Defend America Act of 1996

Summary: Defend America Act of 1996 - Expresses U.S. policy to deploy by the end of 2003 a National Missile Defense (NMD) system that:  (1) is capable of providing a highly effective defense of U.S. territory against limited, unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attack; (2) will be augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats; and (3) does not feature an offensive-only form of deterrence. 
Directs the Secretary of Defense to develop for deployment an affordable and operationally effective NMD system which shall achieve an initial operational capability by the end of 2003.  Outlines system elements, including the use of missile interceptors on the ground, at sea, and in space.  Directs the Secretary to take specified actions to implement the NMD system development upon enactment of this Act, including the conduct of an integrated systems test by the end of 1998. 
Requires the Secretary to report to the Congress the Secretary's plans for the development and deployment of the NMD system. 
Urges the President to pursue high-level discussions with the Russian Federation to achieve an agreement to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to allow deployment of the NMD system.  Requires the President to present any such agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent.  Requires the President and the Congress, if such an agreement is not achieved within one year after enactment of this Act, to consider exercising the option of withdrawing the United States from the ABM Treaty.

SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Defend America Act of 1996''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Although the United States possesses the technological 
        means to develop and deploy defensive systems that would be 
        highly effective in countering limited ballistic missile 
        threats to its territory, the United States has not deployed 
        such systems and currently has no policy to do so.
            (2) The threat that is posed to the national security of 
        the United States by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is 
        significant and growing, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
            (3) The trend in ballistic missile proliferation is toward 
        longer range and increasingly sophisticated missiles.
            (4) Several countries that are hostile to the United States 
        (including North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Iraq) have 
        demonstrated an interest in acquiring ballistic missiles 
        capable of reaching the United States.
            (5) The Intelligence Community of the United States has 
        confirmed that North Korea is developing an intercontinental 
        ballistic missile that will be capable of reaching Alaska or 
        beyond once deployed.
            (6) There are ways for determined countries to acquire 
        missiles capable of threatening the United States with little 
        warning by means other than indigenous development.
            (7) Because of the dire consequences to the United States 
        of not being prepared to defend itself against a rogue missile 
        attack and the long-lead time associated with preparing an 
        effective defense, it is prudent to commence a national missile 
        defense deployment effort before new ballistic missile threats 
        to the United States are unambiguously confirmed.
            (8) The timely deployment by the United States of an 
        effective national missile defense system will reduce the 
        incentives for countries to develop or otherwise acquire 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles, thereby inhibiting as well 
        as countering the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass 
        destruction.
            (9) Deployment by the United States of a national missile 
        defense system will reduce concerns about the threat of an 
        accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attack on the 
        United States.
            (10) The offense-only approach to strategic deterrence 
        presently followed by the United States and Russia is 
        fundamentally adversarial and is not a suitable basis for 
        stability in a world in which the United States and the states 
        of the former Soviet Union are seeking to normalize relations 
and eliminate Cold War attitudes and arrangements.
            (11) Pursuing a transition to a form of strategic 
        deterrence based increasingly on defensive capabilities and 
        strategies is in the interest of all countries seeking to 
        preserve and enhance strategic stability.
            (12) The deployment of a national missile defense system 
        capable of defending the United States against limited 
        ballistic missile attacks would (A) strengthen deterrence at 
        the levels of forces agreed to by the United States and Russia 
        under the START I Treaty, and (B) further strengthen deterrence 
        if reductions below START I levels are implemented in the 
        future.
            (13) Article XIII of the ABM Treaty envisions ``possible 
        changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the 
        provisions of this treaty''.
            (14) Articles XIII and XIV of the treaty establish means 
        for the parties to amend the treaty, and the parties have in 
        the past used those means to amend the treaty.
            (15) Article XV of the treaty establishes the means for a 
        party to withdraw from the treaty, upon six months notice ``if 
        it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject 
        matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests''.
            (16) Previous discussions between the United States and 
        Russia, based on Russian President Yeltsin's proposal for a 
        Global Protection System, envisioned an agreement to amend the 
        ABM Treaty to allow (among other measures) deployment of as 
        many as four ground-based interceptor sites in addition to the 
        one site permitted under the ABM Treaty and unrestricted 
        exploitation of sensors based within the atmosphere and in 
        space.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

    (a) It is the policy of the United States to deploy by the end of 
2003 a National Missile Defense system that--
            (1) is capable of providing a highly-effective defense of 
        the territory of the United States against limited, 
        unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks; and
            (2) will be augmented over time to provide a layered 
        defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile 
        threats as they emerge.
    (b) It is the policy of the United States to seek a cooperative 
transition to a regime that does not feature an offense-only form of 
deterrence as the basis for strategic stability.

