Question: How many samples are considered in the human evaluation?
Evidence: Datasets and Models We evaluate our adversarial attacks on different text classification datasets from tasks such as sentiment classification, subjectivity detection and question type classification. Amazon, Yelp, IMDB are sentence-level sentiment classification datasets which have been used in recent work BIBREF15 while MR BIBREF16 contains movie reviews based on sentiment polarity. MPQA BIBREF17 is a dataset for opinion polarity detection, Subj BIBREF18 for classifying a sentence as subjective or objective and TREC BIBREF19 is a dataset for question type classification.
We use 3 popular text classification models: word-LSTM BIBREF20, word-CNN BIBREF21 and a fine-tuned BERT BIBREF12 base-uncased classifier. For each dataset we train the model on the training data and perform the adversarial attack on the test data. For complete model details refer to Appendix.
As a baseline, we consider TextFooler BIBREF11 which performs synonym replacement using a fixed word embedding space BIBREF22. We only consider the top $K{=}50$ synonyms from the MLM predictions and set a threshold of 0.8 for the cosine similarity between USE based embeddings of the adversarial and input text.
Results We perform the 4 modes of our attack and summarize the results in Table . Across datasets and models, our BAE attacks are almost always more effective than the baseline attack, achieving significant drops of 40-80% in test accuracies, with higher average semantic similarities as shown in parentheses. BAE-R+I is the strongest attack since it allows both replacement and insertion at the same token position, with just one exception. We observe a general trend that the BAE-R and BAE-I attacks often perform comparably, while the BAE-R/I and BAE-R+I attacks are much stronger. We observe that the BERT-based classifier is more robust to the BAE and TextFooler attacks than the word-LSTM and word-CNN models which can be attributed to its large size and pre-training on a large corpus.
The baseline attack is often stronger than the BAE-R and BAE-I attacks for the BERT based classifier. We attribute this to the shared parameter space between the BERT-MLM and the BERT classifier before fine-tuning. The predicted tokens from BERT-MLM may not drastically change the internal representations learned by the BERT classifier, hindering their ability to adversarially affect the classifier prediction.
Effectiveness We study the effectiveness of BAE on limiting the number of R/I operations permitted on the original text. We plot the attack performance as a function of maximum $\%$ perturbation (ratio of number of word replacements and insertions to the length of the original text) for the TREC dataset. From Figure , we clearly observe that the BAE attacks are consistently stronger than TextFooler. The classifier models are relatively robust to perturbations up to 20$\%$, while the effectiveness saturates at 40-50$\%$. Surprisingly, a 50$\%$ perturbation for the TREC dataset translates to replacing or inserting just 3-4 words, due to the short text lengths.
Qualitative Examples We present adversarial examples generated by the attacks on a sentence from the IMDB and Yelp datasets in Table . BAE produces more natural looking examples than TextFooler as tokens predicted by the BERT-MLM fit well in the sentence context. TextFooler tends to replace words with complex synonyms, which can be easily detected. Moreover, BAE's additional degree of freedom to insert tokens allows for a successful attack with fewer perturbations.
Human Evaluation We consider successful adversarial examples generated from the Amazon and IMDB datasets and verify their sentiment and grammatical correctness. Human evaluators annotated the sentiment and the grammar (Likert scale of 1-5) of randomly shuffled adversarial examples and original texts. From Table , BAE and TextFooler have inferior accuracies compared to the Original, showing they are not always perfect. However, BAE has much better grammar scores, suggesting more natural looking adversarial examples.
Ablation Study We analyze the benefits of R/I operations in BAE in Table . From the table, the splits $\mathbb {A}$ and $\mathbb {B}$ are the $\%$ of test points which compulsorily need I and R operations respectively for a successful attack. We can observe that the split $\mathbb {A}$ is larger than $\mathbb {B}$ thereby indicating the importance of the I operation over R. Test points in split require both R and I operations for a successful attack. Interestingly, split is largest for Subj, which is the most robust to attack (Table ) and hence needs both R/I operations. Thus, this study gives positive insights towards the importance of having the flexibility to both replace and insert words.
Refer to the Appendix for additional results, effectiveness graphs and details of human evaluation.
We perform human evaluation of our BAE attacks on the BERT classifier. For 3 datasets, we consider 100 samples from each test set shuffled randomly with their successful adversarial examples from BAE-R, BAE-R+I and TextFooler.
Answer: For 3 datasets, the authors consider 100 samples from each test set shuffled randomly.