title: Financial ratio

text: A financial ratio or accounting ratio is a relative magnitude of two selected numerical values taken from an enterprise's financial statements. Often used in accounting, there are many standard ratios used to try to evaluate the overall financial condition of a corporation or other organization. Financial ratios may be used by managers within a firm, by current and potential shareholders (owners) of a firm, and by a firm's creditors. Financial analysts use financial ratios to compare the strengths and weaknesses in various companies. If shares in a company are traded in a financial market, the market price of the shares is used in certain financial ratios.


title: Financial ratio

text: Ratios can be expressed as a decimal value, such as 0.10, or given as an equivalent percent value, such as 10%. Some ratios are usually quoted as percentages, especially ratios that are usually or always less than 1, such as earnings yield, while others are usually quoted as decimal numbers, especially ratios that are usually more than 1, such as P/E ratio; these latter are also called multiples. Given any ratio, one can take its reciprocal; if the ratio was above 1, the reciprocal will be below 1, and conversely. The reciprocal expresses the same information, but may be more understandable: for instance, the earnings yield can be compared with bond yields, while the P/E ratio cannot be: for example, a P/E ratio of 20 corresponds to an earnings yield of 5%.


title: Financial ratio

text: Values used in calculating financial ratios are taken from the balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows or (sometimes) the statement of changes in equity. These comprise the firm's "accounting statements" or financial statements. The statements' data is based on the accounting method and accounting standards used by the organisation.


title: Financial ratio

text: Financial ratios quantify many aspects of a business and are an integral part of the financial statement analysis. Financial ratios are categorized according to the financial aspect of the business which the ratio measures. Liquidity ratios measure the availability of cash to pay debt. Activity ratios measure how quickly a firm converts non-cash assets to cash assets. Debt ratios measure the firm's ability to repay long-term debt. Profitability ratios measure the firm's use of its assets and control of its expenses to generate an acceptable rate of return. Market ratios measure investor response to owning a company's stock and also the cost of issuing stock.


title: Financial ratio

text: These are concerned with the return on investment for shareholders, and with the relationship between return and the value of an investment in company's shares.


title: Financial ratio

text: Ratios generally are not useful unless they are benchmarked against something else, like past performance or another company. Thus, the ratios of firms in different industries, which face different risks, capital requirements, and competition are usually hard to compare.


title: Financial ratio

text: Financial ratios may not be directly comparable between companies that use different accounting methods or follow various standard accounting practices. Most public companies are required by law to use generally accepted accounting principles for their home countries, but private companies, partnerships and sole proprietorships may elect to not use accrual basis accounting. Large multi-national corporations may use International Financial Reporting Standards to produce their financial statements, or they may use the generally accepted accounting principles of their home country.


title: Financial ratio

text: There is no international standard for calculating the summary data presented in all financial statements, and the terminology is not always consistent between companies, industries, countries and time periods.


title: Financial ratio

text: Various abbreviations may be used in financial statements, especially financial statements summarized on the Internet. Sales reported by a firm are usually net sales, which deduct returns, allowances, and early payment discounts from the charge on an invoice. Net income is always the amount "after" taxes, depreciation, amortization, and interest, unless otherwise stated. Otherwise, the amount would be EBIT, or EBITDA (see below).


title: Financial ratio

text: Companies that are primarily involved in providing services with labour do not generally report "Sales" based on hours. These companies tend to report "revenue" based on the monetary value of income that the services provide.


title: Financial ratio

text: Note that Shareholders' Equity and Owner's Equity are "not" the same thing, Shareholder's Equity represents the total number of shares in the company multiplied by each share's book value; Owner's Equity represents the total number of shares that an individual shareholder owns (usually the owner with controlling interest), multiplied by each share's book value. It is important to make this distinction when calculating ratios.


title: Financial ratio

text: Profitability ratios measure the company's use of its assets and control of its expenses to generate an acceptable rate of return


title: Financial ratio

text: Debt ratios quantify the firm's ability to repay long-term debt. Debt ratios measure financial leverage.


title: Financial ratio

text: Market ratios measure investor response to owning a company's stock and also the cost of issuing stock.


title: Financial ratio

text: In addition to assisting management and owners in diagnosing the financial health of their company, ratios can also help managers make decisions about investments or projects that the company is considering to take, such as acquisitions, or expansion.


title: Prophase

text: Prophase () is the first stage of cell division in both mitosis and meiosis. Beginning after interphase, DNA has already been replicated when the cell enters prophase. The main occurrences in prophase are the condensation of the chromatin reticulum and the disappearance of the nucleolus.


title: Prophase

text: Various DNA stains are used to treat cells such that condensing chromosomes can be visualized as the move through prophase.


title: Prophase

text: The giemsa G-banding technique is commonly used to identify mammalian chromosomes, but utilizing the technology on plant cells was originally difficult due to the high degree of chromosome compaction in plant cells. G-banding was fully realized for plant chromosomes in 1990. During both meiotic and mitotic prophase, giemsa staining can be applied to cells to elicit G-banding in chromosomes. Silver staining, a more modern technology, in conjunction with giesma staining can be used to image the synaptonemal complex throughout the various stages of meiotic prophase. To perform G-banding, chromosomes must be fixed, and thus it is not possible to perform on living cells.


title: Prophase

text: Fluorescent stains such as DAPI can be used in both live plant and animal cells. These stains do not band chromosomes, but instead allow for DNA probing of specific regions and genes. Use of fluorescent microscopy has vastly improved spatial resolution.


title: Prophase

text: Prophase is the first stage of mitosis in animal cells, and the second stage of mitosis in plant cells. At the start of prophase there are two identical copies of each chromosome in the cell due to replication in interphase. These copies are referred to as sister chromatids and are attached by DNA element called the centromere. The main events of prophase are: the condensation of chromosomes, the movement of the centrosomes, the formation of the mitotic spindle, and the beginning of nucleoli break down.


title: Prophase

text: DNA that was replicated in interphase is condensed from DNA strands with lengths reaching 0.7 μm down to


title: Prophase

text: 0.2-0.3 μm. This process employs the condensin complex. Condensed chromosomes consist of two sister chromatids joined at the centromere.


title: Prophase

text: During prophase in animal cells, centrosomes move far enough apart to be resolved using a light microscope. Microtubule activity in each centrosome is increased due to recruitment of γ-tubulin. Replicated centrosomes from interphase move apart towards opposite poles of the cell, powered by centrosome associated motor proteins. Interdigitated interpolar microtubules from each centrosome interact with each other, helping to move the centrosomes to opposite poles.


title: Prophase

text: Microtubules involved in the interphase scaffolding break down as the replicated centrosomes separate. The movement of centrosomes to opposite poles is accompanied in animal cells by the organization of individual radial microtubule arrays (asters) by each centromere. Interpolar microtubules from both centrosomes interact, joining the sets of microtubules and forming the basic structure of the mitotic spindle. Plant cells do not have centrosomes and the chromosomes can nucleate microtubule assembly into the mitotic apparatus. In plant cells, microtubules gather at opposite poles and begin to form the spindle apparatus at locations called foci. The mitotic spindle is of great importance in the process of mitosis and will eventually segregate the sister chromatids in metaphase.


title: Prophase

text: The nucleoli begin to break down in prophase, resulting in the discontinuation of ribosome production. This indicates a redirection of cellular energy from general cellular metabolism to cellular division. The nuclear envelope stays intact during this process.


title: Prophase

text: Meiosis involves two rounds of chromosome segregation and thus undergoes prophase twice, resulting in prophase I and prophase II. Prophase I is the most complex phase in all of meiosis because homologous chromosomes must pair and exchange genetic information. Prophase II is very similar to mitotic prophase.


title: Prophase

text: Prophase I is divided into five phases: leptotene, zygotene, pachytene, diplotene, and diakinesis. In addition to the events that occur in mitotic prophase, several crucial events occur within these phases such as pairing of homologous chromosomes and the reciprocal exchange of genetic material between these homologous chromosomes. Prophase I occurs at different speeds dependent on species and sex. Many species arrest meiosis in diplotene of prophase I until ovulation. In humans, decades can pass as oocytes remain arrested in prophase I only to quickly complete meiosis I prior to ovulation.


title: Prophase

text: In the first stage of prophase I, leptotene (from the Greek for "delicate"), chromosomes begin to condense. Each chromosome is in a haploid state and consists of two sister chromatids; however, the chromatin of the sister chromatids is not yet condensed enough to be resolvable in microscopy. Homologous regions within homologous chromosome pairs begin to associate with each other.


title: Prophase

text: In the second phase of prophase I, zygotene (from the Greek for "conjugation"), all maternally and paternally derived chromosomes have found their homologous partner. The homologous pairs then undergo synapsis, a process by which the synaptonemal complex (a proteinaceous structure) aligns corresponding regions of genetic information on maternally and paternally derived non-sister chromatids of homologous chromosome pairs. The paired homologous chromosome bound by the synaptonemal complex are referred to as bivalents or tetrads. Sex (X and Y) chromosomes do not fully synapse because only a small region of the chromosomes are homologous.


