# Consciousness Studies/Table Of Theories

## Theories of Consciousness

Some recent scientific theories of consciousness are tabulated below.
The extent to which they account for the phenomenon of consciousness is
shown.

It is remarkable that many of the theories are consistent with one
another. As in the tale of the \'blind men and the elephant\' some of
the theories seem to describe the trunk, some the tail etc. but they all
seem to be part of the same elephant! The convergence of the theories is
shown in the illustration below:

![](constudsumm.gif "constudsumm.gif")

## Table of theories

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D = Explanation of unconscious but active cerebral cortex

E = Explanation of knowing you know

F = Explanation of non-computability`</B>`{=html}

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G = Binding (simultaneous processing of relevant data)

H = Extended present

I = Quantum state vector reduction`</B>`{=html}

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Microconsciousness

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Zeki, S., & Bartel, A. (1999)

Toward a Theory of Visual Consciousness. Consciousness & Cognition, 8,
225-259.

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Geometrical Phenomenalism

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Green, A. (2003)

 Geometrical
phenomenalism

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ORCH-R

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Hameroff, S & Penrose, R. 1989

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Quantum Brain Model

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Ricciardi, L. M. and H. Umezawa, 1967. Brain physics and many-body
problems, Kibernetik 4, 44-48.

<http://arXiv.org/abs/q-bio/0309009>

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 N

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Many Minds

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Donald, M. 1990. Quantum Theory and the Brain. Proc R Soc Lond. A427
43-93.

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Dual-Time Supercausality

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King, C.C. 1989. Physics Essays 2/2 128-151.

<http://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/~king/Preprints/Transup.htm>

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Spin Mediated Consciousness

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Hu, H. & Wu, M. 2002. Spin-Mediated Consciousness Theory: An Approach
Based On Pan-Protopsychism.

<http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002579/>

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Quantum Theory of Consciousness (synaptic cleft)

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Walker, E.W. 1998. the `<I>`{=html}Noetic Journal`</I>`{=html},
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<http://users.erols.com/wcri/CONSCIOUSNESS.html>

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Global Workspace Theory

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Baars, B. 1988. A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge
University Press, New York

<http://www.ceptualinstitute.com/genre/baars/baarsBrain.htm>

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N

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Topological Geometrodynamics (TGD) Inspired Theory of Consciousness

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Pitkänen, M. 199?. Topological Geometrodynamics

<http://www.physics.helsinki.fi/~matpitka/mainpage.html>

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The Conscious Electromagnetic Field Theory

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McFadden, J.J. 2002

<http://www.surrey.ac.uk/qe/cemi.htm>

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E = Explanation of knowing you know

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H = Extended present

I = Quantum state vector reduction`</B>`{=html}

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Smythies, J. 2003. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10:3 47-56

<http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/smythies.pdf>

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Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2003 April 29; 100(9):
5520--5524

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Edwards, J. (2006)

`How Many Pople Are There In My Head, And In Hers, Imprint Academic. ``http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~regfjxe/aw.htm`

Sevush, S. (2006)

SINGLE-NEURON THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Journal of Theoretical Biology.
238(3), 704-725.
<http://cogprints.org/4432/01/single%5Fneuron%5Ftheory.htm>

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```


# Consciousness Studies/Contemporary Explanations#Functionalism

*This section is about the types of theory that have been advanced to
explain consciousness. Specific explanations should be entered as
separate pages.*

## Introduction

Explanations of consciousness fall into three broad categories, those
that attempt to explain the empirical experience called consciousness
with scientific theories, those that seek to find some way in which
consciousness could be explained by digital computers or nineteenth
century materialism by redefining or eliminating experience and those
that regard consciousness as inexplicable or supernatural.

## Identity theory of mind

The identity theory of mind, or type physicalism, holds that the mind is
identical to the brain. Type physicalists identify qualia and the form
of experience with brain activity. They argue that \"mind states\" have
physical causes and physical effects - thus the mind states themselves
must be physical; a non-physical \"middle step\" is superfluous.

Type physicalism has not yet gained widespread support because although
brain activity that correlates with experience has been found everywhere
in the brain, no set of brain activity that is phenomenal consciousness
itself has yet been found - although this is not surprising because
neuronal spike activity is unlikely to host phenomenal consciousness -
see scientific theories of
consciousness.

## Functionalism

Functionalism was developed as a theory of the mind-body problem because
of objections to identity theory and logical behaviourism. Its core idea
is that the mental states can be accounted for without taking into
account the underlying physical medium (the neurons), instead attending
to higher-level functions such as beliefs, desires, and emotions. It is
a theory of behaviour and access consciousness and so from the outset
avoids any explanation of phenomenal consciousness, substituting beliefs
and judgements (functions) for entities such as qualia.

According to functionalism, the mental states that make up consciousness
can essentially be defined as complex interactions between different
functional processes. Because these processes are not limited to a
particular physical state or physical medium, they can be realized in
multiple ways, including, theoretically, within non-biological
systems.This affords consciousness the opportunity to exist in non-human
minds that are based on algorithmic processors such as digital
computers. This is a highly contentious conjecture although
non-functionalist physicalists might agree that machines that are not
digital computers could possess consciousness through an identity theory
of mind - see The problem of machine and digital
consciousness.

Functionalism\'s explanation of consciousness, or the mental, is best
understood when considering the analogy made by functionalists between
the mind and the modern digital computer. More specifically, the analogy
is made to a \"machine\" capable of computing any given algorithm (i.e.
a Turing machine). This machine would involve:

Data input (the senses in humans), data output (both behaviour and
memory), functional states (mental states), the ability to move from one
functional state into another, and the definition of functional states
with reference to the part they play in the operation of the entire
entity - i.e. in reference to the other functional states. So long as
the same process was achieved, the \"physical stuff\" \-- that being
computer hardware or biological structure \-- could achieve
consciousness.

This variety of functionalism was developed by Hilary Putnam. One of the
major proponents of functionalism is Jerry Fodor.

Further reading:

Block, N. (1996). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan,
1996
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/functionalism.pdf>

## Dualism

### Substance dualism

This theory proposes that phenomenal experience occurs in a non-physical
place. In Cartesian Dualism the non-physical place is an unextended soul
that looks out at the brain. In Reid\'s Natural Dualism the non-physical
place is a point-soul that looks out at the world.

### Property dualism

Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the
appropriate way (i.e., organized in the way that living human bodies are
organized), mental properties emerge. Property dualism is a branch of
emergent materialism. The appeal to emergentism deserves closer
attention. Scientific theories often deal with emergent phenomena, for
instance an enzyme consists of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, manganese and
oxygen and from this catalytic action emerges. The theory of enzyme
structure and the action of this structure on the substrate explains how
this emergence occurs. Notice that the theory of enzymes explains the
emergence of catalytic activity; emergence does not explain the theory.
In science the statement that some property will \'emerge\' means that
there will be a theory that accounts for this property. Property
dualism, by appealing to emergence, is stating that some theory of
consciousness will be possible. In other words it is an explanation that
proposes that the explanation is yet to be known.

## Intentionalism

## Higher order thought

*This section is a stub and needs expansion*

## Eliminativism

Eliminative materialism is the school of thought that argues for an
absolute version of materialism with respect to mental entities and
mental vocabulary. It principally argues that our common-sense
understanding of the mind (often called \'folk psychology\') is not a
viable theory on which to base scientific investigation, and therefore
no coherent neural basis will be found for many such everyday
psychological concepts (such as belief or intention) and that behaviour
and experience can only be adequately explained on the biological level.

Eliminative materialists therefore believe that consciousness does not
exist and that the concept will eventually be eliminated as neuroscience
progresses. Similarly, they argue that folk psychological concepts such
as belief, desire and intention do not have any consistent neurological
substrate.

