# Consciousness Studies/The Conflict2#Direct realism

*This part of this section is about the where and when of the experience
called consciousness. Is it in the world, in the brain or are the world
and brain within it?*

## Phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness

Block(1995) drew attention to the way that there appear to be two types
of consciousness: *phenomenal* consciousness and *access* consciousness:

`Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally`\
`conscious  aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that`\
`state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is `\
`availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech `\
`and action. (Block 1995).`

*See the section on Ned Block\'s
ideas
for a deeper coverage of his approach to access and phenomenal
consciousness.*

Block uses Nagel\'s famous (1974) paper, \"What is it like to be a
bat?\" as an exemplary description of phenomenal consciousness.
Excellent descriptions have also been proffered by the empiricist
philosophers who gave lengthy descriptions of consciousness as partly
experience itself. Although Block has formalised the idea of phenomenal
and access consciousness similar ideas have also been put forward by
many philosophers including Kant and Whitehead.

Access consciousness has two interpretations, in the first, used by
Block, it applies to the functions that appear to operate on phenomenal
consciousness. In the second, used by the behaviourists and
eliminativists, it is some property of the functions of the brain that
can be called \'consciousness\'.

This division between phenomenal and functional aspects of consciousness
is useful because it emphasises the idea of phenomenal consciousness as
observation rather than action. Some philosophers such as Huxley in
1874, have taken the view that because phenomenal consciousness appears
to have no function it is of no importance or cannot exist. James (1879)
introduced the term \"epiphenomenalism\" to summarise the idea that
consciousness has no function.

The idea that phenomenal consciousness cannot exist is a type of
*Eliminativism* (also known as Eliminative Materialism). Eliminativism
owes much to the work of Sellars(1956) and Feyerbend (1963). Dennett
(1978) applied Eliminativism to phenomenal consciousness and denies that
pain is real. Others such as Rey(1997) have also applied eliminativism
to phenomenal consciousness.

Dennett (1988) redefines consciousness in terms of access consciousness
alone, he argues that \"Everything real has properties, and since I
don\'t deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious
experience has properties\". Having related all consciousness to
properties he then declares that these properties are actually
judgements of properties. He considers judgements of the properties of
consciousness to be identical to the properties themselves. He writes:

`<font face="times">`{=html}\"The infallibilist line on qualia treats
them as properties of one\'s experience one cannot in principle
misdiscover, and this is a mysterious doctrine (at least as mysterious
as papal infallibility) unless we shift the emphasis a little and treat
qualia as logical constructs out of subjects\' qualia-judgments: a
subject\'s experience has the quale F if and only if the subject judges
his experience to have quale F. \"`</font>`{=html}

Having identified \"properties\" with \"judgement of properties\" he can
then show that the judgements are insubstantial, hence the properties
are insubstantial and hence the qualia are insubstantial or even
non-existent. Dennett concludes that qualia can be rejected as
non-existent:

`<font face="times">`{=html}\"So when we look one last time at our
original characterization of qualia, as ineffable, intrinsic, private,
directly apprehensible properties of experience, we find that there is
nothing to fill the bill. In their place are relatively or practically
ineffable public properties we can refer to indirectly via reference to
our private property-detectors\-- private only in the sense of
idiosyncratic. And insofar as we wish to cling to our subjective
authority about the occurrence within us of states of certain types or
with certain properties, we can have some authority\--not infallibility
or incorrigibility, but something better than sheer guessing\--but only
if we restrict ourselves to relational, extrinsic properties like the
power of certain internal states of ours to provoke acts of apparent re-
identification. So contrary to what seems obvious at first blush, there
simply are no qualia at all. \" (Dennett 1988)`</font>`{=html}

Dennett\'s asserts that \"a subject\'s experience has the quale F if and
only if the subject judges his experience to have quale F\". This is a
statement of the belief that qualia are the same as processes such as
judgements. Processes such as judgements are flows of data where one
state examines a previous state in a succession over time and embody
what Whitehead called the \"materialist\" concept of time. Dennett does
not consider how a scientific concept of time might affect his argument.

Dennett\'s argument has been persuasive and there are now many
philosophers and neuroscientists who believe that the problem of
phenomenal consciousness does not exist. This means that, to them, what
we call \'consciousness\' can only be a property of the functions
performed by the brain and body. According to these philosophers only
access consciousness exists.

Those who support the idea of phenomenal consciousness also tend to
frame it in terms of nineteenth century theory where one state examines
a previous state in a succession over time, for instance Edelman(1993)
places the past in memories at an instant and time within experience is
explained as continuing modelling processes:

`<font face="times">`{=html}\"Primary consciousness is the state of
being mentally aware of things in the world\--of having mental images in
the present. But it is not accompanied by any sense of a person with a
past and a future\.... In contrast, higher-order consciousness involves
the recognition by a thinking subject of his or her own acts or
affections. It embodies a model of the personal, and of the past and the
future as well as the present. It exhibits direct awareness\--the
noninferential or immediate awareness of mental episodes without the
involvement of sense organs or receptors. It is what we humans have in
addition to primary consciousness. We are conscious of being
conscious.\" `</font>`{=html}

Block(2004) also suggests this flow from state to state in his idea of
\"Reflexivity\" where our idea of familiarity with an object is due to
one state being analysed by another:

`<font face="times">`{=html}\"Thus in the "conscious" case, the subject
must have a state that is about the subject's own perceptual experience
(looking familiar) and thus conscious in what might be termed a
"reflexive" sense. An experience is conscious in this sense just in case
it is the object of another of the subject's states; for example, one
has a thought to the effect that one has that experience. The reflexive
sense of \'consciousness\' contrasts with phenomenality, which perhaps
attaches to some states which are not the objects of other mental
states. Reflexive consciousness might better be called 'awareness' than
'consciousness'. Reflexivity is phenomenality plus something else
(reflection) and that opens up the possibility in principle for
phenomenality without reflection. For example, it is at least
conceptually possible for there to be two people in pain, one of whom is
introspecting the pain the other not. (Perhaps infants or animals can
have pain but don't introspect it.) The first is reflexively conscious
of the pain, but both have phenomenally conscious states, since pain is
by its very nature a phenomenally conscious state. \"`</font>`{=html}

Both Block and Edelman allow phenomenal consciousness, our experience,
as an unexplained phenomenon. Block, Edelman and also Dennett\'s ideas
of consciousness are shown in the illustration below:

![](Constudphen.gif "Constudphen.gif")

This model differs from the empirical reports of phenomenal
consciousness that were considered earlier. According to the empirical
reports the present moment in our experience is extended so the
succession of outputs or stages of access consciousness could constitute
the contents of phenomenal consciousness. In other words phenomenal
consciousness is composed of periods of access consciousness. This is
how it seems to the empiricist and in our own experience but how such a
state could be explained in terms of brain activity is highly
problematical. Given that nineteenth century ideas cannot explain such a
state a scientific explanation will be required.

