sou · H5B3110 · 2018-01-11 00:00:00 — Det finns ett fortsatt behov av att i högre grad än prioritera det förebyggande arbetet mot radikalisering, och alltså ligga närmare riskpersoner och riskgrupper. Till det kommer nödvändigheten av en fungerande avhopparverksamhet för dem som väljer att lämna extremism och behöver stöd för att ta det steget. Nyss argumenterades för vikten att hantera våldsbejakande extremism som en risk. Slutsatsen är därför att minska riskerna. Ett kompletterande perspektiv är att ta fasta på allt det som gör samhället starkt i socialt hänseende. Genom att öka samhällets motståndskraft – resiliens – erbjuds ytterligare en väg i arbetet mot våldsbejakande extremism. Denna kompletterande strategi bör undersökas närmare. Om resiliens är en framtidsfråga kan det vara nödvändigt att även se till riskreducering och att förbereda samhället för det värsta. Det är en dörr som samordningen avslutningsvis öppnar för. Knappast någon fråga tilldrar sig lika mycket uppmärksamhet som våldsbejakande extremism. Kritiska röster hörs ofta om att det görs för litet eller att det som görs är fel. Kritik riktas mot regeringen, myndigheter, kommuner och inte minst samordningen. Det finns också en annan berättelse. är inte samma som 2014. kommuner tar extremisthotet på stort allvar och ser sitt eget ansvar för att agera. Lokala samordnare rekryteras, lägesbilder tas fram liksom handlingsplaner. Det finns ett stort engagemang parat med oro över utvecklingen. Vi på samordningen mot våldsbejakande extremism kan med säkerhet säga det efter att ha mött 800 kommunala tjänstemän, lokalpoliser och lokala civilsamhällesaktörer under årets kunskapsseminarier. I kapitel 7 finns en redovisning av alla de rapporter som samverkande myndigheter tagit fram. Regeringens strategier är analyserade i kapitel 6. Aktiviteten har varit hög. har terrorhotet kommit närmare. dömdes en bombtillverkare i till fängelse för förberedelse till terroristbrott. dömdes några personer för ett bombdåd mot lokal i och ett försöksbrott mot ett flyktingboende. Det längsta fängelsestraffet som dömdes ut var 5,5 års fängelse. Åklagaren betonade särskilt att det i Göteborgsmålet rörde sig om tidsinställda bomber. Två av bombmännen hade genomgått paramilitär träning i . Vi väntar fortfarande på åtalet för terrordådet på i . Ingen kan knappast ha undgått hur vit makt-miljön mobiliserar och agerar alltmer ogenerat på gator och torg: på i , första maj i och senast i samband med bokmässan i . Även framtiden ställer krav på mycket arbete, men ingen kan förneka att det nu finns en plattform för arbetet mot våldsbejakande extremism. är inte som 2014. The remit to safeguard democracy against violent extremism On 26 2014, the Government adopted terms of reference for a national coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism. Three representatives have successively held the position of National coordinator, and both personnel and positions within the Coordination have fluctuated throughout this time. , to highlight the assignment rather than the individuals involved, we refer to this remit as the Coordination, which has had the characteristics of an implementing committee. The Coordination’s remit has been extended to 12 January 2018 through supplementary terms of reference. This final report accounts for the Coordination’s work and activities over the past three and a half years. The Coordination is part of a broader Government effort made up of terror strategies, action plans to safeguard democracy against violent extremism, and a large number of assignments to a range of government agencies. Consequently, one of the aims of this final report is to explain the role of the Coordination within this broader effort. Against that background, and in combination with an analysis of the drivers of violent extremism, the report concludes with a discussion of future needs for safeguarding democracy against violent extremism. Putting the problem on the agenda “Isn’t this a matter for the ?” This was the position that former government minister and her colleagues came up against when they began visiting a large number of Swedish municipalities mid-2014. The issue at hand was the responsibility for and interest in preventing violent extremism in the local community. This applied not just to the right-wing extremist white-supremacy movement, which several municipalities had experience of, and the left-wing extremist autonomous movement, with which there was also a reasonable familiarity, but also to the relatively new phenomenon of violent Islamist extremism. At that time, the country’s municipalities had fairly limited knowledge of violent extremism. Few municipalities were aware that extremist activities or extremist movements existed within their localities. There was preparation in place, and a considerable number of municipal representatives did not feel much responsibility for preventing violent extremism. had been appointed by the Government to the post of National Coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism; a long title that indicates the remit is not about counterterrorism but rather about prevention. Other parts of society, primarily the judicial system, are responsible for preempting and protecting the country from attacks. The measures subjected to coordination – by government agencies, municipalities and civil society – aim to reduce the base of recruitment to violent extremism and thereby prevent its ultimate consequence; terrorism. Coordination later specified the remit’s content in greater detail in the following way. •strengthen democracy against violent extremism •prevent people from joining violent extremist movements •help facilitate the process to exit such movements. The material submitted to the Government in planning for the of a coordination body identified a bureaucratic ‘gap’ between the central government and municipal levels. A national body was needed to coordinate ’s efforts to prevent violent extremism. on, the Coordination emphasised that the municipalities hold a central role in prevention. It is within local communities that extremist movements emerge and people are radicalised. It is also in the local community that the idea forms for people to to areas of armed conflict such as and – the predominant destinations during the remit period. And it is to the local community that they return. Consequently, the first phase of the Coordination’s remit was dedicated to putting the problem on the agenda and mobilising the country’s municipalities. This primarily involved a seemingly infinite number of meetings and educational seminars. At an early stage, the Coordination prioritised visiting 100 municipalities and, by summer 2016, had