title: Irish Army

text: Most Irish troops were withdrawn from Lebanon in 2001, following the Israeli evacuation of their forces the previous year. However, 11 Irish troops remained there as observers. They were present during the 2006 Lebanon War. After this conflict, UNIFIL was reinforced and a mechanised infantry company of 165 Irish troops was deployed to southern Lebanon. Their role was to provide perimeter protection for a Finnish Army engineering unit. After 12 months, the 1st Finnish/Irish Battalion ceased operations and was stood down from duty after having completed its mandate with UNIFIL. A number of Irish personnel remained in service at UNIFIL HQ in Southern Lebanon.


title: Irish Army

text: Irish battalions returned to Lebanon in 2011 – initially with roughly 480 troops deployed in the region. This was reduced to approximately 330 troops in May 2013, and further to 180 troops in November 2013. As of May 2016, there were 194 Irish soldiers deployed to UNIFIL serving alongside Finnish Armed Forces as part of a joint Battalion which is currently under Finnish command. Ireland takes over command of the Battalion from Finland in November 2016 at which time an additional Company of some 150 personnel will be deployed to UNIFIL bringing Ireland's contribution to this mission to 340 personnel.


title: Irish Army

text: In November 2022, 333 Irish soldiers deployed to southern Lebanon as part of UNIFIL's 121st Infantry Battalion. On 14 December 2022, one Irish peacekeeper was killed and seven others were injured in a "serious incident" involving small arms fire.


title: Irish Army

text: From August 1988 until May 1991, Irish soldiers were deployed under the UN force UNIIMOG, on the border between Iraq and Iran to supervise the withdrawal of both sides' forces to within their respective borders after the end of the Iran–Iraq War. The Irish provided 177 of the 400 UNIIMOG personnel involved with the mission. The mission came to an end in 1991, when Iran and Iraq completed the withdrawal of their troops. A small number of Irish observers were stationed in Kuwait from 1991 to 2002 as part of UNIKOM.


title: Irish Army

text: In 1993, 100 troops forming a transport company were deployed in Somalia, as part of the UNOSOM II peace-enforcing mission. In December 2001, 221 Irish soldiers were sent to Eritrea as part of UNMEE, and were tasked with the defence of the UN headquarters there.


title: Irish Army

text: In 1997 an Irish Army Military Police unit and a company of transport corps troops were deployed to Bosnia as part of SFOR (1995–2005) and EUFOR (December 2005 to present). The MP company was based in SFOR HQ in Sarajevo and policed the 8,000 SFOR troops based in the area. From 1999 until 2010, a company of Irish troops was stationed in Kosovo as part of KFOR.


title: Irish Army

text: In July 1999, Irish officers were sent to East Timor as part of the UNAMET observer group (Timorese Independence Referendum). In October, a platoon of Rangers (1 Ircon) from the Army Ranger Wing (ARW) were sent as part of the INTERFET peacekeeping force after the Referendum. The ARW platoon served in the reconnaissance company of the 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Regiment (1 RNZIR) Battalion Group for a four-month tour. INTERFET handed over to UNTAET during ARW 2 Ircon's tour in 2000. The third contingent to East Timor (3 Ircon) in June 2000 marked a new departure for the Defence Forces, as all the infantry sections were drawn from the 2nd Infantry Battalion. Late 2000 saw the 12th Infantry supply 4 Ircon. Nine contingents in total were deployed including 4 Infantry Battalion, 5 Infantry Battalion, 28 Infantry Battalion, 1 Cathlán Coisithe, and finally the 6 Infantry Battalion under UNMISET until May 2004.


title: Irish Army

text: After November 2003, Irish troops were stationed in Liberia as part of UNMIL. The Liberian mission was the largest Irish overseas deployment since Lebanon and consisted of a single composite battalion. The UN force, UNMIL, was 15,000 strong and was charged with stabilising the country after the Second Liberian Civil War. The Irish troops were based in Camp Clara, near Monrovia and were tasked with acting as the Force Commander's "Quick Reaction Force" (QRF) in the Monrovia area. This meant the securing of key locations, conducting searches for illegally held weapons, patrolling and manning checkpoints on the main roads and providing security to civilians under threat of violence. The Irish deployment to Liberia was due to end in November 2006. However, at that time the deployment was extended for a further 6 months to May 2007. During the UNMIL deployment, a detachment of Irish Army Rangers successfully rescued a group of civilians being held hostage by renegade Liberian gunmen. Acting on intelligence, twenty heavily armed Rangers were dropped by helicopter, freeing the hostages and capturing the rebel leader. In all the following battalions were involved in 2,745 cumulative missions under UNMIL:


title: Irish Army

text: In August 2007, the Irish government announced that 200 Irish soldiers would be sent to support the United Nations effort as part of EUFOR Chad/CAR. As of 2008 500 troops had been deployed – 54 of whom were Irish Army Rangers. In announcing the mission, the Minister for Defence recognised the regional nature of the crisis, involving instability in Darfur, Chad and the Central African Republic. In accordance with their terms of reference, the deployment of Irish forces was confined to Chad. Ireland contributed the second largest contingent of soldiers to EUFOR Chad/CAR, after France, as part of the mission to establish peace in Chad and to protect refugees from neighbouring Darfur. The Irish soldiers conducted operations concerned with the delivery of humanitarian aid, protection of civilians, and ensuring the safety of UN personnel. There were a number of deployments to the mission, rotating every four months, with the final contingent completing their tour in May 2010:


title: Irish Army

text: In 2013 the United Nations asked Ireland to send peacekeepers as part of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan region of Syria, to try to contain the Syrian civil war from spreading into Israel. The 43 Infantry Group, consisting of 115 personnel, deployed into Syria in September 2013. The group is tasked primarily to serve as the Force Mobile Reserve within the UNDOF Area of Responsibility. The Irish peacekeepers were attacked by Syrian rebels on 29 November 2013. The Irish convoy came under small arms fire and a Mowag APC later struck a land mine, damaging the vehicle, when driving out of the attack. The Irish returned fire with 12.7mm (.50 calibre) heavy machine guns mounted on their vehicles before the rebels retreated.


title: Irish Army

text: The Irish were involved in a combat mission in August 2014 after 44 Filipino UN troops were captured by the rebel militia Al Nusra. Some of the UN troops managed to escape and an armoured escort from the Irish 44th Infantry Group escorted the Filipino soldiers to safety. Fire was exchanged with heavy machine guns but there were no casualties on the UN side. The Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated he would withdraw the Irish contingent from Golan unless guarantees could be given about their safety. '"We don't want to see Irish troops or the UN contingent being drawn into a Syrian civil war"', he said. Irish troops were withdrawn into Israeli occupied Golan in 2014. Nevertheless, as of late 2016, 138 Irish troops remained deployed in the region under UNDOF. In late 2018 the UN contingent returned to the Syria side of the de facto border after Syrian government forces took Daraa and Quneitra from rebel forces in the 2018 Southern Syria offensive.


title: Irish Army

text: At home, the Army was deployed to aid the Garda Síochána (the police force) along the border with Northern Ireland during the conflict known as the Troubles (1969–1998). In the early 1970s, it was suggested that the Army might cross the Border to protect the Irish nationalist community within Northern Ireland. This was never acted upon, although units were moved to the border region in 1969–70 during the Battle of the Bogside, in order to provide medical support to those wounded in the fighting.


title: Irish Army

text: The Army's largest aid to the civil power role is its cash-in-transit escorts, with over 2000 missions carried out every year. All large shipments of cash within the State have been provided with armed military escorts since 1978. The Army provides 24-hour armed security at the maximum security Portlaoise Prison and armed escorts for the Prison Service transporting Ireland's most dangerous criminals. The Central Bank of Ireland had the Government put in place contingency plans to provide armed Defence Force security for major Irish banks over public order fears if a cash shortage was triggered at the height of the 2008/2009 financial crisis.


title: Irish Army

text: As of 1 December 2015, 493 Defence Force personnel are serving in 12 different missions throughout the world including Lebanon (UNIFIL), Syria (UNDOF), Middle East (UNTSO), Kosovo (KFOR), German-led Battle Group 2016 and other observer and staff appointments to UN, EU, OSCE and PfP posts.


title: Irish Army

text: All enlisted members of the Army undergo 29 weeks of training in order to become a fully trained infantry soldier. The first 17 weeks is recruit training, after which they become a 2 Star Private. They then undergo a further 12 weeks of advanced training, after which they pass-out as a 3 Star Private, Trooper or Gunner depending on their respective Corps. During this continuous 29 weeks of training, they are required to live in barracks. The Army recruits both men and women.


title: Irish Army

text: Recruit training includes foot drill, arms drill, field-craft, medical, radio operation, rifle marksmanship, unarmed combat, counter-IED, tactical and daily physical training (PT). During this stage of training, they are also given weapons training on the Steyr Rifle, General Purpose Machine Gun and grenade.


title: Irish Army

text: On completion of recruit training, soldiers become 2 Star Privates and immediately begin 3 Star training. This includes more advanced training of everything covered by recruit training plus riot training, navigation, CBRN, helicopter drills, survival, FIBUA, ATCP training, live fire tactical training, etc. They also receive further weapons training on the M203 Grenade Launcher and Short Range Anti-Armour Weapon.


title: Irish Army

text: Throughout their service, soldiers must complete Trained Soldier Specialist Training courses to advance their skills and for promotion.


title: Irish Army

text: The Army has an establishment of 7,310 personnel and consists of two brigades. Prior to 2012, the army was divided into three brigades, organised to be responsible for a geographical area of the State: Southern, Eastern and Western. Following budgetary decisions in 2011, the army was reorganised in late 2012 into a two brigades structure. The training element of the army, the Defence Forces Training Centre, operates independently of the brigade structure.


title: Irish Army

text: The Infantry Corps represent the largest component and are the operational troops of the Army. They must be prepared for tactical deployment in any location at short notice. In wartime this means that they will be among the frontline troops in the defence of the Irish state. In peacetime, they can be seen daily performing operational duties in aid to the civil power such as providing escorts to cash, prisoner or explosive shipments, patrols of vital state installations and border patrols, including checkpoints.


title: Irish Army

text: The Artillery Corps provides fire support as required by infantry or armoured elements. The Corps was founded in 1924 and today consists of two main branches: Field Artillery and Air Defence. Between them, the two branches of the Corps provide several vital services;


title: Irish Army

text: The Engineer Corps is the combat engineering unit of the Defence Forces. The Engineer Corps is responsible for all military engineering matters across the Defence Forces.


title: Irish Army

text: The responsibility for the procurement and maintenance of all ordnance equipment is vested in the Ordnance Corps and encompasses a spectrum of equipment ranging from anti-aircraft missiles and naval armament to the uniforms worn by military personnel. The corps is also responsible for the procurement of food and provision of commercial catering services. These tasks are of a technical nature and the corps personnel are appropriately qualified and with the expertise to afford technical evaluation of complete weapon systems, it also includes embracing weapons, ammunition, fire control instruments and night vision equipment. The Ordnance Corps provides improvised explosive device disposal within the state, in support of the Garda Síochána. Courses are conducted for its own personnel and for students from the military and police of other nations. Ordnance Corps personnel continue to serve in overseas missions and are an essential component of missions involving troops.


title: Irish Army

text: The Transport Corps is responsible for procurement, management and maintenance of soft-skinned vehicles, and maintenance of armoured vehicles. It is also responsible for the driving standards, training and certification, as well as providing vehicle fuels and lubricants, and certain logistics – such as heavy lift capabilities.


title: Irish Army

text: The Medical Corps is responsible for promoting health and treating sick or wounded personnel, and has provided medical and dental support in all the Army's main UN missions. As with similar branches in other militaries, they also sometimes provide humanitarian assistance to local civilian populations – by giving medical aid where local health services are not functioning adequately.


title: Irish Army

text: The Military Police (, hence the nickname "PAs") are responsible for the prevention and investigation of offences, the enforcement of discipline and the general policing of the Defence Forces. In wartime, additional tasks include the provision of a traffic control organisation to allow rapid movement of military formations to their mission areas. Other wartime rules include control of prisoners of war and refugees. Traditionally, the Military Police have had involvement at State and ceremonial occasions. In recent years the Military Police have been deployed in UN missions (such as Iran and Iraq) and later in the former Yugoslavia (SFOR). The Gardaí assist in providing specialist police training to the Military Police in the field of crime investigation.


title: Irish Army

text: The Communications and Information Services (CIS) Corps is a support corps responsible for installing, maintaining and operating telecommunications equipment and information systems.


title: Irish Army

text: The rank structure of the Irish Army is organised along standard military rank and command structures. These consist of the following ranks:


title: Irish Army

text: The Army has historically purchased and used weapons and equipment from other western countries, mainly from Western European nations. Ireland has a very limited arms industry and rarely produces its own armaments.


title: Irish Army

text: From its establishment the Army used the British-made Lee–Enfield .303 rifle, which would be the mainstay for many decades. In the 1960s some modernisation came with the introduction of the Belgian-made FN FAL 7.62 mm battle rifle. Since 1989 the service rifle for the Army is the Austrian-made Steyr AUG 5.56 mm assault rifle (used by all branches of the Defence Forces).


title: Irish Army

text: Other weapons in use by the Army include the USP 9mm pistol, M203 grenade launcher, FN MAG machine gun, M2 Browning machine gun, Accuracy International Arctic Warfare sniper rifles, AT4 SRAAW, FGM-148 Javelin Anti-tank guided missile, L118 105mm Howitzer, and RBS 70 Surface to Air Missile system.


title: Irish Army

text: The Army has purchased 80 Swiss made Mowag Piranha Armoured personnel carriers which have become the Army's primary vehicle in the Mechanized infantry role. These are equipped with 12.7 mm HMGs, or the Oto Melara 30 mm Autocannon. The Army operates a number of RG Outriders.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead is an absurdist, existential tragicomedy by Tom Stoppard, first staged at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe in 1966. The play expands upon the exploits of two minor characters from Shakespeare's "Hamlet", the courtiers Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, and the main setting is Denmark.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The action of Stoppard's play takes place mainly "in the wings" of Shakespeare's "Hamlet", with brief appearances of major characters from "Hamlet" who enact fragments of the original's scenes. Between these episodes, the two protagonists voice their confusion at the progress of events occurring onstage without them in "Hamlet", of which they have no direct knowledge.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: Comparisons have also been drawn with Samuel Beckett's "Waiting for Godot", for the presence of two central characters who almost appear to be two halves of a single character. Many plot features are similar as well: the characters pass time by playing Questions, impersonating other characters, and interrupting each other or remaining silent for long periods of time.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The title is taken directly from the final scene of Shakespeare's "Hamlet". In an earlier scene, Prince Hamlet has been exiled to England by the treacherous King of Denmark (his uncle Claudius, who has murdered Hamlet's father to obtain the throne). En route to England, Hamlet discovers a letter from King Claudius which is being carried to England by Hamlet's old but now untrusted friends Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. The letter commands that Hamlet be put to death upon his arrival in England. Hamlet rewrites the letter to command that instead, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern be put to death. He then escapes back to Denmark.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: By the end of Shakespeare's play, Prince Hamlet, Laertes, Ophelia, Polonius, King Claudius, and Queen Gertrude all lie dead.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: An ambassador from England arrives on the scene to bluntly report "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead" ("Hamlet". Act V, Scene II, line 411); they join the stabbed, poisoned and drowned key characters. By the end of "Hamlet", Horatio is the only main figure left alive.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: A previous, satirical play of a similar nature named "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern" was written by W. S. Gilbert in 1874 and performed in 1891.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: With William Shakespeare's play "Hamlet" as the backdrop"," "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead" concerns the musings and mishaps of the titular characters. The play is structured as the inverse of "Hamlet", in which Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are two minor characters who were childhood friends of the Prince; instead, the duo remains the focus and Hamlet himself is a minor role whose actions occur largely offstage, with the exception of a few short scenes in which the dramatic plays converge.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: In "Hamlet", Rosencrantz and Guildenstern operate under the King's command in an attempt to discover Hamlet's motives and plot against him. Hamlet, however, derisively mocks and outwits them, so that they, rather than he, are sentenced to death in the end. "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead" explores these events from the perspective of the duo; their actions seem largely nonsensical because they are superseded and, therefore, determined by Hamlet's plot.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: After witnessing a performance of "The Murder of Gonzago" – the play within the play in "Hamlet" – they find themselves on a ship, transporting Prince Hamlet to the King in England, with the troupe that staged the performance also on board as stowaways. They are supposed to give him a letter with an instruction to execute Hamlet, who discovers this and replaces the letter with another one. During the voyage, the ship is hijacked by pirates, after which it is discovered that Hamlet has disappeared and the letter now instructs the English monarch to execute instead.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The troupe recreates the duel scene from "Hamlet" with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, at the end, accepting "quo fata ferunt" ("whither the fates carry [us]"). The play concludes with the final scene from "Hamlet" in which the English Ambassador arrives and announces that "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead".


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are betting on coin flips. Rosencrantz, who bets heads each time, wins 92 flips in a row. The extreme unlikeliness of this event according to the laws of probability leads Guildenstern to suggest that they may be "within un-, sub- or supernatural forces". It is revealed that the duo are journeying to court on the orders of the King. Guildenstern theorizes on the nature of reality, focusing on how an event becomes increasingly real as more people witness it.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: A troupe of Tragedians arrives and offers the two men a show. They seem capable only of performances involving bloodbaths. The next two scenes at court are from the plot of "Hamlet". The first, involving Hamlet and Ophelia, takes place offstage in "Hamlet"—the stage directions repeat exactly the words with which Ophelia describes the event to Polonius in "Hamlet". The second is taken directly from "Hamlet": Rosencrantz and Guildenstern's first appearance in that play. The Danish king and queen, Claudius and Gertrude, ask the two to discover the nature of Hamlet's recent madness. The royal couple demonstrate an inability to distinguish the two courtiers from one another, as do the characters themselves (to their irritation).


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern attempt to practise for their meeting with the Prince by one pretending to be Hamlet and the other asking him questions, but they glean no new information from it. The act closes with another scene from "Hamlet" in which they finally meet the Prince face to face.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The conversation ends between Rosencrantz, Guildenstern, and Hamlet. Guildenstern tries to be optimistic, while Rosencrantz admits that the pair made no progress and Hamlet entirely outwitted them.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The Player returns to the stage. He is angry that the pair did not stay to watch their play earlier because, without an audience, his Tragedians are nothing. He tells them to stop questioning their existence because life appears too chaotic to comprehend upon examination. The Player, Rosencrantz, and Guildenstern lose themselves in another illogical conversation that demonstrates the limits of language. The Player leaves to prepare for his production of "The Murder of Gonzago", set to be put on in front of Hamlet and the King and Queen.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: Claudius and Gertrude enter and begin another short scene taken directly from "Hamlet": they ask about the duo's encounter with the Prince, and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern inform them about his interest in the Tragedians' production. After Claudius and Gertrude leave, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern contemplate their job. They see Hamlet walk by but fail to seize the opportunity to interrogate him.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The Tragedians return and perform their dress rehearsal of "The Murder of Gonzago". Their play moves beyond the scope of what the reader sees in "Hamlet"; characters resembling Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are seen taking a sea voyage and meeting their deaths at the hands of English courtiers, foreshadowing the duo's true fate. Rosencrantz does not quite make the connection, but Guildenstern is frightened into a verbal attack on the Tragedians' inability to capture the real essence of death. The stage becomes dark.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: When the stage is once again visible, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern lie in the same position as had the actors portraying their deaths. The duo are upset that they have become the pawns of the royal couple. Claudius enters again and tells them to find where Hamlet has hidden Polonius's corpse. After many false starts, they eventually find Hamlet, who leaves with Claudius.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: Rosencrantz is delighted to find that his mission is complete, but Guildenstern knows it has not ended. Hamlet enters, speaking with a Norwegian soldier. Rosencrantz decides that he is happy to accompany Hamlet to England because it means freedom from the orders of the Danish court. Guildenstern understands that wherever they go, they are still trapped in this world.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern find themselves on a ship that has already set sail. The pair seems to have no knowledge of how they got there. At first, they try to determine whether they are still alive, before they recognize that they are not dead and are on board a boat. They remember that Claudius has given them a letter to deliver to England. After some brief confusion over who actually has the letter, they find it and eventually open it. They realize that Claudius has asked for Hamlet to be killed. While Rosencrantz seems hesitant to follow their orders now, Guildenstern convinces him that they are not worthy of interfering with fate and the plans of kings. The stage darkens and, presumably, the characters go to sleep. Hamlet switches the letter with one he has written himself, an act which takes place offstage in "Hamlet".


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The pair discovers that the Tragedians are hidden ("impossibly", according to the stage directions) in several barrels on deck. They are fleeing Denmark because their play offended Claudius. When Rosencrantz complains that there is not enough action, pirates attack. Hamlet, Rosencrantz, Guildenstern, and the Player all hide in separate barrels. The lights dim.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: When the lights come on again, Hamlet has vanished (in "Hamlet" it is reported that he was kidnapped by pirates from the ship). Rosencrantz and Guildenstern panic, then re-read the letter to find that it now calls for them to be put to death instead of the prince. Guildenstern cannot understand why he and Rosencrantz are so important as to necessitate their executions.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The Player tells Guildenstern that all paths end in death. Guildenstern snaps and draws the Player's dagger from his belt, shouting that his portrayals of death do not do justice to the real thing. He stabs the Player and the Player appears to die. Guildenstern fully believes that he has killed the Player. Seconds later, the Tragedians begin to clap and the Player stands up and bows, revealing the knife to be a theatrical one with a retractable blade. The Tragedians then act out the deaths from the final scene of "Hamlet".


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The lighting shifts so that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern appear alone. Rosencrantz still does not understand why they must die, yet he resigns himself to his fate and he disappears. Guildenstern wonders when he passed the point where he could have stopped the series of events that has brought him to this point. He disappears as well. The final scene features the last few lines from Shakespeare's "Hamlet", as the Ambassador from England announces that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: Metatheatre is a central structural element of "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead". Scenes that are staged as plays, dumb shows, or commentaries on dramatic theory and practice are prominent in both Stoppard's play and Shakespeare's original tragedy "Hamlet". In "Hamlet", metatheatrical elements include the Player's speech (2.2), Hamlet's advice to the Players (3.2), and the meta-play "The Mousetrap" (3.3). Since Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are characters from "Hamlet" itself, Stoppard's entire play can be considered a piece of metatheatre. Bernardina da Silveira Pinheiro observes that Stoppard uses metatheatrical devices to produce a "parody" of the key elements of Shakespeare's "Hamlet" that includes foregrounding two minor characters considered "nonentities" in the original tragedy.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The play had its first incarnation as a 1964 one-act titled "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Meet King Lear". The expanded version under the current title was first staged at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe on 24 August 1966, by the Oxford Theatre Group. The play debuted in London with a production at the Old Vic directed by Derek Goldby, designed by Desmond Heeley, and scored by Marc Wilkinson. It premiered on 11 April 1967, with John Stride as Rosencrantz, Edward Petherbridge as Guildenstern, Graham Crowden as the Player, and John McEnery as Hamlet. The play returned to the National Theatre on 14 December 1995 and this production with Adrian Scarborough as Rosencrantz and Simon Russell Beale as Guildenstern subsequently toured to Belfast, Cork, Bath, Newcastle, Sheffield and Bradford.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: In 2011 the play was revived in a production directed by Sir Trevor Nunn, opening at Chichester Festival Theatre before transferring to the Theatre Royal Haymarket in London's West End (June–August 2011). It starred Samuel Barnett and Jamie Parker. Tim Curry was originally scheduled to appear as The Player, but dropped out during preview performances at Chichester Festival Theatre due to ill health and was replaced by Chris Andrew Mellon. In 2013, an excerpt of the play was performed by Benedict Cumberbatch (Rosencrantz) and Kobna Holdbrook-Smith (Guildenstern) on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the National Theatre.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: From 25 February to 6 May 2017 the play returned to The Old Vic in a production celebrating its 50th anniversary, directed by David Leveaux and starring Daniel Radcliffe as Rosencrantz and Joshua McGuire as Guildenstern.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The Royal National Theatre production of "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern" had a year-long Broadway run from 9 October 1967, through 19 October 1968, initially at the Alvin Theatre, then transferring to the Eugene O'Neill Theatre on 8 January 1968.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The production, which was Stoppard's first on Broadway, totalled eight previews and 420 performances. It was directed by Derek Goldby and designed by Desmond Heeley and starred Paul Hecht as the Player, Brian Murray as Rosencrantz and John Wood as Guildenstern. The play was nominated for eight Tony Awards, and won four: Best Play, Scenic Design, Costume Design and Producer; the director and the three leading actors, all nominated for Tonys, did not win.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The play also won Best Play from the New York Drama Critics Circle in 1968, and Outstanding Production from the Outer Critics Circle in 1969. Clive Barnes of "The New York Times" described the play as "very funny, very brilliant, very chilling."


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The play had a 1987 New York revival by Roundabout Theatre at the Union Square Theatre, directed by Robert Carsen and featuring John Wood as the Player, Stephen Lang as Rosencrantz and John Rubinstein as Guildenstern. It ran for 40 performances from 29 April to 28 June 1987.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: Several times since 1995, the American Shakespeare Center has mounted repertories that included both "Hamlet" and "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern", with the same actors performing the same roles in each; in their 2001 and 2009 seasons the two plays were "directed, designed, and rehearsed together to make the most out of the shared scenes and situations".


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: A 1983 radio adaptation was broadcast on the BBC World Service on 17 October directed by Gordon House, with Nigel Anthony as Rosencrantz, Nicky Henson as Guildenstern, Jack May as The Player, John Duttine as Hamlet, Peter Vaughan as Claudius, Marcia Warren as Gertrude, Eileen Tully as Ophelia, Cyril Shaps as Polonius and Alex Jennings as a Tragedian.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: Film rights to the play were originally bought by MGM in 1968 for a reported $350,000 plus 10% of the profits. John Boorman was announced as director with Bob Chartoff and Irwin Winkler to produce. The film was not made, however.


title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead

text: The play was eventually adapted for a film released in February 1990, with screenplay and direction by Stoppard. The motion picture is Stoppard's only film directing credit: "[I]t began to become clear that it might be a good idea if I did it myself—at least the director wouldn't have to keep wondering what the author meant. It just seemed that I'd be the only person who could treat the play with the necessary disrespect." The cast included Gary Oldman as Rosencrantz, Tim Roth as Guildenstern, Richard Dreyfuss as the Player, Joanna Roth as Ophelia, Ian Richardson as Polonius, Joanna Miles as Gertrude, Donald Sumpter as Claudius, and Iain Glen as Hamlet.


title: European debt crisis

text: The European debt crisis, often also referred to as the eurozone crisis or the European sovereign debt crisis, is a multi-year debt crisis that took place in the European Union (EU) from 2009 until the mid to late 2010s. Several eurozone member states (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus) were unable to repay or refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks under their national supervision without the assistance of third parties like other eurozone countries, the European Central Bank (ECB), or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).


title: European debt crisis

text: The eurozone crisis was caused by a balance-of-payments crisis, which is a sudden stop of foreign capital into countries that had substantial deficits and were dependent on foreign lending. The crisis was worsened by the inability of states to resort to devaluation (reductions in the value of the national currency) due to having the Euro as a shared currency. Debt accumulation in some eurozone members was in part due to macroeconomic differences among eurozone member states prior to the adoption of the euro. The European Central Bank adopted an interest rate that incentivized investors in Northern eurozone members to lend to the South, whereas the South was incentivized to borrow because interest rates were very low. Over time, this led to the accumulation of deficits in the South, primarily by private economic actors. A lack of fiscal policy coordination among eurozone member states contributed to imbalanced capital flows in the eurozone, while a lack of financial regulatory centralization or harmonization among eurozone states, coupled with a lack of credible commitments to provide bailouts to banks, incentivized risky financial transactions by banks. The detailed causes of the crisis varied from country to country. In several countries, private debts arising from a property bubble were transferred to sovereign debt as a result of banking system bailouts and government responses to slowing economies post-bubble. European banks own a significant amount of sovereign debt, such that concerns regarding the solvency of banking systems or sovereigns are negatively reinforcing.


title: European debt crisis

text: The onset of crisis was in late 2009 when the Greek government disclosed that its budget deficits were far higher than previously thought. Greece called for external help in early 2010, receiving an EU–IMF bailout package in May 2010. European nations implemented a series of financial support measures such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in early 2010 and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in late 2010. The ECB also contributed to solve the crisis by lowering interest rates and providing cheap loans of more than one trillion euro in order to maintain money flows between European banks. On 6 September 2012, the ECB calmed financial markets by announcing free unlimited support for all eurozone countries involved in a sovereign state bailout/precautionary programme from EFSF/ESM, through some yield lowering Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). Ireland and Portugal received EU-IMF bailouts In November 2010 and May 2011, respectively. In March 2012, Greece received its second bailout. Both Spain and Cyprus received rescue packages in June 2012.


title: European debt crisis

text: Return to economic growth and improved structural deficits enabled Ireland and Portugal to exit their bailout programmes in July 2014. Greece and Cyprus both managed to partly regain market access in 2014. Spain never officially received a bailout programme. Its rescue package from the ESM was earmarked for a bank recapitalisation fund and did not include financial support for the government itself. The crisis has had significant adverse economic effects and labour market effects, with unemployment rates in Greece and Spain reaching 27%, and was blamed for subdued economic growth, not only for the entire eurozone but for the entire European Union. It had a major political impact on the ruling governments in 10 out of 19 eurozone countries, contributing to power shifts in Greece, Ireland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Belgium, and the Netherlands as well as outside of the eurozone in the United Kingdom.


title: European debt crisis

text: The eurozone crisis resulted from the structural problem of the eurozone and a combination of complex factors. There is a consensus that the root of the eurozone crisis lay in a balance-of-payments crisis (a sudden stop of foreign capital into countries that were dependent on foreign lending), and that this crisis was worsened by the fact that states could not resort to devaluation (reductions in the value of the national currency to make exports more competitive in foreign markets). Other important factors include the globalisation of finance; easy credit conditions during the 2002–2008 period that encouraged high-risk lending and borrowing practices; the financial crisis of 2007–08; international trade imbalances; real estate bubbles that have since burst; the Great Recession of 2008–2012; fiscal policy choices related to government revenues and expenses; and approaches used by states to bail out troubled banking industries and private bondholders, assuming private debt burdens or socializing losses.


title: European debt crisis

text: Macroeconomic divergence among eurozone member states led to imbalanced capital flows between the member states. Prior to the adoption of the euro, Southern eurozone member states grew rapidly (with rising wages and prices) whereas Northern eurozone members grew slowly. Despite these different macroeconomic conditions, the European Central Bank could only adopt one interest rate, choosing one that meant that real interest rates in Germany were high (relative to inflation) and low in Southern eurozone member states. This incentivized investors in Germany to lend to the South, whereas the South was incentivized to borrow (because interest rates were very low). Over time, this led to the accumulation of deficits in the South, primarily by private economic actors.


title: European debt crisis

text: Comparative political economy explains the fundamental roots of the European crisis in varieties of national institutional structures of member countries (north vs. south), which conditioned their asymmetric development trends over time and made the union susceptible to external shocks. Imperfections in the Eurozone's governance construction to react effectively exacerbated macroeconomic divergence.


title: European debt crisis

text: Eurozone member states could have alleviated the imbalances in capital flows and debt accumulation in the South by coordinating national fiscal policies. Germany could have adopted more expansionary fiscal policies (to boost domestic demand and reduce the outflow of capital) and Southern eurozone member states could have adopted more restrictive fiscal policies (to curtail domestic demand and reduce borrowing from the North). Per the requirements of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, governments pledged to limit their deficit spending and debt levels. However, some of the signatories, including Germany and France, failed to stay within the confines of the Maastricht criteria and turned to securitising future government revenues to reduce their debts and/or deficits, sidestepping best practice and ignoring international standards. This allowed the sovereigns to mask their deficit and debt levels through a combination of techniques, including inconsistent accounting, off-balance-sheet transactions, and the use of complex currency and credit derivatives structures. From late 2009 on, after Greece's newly elected, PASOK government stopped masking its true indebtedness and budget deficit, fears of sovereign defaults in certain European states developed in the public, and the government debt of several states was downgraded. The crisis subsequently spread to Ireland and Portugal, while raising concerns about Italy, Spain, and the European banking system, and more fundamental imbalances within the eurozone. The under-reporting was exposed through a revision of the forecast for the 2009 budget deficit from "6–8%" of GDP (no greater than 3% of GDP was a rule of the Maastricht Treaty) to 12.7%, almost immediately after PASOK won the October 2009 Greek national elections. Large upwards revision of budget deficit forecasts due to the international financial crisis were not limited to Greece: for example, in the United States forecast for the 2009 budget deficit was raised from $407 billion projected in the 2009 fiscal year budget, to $1.4 trillion, while in the United Kingdom there was a final forecast more than 4 times higher than the original. In Greece, the low ("6–8%") forecast was reported until very late in the year (September 2009), clearly not corresponding to the actual situation.


title: European debt crisis

text: Fragmented financial regulation contributed to irresponsible lending in the years prior to the crisis. In the eurozone, each country had its own financial regulations, which allowed financial institutions to exploit gaps in monitoring and regulatory responsibility to resort to loans that were high-yield but very risky. Harmonization or centralization in financial regulations could have alleviated the problem of risky loans. Another factor that incentivized risky financial transaction was that national governments could not credibly commit not to bailout financial institutions who had undertaken risky loans, thus causing a moral hazard problem.


title: European debt crisis

text: The European debt crisis erupted in the wake of the Great Recession around late 2009, and was characterized by an environment of overly high government structural deficits and accelerating debt levels. When, as a negative repercussion of the Great Recession, the relatively fragile banking sector had suffered large capital losses, most states in Europe had to bail out several of their most affected banks with some supporting recapitalization loans, because of the strong linkage between their survival and the financial stability of the economy. As of January 2009, a group of 10 central and eastern European banks had already asked for a bailout. At the time, the European Commission released a forecast of a 1.8% decline in EU economic output for 2009, making the outlook for the banks even worse. The many public funded bank recapitalizations were one reason behind the sharply deteriorated debt-to-GDP ratios experienced by several European governments in the wake of the Great Recession. The main root causes for the four sovereign debt crises erupting in Europe were reportedly a mix of: weak actual and potential growth; competitive weakness; liquidation of banks and sovereigns; large pre-existing debt-to-GDP ratios; and considerable liability stocks (government, private, and non-private sector).


title: European debt crisis

text: In the first few weeks of 2010, there was renewed anxiety about excessive national debt, with lenders demanding ever-higher interest rates from several countries with higher debt levels, deficits, and current account deficits. This in turn made it difficult for four out of eighteen eurozone governments to finance further budget deficits and repay or refinance existing government debt, particularly when economic growth rates were low, and when a high percentage of debt was in the hands of foreign creditors, as in the case of Greece and Portugal.


title: European debt crisis

text: The states that were adversely affected by the crisis faced a strong rise in interest rate spreads for government bonds as a result of investor concerns about their future debt sustainability. Four eurozone states had to be rescued by sovereign bailout programs, which were provided jointly by the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission, with additional support at the technical level from the European Central Bank. Together these three international organisations representing the bailout creditors became nicknamed "the Troika".


title: European debt crisis

text: To fight the crisis some governments have focused on raising taxes and lowering expenditures, which contributed to social unrest and significant debate among economists, many of whom advocate greater deficits when economies are struggling. Especially in countries where budget deficits and sovereign debts have increased sharply, a crisis of confidence has emerged with the widening of bond yield spreads and risk insurance on CDS between these countries and other EU member states, most importantly Germany. By the end of 2011, Germany was estimated to have made more than out of the crisis as investors flocked to safer but near zero interest rate German federal government bonds ("bunds"). By July 2012 also the Netherlands, Austria, and Finland benefited from zero or negative interest rates. Looking at short-term government bonds with a maturity of less than one year the list of beneficiaries also includes Belgium and France. While Switzerland (and Denmark) equally benefited from lower interest rates, the crisis also harmed its export sector due to a substantial influx of foreign capital and the resulting rise of the Swiss franc. In September 2011 the Swiss National Bank surprised currency traders by pledging that "it will no longer tolerate a euro-franc exchange rate below the minimum rate of 1.20 francs", effectively weakening the Swiss franc. This is the biggest Swiss intervention since 1978.


title: European debt crisis

text: Despite sovereign debt having risen substantially in only a few eurozone countries, with the three most affected countries Greece, Ireland and Portugal collectively only accounting for 6% of the eurozone's gross domestic product (GDP), it became a perceived problem for the area as a whole, leading to concerns about further contagion of other European countries and a possible break-up of the eurozone. In total, the debt crisis forced five out of 17 eurozone countries to seek help from other nations by the end of 2012.


title: European debt crisis

text: In mid-2012, due to successful fiscal consolidation and implementation of structural reforms in the countries being most at risk and various policy measures taken by EU leaders and the ECB (see below), financial stability in the eurozone improved significantly and interest rates fell steadily. This also greatly diminished contagion risk for other eurozone countries. only 3 out of 17 eurozone countries, namely Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus still battled with long-term interest rates above 6%. By early January 2013, successful sovereign debt auctions across the eurozone but most importantly in Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, showed investors' confidence in the ECB backstop. In November 2013 ECB lowered its bank rate to only 0.25% to aid recovery in the eurozone. As of May 2014 only two countries (Greece and Cyprus) still needed help from third parties.


title: European debt crisis

text: The Greek economy had fared well for much of the 20th century, with high growth rates and low public debt. By 2007 (i.e., before the global financial crisis of 2007–2008), it was still one of the fastest growing in the eurozone, with a public debt-to-GDP that did not exceed 104%, but it was associated with a large structural deficit. As the world economy was hit by the financial crisis of 2007–08, Greece was hit especially hard because its main industries—shipping and tourism—were especially sensitive to changes in the business cycle. The government spent heavily to keep the economy functioning and the country's debt increased accordingly.


title: European debt crisis

text: The Greek crisis was triggered by the turmoil of the Great Recession, which led the budget deficits of several Western nations to reach or exceed 10% of GDP. In the case of Greece, the high budget deficit (which, after several corrections, had been allowed to reach 10.2% and 15.1% of GDP in 2008 and 2009, respectively) was coupled with a high public debt to GDP ratio (which, until then, was relatively stable for several years, at just above 100% of GDP, as calculated after all corrections). Thus, the country appeared to lose control of its public debt to GDP ratio, which already reached 127% of GDP in 2009. In contrast, Italy was able (despite the crisis) to keep its 2009 budget deficit at 5.1% of GDP, which was crucial, given that it had a public debt to GDP ratio comparable to Greece's.


title: European debt crisis

text: In addition, being a member of the Eurozone, Greece had essentially no autonomous monetary policy flexibility.


title: European debt crisis

text: Finally, there was an effect of controversies about Greek statistics (due the aforementioned drastic budget deficit revisions which led to an increase in the calculated value of the Greek public debt by about 10%, a public debt-to-GDP ratio of about 100% until 2007), while there have been arguments about a possible effect of media reports. Consequently, Greece was "punished" by the markets which increased borrowing rates, making it impossible for the country to finance its debt since early 2010.


title: European debt crisis

text: Despite the drastic upwards revision of the forecast for the 2009 budget deficit in October 2009, Greek borrowing rates initially rose rather slowly. By April 2010 it was apparent that the country was becoming unable to borrow from the markets; on 23 April 2010, the Greek government requested an initial loan of from the EU and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to cover its financial needs for the remaining part of 2010. A few days later Standard & Poor's slashed Greece's sovereign debt rating to BB+ or "junk" status amid fears of default, in which case investors were liable to lose 30–50% of their money. Stock markets worldwide and the euro currency declined in response to the downgrade.


title: European debt crisis

text: On 1 May 2010, the Greek government announced a series of austerity measures (the third austerity package within months) to secure a three-year loan (First Economic Adjustment Programme). This was met with great anger by some Greeks, leading to massive protests, riots, and social unrest throughout Greece. The Troika, a tripartite committee formed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (EC, ECB and IMF), offered Greece a second bailout loan worth in October 2011 (Second Economic Adjustment Programme), but with the activation being conditional on implementation of further austerity measures and a debt restructure agreement. Surprisingly, the Greek prime minister George Papandreou first answered that call by announcing a December 2011 referendum on the new bailout plan, but had to back down amidst strong pressure from EU partners, who threatened to withhold an overdue loan payment that Greece needed by mid-December. On 10 November 2011, Papandreou resigned following an agreement with the New Democracy party and the Popular Orthodox Rally to appoint non-MP technocrat Lucas Papademos as new prime minister of an interim national union government, with responsibility for implementing the needed austerity measures to pave the way for the second bailout loan.


title: European debt crisis

text: All the implemented austerity measures have helped Greece bring down its primary deficit—i.e., fiscal deficit before interest payments—from €24.7bn (10.6% of GDP) in 2009 to just €5.2bn (2.4% of GDP) in 2011, but as a side-effect they also contributed to a worsening of the Greek recession, which began in October 2008 and only became worse in 2010 and 2011. The Greek GDP had its worst decline in 2011 with −6.9%, a year where the seasonal adjusted industrial output ended 28.4% lower than in 2005, and with 111,000 Greek companies going bankrupt (27% higher than in 2010). As a result, Greeks have lost about 40% of their purchasing power since the start of the crisis, they spend 40% less on goods and services, and the seasonal adjusted unemployment rate grew from 7.5% in September 2008 to a record high of 27.9% in June 2013, while the youth unemployment rate rose from 22.0% to as high as 62%. Youth unemployment ratio hit 16.1 per cent in 2012.


title: European debt crisis

text: Overall the share of the population living at "risk of poverty or social exclusion" did not increase notably during the first two years of the crisis. The figure was measured to 27.6% in 2009 and 27.7% in 2010 (only being slightly worse than the EU27-average at 23.4%), but for 2011 the figure was now estimated to have risen sharply above 33%. In February 2012, an IMF official negotiating Greek austerity measures admitted that excessive spending cuts were harming Greece. The IMF predicted the Greek economy to contract by 5.5% by 2014. Harsh austerity measures led to an actual contraction after six years of recession of 17%.


title: European debt crisis

text: Some economic experts argue that the best option for Greece, and the rest of the EU, would be to engineer an "orderly default", allowing Athens to withdraw simultaneously from the eurozone and reintroduce its national currency the drachma at a debased rate. If Greece were to leave the euro, the economic and political consequences would be devastating. According to Japanese financial company Nomura an exit would lead to a 60% devaluation of the new drachma. Analysts at French bank BNP Paribas added that the fallout from a Greek exit would wipe 20% off Greece's GDP, increase Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio to over 200%, and send inflation soaring to 40–50%. Also UBS warned of hyperinflation, a bank run and even "military coups and possible civil war that could afflict a departing country". Eurozone National Central Banks (NCBs) may lose up to €100bn in debt claims against the Greek national bank through the ECB's TARGET2 system. The Deutsche Bundesbank alone may have to write off €27bn.


title: European debt crisis

text: To prevent this from happening, the Troika (EC, IMF and ECB) eventually agreed in February 2012 to provide a second bailout package worth , conditional on the implementation of another harsh austerity package that would reduce Greek expenditure by €3.3bn in 2012 and another €10bn in 2013 and 2014. Then, in March 2012, the Greek government did finally default on parts of its debt - as there was a new law passed by the government so that private holders of Greek government bonds (banks, insurers and investment funds) would "voluntarily" accept a bond swap with a 53.5% nominal write-off, partly in short-term EFSF notes, partly in new Greek bonds with lower interest rates and the maturity prolonged to 11–30 years (independently of the previous maturity). This counted as a "credit event" and holders of credit default swaps were paid accordingly. It was the world's biggest debt restructuring deal ever done, affecting some of Greek government bonds. The debt write-off had a size of , and caused the Greek debt level to temporarily fall from roughly €350bn to €240bn in March 2012 (it would subsequently rise again, due to the resulting bank recapitalization needs), with improved predictions about the debt burden. In December 2012, the Greek government bought back €21 billion ($27 billion) of their bonds for 33 cents on the euro.


title: European debt crisis

text: Critics such as the director of LSE's Hellenic Observatory argue that the billions of taxpayer euros are not saving Greece but financial institutions. Of all €252bn in bailouts between 2010 and 2015, just 10% has found its way into financing continued public deficit spending on the Greek government accounts. Much of the rest went straight into refinancing the old stock of Greek government debt (originating mainly from the high general government deficits being run in previous years), which was mainly held by private banks and hedge funds by the end of 2009. According to LSE, "more than 80 % of the rescue package" is going to refinance the expensive old maturing Greek government debt towards private creditors (mainly private banks outside Greece), replacing it with new debt to public creditors on more favourable terms, that is to say paying out their private creditors with new debt issued by its new group of public creditors known as the Troika. The shift in liabilities from European banks to European taxpayers has been staggering. One study found that the public debt of Greece to foreign governments, including debt to the EU/IMF loan facility and debt through the Eurosystem, increased from €47.8bn to €180.5bn (+132,7bn) between January 2010 and September 2011, while the combined exposure of foreign banks to (public and private) Greek entities was reduced from well over €200bn in 2009 to around €80bn (−120bn) by mid-February 2012. , 78% of Greek debt is owed to public sector institutions, primarily the EU. According to a study by the European School of Management and Technology only €9.7bn or less than 5% of the first two bailout programs went to the Greek fiscal budget, while most of the money went to French and German banks. (In June 2010, France's and Germany's foreign claims vis-a-vis Greece were $57bn and $31bn respectively. German banks owned $60bn of Greek, Portuguese, Irish and Spanish government debt and $151bn of banks' debt of these countries.) According to a leaked document, dated May 2010, the IMF was fully aware of the fact that the Greek bailout program was aimed at rescuing the private European banks – mainly from France and Germany. A number of IMF Executive Board members from India, Brazil, Argentina, Russia, and Switzerland criticized this in an internal memorandum, pointing out that Greek debt would be unsustainable. However their French, German and Dutch colleagues refused to reduce the Greek debt or to make (their) private banks pay.


title: European debt crisis

text: Mid May 2012, the crisis and impossibility to form a new government after elections and the possible victory by the anti-austerity axis led to new speculations Greece would have to leave the eurozone shortly. This phenomenon became known as "Grexit" and started to govern international market behaviour. The centre-right's narrow victory in 17 June election gave hope that Greece would honour its obligations and stay in the Euro-zone.


title: European debt crisis

text: Due to a delayed reform schedule and a worsened economic recession, the new government immediately asked the Troika to be granted an extended deadline from 2015 to 2017 before being required to restore the budget into a self-financed situation; which in effect was equal to a request of a third bailout package for 2015–16 worth €32.6bn of extra loans. On 11 November 2012, facing a default by the end of November, the Greek parliament passed a new austerity package worth €18.8bn, including a "labour market reform" and "mid term fiscal plan 2013–16". In return, the Eurogroup agreed on the following day to lower interest rates and prolong debt maturities and to provide Greece with additional funds of around €10bn for a debt-buy-back programme. The latter allowed Greece to retire about half of the in debt that Athens owes private creditors, thereby shaving roughly off that debt. This should bring Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio down to 124% by 2020 and well below 110% two years later. Without agreement the debt-to-GDP ratio would have risen to 188% in 2013.


title: European debt crisis

text: The "Financial Times" special report on the future of the European Union argues that the liberalisation of labour markets has allowed Greece to narrow the cost-competitiveness gap with other southern eurozone countries by approximately 50% over the past two years. This has been achieved primary through wage reductions, though businesses have reacted positively. The opening of product and service markets is proving tough because interest groups are slowing reforms. The biggest challenge for Greece is to overhaul the tax administration with a significant part of annually assessed taxes not paid. Poul Thomsen, the IMF official who heads the bailout mission in Greece, stated that "in structural terms, Greece is more than halfway there".


title: European debt crisis

text: In June 2013, Equity index provider MSCI reclassified Greece as an emerging market, citing failure to qualify on several criteria for market accessibility.


title: European debt crisis

text: Both of the latest bailout programme audit reports, released independently by the European Commission and IMF in June 2014, revealed that even after transfer of the scheduled bailout funds and full implementation of the agreed adjustment package in 2012, there was a new forecast financing gap of: "€5.6bn in 2014, €12.3bn in 2015, and €0bn in 2016". The new forecast financing gaps will need either to be covered by the government's additional lending from private capital markets, or to be countered by additional fiscal improvements through expenditure reductions, revenue hikes or increased amount of privatizations. Due to an improved outlook for the Greek economy, with return of a government structural surplus in 2012, return of real GDP growth in 2014, and a decline of the unemployment rate in 2015, it was possible for the Greek government to return to the bond market during the course of 2014, for the purpose of fully funding its new extra financing gaps with additional private capital. A total of €6.1bn was received from the sale of three-year and five-year bonds in 2014, and the Greek government now plans to cover its forecast financing gap for 2015 with additional sales of seven-year and ten-year bonds in 2015.


title: European debt crisis

text: The latest recalculation of the seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP figures for the Greek economy revealed that it had been hit by three distinct recessions in the turmoil of the Global Financial Crisis:


title: European debt crisis

text: Greece experienced positive economic growth in each of the three first quarters of 2014. The return of economic growth, along with the now existing underlying structural budget surplus of the general government, build the basis for the debt-to-GDP ratio to start a significant decline in the coming years ahead, which will help ensure that Greece will be labelled "debt sustainable" and fully regain complete access to private lending markets in 2015. While the "Greek government-debt crisis" hereby is forecast officially to end in 2015, many of its negative repercussions (e.g. a high unemployment rate) are forecast still to be felt during many of the subsequent years.


title: European debt crisis

text: During the second half of 2014, the Greek government again negotiated with the Troika. The negotiations were this time about how to comply with the programme requirements, to ensure activation of the payment of its last scheduled eurozone bailout tranche in December 2014, and about a potential update of its remaining bailout programme for 2015–16. When calculating the impact of the 2015 fiscal budget presented by the Greek government, there was a disagreement, with the calculations of the Greek government showing it fully complied with the goals of its agreed ""Midterm fiscal plan 2013–16"", while the Troika calculations were less optimistic and returned a not covered financing gap at €2.5bn (being required to be covered by additional austerity measures). As the Greek government insisted their calculations were more accurate than those presented by the Troika, they submitted an unchanged fiscal budget bill on 21 November, to be voted for by the parliament on 7 December. The Eurogroup was scheduled to meet and discuss the updated review of the Greek bailout programme on 8 December (to be published on the same day), and the potential adjustments to the remaining programme for 2015–16. There were rumours in the press that the Greek government has proposed immediately to end the previously agreed and continuing IMF bailout programme for 2015–16, replacing it with the transfer of €11bn unused bank recapitalization funds currently held as reserve by the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF), along with establishment of a new precautionary Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL) issued by the European Stability Mechanism. The ECCL instrument is often used as a follow-up precautionary measure, when a state has exited its sovereign bailout programme, with transfers only taking place if adverse financial/economic circumstances materialize, but with the positive effect that it help calm down financial markets as the presence of this extra backup guarantee mechanism makes the environment safer for investors.


title: European debt crisis

text: The positive economic outlook for Greece—based on the return of seasonally adjusted real GDP growth across the first three quarters of 2014—was replaced by a new fourth recession starting in Q4-2014. This new fourth recession was widely assessed as being direct related to the premature snap parliamentary election called by the Greek parliament in December 2014 and the following formation of a Syriza-led government refusing to accept respecting the terms of its current bailout agreement. The rising political uncertainty of what would follow caused the Troika to suspend all scheduled remaining aid to Greece under its second programme, until such time as the Greek government either accepted the previously negotiated conditional payment terms or alternatively could reach a mutually accepted agreement of some new updated terms with its public creditors. This rift caused a renewed increasingly growing liquidity crisis (both for the Greek government and Greek financial system), resulting in plummeting stock prices at the Athens Stock Exchange while interest rates for the Greek government at the private lending market spiked to levels once again making it inaccessible as an alternative funding source.


title: European debt crisis

text: Faced by the threat of a sovereign default and potential resulting exit of the eurozone, some final attempts were made by the Greek government in May 2015 to settle an agreement with the Troika about some adjusted terms for Greece to comply with in order to activate the transfer of the frozen bailout funds in its second programme. In the process, the Eurogroup granted a six-month technical extension of its second bailout programme to Greece.


title: European debt crisis

text: On 5 July 2015, the citizens of Greece voted decisively (a 61% to 39% decision with 62.5% voter turnout) to reject a referendum that would have given Greece more bailout help from other EU members in return for increased austerity measures. As a result of this vote, Greece's finance minister Yanis Varoufakis stepped down on 6 July. Greece was the first developed country not to make a payment to the IMF on time, in 2015 (payment was made with a 20-day delay). Eventually, Greece agreed on a third bailout package in August 2015.


title: European debt crisis

text: Between 2009 and 2017 the Greek government debt rose from €300 bn to €318 bn, i.e. by only about 6% (thanks, in part, to the 2012 debt restructuring); however, during the same period, the critical debt-to-GDP ratio shot up from 127% to 179% basically due to the severe GDP drop during the handling of the crisis.


title: European debt crisis

text: The Irish sovereign debt crisis arose not from government over-spending, but from the state guaranteeing the six main Irish-based banks who had financed a property bubble. On 29 September 2008, Finance Minister Brian Lenihan Jnr issued a two-year guarantee to the banks' depositors and bondholders. The guarantees were subsequently renewed for new deposits and bonds in a slightly different manner. In 2009, a National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) was created to acquire large property-related loans from the six banks at a market-related "long-term economic value".


title: European debt crisis

text: Irish banks had lost an estimated 100 billion euros, much of it related to defaulted loans to property developers and homeowners made in the midst of the property bubble, which burst around 2007. The economy collapsed during 2008. Unemployment rose from 4% in 2006 to 14% by 2010, while the national budget went from a surplus in 2007 to a deficit of 32% GDP in 2010, the highest in the history of the eurozone, despite austerity measures.


title: European debt crisis

text: With Ireland's credit rating falling rapidly in the face of mounting estimates of the banking losses, guaranteed depositors and bondholders cashed in during 2009–10, and especially after August 2010. (The necessary funds were borrowed from the central bank.) With yields on Irish Government debt rising rapidly, it was clear that the Government would have to seek assistance from the EU and IMF, resulting in a "bailout" agreement of 29 November 2010. Together with additional coming from Ireland's own reserves and pensions, the government received , of which up to was to be used to support the country's failing financial sector (only about half of this was used in that way following stress tests conducted in 2011). In return the government agreed to reduce its budget deficit to below three per cent by 2015. In April 2011, despite all the measures taken, Moody's downgraded the banks' debt to junk status.


title: European debt crisis

text: In July 2011, European leaders agreed to cut the interest rate that Ireland was paying on its EU/IMF bailout loan from around 6% to between 3.5% and 4% and to double the loan time to 15 years. The move was expected to save the country between 600 and 700 million euros per year. On 14 September 2011, in a move to further ease Ireland's difficult financial situation, the European Commission announced it would cut the interest rate on its loan coming from the European Financial Stability Mechanism, down to 2.59 per cent—which is the interest rate the EU itself pays to borrow from financial markets.


title: European debt crisis

text: The Euro Plus Monitor report from November 2011 attests to Ireland's vast progress in dealing with its financial crisis, expecting the country to stand on its own feet again and finance itself without any external support from the second half of 2012 onwards. According to the Centre for Economics and Business Research Ireland's export-led recovery "will gradually pull its economy out of its trough".


title: European debt crisis

text: As a result of the improved economic outlook, the cost of 10-year government bonds has fallen from its record high at 12% in mid July 2011 to below 4% in 2013 (see the graph "Long-term Interest Rates").


title: European debt crisis

text: On 26 July 2012, for the first time since September 2010, Ireland was able to return to the financial markets, selling over €5 billion in long-term government debt, with an interest rate of 5.9% for the 5-year bonds and 6.1% for the 8-year bonds at sale. In December 2013, after three years on financial life support, Ireland finally left the EU/IMF bailout programme, although it retained a debt of €22.5 billion to the IMF; in August 2014, early repayment of €15 billion was being considered, which would save the country €375 million in surcharges. Despite the end of the bailout the country's unemployment rate remains high and public sector wages are still around 20% lower than at the beginning of the crisis. Government debt reached 123.7% of GDP in 2013.


title: European debt crisis

text: On 13 March 2013, Ireland managed to regain complete lending access on financial markets, when it successfully issued €5bn of 10-year maturity bonds at a yield of 4.3%.


title: European debt crisis

text: Ireland ended its bailout programme as scheduled in December 2013, without any need for additional financial support.


title: European debt crisis

text: Unlike other European countries that were also severely hit by the Great Recession in the late 2000s and eventually received bailouts in the early 2010s (such as Greece and Ireland), Portugal had the characteristic that the 2000s were not marked by economic growth, but were already a period of economic crisis, marked by stagnation, two recessions (in 2002–03 and 2008–09) and government-sponsored fiscal austerity in order to reduce the budget deficit to the limits allowed by the European Union's Stability and Growth Pact.


title: European debt crisis

text: According to a report by the "Diário de Notícias", Portugal had allowed considerable slippage in state-managed public works and inflated top management and head officer bonuses and wages in the period between the Carnation Revolution in 1974 and 2010. Persistent and lasting recruitment policies boosted the number of redundant public servants. Risky credit, public debt creation, and European structural and cohesion funds were mismanaged across almost four decades. When the global crisis disrupted the markets and the world economy, together with the US subprime mortgage crisis and the eurozone crisis, Portugal was one of the first economies to succumb, and was affected very deeply.


title: European debt crisis

text: In the summer of 2010, Moody's Investors Service cut Portugal's sovereign bond rating, which led to an increased pressure on Portuguese government bonds. In the first half of 2011, Portugal requested a €78 billion IMF-EU bailout package in a bid to stabilise its public finances.


title: European debt crisis

text: Portugal's debt was in September 2012 forecast by the Troika to peak at around 124% of GDP in 2014, followed by a firm downward trajectory after 2014. Previously the Troika had predicted it would peak at 118.5% of GDP in 2013, so the developments proved to be a bit worse than first anticipated, but the situation was described as fully sustainable and progressing well. As a result, from the slightly worse economic circumstances, the country has been given one more year to reduce the budget deficit to a level below 3% of GDP, moving the target year from 2013 to 2014. The budget deficit for 2012 has been forecast to end at 5%. The recession in the economy is now also projected to last until 2013, with GDP declining 3% in 2012 and 1% in 2013; followed by a return to positive real growth in 2014. Unemployment rate increased to over 17% by end of 2012 but it has since decreased gradually to 10,5% as of November 2016.


title: European debt crisis

text: As part of the bailout programme, Portugal was required to regain complete access to financial markets by September 2013. The first step towards this target was successfully taken on 3 October 2012, when the country managed to regain partial market access by selling a bond series with 3-year maturity. Once Portugal regains complete market access, measured as the moment it successfully manage to sell a bond series with a full 10-year maturity, it is expected to benefit from interventions by the ECB, which announced readiness to implement extended support in the form of some yield-lowering bond purchases (OMTs), aiming to bring governmental interest rates down to sustainable levels. A peak for the Portuguese 10-year governmental interest rates happened on 30 January 2012, where it reached 17.3% after the rating agencies had cut the governments credit rating to "non-investment grade" (also referred to as "junk"). As of December 2012, it has been more than halved to only 7%. A successful return to the long-term lending market was made by the issuing of a 5-year maturity bond series in January 2013, and the state regained complete lending access when it successfully issued a 10-year maturity bond series on 7 May 2013.


title: European debt crisis

text: According to the "Financial Times" special report on the future of the European Union, the Portuguese government has "made progress in reforming labour legislation, cutting previously generous redundancy payments by more than half and freeing smaller employers from collective bargaining obligations, all components of Portugal's €78 billion bailout program". Additionally, unit labour costs have fallen since 2009, working practices are liberalizing, and industrial licensing is being streamlined.


title: European debt crisis

text: On 18 May 2014, Portugal left the EU bailout mechanism without additional need for support, as it had already regained a complete access to lending markets back in May 2013, and with its latest issuing of a 10-year government bond being successfully completed with a rate as low as 3.59%. Portugal still has many tough years ahead. During the crisis, Portugal's government debt increased from 93 to 139 percent of GDP. On 3 August 2014, Banco de Portugal announced the country's second biggest bank Banco Espírito Santo would be split in two after losing the equivalent of $4.8 billion in the first 6 months of 2014, sending its shares down by 89 percent.


title: European debt crisis

text: Spain had a comparatively low debt level among advanced economies prior to the crisis. Its public debt relative to GDP in 2010 was only 60%, more than 20 points less than Germany, France or the US, and more than 60 points less than Italy or Greece. Debt was largely avoided by the ballooning tax revenue from the housing bubble, which helped accommodate a decade of increased government spending without debt accumulation. When the bubble burst, Spain spent large amounts of money on bank bailouts. In May 2012, Bankia received a 19 billion euro bailout, on top of the previous 4.5 billion euros to prop up Bankia. Questionable accounting methods disguised bank losses. During September 2012, regulators indicated that Spanish banks required €59 billion (US$77 billion) in additional capital to offset losses from real estate investments.


title: European debt crisis

text: The bank bailouts and the economic downturn increased the country's deficit and debt levels and led to a substantial downgrading of its credit rating. To build up trust in the financial markets, the government began to introduce austerity measures and in 2011 it passed a law in congress to approve an amendment to the Spanish Constitution to require a balanced budget at both the national and regional level by 2020. The amendment states that public debt can not exceed 60% of GDP, though exceptions would be made in case of a natural catastrophe, economic recession or other emergencies. As one of the largest eurozone economies (larger than Greece, Portugal and Ireland combined) the condition of Spain's economy is of particular concern to international observers. Under pressure from the United States, the IMF, other European countries and the European Commission the Spanish governments eventually succeeded in trimming the deficit from 11.2% of GDP in 2009 to 7.1% in 2013.


title: European debt crisis

text: Nevertheless, in June 2012, Spain became a prime concern for the Euro-zone when interest on Spain's 10-year bonds reached the 7% level and it faced difficulty in accessing bond markets. This led the Eurogroup on 9 June 2012 to grant Spain a financial support package of up to €100 billion. The funds will not go directly to Spanish banks, but be transferred to a government-owned Spanish fund responsible to conduct the needed bank recapitalisations (FROB), and thus it will be counted for as additional sovereign debt in Spain's national account. An economic forecast in June 2012 highlighted the need for the arranged bank recapitalisation support package, as the outlook promised a negative growth rate of 1.7%, unemployment rising to 25%, and a continued declining trend for housing prices. In September 2012 the ECB removed some of the pressure from Spain on financial markets, when it announced its "unlimited bond-buying plan", to be initiated if Spain would sign a new sovereign bailout package with EFSF/ESM. Strictly speaking, Spain was not hit by a sovereign debt-crisis in 2012, as the financial support package that they received from the ESM was earmarked for a bank recapitalization fund and did not include financial support for the government itself.


title: European debt crisis

text: According to the latest debt sustainability analysis published by the European Commission in October 2012, the fiscal outlook for Spain, if assuming the country will stick to the fiscal consolidation path and targets outlined by the country's current EDP programme, will result in a debt-to-GDP ratio reaching its maximum at 110% in 2018—followed by a declining trend in subsequent years. In regards of the structural deficit the same outlook has promised, that it will gradually decline to comply with the maximum 0.5% level required by the Fiscal Compact in 2022/2027.


title: European debt crisis

text: Though Spain was suffering with 27% unemployment and the economy was shrinking 1.4% in 2013, Mariano Rajoy's conservative government has pledged to speed up reforms, according to the "Financial Times" special report on the future of the European Union. "Madrid is reviewing its labour market and pension reforms and has promised by the end of this year to liberalize its heavily regulated professions." But Spain is benefiting from improved labour cost competitiveness. "They have not lost export market share," says Eric Chaney, chief economist at Axa. "If credit starts flowing again, Spain could surprise us."


title: European debt crisis

text: On 23 January 2014, as foreign investor confidence in the country has been restored, Spain formally exited the EU/IMF bailout mechanism. By end of March 2018, unemployment rate of Spain has fallen to 16.1%. and the debt is 98,30 % of the GDP


title: European debt crisis

text: The economy of the small island of Cyprus with 840,000 people was hit by several huge blows in and around 2012 including, amongst other things, the €22 billion exposure of Cypriot banks to the Greek debt haircut, the downgrading of the Cypriot economy into junk status by international rating agencies and the inability of the government to refund its state expenses.


title: European debt crisis

text: On 25 June 2012, the Cypriot Government requested a bailout from the European Financial Stability Facility or the European Stability Mechanism, citing difficulties in supporting its banking sector from the exposure to the Greek debt haircut.


title: European debt crisis

text: On 30 November the Troika (the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank) and the Cypriot Government had agreed on the bailout terms with only the amount of money required for the bailout remaining to be agreed upon. Bailout terms include strong austerity measures, including cuts in civil service salaries, social benefits, allowances and pensions and increases in VAT, tobacco, alcohol and fuel taxes, taxes on lottery winnings, property, and higher public health care charges. At the insistence of the Commission negotiators, at first the proposal also included an unprecedented one-off levy of 6.7% for deposits up to €100,000 and 9.9% for higher deposits on all domestic bank accounts. Following public outcry, the eurozone finance ministers were forced to change the levy, excluding deposits of less than €100,000, and introducing a higher 15.6% levy on deposits of above €100,000 ($129,600)—in line with the EU minimum deposit guarantee. This revised deal was also rejected by the Cypriot parliament on 19 March 2013 with 36 votes against, 19 abstentions and one not present for the vote.


title: European debt crisis

text: The final agreement was settled on 25 March 2013, with the proposal to close the most troubled Laiki Bank, which helped significantly to reduce the needed loan amount for the overall bailout package, so that €10bn was sufficient without need for imposing a general levy on bank deposits. The final conditions for activation of the bailout package was outlined by the Troika's MoU agreement, which was endorsed in full by the Cypriot House of Representatives on 30 April 2013. It includes:


title: European debt crisis

text: The Cypriot debt-to-GDP ratio is on this background now forecasted only to peak at 126% in 2015 and subsequently decline to 105% in 2020, and thus considered to remain within sustainable territory.


title: European debt crisis

text: Although the bailout support programme feature sufficient financial transfers until March 2016, Cyprus began slowly to regain its access to the private lending markets already in June 2014. At this point of time, the government sold €0.75bn of bonds with a five-year maturity, to the tune of a 4.85% yield. A continued selling of bonds with a ten-year maturity, which would equal a regain of complete access to the private lending market (and mark the end of the era with need for bailout support), is expected to happen sometime in 2015. The Cypriot minister of finance recently confirmed, that the government plan to issue two new European Medium Term Note (EMTN) bonds in 2015, likely shortly ahead of the expiry of another €1.1bn bond on 1 July and a second expiry of a €0.9bn bond on 1 November. As announced in advance, the Cypriot government issued €1bn of seven-year bonds with a 4.0% yield by the end of April 2015.


title: European debt crisis

text: On 9 May 2010, the 27 EU member states agreed to create the European Financial Stability Facility, a legal instrument aiming at preserving financial stability in Europe, by providing financial assistance to eurozone states in difficulty. The EFSF can issue bonds or other debt instruments on the market with the support of the German Debt Management Office to raise the funds needed to provide loans to eurozone countries in financial troubles, recapitalise banks or buy sovereign debt.


title: European debt crisis

text: Emissions of bonds are backed by guarantees given by the euro area member states in proportion to their share in the paid-up capital of the European Central Bank. The €440 billion lending capacity of the facility is jointly and severally guaranteed by the eurozone countries' governments and may be combined with loans up to €60 billion from the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (reliant on funds raised by the European Commission using the EU budget as collateral) and up to €250 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to obtain a financial safety net up to €750 billion.


title: European debt crisis

text: The EFSF issued €5 billion of five-year bonds in its inaugural benchmark issue 25 January 2011, attracting an order book of €44.5 billion. This amount is a record for any sovereign bond in Europe, and €24.5 billion more than the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), a separate European Union funding vehicle, with a €5 billion issue in the first week of January 2011.


title: European debt crisis

text: On 29 November 2011, the member state finance ministers agreed to expand the EFSF by creating certificates that could guarantee up to 30% of new issues from troubled euro-area governments, and to create investment vehicles that would boost the EFSF's firepower to intervene in primary and secondary bond markets.


title: European debt crisis

text: The transfers of bailout funds were performed in tranches over several years and were conditional on the governments simultaneously implementing a package of fiscal consolidation, structural reforms, privatization of public assets and setting up funds for further bank recapitalization and resolution.


title: European debt crisis

text: Stocks surged worldwide after the EU announced the EFSF's creation. The facility eased fears that the Greek debt crisis would spread, and this led to some stocks rising to the highest level in a year or more. The euro made its biggest gain in 18 months, before falling to a new four-year low a week later. Shortly after the euro rose again as hedge funds and other short-term traders unwound short positions and carry trades in the currency.


title: European debt crisis

text: The dollar Libor held at a nine-month high. Default swaps also fell. The VIX closed down a record almost 30%, after a record weekly rise the preceding week that prompted the bailout.


title: European debt crisis

text: The agreement is interpreted as allowing the ECB to start buying government debt from the secondary market, which is expected to reduce bond yields. As a result, Greek bond yields fell sharply from over 10% to just over 5%. Asian bonds yields also fell with the EU bailout.)


title: European debt crisis

text: The EFSF only raises funds after an aid request is made by a country. As of the end of July 2012, it has been activated various times. In November 2010, it financed of the total rescue package for Ireland (the rest was loaned from individual European countries, the European Commission and the IMF). In May 2011 it contributed one-third of the €78 billion package for Portugal. As part of the second bailout for Greece, the loan was shifted to the EFSF, amounting to (130bn new package plus 34.4bn remaining from Greek Loan Facility) throughout 2014. On 20 July 2012, European finance ministers sanctioned the first tranche of a partial bailout worth up to €100 billion for Spanish banks. This leaves the EFSF with or an equivalent of in leveraged firepower.


title: European debt crisis

text: The EFSF is set to expire in 2013, running some months parallel to the permanent rescue funding program called the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which will start operating as soon as member states representing 90% of the capital commitments have ratified it. (see section: ESM)


title: European debt crisis

text: On 13 January 2012, Standard & Poor's downgraded France and Austria from AAA rating, lowered Spain, Italy (and five other) euro members further. Shortly after, S&P also downgraded the EFSF from AAA to AA+.


title: European debt crisis

text: On 5 January 2011, the European Union created the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), an emergency funding programme reliant upon funds raised on the financial markets and guaranteed by the European Commission using the budget of the European Union as collateral. It runs under the supervision of the Commission and aims at preserving financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to EU member states in economic difficulty.


title: European debt crisis

text: The Commission fund, backed by all 27 European Union members, has the authority to raise up to and is rated AAA by Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's.


title: European debt crisis

text: Under the EFSM, the EU successfully placed in the capital markets an issue of bonds as part of the financial support package agreed for Ireland, at a borrowing cost for the EFSM of 2.59%.


title: European debt crisis

text: Like the EFSF, the EFSM was replaced by the permanent rescue funding programme ESM, which was launched in September 2012.


title: European debt crisis

text: On 26 October 2011, leaders of the 17 eurozone countries met in Brussels and agreed on a 50% write-off of Greek sovereign debt held by banks, a fourfold increase (to about €1 trillion) in bail-out funds held under the European Financial Stability Facility, an increased mandatory level of 9% for bank capitalisation within the EU and a set of commitments from Italy to take measures to reduce its national debt. Also pledged was in "credit enhancement" to mitigate losses likely to be suffered by European banks. José Manuel Barroso characterised the package as a set of "exceptional measures for exceptional times".


title: European debt crisis

text: The package's acceptance was put into doubt on 31 October when Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou announced that a referendum would be held so that the Greek people would have the final say on the bailout, upsetting financial markets. On 3 November 2011 the promised Greek referendum on the bailout package was withdrawn by Prime Minister Papandreou.


title: European debt crisis

text: In late 2011, Landon Thomas in the "New York Times" noted that some, at least, European banks were maintaining high dividend payout rates and none were getting capital injections from their governments even while being required to improve capital ratios. Thomas quoted Richard Koo, an economist based in Japan, an expert on that country's banking crisis, and specialist in balance sheet recessions, as saying:


title: European debt crisis

text: I do not think Europeans understand the implications of a systemic banking crisis. ... When all banks are forced to raise capital at the same time, the result is going to be even weaker banks and an even longer recession—if not depression. ... Government intervention should be the first resort, not the last resort.


title: European debt crisis

text: Beyond equity issuance and debt-to-equity conversion, then, one analyst "said that as banks find it more difficult to raise funds, they will move faster to cut down on loans and unload lagging assets" as they work to improve capital ratios. This latter contraction of balance sheets "could lead to a depression", the analyst said. Reduced lending was a circumstance already at the time being seen in a "deepen[ing] crisis" in commodities trade finance in western Europe.


title: European debt crisis

text: In a marathon meeting on 20/21 February 2012 the Eurogroup agreed with the IMF and the Institute of International Finance on the final conditions of the second bailout package worth €130 billion. The lenders agreed to increase the nominal haircut from 50% to 53.5%. EU Member States agreed to an additional retroactive lowering of the interest rates of the Greek Loan Facility to a level of just 150 basis points above Euribor. Furthermore, governments of Member States where central banks currently hold Greek government bonds in their investment portfolio commit to pass on to Greece an amount equal to any future income until 2020. Altogether this should bring down Greece's debt to between 117% and 120.5% of GDP by 2020.


title: European debt crisis

text: The European Central Bank (ECB) has taken a series of measures aimed at reducing volatility in the financial markets and at improving liquidity.


title: European debt crisis

text: The move took some pressure off Greek government bonds, which had just been downgraded to junk status, making it difficult for the government to raise money on capital markets.


title: European debt crisis

text: On 30 November 2011, the ECB, the US Federal Reserve, the central banks of Canada, Japan, Britain and the Swiss National Bank provided global financial markets with additional liquidity to ward off the debt crisis and to support the real economy. The central banks agreed to lower the cost of dollar currency swaps by 50 basis points to come into effect on 5 December 2011. They also agreed to provide each other with abundant liquidity to make sure that commercial banks stay liquid in other currencies.


title: European debt crisis

text: With the aim of boosting the recovery in the eurozone economy by lowering interest rates for businesses, the ECB cut its bank rates in multiple steps in 2012–2013, reaching an historic low of 0.25% in November 2013. The lowered borrowing rates have also caused the euro to fall in relation to other currencies, which is hoped will boost exports from the eurozone and further aid the recovery.


title: European debt crisis

text: With inflation falling to 0.5% in May 2014, the ECB again took measures to stimulate the eurozone economy, which grew at just 0.2% during the first quarter of 2014. (Deflation or very low inflation encourages holding cash, causing a decrease in purchases.) On 5 June, the central bank cut the prime interest rate to 0.15%, and set the deposit rate at −0.10%. The latter move in particular was seen as "a bold and unusual move", as a negative interest rate had never been tried on a wide-scale before. Additionally, the ECB announced it would offer long-term four-year loans at the cheap rate (normally the rate is primarily for overnight lending), but only if the borrowing banks met strict conditions designed to ensure the funds ended up in the hands of businesses instead of, for example, being used to buy low risk government bonds. Collectively, the moves are aimed at avoiding deflation, devaluing the euro to make exportation more viable, and at increasing "real world" lending.


title: European debt crisis

text: Stock markets reacted strongly to the ECB rate cuts. The German DAX index, for example, set a record high the day the new rates were announced. Meanwhile, the euro briefly fell to a four-month low against the dollar. However, due to the unprecedented nature of the negative interest rate, the long-term effects of the stimulus measures are hard to predict. Bank president Mario Draghi signalled the central bank was willing to do whatever it takes to turn around the eurozone economies, remarking "Are we finished? The answer is no." He laid the groundwork for large-scale bond repurchasing, a controversial idea known as quantitative easing.