The idea that phenomenal consciousness misrepresents or \"misdiscovers\"
itself (Dennett 1988) deserves further discussion. According to
materialism the present instant has no duration so can only be known in
succeeding instants as a report or memory and this could be wrong.
Whitehead considered that this viewpoint originates in an archaic view
of science, particularly the concept of time in science:

\"The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries accepted as their natural
philosophy a certain circle of concepts which were as rigid and definite
as those of the philosophy of the middle ages, and were accepted with as
little critical research. I will call this natural philosophy
\'materialism.\' Not only were men of science materialists, but also
adherents of all schools of philosophy. The idealists only differed from
the philosophic materialists on question of the alignment of nature in
reference to mind. But no one had any doubt that the philosophy of
nature considered in itself was of the type which I have called
materialism. It is the philosophy which I have already examined in my
two lectures of this course preceding the present one. It can be
summarised as the belief that nature is an aggregate of material and
that this material exists in some sense at each successive member of a
one-dimensional series of extensionless instants of time. Furthermore
the mutual relations of the material entities at each instant formed
these entities into a spatial configuration in an unbounded space. It
would seem that space\-\--on this theory-would be as instantaneous as
the instants, and that some explanation is required of the relations
between the successive instantaneous spaces. The materialistic theory is
however silent on this point; and the succession of instantaneous spaces
is tacitly combined into one persistent space. This theory is a purely
intellectual rendering of experience which has had the luck to get
itself formulated at the dawn of scientific thought. It has dominated
the language and the imagination of science since science flourished in
Alexandria, with the result that it is now hardly possible to speak
without appearing to assume its immediate obviousness.\" (Whitehead
1920).

## Direct Realism and Direct Perception

Direct Realism proposes that phenomenal experience is directly objects
in the world without any intervening representation. It is motivated by
the belief that the Problem of Regression, the Subject-Object Paradox
and the recursion form of the Homunculus arguments show that phenomenal
consciousness cannot occur in the brain alone. Direct Realists reason
that if phenomenal consciousness cannot be things in the brain then it
must be something outside the brain.

There are two principle types of Direct Realism: Natural Dualism and
Behaviourism (both Radical and Analytical). Some behaviourists use the
term "Direct Perception" rather than Direct Realism and consider that
only the invariant parts of perception are direct (see for instance
Michaels and Carello 1981). Thomas Reid is generally regarded as the
founder of Direct Realism. In his Natural Dualism he proposed that the
soul is in direct contact with the contents of experience and these
contents are things in the world beyond the body. The Direct Realism of
Reid is summarised in the statement of his famous disciple Sir William
Hamilton: \"In the simplest act of perception I am conscious of myself
as the perceiving subject and of an external reality as the object
perceived\". Reid\'s Natural Dualism has now been largely replaced by
radical and analytical behaviourism which eschew the idea of a soul and
propose that phenomenal consciousness, if it exists at all, is a
behavioural reflex.

The modern justification of Direct Realism mainly consists of arguments
against Indirect Realism or Representationalism. Philosophers such as
Austin (1962) and Le Morvan (2004) have summarised the Direct Realism
debate and have identified the following arguments in favour of Indirect
Realism and given rebuttals to each of them:

1\. The Causal Argument: perception involves a succession of causal
events such as the reflection of photons, bleaching of retinal pigments
etc. so perception must involve the end of this causal chain. The Direct
Realist response is that, although there may be a causal chain in
sensation this does not inevitably imply that the end of the chain is
the content of phenomenal experience.

2\. The Time Lag Argument: it takes time for light to travel from an
object to the senses, time for chemical changes in the retina etc\...
The Direct Realist response is that direct perception may be referred
back in time.

3\. The Partial Character of Perception Argument: we only perceive the
surface of objects, and then only a part of the surface. As the whole
object would be perceived directly perception must be indirect. The
Direct Realist response is that direct perception could occur even if
only parts of an object were perceived.

4\. The Perceptual Relativity Argument: things appear to be different
shapes depending upon the point of view. The Direct Realist response is
that if perception can occur backwards in time it should have no problem
occurring back down a line of sight. However, Le Morvan\'s argument does
not seem to encompass the geometrical nature of phenomenal experience,
seeking to explain geometry in terms of movement.

5\. The Argument from Perceptual Illusion: A stick may appear bent when
projecting from the surface of water. Direct Realists apply the argument
used in (4) to this problem. The bent stick illusion is a physical event
in the world beyond the eye rather than a normal optical illusion such
as the Muller-Lyer illusion etc., see (6) for a discussion of optical
illusions.

6\. The Argument from Hallucination: Hallucinations are not in the world
beyond the body. This is highly problematical for Direct Realists
especially when phenomena such as lucid dreams, dreams and visual
imaginations are included along with hallucinations. Direct Realists
classify these phenomena as not being perceptions or deny that they
actually exist as phenomena. Indirect Realists would maintain that all
of perception is a reconstruction and use optical illusions such as the
Muller-Lyer, Ames Room etc. to justify this contention so the Direct
Realist approach to hallucination, dreams etc. might seem like an
unwillingness to accept Indirect Realism rather than an argument.

7\. The Dubitability Argument (cf: Indubitability argument): we cannot
doubt current phenomenal experience but we can doubt the world beyond
the body therefore phenomenal experience is not the world beyond the
body. Direct Realists fall back on Presentism or functional Presentism
to defeat this argument. If phenomenal experience is instantaneous and
made anew at each instant then anything can be doubted.

