Federal Reserve) and to a limit of 25% of tier 1 capital for credit exposures to any other unaffiliated counterparty.

In September 2017, the Federal Reserve issued a final rule that imposes contractual requirements on certain “qualified financial contracts” to which U.S. G-SIBs, including us, and their subsidiaries are parties. Under the final rule, certain qualified financial contracts generally must expressly provide that transfer restrictions and default rights against a U.S. G-SIB, or subsidiary of a U.S. G-SIB, are limited to the same extent as they would be under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and their implementing regulations. In addition, certain qualified financial contracts may not, among other things, permit the exercise of any cross-default right against a U.S. G-SIB or subsidiary of a U.S. G-SIB based on an affiliate’s entry into insolvency, resolution or similar proceedings, subject to certain creditor protections. There is a phased-in compliance schedule based on counterparty type, with a first compliance date of January 1, 2019.

In addition, the final rules create an early-remediation regime to address financial distress or material management weaknesses determined with reference to four levels of early remediation, including heightened supervisory review, initial remediation, recovery, and resolution assessment, with specific limitations and requirements tied to each level.

The systemic-risk regime also provides that, for institutions deemed to pose a grave threat to U.S. financial stability, the Federal Reserve, upon an FSOC vote, must limit that institution’s ability to merge, restrict its ability to offer financial products, require it to terminate activities, impose conditions on activities or, as a last resort, require it to dispose of assets. Upon a grave-threat determination by the FSOC, the Federal Reserve must issue rules that require financial institutions subject to the systemic-risk regime to maintain a debt-to-equity ratio of no more than 15 to 1 if the FSOC considers it necessary to mitigate the risk of the grave threat. The Federal Reserve also has the ability to establish further standards, including those regarding contingent capital, enhanced public disclosures, and limits on short-term debt, including off-balance sheet exposures.

# Resolution Planning

State Street, like other bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of \$50 billion or more, periodically submits a plan for rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure — commonly referred to as a resolution plan or a living will — to the Federal Reserve and the FDIC under Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Through resolution planning, we seek, in the event of the insolvency of State Street, to maintain State Street Bank’s role as a key infrastructure provider within the financial system, while minimizing risk to the financial system and maximizing value for the benefit of our stakeholders. We have and will continue to focus management attention and resources to meet regulatory expectations with respect to resolution planning.

We submitted our 2017 resolution plan describing our preferred resolution strategy to the Federal Reserve and FDIC on June 30, 2017. On December 19, 2017, the Federal Reserve and FDIC announced that they had completed their review and had not identified deficiencies or specific shortcomings. Nonetheless, the agencies identified four common areas in which more work may need to be done by all firms, including State Street, to continue to improve resolvability: intra-group liquidity;internal loss-absorbing capacity; derivatives; and payment, clearing and settlement activities. State Street’s next resolution plan is due July 1, 2019.

In the event of material financial distress or failure, our preferred resolution strategy is the SPOE Strategy. The SPOE Strategy provides that prior to the bankruptcy of the Parent Company and pursuant to a support agreement among the Parent Company, SSIF (a direct subsidiary of the Parent Company), State Street’s Beneficiary Entities (as defined below) and certain other State Street entities, SSIF is obligated, up to its available resources, to recapitalize and/or provide liquidity to State Street Bank and the other State Street entities benefiting from such capital and/or liquidity support (collectively with State Street Bank, “Beneficiary Entities”), in amounts designed to prevent the Beneficiary Entities from themselves entering into resolution proceedings. Following the recapitalization of, or provision of liquidity to the Beneficiary Entities, the Parent Company would enter into a bankruptcy proceeding under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The Beneficiary Entities and other State Street subsidiaries would be transferred to a newly organized holding company held by a reorganization trust for the benefit of the Parent Company’s claimants.