SEC. 4. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.

    (a) Requirement for Development of System.--To implement the policy 
established in section 3(a), the Secretary of Defense shall develop for 
deployment an affordable and operationally effective National Missile 
Defense (NMD) system which shall achieve an initial operational 
capability (IOC) by the end of 2003.
    (b) Elements of the NMD System.--The system to be developed for 
deployment shall include the following elements:
            (1) An interceptor system that optimizes defensive coverage 
        of the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against 
        limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attacks 
        and includes one or a combination of the following:
                    (A) Ground-based interceptors.
                    (B) Sea-based interceptors.
                    (C) Space-based kinetic energy interceptors.
                    (D) Space-based directed energy systems.
            (2) Fixed ground-based radars.
            (3) Space-based sensors, including the Space and Missile 
        Tracking System.
            (4) Battle management, command, control, and communications 
        (BM/C&lt;SUP&gt;3).

SEC. 5. IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

    The Secretary of Defense shall--
            (1) upon the enactment of this Act, promptly initiate 
        required preparatory and planning actions that are necessary so 
        as to be capable of meeting the initial operational capability 
        (IOC) date specified in section 4(a);
            (2) plan to conduct by the end of 1998 an integrated 
        systems test which uses elements (including BM/C&lt;SUP&gt;3 
        elements) that are representative of, and traceable to, the 
        national missile defense system architecture specified in 
        section 4(b);
            (3) prescribe and use streamlined acquisition policies and 
        procedures to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of 
        developing the system specified in section 4(a); and
            (4) develop an affordable national missile defense follow-
        on program that--
                    (A) leverages off of the national missile defense 
                system specified in section 4(a), and
                    (B) augments that system, as the threat changes, to 
                provide for a layered defense.

SEC. 6. REPORT ON PLAN FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
              AND DEPLOYMENT.

    Not later than March 15, 1997, the Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to Congress a report on the Secretary's plan for development and 
deployment of a national missile defense system pursuant to this Act. 
The report shall include the following matters:
            (1) The Secretary's plan for carrying out this Act, 
        including--
                    (A) a detailed description of the system 
                architecture selected for development under section 
                4(b); and
                    (B) a discussion of the justification for the 
                selection of that particular architecture.
            (2) The Secretary's estimate of the amount of 
        appropriations required for research, development, test, 
        evaluation, and for procurement, for each of fiscal years 1997 
        through 2003 in order to achieve the initial operational 
        capability date specified in section 4(a).
            (3) A cost and operational effectiveness analysis of 
        follow-on options to improve the effectiveness of such system.
            (4) A determination of the point at which any activity that 
        is required to be carried out under this Act would conflict 
        with the terms of the ABM Treaty, together with a description 
        of any such activity, the legal basis for the Secretary's 
        determination, and an estimate of the time at which such point 
        would be reached in order to meet the initial operational 
        capability date specified in section 4(a).

SEC. 7. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.

    (a) ABM Treaty Negotiations.--In light of the findings in section 2 
and the policy established in section 3, Congress urges the President 
to pursue high-level discussions with the Russian Federation to achieve 
an agreement to amend the ABM Treaty to allow deployment of the 
national missile defense system being developed for deployment under 
section 4.
    (b) Requirement for Senate Advice and Consent.--If an agreement 
described in subsection (a) is achieved in discussions described in 
that subsection, the President shall present that agreement to the 
Senate for its advice and consent. No funds appropriated or otherwise 
available for any fiscal year may be obligated or expended to implement 
such an amendment to the ABM Treaty unless the amendment is made in the 
same manner as the manner by which a treaty is made.
    (c) Action Upon Failure To Achieve Negotiated Changes Within One 
Year.--If an agreement described in subsection (a) is not achieved in 
discussions described in that subsection within one year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the President and Congress, in 
consultation with each other, shall consider exercising the option of 
withdrawing the United States from the ABM Treaty in accordance with 
the provisions of Article XV of that treaty.

SEC. 8. ABM TREATY DEFINED.

    For purposes of this Act, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty 
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and 
signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, and includes the Protocols to that 
Treaty, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974.