The points above have summarised the Direct Realist stance on visual
perception. Other sensory modalities have also been considered in the
Direct Realism debate.

Fowler (1986) considered that sounds were attached to objects in the
world. This idea is strange because sounds only seem to be closely
attached to objects in the world when these objects are seen as well as
heard. For example, when a subject is blindfolded it is found that there
can be a large error in locating the position of a sound in the world,
this is especially true for low frequency sounds. The Direct Realist
approach has difficulty explaining the transition from sounds with an
indefinite location when a subject is blindfolded to sounds that are
bound to visual events when the blindfold is removed. It also runs into
problems explaining how the sound of speech from a single loudspeaker
can become bound to lip movements on a cinema screen. If the binding
does not occur in the brain then where does it occur?

Pain is particularly problematic for Direct Realism because, unlike
colour vision where \'red\' is inferred to be a property of electrons or
light, pain is an inner experience that is not a property of tissue
damage. Tissue damage has properties such as bleeding, wheal formation
etc. but pain seems to be phenomenal experience in the brain and
\'phantom pain\' can occur without tissue damage (see Aydede (2001), Tye
(2004) and Chapman, and Nakamura (1999) for further analysis). On closer
inspection other sensations also appear to be inner experiences rather
than direct sensations. For instance, the red crosses of different hues
in the illustration below are all due to the same physical wavelengths
of light. In this case the range of hues in experience is unrelated to
the actual physical red on the page or screen.

Another problem for Direct Realism is that it does not overcome the
problems that it is supposed to solve. The argument for Direct Realism
begins with the idea that there are severe problems with
representationalism (the idea that phenomenal experience is in the
brain) and that direct perception is an alternative that does not have
these problems. However on closer inspection Direct Realism suffers from
almost same problems as representationalism. If phenomenal experience is
the world itself then Ryle\'s regress applies to the world itself and
this can only be avoided by assuming that phenomenal experience is a
subset of the world (i.e.: a representation) that receives input from
other parts of the world that are not part of phenomenal experience.

It is also commonly assumed that Direct Realism avoids the recursion
argument because it is believed that the separation of the observer from
the things that are observed is simply due to the geometry of the world.
If such simple geometry is possible between the eye and the world then
it should also be possible in the brain and a similar geometrical
explanation could be invoked to avoid recursion in representations.

These points are shown in the illustration below:

image:Constuddir1.gif

Scientists have a further problem with Direct Realism. The illustration
below demonstrates that our scientific knowledge of the world differs
markedly from our phenomenal experience.

image:constuddirect.gif

It is difficult to see how the form and content of phenomenal experience
could supervene directly on the world beyond the body. The world
inferred from measurements beyond the body seems to be a nebulous set of
quantum phenomena that are arranged as probability fields in three
dimensions at any instant. The objects in this real world are mostly
space. The world of phenomenal experience on the other hand contains
objects that are one-sided, and are like a 2 dimensional field of
vectors directed simultaneously at an observation point which is
apparently separate from them. Phenomenal experience is not three
dimensional, the rear of objects is not available within it at any
instant. Visual phenomenal experience seems to be a geometrical
relationship between an abstract observation point and the reflection
properties of the part of the world external to the body. It is a form
that crudely overlies the angular separations in inferred reality,
providing approximate directional data. It is not like things in
themselves beyond the body, not even in type, being a set of directional
vectors. (See the module on the neuroscience of perception for a
discussion of depth perception).

If the form and content of visual phenomenal experience are abstractions
separated according to the angular positions of things in the world
beyond the body then theories which propose that phenomenal experience
is the world itself are problematical. It should be noted that things
arranged according to angular positions can appear to overlie any group
of similar things along a radius from the centre point.

![](Constuddirectangle.gif "Constuddirectangle.gif")

If Direct Realists admit that things are as they appear to be, observed
according to angular positions at a \'point eye\', then any
representation of things on the inside of a sphere of any radius would
appear similar. The geometry of the \'point eye\' is problematical
whether the view contains the world itself or a representation of the
world; it cannot be the movements of lumps of matter or energy and the
point observation cannot be due to lumps all landing at a point. In
other words the \'view\' is inconsistent with nineteenth century
materialism and will require a scientific explanation.

Radical and Analytical Behaviourism tackle the problem of the difference
between the world inferred from measurements beyond the body and the
phenomenal world by denying phenomenal consciousness and maintaining
that access and reflex consciousness are all that exists or is
necessary. Radical Behaviourism is an offshoot of psychological
behaviourism and was established as a philosophical adjunct to Marxism
by Vygotsky and popularised by Burrhus Frederic Skinner (see Skinner
1953). There is another movement in psychological behaviourism which is
similar to Radical Behaviourism called Ecological Psychology (see Gibson
1966, 1979 and also Michaels and Carello 1981). Analytical Behaviourism
is a philosophical movement established by Gilbert Ryle (see Ryle 1949).

The core of Analytical and Radical Behaviourism is the assumption that
consciousness exists for a durationless instant so that the Dubitability
Argument and the Regression and Recursion Arguments can be applied (Ryle
1949, Skinner 1971 and see the sections on Ryle\'s Regress and the
Subject-Object Paradox above). As a result the Direct Realist is able to
insinuate that subjects only think that they have had a particular
experience (cf: Dennett 1991a). It is intriguing that Eliminativists
also maintain that experience is the world itself, for instance an
insight into Dennett\'s idea of the mind is to be found on pages 407-408
of Consciousness Explained:

\"It seemed to him, according to the text, as if his mind - his visual
field - were filled with intricate details of gold-green buds an
wiggling branches, but although this is how it seemed this was an
illusion. No such \"plenum\" ever came into his mind; the plenum
remained out in the world where it is didn\'t have to be represented,
but could just be. When we marvel, in those moments of heightened
self-consciousness, at the glorious richness of our conscious
experience, the richness we marvel at is actually the richness of the
world outside, in all its ravishing detail. It does not \"enter\" our
conscious minds, but is simply available\"

This is a clear description of Direct Realism (although Dennett does not
describe himself as a direct realist).