Proponents of this view often make parallels to previous scientific
theories which have been eliminated, such as the four humours theory of
medicine, the phlogiston theory of combustion and \'vital force\' theory
of life. In these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions
of these theories, but rejected them as obsolete. Eliminative
materialists argue that folk psychology is headed the same way.
According to W.V. Quine it will take tens of years before folk
psychology will be replaced with real science. (see Phenomenal
consciousness and access
consciousness).

Eliminative materialism was first defended by W.V. Quine, Paul
Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty. This view is most associated with
philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland although philosophers such as
Daniel Dennett would also consider themselves eliminativists for many
aspects of psychology. Philosopher Dale Jacquette has claimed that
Occam\'s Razor is the rationale behind eliminativism and reductionism.

The most common argument against eliminative materialism is the argument
from qualia, which is deployed in various forms by Thomas Nagel, Frank
Jackson, and many others. Perhaps the most powerful argument against
eliminativism is that experience itself is many things simultaneously;
it is, as Aristotle points out, immediate and hence is not composed of
judgements.

## Mysterianism

New Mysterianism is a philosophy proposing that certain problems (in
particular, consciousness) will never be explained.

Owen Flanagan noted in his 1991 book \"Science of the Mind\" that some
modern thinkers have suggested that consciousness might never be
completely explained. Flanagan called them \"the new mysterians\" after
the rock group ? and the Mysterians. The term originated with the
Japanese alien-invasion film The Mysterians. The \"old mysterians\" are
thinkers throughout history who have put forward a similar position.
They include Leibniz, Dr Johnson, and Thomas Huxley. The latter said,
\"How is it that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness
comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed his
lamp.\" \[6, p. 229, quote\]

Noam Chomsky distinguishes between problems, which seem solvable, at
least in principle, through scientific methods, and mysteries which do
not, even in principle. He notes that the cognitive capabilities of all
organisms are limited by biology, e.g. a mouse will never speak. In the
same way, certain problems may be beyond our understanding.

The term New Mysterianism has been extended by some writers to encompass
the wider philosophical position that humans don\'t have the
intellectual ability to understand many hard problems, not just the
problem of consciousness, at a scientific level. This position is also
known as Anti-Constructive Naturalism.

For example, in the mind-body problem, emergent materialism claims that
humans aren\'t smart enough to determine \"the relationship between mind
and matter.\" \[4\] Strong agnosticism is a religious application of
this position.

Colin McGinn is the leading proponent of the New Mysterian position.

Critics argue this philosophy isn\'t useful and encourages capitulation.
One critic noted:

the extreme \"Mysterian\" position, that there are vital issues forever
beyond our reach, is in many ways deeply unsatisfying. \[7\]

References

\[1\] McGinn, Colin - The Problem of Consciousness

\[2\] McGinn, Colin - Problems in Philosophy: the limits of enquiry

\[3\] McGinn, Colin - The Mysterious Flame

\[4\] Blackburn, Simon - Think: A compelling introduction to philosophy,
chapter two

\[5\] Flanagan, Owen - The Science of the Mind (1991) 2ed MIT Press,
Cambridge

\[6\] Horgan, John - The Undiscovered Mind (1999), Phoenix,

## Idealism and panpsychism

### Idealism


# Consciousness Studies/Contemporary Explanations#Property dualism

*This section is about the types of theory that have been advanced to
explain consciousness. Specific explanations should be entered as
separate pages.*

## Introduction

Explanations of consciousness fall into three broad categories, those
that attempt to explain the empirical experience called consciousness
with scientific theories, those that seek to find some way in which
consciousness could be explained by digital computers or nineteenth
century materialism by redefining or eliminating experience and those
that regard consciousness as inexplicable or supernatural.

## Identity theory of mind

The identity theory of mind, or type physicalism, holds that the mind is
identical to the brain. Type physicalists identify qualia and the form
of experience with brain activity. They argue that \"mind states\" have
physical causes and physical effects - thus the mind states themselves
must be physical; a non-physical \"middle step\" is superfluous.

Type physicalism has not yet gained widespread support because although
brain activity that correlates with experience has been found everywhere
in the brain, no set of brain activity that is phenomenal consciousness
itself has yet been found - although this is not surprising because
neuronal spike activity is unlikely to host phenomenal consciousness -
see scientific theories of
consciousness.

## Functionalism

Functionalism was developed as a theory of the mind-body problem because
of objections to identity theory and logical behaviourism. Its core idea
is that the mental states can be accounted for without taking into
account the underlying physical medium (the neurons), instead attending
to higher-level functions such as beliefs, desires, and emotions. It is
a theory of behaviour and access consciousness and so from the outset
avoids any explanation of phenomenal consciousness, substituting beliefs
and judgements (functions) for entities such as qualia.

According to functionalism, the mental states that make up consciousness
can essentially be defined as complex interactions between different
functional processes. Because these processes are not limited to a
particular physical state or physical medium, they can be realized in
multiple ways, including, theoretically, within non-biological
systems.This affords consciousness the opportunity to exist in non-human
minds that are based on algorithmic processors such as digital
computers. This is a highly contentious conjecture although
non-functionalist physicalists might agree that machines that are not
digital computers could possess consciousness through an identity theory
of mind - see The problem of machine and digital
consciousness.

Functionalism\'s explanation of consciousness, or the mental, is best
understood when considering the analogy made by functionalists between
the mind and the modern digital computer. More specifically, the analogy
is made to a \"machine\" capable of computing any given algorithm (i.e.
a Turing machine). This machine would involve:

Data input (the senses in humans), data output (both behaviour and
memory), functional states (mental states), the ability to move from one
functional state into another, and the definition of functional states
with reference to the part they play in the operation of the entire
entity - i.e. in reference to the other functional states. So long as
the same process was achieved, the \"physical stuff\" \-- that being
computer hardware or biological structure \-- could achieve
consciousness.

This variety of functionalism was developed by Hilary Putnam. One of the
major proponents of functionalism is Jerry Fodor.

Further reading:

Block, N. (1996). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan,
1996
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/functionalism.pdf>

## Dualism

### Substance dualism

This theory proposes that phenomenal experience occurs in a non-physical
place. In Cartesian Dualism the non-physical place is an unextended soul
that looks out at the brain. In Reid\'s Natural Dualism the non-physical
place is a point-soul that looks out at the world.

### Property dualism

Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the
appropriate way (i.e., organized in the way that living human bodies are
organized), mental properties emerge. Property dualism is a branch of
emergent materialism. The appeal to emergentism deserves closer
attention. Scientific theories often deal with emergent phenomena, for
instance an enzyme consists of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, manganese and
oxygen and from this catalytic action emerges. The theory of enzyme
structure and the action of this structure on the substrate explains how
this emergence occurs. Notice that the theory of enzymes explains the
emergence of catalytic activity; emergence does not explain the theory.
In science the statement that some property will \'emerge\' means that
there will be a theory that accounts for this property. Property
dualism, by appealing to emergence, is stating that some theory of
consciousness will be possible. In other words it is an explanation that
proposes that the explanation is yet to be known.

## Intentionalism

## Higher order thought

*This section is a stub and needs expansion*

## Eliminativism

Eliminative materialism is the school of thought that argues for an
absolute version of materialism with respect to mental entities and
mental vocabulary. It principally argues that our common-sense
understanding of the mind (often called \'folk psychology\') is not a
viable theory on which to base scientific investigation, and therefore
no coherent neural basis will be found for many such everyday
psychological concepts (such as belief or intention) and that behaviour
and experience can only be adequately explained on the biological level.

Eliminative materialists therefore believe that consciousness does not
exist and that the concept will eventually be eliminated as neuroscience
progresses. Similarly, they argue that folk psychological concepts such
as belief, desire and intention do not have any consistent neurological
substrate.

Proponents of this view often make parallels to previous scientific
theories which have been eliminated, such as the four humours theory of
medicine, the phlogiston theory of combustion and \'vital force\' theory
of life. In these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions
of these theories, but rejected them as obsolete. Eliminative
materialists argue that folk psychology is headed the same way.
According to W.V. Quine it will take tens of years before folk
psychology will be replaced with real science. (see Phenomenal
consciousness and access
consciousness).