Under the support agreement, the Parent Company has pre-funded SSIF by contributing certain of its assets (primarily its liquid assets, cash deposits, investments in intercompany debt, investments in marketable securities and other cash and non-cash equivalent investments) to SSIF contemporaneous with entering into the support agreement and will continue to contribute such assets, to the extent available, on an on-going basis. In consideration for these contributions, SSIF has agreed in the support agreement to provide capital and liquidity support to the Parent Company and all of the Beneficiary Entities in accordance with the Parent Company’s capital and liquidity policies. Under the support agreement, the Parent Company is only permitted to

retain cash needed to meet its upcoming obligations and to fund expected expenses during a potential bankruptcy proceeding. SSIF has provided the Parent Company with a committed credit line and issued (and may issue) one or more promissory notes to the Parent Company (the "Parent Company Funding Notes") that together are intended to allow the Parent Company to continue to meet its obligations throughout the period prior to the occurrence of a "Recapitalization Event" (as defined below). The support agreement does not contemplate that SSIF is obligated to maintain any specific level of resources and SSIF may not have sufficient resources to implement the SPOE Strategy.

In the event a Recapitalization Event occurs, the obligations outstanding under the Parent Company Funding Notes would automatically convert into or be exchanged for capital contributed to SSIF. The obligations of the Parent Company and SSIF under the support agreement are secured through a security agreement that grants a lien on the assets that the Parent Company and SSIF would use to fulfill their obligations under the support agreement to the Beneficiary Entities. SSIF is a distinct legal entity separate from the Parent Company and the Parent Company’s other affiliates.

In accordance with its policies, State Street is required to monitor, on an ongoing basis, the capital and liquidity needs of State Street Bank and the other Beneficiary Entities. To support this process, State Street has established a trigger framework that identifies key actions that would need to be taken or decisions that would need to be made if certain events tied to State Street’s financial condition occur. In the event that State Street experiences material financial distress, the support agreement requires State Street to model and calculate certain capital and liquidity triggers on a regular basis to determine whether or not the Parent Company should commence preparations for a bankruptcy filing and whether or not a Recapitalization Event has occurred.

Upon the occurrence of a Recapitalization Event: (1) SSIF would not be authorized to provide any further liquidity to the Parent Company; (2) the Parent Company would be required to contribute to SSIF any remaining assets it is required to contribute to SSIF under the support agreement (which specifically exclude amounts designated to fund expected expenses during a potential bankruptcy proceeding); (3) SSIF would be required to provide capital and liquidity support to the Beneficiary Entities to support such entities’ continued operation to the extent of its available resources and consistent with the support agreement; and (4) the Parent Company would be expected to commence Chapter 11 proceedings under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. No person or entity, other than a party to the support agreement, should rely, including in evaluating any State Street entity from a creditor's perspective or determining whether to enter into a contractual relationship with any State Street entity, on any State Street affiliate being or remaining a Beneficiary Entity or receiving capital or liquidity support pursuant to the support agreement.

A “Recapitalization Event” is defined under the support agreement as the earlier occurrence of one or more capital and liquidity thresholds being breached or the authorization by the Parent Company's Board of Directors for the Parent Company to commence bankruptcy proceedings. These thresholds are set at levels intended to provide for the availability of sufficient capital and liquidity to enable an orderly resolution without extraordinary government support. The SPOE Strategy and the obligations under the support agreement may result in the recapitalization of State Street Bank and the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings by the Parent Company at an earlier stage of financial stress than might otherwise occur without such mechanisms in place. An expected effect of the SPOE Strategy and applicable TLAC regulatory requirements is that State Street’s losses will be imposed on the Parent Company shareholders and the holders of long-term debt and other forms of TLAC securities currently outstanding or issued in the future by the Parent Company, as well as on any other Parent Company creditors, before any of its losses are imposed on the holders of the debt securities of the Parent Company's operating subsidiaries or any of their depositors or creditors, or before U.S. taxpayers are put at risk.

There can be no assurance that credit rating agencies, in response to our resolution plan or the support agreement, will not downgrade, place on negative watch or change their outlook on our debt credit ratings, generally or on specific debt securities. Any such downgrade, placement on negative watch or change in outlook could adversely affect our cost of borrowing, limit our access to the capital markets or result in restrictive covenants in future debt agreements and could also adversely impact the trading prices, or the liquidity, of our outstanding debt securities.

State Street Bank is also required to submit periodically to the FDIC a plan for resolution in the event of its failure, referred to as an IDI plan. Under the IDI plan rule, submission of the IDI plan is scheduled for July 1, 2018.

# Orderly Liquidation Authority

Under the Dodd-Frank Act, certain financial companies, including bank holding companies such as State Street, and certain covered subsidiaries, can be subjected to the orderly liquidation authority. The U.S. Treasury Secretary, in consultation with the U.S. President, must first make certain extraordinary