Radical Behaviourism is sometimes described as the dictum that the only
psychological events that are of importance are those that occur outside
the head. The absurdity of this has led to jokes:

Q: What does one behaviorist say to another when they meet on the
street?

A: You\'re fine. How am I?

Q: What does one behaviorist say to another after sex?

A: That was great for you. How was it for me?

(Ziff 1958)

However Vygotsky, Skinner and other Radical Behaviourists hold that
inner behaviour is possible so that events within the brain can result
in reward or punishment. Vygotsky (1925) describes this approach:

\"Consciousness is wholly reduced to the transmitting mechanisms of
reflexes operating according to general laws, i.e., no processes other
than reactions can be admitted into the organism. The way is also paved
for the solution of the problem of self-awareness and self-observation.
Inner perception and introspection are possible only thanks to the
existence of a proprioceptive field and secondary reflexes, which are
connected with it. This is always the echo of a reaction.\"

Hence Radical Behaviourists are able to make the claim that what are
believed to be representations with phenomenal content are processes.
Even events such as pain can then be explained as reflexes involving
organs within the skin. However, by opening the possibility that such
reflexes could occur at any sense organ, including the eye, this makes
Radical Behaviourism a mixed Direct Realist/Indirect Realist philosophy
with consciousness as a process, not a separate thing such as phenomenal
consciousness (see the section on representationalism and intentionality
below).

But this raises a serious issue for science: can the phenomenal
consciousness that seems to contain our observations really be argued
out of existence on the basis of a theory? As Gregory (1988) put it: "
'If you can't explain it -- deny it' is one strategy for dealing with
embarrassing questions such as 'what is consciousness?' ". But is this
the right strategy?

Direct Realism fails to overcome the problems of regression and
recursion inherent in representations. It proposes that phenomenal
consciousness is identical to the physical world beyond the body but
must then use a plethora of arguments to explain why this is evidently
not so. When confronted with these problems its proponents resort to the
argument that everything can be doubted and can misrepresent itself. Yet
it is still widely believed.

It should be noted that Direct Realism is espoused in Religious Natural
Dualism, some forms of Augustinian theology, nineteenth century
materialism and its offspring such as Marxism, post-modernism,
post-Marxism, and various sociological movements. It is also necessary
for some forms of Strong AI to occur. Perhaps this explains why few
ideas have attracted as much attention and defence as Direct Realism.

It is interesting to compare the Direct Realist and Indirect Realist
interpretations of something as simple as a cartoon on television (such
as the image below). According to Indirect Realism the cartoon would be
a moving representation constructed in the brain using data from the
senses. This leads to the prediction of brain mechanisms for modelling
motions, combining colours, binding sound and vision etc., many of which
have been verified. Can you demonstrate how the theory of Direct Realism
could explain the phenomenal experience that contains the cartoon and
produce a list of the predictions made by the theory?

![](constudcartoon.gif "constudcartoon.gif")

In science a theory should be of predictive value, for instance,
information theory describes how the state of a thing can be impressed
on a carrier so that a signal can be transmitted from one place to
another. This theory predicts what will happen when the signal arrives
at its destination and how the state of the source can be inferred from
the events at the destination, the total amount of information that can
be transmitted etc. At the destination it is the form of the signal that
is directly known by interaction and measurement, the form of the source
is inferred. Direct Realism is a direct challenge to this information
theory but does it deliver a more powerful predictive description of
phenomenal consciousness or is experience always dependent on what
happens to the information flow between things in the world and
somewhere in the brain? Does direct realism have a physical theory?

Ultimately it appears as if Direct Realism is about various
understandings of Information Theory. For example, Austin (1962)
discusses what we see when we see a church camouflaged as a barn and
comments that: \"We see, of course, a church that now looks like a
barn.\". Do we see a church or a barn? Scientific information theory is
clear about this, the church is an entity composed of selected
information from the quantum state of its constituents, the optical
image of a camouflaged church is an arrangement of photons emanating
from a screen on which it is projected, the retina has an arrangement of
chemical and electrical events based on an optical image and conscious
visual experience correlates with the arrangement of things on the
retina. The fact that conscious experience also correlates with
classifications of the retinal image as a barn or a church suggests that
conscious experience is an arrangement of things in the brain based on
both the retinal arrangement and the contents of a relational database.

Austin\'s arguments have been mythologised as a final demonstration that
\"sense data\" theories are false. However, as will be seen below, sense
data theories merely claim that there is a succession of information
states between an information state outside the body and that reported
as conscious experience i.e.: subjects report that a church is
camouflaged when it is camouflaged.

## Indirect Realism

Indirect realism proposes that phenomenal consciousness exists and is a
set of signals or **sense data**, usually in the brain. This was
proposed by philosophers from Aristotle to Locke and was probably the
most widespread idea of conscious experience until the eighteenth
century.

The idea of sense data is discussed in depth by Russell (1912).
Russell\'s original definition is given below:

`<font face="times new roman">`{=html}\"Let us give the name of
\'sense-data\' to the things that are immediately known in sensation:
such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so
on. We shall give the name \'sensation\' to the experience of being
immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we
have a sensation of the colour, but the colour itself is a sense-datum,
not a sensation. The colour is that of which we are immediately aware,
and the awareness itself is the sensation. It is plain that if we are to
know anything about the table, it must be by means of the sense-data \--
brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness, etc. \-- which we associate with
the table; but, for the reasons which have been given, we cannot say
that the table is the sense-data, or even that the sense-data are
directly properties of the table.\"`</font>`{=html}

Russell\'s definition is a materialist concept in which experience is
always **of** something because the durationless instant of the present
has always gone. As such it differs from some empiricist ideas where
experience is not confined to the durationless instant.

Science is Indirect Realist because it holds that the scientist can only
make **measurements** of events in the world. These measurements give
rise to signals as a result of interaction with the event. According to
**decoherence theory** the signals are a state that is a mixture of the
state of the measuring instrument and the state of the thing being
measured. For example, the eyes are measuring instruments that are
sensitive to photons, photons are signals containing a state that is
based on the state of electrons in a surface and the state of electrons
is based on the state of the surface etc. Scientific inference allows
some aspects of the state of the surface to be inferred from the state
of the photons.

