Basic structure doctrine - wikipedia Basic structure doctrine Part of a series on Constitution of India Preamble Parts Fundamental Rights PART I ∙ II ∙ III ∙ IV ∙ IVA ∙ V ∙ VI ∙ VII VIII ∙ IX ∙ IXA ∙ IXB ∙ X ∙ XI ∙ XII ∙ XIII ∙ XIV XV ∙ XVI ∙ XVIA ∙ XVII ∙ XVIII ∙ XIX ∙ XX ∙ XXI XXII Schedules First ∙ Second ∙ Third ∙ Fourth ∙ Fifth Sixth ∙ Seventh ∙ Eighth ∙ Ninth Tenth ∙ Eleventh ∙ Twelfth Appendices I ∙ II ∙ III ∙ IV ∙ V Amendments List ∙ 1 ∙ 2 ∙ 3 ∙ 4 ∙ 5 ∙ 6 ∙ 7 ∙ 8 ∙ 9 ∙ 10 ∙ 11 ∙ 12 ∙ 13 ∙ 14 ∙ 15 ∙ 16 ∙ 17 ∙ 18 ∙ 19 ∙ 20 ∙ 21 ∙ 22 ∙ 23 ∙ 24 ∙ 25 ∙ 26 ∙ 27 ∙ 28 ∙ 29 ∙ 30 ∙ 31 ∙ 32 ∙ 33 ∙ 34 ∙ 35 ∙ 36 ∙ 37 ∙ 38 ∙ 39 ∙ 40 ∙ 41 ∙ 42 ∙ 43 ∙ 44 ∙ 45 ∙ 46 ∙ 47 ∙ 48 ∙ 49 ∙ 50 ∙ 51 ∙ 52 ∙ 53 ∙ 54 ∙ 55 ∙ 56 ∙ 57 ∙ 58 ∙ 59 ∙ 60 ∙ 61 ∙ 62 ∙ 63 ∙ 64 ∙ 65 ∙ 66 ∙ 67 ∙ 68 ∙ 69 ∙ 70 ∙ 71 ∙ 72 ∙ 73 ∙ 74 ∙ 75 ∙ 76 ∙ 77 ∙ 78 ∙ 79 ∙ 80 ∙ 81 ∙ 82 ∙ 83 ∙ 84 ∙ 85 ∙ 86 ∙ 87 ∙ 88 ∙ 89 ∙ 90 ∙ 91 ∙ 92 ∙ 93 ∙ 94 ∙ 95 ∙ 96 ∙ 97 ∙ 98 ∙ 99 ∙ 100 ∙ 101 Related topics Union List State List Concurrent List Basic structure doctrine Uniform civil code The basic structure doctrine is an Indian judicial principle that the Constitution of India has certain basic features that can not be altered or destroyed through amendments by the parliament. Key among these `` basic features '', are the fundamental rights granted to individuals by the constitution. The doctrine thus forms the basis of a limited power of the Supreme Court to review and strike down constitutional amendments enacted by the Parliament which conflict with or seek to alter this `` basic structure '' of the Constitution. The basic structure doctrine applies only to constitutional amendments. The basic features of the Constitution have not been explicitly defined by the Judiciary, and the claim of any particular feature of the Constitution to be a `` basic '' feature is determined by the Court in each case that comes before it. The basic structure doctrine does not apply to ordinary Acts of Parliament, which must itself be in conformity with the Constitution. The Supreme Court 's initial position on constitutional amendments was that any part of the Constitution was amendable and that the Parliament might, by passing a Constitution Amendment Act in compliance with the requirements of article 368, amend any provision of the Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights and article 368. The `` basic features '' principle was first expounded in 1964, by Justice J.R. Mudholkar in his dissent, in the case of Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan. He wrote, It is also a matter for consideration whether making a change in a basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be, in effect, rewriting a part of the Constitution ; and if the latter, would it be within the purview of Article 368 ? In 1967, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decisions in Golaknath v. State of Punjab. It held that Fundamental Rights included in Part III of the Constitution are given a `` transcendental position '' and are beyond the reach of Parliament. It also declared any amendment that `` takes away or abridges '' a Fundamental Right conferred by Part III as unconstitutional. By 1973, the basic structure doctrine triumphed in Justice Hans Raj Khanna 's judgment in the landmark decision of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala. Previously, the Supreme Court had held that the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution was unfettered. However, in this landmark ruling, the Court adjudicated that while Parliament has `` wide '' powers, it did not have the power to destroy or emasculate the basic elements or fundamental features of the constitution. Although Kesavananda was decided by a narrow margin of 7 - 6, the basic structure doctrine has since gained widespread acceptance and legitimacy due to subsequent cases and judgments. Primary among these was the imposition of a state of emergency by Indira Gandhi in 1975, and her subsequent attempt to suppress her prosecution through the 39th Amendment. When the Kesavananda case was decided, the underlying apprehension of the majority bench that elected representatives could not be trusted to act responsibly was perceived as unprecedented. However, the passage of the 39th Amendment by the Indian National Congress ' majority in central and state legislatures, proved that in fact such apprehension was well - founded. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain and Minerva Mills v. Union of India, Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court used the basic structure doctrine to strike down the 39th Amendment and parts of the 42nd Amendment respectively, and paved the way for restoration of Indian democracy. The Supreme Court 's position on constitutional amendments laid out in its judgements is that Parliament can amend the Constitution but can not destroy its `` basic structure ''. Contents 1 Definition 2 Background 2.1 Golaknath case 3 Kesavananda Bharati case ( 1973 ) 3.1 Defining the basic structure 4 The Emergency ( 1975 ) 5 Development 6 Evolution of the doctrine 7 Influence 8 See also 9 References Definition The `` basic features '' principle was first expounded in 1964, by Justice J.R. Mudholkar in his dissent, in the case of Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan. He wrote, It is also a matter for consideration whether making a change in a basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be, in effect, rewriting a part of the Constitution ; and if the latter, would it be within the purview of Article 368 ? '' The basic features of the Constitution have not been explicitly defined by the Judiciary. At least, 20 features have been described as `` basic '' or `` essential '' by the Courts in numerous cases, and have been incorporated in the basic structure. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Naraian and also in the Minerva Mills case, it was observed that the claim of any particular feature of the Constitution to be a `` basic '' feature would be determined by the Court in each case that comes before it. Some of the features of the Constitution termed as `` basic '' are listed below : Supremacy of the Constitution Rule of law The principle of Separation of Powers The objectives specified in the Preamble to the Constitution Judicial Review Articles 32 and 226 Federalism ( including financial liberty of states under Articles 282 and 293 ) Secularism The Sovereign, Democratic, Republican structure Freedom and dignity of the individual Unity and integrity of the Nation The principle of equality, not every feature of equality, but the quintessence of equal justice ; The `` essence '' of other Fundamental Rights in Part III The concept of social and economic justice -- to build a Welfare State : Part IV in toto The balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles The Parliamentary system of government The principle of free and fair elections Limitations upon the amending power conferred by Article 368 Independence of the Judiciary Effective access to justice Powers of the Supreme Court under Articles 32, 136, 141, 142 Legislation seeking to nullify the awards made in exercise of the judicial power of the State by Arbitration Tribunals constituted under an Act Welfare state Background The Supreme Court 's initial position on constitutional amendments was that no part of the Constitution was unamendable and that the Parliament might, by passing a Constitution Amendment Act in compliance with the requirements of article 368, amend any provision of the Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights and article 368. In Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India ( AIR. 1951 SC 458 ), the Supreme Court unanimously held, `` The terms of article 368 are perfectly general and empower Parliament to amend the Constitution without any exception whatever. In the context of article 13, `` law '' must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power, with the result that article 13 ( 2 ) does not affect amendments made under article 368. In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan ( case citation : 1965 AIR 845, 1965 SCR ( 1 ) 933 ), by a majority of 3 - 2, the Supreme Court held, `` When article 368 confers on Parliament the right to amend the Constitution, the power in question can be exercised over all the provisions of the Constitution. It would be unreasonable to hold that the word `` Law '' in article 13 ( 2 ) takes in Constitution Amendment Acts passed under article 368. '' In both cases, the power to amend the rights had been upheld on the basis of Article 368. Golaknath case Main article : I.C. Golak Nath and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Anr. In 1967, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decisions in Golaknath v. State of Punjab. A bench of eleven judges ( the largest ever at the time ) of the Supreme Court deliberated as to whether any part of the Fundamental Rights provisions of the constitution could be revoked or limited by amendment of the constitution. The Supreme Court delivered its ruling, by a majority of 6 - 5 on 27 February 1967. The Court held that an amendment of the Constitution is a legislative process, and that an amendment under article 368 is `` law '' within the meaning of article 13 of the Constitution and therefore, if an amendment `` takes away or abridges '' a Fundamental Right conferred by Part III, it is void. Article 13 ( 2 ) reads, `` The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the right conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of contravention, be void. '' The Court also ruled that Fundamental Rights included in Part III of the