sou · H9B387 · 2021-11-02 00:00:00 — Sekretesskyddet för uppgifter som granskningsmyndigheten kom- mer att behandla behöver kompletteras när det gäller uppgifter om enskilds affärs- eller driftförhållanden. Vi föreslår därför att offent- lighets- och sekretessförordningen (2009:641) ska kompletteras så att sekretess gäller för uppgift om enskilds affärs- eller driftförhållande i verksamhet som består i utredning i ärenden enligt den föreslagna lagen. kan vid sin bedömning behöva få känne- dom om ifall investerarens gjort sig skyldig till brott. Vi föreslår därför att det införs en bestämmelse i förordningen (1999:1134) om belast- ningsregister om att uppgifter ur belastningsregistret ska lämnas ut, om det begärs av ISP i ett ärende enligt den föreslagna lagen. Vi bedömer att våra förslag är förenliga med vederbörliga grund- lagsbestämmelser. Vi bedömer också att det inte bör införas någon rätt till ersättning till följd av ett beslut om förbud mot eller villkor för utländska direkt- investeringar. Avgränsningar i förhållande till andra regelverk Säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585) och det granskningssystem som vi föreslår överlappar varandra i vissa delar, men har olika utgångs- punkter och delvis olika tillämpningsområden. Regelverken kom- pletterar varandra och bör gälla parallellt. Inget av regelverken bör vara subsidiärt till det andra. Våra förslag innebär en överlappning av lagen (1992:1300) om krigsmateriel så till vida att det enligt både den lagen och enligt det granskningssystem vi föreslår finns möjligheter att ställa upp villkor för ett tillstånd respektive en investering. Villkoren är dock av olika karaktär. Vi bedömer att regelverken bör gälla parallellt. Det finns inget konkurrensförhållande mellan lagstiftningen om produkter med dubbla användningsområden och det gransknings- system vi föreslår. Regelverken kompletterar varandra. Konkurrenslagstiftningen och det granskningssystem som vi föreslår fyller olika syften. Regelverken bör gälla parallellt. Våra förslag innebär att skyddet för skyddsvärda verksam- heter stärks. Om någon reglering på området inte införs, skulle det innebära att grundläggande funktioner i det svenska samhället ut- sätts för oacceptabla säkerhetsrisker. Förslagens påverkan på utländska direktinvesteringar generellt i kan inte bedömas närmare. Att investeringar förbjuds eller inte genomförs alls kan medföra samhällsekonomiska nackdelar. Eventuella nackdelar på kortare sikt kan dock vägas upp av fördelar på . Förslagen har dessutom utformats för att de ska med- föra så begränsade effekter på oproblematiska investeringar som möjligt, som investeringar som kan medföra oacceptabla säkerhetsrisker ska kunna fångas upp av systemet. Vi bedömer att konsekvenserna för oproblematiska investeringar kommer att bli försumbara. Våra förslag kan ha viss påverkan på den kommunala självstyrel- sen. Förslagen går dock inte utöver vad som är nödvändigt för att skydda sådan skyddsvärd verksamhet som förslagen tar sikte på. En grov uppskattning ger vid handen att våra förslag kräver ett nettotillskott om , i huvudsak för nyanställ- ningar hos de myndigheter som ska bygga upp och vara verksamma i granskningssystemet. Härutöver uppkommer vissa kostnader för kom- petensförsörjning och annan utveckling med mera som i allt väsent- ligt kan tas inom ram men som likväl kräver engångsfinansiering på . Förslagen kan antas leda till marginella kostnadsökningar också för andra offentliga aktörer, inklusive och domstolar, som kan hanteras inom ramen för tillgängliga medel. Myndigheternas resursbehov bör tillgodoses genom ökade förvaltningsanslag och finansieras inom de utgifts- områden som normalt bekostar respektive myndighets anslag. De investeringsobjekt som berörs finns inom ett flertal utpekade sektorer och branscher. Eftersom det närmare utpekandet av många av verksamheterna ska göras i föreskrifter på förordningsnivå alter- nativt i myndighetsföreskrifter går det inte att närmare bedöma hur många investeringsobjekt det är fråga om totalt sett. Förslagen medför kostnader för berörda investerare. Kostna- derna kommer att variera från fall till fall och är beroende av om- fattningen av bland annat handläggningen vid granskningsmyndig- heten. Förslagen kan komma att medföra vissa direkta kostnader för investeringsobjekten. Förslagen medför inte några direkta kostnader för investerarens motpart. Vi föreslår att regelverket ska träda i kraft . Lagen ska dock inte tillämpas på investeringar som genomförs före . The inquiry’s remit Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of Parliament and of 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (hereinafter ‘the EU Regulation’) entered into force on and has applied since 11 October 2020. A fundamental aim of the EU Regulation is to create a legal framework for the screening of foreign direct investments (FDI) in the Union on grounds of security or public order. Our inquiry consisted of two parts. One was to propose the adaptations and supplementary provisions necessary for the imple- mentation of the EU Regulation in . We reported on this part in 2020 in the interim report Kompletterande bestämmelser till EU:s förordning om utländska direktinvesteringar (SOU 2020:11) [Supplementary provisions to the EU Regulation on foreign direct investments]. Our proposals have led to legislation. Lagen (2020:826) med kompletterande bestämmelser till EU:s förordning om utländska direktinvesteringar [Act containing supplementary provisions to the EU Regulation on ] and förordningen (2020:827) med kompletterande bestämmelser till EU:s förordning om utländska direktinvesteringar [Ordinance containing supplemen- tary provisions to the EU Regulation on ] entered into force on . In this final report, we report on the second part of the remit: to propose how a Swedish mechanism for screening FDIs in protected areas could be