In modern Indirect Realism there is an attempt to distinguish the
phenomenal content of conscious experience from the processing involved
in accessing this phenomenal content. According to these theories
phenomenal experience is an arrangement of signals that are the content
of the experience. This arrangement forms a *representation* of things
in the world so this form of indirect realism is known as
**Representationalism**. Tye (2003) describes types of
representationalist theory:

`<font face="times new roman">`{=html}\"Representationalism, as I have
presented it so far, is an identity thesis with respect to qualia:
qualia are supposedly one and the same as certain representational
contents.\"`</font>`{=html}

Tye also describes variants of this idea of representationalism:

`<font face="times new roman">`{=html}\"Sometimes it is held instead
that qualia are one and the same as certain representational properties
of experiences; and sometimes it is is argued that these
representational properties are themselves irreducible (Siewert 1998).
There is also a weaker version of representationalism, according to
which it is metaphysically necessary that experiences exactly alike with
respect to their representational contents are exactly alike with
respect to their qualia. Obviously, this supervenience thesis leaves
open the further question as to the essential nature of
qualia.\"`</font>`{=html} (Tye 2003).

In a scientific sense Direct Realists believe that phenomenal experience
is the signals that occur next to things in the world beyond the body
(which they call \"things in themselves\") and Indirect Realists usually
believe that phenomenal experience is signals in the brain. It can be
seen from the pattern of signal flow that the signals travelling into
the brain preserve the spatial relationships of the original signals and
encode the properties in the original signals. This means that the
original signals next to the QM sources and the signals in the brain are
equivalent provided the latter are oriented appropriately relative to
signals from the body. Either set of signals could transmit or contain
the same information. Both Direct and Indirect Realism cannot, at
present, explain the physics of how a viewing point occurs in experience
i.e.: how we seem to see through an apparent space to the signals that
are the contents of experience. So the choice between Direct Realism and
Indirect Realism reduces to whether there is only one set of signals or
a chain of signals between the world and phenomenal experience.

The philosophical arguments for Indirect Realism are listed below:

1\. Variable perspective: when we see things the view changes so what we
see must be a different set of signals depending on the view rather than
a constant object.

2\. Illusions: we can see through fingers and see a variety of colours
where measurements tell us one exists. Direct Realists quote the \"bent
stick illusion\", which is not really an illusion at all, being a
physical event.

3\. Hallucinations: two people can have phenomenal experience containing
a table. The first may be viewing a real table whereas the second may be
hallucinating a table. If the tables are the same (phenomenally) then
experience is indirect.

4\. Double vision: press the side of one eye, two images appear (cf Hume
1739) yet there are not two things in the world.

5\. Time gap arguments: according to materialism the past has gone. The
things being seen no longer exist in the state that relates to the state
in experience. In the extreme case, some stars in the night sky no
longer exist but are still in experience so experience must be a derived
signal.

6\. Secondary qualities such as pain, colour and smell do not exist as
physical things in the source of signals and are likely to be properties
of signals in the brain.

![](constudindirect.gif "constudindirect.gif")

Indirect Realism has received strong support from recent discoveries in
neuroscience, for example, it is now clear that both the colour and
motion in phenomenal experience are added by cortical processes. In
Cerebral **Achromatopsia** patients have suffered trauma to area V4 of
the cerebral cortex and report seeing the world in greyscale with no
colour vision and in Congenital Achromatopsia people do not even
understand the meaning of \'colour\'. In an astonishing ailment called
**Akinetopsia** patients perceive movement as a succession of stationary
images (Rizzo *et al.* 1995). Akinetopsia is usually associated with
damage to cortical area V5. Moutoussis and Zeki (1997) have demonstrated
that the addition of colour occurs more rapidly than the addition of
motion. The section on the Neuroscience of Consciousness describes these
discoveries and many other aspects of the creation of phenomenal
experience in the brain.

Unfortunately knowledge of the whereabouts of the signals that are the
content of conscious experience does not resolve the problem of
phenomenal consciousness. Whether these signals are next to objects in
the world or at the end of a chain of signals in the brain there still
remains the problem of how they become arranged in the form of
experience. If such a thing occurs at all.

### Intentionality and representation

There is a materialist interpretation of representationalism in which
representations are redefined as intentional states:

`<font face="times new roman">`{=html}\"One way of explaining what is
meant by 'intentionality' in the (more obscure) philosophical sense is
this: it is that aspect of mental states or events that consists in
their being of or about things (as pertains to the questions, 'What are
you thinking of?' and 'What are you thinking about?'). Intentionality is
the aboutness or directedness of mind (or states of mind) to things,
objects, states of affairs, events. So if you are thinking about San
Francisco, or about the increased cost of living there, or about your
meeting someone there at Union Square---your mind, your thinking, is
directed toward San Francisco, or the increased cost of living, or the
meeting in Union Square. To think at all is to think of or about
something in this sense. This 'directedness' conception of
intentionality plays a prominent role in the influential philosophical
writings of Franz Brentano and those whose views developed in response
to his (to be discussed further in Section 3).\"(Siewert
2003)`</font>`{=html}

This definition allows \"representation\" to be redefined as a data
stream rather than a set of things arranged in some mental or neural
state that represents things in space. Husserl thought this approach
would allow a description of consciousness that \"carefully abstains
from affirming the existence of anything in spatio-temporal reality\"
(Siewert 2003) although it could be argued that a data stream such as
any description can never escape the constraints of representation in
time at some place.

Unfortunately the concept of \"intentionality\" has become so diverse
that it could be applied to almost any aspect of the description of
consciousness. An interesting example of this is given by Loar (2001)
where \"intentionality\" is considered to overlap \"representing\" and
\"conceiving\":

`<font face="times new roman">`{=html}\"A person\'s thoughts represent
things to her \-- conceive things \-- in many ways: perceptually,
memory-wise, descriptively, by naming, by analogy, by intuitive sorting,
theoretically, abstractly, implicitly and explicitly. These various
manners of conceiving have something in common: they have intentional
properties, and they have them essentially. `</font>`{=html}

The usage of the term \"intentional state\" has become so broad that it
now means little more than a state that is about another state.