Constitution are given a `` transcendental position '' under the Constitution and are kept beyond the reach of Parliament. The Court also held that the scheme of the Constitution and the nature of the freedoms it granted incapacitated Parliament from modifying, restricting or impairing Fundamental Freedoms in Part III. Parliament passed the 24th Amendment in 1971 to abrogate the Supreme Court ruling in the Golaknath case. It amended the Constitution to provide expressly that Parliament has the power to amend any part of the Constitution including the provisions relating to Fundamental Rights. This was done by amending articles 13 and 368 to exclude amendments made under article 368, from article 13 's prohibition of any law abridging or taking away any of the Fundamental Rights. Chief Justice Koka Subba Rao writing for the majority held that : A law to amend the constitution is a law for the purposes of Article 13. Article 13 prevents the passing of laws which `` take away or abridge '' the Fundamental Rights provisions. Article 368 does not contain a power to amend the constitution but only a procedure. The power to amend comes from the normal legislative power of Parliament. Therefore, amendments which `` take away or abridge '' the Fundamental Rights provisions can not be passed. Kesavananda Bharati case ( 1973 ) Main article : Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala Six years later in 1973, the largest ever Constitution Bench of 13 Judges, heard arguments in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala ( case citation : AIR 1973 SC 1461 ). The Supreme Court reviewed the decision in Golaknath v. State of Punjab, and considered the validity of the 24th, 25th, 26th and 29th Amendments. The Court held, by a margin of 7 - 6, that although no part of the constitution, including fundamental rights, was beyond the amending power of Parliament ( thus overruling the 1967 case ), the `` basic structure of the Constitution could not be abrogated even by a constitutional amendment ''. The decision of the Judges is complex, consisting of multiple opinions taking up one complete volume in the law reporter `` Supreme Court Cases ''. The findings included the following : All of the Judges held that the 24th, 25th and 29th Amendments Acts are valid. Ten judges held that Golak Nath 's case was wrongly decided and that an amendment to the Constitution was not a `` law '' for the purposes of Article 13. Seven judges held that the power of amendment is plenary and can be used to amend all the articles of the constitution ( including the Fundamental Rights ). Seven judges held ( six judges dissenting on this point ) that `` the power to amend does not include the power to alter the basic structure of the Constitution so as to change its identity ''. Seven judges held ( two judges dissenting, one leaving this point open ) that `` there are no inherent or implied limitations on the power of amendment under Article 368 ''. Nine judges ( including two dissentients ) signed a statement of summary for the judgment that reads : Golak Nath 's case is over-ruled. Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. The Constitution ( Twenty - fourth Amendment ) Act, 1971 is valid. Section 2 ( a ) and 2 ( b ) of the Constitution ( Twenty - fifth Amendment ) Act, 1971 is valid. The first part of section 3 of the Constitution ( Twenty - fifth Amendment ) Act, 1971 is valid. The second part namely `` and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy '' is invalid. The Constitution ( Twenty - ninth Amendment ) Act, 1971 is valid. The ruling thus established the principle that the basic structure can not be amended on the grounds that a power to amend is not a power to destroy. Defining the basic structure The majority had differing opinions on what the `` basic structure '' of the Constitution comprised. Chief Justice Sarv Mittra Sikri, writing for the majority, indicated that the basic structure consists of the following : The supremacy of the constitution. A republican and democratic form of government. The secular character of the Constitution. Maintenance of the separation of powers. The federal character of the Constitution. Justices Shelat and Grover in their opinion added three features to the Chief Justice 's list : The mandate to build a welfare state contained in the Directive Principles of State Policy. Maintenance of the unity and integrity of India. The sovereignty of the country. Justices Hegde and Mukherjea, in their opinion, provided a separate and shorter list : The sovereignty of India. The democratic character of the polity. The unity of the country. Essential features of individual freedoms. The mandate to build a welfare state. Justice Jaganmohan Reddy preferred to look at the preamble, stating that the basic features of the constitution were laid out by that part of the document, and thus could be represented by : A sovereign democratic republic. The provision of social, economic and political justice. Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. Equality of status and opportunity. The emergency ( 1975 ) The Court reaffirmed and applied the basic structure doctrine in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, popularly known as Election case. The constitutionality of Article 329A, which had been inserted by the 39th Amendment in 1975 was challenged in this case. Shortly after the imposition of the Emergency, a bench of thirteen judges was hastily assembled to hear the case. Presided over by Chief Justice Ajit Nath Ray, the court had to determine the degree to which amendments were restricted by the basic structure theory. Ray, who was among the dissenters in the Kesavananda Bharati case, had been promoted to Chief Justice of India on 26 April 1973, superseding three senior Judges, Shelat, Grover and Hegde ( all in the majority in the same case ), which was unprecedented in Indian legal history. On November 10 and 11, the team of civil libertarian barristers, led by Nanabhoy Palkhivala, argued against the Union government 's application for reconsideration of the Kesavananda decision. Some of the judges accepted his argument on the very first day, the others on the next ; by the end of the second day, the Chief Justice was reduced to a minority of one. On the morning of 12 November, Chief Justice Ray tersely pronounced that the bench was dissolved, and the judges rose. The 39th Amendment attempted, among other provisions, to legitimize the election of Indira Gandhi in 1971. Article 329A put the elections of the Prime Minister and Lok Sabha Speaker outside the purview of the judiciary and provided for determination of disputes concerning their elections by an authority to be set up by a Parliamentary law. The Supreme Court struck down clauses ( 4 ) and ( 5 ) of the article 329A, which made the existing election law inapplicable to the Prime Minister 's and Speaker 's election, and declared the pending proceedings in respect of such elections null and void. Development Constitutional lawyer A.G. Noorani notes that the doctrine has `` now spread far and wide beyond its frontiers. '', but that the eventual attribution to Dietrich Conrad is absent, who propounded the arguments in a lecture to the law faculty in the Banaras Hindu University. The argument, Noorani narrates made way to MK Nambyar who read the excerpt out in Golaknath. Implied Limitations of the Amending Power `` Perhaps the position of the Supreme Court is influenced by the fact that it has not so far been confronted with any extreme type of constitutional amendments. It is the duty of the jurist, though, to anticipate extreme cases of conflict, and sometimes only extreme tests reveal the true nature of a legal concept. So, if for the purpose of legal discussion, I may propose some fictive amendment laws to you, could it still be considered a valid exercise of the amendment power conferred by Article 368 if a two - thirds majority changed Article 1 by dividing India into two States of Tamilnad and Hindustan proper ? `` Could a constitutional amendment abolish Article 21, to the effect that forthwith a person could be deprived of his life or personal liberty without authorisation by law ? Could the ruling party, if it sees its majority shrinking, amend Article 368 to the effect that the amending power rests with the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister ? Could the amending power be used to abolish the Constitution and reintroduce, let us say, the rule of a moghul emperor or of the Crown of England ? I do not want, by posing such questions, to provoke easy answers. But I should like to acquaint you with the discussion which took place on such questions among constitutional lawyers in Germany in the Weimar period - discussion, seeming academic at first, but suddenly illustrated by history in a drastic and terrible manner. '' http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1809/18090950.htm The note is that in Kesavananda Bharati the dissenting judge, Justic Khanna approved as `` substantially correct '' the following observations by Prof. Conrad : Any amending body organised within the statutory scheme, howsoever verbally unlimited its power, can not by its very structure change the fundamental pillars supporting its constitutional authority. Limitation of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power ; Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1966 - 1967, Madras, pp. 375 - 430 Evolution of the doctrine The basic structure doctrine was further clarified in Minerva Mills v. Union of India. The 42nd Amendment had been enacted by the government of Indira Gandhi in response to the Kesavananda Bharati judgment