title: Prophase

text: The third phase of prophase I, pachytene (from the Greek for "thick"), begins at the completion of synapsis. Chromatin has condensed enough that chromosomes can now be resolved in microscopy. Structures called recombination nodules form on the synaptonemal complex of bivalents. These recombination nodules facilitate genetic exchange between the non-sister chromatids of the synaptonemal complex in an event known as crossing-over or genetic recombination. Multiple recombination events can occur on each bivalent. In humans, an average of 2-3 events occur on each chromosome.


title: Prophase

text: In the fourth phase of prophase I, diplotene (from the Greek for "twofold"), crossing-over is completed. Homologous chromosomes retain a full set of genetic information; however, the homologous chromosomes are now of mixed maternal and paternal descent. Visible junctions called chiasmata hold the homologous chromosomes together at locations where recombination occurred as the synaptonemal complex dissolves. It is at this stage where meiotic arrest occurs in many species.


title: Prophase

text: In the fifth and final phase of prophase I, diakinesis (from the Greek for "double movement"), full chromatin condensation has occurred and all four sister chromatids can be seen in bivalents with microscopy. The rest of the phase resemble the early stages of mitotic prometaphase, as the meiotic prophase ends with the spindle apparatus beginning to form, and the nuclear membrane beginning to break down.


title: Prophase

text: Prophase II of meiosis is very similar to prophase of mitosis. The most noticeable difference is that prophase II occurs with a haploid number of chromosomes as opposed to the diploid number in mitotic prophase. In both animal and plant cells chromosomes may de-condense during telophase I requiring them to re-condense in prophase II. If chromosomes do not need to re-condense, prophase II often proceeds very quickly as is seen in the model organism Arabidopsis.


title: Prophase

text: Female mammals and birds are born possessing all the oocytes needed for future ovulations, and these oocytes are arrested at the prophase I stage of meiosis. In humans, as an example, oocytes are formed between three and four months of gestation within the fetus and are therefor present at birth. During this prophase I arrested stage (dictyate), which may last for decades, four copies of the genome are present in the oocytes. The adaptive significance of prophase I arrest is still not fully understood. However, it has been proposed that the arrest of ooctyes at the four genome copy stage may provide the informational redundancy needed to repair damage in the DNA of the germline. The repair process used appears to be homologous recombinational repair Prophase arrested oocytes have a high capability for efficient repair of DNA damages. DNA repair capability appears to be a key quality control mechanism in the female germ line and a critical determinant of fertility.


title: Prophase

text: The most notable difference between prophase in plant cells and animal cells occurs because plant cells lack centrioles. The organization of the spindle apparatus is associated instead with foci at opposite poles of the cell or is mediated by chromosomes. Another notable difference is preprophase, an additional step in plant mitosis that results in formation of the preprophase band, a structure composed of microtubules. In mitotic prophase I of plants, this band disappears.


title: Prophase

text: Prophase I in meiosis is the most complex iteration of prophase that occurs in both plant cells and animal cells. To ensure pairing of homologous chromosomes and recombination of genetic material occurs properly, there are cellular checkpoints in place. The meiotic checkpoint network is a DNA damage response system that controls double strand break repair, chromatin structure, and the movement and pairing of chromosomes. The system consists of multiple pathways (including the meiotic recombination checkpoint) that prevent the cell from entering metaphase I with errors due to recombination.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: Royal Air Force Menwith Hill is a Royal Air Force station near Harrogate, North Yorkshire, England, which provides communications and intelligence support services to the United Kingdom and the United States. The site contains an extensive satellite ground station and is a communications intercept and missile warning site. It has been described as the largest electronic monitoring station in the world.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: RAF Menwith Hill is owned by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), but made available to the US Department of Defense (DoD) under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement 1951 and other, undisclosed agreements between the US and British governments. His Majesty's Government (HMG) is entitled to possession of the site and retains control over its use and its facilities, though the administration of the base is the responsibility of the US authorities, with support provided by around 400 staff from Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), in addition to United States Air Force (USAF) and US National Security Agency (NSA) personnel. In 2014, the number of American personnel was reduced as part of a streamlining of operations due to improvements in technology.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: The site acts as a ground station for a number of satellites operated by the US National Reconnaissance Office, on behalf of the NSA, with antennas contained in numerous distinctive white radomes, locally referred to as "the golf balls", and is alleged to be an element of the ECHELON system.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: The site is one of three main sites operated by the United States across the globe as a major satellite monitoring station and intelligence gathering location. The other two sites are located in America and Australia, having similar roles and working together with RAF Menwith Hill to develop knowledge around American, British and Australian interests. The Australian site is known as the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: In 1954, the British War Office purchased of land at Nessfield Farm, located approximately west of Harrogate, North Yorkshire. The area purchased soon increased to and were made available by the British Government to the United States Department of Defense. The site was considered by the US as suitable for gathering signals intelligence from the northern parts of Western Europe and Eastern Europe, specifically the Soviet Union and its associated Warsaw Pact countries. The Yorkshire Dales' low level of background radio noise made it an especially good location for the task. The UK provided assurances to the US that the site would be available to them for at least 21 years.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: Construction of the station on behalf of the United States Army Security Agency (USASA) began in April 1956. Building costs at the time were $6.8 million as well as a further $1.2 million for personnel housing. Initially named Field Station 8613, the site was renamed 13th USASA Field Station on 1 January 1957 and again renamed on 1 January 1959, as Menwith Hill Station. Due to adverse ground conditions and weather, there were delays to the construction programme, with the station finally becoming operational during June 1959.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: Operationally, Menwith Hill was assigned to the USASA Headquarters in Frankfurt, West Germany, whereas for logistical support it was attached to the US Air Force's Third Air Force, which at the time had its headquarters in the UK. Security at the station was provided by a US Army military police detachment and the British Air Ministry Constabulary. However, if the site was compromised during an invasion, three earth-covered bunkers contained ammunition and thermite charges which could be used to destroy classified equipment and material.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: The station initially comprised a headquarters building, barracks, dependent housing and support facilities such as a cinema and social clubs. The operations building was located inside a secure compound, within a large antenna field, approximately from the main site. It was equipped with large high frequency (HF) directional rhombic antennas that could detect signals from around the globe. Over two-hundred Collins R-390A HF communications receivers were used to collect a vast range of signal in the HF band, including carrier waves, voice signals, and burst transmissions. Within the operations centre was the communications centre which was manned by cryptographers using deciphering equipment, however a large amount of the signals collected were encrypted before being forwarded for processing to the US National Security Agency's Fort Meade facility in Maryland.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: In the 1960s, as a result of developments in digital technology and the increased use of satellites for signals intelligence, the specialist skills of engineers and technicians within the National Security Agency (NSA) and their contractors became increasingly important. Therefore, on 1 August 1966, with the agreement of the British Government, control of Menwith Hill Station was handed from the US Army to the NSA when it became a field element of the agency. The NSA expanded the station during the 1970s and 1980s, with the operations centre extended and new buildings erected. The first two radomes, designed to protect satellite receiver and transmission dishes (colloquially known as 'golf balls' and now synonymous with the station) were installed in 1974, at which point around 800 personnel were believed to work there.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: In 1976, 21 years after the initial tenure arrangements were agreed with the US, the British Government renewed assurances that the site would continue to be available for a further 21 years.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: Menwith Hill came to public attention in 1980 when British magazine the "New Statesman" published an article which suggested that the station was the world's largest phone tapping facility and highlighted the secrecy afforded to it by the British and US governments. Investigations found that during the early 1960s, Menwith Hill was integrated into the General Post Office's microwave relay network known as 'Backbone', via a high-capacity underground cable link to the Hunters Stones communications tower, located approximately to the south of the station. It was alleged the link allowed mass interception of civilian telephone and telex communications between the United States, UK and Europe. At the time, eight radomes were now present at Menwith Hill, connecting it with other sites in the NSA's satellite communications network and alleged to allow the surveillance of communications in foreign countries. In response to the article the NSA said "We do radio relays - material comes in from a variety of places and is rerouted. It is a switching operation. We route it sometimes to the UK and sometimes to the US". The suggestion that national and international communications were monitored was denied.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: A detachment of the US Army 704th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade was established at Menwith Hill in 1985. In 1992, the detachment became A Company of the 743rd Military Intelligence Battalion, 704th MI Brigade.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: The US Air Force's 6951st Electronic Security Squadron was formed at Menwith HIll on 1 May 1991. It was later re-designated as the 451st Intelligence Squadron on 1 October 1993.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: In 1995, the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) became the executive agent for Menwith Hill on behalf of the National Security Agency. INSCOM transformed A Company, 743rd Military Intelligence Battalion into the 713th Military Intelligence Group. In 2000, the group added a second company and was re-designated as the 109th Military Intelligence Group.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: On 19 February 1996, the station was renamed RAF Menwith Hill, an administrative change to align the base with other sites made available to the United States by the United Kingdom.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: During a 1997 court case, British Telecom revealed that in 1975, its predecessor, the Post Office, installed two cables between Menwith Hill and a coaxial cable that connected to the microwave radio station at Hunters Stones, which was part of the long-distance telephone network. This connection was replaced in 1992 by a new high capacity fibre-optic cable. Later, two additional cables were added over which telephone and other communications could go to and from the base. These cables were capable of transmitting over 100,000 phone calls simultaneously.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: On 1 October 2000, the 451st Intelligence Squadron, was re-designated as the 451st Information Operations Squadron, before reverting to the 451st Intelligence Squadron on 1 April 2007.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: On 19 July 2002, US Army INSCOM transferred responsibility for administrative and logistical support for Menwith Hill to the US Air Force, to bring the site in-line with other facilities in the UK made available to the US. Notwithstanding, the US Army retained a presence and in place of the 109th Military Intelligence Group, INSCOM formed a provisional battalion designated as the Menwith Hill Battalion (Provisional). On 18 October 2008 the unit, under the command of a Lieutenant Colonel, was re-designated as the 307th Military Intelligence Battalion, subordinate to the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade headquartered at Wiesbaden, Germany. On 16 October 2009, the battalion was re-designated as the 709th Military Intelligence Battalion.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: According to an article in a 2003 issue of an internal NSA newsletter, "Menwith is a large site (several hundred NSA civilians)". In March 2012 researcher Dr. Steve Schofield of BASIC produced a 65-page report called "Lifting the Lid on Menwith Hill", funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and commissioned and published by the Yorkshire Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). Menwith Hill's primary mission is to provide "intelligence support for UK, US and allied interests". The base's multimillion-pound expansion, Project Phoenix, is "one of the largest and most sophisticated high technology programs carried out anywhere in the UK over the last 10 years". Of the 1,800 employees in 2012, 400 were British and 1,200 were American employees of the NSA.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: During the 2009 G-20 London Summit NSA intercept specialists based at Menwith Hill attempted to target and decode the encrypted telephone calls of the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: Planning permission was granted in August 2019 for the construction of three new radomes at the site, bringing the total number to thirty-seven. The three new radomes would be in diameter and located in the southern part of the site.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: RAF Menwith Hill is owned by the British Ministry of Defence (MOD). Although designated as an RAF station, It is made available to the United States Department of Defense (DOD) under the 1951 NATO Status of Forces Agreement and other classified arrangements. The MOD retains control over the site's use and facilities, however the administration of the site is the responsibility of the US authorities.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: The US Air Force's 421st Air Base Squadron provides Menwith Hill with base and mission support services. The squadron is part of the 423rd Air Base Group which in turn is part of the 501st Combat Support Wing, both of which have their headquarters at RAF Alconbury in Cambridgeshire.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: According to the Royal Air Force "RAF Menwith Hill is an integral part of the US DOD world-wide defence communications network. Its primary mission is to provide intelligence support for UK, US and allied interests." The site is a field station of the US National Security Agency (NSA), with personnel from other parts of the DOD also present. UK personnel from the MOD and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) are integrated into both the operational and administrative elements of the site.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: In November 2017, the British Government advised that 1,205 personnel worked at the station, comprising 33 staff from the US military, 344 US contractors, 250 US civilians, 7 UK military (5 Royal Navy and 2 RAF), 85 UK contractors and 486 UK civilians (including those employed by GCHQ).