References

Siewert, C. (2003). Consciousness and Intentionality. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/>

Also see Loar, B. (2001) "Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of
Mental Content", in Reflections and Replies, ed. M. Hahn and B.
Ramsberg, MIT.
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/loar.html>
Williford, K. (2002) The intentionality of consciousness and the
consciousness of intentionality. Intentionality: Past and Future, edited
by Gábor Forrai and George Kampis, Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi.
<http://web.stcloudstate.edu/kwwilliford/Intentionality%20of%20Consciousness.pdf>

Byrne, A. (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110
(April 2001):199-240. <http://stripe.colorado.edu/~leeds/byrne.pdf>

### Cartesian materialism

The term \"Cartesian materialism\" once meant the idea that the mind is
in the brain (see for instance Block 1995). The term had largely fallen
out of use in philosophy until revived by Daniel Dennett (1991) in the
book *Consciousness Explained*. Dennett uses a very particular
definition of the term in his discussions and also uses a particular
definition of the word \"mind\". See the section on Daniel
Dennett
for Dennett\'s critique. Philosophers who adhere to the idea that the
mind is in the brain tend to call themselves \"indirect realists\" or
\"representationalists\" where the substrate of conscious experience is
in the brain and would deny that Dennett\'s critique applies to their
proposals. Dennett\'s critique makes the materialist assumption that if
there is a representation in the brain then a further flow of material
out of this representation would be required for the representation to
become part of mind.

### Identity theories of mind

The idea that mental states are brain states is known as the **identity
theory of mind**. There are two sorts of identity theory, in **type**
identity theory it is held that mental states are identical to brain
states whereas in **token** identity theory it is held that mental
states correlate with brain states.

Type identity theory was attacked by Putnam in \"The Nature of Mental
States\" where he pointed out that if mental states are functions then
type identity theory would presuppose that animals that had the same
mental states would need to have identical brain structures. He
suggested that this is unlikely, it being more probable that animals
have functional systems that perform similar overall functions but which
are not identical. In other words, if it is assumed that conscious
experience is a set of functions then token identity theory is more
probable than type identity theory.

Putnam\'s critique does not preclude identity theories of mind that
involve \"passive ideas\" (i.e.: states that are not classical
functions).

Most identity theories of mind would be representational, the physical
states representing the world in some way. All identity theories of mind
involve Cartesian materialism in the sense of the mental states being
brain states. According to identity theories the mind is in the brain.

Putnam, H. (1967) The nature of mental states. In The Nature of Mind,
edited by Rosenthal, pp. 197--203. Originally published as
\"Psychological predicates in Art, Mind, and Religion\", edited by
Capitan and Merill, pp. 37--48.

## Dualism

Prior to considering the arguments surrounding dualism it is important
to have a clear idea of \"information\" because many of these arguments
have parallels with the difference between information as a set of
states that can be transmitted and the substrate on which this
information is expressed or from which the information is derived. See
Elementary information and information systems
theory.

### Cartesian dualism

Descartes, a philosopher, analysed his experience and developed an
empirical description of how it is arranged. He described mental images
and perceptions as extended in space and with a duration. He called
these extended things **ideas** (Cartesian ideas) and proposed that they
are patterns in the brain. Descartes thought the pineal gland was the
most likely location for these ideas because it is one of the few single
organs in the brain. He also proposed that there is a rational soul that
directly contacts these ideas:

`<font face="times new roman">`{=html}\"Now among these figures, it is
not those imprinted on the external sense organs, or on the internal
surface of the brain, which should be taken to be ideas - but only those
which are traced in the spirits on the surface of gland H *(where the
seat of the imagination and the \'common sense\' is located)*. That is
to say, it is only the latter figures which should be taken to be the
forms or images which the rational soul united to this machine will
consider directly when it imagines some object or perceives it by the
senses.\" Descartes (1664)`</font>`{=html}

See section on
Descartes
for more information and references.

Descartes considered that the soul was a physical point, an unextended
entity that acts like a mind\'s eye. He called this unextended place the
*res cogitans* and concluded that it was a substance that differed from
that of material things:

`<font face="times new roman">`{=html}\".. I thence concluded that I was
a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and
which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any
material thing; so that \" I,\" that is to say, the mind by which I am
what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is even more easily
known than the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not,
it would still continue to be all that it is.\"Descartes
(1637)`</font>`{=html}

This unextended substance that is not material gives the word
\"substance\" a new meaning. It has been attacked as a concept by Locke,
Hume, Berkely and many other philosophers. The concept of there being
two substances, that which composes the physical world and that which
composes the soul, is the origin of the word **Dualism** but dualism, as
a concept, has been extended beyond this original meaning. Cartesian
dualism is a type of **substance dualism**.

Cartesian dualism is an attempt to explain our experience. According to
Descartes something supernatural would be needed for an unextended
viewing point to exist.

Reid\'s **Natural Dualism** also has a point soul looking at things but
proposes that the things in question are forms in the world rather than
in the brain.

### Property dualism

Another sort of dualism has arisen out of a particular interpretation of
the regress and homunculus arguments. These arguments show that
phenomenal experience is not due entirely to flows from place to place
(i.e.: it is not due to classical processes and functions). Property
dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way
(i.e. in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental
properties emerge.

As Goldman (1993) pointed out, qualitative experience does not seem to
be needed in a functional description of a system:

`<font face="times new roman">`{=html}\"For any functional description
of a system that is in pain (or has an itch), it seems as if we can
imagine another system with the same functional description but lacking
the qualitative property of painfulness (or itchiness).\"
`</font>`{=html}

Certainly a functional system that merely reports the words \"I am in
pain\" when it is dropped on the floor does not require any qualitative
property of painfulness. The *absent qualia* arguments suggest that even
in a large system there would be no need for qualitative properties for
the performance of any classical function.

