To restore to the Department of State responsibility over the Police Training Teams being used to provide advisory support, training and development, and equipment for the Iraqi Police Service, to require the Department of State to provide the majority of members for the Police Training Teams, and for other purposes.

Summary: Iraqi Police Service Improvement Act of 2008 - Directs: (1) the Secretary of State to assume responsibility from the Department of Defense (DOD) over the Police Training Teams being used in Iraq to provide advisory support, training and development, and equipment for the Iraqi Police Service; (2) the Secretary to ensure that a majority of the members of each Police Training Team consists of qualified civilian advisors, including Department of State employees and contractor employees; and (3) the Secretary and the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a statement of understanding on command structure, including the responsibilities of members of the Police Training Teams.

States that: (1) in addition to members of the Armed Forces serving on Police Training Teams the Secretary of Defense, at the request of the Secretary, shall make DOD equipment available for the Police Training Teams; and (2) the Armed Forces shall continue to provide security for Police Training Teams.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Iraqi Police Service Improvement Act 
of 2008''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In 2004, National Security Presidential Directive 36 
        (NSPD-36) transferred responsibility from the Department of 
        State to the Department of Defense for ``organizing, equipping, 
        and training all Iraqi security forces'' and stated that ``at 
        the appropriate time, the Secretary of State and the Secretary 
        of Defense shall jointly decide when these functions shall 
        transfer to a security assistance organization and other 
        appropriate organizations under the authority of the Secretary 
        of State and the Chief of Mission.''.
            (2) On May 25, 2007, the Independent Commission on the 
        Security Forces of Iraq, also known as the Jones Commission, 
        was created to assess the readiness of Iraq's military and 
        police forces and report its findings to Congress.
            (3) The Jones Commission cited progress by the Iraqi Army 
        and the Ministry of Defense but less improvement by the 
        Ministry of Interior, ``whose dysfunction has hampered the 
        police force''. The Jones Commission found the ``Iraqi Police 
        Service is incapable today of providing security at a level 
        sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and 
        sectarian violence'' and stressed that the police are central 
        to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq.
            (4) The Jones Commission report stated that although ``U.S. 
        military officers rather than senior civilian law enforcement 
        personnel lead the Coalition training effort for the Iraqi 
        Police Service; this arrangement has inadvertently marginalized 
        civilian police advisors and limited the overall effectiveness 
        of the training and advisory effort.''. The Jones Commission 
        recommended that leadership of the Coalition Police Assistance 
        Training Team (CPATT) and the Police Training Teams should be 
        transferred to senior civilian law enforcement professionals.
            (5) The Jones Commission found the number of civilian 
        international police advisors to be insufficient for the task 
        of training the Iraqi Police Service.
            (6) The Department of Defense's September 2007 Quarterly 
        Report to Congress on Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq 
        found that the Ministry of Interior and its forces required 
        ``continued advisory support, training and development, and 
        equipping to be able to progressively assume missions from 
        Coalition forces. The efforts of embedded advisors are focused 
        on addressing continued shortcomings in logistics, leadership 
        and budget execution that hamper improvement, and in certain 
        cases, cause regression.''. The advisors also assess and report 
        on the operational readiness of the units they mentor on a 
        monthly basis.
            (7) The Department of Defense September 2007 Quarterly 
        Report also stated, ``Current funding levels for the IPA 
        [International Police Advisors] program and availability of 
        military assets do not allow for full coverage of the more than 
        1,100 provincial and local police headquarters and stations in 
        Iraq.''. In the Department of Defense March 2007 Quarterly 
        Report, the Department of Defense stated that ``cost and risk 
        preclude deploying enough PTTs [Police Transition Teams] to 
        cover all of Iraq's police stations; at any time, only 5 of 
        Iraq's 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs . . . Continued PTT 
        presence and participation at Iraqi Police Service stations are 
        needed to improve police readiness and to sustain progress in 
        reforming community policing.''. However, Transition Teams are 
        embedded in the Ministry of Defense, the Joint Headquarters, 
        and with most battalions and brigade and division headquarters.
            (8) The Department of Defense September 2007 Quarterly 
        Report also stated that there were 238 Police Transition Teams 
        for the Iraqi Police Service, with each team composed of 
        approximately 12-15 members, two to four of whom are civilian 
        Department of State contractors, funded by the Department of 
        Defense's Iraq Security Forces Fund. The remaining members are 
        military personnel.
            (9) In testimony given to the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
        Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
        of Representatives, the Department of State stated that since 
        the Department of Defense assumed responsibility for training 
        the Iraqi Security Forces, the Department of Defense has 
        transferred $1,500,000,000 to the Bureau for International 
        Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the Department 
        of State to provide trainers and advisors, including 690 
        International Police Liaison Officers, who are DynCorp 
        contractors, and who serve as advisors in the field to train 
        and mentor Iraqi Police.
            (10) At hearings on the Iraqi Security Forces conducted by 
        the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, 
        several witnesses agreed that there were not enough civilian 
        police advisors for many units of the Iraqi Police Service and 
        that the military advisors lacked the appropriate policing 
        background to appropriately support the community-policing 
        conducted by the Iraqi Police Service.