Eliminative materialism was first defended by W.V. Quine, Paul
Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty. This view is most associated with
philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland although philosophers such as
Daniel Dennett would also consider themselves eliminativists for many
aspects of psychology. Philosopher Dale Jacquette has claimed that
Occam\'s Razor is the rationale behind eliminativism and reductionism.

The most common argument against eliminative materialism is the argument
from qualia, which is deployed in various forms by Thomas Nagel, Frank
Jackson, and many others. Perhaps the most powerful argument against
eliminativism is that experience itself is many things simultaneously;
it is, as Aristotle points out, immediate and hence is not composed of
judgements.

## Mysterianism

New Mysterianism is a philosophy proposing that certain problems (in
particular, consciousness) will never be explained.

Owen Flanagan noted in his 1991 book \"Science of the Mind\" that some
modern thinkers have suggested that consciousness might never be
completely explained. Flanagan called them \"the new mysterians\" after
the rock group ? and the Mysterians. The term originated with the
Japanese alien-invasion film The Mysterians. The \"old mysterians\" are
thinkers throughout history who have put forward a similar position.
They include Leibniz, Dr Johnson, and Thomas Huxley. The latter said,
\"How is it that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness
comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed his
lamp.\" \[6, p. 229, quote\]

Noam Chomsky distinguishes between problems, which seem solvable, at
least in principle, through scientific methods, and mysteries which do
not, even in principle. He notes that the cognitive capabilities of all
organisms are limited by biology, e.g. a mouse will never speak. In the
same way, certain problems may be beyond our understanding.

The term New Mysterianism has been extended by some writers to encompass
the wider philosophical position that humans don\'t have the
intellectual ability to understand many hard problems, not just the
problem of consciousness, at a scientific level. This position is also
known as Anti-Constructive Naturalism.

For example, in the mind-body problem, emergent materialism claims that
humans aren\'t smart enough to determine \"the relationship between mind
and matter.\" \[4\] Strong agnosticism is a religious application of
this position.

Colin McGinn is the leading proponent of the New Mysterian position.

Critics argue this philosophy isn\'t useful and encourages capitulation.
One critic noted:

the extreme \"Mysterian\" position, that there are vital issues forever
beyond our reach, is in many ways deeply unsatisfying. \[7\]

References

\[1\] McGinn, Colin - The Problem of Consciousness

\[2\] McGinn, Colin - Problems in Philosophy: the limits of enquiry

\[3\] McGinn, Colin - The Mysterious Flame

\[4\] Blackburn, Simon - Think: A compelling introduction to philosophy,
chapter two

\[5\] Flanagan, Owen - The Science of the Mind (1991) 2ed MIT Press,
Cambridge

\[6\] Horgan, John - The Undiscovered Mind (1999), Phoenix,

## Idealism and panpsychism

### Idealism


# Consciousness Studies/Contemporary Explanations#Intentionalism

*This section is about the types of theory that have been advanced to
explain consciousness. Specific explanations should be entered as
separate pages.*

## Introduction

Explanations of consciousness fall into three broad categories, those
that attempt to explain the empirical experience called consciousness
with scientific theories, those that seek to find some way in which
consciousness could be explained by digital computers or nineteenth
century materialism by redefining or eliminating experience and those
that regard consciousness as inexplicable or supernatural.

## Identity theory of mind

The identity theory of mind, or type physicalism, holds that the mind is
identical to the brain. Type physicalists identify qualia and the form
of experience with brain activity. They argue that \"mind states\" have
physical causes and physical effects - thus the mind states themselves
must be physical; a non-physical \"middle step\" is superfluous.

Type physicalism has not yet gained widespread support because although
brain activity that correlates with experience has been found everywhere
in the brain, no set of brain activity that is phenomenal consciousness
itself has yet been found - although this is not surprising because
neuronal spike activity is unlikely to host phenomenal consciousness -
see scientific theories of
consciousness.

## Functionalism

Functionalism was developed as a theory of the mind-body problem because
of objections to identity theory and logical behaviourism. Its core idea
is that the mental states can be accounted for without taking into
account the underlying physical medium (the neurons), instead attending
to higher-level functions such as beliefs, desires, and emotions. It is
a theory of behaviour and access consciousness and so from the outset
avoids any explanation of phenomenal consciousness, substituting beliefs
and judgements (functions) for entities such as qualia.

According to functionalism, the mental states that make up consciousness
can essentially be defined as complex interactions between different
functional processes. Because these processes are not limited to a
particular physical state or physical medium, they can be realized in
multiple ways, including, theoretically, within non-biological
systems.This affords consciousness the opportunity to exist in non-human
minds that are based on algorithmic processors such as digital
computers. This is a highly contentious conjecture although
non-functionalist physicalists might agree that machines that are not
digital computers could possess consciousness through an identity theory
of mind - see The problem of machine and digital
consciousness.

Functionalism\'s explanation of consciousness, or the mental, is best
understood when considering the analogy made by functionalists between
the mind and the modern digital computer. More specifically, the analogy
is made to a \"machine\" capable of computing any given algorithm (i.e.
a Turing machine). This machine would involve:

Data input (the senses in humans), data output (both behaviour and
memory), functional states (mental states), the ability to move from one
functional state into another, and the definition of functional states
with reference to the part they play in the operation of the entire
entity - i.e. in reference to the other functional states. So long as
the same process was achieved, the \"physical stuff\" \-- that being
computer hardware or biological structure \-- could achieve
consciousness.

This variety of functionalism was developed by Hilary Putnam. One of the
major proponents of functionalism is Jerry Fodor.

Further reading:

Block, N. (1996). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan,
1996
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/functionalism.pdf>

## Dualism

### Substance dualism

This theory proposes that phenomenal experience occurs in a non-physical
place. In Cartesian Dualism the non-physical place is an unextended soul
that looks out at the brain. In Reid\'s Natural Dualism the non-physical
place is a point-soul that looks out at the world.

### Property dualism

Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the
appropriate way (i.e., organized in the way that living human bodies are
organized), mental properties emerge. Property dualism is a branch of
emergent materialism. The appeal to emergentism deserves closer
attention. Scientific theories often deal with emergent phenomena, for
instance an enzyme consists of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, manganese and
oxygen and from this catalytic action emerges. The theory of enzyme
structure and the action of this structure on the substrate explains how
this emergence occurs. Notice that the theory of enzymes explains the
emergence of catalytic activity; emergence does not explain the theory.
In science the statement that some property will \'emerge\' means that
there will be a theory that accounts for this property. Property
dualism, by appealing to emergence, is stating that some theory of
consciousness will be possible. In other words it is an explanation that
proposes that the explanation is yet to be known.

## Intentionalism

## Higher order thought

*This section is a stub and needs expansion*

## Eliminativism

Eliminative materialism is the school of thought that argues for an
absolute version of materialism with respect to mental entities and
mental vocabulary. It principally argues that our common-sense
understanding of the mind (often called \'folk psychology\') is not a
viable theory on which to base scientific investigation, and therefore
no coherent neural basis will be found for many such everyday
psychological concepts (such as belief or intention) and that behaviour
and experience can only be adequately explained on the biological level.

Eliminative materialists therefore believe that consciousness does not
exist and that the concept will eventually be eliminated as neuroscience
progresses. Similarly, they argue that folk psychological concepts such
as belief, desire and intention do not have any consistent neurological
substrate.

Proponents of this view often make parallels to previous scientific
theories which have been eliminated, such as the four humours theory of
medicine, the phlogiston theory of combustion and \'vital force\' theory
of life. In these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions
of these theories, but rejected them as obsolete. Eliminative
materialists argue that folk psychology is headed the same way.
According to W.V. Quine it will take tens of years before folk
psychology will be replaced with real science. (see Phenomenal
consciousness and access
consciousness).

