A bill to improve the medical care of members of the Armed Forces and veterans, and for other purposes.

Summary: Effective Care for the Armed Forces and Veterans Act of 2007 - Prohibits the Secretary of Defense, during a period of a U.S. major military conflict, from: (1) subjecting work performed by an employee of a Department of Defense (DOD) medical facility or an employee of a private contractor of such facility to public-private competition; or (2) converting such employee or the work performed to private contractor performance. Allows an exception to prevent a negative impact on the provision of services.

Requires a study by the Comptroller General on competitive outsourcing activities at DOD medical facilities.

Provides: (1) a minimum budget for DOD medical services during periods of major military conflicts; and (2) a limitation on the implementation of a recommendation for the closure of Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

Requires the Secretary to: (1) assign at least one case manager for every 20 recovering servicemembers; (2) screen every servicemember returning from deployment in Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom for traumatic brain injury (requiring two related studies); and (3) require DOD medical records management systems to communicate with such systems of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).

Directs the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to assess the VA's ability to meet the long-term care needs of veterans over the next 50 years.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Effective Care for the Armed Forces 
and Veterans Act of 2007''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON COMPETITIVE SOURCING OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES AT 
              MEDICAL FACILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The health and recovery of wounded members of the Armed 
        Forces may be risked by competitive sourcing of services at 
        military medical facilities.
            (2) The provision of medical services to members and former 
        members of the Armed Forces who were injured while serving in 
        Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom is a 
        basic service that is the responsibility of the Government and 
        any disruption is unacceptable when it risks the health of 
        veterans and members of the Armed Forces.
            (3) The Department of Defense has attempted to implement 
        competitive sourcing of services at military medical facilities 
        despite the fact that doing so provides no improvement in the 
        efficiency or effectiveness of such services.
    (b) Prohibition on Initiation of Competitive Sourcing Activities at 
Medical Facilities of Department of Defense During Period of Major 
Military Conflict.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
        during a period in which the Armed Forces are involved in a 
        major military conflict, the Secretary of Defense shall not 
        take any action under the Office of Management and Budget 
        Circular A-76 or any other similar administrative regulation, 
        directive, or policy--
                    (A) to subject work performed by an employee of a 
                medical facility of the Department of Defense or 
                employee of a private contractor of such a medical 
                facility to public-private competition; or
                    (B) to convert such employee or the work performed 
                by such employee to private contractor performance.
            (2) Exception to prevent negative impact on provision of 
        services.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any action at a 
        medical facility of the Department of Defense if the Secretary 
        of Defense certifies to Congress that not initiating such 
        action during such period would have a negative impact on the 
        provision of services at such military medical facility.
    (c) Study on Competitive Sourcing Activities at Medical Facilities 
of Department of Defense.--The Comptroller General of the United States 
shall assess the efficiency and advisability of subjecting work 
performed by an employee of a medical facility of the Department of 
Defense or a private contractor of such a medical facility to public-
private competition, or converting such employee or the work performed 
by such employee to private contractor performance, under the Office of 
Management and Budget Circular A-76 or any other similar administrative 
regulation, directive, or policy.

SEC. 3. MINIMUM BUDGET FOR MEDICAL SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES DURING 
              PERIOD OF MAJOR MILITARY CONFLICT.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Pressure to reduce the budget for the medical services 
        of the Department of Defense has contributed to many of the 
        current problems at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.
            (2) It is inappropriate to reduce the budget for medical 
        services of the Department of Defense or the Department of 
        Veterans Affairs while such services are needed to treat 
        members of the Armed Forces or veterans who were wounded in 
        Iraq and Afghanistan.
    (b) Minimum Budget for Medical Services.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), if 
        the Armed Forces are involved in a major military conflict at 
        the time the President submits the budget for a fiscal year to 
        Congress, the President shall not include in that budget a 
        total aggregate amount allocated for medical services for the 
        Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs 
        that is less than the total aggregate amount allocated for such 
        purposes in the budget submitted by the President to Congress 
        for the previous fiscal year.
            (2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply if the 
        President--
                    (A) certifies to Congress that submitting a total 
                aggregate amount allocated for medical services for the 
                Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans 
                Affairs that is less than that required under paragraph 
                (1) is in the national interest; and
                    (B) submits to Congress a report on the reasons for 
                the reduction described by subparagraph (A).

SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE WALTER 
              REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The final recommendations of the Defense Base Closure 
        and Realignment Commission under the 2005 round of defense base 
        closure and realignment include recommendations to close Walter 
        Reed Army Medical Center and to build new, modern facilities at 
        the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda and at Fort 
        Belvoir to improve the overall quality of and access to health 
        care for members of the Armed Forces.
            (2) These recommendations include the transfer of medical 
        services from the Walter Reed Army Medical Center to the 
        National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda and at Fort Belvoir, 
        but they do not adequately provide for housing for the families 
        of wounded members of the Armed Forces who will receive 
        treatment at such new facilities.
            (3) The recommended closure of the Walter Reed Army Medical 
        Center has impaired the ability of the Secretary of Defense to 
        attract the personnel required to provide proper medical 
        services at such medical center.
    (b) Limitation on Implementation of Recommendations.--The Secretary 
of Defense shall not take any action to implement the recommendations 
of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission under the 2005 
round of defense base closure and realignment relating to the transfer 
of medical services from Walter Reed Army Medical Center to the 
National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda and at Fort Belvoir during 
the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
ending on the date that is 60 days after the date on which Congress 
receives the plan required under subsection (c).
    (c) Plan Required.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
Congress a plan that includes an assessment of the following:
            (1) The feasibility and advisability of providing current 
        or prospective employees at Walter Reed Army Medical Center a 
        guarantee that their employment will continue in the 
        Washington, DC, metropolitan area for more than two years after 
        the date on which Walter Reed Army Medical Center is closed.
            (2) Detailed construction plans for new medical facilities 
        and family housing at the National Naval Medical Center at 
        Bethesda and at Fort Belvoir to accommodate the transfer of 
        medical services from Walter Reed Army Medical Center to the 
        National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda and at Fort Belvoir.
            (3) The costs, feasibility, and advisability of completing 
        all of the construction planned for the transfer of medical 
        services from Walter Reed Army Medical Center to the National 
        Naval Medical Center at Bethesda and at Fort Belvoir before any 
        patients are transferred to such new facilities from Walter 
        Reed Army Medical Center as a result of the recommendations of 
        the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission under the 
        2005 round of defense base closure and realignment.

SEC. 5. IMPROVING CASE MANAGEMENT SERVICES FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED 
              FORCES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Case managers are important for scheduling appointments 
        and making sure recovering servicemembers get the care they 
        need.
            (2) Many case managers are overwhelmed by the large number 
        of wounded members of the Armed Forces returning from 
        deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan.
            (3) Regular contact between health care providers and 
        members of the Armed Forces returning from deployment is 
        important for the diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder 
        in such members.
            (4) It is inappropriate to require a wounded member of the 
        Armed Forces or a family member of such member to provide a 
        photo or a medal from deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan to 
        prove that such member served in and was injured from such 
        deployment.
            (5) Case managers are well qualified to assist recovering 
        servicemembers and their families with the disability 
        evaluation system and discharge procedures of the Department of 
        Defense.
    (b) Case Managers.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall assign at 
        least one case manager for every 20 recovering servicemembers 
        to assist in the recovery of such recovering servicemember.
            (2) Minimum contact.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure 
        that case managers contact each of their assigned recovering 
        servicemembers not less than once per week.
            (3) Training.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that 
        case managers of the Department of Defense are familiar with 
        the disability and discharge system of the Department of 
        Defense and that such case managers are able to assist 
        recovering servicemembers complete necessary and related forms.
    (c) Recovering Servicemember.--In this section, the term 
``recovering servicemember'' means a member of the Armed Forces, 
including a member of the National Guard or a Reserve, who is 
undergoing medical treatment, recuperation, or therapy, or is otherwise 
in medical hold or holdover status, for an injury, illness, or disease 
incurred or aggravated while on active duty in the Armed Forces.