in an effort to reduce the power of the judicial review of constitutional amendments by the Supreme Court. In the Minerva Mills case, Nanabhoy Palkhivala successfully moved the Supreme Court to declare sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Amendment as unconstitutional. The constitutionality of sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Amendment were challenged in this case, when Charan Singh was caretaker Prime Minister. Section 4 of the 42nd Amendment, had amended Article 31C of the Constitution to accord precedence to the Directive Principles of State Policy articulated in Part IV of the Constitution over the Fundamental Rights of individuals articulated in Part III. Section 55 prevented any constitutional amendment from being `` called in question in any Court on any ground ''. It also declared that there would be no limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of definition, variation or repeal the provisions of the Constitution. On 31 July 1980, when Indira Gandhi was back in power, the Supreme Court declared sections 4 & 55 of the 42nd amendment as unconstitutional. It further endorsed and evolved the basic structure doctrine of the Constitution. As had been previously held through the basic structure doctrine in the Kesavananda case, the Court ruled that Parliament could not by amending the constitution convert limited power into an unlimited power ( as it had purported to do by the 42nd amendment ). In the judgement on section 55, Chief Justice Yeshwant Vishnu Chandrachud wrote, Since the Constitution had conferred a limited amending power on the Parliament, the Parliament can not under the exercise of that limited power enlarge that very power into an absolute power. Indeed, a limited amending power is one of the basic features of our Constitution and therefore, the limitations on that power can not be destroyed. In other words, Parliament can not, under Article 368, expand its amending power so as to acquire for itself the right to repeal or abrogate the Constitution or to destroy its basic and essential features. The donee of a limited power can not by the exercise of that power convert the limited power into an unlimited one. The ruling was widely welcomed in India, and Gandhi did not challenge the verdict. In the judgement on Section 4, Chandrachud wrote : Three Articles of our Constitution, and only three, stand between the heaven of freedom into which Tagore wanted his country to awake and the abyss of unrestrained power. They are Articles 14, 19 and 21. Article 31C has removed two sides of that golden triangle which affords to the people of this country an assurance that the promise held forth by the preamble will be performed by ushering an egalitarian era through the discipline of fundamental rights, that is, without emasculation of the rights to liberty and equality which alone can help preserve the dignity of the individual. This latter view of Article 31C was questioned, but not overturned, in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co v Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. ( case citation : AIR 1983 SC 239 ). The concept of basic structure has since been developed by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases, such as Waman Rao v. Union of India ( AIR 1981 SC 271 ), Bhim Singhji v. Union of India ( AIR 1981 SC 234 ), S.P. Gupta v. President of India ( AIR 1982 SC 149 ) ( known as Transfer of Judges case ), S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India ( AIR 1987 SC 386 ), P. Sambamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1987 SC 663 ), Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu and others ( 1992 1 SCC 309 ), L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1997 SC 1125 ), P.V. Narsimha Rao v. State ( CBI / SPE ) ( AIR 1998 SC 2120 ), I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu and others ( 2007 2 SCC 1 ), and Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and others ( JT 2007 ( 2 ) SC 1 ) ( known as Cash for Query case ). The Supreme Court 's position on constitutional amendments laid out in its judgements is that Parliament can amend the Constitution but can not destroy its `` basic structure ''. Influence The influence extends to Commonwealth Countries sharing the judicial system with India. The basic structure doctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in 1989, by expressly relying on the reasoning in the Kesavananda case, in its ruling on Anwar Hossain Chowdhary v. Bangladesh ( 41 DLR 1989 App. Div. 165, 1989 BLD ( Spl. ) 1 ). The High Court of Singapore denied the application of the basic features doctrine in Singapore in Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs. Justice Frederick Arthur Chua held that the doctrine was not applicable to the Singapore Constitution : `` Considering the