Eliminative materialism was first defended by W.V. Quine, Paul
Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty. This view is most associated with
philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland although philosophers such as
Daniel Dennett would also consider themselves eliminativists for many
aspects of psychology. Philosopher Dale Jacquette has claimed that
Occam\'s Razor is the rationale behind eliminativism and reductionism.

The most common argument against eliminative materialism is the argument
from qualia, which is deployed in various forms by Thomas Nagel, Frank
Jackson, and many others. Perhaps the most powerful argument against
eliminativism is that experience itself is many things simultaneously;
it is, as Aristotle points out, immediate and hence is not composed of
judgements.

## Mysterianism

New Mysterianism is a philosophy proposing that certain problems (in
particular, consciousness) will never be explained.

Owen Flanagan noted in his 1991 book \"Science of the Mind\" that some
modern thinkers have suggested that consciousness might never be
completely explained. Flanagan called them \"the new mysterians\" after
the rock group ? and the Mysterians. The term originated with the
Japanese alien-invasion film The Mysterians. The \"old mysterians\" are
thinkers throughout history who have put forward a similar position.
They include Leibniz, Dr Johnson, and Thomas Huxley. The latter said,
\"How is it that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness
comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed his
lamp.\" \[6, p. 229, quote\]

Noam Chomsky distinguishes between problems, which seem solvable, at
least in principle, through scientific methods, and mysteries which do
not, even in principle. He notes that the cognitive capabilities of all
organisms are limited by biology, e.g. a mouse will never speak. In the
same way, certain problems may be beyond our understanding.

The term New Mysterianism has been extended by some writers to encompass
the wider philosophical position that humans don\'t have the
intellectual ability to understand many hard problems, not just the
problem of consciousness, at a scientific level. This position is also
known as Anti-Constructive Naturalism.

For example, in the mind-body problem, emergent materialism claims that
humans aren\'t smart enough to determine \"the relationship between mind
and matter.\" \[4\] Strong agnosticism is a religious application of
this position.

Colin McGinn is the leading proponent of the New Mysterian position.

Critics argue this philosophy isn\'t useful and encourages capitulation.
One critic noted:

the extreme \"Mysterian\" position, that there are vital issues forever
beyond our reach, is in many ways deeply unsatisfying. \[7\]

References

\[1\] McGinn, Colin - The Problem of Consciousness

\[2\] McGinn, Colin - Problems in Philosophy: the limits of enquiry

\[3\] McGinn, Colin - The Mysterious Flame

\[4\] Blackburn, Simon - Think: A compelling introduction to philosophy,
chapter two

\[5\] Flanagan, Owen - The Science of the Mind (1991) 2ed MIT Press,
Cambridge

\[6\] Horgan, John - The Undiscovered Mind (1999), Phoenix,

## Idealism and panpsychism

### Idealism


# Consciousness Studies/Contemporary Explanations#Higher order thought

*This section is about the types of theory that have been advanced to
explain consciousness. Specific explanations should be entered as
separate pages.*

## Introduction

Explanations of consciousness fall into three broad categories, those
that attempt to explain the empirical experience called consciousness
with scientific theories, those that seek to find some way in which
consciousness could be explained by digital computers or nineteenth
century materialism by redefining or eliminating experience and those
that regard consciousness as inexplicable or supernatural.

## Identity theory of mind

The identity theory of mind, or type physicalism, holds that the mind is
identical to the brain. Type physicalists identify qualia and the form
of experience with brain activity. They argue that \"mind states\" have
physical causes and physical effects - thus the mind states themselves
must be physical; a non-physical \"middle step\" is superfluous.

Type physicalism has not yet gained widespread support because although
brain activity that correlates with experience has been found everywhere
in the brain, no set of brain activity that is phenomenal consciousness
itself has yet been found - although this is not surprising because
neuronal spike activity is unlikely to host phenomenal consciousness -
see scientific theories of
consciousness.

## Functionalism

Functionalism was developed as a theory of the mind-body problem because
of objections to identity theory and logical behaviourism. Its core idea
is that the mental states can be accounted for without taking into
account the underlying physical medium (the neurons), instead attending
to higher-level functions such as beliefs, desires, and emotions. It is
a theory of behaviour and access consciousness and so from the outset
avoids any explanation of phenomenal consciousness, substituting beliefs
and judgements (functions) for entities such as qualia.

According to functionalism, the mental states that make up consciousness
can essentially be defined as complex interactions between different
functional processes. Because these processes are not limited to a
particular physical state or physical medium, they can be realized in
multiple ways, including, theoretically, within non-biological
systems.This affords consciousness the opportunity to exist in non-human
minds that are based on algorithmic processors such as digital
computers. This is a highly contentious conjecture although
non-functionalist physicalists might agree that machines that are not
digital computers could possess consciousness through an identity theory
of mind - see The problem of machine and digital
consciousness.

Functionalism\'s explanation of consciousness, or the mental, is best
understood when considering the analogy made by functionalists between
the mind and the modern digital computer. More specifically, the analogy
is made to a \"machine\" capable of computing any given algorithm (i.e.
a Turing machine). This machine would involve:

Data input (the senses in humans), data output (both behaviour and
memory), functional states (mental states), the ability to move from one
functional state into another, and the definition of functional states
with reference to the part they play in the operation of the entire
entity - i.e. in reference to the other functional states. So long as
the same process was achieved, the \"physical stuff\" \-- that being
computer hardware or biological structure \-- could achieve
consciousness.

This variety of functionalism was developed by Hilary Putnam. One of the
major proponents of functionalism is Jerry Fodor.

Further reading:

Block, N. (1996). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan,
1996
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/functionalism.pdf>

## Dualism

### Substance dualism

This theory proposes that phenomenal experience occurs in a non-physical
place. In Cartesian Dualism the non-physical place is an unextended soul
that looks out at the brain. In Reid\'s Natural Dualism the non-physical
place is a point-soul that looks out at the world.

### Property dualism

Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the
appropriate way (i.e., organized in the way that living human bodies are
organized), mental properties emerge. Property dualism is a branch of
emergent materialism. The appeal to emergentism deserves closer
attention. Scientific theories often deal with emergent phenomena, for
instance an enzyme consists of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, manganese and
oxygen and from this catalytic action emerges. The theory of enzyme
structure and the action of this structure on the substrate explains how
this emergence occurs. Notice that the theory of enzymes explains the
emergence of catalytic activity; emergence does not explain the theory.
In science the statement that some property will \'emerge\' means that
there will be a theory that accounts for this property. Property
dualism, by appealing to emergence, is stating that some theory of
consciousness will be possible. In other words it is an explanation that
proposes that the explanation is yet to be known.

## Intentionalism

## Higher order thought

*This section is a stub and needs expansion*

## Eliminativism

Eliminative materialism is the school of thought that argues for an
absolute version of materialism with respect to mental entities and
mental vocabulary. It principally argues that our common-sense
understanding of the mind (often called \'folk psychology\') is not a
viable theory on which to base scientific investigation, and therefore
no coherent neural basis will be found for many such everyday
psychological concepts (such as belief or intention) and that behaviour
and experience can only be adequately explained on the biological level.

Eliminative materialists therefore believe that consciousness does not
exist and that the concept will eventually be eliminated as neuroscience
progresses. Similarly, they argue that folk psychological concepts such
as belief, desire and intention do not have any consistent neurological
substrate.

Proponents of this view often make parallels to previous scientific
theories which have been eliminated, such as the four humours theory of
medicine, the phlogiston theory of combustion and \'vital force\' theory
of life. In these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions
of these theories, but rejected them as obsolete. Eliminative
materialists argue that folk psychology is headed the same way.
According to W.V. Quine it will take tens of years before folk
psychology will be replaced with real science. (see Phenomenal
consciousness and access
consciousness).