designed. The Terms of Reference state that the purpose is to screen buyouts and strategic acquisitions of undertakings domiciled in whose activities or technology are essential for security or public order. Direct investments in the context of Capital flows arise when Swedish undertakings buy undertakings abroad and foreign undertakings buy Swedish undertakings. These capital flows are commonly referred to as direct investments. Direct investments are typically associated with a close relationship between the investor and the undertaking, where the investor acquires some form of direct link with and interest in the undertaking in which the investment is made. In addition to the investment itself, a distinguishing feature of direct investments is that often the investor contributes knowledge, technology and marketing. Foreign direct investments (FDIs) in are made from many different countries. The majority of large FDIs come from other countries in the EU. The three single largest capital inflows from FDIs in 2020 came from , the , and the . is also making big investments in , and these almost tripled from 2019 to 2020. The , the and are the countries with the largest FDI assets in . Experiences from other countries In formulating our proposals, we have taken note of and utilised experiences from other countries. The report includes an account of an report on trends in FDI, as well as an account of the screening mechanisms used by other countries. Foreign direct investments are needed and should only be prohibited if necessary is a small, open economy that is dependent on trade with other countries. Foreign investments that contribute capital, knowledge, skills and new markets to Swedish enterprise are very important for employment and growth in and for the social climate in general. However, strategic buyouts or investments made in undertakings operating in protected areas can pose risks. This is particularly true when the investor has links to ‘closed’, undemocratic and antagonistic There are risks of technology theft, espionage and sabotage, among other things. If large parts of a sector that is essential to the functioning of society are acquired, there will also be risks associated with access to such functions, and activities with the sector becoming heavily dependent on other states. In view of the importance of an open Swedish investment climate, a screening mechanism should target only harmful investments and should not intervene more than is necessary to protect ’s security interests. Therefore, it should only be possible to prohibit an investment if it is necessary to do so. Existing regulatory frameworks do not satisfactorily address the risks of foreign direct investments Currently, there are only limited opportunities to regulate or prevent foreign direct investments that could entail risks to ’s security interests. Existing regulatory frameworks only apply in certain areas, to certain activities, and in specific situations. The purposes of these regulatory frameworks also differ. There is often a lack of both actual opportunities and suitable tools to fully, and with sufficiently nuanced measures, uphold a good investment climate while taking into account the interests that a screening mechanism is meant to protect. Under the existing regulatory frameworks, relevant risks of foreign direct investments cannot be addressed to a sufficient extent nor in a satis- factory . The screening mechanism is intended to protect ’s national security as well as public order and security in Foreign direct investments can pose risks for activities of importance for ’s security as well as for other activities that are important for assuring vital societal functions in . We therefore propose that the Swedish mechanism for screening foreign direct investments should cover those investments that could pose a risk to ’s security – its national competence – and those that could pose a risk to public order or security in in accordance with EU law – Article 52(1) and Article 65(1)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of Union. Application area based on the nationality of the investor We propose that both investments made by investors from third countries and those made by investors from EU Member States should be subject to screening. Investments made by investors from should also be subject to the notification obligation in ’s screening mechanism. If the investor is really a natural person with only Swedish citizenship, the notification is dismissed without further action. The same applies if the investor is a legal person ultimately owned or controlled only by natural persons with Swedish citizenship only. Investments made by a Swedish investor should only be subject to examination if the latter is the ‘front man’ for a foreign actor. The background to this construction is to prevent investors from circum- venting the mechanism by, for example, making the investment through an undertaking in that is ultimately controlled by, for example, an antagonistic state. The Inspectorate of should be the screening authority In the interim report, we assessed that the Inspectorate of () should be the contact point under the EU Regulation, but also the screening authority in a future screening mechanism. This assessment was based on the ISP’s expertise in security policy assess- ments and the authority’s expertise in the area of technology. In this respect, there is no reason to make any other assessment than the one made in the interim report. We therefore propose that the ISP shall be responsible for the examination of foreign direct investments in a Swedish screening mechanism. The ISP will need to consult and utilise the expertise and knowledge of other government agencies in its work. Types of undertakings and activities to be covered by the screening mechanism It can be reasonably assumed