title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: On 27 June 2014, former PNL chairman Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu announced his intention to found a separate liberal party to run for president, stating opposition to the upcoming merger with the PDL. The breakaway party, called the Liberal Reformist Party (PLR), was founded by Popescu-Tăriceanu on 3 July 2014. On 17 July 2014, it was announced that the future merger of the PNL and PDL would retain the National Liberal Party name, while being situated in the PDL's existing headquarters in Bucharest, and would be legally registered by the end of 2014. On 26 July 2014, a joint party congress of the PNL and PDL approved the merger.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: In the first round of the 2014 presidential election on 2 November 2014, ACL presidential candidate Klaus Iohannis, PNL party president and Mayor of Sibiu was the runner-up. Iohannis won the runoff election held on 16 November 2014 with 54.5% of the total number of votes. At the 2016 local elections and legislative elections, the PNL managed to finish second, behind the PSD, and consequently in continuous opposition until 2019 when it regained executive power.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: Regarding the 2019 presidential election, the party previously announced its formal support for a second term of incumbent state president Klaus Iohannis in March 2018 along with an official designation of Ludovic Orban, current party president, for the position of Prime Minister should the PNL win the 2020 legislative elections. In June 2018, at an open air press conference in his native Sibiu, Iohannis publicly announced his intention to run for a second presidential term.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The year 2019 saw two minor parties adhering to the PNL, namely the PND (led by Daniel Fenechiu) and PACT (led by Sebastian Burduja), thereby increasing its total number of members. In late 2019, the National Liberal Party acceded to governance under a minority stand-alone government led by Orban which was voted twice by the Parliament (under, most notably, a confidence and supply agreement with USR and PMP as well as most ethnic minority parties, including most importantly the FDGR/DFDR). At national level, the greatest two challenges that the Orban cabinet tried to monitor, control, and solve are the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic as well as its affiliated recession.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The PNL ran in several electoral alliances with the 2020 USR-PLUS Alliance for the 2020 Romanian local elections, winning the mayor of Bucharest (along with several of the capital's sectors) as well as many other municipalities throughout the countryside. Shortly thereafter, the PNL decided to form local alliances with, most notably, USR PLUS, PMP, and FDGR/DFDR (as well as with two local branches of the PNȚCD and UDMR/RMDSZ in Hunedoara County). After the 2020 Romanian legislative election, the party agreed to form a coalition government alongside USR PLUS and UDMR in order to reportedly provide a stable governance for the next 4 years in Romania.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: Furthermore, incumbent party president Ludovic Orban decided to step down as Prime Minister in early December 2020, letting Nicolae Ciucă acting until the new coalition received the confidence vote in the Parliament after the 2020 legislative elections concluded with concrete, positive results on behalf of a future center-right government. Subsequently, the newly proposed Prime Minister on behalf of the PNL was Florin Cîțu, who previously served as the Minister of Public Finance in both Orban cabinets between 2019 and 2020. Therefore, Cîțu took office on 23 December 2020, after an overwhelming confidence vote in the Parliament (260 for in counterpart to 186 against).


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: In the meantime, it has been announced that a new party congress will take place on 25 September 2021 with 5,000 delegates. At the forthcoming congress, incumbent party president Ludovic Orban will face incumbent Prime Minister Florin Cîțu for the leadership of the party during the upcoming years (although it has been rumoured that Dan Motreanu, former Minister for Agriculture in the First Tăriceanu Cabinet between 2006 and 2007, would also announce his candidacy at a later point during 2021 but the latter eventually declined it). Furthermore, this new congress will also determine the leadership of PNL at each and every level within the party nationwide. Nonetheless, up until the date of the congress, Orban will still remain party president. At the same time, the struggle for power within the PNL between Cîțu and Orban (each one along with their respective teams of supporters) considerably bogged down the pace of reforms applied by the government.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: During early September 2021, several weeks prior to the new congress of the party, USR PLUS decided to exit the Cîțu Cabinet in protest to Cîțu's dismissal of the Minister of Justice; the initial coalition consisting of three centre-right parties was thereby disbanded and reduced to two, with the USR PLUS officially entering opposition and even publicly declaring that they will support any motion of no confidence against Cîțu in the future, deeming him responsible for creating a major governmental crisis in the process.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: Moreover, according to USR PLUS, Cîțu is also responsible for legalizing massive theft from public procurement money with the approval of PNDL 3 (overtaking, in this regard, even convicted former PSD leader Liviu Dragnea) in the prospect of bribing PNL mayors (referred to as "local barons" in a press report by USR PLUS) to side with him for the then upcoming party congress which was held on 25 September 2021.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: In response, Cîțu stated: "only this [three-party] coalition is feasible for Romania. It's that political setup that can handle European Union's recovery plan, our local development, and make use of EU money," after an emergency meeting of the party. He also stated that "this is my message for the coalition talks later today, we have all promised Romania's investments".


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: Additionally, in response to sacking the Justice Minister, Cîțu mentioned in a late night news briefing the following: "I will not accept ministers in the Romanian government who oppose the modernisation of Romania. Blocking the activity of the government only because you do not agree to develop the communities, means violating the mandate given to you by the parliament through the governing programme.", referring to a 50 billion lei ($12 billion) allegedly local development financing scheme aimed at modernizing decrepit infrastructure in the countryside and the plan which needed the justice ministry's seal of approval.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: Eventually, the PNL was helped to maintain a minority cabinet along with the UDMR/RMDSZ after they boycotted the no confidence motion initiated by the USR PLUS and AUR, with the help of both PSD and UDMR/RMDSZ parliamentary groups. In the meantime, Cîțu posted a video portraying himself as Superman on Instagram. In response, the Romanian internet community made a video in which he was portrayed as the psychopathic supervillain Joker. Moreover, Ludovic Orban hinted a psychiatric consultation for Cîțu, in reaction to the Instagram videoclip.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: In addition, it was also in 2021 that, at local political level, the PNL lost other former allies, more specifically the PMP, who veered towards PSD and PRO Romania, establishing new political alliances in some counties (most notably Caraș-Severin) with the two centre-left political parties. In the meantime, former Deputy Prime Minister Dan Barna said that "if USR PLUS will remain in opposition, it will win the electorate of the right [in 2024]". Additionally, Marcel Ciolacu, the incumbent president of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and thereby the leader of the then largest opposition party, stated on 20 September 2021 that PSD will vote for the no confidence motion initiated by the USR PLUS and AUR. In the meantime, PNL president Ludovic Orban clearly stated that "Cîțu could only remain Prime Minister with the support of PSD which would be a catastrophe for both Romania and the PNL". In stark contrast to Orban's statement, Iohannis declared that he still supports Cîțu and that he has no reasons whatsoever for resigning or for being ousted. Nonetheless, in late September 2021, DNA officially started the criminal investigation in Florin Cîțu's case on the grounds of abuse of office and incitement to abuse of office as Prime Minister.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: Several noteworthy Romanian journalists such as Cristian Tudor Popescu, Lucian Mîndruță, and Ramona Ursu have also criticized Cîțu and his actions as Prime Minister and have described themselves totally revolted with respect to why would he still be left to serve as Prime Minister.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: All throughout this period of time, the political crisis had severe results in the economy of the country, with the euro rising consistently above the leu, as reported by the National Bank of Romania (BNR) in the beginning of the autumn of 2021. Furthermore, during late September 2021, the USD had also risen consistently above the RON, as the political crisis kept on lingering. In addition, the finance department of Bloomberg also noted the record inflation levels which rose to the highest charting positions in the last three years in Romania in early September 2021.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: As of 12 September 2021, most of the initial PNL-USR PLUS local alliances established after the 2020 local elections have been disbanded, with the USR PLUS entering official opposition at all local levels towards the PNL. The PNL also has a local governing alliance with the PSD in Ialomița.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: On 25 September 2021, at the PNL congress held at Romexpo in Bucharest, Florin Cîțu was elected the 10th post-1989 president of the PNL with 2,878 votes out of 4,848 total delegates, being congratulated, most notably, by congress organiser Theodor Stolojan, amidst significant heavy fraud allegations claimed, most importantly, by previous PNL president Ludovic Orban and subsequently by Adrian Veștea. Nonetheless, Orban congratulated Cîțu but also said that he no longer has a partnership with Iohannis. Furthermore, he also stated that he resigns from the office of the President of the Chamber of Deputies. The Romanian press had also cited Cîțu's triumph as a Pyrrhic victory as, on the one hand, PSD announced that they will vote the no confidence motion initiated by USR PLUS and AUR and, on the other hand, USR PLUS also stated that they will no longer want to govern under Cîțu.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: On 26 September 2021, the party's new leadership team under Cîțu was voted, validated, and consequently established as well. Shortly after the congress, on 27 September, former president Ludovic Orban stated that Cîțu became persona non grata for a huge number of Romanian citizens and that he doesn't understand he will no longer be PM for too long, only with the mercy of PSD. In the meantime, the PNRR (part of the Next Generation EU package and short for ) was signed and adopted in Bucharest on the occasion of Ursula von der Leyen's visit, mandated by the European Commission. The Romanian PNRR is the 5th Next Generation EU plan adopted by volume of funds and most of the work and successful negations on it were carried out by USR PLUS ministers, in particular Cristian Ghinea. Most opinion polls conducted throughout 2021 registered a significant drop of trust both in Cîțu as PM and in the PNL in the perspective of the next Romanian legislative elections which are most likely going to take place in 2024. In the meantime, PSD initiated its own motion of no confidence which is scheduled to be debated on 30 September and voted on 5 October.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: In addition, former party president Valeriu Stoica accused the recent political behaviour of PNL in the following manner: "PNL acts like PSD", further stating that the party is operating on a catch all ideology and consistent party switching as well as currently defying and breaching the constitution.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: On 5 October 2021, the Cîțu cabinet was ousted by an overwhelming vote on behalf of the PSD, AUR, and USR parliamentary groups at the no confidence motion debated and voted during that day. The no confidence motion was voted by 281 MPs, the largest number of votes to dismiss a government in Romania's post-1989 history. Nevertheless, Cîțu still served as acting/ad interim Prime Minister until a new government will be validated by vote in the Parliament and then subsequently sworn in (i.e. for at least one week from October 5 until still incumbent President Klaus Iohannis will call for party consultations). In the meantime, former PNL president Valeriu Stoica heavily criticized Iohannis for allowing "mediocre people at the leadership of the party" since 2014 onwards. He previously also stated that the PNL would demonstrate gross political immaturity if they will still propose Cîțu as Prime Minister at subsequent party consultations scheduled to take place at the Cotroceni Palace. At the same time, he mentioned that Iohannis should have that the political status quo imposed Cîțu's resignation, avoiding as such the motion of no confidence.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: On 11 October, still incumbent President Klaus Iohannis nominated USR leader and former Prime Minister Dacian Cioloș to form a new government. Cioloș was subsequently rejected by the parliament and Iohannis appointed previous acting PM Nicolae Ciucă instead on 21 October 2021. In late October, relatively shortly after his dismissal, Cîțu's approval rate hit 7% nationwide, a negative record for him. Given the matter, Cîțu resorted to buying Facebook likes from countries such as Vietnam, the ones from the ex-Soviet Union and from the Arab world, partly according to an analysis by former Health minister Vlad Voiculescu of Save Romania Union (USR). In early November 2021, journalist Lucian Mîndruță heavily criticized Iohannis and PNL for making an alliance with PSD, also stating that PSD is the only political party in post-1989 Romania which acceded to governance by "walking on corpses", a reference to the dreadful demographic effects of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic in Romania.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: In mid-early November 2021, several noteworthy political sources hinted a very probable merger of PMP with PNL sometime in the near future (although previous PMP president Cristian Diaconescu publicly dismissed this scenario on his Facebook page) and even a possible, hypothetical absorption of ALDE afterwards (paradoxically enough, thereby subsequently producing the return of Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu in the party he had previously left in 2014), just after the exclusion of Ludovic Orban from the party on 12 November 2021, who stated that "he is [now] free to build a new political force". At an official level however, Cristian Diaconescu later stated that there are indeed negotiations between the delegations of the two parties for a "common political project". Shortly afterwards, incumbent party president Cîțu stated, in the context of the ongoing negotiations with the PSD, that "it is a major compromise that PNL does" (i.e. to make a government with PSD). In stark contrast, former PNL president Orban stated that "a monster is being built" (in reference to the subsequent hypothetical longtime alliance between PSD and PNL) and that he has the obligation to the people who voted for PNL to represent them, as such siding with USR in the process. Subsequently, Diaconescu totally dismissed the possibility of a hypothetical merger between PMP and PNL during his term as PMP president, instead expecting a future invitation to governance, even though PMP is currently extra-parliamentary. On 22 November 2021, Nicolae Ciucă was officially designated PM by Klaus Iohannis, being in charge of a grand coalition government known as the "National Coalition for Romania" (CNR for short). Shortly afterwards, on 23 November 2021, former PNL president Ludovic Orban had officially resigned from the party along with 16 others PNL MPs. In December 2021, Orban officially founded his party which is called "Force of the Right" (or FD for short).


