To set forth the policy of the United States for nuclear nonproliferation.

Summary: Declares that it shall be U.S. policy to:  (1) develop and maintain a nuclear weapons posture consistent with promoting U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy objectives; and (2) reduce the proliferation risks posed by the world's stockpile of plutonium. 
Requires the United States, in order to develop and maintain such a posture, to:  (1) withdraw from deployment and dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons in the context of a bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation to eliminate such weapons; (2) adopt a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons against countries who are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or a comparable international regime; and (3) declare its intention to reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal to levels below START II, in the context of similar reductions by the Russian Federation and strategic reductions by the United Kingdom, France, and China. 
Directs the United States to:  (1) choose a weapons-plutonium disposition option that cannot be perceived as representing U.S. approval of separated plutonium fuel cycles; (2) discourage the civil use of plutonium overseas by identifying alternatives to civilian reprocessing of plutonium and pursuing these alternatives; and (3) seek a nondiscriminatory, multilateral, and internationally verifiable treaty that ends production of weapons-usable fissile material for any other purpose.

SECTION 1. POLICY FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.

    (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
            (1) On September 27, 1993, the President declared to the 
        United Nations that one of the world's most urgent priorities 
        must be to impede the proliferation of weapons of mass 
        destruction.
            (2) In a joint statement issued on January 16, 1994, the 
        President and the President of the Russian Federation declared 
        that the proliferation of nuclear weapons creates a serious 
        threat to the security of all States.
            (3) The President and the President of the Russian 
        Federation further declared that the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the basis for efforts to 
        ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and called for 
        its indefinite and unconditional extension at a conference of 
        its participants in 1995, and they urged that all states that 
        have not yet done so accede to this Treaty.
            (4) The principle obstacle to the indefinite and 
        unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
        of Nuclear Weapons is the concern of the states without nuclear 
        weapons that the states with nuclear weapons have not yet 
        fulfilled their commitment (made 25 years ago in the Treaty) to 
        pursue negotiations toward nuclear disarmament and, in 
        particular, to end the testing of nuclear weapons.
            (5) In its report issued in 1994 and entitled Management 
        and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, the National 
        Academy of Sciences reported that the risks posed by all forms 
        of plutonium must be addressed and that further steps should be 
        taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the 
        world's plutonium stocks, both military and civilian.
            (6) The National Academy of Sciences reported in the report 
        that policy makers will have to take into account the fact that 
        choosing to use weapons plutonium in reactors would be 
        perceived by some as representing generalized United States 
        approval of separated plutonium fuel cycles, thereby 
        compromising the ability of the United States to oppose such 
        fuel cycles elsewhere.
            (7) In section 1611 of the National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1848), 
        the Congress called for a comprehensive policy to end the 
        further spread of nuclear weapons capability, to roll back 
        nuclear proliferation where it has occurred, and to prevent the 
        use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, and set forth 
        eleven objectives to achieve this goal.
            (8) One of the goals set forth in such section is to 
        support the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the 1995 conference of its 
        participants in order to review and extend the treaty and to 
        seek to ensure that all countries sign the treaty or 
        participate in a comparable international regime for monitoring 
        and safeguarding nuclear facilities and material.
            (9) The Congress has played a critical role in the 
        formulation of United States nonproliferation policy and must 
        express its views on the future of the nuclear weapons posture 
        of the United States in order to ensure a complete review of 
        that posture.
    (b) Policy.--The following shall be the policy of the United 
States:
            (1) To develop and maintain a nuclear weapons posture 
        consistent with promoting United States nuclear 
        nonproliferation policy objectives. To develop and maintain 
        that posture, the United States shall--
                    (A) withdraw from deployment and dismantle all of 
                its tactical nuclear weapons in the context of a 
                bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation to 
                eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons;
                    (B) adopt a policy of no-first-use of nuclear 
                weapons against countries which are party to the Treaty 
                on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or a 
                comparable international regime; and
                    (C) declare its intention to reduce its strategic 
                nuclear arsenal to levels below START II, in the 
                context of similar reductions by the Russian 
                Federation, and strategic nuclear reductions by the 
                United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of 
                China.
            (2) To reduce the proliferation risks posed by the world's 
        large stockpile of plutonium from military and civilian 
        sources. To achieve this objective, the United States shall--
                    (A) choose a weapons-plutonium disposition option 
                that cannot be perceived as representing United States 
                approval of separated plutonium fuel cycles;
                    (B) discourage the civil use of plutonium overseas 
                by identifying alternatives to civilian reprocessing of 
                plutonium and pursuing these alternatives with 
                countries that have civilian plutonium programs; and
                    (C) seek a nondiscriminatory, multilateral, and 
                internationally and effectively verifiable treaty that 
                ends production of weapons-usable fissile material for 
                any other purpose.
    (c)  Reports.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Congress a 
report on the status of efforts by the United States to achieve the 
policy described in subsection (b).