visited 260 municipalities. The second phase, which was centred around a structure for local preventive efforts, began around summer 2015. The most important aspect was for each municipality to appoint a staff member responsible for coordinating preventive efforts within the municipality. At the very least, every municipality was to have a contact person as a link to the municipality. time, almost all municipalities in the country have appointed a contact person. Another cornerstone of a permanent local infrastructure was for municipalities to write a situational report concerning violent extremism within their area. Today, many municipalities have produced such a report, and often do so on an annual basis. Municipalities with pronounced problems with violent extremism update it more frequently. Some municipalities update it weekly. The third cornerstone consists of the municipality producing an action plan based on the situational report. Some municipalities have an action plan that focuses on processes and responsibilities. Others have operational action plans that resemble activity plans; who does what, when. Municipalities can collaborate to share a single coordination officer and in this case, it may be appropriate to produce joint situational reports and action plans. This tends to be the case especially in small municipalities or in places where extremist movements span across municipal boundaries. With coordination officers, situational reports and action plans, municipalities are well equipped for conducting preventive efforts. There are procedures and structures that increase the level of preparation and lead to concrete action. In , the Coordination decided to begin the work of establishing local knowledge centres in collaboration with the municipalities in , , and . These are networks in which local coordination officers collaborate with various municipal bodies such as the social services as well as with the local , civil society and health services. The intention is to establish more effective and advanced working methods for prevention. The aim is for the knowledge centres to serve as examples and to inspire other municipalities to further develop their own preventive efforts. A similar example of such a structure has been developed in . The national helpline that opened in is an important channel for concerned parents and others who need advice and support regarding radicalisation and extremism. Those who call can remain anonymous. The Red Cross operated the helpline until 1 February, 2017, when Save the Children took over operations and changed the name of the helpline to Orostelefonen. An additional development for Orostelefonen is that, by request of the caller, the call can be transferred to, for example, the local coordination officer or contact person in the home municipality of the caller. Orostelefonen is also able to follow up calls to ensure that callers have received appropriate support. Orostelefonen is not a ‘hotline’ in the sense that it aims to counter impending terror threats; instead, it is a ‘helpline’. Nonetheless, it can still serve as a societal insurance solution; one of several to prevent the worst from happening and for which the premium is almost non-existent. on, the Coordination established a reference group made up of representatives from a range of collaborating government agencies and the Authorities and Regions. time, the group has been expanded to include additional agencies and civil society representatives. The reference group meets regularly and has primarily functioned as a body for sharing information and transferring knowledge. Two other networks are the researchers’ network and the practitioners’ network. The researchers’ network gathered a range of researchers from different disciplines and has resulted in, among other things, an extensive research anthology. It presents an overview of current research and identifies future research needs. Further reports have been published within the field that reflect both the use of violence and defection from extremist movements. The practitioners’ network has been centred around the work of the four local knowledge centres. By summer 2016, the Coordination had presented a strategy to safeguard democracy from violent extremism. Some key points of the strategy were the local infrastructure of coordination officers, situational reports and action plans. From what to how The third phase began following the summer of 2016 when former government minister assumed the position as National coordinator. By this time, knowledge and awareness about the issue had increased. A range of government agencies had produced reports that reflected various perspectives on violent extremism. Municipalities were involved; local coordination officers were being instituted. Situational reports and action plans were being drawn up. At this stage, the importance of working at the local level was no longer being questioned. Instead, municipalities began to ask questions about how to work concretely. It became necessary to step up national efforts and disseminate more applied knowledge. At the beginning of 2017, when Dr. took over as National coordinator, an extensive series of knowledge seminars began. In partnership with the county administrative boards, the Coordination held 24 seminars to which the respective county’s municipalities were invited. At these seminars, the Coordination has met around 800 people from the country’s municipalities: local coordination officers, contact persons, school and after-school recreation staff, officers from social services, actors from civil society and local officers. Essentially, the seminars involved groups of participants discussing approaches and solutions to a number of scenarios. These concerned extremist propaganda in schools, defection from extremist movements, returnees from areas of armed conflict, children affected by extremist environments, lecturers and public figures who promote violence and unlawful influence on local coordination officers. One question that reoccurred during the seminars was: When is the time to take action? There are dilemmas and difficult decisions to be made regarding the grey zone between constitutionally protected rights and freedoms, and the importance of taking early action to prevent radicalisation and destructive behaviour that puts the individual’s own or other people’s safety and well-being at risk. One of the objectives of the seminars has been to highlight these dilemmas. The county administrative boards have a distinct role given their responsibility to coordinate the county’s work with risk and vulnerability and related issues such as crime prevention. The Coordination has