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: In early 2022, incumbent PNL spokesman Ionuț-Marian Stroe announced that the PNL has just started negotiations for a very probable near future merger with ALDE, but without former ALDE president Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, who is no longer even a member of the latter party. In addition, it was confirmed that PNL is also currently negotiating with PMP for a future merger as well. On 2 April 2022, Florin Cîțu resigned from the position of PNL president and prior to this decision Dan Vîlceanu also announced his resignation as secretary-general of the party. Gheorghe Flutur, president of the Suceava County council, became acting/ad interim president of the PNL on 2 April 2022 until a new congress was held on 10 April 2022.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: At an extraordinary party congress held on 10 April 2022, Nicolae Ciucă was elected the 11th post-1989 president of the PNL with 1,060 valid votes out of 1,120 total ones (60 were nullified and 159 were abstentions). Thus, Nicolae Ciucă became the first military leader in the history of the party. Additionally, Ciucă's primary objective as PNL president is very likely to maintain the cohesion of the "CNR" grand coalition until the end of his term as PM (which is quite probable to occur in May 2023).


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: In terms of external politics, the CNR government led by Ciucă expressed serious concern over the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. Internally, the PNL will choose their new secretary-general on 27 May 2022, when the party's national council will re-unite to vote for this position in front of 1,000 national delegates.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The party adheres to the doctrine of liberalism in the form of conservative liberalism and liberal conservatism, advocating both economic and social liberalization. The party also takes a pro-European stance. In recent years, it has focused more on economic liberalism and a shift to a more catch all platform. The National Liberal Party (PNL) also supports conservative initiatives and policies and the state in moral and religious issues, as well as the privatization and denationalization of the economy, a trend which is currently taking place quite rapidly in Romania, as in other post-communist economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Unlike its Western counterparts, the party is more nationalist and traditionalist on social issues, such as LGBT rights.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The party has factions of adherence to Christian democracy, national liberalism, ethnic nationalism, neoliberalism, and social conservatism. The party has also been described as populist, while former president Florin Cîțu rejects this qualification. However, after joining the European People's Party (EPP) and especially under Cîțu and Ciucă's leadership, the party became more conservative, Radio Free Europe calling it "liberal only in the name".


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: In economic regards, it deems significant the fact that taxes must be lowered and that the private sector of the national economy must be expanded and helped by a series of new laws in order to generate more value. It also advocates a decentralization of Romania's political structure, with greater autonomy given to the eight development regions.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The Congress, or The General Assembly of the delegates of the party's members () is the supreme authority in the party. It leads the party and takes decisions at national level. Its members are elected by the local (territorial) organizations, and The National Consillium. The Congress meets every four years, after the parliamentary elections, or at any time needed. The Congress is convoked either by the Permanent Delegation (see below), at the request of the Central Political Bureau, or at the request of at least half of the Territorial Permanent Delegations. The Congress elects the President of the National Liberal Party, the 15 vice-presidents of the Central Standing Bureau (7 with specific attributions and 8 responsible for the development regions, 23 judges of The Honor and Referee Court (), 7 members of The Central Committee of Censors ().


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The last congress took place at Romexpo in Bucharest on 25 September 2021, when the 10th post-1989 president of the party was elected being Florin Cîțu.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The Permanent Delegation ( – DP) is the structure that leads the party between two Congresses. It meets monthly, or at any time needed. Its members are the following; the President of the National Liberal Party, the members of the Central Political Bureau, the President of the Senate of the party, the Secretary General of the National Liberal Party, the presidents of the two Chambers of the Parliament (if the officeholders are members of the PNL), the leaders of the National liberal Party's parliamentary groups, the Senators and Deputies, the MEPs, the Ministers, the President of the National Liberal Youth (TNL), the President of the Liberal Women Organisation (OFL), the President of the Liberal Student Clubs (CSL), the President of the League of the Local Elected Officeholders of the National Liberal Party (LAL PNL), the President of the Coordinating Council of the Municipality of Bucharest, the European Commissioner (if the officeholder is member of the PNL).