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: Site security is provided by the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP). One of three MDP Central Support Group units is based at Menwith Hill, providing armed officers who can be deployed regionally at short notice, to support wider MDP operations.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: On 1 April 2006, RAF Menwith Hill was designated as a protected site for the purposes of Section 128 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. The effect of the act was to make it a specific criminal offence for a person to trespass into the station.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: In 1988, investigative journalist Duncan Campbell revealed, in an article entitled "Somebody's listening" and published in "New Statesman", the existence of the ECHELON surveillance program, an extension of the UKUSA Agreement on global signals intelligence Sigint. He also detailed how the eavesdropping operations worked. Duncan Campbell presented a report commissioned by STOA concerning the ECHELON system, at a "hearing of the Committee on Citizens Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs on the subject the European Union and data protection" which prompted the European Union to set up the Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: On 5 July 2000, the European Union set up the European Parliament's Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System stated that the global system for the interception of private and commercial communications was operating by means of "cooperation proportionate to their capabilities" among the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the UKUSA. ... It seems likely ... that its name is in fact ECHELON." The Committee raised concerns about the incompatibility of the interception of private and commercial communications with the fundamental right to respect for private life (Article 8 of the ECHR). They were also concerned that interception of commercial communications could be used for "competitive intelligence-gathering rather than combating corruption." During the early 1970s, the first of what became more than eight large satellite communications dishes were installed at Menwith Hill.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: In 1999 he wrote a report on COMINT entitled "Interception Capabilities 2000" for the European Parliament.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: In 1996 author and investigative journalist, Nicky Hager in his book entitled "Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network", provided a detailed account of ECHELON, the worldwide electronic surveillance system used by an intelligence alliance of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: On 3 November 1999, the BBC reported that they had confirmation from the Australian Government of the existence of a powerful "global spying network" codenamed Echelon, that can eavesdrop on every single phone call, fax or e-mail, anywhere on the planet" with Britain and the United States as the chief protagonists. They confirmed that Menwith Hill was "linked directly to the headquarters of the US National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort Meade in Maryland."


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: Between 1984 and 1995 a number of peace camps were established in close proximity to the station. A number of other individual protests have also taken place, predominantly related to nuclear proliferation and strategic missile defense. Protests also occurred at other US military locations in the UK such as Greenham Common.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: Objections to the Strategic Defense Initiative have led to demonstrators storming the perimeter fence, and to demands in 2007 from Labour MPs for a full debate about missile defence and Menwith Hill. Actions continue into 2006.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: One particular local activist, Lindis Percy, was prosecuted, over a protracted period, under a number of different laws.


title: RAF Menwith Hill

text: In April 2012 activists affiliated with the global Occupy Movement held a four-day campsite at Menwith Hill. Protesters said they hoped the camp would "reignite the debate locally, nationally and globally about whether the subversive and undemocratic nature of activities at the base are acceptable, or indeed accountable, to the British public. This debate however, never happened outside of the fringe elements of society."


title: David Wayne

text: David Wayne (born Wayne James McMeekan, January 30, 1914 – February 9, 1995) was an American stage and screen actor with a career spanning over 50 years.


title: David Wayne

text: Wayne was born in Traverse City, Michigan, the son of Helen Matilda (née Mason) and John David McMeekan. His mother died when he was four. He grew up in Bloomingdale, Michigan.


title: David Wayne

text: Wayne attended Western Michigan University for two years and then went to work as a statistician in Cleveland. He began acting with Cleveland's Shakesperean repertory theatre in 1936.


title: David Wayne

text: When World War II began, Wayne volunteered as an ambulance driver with the British Army in North Africa. When the United States entered the war he joined the United States Army.


title: David Wayne

text: Wayne's first major Broadway role was Og the leprechaun in "Finian's Rainbow", for which he won the Theatre World Award and the first ever Tony for Actor, Supporting or Featured (Musical). While appearing in the play, he and co-star Albert Sharpe were recruited by producer David O. Selznick to play Irish characters in the film "Portrait of Jennie" (1948).


title: David Wayne

text: In 1948, Wayne was one of 50 applicants (out of approximately 700) granted membership in New York's newly formed Actors Studio.


title: David Wayne

text: He was awarded a second Tony for Best Actor (Dramatic) for "The Teahouse of the August Moon" and was nominated as Best Actor (Musical) for "The Happy Time". He originated the role of Ensign Pulver in the classic stage comedy "Mister Roberts" and also appeared in "Say, Darling"; "After the Fall"; and "Incident at Vichy".


title: David Wayne

text: In films, Wayne most often was cast as a supporting player, such as the charming cad and singer/songwriter/neighbor opposite Spencer Tracy and Katharine Hepburn in "Adam's Rib" (1949). He portrayed the child killer, originally played by Peter Lorre, in the remake of "M" (1951), a chance to see him in a rare leading role, even rarer as a villain. Wayne also appeared in four films with Marilyn Monroe (more than any other actor): "As Young as You Feel" (1951), "We're Not Married" (1952), "O. Henry's Full House" (1952) (although he shared no scenes with Monroe), and "How to Marry a Millionaire" (1953) where he did have scenes with Monroe. He costarred in "The Tender Trap" (1955) with Frank Sinatra, Debbie Reynolds, and Celeste Holm.


title: David Wayne

text: In 1955, Wayne starred in the NBC comedy "Norby". Wayne appeared in the late 1950s on ABC's "The Pat Boone Chevy Showroom" and the "Twilight Zone" episode "Escape Clause". He starred as Darius Woodley in two 1961 episodes of NBC's "The Outlaws" starring Barton MacLane. Also in 1961, Wayne appeared in the Bell Telephone Company-produced driver safety film "Anatomy of an Accident", about a family outing tragically cut short by a car accident.


title: David Wayne

text: He played the Mad Hatter, one of the recurring villains in the 1960s television series "Batman". In 1964, he guest-starred in the series finale, "Pay Now, Die Later", of CBS's drama "Mr. Broadway", starring Craig Stevens as public relations specialist Mike Bell. In the storyline, Wayne's character, the wealthy John Zeck, hires Bell to prepare Zeck's obituary before his death. Also in the 1960s, Wayne was a radio host on NBC's magazine program "Monitor".


