sou · H8B335 · 2020-06-08 00:00:00 — It may well be that the decision-making public authority does not have access to the data or is not permitted to use it to detect and prevent irregular payments due to confidentiality rules and data protection regulations. It is not possible to utilise data from different parts of the welfare system – for example, payment data, certificates and other control data or data from the – to the necessary extent to effectively detect and prevent irregular payments. The conditions for conducting control activities also vary from one agency to the next. Issues of control are prioritised differently at different agencies and those priorities change over time. This excludes a long-term view of control issues and leads to disjointed control activities. Although public authorities expend a considerable amount of energy countering irregular payments, they all do so based on their own operations. There is no one tasked with or even equipped to work with irregular payments based on the welfare system as a whole. All of this contributes to a situation in which those who exploit the system tend to constantly remain one step ahead, while govern- ment agencies lag behind in their work to control welfare payments. The control activities of government agencies must be supplemented New methods are required in order to get to grips with advanced schemes to defraud the welfare system. In our opinion, the next step in our defences against systematic welfare fraud is to create joint structures equipped to deal with them. If we are to counter irregular payments, the welfare system must be viewed holistically. This demands a long-term vision, continuity and cohesive control of the welfare system in its entirety. It is therefore our opinion that a specific agency should be estab- to counter irregular payments and welfare fraud from a holis- tic perspective. This implies an agency permitted to focus on the task of countering irregular payments without competing additional tasks. The creation of a new government agency sends a clear signal that the Government is prioritising the issue of combating irregular payments from the welfare system. The agency may also have a pre- ventive effect. Furthermore, a government agency with a stated re- sponsibility for these issues can contribute to developing cooper- ation in the field. This will reduce crime and reinforce confidence in the welfare system. Our proposals include the central parts of the welfare state in which public confidence is particularly important, meaning that the new agency’s mandate to prevent and detect irregular payments will cover the , (), and . and, to a certain extent, unemployment benefit funds are also included. A number of other public authorities will also be required to provide data to the and will receive notifications regarding irregularities. A system of transaction accounts In order to create a collective structure for payments from the state welfare systems and the , we propose the estab- lishment of a system of transaction accounts. This system will administer payments from the welfare systems and the . A collective function separate from other agencies provides a holistic overview of welfare payments while at the same time limit- ing the risk of data being disseminated to a greater extent than neces- sary. The transaction account system will overall be more efficient for the state, among other things because welfare payments can be managed collectively and account details for payees will only need to be administered by a single public authority, rather than several. The transaction account system shall be regulated in a separate law and supplementary ordinance. Data from the transaction account system shall form the basis for the Agency’s data analysis and sampling to detect and prevent irreg- ular payments. Data analysis and selection will analyse data and conduct checks to detect irregular welfare payments that decision-making authorities have difficulty in detecting based on the data available to them individually. The operations conducted by the will focus on intentional errors and more advanced schemes to defraud the welfare system, where one or more individuals seek to obtain funds on false grounds. The ability to cross-check data from various welfare agencies allows the Agency to detect irregularities in a that is not currently feasible. This is particularly applicable to cases where data indicative of irregular payments is stored by an agency other than the decision-making authority. It also makes it possible to compare information supplied to different government agencies, thus detecting irregularities. In addition to payment data from the transaction account system, the Agency will need to use certain data held by the decision-making authority as a basis for data analysis and selection; for example, decisions, employer certificates and contact details. data from public authorities will also form the basis for data analysis and selection, including registry data from the Registration Office and Swedish Enforcement Authority. will also be permitted to use personal data from the such as certain tax information and information from the population register. It will also be possible to use certain data from unemployment benefit funds. Payments selected based on the Agency’s data analysis and selection will need to be processed and sorted in order to provide an effective basis on which welfare agencies can detect and prevent irregular welfare payments. We propose that this can be done in two stages: initial and in-depth enquiry. ’s enquiries shall be regu- lated in a separate law. Initial enquiry involves the processing and sorting of all selection results handed over by the Agency’s data analysis and selection department. It may be justified for the Agency to conduct an in- depth enquiry of certain selections; i.e., a supplementary investiga- tion. In-depth enquiries may be initiated when there