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The National Political Bureau ( – BPN) of the National Liberal Party (PNL) proposes the party's politics and coordinates its application. It ensures the party's day-to-day leadership, and it is composed by the following: the President of the party, the 15 vice-presidents (7 with specific charges, and 8 responsible for the development regions). At the BPC's meetings can assist, with consultative vote, the president of the Senate of the PNL, the Secretary-General of the PNL, the Presidents of the two Chambers of the Parliament (if the officeholders are members of the PNL), the leaders of the National liberal Party's parliamentary groups, the President of the TNL, the President of the OFL, the President of the CSL, the President of the League of the LAL, and the Ministers. The BPC meets weekly, or at any time needed, convoked by the president of the PNL.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: According to Article 70 of the PNL Statute, the BPN coordinates and evaluates the objectives of the territorial branches, of the parliamentary groups; it negotiates political agreements (within the limits established by the DP); it coordinates the elections campaign; proposes sanctions according to the Statute; proposes to the DP the political strategy of the party; proposes the candidates for the central executive or public offices; for certain territorial units, proposes to the DP the candidates for the parliamentary elections; proposes to the DP the candidates for the European Parliament elections; proposes the DP to dissolve or dismiss, for exceptional reasons, the territorial branch, or the branch's president; convokes the DP; coordinates the activity of the permanent committees of the National Council, validates or invalidates the results of the elections for the territorial branches; appoints the Secretary-Executive, the Foreign Secretary, and Deputy-Secretaries-General.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The BPN is assisted, in the organizing activity by the Secretary General of the PNL. This office ensures the communication between the central organisms and the territorial branches, ensures the management of the party's assets, is responsible for the informational system. The Secretary-General is assisted by the Deputy-Secretaries-General, appointed by the BPC at the suggestion of the Secretary-General.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: In normal conditions, the term of the BPN members ends during the Party's Congress, when the president leaves the presidium of the Congress. The president of the Standing Bureau of the Congress is, formally, the acting president of the party until the new president is elected. The last acting president of the National Liberal Party (PNL) was Mircea Ionescu-Quintus on 20 March 2009, when Crin Antonescu succeeded Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The National Council () is the debate forum of the National Liberal Party between two Congresses. It reunites twice a year, or at any time necessary, convoked by the president, by the BPC, or at the request of at least half of its members. Its members are: DP, including the members with consultative vote; the Secretaries of State and the equivalent officeholders; the Prefects and Deputy-Prefects; Presidents and vice-presidents of the County Councils; Mayors and Deputy-Mayors of the county capitals, of the sectors of Bucharest, the General Mayor and General Deputy-Mayors of Bucharest; the vice-presidents and Secretaries-General of TNL, OFL, CSL, the Senate of the Party, LAL; honorary members of the party; the President of the structures that deal with specific issues; the Presidents of the CN.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The CN has the following competences: acts to fulfill the decisions of the Congress; adopts the Governing Program; adopts the programs and sectorial politics of the party; approves the reports of the specialty committees; names the candidate of the National Liberal Party for the Romanian Presidency; gives and retracts the quality of honorary member of the party.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: According to Article 65 of the Statute, the CN is organized and functions through its permanent specialty committees, constituted on social and professional criteria. The committees constituted on social criteria promote the interests of the correspondent social category. The committees constituted on professional criteria state the sectorial politics and the public politics in major fields, to express the options and solutions proposed by the National Liberal Party.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The President of the National Liberal Party (PNL) is the guardian of the political programme of the party, of the respect of the statute, and the keeper of the unity and prestige of the party.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The Secretary-General ensures the communication between the central leading structures and the territorial ones, ensures the management of the assets of the party, is responsible for the informational system. The Secretary-General is helped in its activity by Deputy-Secretaries-General appointed by the BPC, upon the suggestion of the Secretary-General.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: Romanian law requires all parties to present a permanent sign and a permanent electoral sign. The former is used to identify the party's buildings and press releases, and the latter to identify the party's electoral materials and the candidates on the elections ballot. Usually they differ slightly.


title: National Liberal Party (Romania)

text: The main element of the party is a blue arrow pointing to the upper right corner of a yellow square, and the letters "P", "N", and "L" in blue, tilted to the right. The position of the "PNL" with respect to the arrow depends on the type of symbol, as shown below.


title: Martin Keown

text: Martin Raymond Keown (; born 24 July 1966) is an English football pundit and former professional footballer who played as a defender from 1984 to 2005, notably in the Premier League for Arsenal, where he made over 400 appearances for the club and won ten honours.


title: Martin Keown

text: He also played for Brighton & Hove Albion, Aston Villa, Everton, Leicester City and Reading. Keown made his England debut in 1992 against France and went on to win 43 caps for the national side over the next ten years, gradually forming a respected defensive partnership with Arsenal teammate Tony Adams at both club and international level. Keown represented England at four major international football finals including the 1998 and 2002 World Cups, as well as Euro 1992 and Euro 2000.


title: Martin Keown

text: He is now a part-time scout and coach for Arsenal, as well as a pundit for the BBC and BT Sport. He came out of retirement in 2012 and briefly played for Combined Counties League Premier Division side Wembley in their FA Cup fixtures.


title: Martin Keown

text: A centre back from Oxford, Keown played for local sides and his local Gaelic football team as a boy, before joining Arsenal on a schoolboy contract in 1980, though he made his professional debut on loan at Brighton & Hove Albion in 1984. His debut for Arsenal came on 23 November 1985, when Don Howe was still their manager, and they drew 0–0 with West Bromwich Albion at The Hawthorns. He played 22 league games that season, mostly alongside Tommy Caton or David O'Leary, but when George Graham was appointed manager on 14 May 1986, he decided that Keown was not part of his plans to try to turn Arsenal into league title contenders and on 9 June 1986 he joined Aston Villa for £125,000. Graham offered him £50 a week less than Keown wanted and stated 1993: "'It seemed crazy that they wouldn't agree and although I didn't want to leave and they didn't want me to go, it became a matter of principle."'


title: Martin Keown

text: Keown signed for Villa after a season in which they had narrowly avoided relegation to the Second Division, a mere four years after being European Cup winners and five years since being league champions. Manager Graham Turner was under a lot of pressure, and after their dismal form continued into the 1986–87 season he was sacked on 14 September 1986 and succeeded by Billy McNeill. Keown appeared in 36 league games that season, but he was unable to save Villa from finishing bottom of the First Division and being relegated after 12 successive seasons in the top flight.


title: Martin Keown

text: Graham Taylor then arrived at Villa Park to succeed the sacked McNeill, and Keown was very much part of his rebuilding plans as he missed just two league games and scored three goals as Villa finished second in the Second Division and won promotion back to the top flight at the first attempt. Keown helped the team secure its top flight status the following season, but was sold to Everton on 7 August 1989, just before the start of the 1989–90 season, for a fee of £750,000.


title: Martin Keown

text: Keown had a fine start to his Everton career, and they topped the table for a while in late autumn and there was hope that they could win the league title, but their form ebbed away after Christmas and they managed only a sixth-place finish. Keown managed 20 league appearances that campaign and a slightly better 24 in 1990–91, when Harvey was replaced by Howard Kendall as manager in November. He missed just three league games in 1991–92, which brought another mid-table finish, and he played just 13 more league games for the Toffees before accepting a £2 million return to Arsenal in February 1993.


title: Martin Keown

text: Keown did not feature in Arsenal's historic FA Cup and League Cup double of 1993 due to being cup-tied. However, he did manage 16 Premier League appearances, playing in a number of positions. He and Andy Linighan were high quality defenders competing alongside Steve Bould and captain Tony Adams in the centre of one of the best English league defences of the 1990s, and Keown also filled in at right-back, left-back, and central midfield, demonstrating a versatility that would be called upon for several seasons.


title: Martin Keown

text: Keown missed out on Arsenal's Cup Winners' Cup Final win over Parma the following year through injury although he did play a part in the overall campaign after appearing in earlier rounds. However, he did start the final the following season when Arsenal were narrowly beaten by Real Zaragoza after extra time.


title: Martin Keown

text: He rarely missed a game in his first four full seasons back at Highbury, and in 1996-97, Arsène Wenger's first season at the club, he made 28 appearances as a defensive midfielder. The season ended painfully when he broke his shoulder playing for England in the 1997 Tournoi de France, ruling him out for five months. As a result, in the 1997–98 double winning campaign, 31-year-old Keown played just 18 times in the Premier League, employed entirely as a centre back. The season saw him claim the first two major trophies of his career after well over a decade of waiting.


title: Martin Keown

text: In the following seasons, Keown became an integral part of Arsène Wenger's team. In a 2000–01 UEFA Champions League tie against FC Shakhtar Donetsk, Keown memorably scored two goals in the last five minutes to help Arsenal come back from 2-1 down to win 3–2. He won a second Double with the club in 2002, and remained a first team regular until the end of the 2002–03 season, when the Gunners won their ninth FA Cup but blew the chance of a unique fourth double due to a late loss of form in the league.


title: Martin Keown

text: On 21 September 2003, during Arsenal and Manchester United's match at Old Trafford, Manchester United were awarded a late penalty with the score at 0–0. After Ruud van Nistelrooy's penalty hit the bar, Keown and Ray Parlour confronted van Nistelrooy, and Keown hit him on the back of the head. After the final whistle, Keown was then involved in a post-match melee; he was subsequently fined £20,000 and suspended for three games for his part in what is now known as the "Battle of Old Trafford". Arsenal would go on to end the 2003-04 season as unbeaten champions. Keown made ten league appearances during the season, before being released on a free transfer in the summer of 2004 after 11 years in his second spell at the club.


title: Martin Keown

text: He signed for Leicester City, but left after less than six months and signed for Reading in January 2005 until the end of the season, after which he retired. As part of a publicity stunt Keown, and a number of other former professional players, including Ray Parlour, Danny Dichio, Jaime Moreno, Graeme Le Saux, Claudio Caniggia and Brian McBride, joined non-league Wembley in order to take part in their 2012–13 FA Cup run. Wembley were knocked out in a replay by Uxbridge after beating Langford in the previous round.


title: Martin Keown

text: Keown played U16 and U18 for England. When it was learned that his mother was Irish and his father Northern Irish, Jack Charlton made an inquiry as to his availability to play for the Republic of Ireland but Keown chose to represent the country of his birth. He was also eligible to play for Northern Ireland as his father was from County Fermanagh. He made his England debut in 1992 against France. With an injury to Mark Wright he was called up into England's squad for UEFA Euro 1992, and played in all three of England's matches.


title: Martin Keown

text: Keown's early ascension to the England team under Graham Taylor did not continue under Terry Venables, who ignored him completely. Keown earned a recall from Glenn Hoddle in 1997, and went to the 1998 World Cup, but did not play. Keown became a regular under Kevin Keegan (captaining the side against Finland) and played in two of England's Euro 2000 matches.


title: Martin Keown

text: By the time Sven-Göran Eriksson became manager, Keown's age was starting to count against him, though he went to the 2002 World Cup, again as a non-playing squad member. Keown retired from international football the day after England's exit at the hands of Brazil. In all he played 43 times for England, scoring two goals.


