide adequate protection of 
        critical electric infrastructure from cyber security 
        vulnerabilities.
            ``(3) Subsequent determinations and orders.--If at any time 
        following the issuance of the initial order under paragraph (2) 
        the Commission determines that the reliability standards 
        established pursuant to section 215 are inadequate to protect 
        critical electric infrastructure from a cyber security 
        vulnerability, the Commission shall order the Electric 
        Reliability Organization to submit to the Commission, not later 
        than 180 days after the date of the determination, a proposed 
        reliability standard or a modification to a reliability 
        standard that will provide adequate protection of critical 
        electric infrastructure from the cyber security vulnerability.
            ``(4) Reliability standards.--Any proposed reliability 
        standard or modification to a reliability standard submitted 
        pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) shall be developed and 
        approved in accordance with section 215(d).
            ``(5) Additional time.--The Commission may, by order, grant 
        the Electric Reliability Organization reasonable additional 
        time to submit a proposed reliability standard or a 
        modification to a reliability standard under paragraph (2) or 
        (3).
    ``(c) Emergency Authority of Secretary.--
            ``(1) In general.--If the Secretary determines that 
        immediate action is necessary to protect critical electric 
        infrastructure from a cyber security threat, the Secretary may 
        require, by order, with or without notice, persons subject to 
        the jurisdiction of the Commission under this section to take 
        such actions as the Secretary determines will best avert or 
        mitigate the cyber security threat.
            ``(2) Coordination with canada and mexico.--In exercising 
        the authority granted under this subsection, the Secretary is 
        encouraged to consult and coordinate with the appropriate 
        officials in Canada and Mexico responsible for the protection 
        of cyber security of the interconnected North American 
        electricity grid.
            ``(3) Consultation.--Before exercising the authority 
        granted under this subsection, to the extent practicable, 
        taking into account the nature of the threat and urgency of 
        need for action, the Secretary shall consult with the entities 
        described in subsection (e)(1) and with officials at other 
        Federal agencies, as appropriate, regarding implementation of 
        actions that will effectively address the identified cyber 
        security threat.
            ``(4) Cost recovery.--The Commission shall establish a 
        mechanism that permits public utilities to recover prudently 
        incurred costs required to implement immediate actions ordered 
        by the Secretary under this subsection.
    ``(d) Duration of Expedited or Emergency Rules or Orders.--Any 
order issued by the Secretary under subsection (c) shall remain 
effective for not more than 90 days unless, during the 90 day-period, 
the Secretary--
            ``(1) gives interested persons an opportunity to submit 
        written data, views, or arguments; and
            ``(2) affirms, amends, or repeals the rule or order.
    ``(e) Jurisdiction.--
            ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding section 201, this 
        section shall apply to any entity that owns, controls, or 
        operates critical electric infrastructure.
            ``(2) Covered entities.--
                    ``(A) In general.--An entity described in paragraph 
                (1) shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
                Commission for purposes of--
                            ``(i) carrying out this section; and
                            ``(ii) applying the enforcement authorities 
                        of this Act with respect to this section.
                    ``(B) Jurisdiction.--This subsection shall not make 
                an electric utility or any other entity subject to the 
                jurisdiction of the Commission for any other purpose.
            ``(3) Alaska and hawaii excluded.--Except as provided in 
        subsection (f), nothing in this section shall apply in the 
        State of Alaska or Hawaii.
    ``(f) Defense Facilities.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
enactment of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall prepare, in 
consultation with the Secretary, the States of Alaska and Hawaii, the 
Territory of Guam, and the electric utilities that serve national 
defense facilities in those States and Territory, a comprehensive plan 
that identifies the emergency measures or actions that will be taken to 
protect the reliability of the electric power supply of the national 
defense facilities located in those States and Territory in the event 
of an imminent cybersecurity threat.
    ``(g) Protection of Critical Electric Infrastructure Information.--
            ``(1) In general.--Section 214 of the Critical 
        Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 133) shall 
        apply to critical electric infrastructure information submitted 
        to the Commission or the Secretary under this section, or 
        developed by a Federal power marketing administration or the 
        Tennessee Valley Authority under this section or section 215, 
        to the same extent as that section applies to critical 
        infrastructure information voluntarily submitted to the 
        Department of Homeland Security under that Act (6 U.S.C. 131 et 
        seq.).
            ``(2) Rules prohibiting disclosure.--Notwithstanding 
        section 552 of title 5, United States Code, the Secretary and 
        the Commission shall prescribe regulations prohibiting 
        disclosure of information obtained or developed in ensuring 
        cyber security under this section if the Secretary or 
        Commission, as appropriate, decides disclosing the information 
        would be detrimental to the security of critical electric 
        infrastructure.
            ``(3) Procedures for sharing information.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The Secretary and the Commission 
                shall establish procedures on the release of critical 
                infrastructure information to entities subject to this 
                section, to the extent necessary to enable the entities 
                to implement rules or orders of the Commission or the 
                Secretary.
                    ``(B) Requirements.--The procedures shall--
                            ``(i) limit the redissemination of 
                        information described in subparagraph (A) to 
                        ensure that the information is not used for an 
                        unauthorized purpose;
                            ``(ii) ensure the security and 
                        confidentiality of the information;
                            ``(iii) protect the constitutional and 
                        statutory rights of any individuals who are 
                        subjects of the information; and
                            ``(iv) provide data integrity through the 
                        timely removal and destruction of obsolete or 
                        erroneous names and information.
    ``(h) Access to Classified Information.--
            ``(1) Authorization required.--No person shall be provided 
        with access to classified information (as defined in section 
        6.1 of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 435 note; relating to 
        classified national security information)) relating to cyber 
        security threats or cyber security vulnerabilities under this 
        section without the appropriate security clearances.
            ``(2) Security clearances.--The appropriate Federal 
        agencies or departments shall cooperate with the Secretary or 
        the Commission, to the maximum extent practicable consistent 
        with applicable procedures and requirements, in expeditiously 
        providing appropriate security clearances to individuals that 
        have a need-to-know (as defined in section 6.1 of that 
        Executive Order) classified information to carry out this 
        section.''.

