sou · H7B346 · 2019-11-29 00:00:00 — First, the Committee propose that decisions to adopt the balance sheet, profit and loss account and allocation of profits should be made by instead of by the Riksdag. The decision of the Riksdag is limited to either approving or setting aside the 's decision. Second, the conditions for the profit allocation to the State are laid down in law. An indexed target level is introduced for the Riksbank’s equity, meaning profits are only distributed to the state budget if the target level is exceeded. Third, the Committee’s proposal clarifies that the Riksbank has the right to make financial provisions in accordance with 's financial reporting guideline. Fourth, a procedure laid down in law is established for restoring the Riksbank’s equity if it falls below a certain level. More- over, the Committee’s proposal makes clear that the Riksbank is a separate legal entity that is owned by the State, that the Riksbank manages its own assets and the income of its activities and that the State guarantees the Riksbank’s obligations. Its institutional independence is strengthened by providing that the Riksbank will no longer be obliged to inform a government minister ahead of all important monetary policy decisions and only has do so after these decisions. Finally, the Committee’s proposal makes clear that the ban to seek and take instructions set out in the Instrument of Government and the Riksbank Act applies to all four ‘ECBS-related tasks’, and to the collection of statistics as part of cooperation in the ECBS, and not only to monetary policy. The new Act also clarifies the conditions on which the Riksbank may borrow foreign currency from the National Debt Office to satisfy the need for foreign reserves. The Riksbank may borrow foreign currency from the National Debt Office corresponding to five per cent of ’s gross domestic product. This kind of borrowing should be preceded by a thorough analysis and justifi- cation of the need to reinforce the foreign reserve. The borrowing should also be preceded by consultations with the National Debt Office. If there are exceptional reasons, the Riksbank may tem- porarily borrow further foreign currency in order to reinforce the foreign reserves. In addition, the Riksbank is given the opportunity to take out foreign currency loans from the National Debt Office with the aim of restoring the foreign exchange reserve if it has been used for liquidity support. ’s proposal clarifies that the Riksbank may raise credits from, provide credits to, and enter into currency repurchase agreements, or other similar agreements, with other central banks without this needing to have any connection with what is called exchange-rate policy in the present Riksbank Act. When the Riks- bank enters into such agreements in order to satisfy another central bank’s need for currency, approval by the Riksdag is required in cer- tain cases. Organisational clarity within the Riksbank (chapter 32) ’s proposal is intended to make the division of respon- sibility within the Riksbank clearer with respect to its organisation and management. This refers, first, to the relationship between and the where the roles are made clearer and more distinct. function is laid down in law. The influence of organisation of the Riksbank, in that the adopts the Riksbank’s rules of procedure, is removed. The decisions on organisational and management issues set out in the rules of pro- cedure should be taken by the Riksbank’s instead so as to achieve the Riksbank’s objectives in the best and most efficient way. is proposed to continue to have the task of appointing the Governor and Deputy Governors in the future. proposes introducing a clear application procedure for the appointment of members of . When recruiting, the should ensure that, taken together, the Governor and Deputy Governors have appropriate competence and expertise in all parts of the Riksbank’s activities. The candidate profile for the Governor of the Riksbank should also include leadership ability. Second, the Committee proposes that the role of the Governor of the Riksbank as the head of the authority and chair of the Exec- utive Board be clarified in law. The Governor of the Riksbank should run the operating activities of the Riksbank according to the direc- tives and guidelines adopted by . This means laying down in law the practice for work in that has developed in recent years and that is, in the Committee’s assessment, functioning well. Third, the Committee proposes that the number of executive board members be decreased from six to five with transitional rules for members appointed before the new Riks- enters into force. There is an efficiency aspect here regarding work in , with five members being judged to be sufficient