Brain in a vat - wikipedia Brain in a vat `` Brain in a jar '' redirects here. For other uses, see Brain in a Jar ( Dungeons & Dragons ). For the biology of brain in a vat, see isolated brain. This article includes a list of references, but its sources remain unclear because it has insufficient inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. ( October 2013 ) A brain in a vat that believes it is walking In philosophy, the brain in a vat ( alternately known as brain in a jar ) is a scenario used in a variety of thought experiments intended to draw out certain features of human conceptions of knowledge, reality, truth, mind, consciousness and meaning. It is an updated version of René Descartes ' Evil Demon thought experiment originated by Gilbert Harman. Common to many science fiction stories, it outlines a scenario in which a mad scientist, machine, or other entity might remove a person 's brain from the body, suspend it in a vat of life - sustaining liquid, and connect its neurons by wires to a supercomputer which would provide it with electrical impulses identical to those the brain normally receives. According to such stories, the computer would then be simulating reality ( including appropriate responses to the brain 's own output ) and the `` disembodied '' brain would continue to have perfectly normal conscious experiences, such as those of a person with an embodied brain, without these being related to objects or events in the real world. Contents 1 Uses 2 Philosophical debates 2.1 Argument from biology 2.2 Argument from ( ultra - ) externalism 3 In fiction 4 See also 5 References 6 External links Uses The simplest use of brain - in - a-vat scenarios is as an argument for philosophical skepticism and solipsism. A simple version of this runs as follows : Since the brain in a vat gives and receives exactly the same impulses as it would if it were in a skull, and since these are its only way of interacting with its environment, then it is not possible to tell, from the perspective of that brain, whether it is in a skull or a vat. Yet in the first case most of the person 's beliefs may be true ( if they believe, say, that they are walking down the street, or eating ice - cream ) ; in the latter case their beliefs are false. Since the argument says one can not know whether one is a brain in a vat, then one can not know whether most of one 's beliefs might be completely false. Since, in principle, it is impossible to rule out oneself being a brain in a vat, there can not be good grounds for believing any of the things one believes ; a skeptical argument would contend that one certainly can not know them, raising issues with the definition of knowledge. The brain in a vat is a contemporary version of the argument given in Hindu Maya illusion, Plato 's Allegory of the Cave, Zhuangzi 's `` Zhuangzi dreamed he was a butterfly '', and the evil demon in René Descartes ' Meditations on First Philosophy. Philosophical debates While the disembodied brain ( the brain in a vat / BIV ) can be seen as a helpful thought experiment, there are several philosophical debates surrounding the plausibility of the thought experiment. If these debates conclude that the thought experiment is implausible, a possible consequence would be that we are no closer to knowledge, truth, consciousness, representation, etc. than we were prior to the experiment. Argument from biology One argument against the BIV thought experiment derives from the idea that the BIV is not and can not be biologically similar to that of an embodied brain ( that is, a brain found in a person ). Since the BIV is disembodied, it follows that it does not have a similar biology to that of an embodied brain. That is, the BIV lacks the connections from the body to the brain, which renders the BIV neither neuroanatomically nor neurophysiologically similar to that of an embodied brain. If this is the case, we can not say that it is even possible for the BIV to have similar experiences to the embodied brain, since the brains are not equal. Argument from ( ultra - ) externalism A second argument deals directly with the stimuli coming into the brain. This is often referred to as the account from externalism or ultra-externalism. In the BIV, the brain receives stimuli from a machine. In an embodied brain, however, the brain receives the stimuli from the sensors found in the body ( via touching, tasting, smelling, etc. ) which receive their input from the external environment. This argument oftentimes leads to the conclusion that there is a difference between what the BIV is representing and what the embodied brain is representing. This debate has been hashed out, but remains unresolved, by several philosophers including Uriah Kriegel, Colin McGinn, and Robert Rupert. This debate has ramifications for philosophy of mind discussions on ( but not limited to ) representation, consciousness, content, cognition, and embodied