passage: Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities , where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans .
  He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning , think the missiles came from India , RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA 'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret .
  Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility , Zinni said , " It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it .
  We had to live there . "
  Zinni 's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan .
  But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington , partly , he thought , because these countries had dictatorial governments .
  After the decision - in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998 , Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes .
  Designed specifically for the special forces , the version of the AC-130 known as " Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude , undetected by radar ; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics , it is capable of rapidly firing precision - guided 25 , 40 , and 105 mm projectiles .
  Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles , it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage .
  After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed , Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker , who headed the Special Operations Command , to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden 's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan .
  The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft .
  Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option , the AC-130s were never deployed .
  Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use , and John Maher , the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations , agreed that this was Zinni 's position .
  Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option .
  He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position .
  Schoomaker says , on the contrary , that he thought the AC-130 option feasible .
  The most likely explanation for the two generals ' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long - term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia .
  The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft 's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles .
query_and_answer: Which countries were thought to have dictatorial governments || India
evidences: Zinni 's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan . But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington , partly , he thought , because these countries had dictatorial governments .