SEC. 3. LIMITED ADDITION OF ERO AUTHORITY FOR CRITICAL ELECTRIC 
              INFRASTRUCTURE.

    Section 215(a)(1) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824o(a)(1)) 
is amended--
            (1) in the first sentence--
                    (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as 
                clauses (i) and (ii), respectively, and indenting 
                appropriately;
                    (B) by striking ``(1) The term'' and inserting the 
                following:
            ``(1) Bulk-power system.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The term'';
                    (C) in clause (i) (as so redesignated), by striking 
                ``and'' after the semicolon at the end;
                    (D) in clause (ii) (as so redesignated), by 
                striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and'';
                    (E) by adding at the end the following:
                            ``(iii) for purposes of section 224, 
                        facilities used for the local distribution of 
                        electric energy that the Commission determines 
                        to be critical electric infrastructure pursuant 
                        to section 224.''; and
            (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``The term'' and 
        inserting the following:
                    ``(B) Exclusion.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (A), the term''.

SEC. 4. LIMITATION.

    Section 215(i) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824o(i)) is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(6) Limitation.--The ERO shall have authority to develop 
        and enforce compliance with reliability standards and temporary 
        emergency orders with respect to a facility used in the local 
        distribution of electric energy only to the extent the 
        Commission determines the facility is so vital to the United 
        States that the incapacity or destruction of the facility would 
        have a debilitating impact on national security, national 
        economic security, or national public health or safety.''.

SEC. 5. TEMPORARY EMERGENCY ORDERS FOR CYBER SECURITY VULNERABILITIES.

    Section 215(d) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824o(d)) is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(7) Temporary emergency orders for cyber security 
        vulnerabilities.--Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) through (6), 
        if the Commission determines that immediate action is necessary 
        to protect critical electric infrastructure for a cyber 
        security vulnerability, the Commission may, without prior 
        notice or hearing, after consulting the ERO, require the ERO--
                    ``(A) to develop and issue a temporary emergency 
                order to address the cyber security vulnerability;
                    ``(B) to make the temporary emergency order 
                immediately effective; and
                    ``(C) to keep the temporary emergency order in 
                effect until--
                            ``(i) the ERO develops, and the Commission 
                        approves, a final reliability standard under 
                        this section; or
                            ``(ii) the Commission authorizes the ERO to 
                        withdraw the temporary emergency order.''.

SEC. 6. EMP STUDY.

    (a) DOE Report.--Not later than 3 years after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with appropriate 
experts at the National Laboratories (as defined in section 2 of the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801)), shall prepare and publish 
a report that assesses the susceptibility of critical electric 
infrastructure to electromagnetic pulse events and geomagnetic 
disturbances.
    (b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) examine the risk of electromagnetic pulse events and 
        geomagnetic disturbances, using both computer-based simulations 
        and experimental testing;
            (2) assess the full spectrum of possible events and 
        disturbances and the likelihood that the events and 
        disturbances would cause significant disruption to the 
        transmission and distribution of electric power; and
            (3) seek to quantify and reduce uncertainties associated 
        with estimates for electromagnetic pulse events and geomagnetic 
        disturbances.
    (c) FERC Assessment.--Not later than 1 year after publication of 
the report under subsection (a), the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy and in 
consultation with electric utilities and the ERO (as defined in section 
215(a) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824o(a)), shall submit to 
Congress an assessment of whether and to what extent infrastructure 
affecting the transmission of electric power in interstate commerce 
should be hardened against electromagnetic events and geomagnetic 
disturbances, including an estimate of the costs and benefits of 
options to harden the infrastructure.

SEC. 7. BUDGETARY EFFECTS.

    The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying 
with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall be determined by 
reference to the latest statement titled ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO 
Legislation'' for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional 
Record by the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that 
such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.