that limited companies are the type of undertaking that will be the focus of the screening mechanism. How- ever, protected activities can be carried on in many legal forms. Our starting point, therefore, is that the screening mechanism should be applicable to all investments in Swedish undertakings that carry on protected activities, regardless of their legal form. We propose that the Act should apply to investments in limited companies, partnerships, unincorporated partnerships, sole trader undertakings, economic associations, and foundations and trusts domiciled in . When it comes to activities, our starting point is that the screening mechanism should be limited as far as possible by setting out in the Act the activities to be covered. However, in order to achieve good precision and a high level of predictability and a certain amount of flexibility, it is appropriate that the Swedish Government or, in some instances, the government agency that the government appoints, further delimits the application of the regulatory framework in ordinances or administrative provisions. Our proposals mean that the following activities with, where applicable, further delimitations in ordinances or administrative provisions, shall be covered by the screening mechanism. ‘Essential services’ refers to services or infrastructure that maintains or assures societal functions that are vital to society’s basic needs, values or safety. A more precise definition of which activities are covered will be set out in administrative provisions to be issued by the (). In this work, MSB is to involve the Swedish Armed Forces, ISP, , the and other public authorities that may have relevant knowledge. Security-sensitive activities are activities covered by the Act (2018:585). •Activities that for, extract, enrich or sell raw materials that are critical to the EU, or other metals and that are critical to . The EU produces lists of raw materials that are critical for the EU. The other metals and that are critical for are to be specified in an ordinance based on data from the Geological Survey of . •Activities whose principal purpose is the processing of sensitive personal data or location data. ‘Sensitive personal data’ means personal data as defined in Article 9(1) of the Protection Regulation1, i.e. personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation. Location data are data processed in an electronic communications network or by an electronic communications service and which shows the geographical position of the terminal equipment of a user. The latter definition is taken from the Electronic Com- munications Act (2003:389). •Activities related to emerging technologies and other strategic protected technologies. An ordinance is to identify these kinds of technologies in more detail based on data from ISP. In this area, technical experts from the ISP, the (), the () and the Swedish Armed Forces work together in order to define the emerging technology areas among other things, so that definitions of these can be developed. A draft is included as an annex to our proposal for an ordinance. •Activities that manufacture, develop, conduct research into or supply dual-use products or supply technical assistance for such products. ‘Dual-use items’ means products listed in to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of Parliament and of 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (recast). 1Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of Parliament and of the Council of on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (Protection Regulation). •Activities that manufacture, develop, conduct research into or supply military equipment or supply technical support for military equipment. Military equipment and technical assistance are the same as referred to in the Act (1992:1300). We do not propose including media undertakings in the screening mechanism We assess that security policy grounds can be pleaded to permit the screening mechanism to cover certain media undertakings. We also assess that it is legislatively possible to design such a mechanism without contravening the fundamental laws of . However, precisely on account of the reasons for inter alia the strong protection in ’s fundamental laws in this area for start-ups, and on account of inter alia the current situation in some other countries, including members of the EU, we have shied away from proposing that the screening mechanism should not include the media area. In order to give the Government and Riksdag the greatest possible room for manoeuvre, we present a basis for drafting the scope of the screening mechanism and how it could be delimited when it comes to the media. This creates the conditions for taking a position after due circulation for comment. Investor circumstances to be relevant in the assessment of a foreign direct investment The screening authority’s examination will need to make an overall assessment in each individual case based on the activity’s actual protection value. Depending on other circumstances, circumstances related to the potential investor may be significant for how the risks of the investment should be assessed. According to our proposals, in its assessment the screening authority must take into account: •Whether the investor is directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, controlled by the government of another country through its ownership structure or substantial financing or in some other way. The ownership structure and actual beneficial ownership may be significant in assessing the risks of an investment. Investments from a private investor with links to a country’s regime may be ill-advised in some cases. A private investor may harbour loyalties to the regime, even though the regime does not have direct control over the investor. In a nation where one party controls the machinery