Eliminative materialism was first defended by W.V. Quine, Paul
Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty. This view is most associated with
philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland although philosophers such as
Daniel Dennett would also consider themselves eliminativists for many
aspects of psychology. Philosopher Dale Jacquette has claimed that
Occam\'s Razor is the rationale behind eliminativism and reductionism.

The most common argument against eliminative materialism is the argument
from qualia, which is deployed in various forms by Thomas Nagel, Frank
Jackson, and many others. Perhaps the most powerful argument against
eliminativism is that experience itself is many things simultaneously;
it is, as Aristotle points out, immediate and hence is not composed of
judgements.

## Mysterianism

New Mysterianism is a philosophy proposing that certain problems (in
particular, consciousness) will never be explained.

Owen Flanagan noted in his 1991 book \"Science of the Mind\" that some
modern thinkers have suggested that consciousness might never be
completely explained. Flanagan called them \"the new mysterians\" after
the rock group ? and the Mysterians. The term originated with the
Japanese alien-invasion film The Mysterians. The \"old mysterians\" are
thinkers throughout history who have put forward a similar position.
They include Leibniz, Dr Johnson, and Thomas Huxley. The latter said,
\"How is it that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness
comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed his
lamp.\" \[6, p. 229, quote\]

Noam Chomsky distinguishes between problems, which seem solvable, at
least in principle, through scientific methods, and mysteries which do
not, even in principle. He notes that the cognitive capabilities of all
organisms are limited by biology, e.g. a mouse will never speak. In the
same way, certain problems may be beyond our understanding.

The term New Mysterianism has been extended by some writers to encompass
the wider philosophical position that humans don\'t have the
intellectual ability to understand many hard problems, not just the
problem of consciousness, at a scientific level. This position is also
known as Anti-Constructive Naturalism.

For example, in the mind-body problem, emergent materialism claims that
humans aren\'t smart enough to determine \"the relationship between mind
and matter.\" \[4\] Strong agnosticism is a religious application of
this position.

Colin McGinn is the leading proponent of the New Mysterian position.

Critics argue this philosophy isn\'t useful and encourages capitulation.
One critic noted:

the extreme \"Mysterian\" position, that there are vital issues forever
beyond our reach, is in many ways deeply unsatisfying. \[7\]

References

\[1\] McGinn, Colin - The Problem of Consciousness

\[2\] McGinn, Colin - Problems in Philosophy: the limits of enquiry

\[3\] McGinn, Colin - The Mysterious Flame

\[4\] Blackburn, Simon - Think: A compelling introduction to philosophy,
chapter two

\[5\] Flanagan, Owen - The Science of the Mind (1991) 2ed MIT Press,
Cambridge

\[6\] Horgan, John - The Undiscovered Mind (1999), Phoenix,

## Idealism and panpsychism

### Idealism


# Consciousness Studies/Contemporary Explanations#Eliminativism

*This section is about the types of theory that have been advanced to
explain consciousness. Specific explanations should be entered as
separate pages.*

## Introduction

Explanations of consciousness fall into three broad categories, those
that attempt to explain the empirical experience called consciousness
with scientific theories, those that seek to find some way in which
consciousness could be explained by digital computers or nineteenth
century materialism by redefining or eliminating experience and those
that regard consciousness as inexplicable or supernatural.

## Identity theory of mind

The identity theory of mind, or type physicalism, holds that the mind is
identical to the brain. Type physicalists identify qualia and the form
of experience with brain activity. They argue that \"mind states\" have
physical causes and physical effects - thus the mind states themselves
must be physical; a non-physical \"middle step\" is superfluous.

Type physicalism has not yet gained widespread support because although
brain activity that correlates with experience has been found everywhere
in the brain, no set of brain activity that is phenomenal consciousness
itself has yet been found - although this is not surprising because
neuronal spike activity is unlikely to host phenomenal consciousness -
see scientific theories of
consciousness.

## Functionalism

Functionalism was developed as a theory of the mind-body problem because
of objections to identity theory and logical behaviourism. Its core idea
is that the mental states can be accounted for without taking into
account the underlying physical medium (the neurons), instead attending
to higher-level functions such as beliefs, desires, and emotions. It is
a theory of behaviour and access consciousness and so from the outset
avoids any explanation of phenomenal consciousness, substituting beliefs
and judgements (functions) for entities such as qualia.

According to functionalism, the mental states that make up consciousness
can essentially be defined as complex interactions between different
functional processes. Because these processes are not limited to a
particular physical state or physical medium, they can be realized in
multiple ways, including, theoretically, within non-biological
systems.This affords consciousness the opportunity to exist in non-human
minds that are based on algorithmic processors such as digital
computers. This is a highly contentious conjecture although
non-functionalist physicalists might agree that machines that are not
digital computers could possess consciousness through an identity theory
of mind - see The problem of machine and digital
consciousness.

Functionalism\'s explanation of consciousness, or the mental, is best
understood when considering the analogy made by functionalists between
the mind and the modern digital computer. More specifically, the analogy
is made to a \"machine\" capable of computing any given algorithm (i.e.
a Turing machine). This machine would involve:

Data input (the senses in humans), data output (both behaviour and
memory), functional states (mental states), the ability to move from one
functional state into another, and the definition of functional states
with reference to the part they play in the operation of the entire
entity - i.e. in reference to the other functional states. So long as
the same process was achieved, the \"physical stuff\" \-- that being
computer hardware or biological structure \-- could achieve
consciousness.

This variety of functionalism was developed by Hilary Putnam. One of the
major proponents of functionalism is Jerry Fodor.

Further reading:

Block, N. (1996). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan,
1996
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/functionalism.pdf>

## Dualism

### Substance dualism

This theory proposes that phenomenal experience occurs in a non-physical
place. In Cartesian Dualism the non-physical place is an unextended soul
that looks out at the brain. In Reid\'s Natural Dualism the non-physical
place is a point-soul that looks out at the world.

### Property dualism

Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the
appropriate way (i.e., organized in the way that living human bodies are
organized), mental properties emerge. Property dualism is a branch of
emergent materialism. The appeal to emergentism deserves closer
attention. Scientific theories often deal with emergent phenomena, for
instance an enzyme consists of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, manganese and
oxygen and from this catalytic action emerges. The theory of enzyme
structure and the action of this structure on the substrate explains how
this emergence occurs. Notice that the theory of enzymes explains the
emergence of catalytic activity; emergence does not explain the theory.
In science the statement that some property will \'emerge\' means that
there will be a theory that accounts for this property. Property
dualism, by appealing to emergence, is stating that some theory of
consciousness will be possible. In other words it is an explanation that
proposes that the explanation is yet to be known.

## Intentionalism

## Higher order thought

*This section is a stub and needs expansion*

## Eliminativism

Eliminative materialism is the school of thought that argues for an
absolute version of materialism with respect to mental entities and
mental vocabulary. It principally argues that our common-sense
understanding of the mind (often called \'folk psychology\') is not a
viable theory on which to base scientific investigation, and therefore
no coherent neural basis will be found for many such everyday
psychological concepts (such as belief or intention) and that behaviour
and experience can only be adequately explained on the biological level.

Eliminative materialists therefore believe that consciousness does not
exist and that the concept will eventually be eliminated as neuroscience
progresses. Similarly, they argue that folk psychological concepts such
as belief, desire and intention do not have any consistent neurological
substrate.

Proponents of this view often make parallels to previous scientific
theories which have been eliminated, such as the four humours theory of
medicine, the phlogiston theory of combustion and \'vital force\' theory
of life. In these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions
of these theories, but rejected them as obsolete. Eliminative
materialists argue that folk psychology is headed the same way.
According to W.V. Quine it will take tens of years before folk
psychology will be replaced with real science. (see Phenomenal
consciousness and access
consciousness).