is reason to assume that an irregular payment has been made. Selections where it seems likely that more than one government agency is affected should be prioritised. When conducting an in-depth enquiry, the Agency shall be permitted to obtain supplementary documentation. shall inform other public authori- ties and unemployment benefit funds of the results of the enquiries. The enquiries shall support control activities conducted by decision- making authorities and unemployment benefit funds. shall not review or overrule decisions taken by other public authorities. shall support and monitor the work of government agencies and unemployment benefit funds to counter irregular welfare payments. There is much to be gained from the exchange of knowledge, joint analysis of problems and coordinated shall constitute a platform for interagency activities to combat irregular payments. Through its specific competence in control issues, the Agency may become an important consultative body when changes affecting the welfare systems are considered. This is particularly important in the event of major or rapid changes that may open new windows of opportunity for those who wish to systematically defraud the wel- fare system. shall also be tasked with submitting a consolidated report to the Government every third year as a basis for ongoing work to counter irregular welfare payments. We propose that the Government adopt a goal of reducing irreg- ular payments, and that this goal should be followed up in the Budget . Processing of personal data ’s processing of personal data, especially in data analysis and selection, constitutes an infringement of individual privacy. In our opinion, this infringement is proportionate to the purpose of detecting and preventing irregular welfare payments and thereby countering welfare crime. We propose a law to facilitate and regulate the processing of personal data deemed necessary for the Agency to carry out its proposed assignment. This proposal includes a number of safeguards, including restrictions on searches and access to personal data for the Agency’s staff, as well as rules on access control. The ordinance shall specify the data that the is permitted to use when performing data analysis and sampling. This is to safeguard the principle of data minimisation and to strengthen the protection of privacy. Public Access to Information and Secrecy Secrecy rules are necessary to protect both individual rights and the public interest in the Agency’s operations. In the operations of the Agency, absolute secrecy shall apply to all data concerning the personal and financial circumstances of individuals and legal entities. Data will therefore always remain secret and shall not be disclosed to public authorities or others unless there are any provisions overriding secrecy. We also propose that it should be possible to classify as secret any information regarding the methods, models and risk factors associated with the analysis and selection conducted to detect and prevent irregular welfare payments. ’s operations presuppose the exchange of data with other public authorities and stakeholders. To facilitate the exchange of data, we propose obligations overriding secrecy regarding the ex- change of intelligence and information. This proposal implies that the following public authorities shall provide certain specified data to the Agency for data analysis and selection: the , Registration Office, CSN, , Health and Social Care Inspec- torate (), , , and unemployment benefit funds. Govern- ment agencies, unemployment benefit funds and credit institutions shall provide information concerning named natural persons or legal entities that may be of significance to the Agency’s in-depth en- quiries. The Swedish Act on the Obligation to Report Irregular Welfare Payments (SFS 2008:206) shall apply to the . may also uncover other likely irregularities in authority decisions and registrations. Registration Office, , and shall therefore be informed when enquiries reveal irregularities in their decisions or registers. shall be organised as a board-supervised authority. should be located in a region with a large labour market and in close proximity to a town or city with one or more higher educa- tion institutions. Within the Agency there shall be a privacy protection council tasked with exercising ongoing insight into the measures taken to ensure the protection of privacy within the organisation. ’s assignment is expected to require a staff of 80 full- time equivalents once the organisation is fully developed after three years. ’s operations place high demands on information security and data protection. Well-functioning cooperation is a prerequisite for the Agency’s operations In particular, the shall cooperate with the , , the Swedish Social In- surance Agency, , the and the in the interests of preventing irregular payments. Corresponding assignments shall be included in the Government’s instructions to each agency. Instructions to the shall also include a directive to cooperate with other interested parties. should participate in interagency cooperation against organised crime as a network authority. The Commission of Inquiry has also been tasked with considering whether municipalities should be able to voluntarily connect to the function, the pros and cons of coordinated data provision for the individual, as well as investigating whether the function should take over responsibility for debt collection on behalf of decision-making authorities. There is insufficient evidence regarding the extent and nature of irregular welfare payments in the municipal sector. The problems appear to be similar to that for state welfare payments. However, there are a number of major differences between state and municipal welfare payments. Therefore, the possibility of municipalities connecting to the functions provided by the requires further study. The possibility of regional authorities connecting to