of government, private undertakings cannot be presumed to be entirely free from state influence over decisions and state control. There are examples of countries where citizens and organisations have a duty to inform the regime on matters affecting national security and where the regime works actively to strengthen its relationships with private under- takings. An investor from an authoritarian state can also try to influence so that the investor’s own national interests are benefited through an investment. A country can also use market dominance to achieve its political goals. •If the investor has previously been involved in activities that have or could have adversely affected ’s security or public order or security in . A sign that the investor has previously participated in such activities may be that there is information that approval has been withheld previously for an investment by the foreign investor, or the foreign investor has breached the conditions imposed on an investment. Information on specific investment patterns may be made available to the screening authority through the EU Regulation’s mechanism for the exchange of information. •If there are other circumstances surrounding the investor that could pose a risk to ’s security or public order or security in . Even factors other than links to the government of another country or previous participation in activities that could have adversely affected Swedish security interests should also be taken into account in the screening authority’s assessment of an investment. That an investor has previously engaged in illegal activities relevant to the risks associated with the investment in question is one such circumstance. Other circumstances are associated with the risks of an actor obtaining an overly dominant position within a certain sector. antagonism in the country that the investor has links to may also be of importance. The procedure in more detail The investor must notify an investment before it is implemented In order for the screening authority to assess a direct investment, it needs to be made aware that an investment is planned. We propose that anyone planning to make an investment covered by the Act be required to notify the investment to the screening authority. Noti- fication must be made before the investment is implemented. The screening authority must be permitted to issue regulations covering the information that must be included in a notification. According to our proposals, both the investor and the investee undertaking must be required to provide any other information or documentation that the authority requests. If an investor does not notify an investment even though an obligation to do so exists, the screening authority may draw up a notification. We also propose that, as a general rule, the planned investee undertaking must be obliged to inform the investor that the Act applies to the activity. The obligation to notify is linked to the extent of the interest The risks of foreign direct investment are mainly related to the extent of the interest the investor gains in the activity in question. We there- fore propose that the obligation to notify an investment should arise if the investment results in a certain interest. Threshold values for the interest required are easier to legislate for some legal arrangements than for others. In the case of investments in limited companies and economic associations, we propose that any investment where the investor after the investment will command 10 per cent or more of the total number of votes in the undertaking, through their shareholding, other partici- pations, or membership, must be notified. An investment must also be notified if the investor alone or with others forms a limited company or an economic association through the investment and thereafter commands 10 per cent or more of the total number of votes. In the case of investments in partnerships and unincorporated partnerships, we propose that the investment must be notified if the investor becomes a partner in such an undertaking through the invest- ment, or if the investment is made in a undertaking in which the investor is already a partner. For investments in foundations and trusts, we propose that all investments in areas covered by the Act through which the investor forms a Swedish foundation or trust or must be notified. An investor can gain influence over an undertaking’s management in other ways than ownership. Provisions in the by-laws or articles of association or agreements with partners may grant the right to appoint or remove board members or exert influence in other ways. Existing undertakings can merge into a joint venture. In light of this, we pro- pose that investments that, in ways other than through a share in ownership, give the investor influence over the management of a limited company, a partnership, unincorporated partnership, eco- nomic association, or foundation or trust established in , must also be notified, provided that the investee on an activity covered by the Act. In the case of activities operated by a sole trader, an investor may place financial or other resources, such as human resources, at the disposal of the undertaking and thereby command a certain influence. We therefore propose that where an investor, in exchange for an agreement on an interest in the activity, intends to place resources at the disposal of an activity operated by a sole trader in an area covered by the screening mechanism, this must be notified. Screening to be a two-stage procedure As far as feasible, it should be possible to pick up direct investments that are particularly important to examine, while unproblematic invest- ments should not need to be examined unnecessarily or, in any case, should be quickly sifted out after an initial investigation. We are therefore proposing a two-stage procedure.