SEC. 3. DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICE TRANSITION TEAMS 
              FOR THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE.

    (a) Transfer of Responsibility.--
            (1) In general.--Notwithstanding National Security 
        Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD-36), not later than 180 days 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
        State shall assume responsibility from the Department of 
        Defense over the Police Training Teams being used in Iraq to 
        provide advisory support, training and development, and 
        equipment for the Iraqi Police Service.
            (2) Statement of understanding.--Not later than 120 days 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
        State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a 
        statement of understanding on command structure, including on 
        the roles and responsibilities of members of the Police 
        Training Teams.
    (b) Composition of Teams.--The Secretary of State shall ensure that 
a majority of the members of each Police Training Team consists of 
qualified civilian advisors, including employees of the Department of 
State and employees of contractors secured by the Department of State. 
Not fewer than two members of each Police Training Team shall be police 
officers or have retired from police service more than two years before 
becoming members of a Police Training Team. The leader of each Police 
Training Team shall also be an employee of the Department of State or 
an employee of a contractor secured by the Department of State. Members 
of the United States Armed Forces and personnel from other United 
States Government agencies, including the Department of Justice, may 
serve on a Police Training Team in a supporting role.
    (c) Transfer of Funds.--Effective as of the date on which the 
Secretary of State assumes responsibility from the Department of 
Defense over the Police Training Teams, all funds made available for 
the Police Training Teams (currently funded through the Iraq Security 
Forces Fund of the Department of Defense) and not expended as of that 
date shall be transferred to the appropriate account for the Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the Department 
of State for the purpose of using Police Training Teams to provide 
advisory support, training and development, and equipment for the Iraqi 
Police Service.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary of State such sums as may be necessary 
for the Department of State to staff Police Training Teams in 
accordance with the findings of the study under section 4(a).
    (e) Continued Department of Defense Role.--In addition to members 
of the Armed Forces serving on Police Training Teams under subsection 
(b), the Secretary of Defense, at the request of the Secretary of 
State, shall make available equipment of the Department of Defense for 
use by the Police Training Teams. The Armed Forces shall continue to 
provide security for Police Training Teams, in the manner provided for 
reconstruction teams operating in Iraq.

SEC. 4. STUDIES REQUIRED.

    (a) Staffing for Police Training Teams.--Not later than 60 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall, in consultation with the Government of Iraq and Coalition 
forces, conduct a study and submit to Congress a report containing the 
recommendations of the Secretary on--
            (1) the number of civilian advisors needed to sufficiently 
        staff enough Police Training Teams to cover a majority of the 
        approximately 1,100 Iraqi police stations;
            (2) the availability of Department of State personnel and 
        contractors to staff the Police Training Teams; and
            (3) the funding required to staff the Police Training 
        Teams.
    (b) Update of IG Assessment.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of State shall submit to Congress an update to the 2005 
interagency Department of Defense-Department of State Inspector General 
Assessment of Iraqi Police Training.

SEC. 5. REPORTS ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall transmit to 
Congress a report on the actions that have been taken to implement the 
requirements of this Act. The report shall specifically identify the 
status of--
            (1) the assumption of responsibility for Police Training 
        Teams by the Department of State;
            (2) the equipment level of the Iraqi Police Service, 
        including armored vehicles and heavy weaponry, and the advisors 
        on the Police Training Teams assigned to the Iraqi Police 
        Service;
            (3) the number of civilian police advisors training the 
        Iraqi Police Service;
            (4) the number of Police Training Teams and the make-up of 
        each team;
            (5) issues affecting the recruitment of the appropriate 
        number of advisors;
            (6) the indicators used to measure the effectiveness of 
        advisors;
            (7) the indicators used to measure the effectiveness of the 
        Iraqi Police Service; and
            (8) the impact of transferring to the Government of Iraq in 
        2007 responsibility for the vetting and recruiting of persons 
        for the Iraqi Police Service with respect to the performance of 
        units of the Iraqi Police Service.