Eliminative materialism was first defended by W.V. Quine, Paul
Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty. This view is most associated with
philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland although philosophers such as
Daniel Dennett would also consider themselves eliminativists for many
aspects of psychology. Philosopher Dale Jacquette has claimed that
Occam\'s Razor is the rationale behind eliminativism and reductionism.

The most common argument against eliminative materialism is the argument
from qualia, which is deployed in various forms by Thomas Nagel, Frank
Jackson, and many others. Perhaps the most powerful argument against
eliminativism is that experience itself is many things simultaneously;
it is, as Aristotle points out, immediate and hence is not composed of
judgements.

## Mysterianism

New Mysterianism is a philosophy proposing that certain problems (in
particular, consciousness) will never be explained.

Owen Flanagan noted in his 1991 book \"Science of the Mind\" that some
modern thinkers have suggested that consciousness might never be
completely explained. Flanagan called them \"the new mysterians\" after
the rock group ? and the Mysterians. The term originated with the
Japanese alien-invasion film The Mysterians. The \"old mysterians\" are
thinkers throughout history who have put forward a similar position.
They include Leibniz, Dr Johnson, and Thomas Huxley. The latter said,
\"How is it that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness
comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed his
lamp.\" \[6, p. 229, quote\]

Noam Chomsky distinguishes between problems, which seem solvable, at
least in principle, through scientific methods, and mysteries which do
not, even in principle. He notes that the cognitive capabilities of all
organisms are limited by biology, e.g. a mouse will never speak. In the
same way, certain problems may be beyond our understanding.

The term New Mysterianism has been extended by some writers to encompass
the wider philosophical position that humans don\'t have the
intellectual ability to understand many hard problems, not just the
problem of consciousness, at a scientific level. This position is also
known as Anti-Constructive Naturalism.

For example, in the mind-body problem, emergent materialism claims that
humans aren\'t smart enough to determine \"the relationship between mind
and matter.\" \[4\] Strong agnosticism is a religious application of
this position.

Colin McGinn is the leading proponent of the New Mysterian position.

Critics argue this philosophy isn\'t useful and encourages capitulation.
One critic noted:

the extreme \"Mysterian\" position, that there are vital issues forever
beyond our reach, is in many ways deeply unsatisfying. \[7\]

References

\[1\] McGinn, Colin - The Problem of Consciousness

\[2\] McGinn, Colin - Problems in Philosophy: the limits of enquiry

\[3\] McGinn, Colin - The Mysterious Flame

\[4\] Blackburn, Simon - Think: A compelling introduction to philosophy,
chapter two

\[5\] Flanagan, Owen - The Science of the Mind (1991) 2ed MIT Press,
Cambridge

\[6\] Horgan, John - The Undiscovered Mind (1999), Phoenix,

## Idealism and panpsychism

### Idealism


# Consciousness Studies/Contemporary Explanations#Mysterianism

*This section is about the types of theory that have been advanced to
explain consciousness. Specific explanations should be entered as
separate pages.*

## Introduction

Explanations of consciousness fall into three broad categories, those
that attempt to explain the empirical experience called consciousness
with scientific theories, those that seek to find some way in which
consciousness could be explained by digital computers or nineteenth
century materialism by redefining or eliminating experience and those
that regard consciousness as inexplicable or supernatural.

## Identity theory of mind

The identity theory of mind, or type physicalism, holds that the mind is
identical to the brain. Type physicalists identify qualia and the form
of experience with brain activity. They argue that \"mind states\" have
physical causes and physical effects - thus the mind states themselves
must be physical; a non-physical \"middle step\" is superfluous.

Type physicalism has not yet gained widespread support because although
brain activity that correlates with experience has been found everywhere
in the brain, no set of brain activity that is phenomenal consciousness
itself has yet been found - although this is not surprising because
neuronal spike activity is unlikely to host phenomenal consciousness -
see scientific theories of
consciousness.

## Functionalism

Functionalism was developed as a theory of the mind-body problem because
of objections to identity theory and logical behaviourism. Its core idea
is that the mental states can be accounted for without taking into
account the underlying physical medium (the neurons), instead attending
to higher-level functions such as beliefs, desires, and emotions. It is
a theory of behaviour and access consciousness and so from the outset
avoids any explanation of phenomenal consciousness, substituting beliefs
and judgements (functions) for entities such as qualia.

According to functionalism, the mental states that make up consciousness
can essentially be defined as complex interactions between different
functional processes. Because these processes are not limited to a
particular physical state or physical medium, they can be realized in
multiple ways, including, theoretically, within non-biological
systems.This affords consciousness the opportunity to exist in non-human
minds that are based on algorithmic processors such as digital
computers. This is a highly contentious conjecture although
non-functionalist physicalists might agree that machines that are not
digital computers could possess consciousness through an identity theory
of mind - see The problem of machine and digital
consciousness.

Functionalism\'s explanation of consciousness, or the mental, is best
understood when considering the analogy made by functionalists between
the mind and the modern digital computer. More specifically, the analogy
is made to a \"machine\" capable of computing any given algorithm (i.e.
a Turing machine). This machine would involve:

Data input (the senses in humans), data output (both behaviour and
memory), functional states (mental states), the ability to move from one
functional state into another, and the definition of functional states
with reference to the part they play in the operation of the entire
entity - i.e. in reference to the other functional states. So long as
the same process was achieved, the \"physical stuff\" \-- that being
computer hardware or biological structure \-- could achieve
consciousness.

This variety of functionalism was developed by Hilary Putnam. One of the
major proponents of functionalism is Jerry Fodor.

Further reading:

Block, N. (1996). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan,
1996
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/functionalism.pdf>

## Dualism

### Substance dualism

This theory proposes that phenomenal experience occurs in a non-physical
place. In Cartesian Dualism the non-physical place is an unextended soul
that looks out at the brain. In Reid\'s Natural Dualism the non-physical
place is a point-soul that looks out at the world.

### Property dualism

Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the
appropriate way (i.e., organized in the way that living human bodies are
organized), mental properties emerge. Property dualism is a branch of
emergent materialism. The appeal to emergentism deserves closer
attention. Scientific theories often deal with emergent phenomena, for
instance an enzyme consists of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, manganese and
oxygen and from this catalytic action emerges. The theory of enzyme
structure and the action of this structure on the substrate explains how
this emergence occurs. Notice that the theory of enzymes explains the
emergence of catalytic activity; emergence does not explain the theory.
In science the statement that some property will \'emerge\' means that
there will be a theory that accounts for this property. Property
dualism, by appealing to emergence, is stating that some theory of
consciousness will be possible. In other words it is an explanation that
proposes that the explanation is yet to be known.

## Intentionalism

## Higher order thought

*This section is a stub and needs expansion*

## Eliminativism

Eliminative materialism is the school of thought that argues for an
absolute version of materialism with respect to mental entities and
mental vocabulary. It principally argues that our common-sense
understanding of the mind (often called \'folk psychology\') is not a
viable theory on which to base scientific investigation, and therefore
no coherent neural basis will be found for many such everyday
psychological concepts (such as belief or intention) and that behaviour
and experience can only be adequately explained on the biological level.

Eliminative materialists therefore believe that consciousness does not
exist and that the concept will eventually be eliminated as neuroscience
progresses. Similarly, they argue that folk psychological concepts such
as belief, desire and intention do not have any consistent neurological
substrate.

Proponents of this view often make parallels to previous scientific
theories which have been eliminated, such as the four humours theory of
medicine, the phlogiston theory of combustion and \'vital force\' theory
of life. In these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions
of these theories, but rejected them as obsolete. Eliminative
materialists argue that folk psychology is headed the same way.
According to W.V. Quine it will take tens of years before folk
psychology will be replaced with real science. (see Phenomenal
consciousness and access
consciousness).

Eliminative materialism was first defended by W.V. Quine, Paul
Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty. This view is most associated with
philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland although philosophers such as
Daniel Dennett would also consider themselves eliminativists for many
aspects of psychology. Philosopher Dale Jacquette has claimed that
Occam\'s Razor is the rationale behind eliminativism and reductionism.