title: David Wayne

text: Wayne was known for his role as Dr. Charles Dutton in Michael Crichton's "The Andromeda Strain" (1971). He also appeared as Uncle Timothy Jamison in the NBC sitcom "The Brian Keith Show" and played Charles Dutton in "The Good Life", also on NBC. Wayne made a guest appearance in a leading role for a 1975 episode of "Gunsmoke" titled "I Have Promises to Keep". He co-starred with Jim Hutton in the 1976 television series "Ellery Queen" (as Inspector Richard Queen).


title: David Wayne

text: In 1973 on Mannix season 6 episode 22 Wayne played a hobo being hunted by the men mistaking him for a different hobo who witnesses a criminal still alive after staging his own death.


title: David Wayne

text: In 1978, Wayne played James Lawrence in the ABC drama "Family", and he played Digger Barnes in four episodes of the CBS soap opera "Dallas". (Wayne's friend Keenan Wynn replaced Wayne in the role of Digger Barnes.) Wayne co-starred in the role of Dr. Amos Weatherby in the 1979–82 television series "House Calls" with Lynn Redgrave and later Sharon Gless.


title: David Wayne

text: Wayne was married to Jane Gordon in 1941 and had two daughters, Susan Wayne Kearney and Melinda Wayne, and a son, Timothy. Timothy disappeared and was presumed drowned during a rafting trip in August 1970. Wayne's wife, daughter of opera vocalist Jeanne Gordon, died in 1993. Susan died in 2019; her remains were cremated and given to her family.


title: David Wayne

text: Wayne was a lifelong Democrat who supported Adlai Stevenson's campaign during the 1952 presidential election.


title: David Wayne

text: On February 9, 1995, ten days after his 81st birthday, Wayne died in his Santa Monica, California, home from complications of lung cancer. His remains were cremated and distributed to his family.


title: David Wayne

text: Wayne won two Tony Awards, one in 1947 for "Finian's Rainbow" and one in 1954 for "The Teahouse of the August Moon".


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: Krestovsky Stadium, known as Gazprom Arena for sponsorship reasons (), is a retractable roof stadium with a retractable pitch in the western portion of Krestovsky Island in Saint Petersburg, Russia, which serves as home for FC Zenit Saint Petersburg. The stadium was opened in 2017 for the FIFA Confederations Cup. It is called Saint Petersburg Stadium during major international tournaments, including the 2017 FIFA Confederations Cup, 2018 FIFA World Cup, and UEFA Euro 2020. It was to host the 2022 UEFA Champions League Final, but as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, UEFA moved the final out of Russia and to the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, a suburb of Paris.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: The stadium was built as one of the venues for the 2018 FIFA World Cup. The competition between architectural projects was won by Kisho Kurokawa's "The Spaceship". The design of the stadium is a modified and enlarged version of Toyota Stadium in Toyota City, Japan, which was also designed by Kurokawa. The stadium was built on the location where the former Kirov Stadium used to stand before it was demolished. The capacity of 56,196 seats was increased to 68,000 seats for the World Cup. It also has 104 luxuriously designed skyboxes.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: In January 2009 "The St. Petersburg Times" reported that the project was now to be funded by the city government of St Petersburg, with Gazprom switching to build a separate skyscraper project. The City Hall had to step in after Gazprom declined to invest any further money into the stadium's construction. Before the stadium was named "Sankt Petersburg" in October 2015, it was known under the names Zenit Arena, Gazprom Arena and Piter Arena.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: On 25 July 2016 the general contractor, Inzhtransstroy-Spb, issued a statement that the city authorities have failed to pay 1 billion rubles ($15.8 million at the current exchange rate) worth of construction work and stopped the work. The next day the contract was terminated. On 1 August there were reports of wind damage to parts of the metal sheathing, and a flood.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: In the end of August 2016, the new general contractor, Metrostroy, resumed construction works on the site.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: In April 2017 the work on the stadium was completed. The total cost of the stadium amounted to 24 billion rubles. The first official match held at the stadium was the Russian Premier League game between FC Zenit Saint Petersburg and FC Ural on 22 April 2017. Branislav Ivanović scored the first goal in the stadium's history.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: On 17 June 2017, the first game of 2017 FIFA Confederations Cup was held on the stadium with the Group A match between the host Russia and New Zealand.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: On 2 July 2017, the 2017 FIFA Confederations Cup Final was held at the stadium between Chile and Germany, becoming the most attended match of the tournament and also setting the record attendance for the stadium.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: On February 15, 2018, the government of Saint Petersburg signed a contract for the rights and use of the stadium with Zenit Arena LLC, which is a subsidiary of JSC football club Zenit.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: On December 16, 2018, the Stadium hosted a Channel One Cup Russia – Finland (5-0) hockey match. 81,000 spectators watched the game and set a record attendance in domestic and European ice hockey.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: After the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, it was announced that the 2022 UEFA Champions League Final would be moved from the Gazprom Arena to the Stade de France.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: On 19 September 2014, it was announced by UEFA that the stadium was chosen to host four UEFA Euro 2020 finals fixtures, three group games and a quarter-final match. On 23 April 2021, the stadium was given three additional group stage matches in Group E (Poland vs. Slovakia, Sweden vs. Slovakia and Sweden vs. Poland) following the removal of the Aviva Stadium in Dublin as a Euro 2020 host city due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic in the Republic of Ireland.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: On 24 September 2019, UEFA announced that the stadium would host the 2021 UEFA Champions League Final. However, due to adjustments of the 2020 final caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe, their hosting time was pushed back a year to 2022. As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, UEFA called an extraordinary meeting of the Executive Committee, and the next day, UEFA confirmed that the final would be moved to the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, a suburb of Paris.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: Saint Petersburg Arena offers 560 seats for people with disabilities, 266 of them are for wheelchair users. Moreover, the stadium design includes special lobbies, elevators and ramps to ensure accessibility to spectators with limited mobility.


title: Krestovsky Stadium

text: The stadium has been fully prepared for the FIFA World Cup games in accordance with the FIFA requirements for capacity and security. The stadium is equipped with a video surveillance and identification system that makes it possible to detect any troublemakers and fans who are not allowed to enter.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The persecution of Falun Gong is the antireligious campaign initiated in 1999 by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to eliminate the spiritual practice of Falun Gong in China, maintaining a doctrine of state atheism. It is characterized by a multifaceted propaganda campaign, a program of enforced ideological conversion and re-education and reportedly a variety of extralegal coercive measures such as arbitrary arrests, forced labor and physical torture, sometimes resulting in death.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Falun Gong is a modern "qigong" discipline combining slow-moving exercises and meditation with a moral philosophy. It was founded by Li Hongzhi, who introduced it to the public in May 1992 in Changchun, Jilin. Following a period of rapid growth in the 1990s, the CCP launched a campaign to "eradicate" Falun Gong on 20 July 1999.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: An extra-constitutional body called the 6-10 Office was created to lead the persecution of Falun Gong. The authorities mobilized the state media apparatus, judiciary, police, army, the education system, families and workplaces against the group. The campaign was driven by large-scale propaganda through television, newspaper, radio and the Internet. There are reports of systematic torture, illegal imprisonment, forced labor, organ harvesting and abusive psychiatric measures, with the apparent aim of forcing practitioners to recant their belief in Falun Gong.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Foreign observers estimate that hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of Falun Gong practitioners have been detained in "re-education through labor" camps, prisons and other detention facilities for refusing to renounce the spiritual practice. Former prisoners have reported that Falun Gong practitioners consistently received "the longest sentences and worst treatment" in labor camps, and in some facilities Falun Gong practitioners formed the substantial majority of detainees. , at least 2,000 Falun Gong practitioners had been reportedly tortured to death in the persecution campaign. Some international observers and judicial authorities have described the campaign against Falun Gong as a genocide. In 2009, courts in Spain and Argentina indicted senior Chinese officials for genocide and crimes against humanity for their role in orchestrating the suppression of Falun Gong.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In 2006, allegations emerged that many Falun Gong practitioners had been killed to supply China's organ transplant industry. An initial investigation found that "the source of 41,500 transplants for the six-year period 2000 to 2005 is unexplained" and concluded that "there has been and continues today to be large scale organ seizures from unwilling Falun Gong practitioners". Ethan Gutmann estimates 65,000 Falun Gong practitioners were killed for their organs from 2000 to 2008. Following additional analysis, the researchers significantly raised the estimates on the number of Falun Gong practitioners who may have been targeted for organ harvesting. In 2008, United Nations Special Rapporteurs reiterated their requests for "the Chinese government to fully explain the allegation of taking vital organs from Falun Gong practitioners and the source of organs for the sudden increase in organ transplants that has been going on in China since the year 2000".


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Falun Gong, also known as Falun Dafa, is a form of spiritual qigong practice that involves meditation, energy exercises, and a set of moral principles that guide practitioners' daily lives. The principles they espouse—"truthfulness, compassion, forbearance"—have been repeated by Falun Gong members. However, according to James Lewis, Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi instructs his followers to deflect from fact when talking to outsiders, contradictory to his teachings about "Truthfulness".


