sou · H7B346 · 2019-11-29 00:00:00 — Konsekvenserna för berörda företag kommer att bero på hur Riks- bankens föreskrifter utformas dels avseende uppgiftsskyldighet inom alla verksamhetsområden och dels specifika föreskrifter mot bakgrund av de utökade uppgifterna inom kontantverksamheten och avseende samhällets krisberedskap och höjd beredskap. The Riksbank is of great importance for economic development in , in both the short and the long term. Like other central banks, the Riksbank is responsible for a number of fundamental tasks that are crucial if the economy is to function well. Two of its fundamental tasks are to provide means of payment and a central system for payment settlement. These tasks form safe and efficient financial system. It is hard to exaggerate the importance of being able to execute payments both in normal times and in times of crisis and of households and businesses having confidence in this being the case. A third fundamental task is to safeguard the value of money by promoting low and stable inflation. The introduction of inflation targets and independent central banks in the 1990s has resulted in much lower and more stable inflation in and elsewhere. Low and stable inflation reduces uncertainty in connection with investments and saving, which is positive for growth. Low and stable inflation also reduces unintentional redistri- bution of wealth. A fourth fundamental task is to act, when the need arises, as a lender of last resort for certain financial companies and to thereby limit the risks of financial crises arising and alleviate their effects if they nevertheless do occur. The financial crisis that exploded in 2008 was a reminder that confidence – and therefore the possibility of raising finance– in financial markets can disappear suddenly. In such a situation the Riksbank can offer financing, against collateral, until the unrest has abated and thereby prevent a financial collapse with serious consequences for the real economy. The fact that central banks have strong powers and are able to act quickly when unrest spreads in financial markets creates confidence and can contribute to reducing unrest. The financial crisis also demonstrated the importance of flexibility. Central banks needed to take different measures depending on the specific problems facing them and the conditions at the time. It should not be possible to give the Riksbank’s instructions in the context of monetary policy. This ensures that the credibility of the price stability objective is maintained. The Riks- bank should also be able to make independent decisions in other areas of activity. Furthermore, the Riksbank should have a high degree of financial independence that ensures that it is able to perform and finance its tasks. The Riksbank should also be governed through a law that clarifies the objectives of its activities and what consid- erations are to be taken into account. Given the central role of the Riksbank for the economy and its independence as an institution, it is very important to ensure its democratic legitimacy. This is achieved through a democratic anchor- ing in which the Riksdag reaches decisions on and clarifies the objectives, tasks and powers of the Riksbank as well as through the appointment of members of . In addition, there is a need for democratic scrutiny of the Riksbank to make it possible to realise accountability. The context of the Riksbank’s activities has changed continually over time. Since the present Riksbank Act entered into force in 1989, there have been great changes in the economic policy landscape re- garding, for instance, the Swedish exchange-rate regime, the deregu- lation and internationalisation of financial markets and Swedish membership of Union. The adjustments made to the Riksbank Act in 1999 related mainly to incorporating the price stability objective in the Act and to stronger independence and a new management structure for the Riksbank. So, the present Riksbank Act was largely framed in the second half of the 1980s when the exchange-rate was fixed and the financial system had a completely different appearance. This means that many parts of the Act are out- dated, and this contributes to its lack of clarity. The global financial crisis and the period of low inflation that followed on it in large parts of the world put the tasks and powers of the central banks in the spotlight. During the acute phase of the financial crisis the central banks acted to avert a financial collapse chiefly by acting as lenders of last resort, i.e. providing liquidity assistance for financial actors when their financing markets were not working. After the acute phase it turned out that monetary policy was restricted by the inability to reduce key interest rates even more. As there was a need for further monetary policy stimulus, interest rate management was supplemented by purchases of financial assets (‘quantitative easing’). The experience of the global financial crisis has resulted in several countries launching inquiries to analyse the future objectives, tasks and powers of the central banks. In the aftermath of the financial crisis considerable changes have also been made to the international and European regulatory frame- works in order to promote financial stability. In , Finans- inspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) has been given responsibility for macro-prudential policies and Riksgälds- kontoret (the Debt Office) has been given respon- sibility for resolution. One central issue in the Inquiry is what objectives, tasks and powers the Riksbank ought to have to promote financial stability and efficiency, given this institutional structure. Moreover, extensive and rapid change in the payment market as a result of technological development and digitalisation has affected the activities of the Riksbank in the payment system. The conditions for the Riksbank’s cash activities have been affected by the rapid decrease in cash use in , a trend that has accelerated in the past ten-year period. The question of preparedness in the payment system has also become increasingly relevant. In particular, the decision to resume unified cohesive defence planning, including the Defence Commission’s indicative proposal regarding the total defence and the design of civil defence, has contributed to this. Thus, a number of the issues that the Committee has been tasked with analysing have been raised by the financial crisis, while others have been justified by a more general need for a review as a result of the institutional and economic changes seen in the past 30 years. In the light of the new situation described above, the difficulties in interpreting and applying the present Act have increased over time. Several actors have stressed the lack of clarity in the Riksbank’s responsibility in the area of financial stability as a particular problem. Other areas in which there is a need to update the Act and clarify the objectives, tasks and powers of the Riksbank are monetary policy, the Riksbank’s international activities, cash activities and responsi- bility to maintain preparedness. There are also some unclear points concerning powers and the distribution of responsibility in the management of the Riksbank, both within and between and the . ’s terms of reference start from the positions taken by the Riksdag in Committee report 2015/16:FiU41 of . According to the terms of reference (ToR 2016:114) the Committee is to analyse and propose statutory amendments in the following areas: •monetary policy objectives and means; •the responsibility of the Riksbank for financial stability; •the institutional independence of the Riksbank; •the organisation of the Riksbank; •the role of the Riksbank in international contexts; •the democratic scrutiny of the Riksbank and monetary policy; •the responsibility of the Riksbank for cash handling, cash pro- vision; and •preparedness in the payment system. According to the Committee’s terms of reference the starting point for the inquiry is that the objective of price stability is still to be of central importance and that the Riksbank is to enjoy a high degree of independence. is also to take account of the fact that does not have the euro as its currency. In addition, the Committee is to start from the division of responsibility decided for macro-prudential policies and resolution. In October 2017 the Committee was also tasked with presenting proposals regarding the Riksbank’s financial independence and balance sheet (ToR 2017:100). The terms of reference also include clarifying in law the conditions on which the Riksbank may reinforce the foreign reserves through loans from the National Debt Office. Central starting points that have guided the Committee’s proposals A new Riksbank Act is needed The present Riksbank Act entered into force on 1 January 1989. In the late 1990s a number of amendments were made focusing mainly on the introduction of the price stability objective, adaptation to the requirements in EU law for independent central banks, including a new management structure for the Riksbank. However, the provi- sions concerning matters including exchange-rate policy, cash supply and the role of the Riksbank with respect to the financial system as whole were not altered. The extensive economic policy and institutional changes that have taken place since the Act entered into force means that an extensive review of the Act is needed, as is also stated in the Committee’s terms of reference. In the view of the Committee, the changes needed in the present Riksbank Act are so extensive and comprehensive that it should be replaced by a new Riksbank Act (see chapter 13) Adaptation to EU law but not to introduction of the euro In the view of the Committee, the legislation should be amended to the extent required to enable the regulatory framework that applies in to be visible in Swedish law. Swedish legislation should therefore reflect the most central rules in EU law for the activities of the Riksbank, taking account of the fact that is a ‘with a derogation’, i.e. it does not have the euro as its currency. However, the Committee’s assessment is that there is no reason to present legislative proposals concerning the legal integration of the Riksbank in System of Central Banks (ECBS) that would enable an immediate introduction of the euro as the currency This should wait until such time as a political decision that will introduce the euro as its currency may have been made. In its legislative proposals the Committee has taken account of views on Swedish legislation presented by Commission regarding matters including the institutional and financial indepen- dence of the Riksbank and the prohibition of monetary financing (see chapter 13). The Riksbank is a special administrative authority with a high degree of independence The Riksbank is an administrative authority and is covered by the requirements of legality, objectivity and proportionality and collabo- ration with other authorities stated in both the Instrument of Govern- ment and the Administrative Procedure Act (2017:900). The con- ditions and need for collaboration with other authorities are different in different parts of the Riksbank’s activities. Moreover, the Riks- bank is answerable to the Riksdag. Compared with the other authori- ties under the Riksdag, the Riksbank has great breadth in its tasks and forms of activities. The Riksbank also has a unique form of man- agement unlike that of other Swedish authorities (see chapter 11). To these special conditions for the Riksbank as an authority, can be added the Riksbank’s independence in the form of its institu- tional independence (the ban on giving instructions), its functional independence, its financial independence, the personal independence of the Riksbank management and the fact that the Riksbank is a separate legal entity distinct from the State (see chapter 12). A clear mandate laid down in law is needed for the activities of the Riksbank As the Riksbank is answerable to the Riksdag, the only possible way of governing it is by law. This is an important reason why the objectives, tasks and powers of the Riksbank should set out in the Act. In several respects the present Riksbank Act is outdated and hard to interpret and therefore to apply. If the activities of the Riksbank are conducted within the framework of a clearer mandate laid down in law, the Riksbank will be better able to act and to take necessary and appropriate measures in different situations. This will also make it easier for other actors to interpret the responsibility of the Riksbank in different areas of activity, such as in work on finan- cial stability and cash activities and regarding society’s crisis prepared- ness and elevated preparedness. There is a lack of clarity in several of the Riksbank’s areas of activity. One area where the deficiencies in current legislation has been highlighted repeatedly is the responsibility of the Riksbank for financial stability. At present there is no explicit mandate regarding financial stability in the Act, over and above the provisions that the Riksbank shall promote a safe and efficient payments system and that the Riksbank may provide emergency liquidity assistance to financial companies if certain conditions are met. The tasks and powers that the Committee proposes that the Riksbank should have in financial stability are largely a codification of practice. In other areas, too, the Riksbank has over time developed practice that is not reflected in the present Riksbank Act. This applies, for example, to the Riksbank’s international work, to the Riksbank’s reports to the Riksdag and information to the public and to the working methods within . In several cases the Committee’s pro- posals mean that practice is codified in law. A clearer mandate laid down in law also secures the democratic ’s activities while improving the condi- tions for scrutiny and the exercise of accountability on the part of the Riksdag in relation to the Riksbank. ’s most important proposals The following is a brief description of the Committee’s most important proposals in the areas identified by the terms of reference. Mandate in monetary policy (chapters 14–19) proposes that the objective of monetary policy in the new Act should be sustainably low and stable inflation (the price stability objective; see chapter 15). The specification of the objective in terms of target variable, rate of growth and price index, should be carried out by the Riksbank. gives its backing to the Riksbank’s present specification, i.e. an inflation target measured according to CPIF with a target growth rate of 2 per cent per year. proposes that, when needed, the Riksbank should make a submission to the Riksdag when it wants to change the current specification, which the Riksdag can then choose to approve or not approve. also proposes that, without setting aside the price stabil- ity objective, the Riksbank should contribute to a balanced develop- ment of production and employment (consideration of the real econ- omy; see chapter 16). and above this, the Committee has considered including financial stability as a separate objective of monetary policy, thereby taking account of financial stability over and above the effects that go via inflation and the real economy. However, the Committee makes the assessment that this is not appropriate (see chapter 17). The tasks of the Riksbank as part of monetary policy consist of conducting monetary policy and ‘exchange-rate management’, the latter if the Government has adopted a target for the exchange-rate (see chapter 19). This means that the proposed act is compatible with both a floating and a fixed exchange-rate. The Committee considers that what should constitute monetary policy, and there- fore be covered by the ‘ban to seek and take instructions’ (see chap- ter 12), is defined by the monetary policy powers that follow from the second chapter of the proposed Riksbank Act (see chapter 13). also proposes that the Riksbank be assigned a number of powers as part of monetary policy (see chapter 18). These powers consist of instruments (e.g. offering credits) and possible restrictions on the use of the instruments (e.g. requirements of col- lateral for credits). According to the Committee’s proposal, the Riks- bank’s powers in monetary policy should cover the following: •Receiving deposits, providing credit in Swedish kronor and foreign currency and deciding the key interest rate. However, credits may only be provided against adequate collateral. •Issuing debt instruments in Swedish kronor. •Buying sovereign debt instruments in the secondary market. emphasises, however, that the Riksbank should, when this is called for, take account of how purchases of sovereign debt instruments affect the functioning of financial markets and the conditions for the management of the State’s (central govern- ment) debt. The Committee considers, however, that the last point does not need to be stated in the new Riksbank Act. •Buying private securities, i.e. financial instruments other than Swedish sovereign debt instruments, if there are exceptional reasons. emphasises, however, that, in general, both changes in key interest rates and purchases of sovereign debt instruments are preferable to purchases of private assets since these assets are much riskier from a financial perspective. also emphasises that the measure should be designed to have the least possible impact on the allocation of credit and resources, given the effects the Riksbank wants to achieve. The Committee considers, however, that this does not need to be stated in the new Riksbank Act. •Implementing currency interventions, but these interventions should be implemented taking account of the applicable exchange- rate system. As part of conducting monetary policy the Committee also pro- poses that the Riksbank should inform the public about matters including the objectives of monetary policy and the Bank’s mone- tary policy strategy. Information on monetary policy decisions made should be given to the Government as soon as possible after the decision and, if possible, before it is announced to the public. In addition, the Riksbank may conduct a dialogue with the Govern- ment and other public authorities or organisations about questions that affect the design of monetary policy and the possibilities of attaining the objectives of monetary policy. Mandate in financial stability (chapters 20–25) proposes that the Riksbank be given an explicit objective for its work on financial stability. The objective should be to contribute to the stability and effectiveness of the financial system. To achieve this objective the Riksbank is given the following main tasks: •providing a payment settlement system and participating in other ways when needed in payment settlement in relation to financial companies and authorities; •identifying vulnerabilities and risks in the financial system that may lead to serious disturbances; •conducting oversight of the financial infrastructure and making preparations to manage crises; and •providing liquidity assistance to the financial system in the form of general liquidity assistance and emergency liquidity assistance. The tasks are largely a codification in law of the activities currently conducted by the Riksbank with respect to financial stability. Regarding liquidity assistance the Riksbank is given the power to provide general liquidity assistance for the purpose of financial stabil- ity. also concludes that the Riksbank ought to have a special responsibility for liquidity assistance to the financial system. specifically, the Riksbank may give credit to or enter into repurchase agreements with Swedish companies subject to the supervision of the Financial Supervisory Authority and equivalent foreign companies conducting operations in via branches and central counterparties (CCPs), if this is needed to counter a serious disturbance in the financial system in . Credits and repurchase agreements can relate to both Swedish kronor and foreign currency. Credits shall be given in return for adequate collateral. The Riksbank may also buy and sell financial instruments at pre- determined prices, in a way similar to a market maker, in order to temporarily support the functioning of system-critical financial mar- kets if this is needed to counter a serious disturbance in the financial system in and if there are exceptional reasons. Regarding emergency liquidity assistance the Committee proposes that the Riksbank’s power to provide credit should be transferred to the new Act, with certain clarification and expansion of the pro- vision. The new provision states that the Riksbank may provide credit in Swedish kronor or foreign currency in return for collateral in order to support liquidity if this is needed to counter a serious disturbance in the financial system in and if there are excep- tional reasons. Such a credit may only be given to a company that is a Swedish company subject to the supervision of the Financial Supervisory Authority or an equivalent foreign company conducting operations in via a branch or a central counterparty. The company must be viable but have temporary liquidity problems. The Riksbank’s international activities (chapters 26 and 27) ’s proposal clarifies that the Riksbank may partici- pate in international cooperation that is of importance for its ability to achieve the objectives for its activities that are stated in the Riksbank Act. makes the assessment that, with this support in law, the Riksbank will continue to be able to participate in the international cooperation it currently participates in. The Riksbank should ensure that the Government receives regular in- formation about important circumstances in the international work that the Riksbank participates in. In the case of decisions on important matters of principle in international contexts that are linked to the activities of other public authorities, the Riksbank should consult with other Swedish author- ities. When the Riksbank participates in an international forum along with another Swedish authority, it is particularly important that the authorities build support for their positions and seek to reach common standpoints in important matters of principle. If the Riksbank’s principal, the Riksdag, or the Government – as part of its responsibility for foreign policy – makes statements about ’s general stance and they are of importance for the authori- ties’ international discussions, the Riksbank shall base the stand- points it frames on these statements. The Riksbank may act as a liaison body and financial counterpart of the (). Swedish standpoints in the IMF should be developed in cooperation between the Govern- ment and the Riksbank, as they are at present. However, since it is , as a country, that is a member of the IMF, the Committee’s assessment is that, ultimately, it is the Government that decides what position should represent. The exception from this is matters concerning monetary policy or other ECBS-related questions. In conjunction with the participation of the Riksbank in the financing of the activities of the IMF, the Riksbank should request that the National Debt Office lends an equivalent amount to the Riksbank. The interest rate should correspond to the interest rate the Riksbank receives from the IMF. The net interest income and any credit losses on account of IMF undertakings will therefore have a direct effect on the state budget instead of, as at present, affecting it indirectly via the Riksbank’s result and dividend to the state budget. The Riksbank’s institutional and financial independence and the foreign reserves (chapters 28–31) The Riksbank’s financial independence is strengthened in several respects in the new Act.