The most common argument against eliminative materialism is the argument
from qualia, which is deployed in various forms by Thomas Nagel, Frank
Jackson, and many others. Perhaps the most powerful argument against
eliminativism is that experience itself is many things simultaneously;
it is, as Aristotle points out, immediate and hence is not composed of
judgements.

## Mysterianism

New Mysterianism is a philosophy proposing that certain problems (in
particular, consciousness) will never be explained.

Owen Flanagan noted in his 1991 book \"Science of the Mind\" that some
modern thinkers have suggested that consciousness might never be
completely explained. Flanagan called them \"the new mysterians\" after
the rock group ? and the Mysterians. The term originated with the
Japanese alien-invasion film The Mysterians. The \"old mysterians\" are
thinkers throughout history who have put forward a similar position.
They include Leibniz, Dr Johnson, and Thomas Huxley. The latter said,
\"How is it that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness
comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed his
lamp.\" \[6, p. 229, quote\]

Noam Chomsky distinguishes between problems, which seem solvable, at
least in principle, through scientific methods, and mysteries which do
not, even in principle. He notes that the cognitive capabilities of all
organisms are limited by biology, e.g. a mouse will never speak. In the
same way, certain problems may be beyond our understanding.

The term New Mysterianism has been extended by some writers to encompass
the wider philosophical position that humans don\'t have the
intellectual ability to understand many hard problems, not just the
problem of consciousness, at a scientific level. This position is also
known as Anti-Constructive Naturalism.

For example, in the mind-body problem, emergent materialism claims that
humans aren\'t smart enough to determine \"the relationship between mind
and matter.\" \[4\] Strong agnosticism is a religious application of
this position.

Colin McGinn is the leading proponent of the New Mysterian position.

Critics argue this philosophy isn\'t useful and encourages capitulation.
One critic noted:

the extreme \"Mysterian\" position, that there are vital issues forever
beyond our reach, is in many ways deeply unsatisfying. \[7\]

References

\[1\] McGinn, Colin - The Problem of Consciousness

\[2\] McGinn, Colin - Problems in Philosophy: the limits of enquiry

\[3\] McGinn, Colin - The Mysterious Flame

\[4\] Blackburn, Simon - Think: A compelling introduction to philosophy,
chapter two

\[5\] Flanagan, Owen - The Science of the Mind (1991) 2ed MIT Press,
Cambridge

\[6\] Horgan, John - The Undiscovered Mind (1999), Phoenix,

## Idealism and panpsychism

### Idealism


# Consciousness Studies/Contemporary Explanations#Idealism and panpsychism

*This section is about the types of theory that have been advanced to
explain consciousness. Specific explanations should be entered as
separate pages.*

## Introduction

Explanations of consciousness fall into three broad categories, those
that attempt to explain the empirical experience called consciousness
with scientific theories, those that seek to find some way in which
consciousness could be explained by digital computers or nineteenth
century materialism by redefining or eliminating experience and those
that regard consciousness as inexplicable or supernatural.

## Identity theory of mind

The identity theory of mind, or type physicalism, holds that the mind is
identical to the brain. Type physicalists identify qualia and the form
of experience with brain activity. They argue that \"mind states\" have
physical causes and physical effects - thus the mind states themselves
must be physical; a non-physical \"middle step\" is superfluous.

Type physicalism has not yet gained widespread support because although
brain activity that correlates with experience has been found everywhere
in the brain, no set of brain activity that is phenomenal consciousness
itself has yet been found - although this is not surprising because
neuronal spike activity is unlikely to host phenomenal consciousness -
see scientific theories of
consciousness.

## Functionalism

Functionalism was developed as a theory of the mind-body problem because
of objections to identity theory and logical behaviourism. Its core idea
is that the mental states can be accounted for without taking into
account the underlying physical medium (the neurons), instead attending
to higher-level functions such as beliefs, desires, and emotions. It is
a theory of behaviour and access consciousness and so from the outset
avoids any explanation of phenomenal consciousness, substituting beliefs
and judgements (functions) for entities such as qualia.

According to functionalism, the mental states that make up consciousness
can essentially be defined as complex interactions between different
functional processes. Because these processes are not limited to a
particular physical state or physical medium, they can be realized in
multiple ways, including, theoretically, within non-biological
systems.This affords consciousness the opportunity to exist in non-human
minds that are based on algorithmic processors such as digital
computers. This is a highly contentious conjecture although
non-functionalist physicalists might agree that machines that are not
digital computers could possess consciousness through an identity theory
of mind - see The problem of machine and digital
consciousness.

Functionalism\'s explanation of consciousness, or the mental, is best
understood when considering the analogy made by functionalists between
the mind and the modern digital computer. More specifically, the analogy
is made to a \"machine\" capable of computing any given algorithm (i.e.
a Turing machine). This machine would involve:

Data input (the senses in humans), data output (both behaviour and
memory), functional states (mental states), the ability to move from one
functional state into another, and the definition of functional states
with reference to the part they play in the operation of the entire
entity - i.e. in reference to the other functional states. So long as
the same process was achieved, the \"physical stuff\" \-- that being
computer hardware or biological structure \-- could achieve
consciousness.

This variety of functionalism was developed by Hilary Putnam. One of the
major proponents of functionalism is Jerry Fodor.

Further reading:

Block, N. (1996). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan,
1996
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/functionalism.pdf>

## Dualism

### Substance dualism

This theory proposes that phenomenal experience occurs in a non-physical
place. In Cartesian Dualism the non-physical place is an unextended soul
that looks out at the brain. In Reid\'s Natural Dualism the non-physical
place is a point-soul that looks out at the world.

### Property dualism

Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the
appropriate way (i.e., organized in the way that living human bodies are
organized), mental properties emerge. Property dualism is a branch of
emergent materialism. The appeal to emergentism deserves closer
attention. Scientific theories often deal with emergent phenomena, for
instance an enzyme consists of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, manganese and
oxygen and from this catalytic action emerges. The theory of enzyme
structure and the action of this structure on the substrate explains how
this emergence occurs. Notice that the theory of enzymes explains the
emergence of catalytic activity; emergence does not explain the theory.
In science the statement that some property will \'emerge\' means that
there will be a theory that accounts for this property. Property
dualism, by appealing to emergence, is stating that some theory of
consciousness will be possible. In other words it is an explanation that
proposes that the explanation is yet to be known.

## Intentionalism

## Higher order thought

*This section is a stub and needs expansion*

## Eliminativism

Eliminative materialism is the school of thought that argues for an
absolute version of materialism with respect to mental entities and
mental vocabulary. It principally argues that our common-sense
understanding of the mind (often called \'folk psychology\') is not a
viable theory on which to base scientific investigation, and therefore
no coherent neural basis will be found for many such everyday
psychological concepts (such as belief or intention) and that behaviour
and experience can only be adequately explained on the biological level.

Eliminative materialists therefore believe that consciousness does not
exist and that the concept will eventually be eliminated as neuroscience
progresses. Similarly, they argue that folk psychological concepts such
as belief, desire and intention do not have any consistent neurological
substrate.

Proponents of this view often make parallels to previous scientific
theories which have been eliminated, such as the four humours theory of
medicine, the phlogiston theory of combustion and \'vital force\' theory
of life. In these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions
of these theories, but rejected them as obsolete. Eliminative
materialists argue that folk psychology is headed the same way.
According to W.V. Quine it will take tens of years before folk
psychology will be replaced with real science. (see Phenomenal
consciousness and access
consciousness).

Eliminative materialism was first defended by W.V. Quine, Paul
Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty. This view is most associated with
philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland although philosophers such as
Daniel Dennett would also consider themselves eliminativists for many
aspects of psychology. Philosopher Dale Jacquette has claimed that
Occam\'s Razor is the rationale behind eliminativism and reductionism.

