The Optimal Design of a Constitution-making Process

La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008,organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France,sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de Jon Elster.There are two normative questions one might ask about constitutions: What is a good constitution? What is a good constitution-making process? In the paper I mainly focus on the second issue,but also discuss the relation between the two. Important desiderata of a constituent assembly include having a number of delegates that is both large enough to prevent bargaining and small enough to allow for a genuine exchange of views; a mode of election of delegates that will generate sufficient diversity both of preferences and of information; a focus on issues on which interest has a minimal purchase; and an organization of the proceedings that minimizes the scope of passion. I also argue that the process ought to hourglass-shaped,with wide public deliberation before the assembly meets and deliberation followed by a referendum after it has produced its proposal.

Disciplines : Philosophie et psychologie,Interaction sociale, communication,Science politique
Mots-clés : comportement collectif,démocratie,rationalité,sagesse,prise de décision,interaction sociale,constitution
Type de document : image en mouvement
Type de ressource : lecture
Niveau : licence
Auteurs ou éditeurs : Jon Elster,C.E.R.I.M.E.S.,COLLEGE DE FRANCE,Marcel LECAUDEY,Loïc QUENTIN