sou · H8B357 · 2020-10-08 00:00:00 — Förändringen innebär att brottsutredande myndigheter kan få till- gång till uppgifter från sjukvården – utan att brottsoffrets samtycke behöver inhämtas – också vid utredningar om s.k. fridskränknings- brott och det föreslagna nya hedersbrottet. Den föreslagna ändringen motiveras av att fördelarna för enskilda brottsoffer och brottsofferkollektivet – i form av mer effektiva brotts- utredningar avseende nu aktuella förhållandevis allvarliga brottstyper –väger tyngre än brottsoffrets intresse av att själv få bestämma om i vilken utsträckning som de brottsutredande myndigheterna ska få ta del av uppgifterna. Vi bedömer att de föreslagna ändringarna minskar den press som ett brottsoffer kan känna på sig om hon eller han själv disponerar över frågan om uppgifterna ska lämnas ut eller inte. Straffet för överträdelse av kontaktförbud Vi föreslår att straffskalan för överträdelser av kontaktförbud enligt 24 § första stycket andra meningen lagen (1988:688) om kontakt- förbud ändras från böter eller fängelse i högst till fängelse i (lägst och) högst som den nuvarande ansvars- frihetsregeln i andra stycket i samma paragraf ersätts med en bestäm- melse om att straffet i ringa fall ska vara böter. Vi anser att brottets allvar motiverar en höjning av normalstraffet för överträdelse av kontaktförbud till ett straff som ligger på fängelse- nivå, dvs. är strängare än böter. När det gäller de ringa fallen leder dessa till ansvarsfrihet. Vi bedömer att den skärpta synen på normalfallet av överträdelse av kontaktförbud bör medföra en skärpt syn även på de ringa fallen. Den som har fått ett kontaktförbud meddelat mot sig ska alltså inte kunna gå fri från ansvar med hänvisning till att han eller hon blivit bjuden hem till skyddspersonen eller liknande. Vi anser att böter är ett rimligt straff för sådana fall, i vilka gärningen kanske inte inne- burit någon direkt skada, kränkning eller fara för skyddspersonen. Även i dessa fall har den som fått förbudet meddelat mot sig haft att rätta sig efter förbudet och – genom att bryta mot detta – begått ett brott mot staten. I denna del har vi valt att understryka särskilt att ”kontakter som med hänsyn till särskilda omständigheter är uppenbart befogade” är undantagna från kontaktförbud redan enligt 1 § första stycket i lagen om kontaktförbud. Övriga överväganden i fråga om kontaktförbud Vi föreslår att ett beslut om utvidgat kontaktförbud ska – oavsett om den mot vilken förbudet avses gälla har överträtt ett tidigare med- delat kontaktförbud eller inte – kunna förenas med villkor om elek- tronisk övervakning. Om den mot vilken förbudet avses gälla har överträtt ett tidigare meddelat kontaktförbud, och det inte finns sär- skilda skäl mot det, ska förbudet förenas med villkor om elektronisk övervakning. gäller, enligt 1 a § andra stycket 1 lagen om kontaktförbud, att ett kontaktförbud avseende gemensam bostad får meddelas en- dast om skälen för ett sådant förbud väger väsentligt tyngre än det intrång eller men i övrigt som förbudet innebär för den mot vilken förbudet avses gälla. Vi föreslår att detta väsentlighetskrav slopas, så att bedömningen i stället gäller frågan om skälen för ett sådant för- bud väger tyngre än det intrång eller men i övrigt som förbudet inne- bär för den mot vilken förbudet avses gälla. Skälet för detta förslag är att det redan vid en vanlig proportionalitetsavvägning, av skälen för och mot ett förbud om kontaktförbud avseende gemensam bo- stad, måste beaktas att den som förbudet är tänkt att meddelas mot typiskt sett har starka skäl för att få besöka och bo i sin bostad. Ett krav på väsentligt tyngre skäl är därför överflödigt och kan riskera att för högt ställda krav i praktiken uppställs för att ett kontaktförbud avseende gemensam bostad ska meddelas. I fråga om den svenska regleringens effektivitet anser vi att det svenska rättssystemet måste betraktas som en helhet. Bestämmelserna om frihetsberövanden i form av häktning, anhållande och gripande kompletterarar bestämmelserna om kontaktförbud på ett sådant sätt att den svenska lagstiftningen på ett effektivt sätt möjliggör ett av- lägsnande av en misstänkt gärningsperson från en gemensam bostad. Vi gör också bedömningen att bestämmelsen om särskilt utvidgat kontaktförbud inte bör ändras med avseende på geografiskt område eftersom det är möjligt att besluta om skydd i ett så stort geografiskt område som är nödvändigt. Konsekvenser av utredningens förslag m.m. De som i praktiken berörs närmast av våra överväganden och förslag är gärningspersoner som begår upprepade hedersrelaterade brott mot samma brottsoffer och brottsoffer som utsätts för sådana brott. Vidare berör övervägandena och förslagen , Åklagar- myndigheten, offentliga försvarare, målsägandebiträden och särskilda företrädare för barn, Kriminalvården, inklusive frivården, de allmänna domstolarna samt . Förslaget angående rättsintyg be- rör även och läkare som upprättar rättsintyg. När det särskilt gäller ekonomiska konsekvenser berör övervägandena och förslagen i första hand Kriminalvården. Den årliga kostnadsökningen för Kriminalvården av att genom- föra våra förslag i fråga om införandet av ett nytt hedersbrott kan upp- skattas till . Domstolarna kan förväntas få ökade kostnader på avseende längre handläggningstider. Den årliga kostnadsökningen för rättsliga biträ- den uppskattas till . Våra straffprocessuella förslag i fråga om rättsintyg m.m. kan för- väntas leda till en endast marginell kostnadsökning för de som beställer rättsintyg. Den årliga kostnadsökningen för Kriminalvården av att genom- föra våra förslag i fråga om skärpt straffskala för överträdelse av kon- taktförbud kan uppskattas till . De ökade kostnader som våra förslag medför är så pass begränsade att de kan finansieras genom omfördelningar inom kostnadsområdet för rättsväsendet. De föreslagna ändringarna i lag kan träda i kraft och det krävs inte några särskilda övergångsbestämmelser. The Inquiry’s remit Our main remit has been to: •analyse and consider whether a specific criminal provision, with its own classification, should be introduced expressly targeting honour-based violence and oppression; •make proposals for such a regulation, irrespective of our conclu- sions regarding whether or not a specific honour-based offence should be introduced; •make proposals on how more effective criminal law protection against honour-based violence and oppression can be achieved in some other way, if the Inquiry deems this appropriate, and con- sider how the statutory limitation period for such an offence should be calculated; •consider whether special statutory limitation rules should apply where an offence has been committed against a person under the age of 18; •analyse the jurisdiction of Swedish courts to adjudicate on such offences committed abroad; and •make proposals for any necessary legislative amendments. We were also instructed to: •analyse whether the minimum penalty for gross violation of a woman’s integrity and gross violation of integrity should be in- creased; and •make proposals for an increased minimum penalty, irrespective of our conclusions on the implications. Finally, we were instructed to: •consider what legislative amendments should be implemented concerning non-contact orders in view of two Riksdag announce- ments, and make proposals for necessary legislative amendments; •analyse and, where necessary, propose any additional amend- ments in this area that are appropriate in view of the evaluation of conducted by ’s Group of Ex- perts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO) with respect to Articles 52 and 53 of the Convention; and •analyse whether the geographical area should be expanded in the case of specially extended non-contact orders and, if necessary, propose legislative amendments. Definitions of honour-based violence and oppression vary. Based on various definitions we have examined, honour-based oppression of- ten consists in standards being laid down in private (which can lead to ‘parallel societies’ arising) and private threats of – and enforce- ment of – sanctions if the oppressed person does not conform to the standards laid down in a context in which the honour of the immedi- ate or wider family acts as an incentive to lay down standards and to threaten and enforce sanctions that are not accepted in the rest of society. The fact that definitions vary means that it is problematic to compare statistics from different sources, and difficult to draw any conclusions concerning how common honour-based violence and other such oppression are. The available information offers only an indication of the minimum level. According to the information we have seen, honour-based oppression is a major problem internation- ally, and is no exception. There is a major and increasing need to combat honour-based violence and other such oppression. person who is subjected to repeated acts that violate their integrity has a considerable need for support. Those who are sub- jected to honour-based violence and other such oppression are par- ticularly defenceless and vulnerable, since they are often entirely lacking support from relatives. In an honour context, the immediate and wider family or group often sympathise with the perpetrator. In other contexts, there are often at least some people who support the victim. It can therefore be assumed that the willingness to report honour-based violence and other such oppression is low, and the number of unreported cases high. In light of this, it is enormously important that society reacts strongly against all forms of honour- based oppression. This applies on a variety of fronts, not just in criminal law. Starting points for a reform Our reflections and proposals proceed from the following general starting points: •Criminal law is about the State’s exercise of its monopoly on vi- olence. has assumed the task of ensuring that order and security prevail, and in return citizens are considered to accept or submit to the State having the exclusive right – and a duty – to punish those who commit certain offences defined in law. Given the singular nature of the system of criminal penalties, very high standards must be imposed on its design – and on legislation be- ing based on rational argumentation. •The legislator must use criminalisation as a last resort, where it is impossible to counter the undesirable conduct in a less drastic way. When criminalising conduct, the principle of nulla poena sine lege (‘no penalty without law’) must be taken into account. This is a fundamental principle of the rule of law. It includes a requirement that criminal law regulations must be written, exact and well-defined. Legislation must not be applied to acts com- mitted prior to entry into force, or to a greater extent than is sup- ported by its wording. •The system of sanctions is built on a view of under which the severity of the sanctions in criminal law, for example the num- ber of day-fines or months or years of imprisonment, must re- flect the seriousness of the offence. The starting point is thus that equally serious offences should be punished equally severely, and that a more serious offence should result in a more severe sanc- tion than a less serious offence. The seriousness of an offence is assessed based on the damage, danger or violation caused by it. The fact that the severity of the penalty should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence must be taken into account both on an abstract level, when the legislator determines the scale of pen- alties for a classification of offence, and in a specific case, when the court determines the sanction for an offence. Imposing a more severe penalty for a certain offence therefore requires that this is called for on grounds of . •Changes to the system of sanctions generally have a limited im- pact on the general level of crime in society. One starting point for our reflections is thus that the proposals we make, based on the directions in our terms of reference, must be seen against the backdrop of a need for measures in areas other than criminal law. •Fundamental constitutional provisions concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms must also be taken into account when considering the conditions for issuing the various forms of non- contact orders. A specific classification of honour-based offence We have noted that there is a major and growing need to combat honour-based violence and other such oppression. On 1 2020, a new ground for more severe penalties was introduced in Chap- ter 29, Section 2, point 10 of the Swedish Criminal Code, targeting criminal offences where honour is a motive. This provision can be applied to both one-off and repeated honour-based offences. We consider that there is a need for further emphasis within the system of criminal penalties of the fact that honour-based violence and oppression are unacceptable. It is therefore necessary to intro- duce a specific offence classification for repeated honour-based acts targeting the same victim. We consider that a clear signal of this kind in criminal legislation will have a normative effect that, in the long term, will help reduce honour-based violence and other such oppres- sion in society. We propose that, taking the integrity violation offences as a model, a new classification of honour-based offence be introduced in Chap- ter 4 of the Swedish Criminal Code. A person who commits criminal acts under Chapter 3, 4, 5, 6 or 12 of the Swedish Criminal Code or under Section 24 of the Non-Contact Orders Act (1988:688) with the aim of preserving or restoring the honour of a person or of an immediate or wider family or some other similar group would, if each of the acts was part of a repeated violation of the victim’s integrity and the acts were liable to severely damage the victim’s self- esteem, be guilty of an honour-based offence. Unlike the provisions on gross violation of integrity and gross violation of a woman’s integrity, the proposed new provision does not contain a requirement (for the act to be punishable) that the perpetrator and the victim must be in a close relationship. The requirement relating to honour – that the perpetrator must have committed the criminal acts “with the aim of preserving or re- storing the honour of a person or of an immediate or wider family or some other similar group” – mirrors the requirement included in the more severe penalties provision in Chapter 29, Section 2, point 10 of the Swedish Criminal Code that has entered into force in the course of the Inquiry’s work. The scale of penalties for the new offence should be the same as for gross violation of integrity and gross violation of a woman’s in- tegrity. At the same time, we propose that Chapter 4, Section 4a, first paragraph and the current Section 4b be amended so that the of- fences of defamation and insulting behaviour under Chapter 5 of the Swedish Criminal Code can also form part of the offences of gross violation of integrity, gross violation of a woman’s integrity and un- lawful harassment. Several requirements in the honour-based offence provision we propose will thus mirror the requirements in the provisions on gross violation of integrity and gross violation of a woman’s integrity. These common requirements are intended to be applied in the same way to the new honour-based offence as they have been applied to gross violation of integrity and gross violation of a woman’s integrity. We also propose that the new provision be introduced as Chapter 4, Section 4b of the Swedish Criminal Code, and that the current Sections 4b–4d be shifted to Sections 4c–4e. Another question we have considered has been whether there are reprehensible acts linked to honour-based motives that are not cov- ered by the catalogue of offences in our proposal above and, if so, whether additional types of acts should be criminalised, subject to the principle of nulla poena sine lege. In this respect, our primary deliberations were based on the existing offences of unlawful coer- cion (Chapter 4, Section 4 of the Swedish Criminal Code) and mo- lestation (Chapter 4, Section 7 of the Swedish Criminal Code). Tak- ing our starting point in a number of different examples of conceiv- able forms of honour-based oppression, we came to the conclusion that the offence of unlawful coercion can be applied in many situa- tions where a person attempts to control another person, e.g. by forcing the other person to cover their hair or wear long-sleeved or ankle-length clothing, or by forbidding them from taking part in physical education lessons, for example. We have also noted that the offence of molestation has a very broad scope of application in terms of ruthless acts. Overall, our assessment is that – if their scopes of application are used to the full – the existing penalty provisions offer good for crime prevention and law enforcement agencies to combat honour-based violence and other such oppression. We consider that the general rules on statutory limitation should apply to the new honour-based offence. We propose that Swedish courts should have jurisdiction for the proposed new honour-based offence, notwithstanding the general dual criminality requirement. Accordingly, Chapter 2, Section 2, fourth para- graph of the Swedish Criminal Code should be amended to include a ref- erence to the new provision in Chapter 4 of the Code proposed by us. Scales of penalties and criminal procedure When the offences of gross violation of integrity and gross violation of a woman’s integrity were introduced into the Swedish Criminal Code in 1998, the penalty provided in the provision on gross viola- tion of integrity was imprisonment for at least six months and at most six years. The provision on gross violation of a woman’s integrity was introduced in the same section and referred back to the scale of pen- alties that applied for gross violation of integrity. subsequently been amended, including changing the scale of penal- ties for both offences to imprisonment for at least nine months and at most six years. We have considered whether the minimum penalty should now be increased to imprisonment for one year. Before we began our In- quiry, the Swedish Authority had proposed such an increase with a view to giving and prosecutors better tools to necessary supporting evidence in the form of records and forensic certificates in cases where the injured party does not consent. The Swedish Authority has also stated that an increased minimum penalty would better reflect the seriousness of the offence. In our assessment, the scale of penalties for gross violation of in- tegrity and gross violation of a woman’s integrity should not be changed. The penalty for these offences and for the proposed new honour-based offence should be imprisonment for at least nine months and at most six years. With reference to our general starting points for reform, we note that it must be possible to justify imposing more severe penalties for a certain classification of offence in that individuals who commit such offences thereby deserve a more severe penalty than that con- tained in the applicable scale of penalties. Whether perpetrators of such offences deserve a more severe penalty should in turn be as- sessed in terms of the scale of the damage, danger or violation in- volved in the criminal act, for example for the victim. The interest of access to procedural tools does not constitute a rational ground for increasing the minimum penalty. The question has thus been whether imposing more severe minimum penalties for the integrity violation offences can be justified on grounds of perpetrators de- serving a more severe penalty. In our assessment, the current scale of penalties for the integrity violation offences, with a minimum penalty of imprisonment for nine months, means that a person who is found guilty of gross violation of integrity or gross violation of a woman’s integrity receives a penalty that is several times more severe than if they had been guilty of each of the individual criminal acts – for example one count of assault (ordinary degree), one count of unlawful coercion and one count of molestation – that would otherwise have made up the integrity violation offence. It is not justifiable to increase that gap, such that the penalty for criminal acts committed against someone who cannot be considered a family member is only a fraction of the penalty for the equivalent criminal acts committed against a family member. Furthermore, we note that a more severe minimum penalty for the integrity violation offences could lead courts, in the relatively least culpable cases, to avoid applying those provisions and to adju- dicate instead on the component offences. This would, in turn, in- volve a risk that increasing the minimum penalty would counteract the aim of the provisions. Despite our position on the implications, in accordance with our remit we propose an alternative scale of penalties for gross violation of integrity and gross violation of a woman’s integrity, whereby the minimum penalty would be increased from imprisonment for nine months to imprisonment for one year. This alternative proposal also covers the proposed new honour-based offence. As we have noted as part of our deliberations on the scale of penal- ties for the integrity violation offences, procedural considerations cannot constitute rational arguments for increasing the minimum penalty for a given offence. However, as we have also noted, wider possibilities to use procedural tools can instead be achieved through changes to the procedural provisions. In light of this, we propose that the provisions in Chapter 10, Section 23 of the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400) and Section 5, second par- agraph of the Act on Certificates in Connection with Crime (2005:225) be amended. The amendments would mean that information about an injured party that is held by health care services and classified as secret could be included in a forensic med- ical certificate and disclosed to an agency tasked with intervening against an offence, if the information concerns suspicions of a com- pleted offence for which no less severe penalty than imprisonment for six months is prescribed, or of an attempted offence for which no less severe penalty than imprisonment for one year is prescribed, rather than two years’ imprisonment as at present. The amendment would mean that law enforcement authorities can also obtain access to information from health care services – without needing to obtain the victim’s consent – when investigating integrity violation offences and the proposed new honour-based offence. The proposed amendment is justified by the fact that the benefits to individual victims and crime victims collectively – in the form of more effective criminal investigations into the relatively serious of- fences under discussion here – outweigh the victim’s interest in de- ciding for themselves to what extent law enforcement authorities are allowed to obtain the information. We consider that the proposed amendments would reduce the pressure that a victim may experience if they themselves are responsible for deciding whether information should be disclosed. Penalties for breaches of non-contact orders We propose that the scale of penalties for breaches of non-contact orders under Section 24, first paragraph, second sentence of the Non-Contact Orders Act (1988:688) be amended from a fine or im- prisonment for at most one year to imprisonment for (at least 14 days and) at most one year, while the current rule on freedom from responsibility in the second paragraph of the same section should be replaced with a provision to the effect that in minor cases, the penalty is a fine.