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The practice of Falun Gong was first taught publicly by Li in Northeast China in the spring of 1992, towards the end of China's "qigong boom". Falun Gong initially enjoyed considerable official support during the early years of its development. It was promoted by the state-run Qigong Association and other government agencies. By the mid-1990s, however, Chinese authorities sought to rein in the influence of qigong practices and enacted more stringent requirements on the country's various qigong denominations. In 1995 authorities mandated that all qigong groups establish Communist Party branches. The government also sought to formalize ties with Falun Gong and exercise greater control over the practice. Falun Gong resisted co-optation, and instead filed to withdraw altogether from the state-run qigong association.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Following this severance of ties to the state, the group came under increasing criticism and surveillance from the country's security apparatus and propaganda department. Falun Gong books were banned from further publication in July 1996, and official news outlets began criticizing the group as a form of "feudal superstition", whose "theistic" orientation was at odds with the official ideology and national agenda.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Tensions continued to escalate through the late 1990s. By 1999, surveys estimated as many as 70 million people were practicing Falun Gong in China. Although some government agencies and senior officials continued expressing support for the practices, others grew increasingly wary of its size and capacity for independent organization.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: On 22 April 1999, several dozen Falun Gong practitioners were beaten and arrested in the city of Tianjin while staging a peaceful sit-in. The practitioners were told that the arrest order came from the Ministry of Public Security, and that those arrested could be released only with the approval of Beijing authorities.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: On 25 April, upwards of 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners assembled peacefully near the Zhongnanhai government compound in Beijing to request the release of the Tianjin practitioners and an end to the escalating harassment against them. It was Falun Gong practitioners' attempt to seek redress from the leadership by going to them and, "albeit very quietly and politely, making it clear that they would not be treated so shabbily." It was the first mass demonstration at the Zhongnanhai compound in the PRC's history, and the largest protest in Beijing since 1989. Several Falun Gong representatives met with then-premier Zhu Rongji, who assured them that the government was not against Falun Gong, and promised that the Tianjin practitioners would be released. The crowd outside dispersed peacefully, apparently believing that their demonstration had been a success.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Security czar and politburo member Luo Gan was less conciliatory, and called on Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party to find a decisive solution to the Falun Gong problem.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: On the night of 25 April 1999, then-Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin issued a letter indicating his desire to see Falun Gong defeated. The letter expressed alarm at Falun Gong's popularity, particularly among Communist Party members. He reportedly called the Zhongnanhai protest "the most serious political incident since the '4 June' political disturbance in 1989."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: At a meeting of the Politburo on 7 June 1999, Jiang described Falun Gong as a grave threat to Communist Party authority—"something unprecedented in the country since its founding 50 years ago"—and ordered the creation of a high-level committee to "get fully prepared for the work of disintegrating [Falun Gong]." Rumors of an impending crackdown began circulating throughout China, prompting demonstrations and petitions. The government publicly denied the reports, calling them "completely baseless" and offering assurances that it had never banned qigong activities.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Just after midnight on 20 July 1999, public security officers seized hundreds of Falun Gong practitioners from their homes in cities across China. Estimates on the number of arrests vary from several hundred to over 5,600. A Hong Kong newspaper reported that 50,000 individuals were detained in the first week of the crackdown. Four Falun Gong coordinators in Beijing were arrested and quickly tried on charges of "leaking state secrets". The Public Security Bureau ordered churches, temples, mosques, newspapers, media, courts and police to suppress Falun Gong. Three days of massive demonstrations by practitioners in some thirty cities followed. In Beijing and other cities, protesters were detained in sports stadiums.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Editorials in state-run newspapers urged people to give up Falun Gong practice, and Communist Party members in particular were reminded that they were atheists and must not allow themselves to "become superstitious by continuing to practice Falun Gong."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Foreign observers have attempted to explain the Party's rationale for banning Falun Gong as stemming from a variety of factors. These include Falun Gong's popularity, its independence from the state and refusal to toe the Party line, internal power politics within the Communist Party, and Falun Gong's moral and spiritual content, which put it at odds with the Party's Marxist–Leninist atheist ideology.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: A World Journal report suggested that certain high-level Party officials wanted to crack down on the practice for years, but lacked sufficient pretext until the protest at Zhongnanhai, which they claim was partly orchestrated by Luo Gan, a long-time opponent of Falun Gong. There were also reportedly rifts in the Politburo at the time of the incident. Willy Wo-Lap Lam writes that Jiang's campaign against Falun Gong may have been used to promote allegiance to himself; Lam quotes one party veteran as saying, "By unleashing a Mao-style movement [against Falun Gong], Jiang is forcing senior cadres to pledge allegiance to his line." Jiang is held by Falun Gong to be personally responsible for the final decision, and sources cited by "The Washington Post" state that, "Jiang Zemin alone decided that Falun Gong must be eliminated," and "picked what he thought was an easy target." Peerman cited reasons such as suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi; Saich postulates that party leaders' anger at Falun Gong's widespread appeal, and ideological struggle. The "Washington Post" reported that members of the Politburo Standing Committee did not unanimously support the crackdown, and that "Jiang Zemin alone decided that Falun Gong must be eliminated." The size and reach of Jiang's anti–Falun Gong campaign surpassed that of many previous mass-movements.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Human Rights Watch notes that the crackdown on Falun Gong reflects historical efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to eradicate religion, which the government believed was inherently subversive. Some journalists believe that Beijing's reaction exposes its authoritarian nature and its intolerance for competing loyalty. "The Globe and Mail" wrote : "...any group that does not come under the control of the Party is a threat"; secondly, the 1989 protests may have heightened the leaders' sense of losing their grip on power, making them live in "mortal fear" of popular demonstrations. Craig Smith of "the Wall Street Journal" suggests that the government which has by definition no view of spirituality, lacks moral credibility with which to fight an expressly spiritual foe; the party feels increasingly threatened by any belief system that challenges its ideology and has an ability to organize itself. That Falun Gong, whose belief system represented a revival of traditional Chinese religion, was being practiced by many Communist Party members and members of the military was seen as particularly disturbing to Jiang Zemin. "Jiang accepts the threat of Falun Gong as an ideological one: spiritual beliefs against militant atheism and historical materialism. He [wished] to purge the government and the military of such beliefs".


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: On 10 June the Party established the 610 Office, a Communist Party-led security agency responsible for coordinating the elimination of Falun Gong. The office was not created with any legislation, and there are no provisions describing its precise mandate. Because of this, it is sometimes described as an extralegal organization. Nonetheless, its tasks were "to deal with central and local, party and state agencies, which were called upon to act in close coordination with that office," according to UCLA professor James Tong. The leaders of the 610 Office are "able to call on top government and party officials...and draw on their institutional resources", and have personal access to the Communist Party General Secretary and the Premier.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The office is headed by a high-ranking member of the Communist Party's Politburo or Politburo Standing Committee. It is closely associated with the powerful Political and Legislative Affairs Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Soon after the creation of the central 610 Office, local branches were established at each administrative level wherever populations of Falun Gong practitioners were present, including the provincial, district, municipal, and sometimes neighborhood levels. In some instances, 610 Offices have been established within large corporations and universities.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The main functions of the 610 Offices include coordinating anti–Falun Gong propaganda, surveillance and intelligence collection, and the punishment and "reeducation" of Falun Gong practitioners. The office is reportedly involved in the extrajudicial sentencing, coercive reeducation, torture, and sometimes death of Falun Gong practitioners.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Journalist Ian Johnson, whose coverage of the crackdown on Falun Gong earned him a Pulitzer Prize, wrote that the job of the 610 Office was "to mobilize the country's pliant social organizations. Under orders from the Public Security Bureau, churches, temples, mosques, newspapers, media, courts and police all quickly lined up behind the government's simple plan: to crush Falun Gong, no measures too excessive."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Beginning in July 1999 Chinese authorities issued a number of notices and circulars prescribing measures to crack down on the Falun Gong and placing restrictions on the practice and expression of religious belief:


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Human rights experts and legal observers have stated that the official directives and legal documents issued for the purge fall short of international legal standards and violate provisions in China's own constitution.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The Ministry of Justice required that lawyers seek permission before taking on Falun Gong cases, and called on them to "interpret the law in such a way as to conform to the spirit of the government's decrees." Additionally, on 5 November 1999 the Supreme People's Court issued a notice to all lower courts stating that it was their "political duty" to "resolutely impose severe punishment" against groups considered heretical, especially Falun Gong. It also required the courts at all levels to handle Falun Gong cases by following the direction of the CCP committees, thereby ensuring that Falun Gong cases would be judged based on political considerations, rather than evidence. Brian Edelman and James Richardson wrote that the SPC notice "does not comport well with a defendant's constitutional right to a defense, and it appears to assume guilt before a trial has taken place."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The CCP's campaign against Falun Gong was a turning point in the development of China's legal system, representing a "significant backward step" in the development of rule of law, according to Ian Dominson. In the 1990s the legal system was gradually becoming more professionalized, and a series of reforms in 1996–97 affirmed the principle that all punishments must be based on the rule of law. However, the campaign against Falun Gong would not have been possible if carried out within the narrow confines of China's existing criminal law. In order to persecute the group, in 1999 the judicial system reverted to being used as a political instrument, with laws being applied flexibly to advance the CCP's policy objectives. Edelman and Richardson write that "the Party and government's response to the Falun Gong movement violates citizens' right to a legal defense, freedom of religion, speech and assembly enshrined in the Constitution... the Party will do whatever is necessary to crush any perceived threat to its supreme control. This represents a move away from the rule of law and toward this historical Mao policy of 'rule by man.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: One of the key elements of the anti–Falun Gong campaign was a propaganda campaign that sought to discredit and demonize Falun Gong and its teachings.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Within the first month of the crackdown, 300–400 articles attacking Falun Gong appeared in the main state-run papers, while primetime television replayed alleged exposés on the group, with no divergent views aired in the media. The propaganda campaign focused on allegations that Falun Gong jeopardized social stability, was deceiving and dangerous, was "anti-science" and threatened progress, and argued that Falun Gong's moral philosophy was incompatible with a Marxist social ethic.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: For several months China Central Television's evening news contained little but anti–Falun Gong rhetoric. China scholars Daniel Wright and Joseph Fewsmith described it as "a study in all-out demonization", they wrote. Falun Gong was compared to "a rat crossing the street that everyone shouts out to squash" by "Beijing Daily"; other officials said it would be a "long-term, complex and serious" struggle to "eradicate" Falun Gong.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: State propaganda initially used the appeal of scientific rationalism to argue that Falun Gong's worldview was in "complete opposition to science" and communism. For example, the "People's Daily" newspaper asserted on 27 July 1999 that the fight against Falun Gong "was a struggle between theism and atheism, superstition and science, idealism and materialism." Other editorials declared that Falun Gong's "idealism and theism" are "absolutely contradictory to the fundamental theories and principles of Marxism," and that the "'truth, kindness and forbearance' principle preached by [Falun Gong] has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve." Suppressing Falun Gong was presented as a necessary step to maintaining the "vanguard role" of the Communist Party in Chinese society.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: At the early stages of the crackdown, the evening news also would broadcast images of large piles of Falun Gong materials being crushed or incinerated. By 30 July, ten days into the campaign, Xinhua had reported confiscations of over one million Falun Gong books and other materials, hundreds of thousands burned and destroyed.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The tenor of the official rhetoric against Falun Gong continued to escalate in the months following July 1999, and broadened to include charges that Falun Gong was colluding with foreign "anti-China" forces. Media reports portrayed Falun Gong as a harm to society, an "abnormal" religious activity, and a dangerous form of "superstition" that led to madness, death, and suicide. These messages were relayed through all state-run—and many non-state-run media channels—as well as through work units and the Communist Party's own structure of cells that penetrate society.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Elizabeth Perry, a Harvard historian, writes that the basic pattern of the offensive was similar to "the anti-rightist campaign of the 1950s [and] the anti-spiritual pollution campaigns of the 1980s." As it did during the Cultural Revolution, the Communist Party organised rallies in the streets and stop-work meetings in remote western provinces by government agencies such as the weather bureau to denounce the practice. Local government authorities have carried out "study and education" programmes throughout China, and official cadres have visited villagers and farmers at home to explain "in simple terms the harm of Falun Gong to them".


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Despite Party efforts, initial charges leveled against Falun Gong failed to elicit widespread popular support for the persecution of the group. In October 1999, three months after the persecution began, the Supreme People's Court issued a judicial interpretation classifying Falun Gong as a "xiejiao". A broad translation of that term is "heretical teaching" or "heterodox teaching", but during the anti–Falun Gong propaganda campaign it was rendered as "cult" or "evil cult" in English. In the context of imperial China, the term "xiejiao" was used to refer to non-Confucian religions, though in the context of Communist China, it has been used to target religious organizations that do not submit to the authority of the Communist Party. Julia Ching writes that the "evil cult" label was defined by an atheist government "on political premises, not by any religious authority", and was used by the authorities to make previous arrests and imprisonments constitutional.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Ian Johnson argued that by applying the 'cult' label, the government put Falun Gong on the defensive, and "cloaked [its] crackdown with the legitimacy of the West's anticult movement." David Ownby similarly wrote that "the entire issue of the supposed cultic nature of Falun Gong was a red herring from the beginning, cleverly exploited by the Chinese state to blunt the appeal of Falun Gong.". According to John Powers and Meg Y. M. Lee, because the Falun Gong was categorized in the popular perception as an "apolitical, qigong exercise club", it was not seen as a threat to the government. The most critical strategy in the Falun Gong persecution campaign, therefore, was to convince people to reclassify the Falun Gong into a number of "negatively charged religious labels" like "evil cult", "sect", or "superstition". In this process of relabelling, the government was attempting to tap into a "deep reservoir of negative feelings related to the historical role of quasi-religious cults as a destabilising force in Chinese political history."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Overseas Chinese propaganda using this label has been censured by Western governments. The Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission in 2006 took issue with anti–Falun Gong broadcasts from Chinese Central Television (CCTV), noting "they are expressions of extreme ill will against Falun Gong and its founder, Li Hongzhi. The derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by such comments could expose the targeted group or individual to hatred or contempt and... could incite violence and threaten the physical security of Falun Gong practitioners."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: A turning point in the government's campaign against Falun Gong occurred on 23 January 2001, when five people set themselves on fire in Tiananmen Square. Chinese government sources declared immediately they were Falun Gong practitioners driven to suicide by the practice, and filled the nation's media outlets with graphic images and fresh denunciations of the practice. The self-immolation was held up as evidence of the "dangers" of Falun Gong, and was used to legitimize the government's crackdown against the group.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Falun Gong sources disputed the accuracy of the government's narrative, noting that their teachings explicitly forbid violence or suicide. Several Western journalists and scholars also noted inconsistencies in the official account of events, leading many to believe the self-immolation may have been staged to discredit Falun Gong. The government did not permit independent investigations and denied Western journalists or human rights groups access to the victims. However, two weeks after the self-immolation incident, "The Washington Post" published an investigation into the identity of two of the victims, and found that "no one ever saw [them] practice Falun Gong."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The campaign of state propaganda that followed the event eroded public sympathy for Falun Gong. As noted by "Time" magazine, many Chinese had previously felt that Falun Gong posed no real threat, and that the state's crackdown against it had gone too far. After the self-immolation, however, the media campaign against the group gained significant traction. Posters, leaflets and videos were produced detailing the supposed detrimental effects of Falun Gong practice, and regular anti–Falun Gong classes were scheduled in schools. CNN compared the government's propaganda initiative to past political movements such as the Korean War and the Cultural Revolution. Later, as public opinion turned against the group, the Chinese authorities began sanctioning the "systematic use of violence" to eliminate Falun Gong. In the year following the incident, the imprisonment, torture, and deaths of Falun Gong practitioners in custody increased significantly.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The Foreign Correspondents' Club of China has complained about their members being "followed, detained, interrogated and threatened" for reporting on the crackdown on Falun Gong. Foreign journalists covering a clandestine Falun Gong news conference in October 1999 were accused by the Chinese authorities of "illegal reporting". Journalists from "Reuters", the "New York Times", the "Associated Press" and a number of other organisations were interrogated by police, forced to sign confessions, and had their work and residence papers temporarily confiscated. Correspondents also complained that television satellite transmissions were interfered with while being routed through China Central Television. Amnesty International states that "a number of people have received prison sentences or long terms of administrative detention for speaking out about the repression or giving information over the Internet."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The 2002 Reporters Without Borders' report on China states that photographers and cameramen working with foreign media were prevented from working in and around Tiananmen Square where hundreds of Falun Gong practitioners had been demonstrating in recent years. It estimates that "at least 50 representatives of the international press have been arrested since July 1999, and some of them were beaten by police; several Falun Gong followers have been imprisoned for talking with foreign journalists." Ian Johnson, "The Wall Street Journal" correspondent in Beijing, wrote a series of articles which won him the 2001 Pulitzer Prize. Johnson left Beijing after writing his articles, stating that "the Chinese police would have made my life in Beijing impossible" after he received the Pulitzer.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Entire news organizations have not been immune to press restrictions concerning Falun Gong. In March 2001, "Time Asia" ran a story about Falun Gong in Hong Kong. The magazine was pulled from the shelves in Mainland China, and threatened that it would never again be sold in the country. Partly as a result of the difficult reporting environment, by 2002, Western news coverage of the persecution within China had all but completely ceased, even as the number of Falun Gong deaths in custody was on the rise.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Terms related to Falun Gong are among the most heavily censored topics on the Chinese Internet, and individuals found downloading or circulating information online about Falun Gong risk imprisonment.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Chinese authorities began filtering and blocking overseas websites as early as the mid-1990s, and in 1998 the Ministry of Public Security developed plans for the "Golden Shield Project" to monitor and control online communications. The campaign against Falun Gong in 1999 provided authorities with added incentive to develop more rigorous censorship and surveillance techniques. The government also moved to criminalize various forms of online speech. China's first integrated regulation on Internet content, passed in 2000, made it illegal to disseminate information that "undermines social stability", harms the "honor and interests of the state", or that "undermines the state's policy for religions" or preaches "feudal" beliefs—a veiled reference to Falun Gong.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The same year, the Chinese government sought out Western corporations to develop surveillance and censorship tools that would let them track Falun Gong practitioners and block access to news and information on the subject. North American companies such as Cisco and Nortel marketed their services to the Chinese government by touting their efficacy in catching Falun Gong.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In addition to censoring the Internet within its borders, the Chinese government and military use cyber-warfare to attack Falun Gong websites in the United States, Australia, Canada and Europe. According to Chinese Internet researcher Ethan Gutmann, the first sustained denial of service attacks launched by China were against overseas Falun Gong websites.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In 2005, researchers from Harvard and Cambridge found that terms related to Falun Gong were the most intensively censored on the Chinese Internet. Other studies of Chinese censorship and monitoring practices produced similar conclusions. A 2012 study examining rates of censorship on Chinese social media websites found Falun Gong-related terms were among the most stringently censored. Among the top 20 terms most likely to be deleted on Chinese social media websites, three are variations on the word "Falun Gong" or "Falun Dafa".