Chalmers (1993) commenting on Goldman\'s point, said that this implies
that **zombies** might exist, functional replicas of humans but without
qualia. He then denied that a complete functional replica of a human
could exist without also including qualia:

`<font face="times new roman">`{=html}\"It seems to me that the only way
to avoid this conclusion is to deny that Zombie Dave is a conceptual
possibility; and the only principled way to deny that Zombie Dave is a
conceptual possibility is to allow that functional organization is
conceptually constitutive of qualitative content.\" Chalmers
(1993).`</font>`{=html}

In other words he identifies qualia with function. According to Chalmers
(1996) qualia are a particular type of function:

`<font face="times new roman">`{=html}\"I claim that conscious
experience arises from fine-grained functional organization. More
specifically, I will argue for a principle of organizational invariance,
holding that given any system that has conscious experiences, then any
system that has the same fine-grained functional organization will have
qualitatively identical experiences. According to this principle,
consciousness is an organizational invariant: a property that remains
constant over all functional isomorphs of a given system. Whether the
organization is realized in silicon chips, in the population of China,
or in beer cans and ping-pong balls does not matter. As long as the
functional organisation is right, conscious experience will be
determined.\" p249`</font>`{=html}

Chalmers\' idea of functional organisation has within it a sometimes
vague implication that the functional units must have a particular form;
for instance, in the development of his argument, he refers to "fine
grained" replacement of organic functional units with inorganic units.

Chalmers is actually making two major points, firstly that qualia occur
during the motion of things (functions), secondly that qualia are
independent of any particular substrate.\*\* For the first point to be
consistent with materialism the qualia must have no effect on the
function, they must be **epiphenomenal**. Epiphenomenal qualia would not
be forbidden by the regress and homunculus arguments and would be akin
to Berkeley\'s \"passive ideas\".

Whether or not epiphenomenal qualia are physical depends upon the
definition of the word \"physical\". If physical functions cause qualia
but qualia cannot affect functions then the qualia are \"physical\" in
the sense of being caused by physical events but might be regarded as
non-physical in the sense of being isolated from further physical
events. In philosophical terms they violate the principle of **Causal
Closure**. However, there are other definitions of physicalism based on
arguments such as **Methodological Naturalism** which hold that anything
that can be investigated using the methods of natural science is a
physical thing (see Stoljar 2001). Thus, although epiphenomenal qualia
may not conform to materialism they may be encompassed by physicalism;
as events that are related to material events they are awaiting a
physical theory of how they emerge from a given function.

The reader might consider whether phenomenal consciousness is indeed
epiphenomenal. Empirical reports describe it as something that is
different from the world beyond the body (see direct
realism) -
could we generate empirical reports of an epiphenomenon?

The term **property dualism** describes how physical events might give
rise to a set of properties that cannot be predicted from the fine
structure of the physical system. The \"dualism\" is present because one
set of events is related to two sets of properties, one of which is not
related by materialism to the set of events. In the case of the proposal
about consciousness outlined above an extra assumption, beyond
materialism, would be needed to explain qualia. Property dualism might
be defined as a theory that there could be a theory of consciousness but
that this requires some new assumption.

As far as the \"when and where\" of consciousness are concerned,
property dualism states that it is somewhere in the processes performed
by the organism and the parts of the organism.

`<font size=1>`{=html} \*\* In terms of information processing, Chalmers
is proposing that qualia are the enactment of a particular information
processing structure.`</font>`{=html}

-   Block, N. (2006). Max Black\'s objection to mind-body identity.
    Oxford Review of Metaphysics No.3.
    <http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/BlockFest/MaxBlack.rtf>
-   Chalmers, D.J. (1993) Commentary on \"The Psychology of Folk
    Psychology\". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16:35-36, 1993
-   Chalmers, D.J. (1996) \"The Conscious Mind: In Search of a
    Fundamental Theory\". Oxford University Press. 1996.
-   Goldman, A.I., (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral
    and Brain Sciences 16: 15-28 (1993).
    <http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/goldman.psyc.html>

### Predicate dualism

Predicate dualism is the view espoused by most non-reductive
physicalists, such as Donald Davidson(1980) and Jerry Fodor(1968), who
maintain that while there is only one ontological category of substances
and properties of substances (usually physical), the predicates that we
use to describe mental events cannot be redescribed in terms of (or
reduced to) physical predicates of natural languages. If we characterize
predicate monism as the view subscribed to by eliminative materialists,
who maintain that such intentional predicates as believe, desire, think,
feel, etc., will eventually be eliminated from both the language of
science and from ordinary language because the entities to which they
refer do not exist, then predicate dualism is most easily defined as the
negation of this position. Predicate dualists believe that so-called
\"folk psychology\", with all of its propositional attitude ascriptions,
is an ineliminable part of the enterprise of describing, explaining and
understanding human mental states and behavior.

Davidson, for example, subscribes to Anomalous Monism, according to
which there can be no strict psycho-physical laws which connect mental
and physical events under their descriptions as mental and physical
events. However, all mental events also have physical descriptions. It
is in terms of the latter that such events can be connected in law-like
relations with other physical events. Mental predicates are irreducibly
different in character (rational, holistic and necessary) from physical
predicates (contingent, atomic and causal).

(Section based on Wikipedia article)

-   Davidson, D (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University
    Press.
-   Fodor,J. (1968) *Psychological Explanation*, Random House.
    .

### The interaction between mind and brain in dualism

#### Interactionism

Interactionism is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and
desires, causally interact with physical states. This is a position
which is very appealing to common-sense intuitions, notwithstanding the
fact that it is very difficult to establish its validity or correctness
by way of logical argumentation or empirical proof. It is appealing to
common-sense because we are surrounded by such everyday occurrences as a
child\'s touching a hot stove (physical event) which causes him to feel
pain (mental event) and then yell and scream (physical event) which
causes his parents to experience a sensation of fear and protectiveness
(mental event) and so on.

#### Epiphenomalism

According to epiphenomenalism, all mental events are caused by a
physical event and have no physical consequences. So, a mental event of
deciding to pick up a rock (call it \"M\") is caused by the firing of
specific neurons in the brain (call it \"P\"), however when the arm and
hand move to pick up a rock (call it \"E\") this is only caused by P.
The physical causes are in principle reducible to fundamental physics,
and therefore mental causes are eliminated using this reductionist
explanation. If P causes M and E, there is no overdetermination in the
explanation for E.