title: Martin Keown

text: Keown joined the coaching staff of Newbury in August 2005, but is now coaching back at former club Arsenal where he is taking his coaching badges. Former Arsenal manager Terry Neill identified him as a key figure behind the success of Arsenal's inexperienced "new-look" defence (which the team resorted to after ongoing injury problems in the 2005–06 season, notably setting a record for minutes played without conceding in the Champions League). In 2007–08 Keown was also a coach for the Oxford University Blues Football team on a part-time basis.


title: Martin Keown

text: Keown regularly appears as a pundit on the BBC's football coverage and "Match of the Day", as well as covering the Champions League for Irish broadcaster TV3. He was also working for ESPN UK during the 2011 Emirates Cup.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Inguinal hernia surgery is an operation to repair a weakness in the abdominal wall that abnormally allows abdominal contents to slip into a narrow tube called the inguinal canal in the groin region.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: There are two different clusters of hernia: groin and ventral (abdominal) wall. Groin hernia includes femoral, obturator, and inguinal. Inguinal hernia is the most common type of hernia and consist of about 75% of all hernia surgery cases in the US. Inguinal hernia, which results from lower abdominal wall weakness or defect, is more common among men with about 90% of total cases. In the inguinal hernia, fatty tissue or a part of the small intestine gets inserted into the inguinal canal. Other structures that are uncommon but may get stuck in inguinal hernia can be the appendix, caecum, and transverse colon. Hernias can be asymptomatic, incarcerated, or strangled. Incarcerated hernia leads to impairment of intestinal flow, and strangled hernia obstructs blood flow in addition to intestinal flow.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Inguinal hernia can make a small lump in the groin region which can be detected during a physical exam and verified by imaging techniques such as computed tomography (CT) . This lump can disappear by lying down and reappear through physical activities, laughing, crying, or forceful bowel movement. Other symptoms can include pain around the groin, an increase in the size of bulge over the time, pain while lifting, and a dull aching sensation. In occult (hidden) hernia, the bulge cannot be detected by physical examination and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) can be more helpful in this situation. Males who have asymptomatic inguinal hernia and pregnant women with uncomplicated inguinal hernia can be observed, but the definitive treatment is mostly surgery.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Surgery remains the ultimate treatment for all types of hernias as they will not get better on their own, however not all require immediate repair. Elective surgery is offered to most patients taking into account their level of pain, discomfort, degree of disruption in normal activity, as well as their overall level of health. Emergency surgery is typically reserved for patients with life-threatening complications of inguinal hernias such as incarceration and strangulation. Incarceration occurs when intra-abdominal fat or small intestine becomes stuck within the canal and cannot slide back into the abdominal cavity either on its own or with manual maneuvers. Left untreated, incarceration may progress to bowel strangulation as a result of restricted blood supply to the trapped segment of small intestine causing that portion to die. Successful outcomes of repair are usually measured via rates of hernia recurrence, pain and subsequent quality of life.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Surgical repair of inguinal hernias is one of the most commonly performed operations worldwide and the most commonly performed surgery within the United States. A combined 20 million cases of both inguinal and femoral hernia repair are performed every year around the world with 800,000 cases in the US as of 2003. The UK reports around 70,000 cases performed every year. Groin hernias account for almost 75% of all abdominal wall hernias with the lifetime risk of an inguinal hernia in men and women being 27% and 3% respectively. Men account for nearly 90% of all repairs performed and have a bimodal incidence of inguinal hernias peaking at 1 year of age and again in those over the age of 40. Although women account for roughly 70% of femoral hernia repairs, indirect inguinal hernias are still the most common subtype of groin hernia in both males and females.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Inguinal hernia surgery is also one of the most common surgical procedures, with an estimated incidence of 0.8-2% and increasing up to 20% in preterm children.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Society guidelines recommend that indications for surgery take into account the severity of symptoms, the type of hernia, previous surgeries, hernia size, bowel incarceration (bowel can no longer return to the abdomen) and the overall general health of the person.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Elective surgery is planned in order to help relieve symptoms, respect the person's preference, and prevent future complications that may require emergency surgery.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Symptomatic hernias tend to cause pain or discomfort within the groin region that may increase with exertion and improve with rest. A swollen scrotum within males may coincide with persistent feelings of heaviness or generalized lower abdominal discomfort. The sensation of groin pressure tends to be most prominent at the end of the day as well as after strenuous activities. Changes in sensation may be experienced along the scrotum and inner thigh.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: A hernia in which the small intestine has become incarcerated or strangulated constitutes a surgical emergency. Symptoms include:


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Surgical repair within 6 hours of the above symptoms may be able to save the strangulated portion of the intestine.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Although pediatric inguinal hernias sometimes present asymptomatically, surgical repair is still the standard of care to prevent hernia incarceration, which for children who are born with hernias has a risk of 12% in full-term children and 39% in preterm children. In preterm neonates, the timing for intervention appears to be of utter importance as surgical hernia repair after neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) discharge might decrease recurrence and anesthesia-induced respiratory difficulties compared to surgery before NICU discharge.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: The person with the hernia should be given an opportunity to participate in the shared decision-making with their physicians as almost all procedures carry significant risks. The benefits of inguinal hernia repair can become overshadowed by risks such that elective repair is no longer in a person's best interest. Such cases include:


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Additionally, certain medical conditions can prevent people from being candidates for laparoscopic approaches to repair. Examples of such include:


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Techniques to repair inguinal hernias fall into two broad categories termed "open" and "laparoscopic". Surgeons tailor their approach by taking into account factors such as their own experience with either techniques, the features of the hernia itself, and the person's anesthetic needs.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: The cost associated with either approach varies widely across regions, but updated guidelines published by the International Endohernia Society (IES) cast doubt on the comprehensiveness of cost comparison studies due in part to the complexity inherent in calculating costs across institutions. The IES asserts that hospital and societal costs are lower for laparoscopic repairs as compared to open approaches. They recommend the routine use of reusable instruments as well as improving the proficiency of surgeons to help further decrease costs as well as time spent in the OR. However, as an example, the UK's National Health Service spends £56 million a year in repairing inguinal hernias, 96% of which were repaired via the open mesh approach while only 4% were done laparoscopically.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: All techniques involve an approximate 10-cm incision in the groin. Once exposed, the hernia sac is returned to the abdominal cavity or excised and the abdominal wall is very often reinforced with mesh. There are many techniques that do not utilize mesh and have their own situations where they are preferable.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Open repairs are classified via whether prosthetic mesh is utilized or whether the patient's own tissue is used to repair the weakness. Prosthetic repairs enable surgeons to repair a hernia without causing undue tension in the surrounding tissues while reinforcing the abdominal wall. Repairs with undue tension have been shown to increase the likelihood that the hernia will recur. Repairs not using prosthetic mesh are preferable options in patients with an above-average risk of infection such as cases where the bowel has become strangulated (blood supply lost due to constriction).


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: One large benefit of this approach lies in its ability to tailor anesthesia to a person's needs. People can be administered local anesthesia, a spinal block, as well as general anesthesia. Local anesthesia has been shown to cause less pain after surgery, shorten operating times, shorten recovery times as well as decrease the need to return to the hospital. However, people who undergo general anesthesia tend to be able to go home faster and experience fewer complications. The European Hernia Society recommends the use of local anesthesia particularly for people with ongoing medical conditions.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Repairs that utilize mesh are usually the first recommendation for the vast majority of patients including those that undergo laparoscopic repair. Procedures that employ mesh are the most commonly performed as they have been able to demonstrate better results compared to non-mesh repairs. Approaches utilizing mesh have been able to demonstrate faster return to usual activity, lower rates of persistent pain, shorter hospital stays, and a lower likelihood that the hernia will recur.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Options for mesh include either synthetic or biologic. Synthetic mesh provides the option of using "heavyweight" as well as "lightweight" variations according to the diameter and number of mesh fibers. Lightweight mesh has been shown to have fewer complications related to the mesh itself than its heavyweight counterparts. It was additionally correlated with lower rates of chronic pain while sharing the same rates of hernia recurrence as compared to heavyweight options. This has led to the adoption of lightweight mesh for minimizing the chance of chronic pain after surgery. Biologic mesh is indicated in cases where the risk of infection is a major concern such as cases in which the bowel has become strangulated. They tend to have lower tensile strength than their synthetic counterparts lending them to higher rates of mesh rupture.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Biomeshes are increasingly popular since their first use in 1999 and their subsequent introduction to the market in 2003. Some have a similar price to high end synthetic meshes. They can be produced from absorbable, animal-sourced extra cellular matrix, or by other means. Synthetic absorbable meshes are also available.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Meshes made of mosquito net cloth, in copolymer of polyethylene and polypropylene have been used for low-income patients in rural India and Ghana. Each piece costs $0.01, 3700 times cheaper than an equivalent commercial mesh. They give results identical to commercial meshes in terms of infection and recurrence rate at 5 years.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: The Lichtenstein tension-free repair has persisted as one of the most commonly performed procedures in the world. The European Hernia Society recommends that in cases where an open approach is indicated, the Lichtenstein technique be utilized as the preferred method. Recent studies have indicated that mesh attachment with the use of adhesive glue is faster and less likely to cause post-op pain as compared to attachment via suture material.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: The plug and patch tension-free technique has fallen out of favor due to higher rates of mesh shift along with its tendency to irritate surrounding tissue. This has led to the European Hernia Society recommending that the technique not be used in most cases.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Techniques in which mesh is not used are referred to as tissue repair technique, suture technique, and tension technique. All involve bringing together the tissue with sutures and are a viable alternative when mesh placement is contraindicated. Such situations are most commonly due to concerns of contamination in cases where there are infections of the groin, strangulation or perforation of the bowel.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: The Shouldice technique is the most effective non-mesh repair thus making it one of the most commonly utilized methods. Numerous studies have been able to validate the conclusion that patients have lower rates of hernia recurrence with the Shouldice technique as compared to other non-mesh repair techniques. However this method frequently experiences longer procedure times and length of hospital stay. Despite being the superior non-mesh technique, the Shouldice method results much higher rates of hernia recurrence in patients when compared to repairs that utilize mesh.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: The Bassini technique, described by Edoardo Bassini in the 1880s, was the first efficient inguinal hernia repair. In this technique, the conjoint tendon (formed by the distal ends of the transversus abdominis and internal oblique muscles) is approximated to the inguinal ligament and closed.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: The Shouldice technique was itself an evolution of prior techniques that had greatly advanced the field of inguinal hernia surgery. Such classic open non-mesh repairs include:


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: There are two main methods of laparoscopic repair: "transabdominal preperitoneal" ("TAPP") and "totally extra-peritoneal" ("TEP") repair. When performed by a surgeon experienced in hernia repair, laparoscopic repair causes fewer complications than Lichtenstein, particularly less chronic pain. However, if the surgeon is experienced in general laparoscopic surgery but not in the specific subject of laparoscopic hernia surgery, laparoscopic repair is not advised as it causes more recurrence risk than Lichtenstein while also presenting risks of serious complications, as organ injury. All that said, many surgeons are shifting to using laparoscopic techniques as they require smaller incisions, and result in less bleeding, lower infection rates, faster recovery, shorter hospitalization periods, and reduced chronic pain.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Recurrence rates are identical when laparoscopy is performed by an experienced surgeon. When performed by a surgeon less experienced in inguinal hernia lap repair, recurrence is larger than after Lichtenstein.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Robot assisted repair of inguinal hernias has demonstrated safety and efficacy in surgeries repairing inguinal hernias that present on both sides of the pubic bone (bilateral) as well as inguinal hernias that present on one side (unilateral). In comparing robot assisted repair of inguinal hernias to traditional laparoscopic techniques, robot assisted surgeries repairing inguinal hernias have longer operating times and can be more costly. However, measures of safety, complication rates, and readmission rates did not significantly differ between robot assisted repair and traditional laparoscopic repair.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Studies have demonstrated that men whose hernias cause little to no symptoms can safely continue to delay surgery until a time that is most convenient for patients and their healthcare team. Research shows that the risk of inguinal hernia complications remains under 1% within the population. Watchful waiting requires that patients maintain a close follow-up schedule with providers to monitor the course of their hernia for any changes in symptoms and can be safely offered for up to 2 years.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Patients who do elect watchful waiting eventually undergo repair within five years as 25% will experience a progression of symptoms such as worsening of pain. Elective repair discussions should be revisited if patients begin to avoid aspects of their normal routine due to their hernia. After 1 year it is estimated that 16% of patients who initially opted for watchful waiting will eventually undergo surgery. Furthermore, 54% and 72% will undergo repair at 5-year and 7.5-year marks respectively.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: The use of a truss is an additional non-surgical option for men. It resembles a jock-strap that utilizes a pad to exert pressure at the site of the hernia in order prevent excursion of the hernia sack. It has little evidence to support its routine use and has not been shown to prevent complications such as incarceration (bowel can no longer slide back into abdomen) or strangulation of bowel (constriction causing loss of blood supply). However some patients do report a soothing of symptoms when utilized.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Inguinal hernia repair complications are unusual, and the procedure as a whole proves to be relatively safe for the majority of patients. Risks inherent in almost all surgical procedures include:


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Post-herniorrhaphy inguinodynia is a condition where 10-12% of patients experience severe pain after inguinal hernia repair, due to a complex combination of different forms of pain signals. It can occur with any inguinal hernia repair technique, and if unresponsive to pain medications, further surgical intervention is often required. Removal of the implanted mesh, in combination with bisection of regional nerves, is commonly performed to address such cases. There remains ongoing discussion amongst surgeons regarding the utility of planned resections of regional nerves as an attempt to prevent its occurrence.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Mortality rates for non-urgent, elective procedures was demonstrated as 0.1%, and around 3% for procedures performed urgently. Other than urgent repair, risk factors that were also associated with increased mortality included being female, requiring a femoral hernia repair, and older age.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Upon awakening from anesthesia, patients are monitored for their ability to drink fluids, produce urine, as well as their ability to walk after surgery. Most patients are then able to return home once those conditions are met. It is not uncommon for patients to experience residual soreness for a couple of days after surgery. Patients are encouraged to make strong efforts in getting up and walking around the day after surgery. Most patients can resume their normal routine of daily living within the week such as driving, showering, light lifting, as well as sexual activity. Long work absences are rarely necessary and length of sick days tend to be dictated by respective employment policies.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: In general, it is not recommended to administer antibiotics as prophylaxis after elective inguinal hernia repair. However, the rate of wound infection determines the appropriate use of the antibiotics.


title: Inguinal hernia surgery

text: Most indirect inguinal hernias in the abdominal wall are not preventable. Direct inguinal hernias may be prevented by maintaining a healthy weight, refraining from smoking, preventing straining during bowel movements, and maintaining proper lifting techniques when heavy lifting. There is no evidence that indicates physicians should routinely screen for asymptomatic inguinal hernias during patient visits.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: The Chihuahuan Desert (, ) is a desert ecoregion designation covering parts of northern Mexico and the southwestern United States. It occupies much of far West Texas, the middle to lower Rio Grande Valley and the lower Pecos Valley in New Mexico, and a portion of southeastern Arizona, as well as the central and northern portions of the Mexican Plateau. It is bordered on the west by the Sonoran Desert, the Colorado Plateau, and the extensive Sierra Madre Occidental range, along with northwestern lowlands of the Sierra Madre Oriental range. Its largest, continual expanse is located in Mexico, covering a large portion of the state of Chihuahua, along with portions of Coahuila, north-eastern Durango, the extreme northern part of Zacatecas, and small western portions of Nuevo León. With an area of about , it is the largest desert in North America. The desert is fairly young, existing for only 8000 years.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: There are several larger mountain ranges in the Chihuahan Desert, including the Sierra Madre, the Sierra del Carmen, the Organ Mountains, the Franklin Mountains, the Sacramento Mountains, the Chisos Mountains, the Guadalupe Mountains, and the Davis Mountains. These create "sky islands" of cooler, wetter, climates adjacent to, or within the desert, and such elevated areas have both coniferous and broadleaf woodlands, including forests along drainages and favored exposures. The lower elevations of the Sandia–Manzano Mountains, the Magdalena–San Mateo Mountains, and the Gila Region partly border the Chihuahuan Desert and partly border other ecoregions that are not deserts.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: There are few urban areas within the desert: the largest is Ciudad Juárez with almost two million inhabitants; Chihuahua, Saltillo, and Torreón; and the US cities of El Paso and Albuquerque. Alamogordo, Alpine, Benson, Carlsbad, Carrizozo, Deming, Fort Stockton, Fort Sumner, Las Cruces, Marfa, Pecos, Roswell, and Willcox are among the other communities in this ecoregion. Safford and Benson in Arizona are located in low elevations of the western edges of the Chihuahuan Desert, but in an ecotone with the Sonoran Desert.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: According to the World Wide Fund for Nature the Chihuahuan Desert may be the most biologically diverse desert in the world as measured by species richness or endemism. The region has been badly degraded, mainly due to grazing. Many native grasses and other species have become dominated by woody native plants, including creosote bush and mesquite, due to overgrazing and other urbanization. The Mexican wolf, once abundant, was nearly extinct and remains on the endangered species list.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: The desert is mainly a rain shadow desert because the two main mountain ranges which bound the desert, the Sierra Madre Occidental to the west and the Sierra Madre Oriental to the east, block most moisture from the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico, respectively. Climatically, the desert mostly has an arid, mesothermal climate with one rainy season in the late summer and smaller amounts of precipitation in early winter, the mean daily temperature of the coldest month warmer than . The majority of rain falls between late June and early October during the North American Monsoon when moist air from the Gulf of Mexico and the Sea of Cortez penetrates into the region, or much less frequently, when a tropical cyclone moves inland and stalls.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: Owing to its inland position and higher elevation than the Sonoran Desert to the west, mostly varying from in elevation, the desert has a slightly milder climate in the summer (though usually daytime June temperatures are in the range of ), with mild to cool winters and occasional to frequent freezes. The hottest temperatures in the desert occur in lower elevation areas and valleys, including near the Rio Grande from south of El Paso into the Big Bend, and the Bolson de Mapimi. A subtropical temperature regime describes lower elevations in the Texas Big Bend region up to the Presidio and Candelaria areas, then southward into similar elevations, while a warm temperate temperature regime describes higher elevations and further north. The average annual temperature in the desert varies from about , depending on elevation and latitude.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: The mean annual precipitation for the Chihuahuan Desert is with a range of approximately , although it receives more precipitation than most other warm desert ecoregions. Nearly two-thirds of the arid zone stations have annual totals between . Snowfall is scant except at the higher elevation edges. Northern and eastern portions have more definite winters than southern and western portions, receiving a portion of winter precipitation as snowfall most winters.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: The creosote bush ("Larrea tridentata") is the dominant plant species on gravelly and occasional sandy soils in valley areas within the Chihuahuan Desert. The other species found with creosote bush depend on factors including the soil type, elevation, and degree of slope. Viscid acacia ("Vachellia vernicosa"), and tarbush ("Flourensia cernua") dominate northern portions, while broom dalea ("Psorothamnus scoparius") occurs on sandy soils in western portions. "Yucca" and "Opuntia" species are abundant on slopes and uplands in most areas, while Arizona rainbow cactus ("Echinocereus polyacanthus") and Mexican fire-barrel cactus ("Ferocactus pilosus") inhabit portions near the US–Mexico border.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: Herbaceous plants, such as bush muhly ("Muhlenbergia porteri"), blue grama ("Bouteloua gracilis"), gypsum grama ("B. breviseta"), and hairy grama ("B. hirsuta"), are dominant in desert grasslands and near the mountain edges including the Sierra Madre Occidental. Lechuguilla ("Agave lechuguilla"), honey mesquite ("Prosopis glandulosa"), "Opuntia macrocentra" and "Echinocereus pectinatus" are the dominant species in western Coahuila. Ocotillo ("Fouquieria splendens"), lechuguilla, and "Yucca filifera" are the most common species in the southeastern part of the desert. Candelilla ("Euphorbia antisyphilitica"), "Mimosa zygophylla", "Acacia glandulifera" and lechuguilla are found in areas with well-draining, shallow soils. The shrubs found near the Sierra Madre Oriental are exclusively lechuguilla, guapilla ("Hechtia glomerata"), Queen Victoria's agave ("Agave victoriae-reginae"), sotol ("Dasylirion" spp.), and barreta ("Helietta parvifolia"), while the well-developed herbaceous layer includes grasses, legumes, and cacti.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: Desert or arid grasslands comprise 20% of this desert and are often mosaics of shrubs and grasses. They include purple three-awn ("Aristida purpurea"), black grama ("Bouteloua eriopoda"), and sideoats grama ("Bouteloua curtipendula"). Early Spanish explorers reported encountering grasses that were "belly high to a horse"; most likely these were big alkali sacaton ("Sporobolus wrightii") and tobosa ("Pleuraphis mutica") along floodplain or bottomland areas.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: The United Nations Environment Programme reported in 2006 that nearly half of the bird, mammal, and butterfly species in the Chihuahuan Desert are expected to be replaced by other species by 2055 due to climate change.


title: Chihuahuan Desert

text: A 2017 assessment found that , or 7%, of the ecoregion is in protected areas. Protected areas include Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge in Arizona; Janos Biosphere Reserve, Médanos de Samalayuca Natural Protected Area and Cañón de Santa Elena Flora and Fauna Protection Area in Chihuahua; Cuatro Ciénegas Basin, Ocampo Flora and Fauna Protection Area, and part of Maderas del Carmen Biosphere Reserve in Coahuila; Mapimí Biosphere Reserve and Cañón de Fernández State Park in Durango; Bitter Lake National Wildlife Refuge, Bosque del Apache National Wildlife Refuge, Carlsbad Caverns National Park, Carrizozo Malpais, Oliver Lee Memorial State Park, Organ Mountains–Desert Peaks National Monument, Petroglyph National Monument, Sevilleta National Wildlife Refuge, and White Sands National Park in New Mexico; and Big Bend National Park, Big Bend Ranch State Park, Black Gap Wildlife Management Area, Franklin Mountains State Park, and part of Guadalupe Mountains National Park in Texas.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: The Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) is a United States Army program intended to procure a variety of armored vehicles to add new capabilities to Army units and replace existing platforms that are nearing the end of their service life. The program covers the following systems:


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: The project began in 2017 after the previous Ground Combat Vehicle program was canceled. The deadline of the projects is expected to be 2035. Multiple groups competed for the bid. The Army gave the contract to a group composed of seven companies Lockheed Martin, SAIC, GS Engineering, Inc., Moog Inc., Hodges Transportation Inc. and Roush Industries.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: In 2014, the Army selected BAE Systems' proposal of a turretless variant of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. the program was scheduled to deliver 2,897 AMPVs in five variants.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: Mobile Protected Firepower is a light tank. It is similar to the M8 Armored Gun System program canceled in 1996, or the Stryker M1128 Mobile Gun System being retired in 2022.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: In December 2018, the Army downselected BAE Systems' and General Dynamics Land Systems' proposals to move forward.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: On June 28th, 2022, the Army selected GDLS Griffin II light tank as the winner of the MPF program with an initial contract of 96 vehicles.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: In June 2018, the Army established the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) program to replace the M2 Bradley. In October 2018, the program was re-designated as the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV). The NGCV program was expanded as a portfolio of next-generation vehicles including tanks and the Bradley-based Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: The Army said OMFV will be designed “to engage in close combat and deliver decisive lethality during the execution of combined arms maneuver,” and will have a 30mm cannon and a second-generation forward looking infrared system, or FLIR. Testing of the vehicle is expected to begin in 2020.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: A joint venture between Raytheon and Rheinmetall offered a variant of the Lynx KF41, and General Dynamics Land Systems offered a variant of the Griffin III. Both Raytheon-Rheinmetall and GDLS were disqualified, leaving no other competitors. The Army decided to restart the program with less-stringent guidelines.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: In July 2021, the Army awarded contracts to five teams: Point Blank Enterprises, Oshkosh Defense, BAE Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems and American Rheinmetall Vehicles. The total value of the contract was $299.4 million. Teams will develop concept designs during the 15-month long phase.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: , Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCF) is not a Program of Record, meaning the Army has not committed to an acquisition plan.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: The RCV is being developed in light, medium and heavy variants. RCV-Light weighs no more than 10 tons, RCV-Medium weighs between 10 and 20 tons, and RCV-H weighs more than 20 and 30 tons.


title: Next Generation Combat Vehicle

text: In January 2020, the Army awarded contracts to Qinetiq and Textron. Qinetiq is to build four RCV-Ls, and Textron is to build four RCV-Ms.


title: Languages of Israel

text: The Israeli population is linguistically and culturally diverse. Hebrew is the country's official language, and almost the entire population speaks it either as native speakers or proficiently as a second language. Its standard form, known as Modern Hebrew, is the main medium of life in Israel. Arabic is used mainly by Israel's Arab minority which comprises about one-fifth of the population. Arabic has a special status under Israeli law.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Russian is spoken by about 20% of the Israeli population, mainly by the large immigrant population from the former Soviet Union, and English is a known foreign language by a significant proportion of the Israeli population as English is used widely in official logos and road signs alongside Hebrew and Arabic. In addition, the 19th edition of Ethnologue lists 36 languages and dialects spoken through Israel.


title: Languages of Israel

text: According to a 2011 Government Social Survey of Israelis over 20 years of age, 49% report Hebrew as their native language, Arabic 18%, Russian 15%, Yiddish 2%, French 2%, English 2%, 1.6% Spanish, and 10% other languages (including Romanian, German and Amharic, which were not offered as answers by the survey). This study also noted that 90% of Israeli Jews and over 60% of Israeli Arabs have a good understanding of Hebrew.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Several laws determine the official status of languages and language policy in Israel. This confusing situation has led to several appeals to the Supreme Court, whose rulings have enforced the current policies of national and local authorities.


title: Languages of Israel

text: On 19 July 2018, the Knesset passed a basic law under the title , which defines Hebrew as "the State's language" and Arabic as a language with "a special status in the State" (article 4). The law further says that it should not be interpreted as compromising the status of the Arabic language in practice prior to the enactment of the basic law, namely, it preserves the status quo and changes the status of Hebrew and Arabic only nominally.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Before the enactment of the aforementioned basic law, the status of official language in Israel was determined by the 82nd paragraph of the Constitution of Mandatory Palestine, which was promulgated by an Order in Council of the British Crown on 14 August 1922, as amended in 1939:


title: Languages of Israel

text: This law, like most other laws of the British Mandate, was adopted in the State of Israel, subject to certain amendments published by the Provisional State Council on 19 May 1948. The amendment states that:


title: Languages of Israel

text: Apart from Hebrew, Arabic and English, the use of Russian dramatically increased with massive arrivals of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union. Today, Russian TV channels and media are widely available alongside Hebrew and Arabic media.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Initially French was used as a diplomatic language in Israel, and was also used alongside Hebrew on official documents such as passports until the 1990s, even though most state officials and civil servants were more fluent in English. However, the Israeli-French alliance unraveled in the runup to the 1967 Six-Day War, leading to decreased use of French. Israeli passports switched from French to English during the 1990s.


title: Languages of Israel

text: The British Mandate articles, issued by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, and the 1922 Palestine Order in Council were the first in modern times to acknowledge Hebrew as an official language of a political entity. This was a significant achievement for the Zionist movement, which sought to establish Hebrew as the national language of the Jewish people and discouraged the use of other Jewish languages, particularly Yiddish, just like Aramaic replaced Hebrew in ancient times.


title: Languages of Israel

text: The movement for the revival of Hebrew as a spoken language was particularly popular among new Jewish Zionist immigrants who came to Ottoman ruled Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem beginning in the 1880s. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda (born in the Russian Empire) and his followers created the first Hebrew-speaking schools, newspapers, and other Hebrew-language institutions. Max Weinreich notes in his book, "History of the Yiddish Language", Volume 1, the "very making of Hebrew into a spoken language derives from the will to separate from the Diaspora". After Ben Yehuda's immigration to Israel, and due to the impetus of the Second Aliyah (1905–1914), Hebrew prevailed as the single official and spoken language of the Jewish community of Mandatory Palestine. When the State of Israel was formed in 1948, the government viewed Hebrew as the "de facto" official language and initiated a melting pot policy, where every immigrant was required to study Hebrew and often to adopt a Hebrew surname. Use of Yiddish, which was the main competitor prior to World War II, was discouraged, and the number of Yiddish speakers declined as the older generations died out. However, Yiddish is still often used in Ashkenazi Haredi communities worldwide, and is sometimes the first language for the members of the Hasidic branches of such communities.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Today, Hebrew is the official language used in government, commerce, court sessions, schools, and universities. It is the language most commonly used in everyday life in Israel. Native Hebrew speakers comprise about 53% of the population. The vast majority of the rest speak Hebrew fluently as a second language. Native-born Israeli Jews are typically native speakers of Hebrew, but a significant minority of Israelis are immigrants who learned Hebrew as a second language. Immigrants who come under the Law of Return are entitled to a free course in an ulpan, or Hebrew language school. Most of them speak fluent Hebrew, but some do not. Most Israeli-Arabs, who comprise a large national minority, and members of other minorities are also fluent in Hebrew. Historically, Hebrew was taught in Arab schools from the third grade onward, but it has been gradually introduced from kindergarten onward starting in September 2015. A Hebrew exam is an essential part of the matriculation exams for students of Israeli schools. The state-affiliated Academy of the Hebrew Language, established in 1953 by a Knesset law, is tasked with researching the Hebrew language and offering standardized rules for the use of the language by the state.


title: Languages of Israel

text: A survey by the Central Bureau of Statistics released in 2013 found that 90% of Israeli Jews were proficient in Hebrew and 70% were highly proficient. It also found that 60% of Israeli Arabs were proficient or highly proficient in Hebrew, while 17% could not read it and 12% could not speak it.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Literary Arabic, along with Hebrew, has special status under Israeli law. Various spoken dialects are used, and Arabic is the native language among Israeli-Arabs. In 1949, there were 156,000 Arabs in Israel, most of whom did not speak Hebrew. Today, the figure stands at about 1.6 million, and although most are proficient in Hebrew, Arabic remains their primary native language.


title: Languages of Israel

text: In addition, a significant number of Israeli Jews know spoken Arabic, although only a very small number are fully literate in written Arabic. Arabic is the native language of older generations of those Mizrahi Jews who immigrated from Arabic-speaking countries. Arabic lessons are widespread in Hebrew-speaking schools from the seventh through ninth grades. Those who wish to do so may opt to continue their Arabic studies through the twelfth grade and take an Arabic matriculation exam. A 2015 study found that 17% of Israeli Jews can understand Arabic and 10% can speak it fluently, but only 2.5% can read an article in the language, 1.5% can write a letter in it, and 1% can read a book in it.


title: Languages of Israel

text: For many years, the Israeli authorities were reluctant to use Arabic, except when explicitly ordered by law (for example, in warnings on dangerous chemicals), or when addressing the Arabic-speaking population. This has changed following a November 2000 supreme court ruling which ruled that although second to Hebrew, the use of Arabic should be much more extensive. Since then, all road signs, food labels, and messages published or posted by the government must also be translated into Literary Arabic, unless being issued by the local authority of an exclusively Hebrew-speaking community. As of December 2017, 40% of digital panels on public buses list their routes in both Hebrew and Arabic across the country, and, starting in 2015, Arabic has been increasingly featured in signs along highways and in railway stations.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Arabic was always considered a legitimate language for use in the Knesset alongside Hebrew, but only rarely have Arabic-speaking Knesset members made use of this privilege as while all Arabic-speaking MKs are fluent in Hebrew, fewer Hebrew-speaking MKs can understand Arabic.


title: Languages of Israel

text: In March 2007, the Knesset approved a new law calling for the establishment of an Arabic Language Academy similar to the Academy of the Hebrew Language. This institute was established in 2008, its centre is in Haifa and it is currently headed by Prof. Mahmud Ghanayem.


title: Languages of Israel

text: In 2008, a group of Knesset members proposed a bill to remove Arabic's status as an official language, making it an "official secondary language". That bill did not pass.


title: Languages of Israel

text: In 2009, Israel Katz, the transport minister, suggested that signs on all major roads in Israel, East Jerusalem and possibly parts of the West Bank would be amended, replacing English and Arabic place names with straight transliterations of the Hebrew name. Currently most road signs are in all three languages. Nazareth, for example, would become "Natzeret". The Transport Ministry said signs would be replaced gradually as necessary due to wear and tear. This has been criticized as an attempt to erase the Arabic language and Palestinian heritage in Israel. Israel's governmental names' committee unanimously rejected that suggestion in 2011.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Russian is by far the most widely spoken non-official language in Israel. Over 20% of Israelis are fluent in Russian after mass Jewish immigration from the USSR (Russian Jews in Israel) and its successor states in the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s. The government and businesses often provide both written and verbal information in Russian. There is also an Israeli television broadcast channel in Russian. In addition, some Israeli schools also offer Russian language courses. The children of Russian immigrants to Israel generally pick up Hebrew as their dominant language, but most still speak Russian, and a majority still use Russian instead of Hebrew with family and Russian-speaking friends. As of 2017 there are up to 1.5 million Russian-speaking Israelis.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Most Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union were highly educated with almost 45 percent of them having some kind of higher education. Despite the fact that the native language of a significant part of the country's population is Russian, the language occupies a modest role in Israel's education system. Hebrew University started teaching Russian in 1962. In public schools, the first Russian-language classes were opened in the 1970s in large cities. The number of students enrolled in these programs dropped in the 1980s as immigration from the Soviet Union slowed down. In the 1990s, a Russian-language program carried out by local governments called "Na'leh 16" included some 1,500 students. In 1997, about 120 schools in Israel taught Russian in one way or another.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Traditionally, Russian speakers read newspapers and listen to radio more often than Hebrew speakers. "Nasha strana" was the major Russian-newspaper in Israel during the 1970s, when it competed with "Tribuna" for the immigrant reader. In 1989, there was only one daily in Russian, and 6 in 1996. Since the 2000s, the number of Russian-language newspapers started to decline due to the increasing number of television and online media. Israeli television provides daily translation in Hebrew, Arabic, and Russian. In 2002, the Israeli Russian-speaking commercial Channel 9 was launched. It is also known as Israel Plus. In November 2007, a typical digital package included 45 channels in foreign languages, with 5 in Russian. At 2004 there were four dailies, 11 weeklies, five monthlies and over 50 local newspapers published in Russian in Israel, with a total circulation of about 250,000 during weekends. Daily radio services in Russian are also available throughout Israel.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Yiddish has been traditionally the language of Ashkenazi Jews in Eastern Europe and the second most widely spoken Jewish language after Hebrew. Currently, it is spoken by approximately 200,000 Israelis, mostly in Hasidic communities. Yiddish is a Germanic language, but incorporates elements of Hebrew. Yiddish saw a decline in its prevalence among the Israeli population in the early statehood of Israel, due to its banning in theatres, movies and other cultural activities. It has undergone a cultural revival in recent years. Yiddish is the primary language in some Haredi Ashkenazi communities in Israel. However, despite state-sponsored initiatives for preserving Yiddish culture, the number of Yiddish-speaking Israelis is in decline as older generations of Ashkenazi Jews die. In addition, due to greater integration of Haredim, many families in Yiddish-speaking Haredi communities have switched to using primarily Hebrew at home, which has led to these communities to launch preservation campaigns. In a 2013 survey, about 2% of Israelis over the age of 20 recorded Yiddish as their native language.


title: Languages of Israel

text: In 2018, the director of the Israeli Ministry of Education stated that graduates who lacked English proficiency were effectively "handicapped" in today's economy. An October 2017 report by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics showed that 38% of Israelis ages 16 to 65 said they lacked basic English skills like speaking, reading, or writing and 13% reported that they do not know any English whatsoever. English retains a role comparable to that of an official language.


title: Languages of Israel

text: In 1999, the High Court of Justice ruled that English, Arabic and Hebrew were inherited as official languages by Israel, but that English had been removed by the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948. The Ordinance said:


title: Languages of Israel

text: In practice, the use of English decreased dramatically during the state's early years. At first, French was used as a diplomatic language, even though most state officials and civil servants were more fluent in English. During the late 1960s, the Israeli-French alliance was undermined, leading to a stronger Israeli-United States alliance and paving the way for the English language to regain much of its lost status. Today, English is the primary language for international relations and foreign exchange, but it is not sanctioned for use in Knesset debates or in drafting legislation. Some British Mandate laws are still formulated in English, and the process of their translation into Hebrew has been gradual. English is required as a second language in schools and universities, for both Hebrew and Arabic-speaking students. Despite the country's history of British mandatory rule, written English in Israel today uses primarily American spelling, punctuation, and grammar.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Although English does not enjoy the same status as Hebrew and Arabic do, English proficiency is a core requirement in the public education system and road signs are generally written in English after Hebrew and Arabic. English is taught in public schools from the third grade to high school, and passing an English oral and written test is a prerequisite for receiving a "Bagrut" (matriculation certificate). Most universities also regard a high level of English as a prerequisite for admission. Exposure to American culture has been massive in Israel in recent decades, and foreign language television shows are generally presented in the original language with Hebrew subtitles rather than dubbed, which means that there is a high level of exposure to English in the media.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Most Israelis can converse in and read English on at least a basic level, and secular Israelis who are of a high social and economic status usually possess greater capabilities in English than those who are of a lower social and economic status (this is mostly due to differing levels of state-sponsored education, as well as variation in cultural exposure to the language). Israelis born from the 1980s onward generally have better English language skills than their parents and grandparents due to growing up with a higher level of exposure to the language in the media. "Proper" usage of the English language is considered a mark of good education among Israelis. In the past, several politicians, including David Levy and Amir Peretz, were mocked openly in the media and in public for their poor English skills.