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In response to censorship of the Chinese Internet, Falun Gong practitioners in North America developed a suite of software tools that could be used by bypass online censorship and surveillance.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: A key component of the Communist Party's campaign is the reeducation or "transformation" of Falun Gong practitioners. Transformation is described as "a process of ideological reprogramming whereby practitioners are subjected to various methods of physical and psychological coercion until they recant their belief in Falun Gong."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The transformation process usually occurs in prisons, labor camps, reeducation centers and other detention facilities. In 2001 Chinese authorities ordered that no Falun Gong practitioner was to be spared from the coercive measures used to make them renounce their faith. The most active were sent directly to labor camps, "where they are first 'broken' by beatings and other torture." Former prisoners report being told by the guards that "no measures are too excessive" to elicit renunciation statements, and practitioners who refuse to renounce Falun Gong are sometimes killed in custody.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The transformation is considered successful once the Falun Gong practitioner signs five documents: a "guarantee" to stop practicing Falun Gong; a promise to sever all ties to the practice; two self-criticism documents critiquing their own behaviour and thinking; and criticisms of Falun Gong doctrine. In order to demonstrate the sincerity of their renunciations, practitioners are made to vilify Falun Gong in front of an audience or on videotape. These recordings may then be used by state-run media as part of a propaganda effort. In some camps the newly reeducated must partake in the transformation of other practitioners—including by inflicting physical abuse on others—as proof that they have fully renounced Falun Gong's teachings.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The transformation efforts are driven by incentives and directives issued from central Communist Party authorities via the 610 Office. Local governments and officials in charge of detention facilities are given quotas stipulating how many Falun Gong practitioners must be successfully transformed. Fulfillment of these quotas is tied to promotions and financial compensation, with "generous bonuses" going to officials who meet the targets set by the government, and possible demotions for those who do not. The central 610 Office periodically launches new transformation campaigns to revise the quotas and disseminate new methods. In 2010, it initiated a nationwide, three-year campaign to transform large numbers of Falun Gong practitioners. Documents posted on Party and local government websites refer to concrete transformation targets and set limits on acceptable rates of "relapse". A similar three-year campaign was launched in 2013.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In order to reach transformation targets, the government sanctioned the systematic use of torture and violence against Falun Gong practitioners, including shocks with electric truncheons and beatings. Amnesty International writes that "detainees who do not cooperate with the 're-education' process will be subjected to methods of torture and other ill-treatment ... with increasing severity." The "soft" methods include sleep deprivation, threatening family members, and denial of access to sanitation or bathrooms. The ill-treatment escalates to beatings, 24-hour surveillance, solitary confinement, shocks with electric batons, abusive forced feedings, "rack" torture and the "tiger bench", wherein the person is bound to a board and their legs are made to bend backwards.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Since 2000, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture documented 314 cases of torture in China, representing more than 1,160 individuals. Falun Gong comprised 66% of the reported torture cases. The Special Rapporteur referred to the torture allegations as "harrowing" and asked the Chinese government to "take immediate steps to protect the lives and integrity of its detainees in accordance with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners".


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Numerous forms of torture are purported to be used, including electric shocks, suspension by the arms,


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: shackling in painful positions, sleep and food deprivation, force-feeding, and sexual abuse, with many variations on each type.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The Falun Dafa Information Center reports that over 3,700 named Falun Gong practitioners have died as a result of torture and abuse in custody, typically after they refused to recant their beliefs. Amnesty International notes that this figure may be "only a small portion of the actual number of deaths in custody, as many families do not seek legal redress for these deaths or systematically inform overseas sources."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Among the first torture deaths reported in the Western press was that of Chen Zixiu, a retired factory worker from Shandong Province. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning article on the persecution of Falun Gong, Ian Johnson reported that labor camp guards shocked her with cattle prods in an attempt to force her to renounce Falun Gong. When she refused, "[Officials] ordered Chen to run barefoot in the snow. Two days of torture had left her legs bruised and her short black hair matted with pus and blood... She crawled outside, vomited, and collapsed. She never regained consciousness." Chen died on 21 February 2000.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: On 16 June 2005, 37-year-old Gao Rongrong, an accountant from Liaoning Province, was tortured to death in custody. Two years before her death, Gao had been imprisoned at the Longshan forced labor camp, where she was badly disfigured with electric shock batons. Gao escaped the labor camp by jumping from a second-floor window, and after pictures of her burned visage were made public, she became a target for recapture by authorities. She was taken back into custody on 6 March 2005 and killed just over three months later.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: On 26 January 2008, security agents in Beijing stopped popular folk musician Yu Zhou and his wife Xu Na while they were on their way home from a concert. The 42-year-old Yu Zhou was taken into custody, where authorities attempted to force him to renounce Falun Gong. He was tortured to death within 11 days.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Government authorities deny that Falun Gong practitioners are killed in custody. They attribute deaths to suicide, illness, or other accidents.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In 2006, allegations emerged that many Falun Gong practitioners had been killed to supply China's organ transplant industry. These allegations prompted an investigation by former Canadian Secretary of State David Kilgour and human rights lawyer David Matas. In July 2006, the Kilgour-Matas report found that "the source of 41,500 transplants for the six-year period 2000 to 2005 is unexplained" and concluded that "the government of China and its agencies in numerous parts of the country, in particular hospitals but also detention centres and 'people's courts', since 1999 have put to death a large but unknown number of Falun Gong prisoners of conscience".


