POSTURE Act

Summary: Protecting Our Security Through Utilizing Right-Sized End-Strength Act of 2016 or the POSTURE Act This bill expresses the sense of Congress that given the uncertain world and the need for trained and ready U.S. land force, the planned drawdown of land forces should be stopped. The bill sets forth:  FY2016 Army, Marine Corps, and Selected Reserve strength levels; and Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force permanent active duty end strength minimum levels.  Any proposal to lower the end strength levels established by this Act must first be approved by Congress through enactment of a law to that effect.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Our Security Through 
Utilizing Right-Sized End-Strength Act of 2016'' or the ``POSTURE 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The first function of Government is to secure its 
        people and their rights. The United States is blessed that 
        countless men and women have done so by serving in the Armed 
        Forces, which consists of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air 
        Force, and Coast Guard.
            (2) History has shown that sufficient Land Forces are 
        critical to the security of the American people and their 
        rights and to assure United States allies, deter aggression, 
        shape security environments, and win wars. Furthermore, Land 
        Forces have been proven to be essential to consolidate gains 
        and achieve sustainable outcomes.
            (3) The Land Forces of the United States are comprised of 
        the Army (Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard) 
        and the Marine Corps (Active Marine Corps and Marine Corps 
        Reserve).
            (4) On the day before September 11, 2001, the Land Forces 
        of the United States included 1,036,601 Soldiers and 212,744 
        Marines. Broken down by component, that included 480,801 
        Soldiers in the Active Army, 205,300 Soldiers in the Army 
        Reserve, 350,500 Soldiers in the Army National Guard, 172,934 
        Marines in the Active Marine Corps, and 39,810 Marines in the 
        Marine Corps Reserve.
            (5) At the height of the Global War on Terrorism, the Land 
        Forces of the United States included 1,138,907 Soldiers and 
        242,558 Marines. Broken down by component, that included 
        570,000 Soldiers in the Active Army, 206,892 Soldiers in the 
        Army Reserve, 362,015 Soldiers in the Army National Guard, 
        202,786 Marines in the Active Marine Corps, and 39,772 Marines 
        in the Marine Corps Reserve.
            (6) For fiscal year 2016, authorizations for the Land 
        Forces of the United States include 1,015,000 Soldiers and 
        222,900 Marines. Broken down by component, that includes 
        475,000 Soldiers in the Active Army, 198,000 Soldiers in the 
        Army Reserve, 342,000 Soldiers in the Army National Guard, 
        184,000 Marines in the Active Marine Corps, and 38,900 Marines 
        in the Marine Corps Reserve.
            (7) The drawdown of the Land Forces of the United States is 
        planned to continue through fiscal year 2018, when end strength 
        will be approximately 970,000 Soldiers and 220,500 Marines. 
        Broken down by component, that will be 450,000 Soldiers in the 
        Active Army, approximately 195,000 Soldiers in the Army 
        Reserve, approximately 335,000 Soldiers in the Army National 
        Guard, 182,000 Marines in Active Marine Corps, and 38,500 
        Marines in the Marine Corps Reserve.
            (8) In Europe, forward-stationed Army forces have been 
        reduced from over 215,000 at the time of the fall of the Berlin 
        Wall to the current level of under 30,000, jeopardizing the 
        United States strategic capability to deter adversaries by 
        conventional force and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 
        capability to rapidly respond to Russian aggression against its 
        front-line member states.
            (9) The Administration has enacted this policy of reducing 
        the end strength of United States Land Forces based on security 
        analysis and expectations of future force capabilities 
        contained in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the 2013 
        Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR), and the 2014 
        Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which included the following:
                    (A) Ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan by 
                ``transitioning out of Iraq and drawing down in 
                Afghanistan''.
                    (B) ``Building a closer relationship'' with Russia 
                and assuming that ``most European countries are now 
                producers of security rather than consumers of it''.
                    (C) No longer sizing United States Armed Forces 
                ``to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability 
                operations''.
                    (D) ``Increasing reliance on our allies and 
                partners'' to compensate for ``reductions in our 
                capacity''.
                    (E) Emphasizing an ability to regenerate 
                capabilities and the use of innovation and technology 
                to compensate for a smaller force.
            (10) Given developments over the past several years, the 
        assumptions about the security environment are outdated and, 
        unfortunately, proven flawed.
            (11) The United States, its allies, and their partners face 
        new threats, including the following:
                    (A) A civil war in Syria, triggering a humanitarian 
                crisis and destabilizing the entire region.
                    (B) The rise of the Islamic State which has taken 
                control of large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq 
                and has more ambitious global goals, including stated 
                intentions of additional direct attacks against the 
                United States and United States allies, both at home 
                and abroad.
                    (C) Iran, which has continued its bellicose 
                rhetoric and support for terrorist activities 
                throughout the Middle East.
                    (D) A resurgent Russia that annexed Crimea, invaded 
                Ukraine, and is now conducting military operations in 
                Syria, with its posture and actions causing concern to 
                NATO allies.
                    (E) The continued military build-up by China and 
                its actions in the South China Sea, which have raised 
                concerns among nations in the Pacific and across the 
                world.
                    (F) A provocative and unpredictable North Korea 
                that has escalated tensions throughout the Pacific and 
                beyond and expanded its nuclear capability.
            (12) In response to these developments, short notice 
        deployments of United States Land Forces have increased across 
        the globe, including the following:
                    (A) To address a resurgent Russia, the Army 
                deployed forces in various locations in Eastern Europe 
                to assure NATO allies and to help train, assist, and 
                assure their armed forces as well as sent forces to 
                Ukraine to train and equip their armed forces.
                    (B) To address the rise of the Islamic State, the 
                Army deployed forces to Iraq to train and assist their 
                armed forces.
                    (C) To address a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, 
                scheduled redeployments of United States Land Forces 
                were altered and these forces are now expected to 
                remain in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.
                    (D) To help stabilize troubled areas across the 
                globe, including Southeast Asia and Africa, the Marine 
                Corps and Army have deployed to conflict-scarred 
                countries such as Cambodia.
                    (E) To address unique threats and to build partner 
                capacity across the globe, United States Joint Special 
                Operations Forces continue to constantly deploy 
                worldwide.
                    (F) To address widespread and destabilizing natural 
                disasters, including the Indian Ocean earthquake and 
                tsunami in 2004, the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, the 
                tsunami in Japan in 2011, the Ebola outbreak in West 
                Africa in 2014, and the earthquake in Nepal in 2015, 
                the Army and Marine Corps continue to deploy on short 
                notice across the globe.
            (13) Furthermore, the assumptions about the future purpose, 
        use, and capability of the Land Forces have also been disputed:
                    (A) The 2014 National Defense Panel concluded that 
                the 2014 QDR's ``reduction in Army end strength goes 
                too far.''.
                    (B) The National Commission on the Future of the 
                Army found the following:
                            (i) ``Because PB16 (FY2016 President's 
                        Budget) does not address the escalation of 
                        threats to global stability and national 
                        security, it is, at best, on the low end of 
                        needed resources'' (Page 43).
                            (ii) ``. . . this force size provides only 
                        limited ability to react to unforeseen 
                        circumstances'' (Page 51).
                            (iii) ``Using directed planning assumptions 
                        and with its planned fiscal year 2017 force, 
                        the Army is, in fact, neither sized nor shaped 
                        for conducting any kind of large-scale, long-
                        duration mission at acceptable risk'' (Page 
                        52).
            (14) A comprehensive and holistic view of the Land Forces 
        of the United States is necessary. In particular, previous 
        assumptions about the deployment and use of reserve components 
        no longer apply. For example, more than 600,000 members of the 
        reserve components have been deployed since September 11, 2001. 
        Beyond these missions conducted pursuant to the authority of 
        title 10 of the United States Code, these forces are also 
        responsible for all homeland defense and critical defense 
        support to civil authority missions under title 32 of the 
        United States Code during times of crisis response and natural 
        disaster relief. For these reasons, the reserve components of 
        the Land Forces are a critical piece to the overall mission of 
        the total force.
            (15) Finally, senior leaders in the United States military 
        have expressed concern regarding the current and future 
        reductions in the end strength of the Land Forces of the United 
        States, including the following:
                    (A) Then-Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, 
                General Martin Dempsey, wrote in his risk assessment 
                accompanying the 2014 QDR that the current defense 
                strategy ``takes risk in the capacity of . . . land 
                forces''.
                    (B) The current Chief of Staff of the Army, General 
                Mark Milley disputed many of the assumptions described 
                in finding eight in an address before the Association 
                of the United States Army, including that ``wars of the 
                future will be short'', ``wars can be won through the 
                use of advanced technologies'', ``allies and partners 
                can provide capable land forces in sufficient scale'', 
                and ``armies are easy to regenerate''.
                    (C) The current commander of United States European 
                Command, General Philip Breedlove, testified before the 
                House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on 
                Defense that ``virtual presence means actual absence. . 
                . . Further reductions of both infrastructure and 
                forces will reduce our access to key strategic 
                locations during times of crisis''.
                    (D) The former Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
                General James Amos, testified at a hearing before the 
                Senate Armed Services Committee that ``we are headed 
                towards a force in not too many years that will be 
                hollow back home and not ready to deploy . . . there 
                would be no rotational relief like we had in Iraq and 
                Afghanistan''.
                    (E) The former commander of United States European 
                Command, Admiral James Stavridis, recently stated that 
                ``we're still at war . . . actively involved on 
                multiple continents in real combat operations. We 
                should not be drastically reducing our troop levels.''.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    Given the volatile, uncertain, and ambiguous world and the need for 
trained and ready Land Forces of the United States, in conjunction with 
joint and multinational forces, to deter threats, shape the 
international security environment, respond to emergent situations and 
crises, and, if necessary, to fight and win the Nation's wars, it is 
the sense of Congress that the planned drawdown of Land Forces should 
be immediately stopped.