to achieve breadth in decision-making. When it comes to monetary policy decisions, and other policy decisions with an impact on society, the executive board members should have equal standing and the Committee proposal of five executive board members means that the casting vote of the Governor of the Riksbank will seldom be relevant. Greater organisational clarity with a specific distribution of re- sponsibility between different parts of Riksbank management will enable the Riksbank to improve efficiency and the achievement of objectives in its activities. Stronger democratic scrutiny of the Riksbank (chapter 33) Under the terms of reference, the Committee’s remit is to present proposals to strengthen democratic scrutiny. Deficiencies have been identified in the democratic scrutiny of the Riksbank in areas in- cluding the resources and time available to for this scrutiny, the Committee’s disadvantage in terms of information and knowledge and the insufficient dialogue between the and . does any external body examine regulatory compliance by the Riksbank. The forms for information to the public and reports to the Riksdag are codified in law mainly in accordance with the practice that has been developed by the Riksbank. A new provision is added to the Riksdag Act to the effect that shall monitor all the activities of the Riksbank with respect to the achieve- ment of objectives and efficiency. In addition, the National Audit Office will audit the regulatory compliance of the Riksbank as part of its annual financial audit. The stronger scrutiny by audit of regulatory compliance by the National Audit Office require the allocation of additional resources. 's control function is laid down in law. is responsible for following the work of and the other activities of the Riksbank. The Gene- ral Council should keep informed about matters of substantial importance. should also meet regularly and should report its observations to at the request of that Committee. Finally, the Committee’s proposal makes clear that the ’s existing audit function should examine the work of . makes the assessment that the democratic scrutiny of the Riksbank’s activities on the part of the Riksdag is made easier by codifying existing practice in several areas and by assigning the Riksbank clearer tasks and powers in areas including financial stability and cash activities and regarding society’s crisis preparedness and elevated preparedness. This also applies to bodies for external review such as the National Audit Office. Responsibility for cash management and stronger role in the cash management chain (chapter 34) In the interim report (SOU 2018:42) the Committee concluded that the State should work to ensure that the continued development of access to cash services takes place under controlled conditions to ensure that the cash needs of the general public and society are met. Moreover, cash and an effective cash infrastructure must not be allowed to disappear before a position can be taken on the role of cash as means of payment from a longer-term perspective. makes the assessment that, over and above the proposals made in its interim report, measures also need to be taken to strengthen the role of the Riksbank and to clarify its responsibility for cash management in society. In line with the assessments made in the interim report, the Committee proposes that the Riksbank be given an objective for all of its cash activities: to contribute to the availability of cash to a satisfactory extent throughout . The Riksbank is also assigned three tasks in its cash activities: •being responsible for issuing cash in by issuing and re- deeming banknotes and coins; •having an overall responsibility for the functioning of cash man- agement in , which includes reporting regularly to the Riksdag and, when needed, acting as a coordinating actor in cash management; and •being responsible for ensuring that there are cash depot opera- tions in and that there are banknote depots in at least five places in , with two of them being in the northern parts of the country. and above its present powers in cash activities, the Riksbank is also given a greater right to obtain information from authorities and certain private companies so as to be able to follow and analyse cash management. The Riksbank is also given a certain expanded right to issue regulations on cash management. The notion of legal tender in the present Riksbank Act is clarified, including in relation to contract law. emphasises that public actors ought not to contribute actively to the further marginalisation of the role of cash before the Riksdag has taken a position on the role of cash from a longer-term perspective. In this context the Committee welcomes the Riksdag’s announcement (Com- mittee