title: Languages of Israel

text: Due to immigration from English-speaking countries, a small but significant minority of Israeli Jews are native English speakers. One survey found that about 2% of Israelis spoke English as their native language.


title: Languages of Israel

text: The melting pot policy, which governed the Israel language policy in its early days, was gradually neglected during the late 1970s. While in the 1950s Israeli law banned Yiddish-language theaters and forced civil servants to adopt Hebrew surnames, the new policy allowed immigrants to communicate with the authorities in their language of origin and encouraged them to keep their original language and culture. This new practice has become evident since the early 1990s with massive immigration from the former Soviet Union and the additional immigration from Ethiopia (Ethiopian Jews in Israel). Israeli authorities began to use Russian and Amharic extensively when communicating with these new immigrants. During the 1991 Gulf War, warnings and instructions were issued in at least seven languages. In 1991, a new radio station was erected, called "REKA", which is a Hebrew acronym for "Aliyah Absorption Network". At first, it broadcast exclusively in Russian, also containing programming aimed at teaching Hebrew, which included veteran Israel radio broadcasters recapping news in "easy Hebrew"; some years later, Amharic and Tigrinya time slots were introduced. Just as news in Arabic existed on Arutz 1, news programmes appeared in Russian, Amharic and Tigrinya. Several newspapers and magazines were published in Russian and easy Hebrew with Niqqud. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the first Russian-language TV channel was created.


title: Democratic centralism

text: Democratic centralism is a practice in which political decisions reached by voting processes are binding upon all members of the political party. It is mainly associated with Leninism, wherein the party's political vanguard of professional revolutionaries practised democratic centralism to elect leaders and officers, determine policy through free discussion, and decisively realise it through united action. Democratic centralism has also been practised by social democratic and democratic socialist parties as well. Scholars have disputed whether democratic centralism was implemented in practice in the Soviet Union and China, pointing to violent power struggles, backhanded political maneuvering, historical antagonisms and the politics of personal prestige in those regimes.


title: Democratic centralism

text: In party meetings, a motion (new policy or amendment, goal, plan or any other kind of political question) is proposed. After a period of debate, a vote is taken. If one vote clearly wins (gaining a share of 60% or above among two options, for example) all party members are expected to follow that decision, and not continue propagandizing or otherwise working against it, aiming to act in unity. In the development of socialism in the Soviet Union and China, it was largely taken up in response to dramatic developments and violence which required faster mechanisms of decision-making. A constellation of practices surround this in order to encourage participation and debate, such as "Don't Blame the Speaker".


title: Democratic centralism

text: The text "What Is to Be Done?" from 1902 is popularly seen as the founding text of democratic centralism. At this time, democratic centralism was generally viewed as a set of principles for the organizing of a revolutionary workers' party. However, Vladimir Lenin's model for such a party, which he repeatedly discussed as being "democratic centralist", was the German Social Democratic Party, inspired by remarks made by the social democrat Jean Baptista von Schweitzer. Lenin described democratic centralism as consisting of "freedom of discussion, unity of action".


title: Democratic centralism

text: The doctrine of democratic centralism served as one of the sources of the split between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The Mensheviks supported a looser party discipline within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in 1903 as did Leon Trotsky, in "Our Political Tasks", although Trotsky joined ranks with the Bolsheviks in 1917.


title: Democratic centralism

text: The Sixth Party Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) held at Petrograd between 26 July and 3 August 1917 defined democratic centralism as follows:


title: Democratic centralism

text: After the successful consolidation of power by the Communist Party following the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War, the Bolshevik leadership, including Lenin, instituted a ban on factions in the party as Resolution No. 12 of the 10th Party Congress in 1921. It was passed in the morning session on 16 March 1921. Trotskyists sometimes claim that this ban was intended to be temporary, but there is no language in the discussion at the 10th Party Congress suggesting such.


title: Democratic centralism

text: The Group of Democratic Centralism was a group in the Soviet Communist Party who advocated different concepts of party democracy.


title: Democratic centralism

text: In "On Party Unity", Lenin argued that democratic centralism prevents factionalism. He argued that factionalism leads to less friendly relations among members and that it can be exploited by enemies of the party.


title: Democratic centralism

text: By the Brezhnev period, democratic centralism was described in the 1977 Soviet Constitution as a principle for organizing the state: "The Soviet state is organized and functions on the principle of democratic centralism, namely the electiveness of all bodies of state authority from the lowest to the highest, their accountability to the people, and the obligation of lower bodies to observe the decisions of higher ones."


title: Democratic centralism

text: For much of the time between the era of Joseph Stalin and the 1980s, the principle of democratic centralism meant that the Supreme Soviet, while nominally vested with great lawmaking powers, did little more than approve decisions already made at the highest levels of the Communist Party. When the Supreme Soviet was not in session, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet performed its ordinary functions. Nominally, if such decrees were not ratified by the full Supreme Soviet, they were considered revoked. However, ratification was usually a mere formality, though occasionally even this formality was not observed. Thus, decisions made by the Party's top leaders "de facto" had the force of law.


title: Democratic centralism

text: The democratic centralist principle extended to elections in the Soviet Union. All socialist countries were—either "de jure" or "de facto"—one-party states. In most cases, the voters were presented with a single list of unopposed candidates, which usually won 90 percent or more of the vote.


title: Democratic centralism

text: The Leninist practice of democratic centralism has been introduced during the Republic of China era to the Kuomintang in 1923. It was allied with the Chinese Communist Party during the Warlord Era and received support from the Soviet Union. The organizational structures of the Kuomintang would remain in place until the democratization on Taiwan in the 1990s and would serve as a structural basis of several Taiwanese political parties such as the Democratic Progressive Party.


title: Democratic centralism

text: Democratic centralism is also stated in Article 3 of the present Constitution of the People's Republic of China: Article 3. The state organs of the People's Republic of China apply the principle of democratic centralism"." The National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at different levels are instituted through democratic election. They are responsible to the people and subject to their supervision. All administrative, judicial and procuratorial organs of the state are created by the people's congresses to which they are responsible and under whose supervision they operate. The division of functions and powers between the central and local state organs is guided by the principle of giving full play to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local authorities under the unified leadership of the central authorities.


title: Democratic centralism

text: This idea is translated into the supremacy of the National People's Congress, which represents China's citizens and exercises legislative authority on their behalf. Other powers, including the power to appoint the head of state and head of government, are also vested in this body.


title: Democratic centralism

text: The Communist Party of Vietnam is organized according to the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. According to the regulations of the Party, democratic centralism is performed following these rules:


title: Death Sentence (2007 film)

text: Death Sentence is a 2007 American vigilante action drama film loosely based on the 1975 novel of the same name by Brian Garfield.


title: Death Sentence (2007 film)

text: Directed by James Wan, the film stars Kevin Bacon as Nick Hume, a man who takes the law into his own hands after his son is murdered by a gang as an initiation ritual. Hume must protect his family from the gang's resulting vengeance.


title: Death Sentence (2007 film)

text: Nick Hume, a businessman living in Columbia, South Carolina, goes to watch his son Brendan's hockey game. As they are driving home, they stop at a gas station in a bad part of town. During an apparent robbery of the gas station, Joe Darley, a new gang member, slices Brendan's throat with a machete. Nick ambushes the thugs, pulls off Joe's mask and sees his face. Joe escapes, only to get hit by a car. Nick rushes Brendan to the hospital, but the boy dies. Lucas, Nick's younger and less charismatic son suffers survivor guilt.


title: Death Sentence (2007 film)

text: Nick identifies Joe in a police line-up, but is outraged when the district attorney tells him that the defense will cut a deal for a light sentence, since there is not enough evidence to take the case to trial. At a pre-trial hearing, Nick recants his identification so Joe will go free. After following the gang to their hideout, Nick waits until Joe is alone and stabs him to death. The gang leader, Billy, wants revenge. One of the gang members says his sister saw a man in a suit on the night when Joe was killed. Confirming it was Nick from a newspaper picture, they ambush him on the street. He is chased to a parkade. He manages to stay hidden, and runs up the parkade levels, jumping on vehicles as he goes. The alarms from the cars are going off which seems to confuse Billy and his gang. Nick ends up on the top level where a gang member is closing in. Nick fights for his life, and ends up trapped in a car with the guy. As the gear shift is hit into "neutral" the car rolls to the edge of the parkade. Nick escapes just in time, but the gang member plummets to his death. Nick finds his own car and drives home.


title: Death Sentence (2007 film)

text: Another of the gang members arrives at Nick's office to deliver a suitcase he dropped during the chase. Nick calls a phone number found in the case, which belongs to Billy. Billy warns that Nick has bought a "death sentence" for his family, revealing that Joe was his brother. Nick immediately calls Jessica Wallis, the detective assigned to Brendan's case, who is already aware of what Nick started. Jessica grants Nick's family police protection and issues APBs on Billy and his gang. That night, the officers at Nick's house are stealthily killed, but by the time Nick realizes, he finds the gang members are in the house. They attack and subdue Nick, then drag Helen and Lucas downstairs to shoot them; Helen dies while Nick and Lucas are hospitalized.