differences in the making of the Indian and our Constitution, it can not be said that our Parliament 's power to amend our Constitution is limited in the same way as the Indian Parliament 's power to amend the Indian Constitution. '' In Malaysia, the basic features doctrine was also found to be inapplicable by the Federal Court in Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor. The Court remarked that the Indian Constitution was not drafted by `` mere mortals '', while the same could not be said for the Malaysian Constitution. The Indian Constitution was drafted by a constituent assembly representative of the Indian people in territorial, racial and community terms, while both the Malaysian and Singapore Constitutions were enacted by ordinary legislatures. Reliance on the drawing of distinctions between the Indian Constitution on the one hand and the Malaysian and Singapore Constitutions on the other on the basis of the history of their framing has been criticized as weak and inadequate. See also Judicial Activism In India Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs in Singapore, the concerned court considered and rejected the applicability of the doctrine. Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor in Malaysia. Anwar Hossain Chowdhary v. Bangladesh References ^ Jump up to : `` The basic features ''. The Hindu. 2004 - 09 - 26. Retrieved 2012 - 07 - 09. Jump up ^ `` Kesavananda Bharati... vs State Of Kerala And Anr on 24 April, 1973 ''. Indian Kanoon. Retrieved 2012 - 07 - 09. ^ Jump up to : `` Revisiting a verdict ''. 29 ( 01 ). Frontline. Jan 14 -- 27, 2012. Archived from the original on 2013 - 12 - 03. Retrieved 2012 - 07 - 09. Jump up ^ `` Kesavananda Bharati... vs State Of Kerala And Anr on 24 April, 1973 ''. Indian Kanoon. Para. 316. Retrieved 2012 - 06 - 24. Jump up ^ `` Kesavananda Bharati... vs State Of Kerala And Anr on 24 April, 1973 ''. Indian Kanoon. Para. 787. Retrieved 2012 - 07 - 09. Jump up ^ http://www.indialawjournal.com/volume3/issue_2/article_by_rushminsunny.html ^ Jump up to : `` Constitution Amendment : Nature and Scope of the Amending Process '' ( PDF ). Lok Sabha Secretariat. pp. 14 -- 20. Archived from the original ( PDF ) on 3 December 2013. Retrieved 1 December 2013. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain. Jump up ^ Austin, Granville ( 1999 ). Working a Democratic Constitution - A History of the Indian Experience. New Delhi : Oxford University Press. pp. 258 -- 277. ISBN 019565610 - 5. Jump up ^ Satya Prateek ( 2008 ). `` Today 's Promise, Tomorrow 's Constitution : ' Basic Structure ', Constitutional Transformations And The Future Of Political Progress In India '' ( PDF ). NUJS Law Review. West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences. 1 ( 3 ). Retrieved 2012 - 07 - 17. Jump up ^ Jasdeep Randhawa. `` Understanding Judicialization Of Mega-Politics : The Basic Structure Doctrine And Minimum Core ''. Jus Politicum. Retrieved 2012 - 07 - 17. Jump up ^ NOORANI, A.G. ( Apr 28 -- May 11, 2001 ). `` Behind the ' basic structure ' doctrine : On India 's debt to a German jurist, Professor Dietrich Conrad ''. Frontline. the Hindu group. Retrieved 22 March 2014. THERE is, sadly, little acknowledgment in India of that debt we owe to a distinguished German jurist and a scholar steeped in other disciplines beyond the confines of law - Professor Dietrich Conrad, formerly Head of the Law Department, South Asia Institute of the University of Heidelberg, Germany... It was no mere coincidence that a German jurist had thought of implied limitations on the amending power. Article 79 ( 3 ) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, adopted on May 8, 1949, six months before the drafting of India 's Constitution ended, bars explicitly amendments to provisions concerning the federal structure and to `` the basic principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 ( on human rights and the `` democratic and social '' set - up ). The Germans learnt from the bitter experience of the Nazi era. The framers of the Constitution of India refused to look beyond the Commonwealth countries and the United States... Prof. Conrad aptly remarked that `` in this free trade of constitutional ideas the Indian Supreme Court has come to play the role of an exporter. This holds true with respect to at least two major innovations introduced by the court '' ; namely, public interest litigation and `` the basic structure doctrine ''. ^ Jump up to : Raghav Sharma ( 2008 - 04 - 16 ). `` Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors : A Jurisprudential Perspective ''. Social Science Research Network. SSRN 1121817. Missing or empty url = ( help ) ; access - date = requires url = ( help ) ^ Jump up to : `` Indian Constitution : Sixty years of our faith ''. The Indian Express. 