Report 2018/19:FiU44) to the Government about appointing an inquiry with a broad mandate to investigate the role of the State in the payment market, digital central bank money and the meaning of the concept of legal tender. Greater responsibility for society’s crisis preparedness and during elevated preparedness (chapter 35) The responsibility of the Riksbank for crisis preparedness and during elevated preparedness is clarified and increased. As before, the Riks- bank should be responsible for planning for peacetime crises and elevated preparedness regarding its own activities. In addition, the Riksbank should have a planning and control responsibility for legal persons that are of particular importance for the execution of elec- tronic payments and for traders in the area of cash handling. The objective of these activities should be to enable the public to make essential payments even during peacetime crises and elevated preparedness, to limit vulnerability regarding payments and to en- sure that the Riksbank to has a good capability to handle its tasks even during peacetime crises and elevated preparedness. In peacetime the Riksbank should plan so as to be able to shift to its wartime organisation during elevated preparedness. It should be possible to make decisions about the wartime posting of both Riks- bank personnel and certain privately employed personnel. In the event of disturbances regarding the execution of payments that arise during peacetime crises, the Riksbank should, when needed, imme- diately set up a command function for coordination and informa- tion. The bulk of requirements that apply to authorities under the Government regarding risk and vulnerability analyses, training and exercises, and other measures ahead of and during elevated prepared- ness are included in the new Riksbank Act. As a general rule, the legal persons and traders covered by the Riksbank's planning and control responsibility should be obliged to continue their activities in war and when there is a risk of war. They should also be obliged to take measures regarding the training of their personnel, exercises, etc. The Riksbank should be able to issue regulations containing requirements about what measures they have to take. During elevated preparedness both cash and emergency money should be legal tender, meaning that it should not be possible to agree not to comply with the right to pay with them. ’s proposals mean a substantially higher level of ambition for the role of the Riksbank for society’s crisis prepared- ness and during elevated preparedness. •A principle of proportionality is introduced for decision-making by the Riksbank. The principle is based on the principle of proportionality in EU law and in the Swedish Administrative Procedure Act (see chapter 13). The meaning of the proportion- ality principle is that a measure should be taken if the intended result is in reasonable proportion to the costs and risks that the measure leads to for the Riksbank’s and the State’s finances. •When the Riksbank takes various measures, the decision should be justified by stating which provisions are being applied and what facts have been decisive for the position taken by the Riks- bank (see chapter 13). •The group of companies obliged to report information to the Riksbank has been expanded slightly compared with the present regulations to enable the Riksbank to carry out all its tasks under the new Riksbank Act (see chapter 36). •An express provision is introduced about the right of the Riks- bank to use information collected for statistical purposes, both to produce national statistics and for international cooperation in, for instance, the ESCB or BIS (see chapter 36). •The Riksbank's task of managing assets is clarified in the new Riksbank Act. The purpose of this asset management is to enable the Riksbank to perform its tasks, in the first place, and to generate returns to finance its activities, in the second place. The assets should be managed with low risk, taking account of the various purposes of the asset holdings. In asset management, particular weight should be attached to how sustainable develop- ment can be promoted (see chapter 29). Impacts of the Committee’s proposals (chapter 38) One impact of the proposal of a new Riksbank Act is that some of the unclear points that have been raised regarding the tasks and powers of the Riksbank are mitigated with a new, modernised and clearer act. This will improve the Riksbank’s possibilities of acting in an appropriate way and also make it easier for other actors to interpret the responsibility of the Riksbank in different areas of activity, such as in work on financial stability, cash activities and regarding society’s crisis preparedness and elevated preparedness. Under