these functions should also be examined. The transaction account system will simplify matters for individuals, in as much as they will only need to provide their account details for payment once and to a single agency; otherwise, we have been unable to identify a need for the to coordinate further reporting from individuals. Consideration of gathering the administration of repayment claims with the should be delayed until certain regulatory changes in that area have been implemented and taken effect. Among other things, this applies to rules for housing benefit, which accounts for the majority of repayment claims from the . Our main proposal is for additional funding so that funds are not taken from existing welfare operations. Alternatively, financing may be achieved by reducing administrative appropriations to the affected public authorities. The latter should then be achieved through a general reduction in appropriations for those authorities that are to be covered by the transaction account system. Reductions should be pro- portionate in relation to the operating costs of the public authority in question. The public authorities that we propose should join the transaction account system, and are therefore affected by the finance- ing proposal, are the , , the , the and the . The total annual cost of a fully developed organisation is calcu- lated to be in the region of million. The cost of bank charges will be reduced for the affected public authorities and corre- sponding appropriations should be transferred to the Payment Con- trol Agency. The remaining annual funding requirement for a fully developed organisation is million. There is a pressing need to implement our proposals as soon as possible so that the can commence opera- tions. The detection and prevention of irregular welfare payments is an issue that must be highly prioritised. We propose that the Agency should commence operations on 1 2022. The new laws and ordinances should enter into force when the Agency begins its work. The connection of public authority payments to the transaction account system should take place successively, with all relevant payments from the affected agencies being made via the system no later than 1 2025. Consequences of the proposals Fewer irregular payments and a reduction in welfare crime In our assessment, these proposals will lead to fewer irregular pay- ments and therefore a reduction in welfare crime. Primarily, we believe that the proposals will have an impact on intentional errors and systematic and organised welfare fraud. Our proposals will lead to irregular payments being detected at an earlier stage than is currently the case. Earlier detection signi- ficantly increases the chances of recovering irregular payments by demanding repayment. By using data analysis and selection, the will uncover irregularities that currently go undetected. ’s ability to co-process population reg- ister data with data from welfare systems will also lead to identity fraud being detected to a greater extent. ’s enquiries means that an additional organisation will examine irregularities, supplementing the work of existing govern- ment agencies, in particular with regard to advanced fraud that affects more than one welfare system. For example, schemes involving com- panies and identity fraud that are currently difficult to detect, as individual authorities lack access to the necessary data to uncover and investigate them. Detecting irregularities will also increase the chances of prose- cuting crimes. Earlier detection of irregularities will mean that future ongoing payments can be stopped at an earlier stage. The attractive- ness of this type of crime can therefore be expected to decrease. One important aspect of reduced criminality affecting the wel- fare system is the implications for other, more serious crime. There have been examples of the proceeds of welfare crime being used to finance serious organised crime and, in some cases, even terrorist Our proposals reduce the opportunities to finance such serious crime, with positive effects for society at large. We believe that our proposals will increase confidence in both the welfare state and social institutions. Lower state expenditure in the long term Although the proposals will initially involve increased costs, in the long term they are calculated to lead to lower state expenditure. The net effect depends on the results achieved by the Agency in terms of reduced irregular payments. Irregular welfare payments have been estimated at approximately billion, equivalent to approximately of total payments. Even though the estimates should be cautiously interpreted, irregu- lar payments amount to a significant sum. If only a small proportion of these payments disappear, it will balance and justify the cost of the Agency. The transaction account system largely involves a fixed cost, while to a large extent, other elements of the proposals can be adapted to the chosen level of ambition. Consequences for government agencies Many of the consequences for government agencies will be similar. One consequence for directly affected agencies is that IT solutions will need to be implemented for data transfer to the Payment Con- trol Agency. These government agencies will also be affected by the cooperation built up with the . Intelligence regarding suspected irregularities gathered by the will be made available to the existing authorities. The pro- posals contribute to the quality of the control activities performed by the government agencies. In all likelihood, intelligence from the will lead to more reassessments and de- mands for repayment by the agencies in question. Consequences for municipalities and regions The proposals have no consequences for municipal self-governance, as at this stage it is not proposed to include municipalities and regions in the Agency’s activities. There is however a risk of passing on costs. If the detection and prevention of