2010 - 02 - 02. Retrieved 2013 - 12 - 01. ^ Jump up to : `` Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors ''. Open Archive. Archived from the original on 2012 - 04 - 04. Retrieved 2012 - 07 - 17. Jump up ^ `` When in doubt, amend ''. Indian Express. 2009 - 08 - 21. Retrieved 2013 - 11 - 23. Jump up ^ `` India - The Constitution ''. Countrystudies.us. Retrieved 2013 - 12 - 01. Jump up ^ `` Archived copy ''. Archived from the original on 2010 - 12 - 20. Retrieved 2013 - 12 - 02. Jump up ^ Teo Soh Lung ( H.C. ), p. 479, para. 47. Jump up ^ ( 1980 ) 1 M.L.J. ( Malayan Law Journal ) 70. Jump up ^ Phang Chin Hock, p. 73. Jump up ^ Jaclyn Ling - Chien Neo ; Yvonne C.L. Lee ( 2009 ), `` Protecting Rights '', in Li - ann Thio ; Kevin Y ( ew ) L ( ee ) Tan, eds., Evolution of a Revolution : Forty years of the Singapore Constitution, London ; New York, N.Y. : Routledge - Cavendish, p. 169, ISBN 978 - 0 - 415 - 43862 - 9 CS1 maint : Extra text : editors list ( link ). Jump up ^ Ravneet Kaur ( 1994 ), `` The Basic Features Doctrine and the Elected President Act '', Singapore Law Review, 15 : 244 -- 266 at 253 -- 254 ; see also A ( ndrew ) J. Harding ( 1979 ), `` Death of a Doctrine ? Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor '', Malaya Law Review, 21 : 365 -- 374 at 371. http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/const/the_basic_structure_of_the_indian_constitution.pdf HM Seervai, ' Constitutional Law of India ' V.N. Shukla ' Constitution of India ' 10th edition Anuranjan Sethi ( October 25, 2005 ), ' Basic Structure Doctrine : Some Reflections ``. SSRN 835165 Conrad, Dietrich, Law and Justice, United Lawyers Association, New Delhi ( Vol. 3, Nos. 1 - 4 ; pages 99 -- 114 ) Conrad, Dietrich, Limitation of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power ; Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1966 - 1967, Madras, pp. 375 -- 430 Law Core subjects Administrative law Constitutional law Contract Criminal law Deed Equity Evidence International law Law of obligations Procedure Civil Criminal Property law Public law Restitution Statutory law Tort Other subjects Agricultural law Aviation law Banking law Bankruptcy Commercial law Competition law Conflict of laws Construction law Consumer protection Corporate law Cyberlaw Election law Energy law Entertainment law Environmental law Family law Financial regulation Health law Immigration law Intellectual property International criminal law International human rights International slavery laws Labour Law of war Legal archaeology Legal fiction Maritime law Media law Military law Probate Estate Will and testament Product liability Public international law Space law Sports law Tax law Transport law Trust law Women in law Sources of law Charter Constitution Custom Divine right Human rights Natural and legal rights Case law Precedent Law making Ballot measure Codification Decree Edict Executive order Proclamation Legislation Delegated legislation Regulation Rulemaking Promulgation Repeal Treaty Statutory law Statute Act of Parliament Act of Congress ( US ) Legal systems Civil law Common law Chinese law Legal pluralism Religious law Canon law Hindu law Jain law Jewish law Sharia Roman law Socialist law Statutory law Xeer Yassa Legal theory Critical legal studies Comparative law Feminist Law and economics Legal formalism History Natural law International legal theory Principle of legality Rule of law Sociology Jurisprudence Adjudication Administration of justice Criminal justice Court - martial Dispute resolution Fiqh Lawsuit / Litigation Legal opinion Legal remedy Judge Justice of the peace Magistrate Judgment Judicial review Jurisdiction Jury Justice Practice of law Attorney Barrister Counsel Lawyer Legal representation Prosecutor Solicitor Question of fact Question of law Trial Trial advocacy Trier of fact Verdict Legal institutions Bureaucracy The bar The bench Civil society Court Election commission Executive Judiciary Law enforcement Legal education Law school Legislature Military Police Political party Tribunal Index Outline Portal Indian Constitution Basic Structure Retrieved from `` https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Basic_structure_doctrine&oldid=801300644 '' Categories : Constitution of India Hidden categories : All articles with dead external links Articles with dead external links from July 2017 Articles with permanently dead external links Pages using web citations with no URL Pages using citations with accessdate and no URL CS1 maint : Extra text : editors list Talk Contents About Wikipedia Add links This page was last edited on 18 September 2017, at 21 : 43. 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Question: what do you mean by basic structure of indian constitution
Answer: that the Constitution of India has certain basic features that cannot be altered or destroyed through amendments by the parliament