The most common argument against eliminative materialism is the argument
from qualia, which is deployed in various forms by Thomas Nagel, Frank
Jackson, and many others. Perhaps the most powerful argument against
eliminativism is that experience itself is many things simultaneously;
it is, as Aristotle points out, immediate and hence is not composed of
judgements.

## Mysterianism

New Mysterianism is a philosophy proposing that certain problems (in
particular, consciousness) will never be explained.

Owen Flanagan noted in his 1991 book \"Science of the Mind\" that some
modern thinkers have suggested that consciousness might never be
completely explained. Flanagan called them \"the new mysterians\" after
the rock group ? and the Mysterians. The term originated with the
Japanese alien-invasion film The Mysterians. The \"old mysterians\" are
thinkers throughout history who have put forward a similar position.
They include Leibniz, Dr Johnson, and Thomas Huxley. The latter said,
\"How is it that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness
comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed his
lamp.\" \[6, p. 229, quote\]

Noam Chomsky distinguishes between problems, which seem solvable, at
least in principle, through scientific methods, and mysteries which do
not, even in principle. He notes that the cognitive capabilities of all
organisms are limited by biology, e.g. a mouse will never speak. In the
same way, certain problems may be beyond our understanding.

The term New Mysterianism has been extended by some writers to encompass
the wider philosophical position that humans don\'t have the
intellectual ability to understand many hard problems, not just the
problem of consciousness, at a scientific level. This position is also
known as Anti-Constructive Naturalism.

For example, in the mind-body problem, emergent materialism claims that
humans aren\'t smart enough to determine \"the relationship between mind
and matter.\" \[4\] Strong agnosticism is a religious application of
this position.

Colin McGinn is the leading proponent of the New Mysterian position.

Critics argue this philosophy isn\'t useful and encourages capitulation.
One critic noted:

the extreme \"Mysterian\" position, that there are vital issues forever
beyond our reach, is in many ways deeply unsatisfying. \[7\]

References

\[1\] McGinn, Colin - The Problem of Consciousness

\[2\] McGinn, Colin - Problems in Philosophy: the limits of enquiry

\[3\] McGinn, Colin - The Mysterious Flame

\[4\] Blackburn, Simon - Think: A compelling introduction to philosophy,
chapter two

\[5\] Flanagan, Owen - The Science of the Mind (1991) 2ed MIT Press,
Cambridge

\[6\] Horgan, John - The Undiscovered Mind (1999), Phoenix,

## Idealism and panpsychism

### Idealism


# Consciousness Studies/Other Explanations

Consciousness-only is the foundation of a buddhist theory known as
vijnanavada. Proponents, notably the Yogacara school, suggest that the
sum of experience exists only in our minds. Philosophers recognition of
this view as subjective idealism is a matter of discussion because these
traditions often deny the existence of ontological subject. These views
are rooted in the denial of existence of any kind of ontological
substance (as Matter, Soul, God, etc.). Consciousness-only views can
also be found in taoist philosophy, notably Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu.


# Consciousness Studies/Other Explanations#Consciousness-only

Consciousness-only is the foundation of a buddhist theory known as
vijnanavada. Proponents, notably the Yogacara school, suggest that the
sum of experience exists only in our minds. Philosophers recognition of
this view as subjective idealism is a matter of discussion because these
traditions often deny the existence of ontological subject. These views
are rooted in the denial of existence of any kind of ontological
substance (as Matter, Soul, God, etc.). Consciousness-only views can
also be found in taoist philosophy, notably Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu.


# Consciousness Studies/BioPsychoSociology

This brief summary is an illustration of an attempt to model a
multidisciplinary biopsychosocial (bps) understanding of
self-consciousness seen from the perspective of both scientific
methodology and metaphysical logic where the empirical and the
inferential provide a seamless blend of the ontological brain with the
epistemological mind.

The achievement of self consciousness is the crucial mental state
allowing the human species to monitor the equilibrium state of
biopsychosocial ongoing contingencies especially when confronting
life-threatening circumstances. The inherited proto-semantics and
acquired language guide the required recursive co-generation of the
appropriate language and thought to meet the contingency. Thus informed,
it allows humans to elaborate effective adaptive short and long range
responses.

## Definition of terms

Bps model uses some unusual definitions of terms. These are explained
below.

\"Sense-phenomenal awareness\" is defined as an unconscious,
life-preserving, adaptive reflex response which may occur without
qualia. It originates at a sensory receptor, wherever located in the
body economy, and ends at an effector organ, glandular or muscular. -
Phenomenal consciousness/awareness is a term normally reserved for
experience containing qualia in other analyses.

System/network \"awareness\" is defined in the bps model as that
unconscious processing occurring during the integration of the
participating neural network modules leading to a stereotyped adaptive
response. - normally awareness is defined as knowledge that a conscious
state is present.

Sense-phenomenal awareness may become a conscious experience when
relevant inferential networks (e.g., memory, emotions, etc.)are
subsequently accessed, including inner-language processors. When
experiences are recalled the qualia that arise are called \"conceptual
qualia\".

\"Access consciousness\" is described as being initially an unconscious
process that makes it possible for a life-preserving, reflex-driven and
\'unconscious\' sense-phenomenal state of mind to become conscious by
making use of available, pertinent and concurrent mental states to
interact with the novel sense-phenomenal input, a potentially
life-threatening event.

\"Proto-linguistic organ\" or \'plo\' is described as the first line of
defense to guard against life-threatening stimuli arising from
sense-phenomenal inputs (external, visceral or proprioceptive). Housed
in the amygdaloidal complex, it represents the inherited proto-semantic
(primitive \'meanings\') database responsible for activating the
corresponding unconscious fight/flight adaptive Cannon effector
response.

\"Proto-semantic\" input from plo is described as a required initial
participant in the subsequent recursive co-generation of inner language
and thought as may be required in the eventual elaboration of
\"conceptual consciousness\".

## Higher order consciousness theory

The \'bps\' model of \'consciousness\' is a high order consciousness
theory in which an unconscious, non inferential phenomenal state
(established from either online sensory receptor input or offline memory
input), when confronting a novel life-threatening event, triggers an
initially unconscious access intermediate stage where relevant modular
networks are incorporated including Broca\'s language processor
recursively co-generating in the process the \'inner language\'
narrative state and accompanying thought, a conscious high order mental
state, all of which causally precedes (or is simultaneous with) the
adaptive response (if any, as we see in dreams).

Notice that bps considers phenomenal states to be non-conscious, this
would confuse the ordinary reader who expects the Kantian term
\"phenomenal\" to be equivalent to the term \"conscious experience\".
Only the higher order mental state is regarded as \"conscious\".

The \'bps\' model basically describes two co-existing, ongoing mental
states, one non-inferential subconscious \'gut feeling\' inner sense
(BOP, a variant of Lycan\'s 1996 HOP) and an initially non-inferential
unconscious accessing of narrative pathways leading to (recursive
co-generation of \'inner language\' and thought is an open option) the
eventual production of higher order thought (HOT) whose content is the
feeling that oneself is the subject of self-consciousness.

In other words, according to the \'bps\' theory, feelings are not part
of consciousness until higher order thought occurs, i.e., qualia needs a
context.

In \'bps\' theory not even self-consciousness, of which \'qualia\' may
arguably be considered a subset of, has revealed its constitutive
secrets. This means that bps is a theory of brain processing rather than
a theory of the content of consciousness (qualia) or consciousness
itself except when it ventures into the postulate that language and
self-consciousness are recursively co-generated or co-causal. More
controversial is the mediation of the amygdaloid complex (plo) in
providing inherited primitive \'meanings\' (protosemantic codelets) to
initiate Chomskian language processing and thought co-generation, i.e.,
protosemantics precedes syntax structuring. For a more complete
exposition see:

Further Reading: <http://delaSierra-Sheffer.net> For a quantum field
perspective see also: <http://www.biopsychosociology.org>
<http://spaces.msn.com/angelldls/>