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: called attention to the extremely short wait times for organs in China—one to two weeks for a liver compared with 32.5 months in Canada—indicating that organs were being procured on demand. A significant increase in the number of annual organ transplants in China beginning in 1999, corresponded with the onset of the persecution of Falun Gong. Despite very low levels of voluntary organ donation, China performs the second-highest number of transplants per year. Kilgour and Matas also presented incriminating material from Chinese transplant center web sites advertising the immediate availability of organs from living donors, as well as transcripts of telephone interviews in which hospitals told prospective transplant recipients that they could obtain Falun Gong organs. An updated version of their report was published as a book in 2009. Kilgour followed up on this investigation in a 680-page 2016 report.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In 2014, investigative journalist Ethan Gutmann published the results of his own investigation. Gutmann conducted extensive interviews with former detainees in Chinese labor camps and prisons, as well as former security officers and medical professionals with knowledge of China's transplant practices. He reported that organ harvesting from political prisoners likely began in Xinjiang province in the 1990s, and then spread nationwide. Gutmann estimates that some 64,000 Falun Gong prisoners may have been killed for their organs between the years 2000 and 2008.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In 2016, the researchers published a joint update to their findings showing that the number of organ transplants conducted in China is much higher than previously believed, and that the death from illicit organ harvesting could be as high as 1,500,000. The 789-page report is based on an analysis of records from hundreds of Chinese transplant hospitals.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In December 2005 and November 2006, China's Deputy Health Minister acknowledged that the practice of removing organs from executed prisoners for transplants was widespread. However, Chinese officials deny that Falun Gong practitioners' organs are being harvested, and insist that China abides by World Health Organization principles that prohibit the sale of human organs without written consent from donors.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In May 2008, two United Nations Special Rapporteurs reiterated their requests for the Chinese authorities to adequately respond to the allegations, and to provide a source for the organs that would account for the sudden increase in organ transplants in China since 2000.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In June 2019, an independent tribunal sitting in London named the China Tribunal, established to inquire into forced organ harvesting from and among prisoners of conscience in China, stated that the members of the Falun Gong spiritual group continued to be murdered by China for their organs. The tribunal said it had clear evidence that forced organ harvesting has been taking place in China from over at least 20 years. China has repeatedly denied the accusations, claiming to have stopped using organs from executed prisoners in 2015. However, the lawyers and experts at the China Tribunal are convinced that the practice was still taking place with the imprisoned Falun Gong members "probably the principal source" of organs for forced harvesting.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Foreign observers estimate that hundreds of thousands—and perhaps millions—of Falun Gong practitioners have been held extralegally in reeducation-through-labor camps, prisons, and other detention facilities.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Large-scale arrests are conducted periodically and often coincide with important anniversaries or major events. The first wave of arrests occurred on the evening of 20 July, when several thousand practitioners were taken from their homes into police custody. In November 1999—four months after the onset of the campaign—Vice Premier Li Lanqing announced that 35,000 Falun Gong practitioners had been arrested or detained. The Washington Post wrote that "the number of detained people... in the operation against Falun Gong dwarfs every political campaign in recent years in China." By April 2000 over 30,000 people had been arrested for protesting in defense of Falun Gong in Tiananmen Square. Seven hundred Falun Gong followers were arrested during a demonstration in the Square on 1 January 2001.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In advance of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing over 8,000 Falun Gong practitioners were taken from their homes and workplaces in provinces across China. Two years later authorities in Shanghai detained over 100 practitioners ahead of the 2010 World Expo. Those who refused to disavow Falun Gong were subjected to torture and sent to reeducation through labor facilities.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: From 1999 to 2013, the vast majority of detained Falun Gong practitioners were held in reeducation through labor (RTL) camps—a system of administrative detention where people can be imprisoned without trial for up to four years.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The RTL system was established during the Maoist era to punish and reprogram "reactionaries" and other individuals deemed enemies of the Communist cause. In more recent years, it has been used to incarcerate petty criminals, drug addicts and prostitutes, as well as petitioners and dissidents. RTL sentences can be arbitrarily extended by police, and outside access is not permitted. Prisoners are forced to do heavy work in mines, brick manufacturing centers, agricultural fields, and many different types of factories. Physical torture, beatings, interrogations, and other human rights abuses take place in the camps, according to former prisoners and human rights organizations.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: China's network of RTL centers expanded significantly after 1999 to accommodate an influx of Falun Gong detainees, and authorities used the camps to try to "transform" Falun Gong practitioners. Amnesty International reports that "The RTL system has played a key role in the anti–Falun Gong campaign, absorbing large numbers of practitioners over the years... Evidence suggests that Falun Gong constituted on average from one third to, in some cases, 100 percent of the total population of certain RTL camps."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: International observers estimated that Falun Gong practitioners accounted for at least half of the total RTL population, amounting to several hundred thousand people. A 2005 report by Human Rights Watch found that Falun Gong practitioners made up the majority of the detainee population in the camps studied, and received the "longest sentences and worst treatment." "The government's campaign against the group has been so thorough that even long-time Chinese activists are afraid to say the group's name aloud."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In 2012 and early 2013, a series of news reports and exposés focused attention on human rights abuses at the Masanjia Forced Labor Camp, where approximately half of the inmates were Falun Gong practitioners. The exposure helped galvanize calls to end the reeducation-through-labor system. In early 2013, CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping announced that RTL would be abolished, resulting in the closure of the camps. However, human rights groups found that many RTL facilities have simply been renamed as prisons or rehabilitation centers, and that the use of extrajudicial imprisonment of dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners has continued.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The system is often called Laogai, the abbreviation for láodòng gǎizào (), which means "reform through labor", and is a slogan of the Chinese criminal justice system.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In addition to prisons and RTL facilities, the 610 Office created a nationwide network of extrajudicial reeducation centers to "transform the minds" of Falun Gong practitioners. The centers are run extrajudicially, and the government officially denies their existence. They are known as "black jails", "brainwashing centers", "transformation through reeducation centers", or "legal education centers". Some are temporary programs established in schools, hotels, military compounds or work units. Others are permanent facilities that operate as private jails.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: If a Falun Gong practitioner refuses to be "transformed" in prison or RTL camps, they can be sent directly to transformation centers upon completion of their sentence. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China writes that the facilities "are used specifically to detain Falun Gong practitioners who have completed terms in reeducation through labor (RTL) camps but whom authorities refuse to release." Practitioners who are involuntarily detained in the transformation centers must pay tuition fees amounting to hundreds of dollars. The fees are extorted from family members as well as from practitioners' work units and employers.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The government's use of "brainwashing sessions" began in 1999, but the network of transformation centers expanded nationwide in January 2001 when the central 610 Office mandated that all government bodies, work units, and corporations use them. The Washington Post reported "neighborhood officials have compelled even the elderly, people with disabilities and the ill to attend the classes. Universities have sent staff to find students who had dropped out or been expelled for practicing Falun Gong, and brought them back for the sessions. Other members have been forced to leave sick relatives" to attend the reeducation sessions. After the closure of the RTL system in 2013, authorities leaned more heavily on the transformation centers to detain Falun Gong practitioners. After the Nanchong RTL center in Sichuan province was closed, for example, at least a dozen of the Falun Gong practitioners detained there were sent directly to a local transformation center. Some former RTL camps have simply been renamed and converted into transformation centers.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Falun Gong practitioners who refuse to recant their beliefs are sometimes sent involuntarily to psychiatric hospitals, where they may be subject to beatings, sleep deprivation, torture by electrocution, and injections with sedatives or anti-psychotic drugs. Some are sent to the hospitals (known as "ankang" facilities) because their prison or RTL sentences have expired and they had not yet been successfully "transformed" in the brainwashing classes. Others were told that they were admitted because they had a "political problem"—that is, because they appealed to the government to lift the ban of Falun Gong.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Robin Munro, former Director of the Hong Kong Office of Human Rights Watch and now deputy director with China Labour Bulletin, drew attention to the abuses of forensic psychiatry in China in general, and of Falun Gong practitioners in particular. In 2001, Munro alleged that forensic psychiatrists in China have been active since the days of Mao Zedong, and have been involved in the systematic misuse of psychiatry for political purposes. He says that large-scale psychiatric abuses are the most distinctive aspect of the government's protracted campaign to "crush the Falun Gong", and he found a very sizable increase in Falun Gong admissions to mental hospitals since the onset of the government's persecution campaign.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Munro claimed that detained Falun Gong practitioners are tortured and subject to electroconvulsive therapy, painful forms of electrical acupuncture treatment, prolonged deprivation of light, food and water, and restricted access to toilet facilities in order to force "confessions" or "renunciations" as a condition of release. Fines of several thousand yuan may follow. Lu and Galli write that dosages of medication up to five or six times the usual level are administered through a nasogastric tube as a form of torture or punishment, and that physical torture is common, including binding tightly with ropes in very painful positions. This treatment may result in chemical toxicity, migraines, extreme weakness, protrusion of the tongue, rigidity, loss of consciousness, vomiting, nausea, seizures and loss of memory.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Dr. Alan Stone, a professor of law and psychiatry at Harvard, found that a significant number of the Falun Gong practitioners held in psychiatric hospitals had been sent there from labor camps, writing "[They] may well have been tortured and then dumped in psychiatric hospitals as an expedient disposition." He agreed that Falun Gong practitioners sent to psychiatric hospitals had been "misdiagnosed and mistreated", but did not find definitive evidence that the use of psychiatric facilities was part of a uniform government policy, noting instead that patterns of institutionalization varied from province to province.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Since 1999, several thousand Falun Gong practitioners have been sentenced to prisons through the criminal justice system. Most of the charges against Falun Gong practitioners are for political offenses such as "disturbing social order", "leaking state secrets", "subverting the socialist system", or "using a heretical organization to undermine the implementation of the law"—a vaguely worded provision used to prosecute, for instance, individuals who used the Internet to disseminate information about Falun Gong.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: According to a report by Amnesty International, trials against Falun Gong practitioners are "Grossly unfair—the judicial process was biased against the defendants at the outset and the trials were a mere formality... None of the accusations against the defendants relate to activities which would legitimately be regarded as crimes under international standards."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Chinese human rights lawyers who have attempted to defend Falun Gong clients have faced varying degrees of persecution themselves, including disbarment, detention, and in some cases, torture and disappearance.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Since July 1999, civil servants and Communist Party members have been forbidden from practicing Falun Gong. Workplaces and schools were enjoined to participate in the struggle against Falun Gong by pressuring recalcitrant Falun Gong believers to renounce their beliefs, sometimes sending them to special reeducation classes to be "transformed". Failure to do so has results in lost wages, pensions, expulsion, or termination from jobs.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: Writing in 2015, Noakes and Ford noted that "Post-secondary institutions across the country—from agricultural universities to law schools to fine arts programmes—require students to prove that they have adopted the 'correct attitude' on Falun Gong as a condition of admission." For example, students at many universities are required to obtain a certificate from the public security ministry certifying that they have no affiliation with Falun Gong. The same is true in employment, with job postings frequently specifying that prospective candidates must have no record of participation in Falun Gong. In some cases, even changing one's address requires proving the correct political attitude toward Falun Gong.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The Communist Party's campaign against Falun Gong has extended to Chinese diaspora communities, including through the use of media, espionage and monitoring of Falun Gong practitioners, harassment and violence against practitioners, diplomatic pressure applied to foreign governments, and hacking of overseas websites. According to a defector from the Chinese consulate in Sydney, Australia, "The war against Falun Gong is one of the main tasks of the Chinese mission overseas."


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: In 2004 the U.S. House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution condemning the attacks on Falun Gong practitioners in the United States by agents of the Communist Party. The resolution reported that party affiliates have "pressured local elected officials in the United States to refuse or withdraw support for the Falun Gong spiritual group," that Falun Gong spokespeople have had their houses broken into, and individuals engaged in peaceful protest actions outside embassies and consulates have been physically assaulted.


title: Persecution of Falun Gong

text: The overseas campaign against Falun Gong is described in documents issued by China's Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO). In a report from a 2007 meeting of OCAO directors at the national, provincial, and municipal level, the office stated that it "coordinates the launching of anti-'Falun Gong' struggles overseas." OCAO exhorts overseas Chinese citizens to participate in "resolutely implementing and executing the Party line, the Party's guiding principles, and the Party's policies," and to "aggressively expand the struggle" against Falun Gong, ethnic separatists, and Taiwanese independence activists abroad. Other party and state organizations believed to be involved in the overseas campaign include the Ministry of State Security, the 610 Office and the People's Liberation Army among others.