irregular state welfare payments is strengthened, it may lead those who abuse the system to target regional and municipal organisations. Consequences for unemployment benefit funds The unemployment benefit funds shall provide information to the on a regular basis. The proposal therefore increases the reporting burden on unemployment benefit funds. The unemployment benefit funds will receive regular notifications from the regarding suspected irregulari- ties. This will provide documentation for use in the control activities conducted by the unemployment benefit funds. The proposal contributes to competition on equal terms. Serious businesses currently struggle to compete with companies whose business model is based on abusing the welfare system. Our propos- als are specifically intended to make it more difficult for more serious schemes to defraud the welfare system. Credits institutions will be faced with a somewhat increased reporting burden, as it is proposed that they be required to provide information for the Agency’s in-depth enquiries 1.1Förslag till lag (0000:00) om transaktionskonto Härigenom föreskrivs följande. Ett system med transaktionskonto 1 § Myndigheten för utbetalningskontroll ska administrera ett system med transaktionskonto för utbetalningar från myndigheter. De utbetalningar som regeringen bestämmer ska ske via systemet med transaktionskonto. Vem ska ha ett transaktionskonto? 2 § Myndigheten för utbetalningskontroll ska registrera ett trans- aktionskonto för den som har fått beslut om en sådan utbetalning som avses i 1 §. Vad ska registreras på ett transaktionskonto? 3 § Ett tillgodohavande ska registreras på ett transaktionskonto så snart Myndigheten för utbetalningskontroll får ett underlag på en utbetalning från beslutande myndighet. När ska utbetalning från ett transaktionskonto ske? 4 § Ett tillgodohavande på ett transaktionskonto ska betalas ut den dag som beslutande myndighet har bestämt. När är den beslutande myndighetens utbetalning verkställd? 5 § En utbetalning är verkställd för den beslutande myndigheten den dag som tillgodohavandet ska betalas ut enligt 4 §. Hur ska ett tillgodohavande betalas ut? 6 § Ett tillgodohavande på ett transaktionskonto ska betalas till ett konto hos ett kreditinstitut. Om uppgift om sådant konto saknas får utbetalning ske på annat sätt. Myndigheten får även i annat fall besluta om utbetalning på annat sätt om särskilda förhållanden föranleder det. 7 § Ett tillgodohavande på ett transaktionskonto får inte överlåtas innan det ska betalas ut enligt 4 §. Tillgodohavande som inte kan betalas ut 8 § Ett tillgodohavande som inte kan betalas ut ska stå kvar på transaktionskontot. Ett tillgodohavande som inte har kunnat betalas ut från den tidpunkt som anges i 4 § tillfaller staten. 9 § Utsökningsbalkens bestämmelser tillämpas vid utmätning av ett tillgodohavande. 10 § Ett tillgodohavande får utmätas trots att det inte får överlåtas enligt 7 §. 11 § De myndigheter vars utbetalningar ska administreras via systemet med transaktionskonto ska lämna de uppgifter som behövs för att utbetalningen ska kunna administreras av Myndigheten för utbetalningskontroll. 12 § Regeringen eller den myndighet som regeringen bestämmer kan med stöd av 8 kap. 7 § regeringsformen meddela föreskrifter som kompletterar denna lag. 1.Denna lag träder i kraft . 2.Lagen ska tillämpas i förhållande till de myndigheter vars ut- betalningar ska administreras via systemet med transaktionskonto först när de ansluts till systemet med transaktionskonto och för de utbetalningar som administreras via transaktionskontot. Lagen ska dock tillämpas fullt ut för anslutna myndig- heter. 1.2Förslag till lag (0000:00) om granskningar för att upptäcka och förhindra felaktiga utbetalningar från välfärdssystemen Härigenom föreskrivs följande. 1 § Denna lag innehåller bestämmelser om verksamheten vid Myn- digheten för utbetalningskontroll med granskningar för att upptäcka och förhindra felaktiga utbetalningar från välfärdssystemen. Verk- samheten sker genom inledande och fördjupad granskning. Lagen innehåller även bestämmelser om underrättelseskyldighet för Myndigheten för utbetalningskontroll med anledning av fel- aktigheter som identifieras i verksamheten med granskningar. 2 § Med en felaktig utbetalning avses i denna lag förmån, stöd eller skatt och avgift som beslutats, betalats ut eller tillgodoräknats fel- aktigt eller med ett för högt eller ett för lågt belopp. Med urvalsträffar avses i denna lag utbetalningar som har valts ut i myndighetens verksamhet med dataanalyser och urval i syfte att upptäcka och förhindra felaktiga utbetalningar. Med beslutande myndighet eller arbetslöshetskassa avses i denna lag den myndighet eller arbetslöshetskassa som har fattat beslut om utbetalning som har valts ut för fördjupad granskning. 1 § Inledande granskning innebär hantering och sortering av de urvalsträffar som har lämnats över från myndighetens verksamhet med dataanalyser och urval. 2 § En inledande granskning ska vidtas innan 1.myndigheten inleder en fördjupad granskning, 2.myndigheten underrättar en annan myndighet eller arbetslös- hetskassa om urvalsträffen, eller 3. urvalsträffen avslutas utan åtgärd. 3 § Fördjupad granskning innebär en närmare analys av urvals- träffar. Fördjupad granskning ska utgöra ett stöd för beslutande myndig- heters och arbetslöshetskassors kontroll av utbetalningar från väl- färdssystemen. 4 § En fördjupad granskning får inledas om det finns anledning att anta att det har skett en felaktig utbetalning. Vid bedömning av vilka urvalsträffar som ska väljas ut för för- djupad granskning ska det särskilt beaktas om 1.det finns anledning att anta att fler än en myndighet eller arbetslöshetskassa berörs av det förhållande som ligger till grund för antagandet att det har skett en felaktig utbetalning, och 2.effektivitetsskäl talar för att granskningen genomförs av Myn- digheten för utbetalningskontroll i stället för av berörda myndig- heter eller arbetslöshetskassor.