previously proposed that, through regulations, the county administrative boards be given an explicitly designated coordinating role in the work to prevent violent extremism (SOU 2016:92). The justification for this is that the administrative distance between the municipalities and the national coordination is too big. The Coordination also sees a potential benefit in viewing violent extremism as a social risk to be managed by the crisis management system. The Coordination has also published a guide to assist municipalities in producing situational reports and action plans. Another important measure to increase knowledge is the 7.5 ECTS course that has implemented in partnership with the Coordination: Våldsbejakande extremism i – individ, samhälle, ideologi och praktik [Violent Extremism in – Individual, Community, Ideology and Practice]. The point of departure for this course is the course participants’ own experience and knowledge from their practical work to prevent violent extremism combined with the latest Swedish and international research. An increased collaboration with relevant actors from civil society has also been crucial. One key activity has been the 24 seminars in which actors from civil society have participated. The Coordination has also worked with creating and facilitating contacts, which has led to a more open dialogue between civil society, including religious actors, government agencies and municipalities. Relations between these different actors are now increasingly based on trust and there are platforms for collaboration. Several municipalities have begun or are about to begin constructive partnerships with various local civil society organisations. The Coordination’s remit ends in the middle of the third phase of moving from what to how. Subsequently, the municipalities have significant needs for qualified support and counselling. This also applies to individual cases. Even though this is not stated in the Coordination’s remit, the necessity to provide support in individual cases, primarily to municipalities, became clear at an early stage. The reason for this is that there has been no other actor to turn to. It has often been sufficient for the Coordination to act as a link between people or functions. In other cases, the Coordination has played an and operational role until there are sufficient levels of trust between those involved and a viable way forward is identified. Moving forward, the need to support local efforts to prevent violent extremism is significant. Moreover, there is an extensive and almost inexhaustible need for central government support in developing, describing and evaluating methods for local efforts to prevent violent extremism. Furthermore, municipalities need concrete support in specific cases. This applies to the individual cases just mentioned. The majority of municipalities will never be able to amount sufficient expertise and experience of their own to deal with such ‘rare cases’. However, this support concerns also cases of a more structural nature, such as receiving advice on how to deal with problems in a certain area or at a school. There may also be a need for support in producing a situational report or action plan. In some instances, a national ‘response team’ has been discussed. The national coordination needs to be further developed as well. One possibility would be to draw inspiration from the structures that have already been established at the local level with coordination officers, situational reports and action plans. At the national level, some form of cooperation council could also be established. In addition, a comprehensive national situational report could be drawn up and provide a basis for a national action plan. Much is being done to strengthen democracy, but too is being done to prevent people from being radicalised. There is a need to give greater priority to efforts to prevent radicalisation and hence to get closer to at-risk individuals and groups. On top of this, there is a need for a functional exit program for those who choose to leave extremism and need support to take the next step. The importance of treating violent extremism in terms of risk management has been argued for previously. Consequently, the focus should be on minimising the risks. A complementary perspective involves taking stock of what makes society strong from a social point of view. Increasing the societal resilience is another way forward in the work to prevent violent extremism. This complementary strategy should be investigated in more detail. If resilience becomes policy, it may also be necessary to look at risk reduction and at preparing society for the worst in this regard. In its conclusion, this is a door that the Coordination wishes to open. There are few issues that attract as much attention as violent extremism. Critical voices state that too is being done or that the wrong measures are being taken. Criticism is directed towards the Government, the authorities, municipalities, and not least, the Coordination. There is also another side of the story. The year 2017 is not the same as 2014. Swedish municipalities take the threat of violent extremism very seriously and understand they have a responsibility to act. Local coordination officers are being recruited, situational reports are being produced as are action plans. There is a generally broad commitment coupled with a concern about the developments. Those of us who work at the Coordination can say this with great certainty, having met with 800 municipal officers, local officers and actors from local civil society over the course of this year’s seminars. Chapter 7 contains an account of all the relevant reports that collaborating agencies have produced and the Government’s counterterrorism strategies are analysed in Chapter 6. The level of activity has certainly been high. At the same time, the threat of terror has moved closer to home. Last year, a bomb maker in was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for making preparations to commit a terrorism offence. Several people were recently convicted of bombing the Syndicalists’ offices in and attempting to attack an asylum accommodation centre. The longest prison sentence handed down was five and a half years. The prosecutor specifically emphasised that bombs in the case were equipped with timing devices. Two of the bombers had undergone paramilitary training in . We are still awaiting the prosecution for the terror attack on in on . It is hard for anyone not to have noticed how the white-supremacy movement is mobilising and acting increasingly uninhibitedly out on the streets. On in in , 1 in and most recently in conjunction with the book fair in . