passage: Before 9/11 , the CIA did not invest in developing a robust capability to conduct paramilitary operations with U.S. personnel .
  It relied on proxies instead , organized by CIA operatives without the requisite military training .
  The results were unsatisfactory .
  Whether the price is measured in either money or people , the United States can not afford to build two separate capabilities for carrying out secret military operations , secretly operating standoff missiles , and secretly training foreign military or paramilitary forces .
  The United States should concentrate responsibility and necessary legal authorities in one entity .
  The post-9/11 Afghanistan precedent of using joint CIA - military teams for covert and clandestine operations was a good one .
  We believe this proposal to be consistent with it .
  Each agency would concentrate on its comparative advantages in building capabilities for joint missions .
  The operation itself would be planned in common .
  The CIA has a reputation for agility in operations .
  The military has a reputation for being methodical and cumbersome .
  We do not know if these stereotypes match current reality ; they may also be one more symptom of the civil - military misunderstandings we described in chapter 4 .
  It is a problem to be resolved in policy guidance and agency management , not in the creation of redundant , overlapping capabilities and authorities in such sensitive work .
  The CIA 's experts should be integrated into the military 's training , exercises , and planning .
  To quote a CIA official now serving in the field:"One fight , one team . "
  Finally , to combat the secrecy and complexity we have described , the overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret .
  Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for intelligence , defending the broad allocation of how these tens of billions of dollars have been assigned among the varieties of intelligence work .
  The specifics of the intelligence appropriation would remain classified , as they are today .
query_and_answer: What was unsatisfactory without requisite military training ? || CIA's relying on proxies to conduct paramilitary operations
evidences: It relied on proxies instead , organized by CIA operatives without the requisite military training . The results were unsatisfactory .