#### Parallelism

Psycho-physical parallelism is a very unusual view about the interaction
between mental and physical events which was most prominently, and
perhaps only truly, advocated by Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. Like
Malebranche and others before him, Leibniz recognized the weaknesses of
Descartes\' account of causal interaction taking place in a physical
location in the brain. Malebranche decided that such a material basis of
interaction between material and immaterial was impossible and therefore
formulated his doctrine of occasionalism, stating that the interactions
were really caused by the intervention of God on each individual
occasion. Leibniz idea is that God has created a pre-established harmony
such that it only seems as if physical and mental events cause, and are
caused by, one another. In reality, mental causes only have mental
effects and physical causes only have physical effects. Hence the term
parallelism is used to describe this view.

#### Occasionalism

Occasionalism argues that bodily events are the occasion of an act by
the Creator causing a corresponding mental event, and vice versa. Any
such view requires a theological structure as a premise.

#### Further reading

-   Robinson, Howard, \"Dualism\", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
    Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
    <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/dualism/>
-   Robinson, H. (2003) \"Dualism\", in S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds)
    The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell, Oxford,
    85-101.
-   Amoroso, R.L. (2010) \"The complementarity of Mind and Body:
    Realizing the Dream of Descartes, Einstein and Eccles\", New York:
    Nova Science Publishers,

`, ``https://www.novapublishers.com/catalog/product_info.php?products_id=12759`

## Idealism

According to Idealism only the mental truly exists.

The form and content of personal conscious experience might be related
to the structure of the world and brain in several ways. It could be a
**solipsism** or be the mind of God.

*This is a **stub** and needs expansion*.

## Panpsychism

### Etymology

Ancient Greek *pan* (πᾶν : \"all, everything, whole\") and *psyche*
(ψυχή : \"soul, mind\").[^1] Psyche is the from
ψύχω (*psukhō*, \"I blow\") and means mind or \'life-breath\'.

Philip Goff, a proponent of panpsychism, carves out a distinction
between panexperientialism and pancognitivism. Panexperientialism is the
belief that *experience* is ubiquitous, while pancognitivism is the
belief that *cognition* is ubiquitous. Most modern purponents of
panpsychism, such as Annaka Harris and David Chalmers, are careful to
distance themselves from pancognitivism.

In some interpretations, such as monadism, Panpsychism and Idealism can
overlap because the universe is conceived as being composed of an
infinity of point consciousnesses that each contain information about
the whole universe.

The form and content of personal conscious experience might be related
to the structure of the world and brain in many ways.

*This is a **stub** and needs expansion*.

## References

Seager W. & Allen-Hermanson (2001). 'Panpsychism.' Online document:
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, \[online\],
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/>, \[accessed 10/2005\]

**Supervenience**

-   Chalmers, D.J. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.

**The problem of regression**

-   Ryle, G. (1949) The Concept of Mind. The University of Chicago
    Press, 1949.

**The homunculus argument**

-   Gregory, R.L. (1990) Eye and Brain: The Psychology of Seeing, Oxford
    University Press Inc. New York.
-   Gregory, T.L. (1987). The Oxford Companion to Mind. Oxford
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**Subject-object paradox**

-   James, W. (1904)Does \'Consciousness\' Exist? Journal of
    Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1,
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-   Hegel, G.W.F. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: SECTION I. MIND SUBJECTIVE B.
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-   Velmans, M. (1996) Consciousness and the \"Casual Paradox\".
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    538-542.
-   Bermudez, J.L. (1999) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness
    (representation and Mind) Psycoloquy:
    10,#35

**Ontological status**

-   Bierman, D.J. (2004) Non Conscious Processes Preceding Intuitive
    decisions
    <http://m0134.fmg.uva.nl/~djb/publications/2004/Intuition_bialsymp2004.pdf>
-   Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes\' error: Emotion, reason and the
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-   Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason
    <http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/>

**Phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness**

Block, N. (1995) On a confusion about a function of consciousness.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 227-287.
<http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/31/bbs00000431-00/bbs.block.html>

Block, N. (2004). *The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science*.
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/ecs.pdf>

Dennett, D. (1978). Why You Can\'t Make a Computer that Feels Pain, in:
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Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review
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<http://web.archive.org/19990218140703/members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/Nagel_Bat.html>

Rey, Georges, (1997). Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.Blackwell: Oxford

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Whitehead, A.N. (1920). The Concept of Nature. Chapter 3: Time.
<http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Whitehead/Whitehead_1920/White1_03.html>

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<http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/maydede/pain.pdf>

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    cultural-historical psychology (European Studies in the History of
    Science and Ideas. Vol. 8), pp. 251--281. Peter Lang Publishing.
    <http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/consciousness.htm>
-   Ziff, Paul. \"About Behaviourism.\" Analysis 18 (1958): 132-136.
    Quoted by Larry Hauser in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/b/behavior.htm#B>. F. Skinner:
    Radical Behaviorism

**Indirect Realism**

-   Moutoussis, K. and Zeki, S. (1997). A direct demonstration of
    perceptual asynchrony in vision. Proceedings of the Royal Society of
    London, Series B: Biological Sciences, 264, 393 - 399.
-   Rizzo, M., Nawrot, M. & Zihl, J. (1995). Motion and shape perception
    in cerebral akinetopsia.Brain, 118. 1105-1127.
    <http://nawrot.psych.ndsu.nodak.edu/Publications/Nawrot.pdf/RizzoNawrotZihl.1995.pdf>
-   Russell, B. (1912). Problems of Philosophy. Home University Library.
    <http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus1.html>
-   Tye, M. (2003) Qualia. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/#Repqualia>

Further reading:

-   Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature.
    <http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/ToC/hume%20treatise%20ToC.htm>
-   Firth, R. (1949) Sense Data and the Percept Theory, Mind, 58 (1949);
    59 (1950). (Describes early reasons for rejecting Indirect Realism)
    <http://www.ditext.com/firth/spt.html>
-   Grush, R. (2000). Self, world and space: The meaning and mechanisms
    of ego- and allocentric spatial representation. Brain and Mind
    1(1):59-92.

<http://mind.ucsd.edu/papers/sws/sws.html>

[^1]: Clarke, D.S. *Panpsychism: Past and Recent Selected Readings*.
    State University of New York Press, 2004. p.1