the proposed new Act it will still be possible to take the mea- sures taken by the Riksbank in connection with the financial crisis and in the decade after it. The impact on the Riksbank’s resource requirements relating to work on financial stability is judged to be limited since, in most cases, the Committee’s proposals involve the clarification and codi- fication of practice. There is not judged to be any impact on the need for resources concerning monetary policy and the Riksbank’s international activities either. ’s proposals regarding the Riksbank’s responsibility for cash management and other cash activities entails some new tasks and powers and will lead to cost increases for the Riksbank. The same applies to the Riksbank’s clearer and increased responsibility for society’s crisis preparedness and during elevated preparedness. ’s proposals are assessed as increasing the resources needed by some 16–21 full-time equivalents. This is one reason for why the Riksbank’s result is judged to be weakened by – 68 million. The provision proposed regarding the right of the Riks- bank to borrow foreign currency from the National Debt Office, corresponding to 5 per cent of ’s GDP, is not judged to have any effects on the Riksbank’s costs in relation to the present situation as the existing foreign currency loans are below 5 per cent of GDP. However, the proposal that future activations of under- takings to the IMF should be charged to the state budget and not the Riksbank reduces the foreign reserves needed. how the Riksbank chooses to act, the decrease in the interest expense on account of this proposal is in the range –125 million. The resources required also increase by around million on account of the reinforced scrutiny of the Riksbank’s activities by the Riksdag () and the Audit Office. However, the judgment made is that this can be financed within the current limits of these authorities’ appropriations. The impacts on other government authorities are judged to be limited. The management of the sovereign debt by the National Debt Office is affected in that the Office has to handle borrowing to finance IMF undertakings and in that rules are put in place as to how foreign currency is to be borrowed to satisfy the Riksbank’s need for foreign reserves. Moreover, even closer collaboration than at present with the Riksbank will be required of authorities with activities in financial stability, the cash management chain and the area of preparedness. Taken together, the Committee’s proposals result in an effect on aggregate public finances of between -68 and +86 million per year. The proposed rule on profit allocation means that the result reported by the Riksbank will have a direct effect on the state bud- get. The dividend will vary more than it currently does. However, its impact on the size of the dividend is highly dependent on the level of the Riksbank's equity when the new profit allocation rule starts to apply. Future dividends can therefore be both higher and lower than follows from the present profit allocation principle. The impacts on the companies affected will depend on the design both of the Riksbank's regulations regarding the obligation to report information in all areas of activity and of specific regulations against the background of its increased tasks in cash activities and regarding society’s crisis preparedness and elevated preparedness. 1.1Förslag till lag om ändring i regeringsformen Härigenom föreskrivs att 7 kap. 7 §, 8 kap. 13 § och 9 kap. 13 och 14 §§ regeringsformen1 ska ha följande lydelse. Författningar, förslag till riks- Författningar, förslag till riks- dagen och andra beslut som ska dagen och andra beslut som ska expedieras ska för att bli gällande expedieras ska för att bli gällande skrivas under av statministern skrivas under av statsministern eller ett annat statsråd på reger- eller ett annat statsråd på reger- dock genom förordning före- dock genom förordning före- skriva att en tjänsteman i sär- skriva att en tjänsteman i sär- skilda fall ska få skriva under skilda fall ska få skriva under beslut som ska expedieras. beslut som ska expedieras. kan genom lag upp- kan genom lag be- dra åt att meddela föreskrifter inom dess ansvars- föreskrifter inom dess ansvars- område enligt 9 kap. och i fråga områden enligt 9 kap. och i fråga om dess uppgift att främja ett säkert om dess uppgifter i övrigt enligt och effektivt betalningsväsende. 1Regeringsformen omtryckt 2018:1903. kan bemyndiga myndigheter att meddela föreskrifter som avser förhållanden inom eller dess myn- digheter. bank och en myndighet under bank och en myndighet under svaret för penningpolitiken. 1. utforma och genomföra pen- 2. genomföra valutainterven- 3. inneha och förvalta valuta- 4. inom ramen för samarbetet met främja väl fungerande betal- 5. samla in den statistik som behövs för samarbetet inom Euro- Ingen myndighet får bestäm- Ingen myndighet får bestäm- ma hur ska besluta i ma hur ska besluta i frågor som rör penningpolitik. frågor som den ansvarar för enligt områden får inte heller begära eller ta emot instruktioner har elva fullmäktige, som väljs av . Riks- banken leds av en direktion, som utses av fullmäktige. prövar om ledamöterna i fullmäktige och direktionen ska beviljas ansvarsfrihet. Om vägrar en fullmäktig ansvars- frihet är han eller hon därmed skild från sitt uppdrag. Fullmäktige får skilja en ledamot av direktionen från anställningen endast om ledamoten inte längre uppfyller de krav som ställs för att han eller hon ska kunna utföra sina uppgifter eller om han eller hon gjort sig skyldig till allvarlig försummelse. Bestämmelser om val av full- Föreskrifter om val av full- ledning och verksamhet med- ledning och verksamhet med- delas i lag. delas genom lag. Endast har rätt att Endast har rätt att ge ut sedlar och mynt. ge ut sedlar och mynt. melser om penning- och betal- skrifter om utgivning och giltig- ningsväsendet meddelas i övrigt heten av sedlar och mynt med- delas genom lag. Denna lag träder i kraft . 1.2Förslag till lag om ändring i riksdagsordningen Härigenom föreskrivs i fråga om riksdagsordningen (2014:801) dels att 7 kap. 9 § och 13 kap. 24 § och tilläggsbestämmelse 9.17.4 ska ha följande lydelse, dels att det ska införas två nya paragrafer, 11 kap. 18 a § och 13 kap. 25 §, och närmast före 11 kap. 18 a § och 13 kap. 25 § rubriker av följande lydelse. ska bereda ärenden om 1.allmänna riktlinjer för den ekonomiska politiken och för beslut om statens budget, och Utskottet ska dessutom be- reda förslag till beslut om statens budget enligt 11 kap. 18 § tredje och femte styckena. Vidare ska utskottet granska beräkningen av statens inkomster och årsredo- visningen för staten. Utskottet ska sammanställa be- slut om statens budget. Ytterligare bestämmelser om utskottets uppgifter finns i reger- ingsformen och denna lag. I fråga om verk- samhet ska utskottet även, vid sidan av uppgifter enligt lagen (2002:1022) om revi- sion av statlig verksamhet m.m., ansvara för att följa upp och utvär- dera verksamhet. Utskottet ska dessutom bereda förslag till beslut om statens budget enligt 11 kap. 18 § tredje och femte styckena. Vidare ska utskottet granska beräkningen av statens inkomster och årsredo- visningen för staten. Utskottet ska sammanställa be- slut om statens budget. I regeringsformen och denna lag finns ytterligare bestämmelser om utskottets uppgifter. fullmäktige och direktion får göra framställningar hos inom sina ansvarsområden. Om har fattat be- slut om utformningen av prisstabi- litetsmålet enligt 2 kap. 1 § första stycket lagen (2021:000) om riksbank, ska direktionen göra en framställning hos riks- dagen om godkännande av målet. Beslut om utformningen av prisstabilitetsmålet Vid beslut med anledning av en framställning om utformningen av prisstabilitetsmålet enligt 2 kap. 1 § första stycket lagen (2021:000) om riksbank ska Riks- bankens beslut enligt framställ- ningen antingen godkännas eller inte godkännas. Om beslutet inte godkänns, gäller när- mast föregående beslut om utform- ningen av prisstabilitetsmålet. Åtal mot nedan angivna befattningshavare för ett brott begånget i utövningen av hans eller hennes uppdrag eller anställning får beslutas 1. endast av finansutskottet 1. endast av finansutskottet när det gäller åtal mot en full- när det gäller åtal mot en full- mäktig i eller en leda- mäktig i , och 2Ändringen innebär bl.a. att andra stycket upphävs. mot av direktion, och 2.endast av när det gäller åtal mot en leda- mot av riksdagsstyrelsen, eller över- klagandenämnd, mot en av ombudsmän, riksrevisorerna eller mot riksdagsdirektören. Bestämmelserna i första stycket om åtal mot en ledamot av Riks- bankens direktion ska inte tillämpas ifråga om ett brott begånget i ut- övningen av beslut- anderätt enligt lagen (1992:1602) om valuta- och kreditreglering. får besluta om en särskild utredning av omstän- digheter som kan ligga till grund för att skilja en ledamot i bankens direktion från uppdraget. 1.Denna lag träder i kraft . 2.Äldre bestämmelser om åtal gäller för brott som har begåtts före . 1.3Förslag till lag om riksbank Härigenom föreskrivs följande. Lagens innehåll och allmänna bestämmelser 1 § Denna lag innehåller bestämmelser om riksbank (Riks- banken). I lagen finns även bestämmelser om finansiella företag, vissa andra juridiska personer och näringsidkare och betalningsmedel. Lagen består av 13 kapitel. –lagens innehåll och allmänna bestämmelser (1 kap.), –penningpolitik (2 kap.), –det finansiella systemet (3 kap.), –kontanter (4 kap.), –krisberedskap och höjd beredskap (5 kap.),