SEC. 6. SCREENING FOR TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Many of the members of the Armed Forces deployed in 
        Iraq and Afghanistan have brain injuries.
            (2) In many cases, such injuries are not diagnosed because 
        there is no external indication of such injury.
            (3) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs carries out programs 
        to screen all recent combat veterans for traumatic brain 
        injury; the Secretary of Defense does not do so.
    (b) Screening Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall screen 
every member of the Armed Forces returning from deployment in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom for traumatic brain injury 
upon the return of each such member.
    (c) Studies on Treating Traumatic Brain Injury as Presumptive 
Condition for Disability Compensation.--
            (1) Study by secretary of defense.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
                conduct a study on the feasability and advisability of 
                treating traumatic brain injury as a presumptive 
                condition for members of the Armed Forces who served in 
                Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom 
                for the qualification for disability compensation under 
                laws administered by the Secretary of Defense.
                    (B) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
                of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
                shall submit to Congress a report on the results of the 
                study required by subparagraph (A).
            (2) Study by secretary of veterans affairs.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of Veterans Affairs 
                shall conduct a study on the feasability and 
                advisability of treating traumatic brain injury as a 
                presumptive condition for veterans who served as 
                members of the Armed Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
                or Operation Enduring Freedom for the qualification for 
                disability compensation under laws administered by the 
                Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
                    (B) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
                of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Veterans 
                Affairs shall submit to Congress a report on the 
                results of the study required by subparagraph (A).
            (3) Study by director of national institutes of health.--
                    (A) In general.--The Director of the National 
                Institutes of Health shall conduct a study on traumatic 
                brain injury, including the detection of traumatic 
                brain injury and the measurement and classification of 
                the severity of traumatic brain injury.
                    (B) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
                of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
                National Institutes of Health shall submit to Congress 
                a report on the results of the study required by 
                subparagraph (A).

SEC. 7. REQUIRING MEDICAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS OF DEPARTMENT OF 
              DEFENSE TO COMMUNICATE WITH MEDICAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT 
              SYSTEMS OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The electronic transfer of medical records of members 
        of the Armed Forces from the medical records management systems 
        of the Department of Defense to the medical records management 
        systems of the Department of Veterans Affairs would be prudent.
            (2) The Department of Veterans Affairs has been a leader in 
        the implementation of electronic medical records management 
        systems.
    (b) Electronic Communication Between Medical Records Management 
Systems Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than two years after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
        ensure that the medical records management systems of the 
        Department of Defense are capable of transmitting medical 
        records to and receiving medical records from the medical 
        records management systems of the Department of Veterans 
        Affairs electronically.
            (2) Initiation of activities.--Not later than one year 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
        Defense shall begin any activities required to meet the 
        requirements of paragraph (1).

SEC. 8. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS ASSESSMENT OF LONG-TERM CARE 
              NEEDS OF VETERANS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Multiple studies show that, in the next five years, the 
        Department of Veterans Affairs will add hundreds of thousands 
        of new veterans to the medical records management systems of 
        the Department of Veterans Affairs.
            (2) During such period, many veterans will have multiple 
        medical care needs caused by complex medical conditions.
    (b) Assessment of Long-Term Care Needs.--The Secretary of Veterans 
Affairs shall assess the current ability of the Department of Veterans 
Affairs to meet long-term care needs of veterans during the 50-year 
period that begins on the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (c) Determination of Actions Required To Meet Long-Term Care 
Needs.--The Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall determine what actions 
are required to ensure that the needs described in subsection (b) are 
satisfied.
    (d) Report Required.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall submit 
to Congress a report on the assessment required in subsection (b) and 
the determination required in subsection (c).