passage: After the August missile strikes , diplomatic options to press the Taliban seemed no more promising than military options .
  The United States had issued a formal warning to the Taliban , and also to Sudan , that they would be held directly responsible for any attacks on Americans , wherever they occurred , carried out by the Bin Laden network as long as they continued to provide sanctuary to it .
  For a brief moment , it had seemed as if the August strikes might have shocked the Taliban into thinking of giving up Bin Laden .
  On August 22 , the reclusive Mullah Omar told a working - level State Department official that the strikes were counterproductive but added that he would be open to a dialogue with the United States on Bin Laden 's presence in Afghanistan .
  Meeting in Islamabad with William Milam , the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan , Taliban delegates said it was against their culture to expel someone seeking sanctuary but asked what would happen to Bin Laden should he be sent to Saudi Arabia .
  Yet in September 1998 , when the Saudi emissary , Prince Turki , asked Mullah Omar whether he would keep his earlier promise to expel Bin Laden , the Taliban leader said no .
  Both sides shouted at each other , with Mullah Omar denouncing the Saudi government .
  Riyadh then suspended its diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime .
  ( Saudi Arabia , Pakistan , and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries that recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan . ) Crown Prince Abdullah told President Clinton and Vice President Gore about this when he visited Washington in late September .
  His account confirmed reports that the U.S. government had received independently .
  Other efforts with the Saudi government centered on improving intelligence sharing and permitting U.S. agents to interrogate prisoners in Saudi custody .
  The history of such cooperation in 1997 and 1998 had been strained .
  Several officials told us , in particular , that the United States could not get direct access to an important al Qaeda financial official , Madani al Tayyib , who had been detained by the Saudi government in 1997.67Though U.S. officials repeatedly raised the issue , the Saudis provided limited information .
  In his September 1998 meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah , Vice President Gore , while thanking the Saudi government for their responsiveness , renewed the request for direct U.S. access to Tayyib .
  The United States never obtained this access .
  An NSC staff - led working group on terrorist finances asked the CIA in November 1998 to push again for access to Tayyib and to see " if it is possible to elaborate further on the ties between Usama bin Ladin and prominent individuals in Saudi Arabia , including especially the Bin Laden family . "
  One result was two NSC - led interagency trips to Persian Gulf states in 1999 and 2000 .
  During these trips the NSC , Treasury , and intelligence representatives spoke with Saudi officials , and later interviewed members of the Bin Laden family , about Usama 's inheritance .
query_and_answer: What action briefly seemed like it might convince the Taliban to give up Bin Laden ? || Because the US said the Taliban would be responsible for any attacks on US citizens
evidences: After the August missile strikes , diplomatic options to press the Taliban seemed no more promising than military options . The United States had issued a formal warning to the Taliban , and also to Sudan , that they would be held directly responsible for any attacks on Americans , wherever they occurred , carried out by the Bin Laden network as long as they continued to provide sanctuary to it . For a brief moment , it had seemed as if the August strikes might have shocked the Taliban into thinking of giving up Bin Laden .