cognition. In fiction A monstrous brain in a jar, in a poster for The Brain That Would n't Die Main article : Isolated brain § In fiction See also : Simulated reality in fiction Agents of S.H.I.E.L.D., Season 4 `` The Brain of Colonel Barham '', a 1965 episode of the TV series The Outer Limits The Brain of Morbius Brainstorm Caprica The City of Lost Children Cold Lazarus Dark Star Donovan 's Brain Fallout Futurama Gangers in Doctor Who Inception The Man with Two Brains The Matrix film series `` Out of Time '', an episode of Red Dwarf Old World Blues, an expansion pack for Fallout : New Vegas Possible Worlds Psycho - Pass Repo Men RoboCop ( most obvious with Cain in RoboCop 2 ) Saints Row IV `` Ship in a Bottle '', an episode of Star Trek : The Next Generation Sid Meier 's Alpha Centauri Soma Source Code `` Spock 's Brain '', an episode of Star Trek : The Original Series Strange Days The Thirteenth Floor Transcendence `` The Vacation Goo '', an episode of American Dad ! Welt am Draht The Whisperer in Darkness Where am I ?, written by Daniel Dennett William and Mary by Roald Dahl `` White Christmas - Part II '', an episode of Black Mirror See also Boltzmann brain Dream argument Experience machine Human Brain Project Internalism and externalism Isolated brain Neurally controlled animat Simulation hypothesis Skeptical hypothesis Technological singularity Transhumanism References Jump up ^ Harman, Gilbert 1973 : Thought, Princeton / NJ, p. 5. Jump up ^ Putnam, Hilary. `` Brains in a Vat '' ( PDF ). Retrieved 21 April 2015. Jump up ^ Klein, Peter ( 2 June 2015 ). `` Skepticism ''. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 7 January 2017. Jump up ^ Heylighen, Francis ( 2012 ). `` A Brain in a Vat Cannot Break Out : Why the Singularity Must be Extended, Embedded, and Embodied ''. Journal of Consciousness Studies. University of Cincinnati. 19 ( 1 -- 2 ) : 126 -- 142. Jump up ^ Thompson, Evan ; Cosmelli, Diego ( Spring 2011 ). `` Brain in a Vat or Body in a World ? Brainbound versus Enactive Views of Experience ''. Philosophical Topics. University of Arkansas. 39 ( 1 ) : 163 -- 180. Jump up ^ Kirk, Robert ( 1997 ). `` Consciousness, Information and External Relations ''. Communication and Cognition. 30 ( 3 -- 4 ). Jump up ^ Kriegel, Uriah ( 2014 ). Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 180 -- 95. Jump up ^ McGinn, Colin ( 1988 ). `` Consciousness and Content ''. Proceedings of the British Academy. 76 : 219 -- 39. Jump up ^ Rupert, Robert ( 2014 ). The Sufficiency of Objective Representation. Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 180 -- 95. Jump up ^ Shapiro, Lawrence ( 2014 ). When Is Cognition Embodied. Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 73 -- 90. External links Wikimedia Commons has media related to Brain in a vat. Philosophy Brueckner, Tony. `` Skepticism and Content Externalism ''. In Zalta, Edward N. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. `` Brain in a vat ''. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Inverse `` brain in a vat '' Putnam 's discussion of the `` brains in a vat '' in chapter one of Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. 1981. p. 222. ISBN 0 - 52129776 - 1. ISBN 978 - 0 - 521 - 29776 - 9. ' Where Am I ? ' by Daniel Dennett `` Brain in a Vat Brain Teaser '' -- Harper 's Magazine ( 1996 ) Science Adaptive flight control with living neuronal networks on microelectrode arrays Architecture for Neuronal Cell Control of a Mobile Robot Skepticism Types Academic Moral Scientific Philosophical Religious ( Jewish ) Local Environmental Pyrrhonian Cartesian Daoist Pseudoskepticism Zététique Skeptical hypotheses Evil genius Brain in a vat Dream argument Omphalos hypothesis Responses Here is one hand Semantic externalism Process reliabilism Epistemic closure Contextualism Relativism Lists List of books about skepticism List of notable skeptics List of skeptical conferences List of skeptical magazines List of skeptical organizations List of skeptical podcasts Retrieved from `` https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Brain_in_a_vat&oldid=825868255 '' Categories : Concepts in epistemology Hypothetical technology Internalism and externalism Philosophical arguments Reality Science fiction themes Thought experiments in philosophy of mind Hidden categories : Use dmy dates from September 2015 Articles lacking in - text citations from October 2013 All articles lacking in - text citations Talk Contents About Wikipedia Català Dansk Deutsch Eesti Español فارسی Français 한국어 Íslenska Italiano ქართული Lietuvių Nederlands 日本 語 Norsk Polski Português Русский Suomi Svenska Türkçe Українська Tiếng Việt 中文 Edit links This page was last edited on 15 February 2018, at 22 : 05. 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Question: who came up with the brain in a vat theory
Answer: an updated version of René Descartes' Evil Demon thought experiment originated by Gilbert Harman