SEC. 4. FISCAL YEAR 2016 END-STRENGTH LEVELS FOR LAND FORCES OF THE 
              UNITED STATES.

    (a) Active Forces.--
            (1) Army.--The authorized end strength for Army active duty 
        personnel as of September 30, 2016, is 480,000.
            (2) Marine corps.--The authorized end strength for Marine 
        Corps active duty personnel as of September 30, 2016, is 
        184,000.
    (b) Selected Reserve.--
            (1) Army reserve components.--The authorized end strength 
        for Selected Reserve personnel of the Army reserve components 
        as of September 30, 2016, are as follows:
                    (A) The Army National Guard of the United States, 
                350,000.
                    (B) The Army Reserve, 205,000.
            (2) Marine corps reserve.--The authorized end strength for 
        Selected Reserve personnel of the Marine Corps Reserve as of 
        September 30, 2016, is 38,900.

SEC. 5. REVISION IN PERMANENT ACTIVE DUTY END STRENGTH MINIMUM LEVELS.

    Section 691(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
striking paragraphs (1) through (4) and inserting the following:
            ``(1) For the Army, 480,000.
            ``(2) For the Navy, 329,200.
            ``(3) For the Marine Corps, 184,000.
            ``(4) For the Air Force, 317,000.''.

SEC. 6. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is policy of the United States to pursue and maintain peace 
through strength. Therefore, any proposal to lower the end strength 
levels established by this Act and the amendments made by this Act must 
first be approved by Congress through the enactment of a law to that 
effect.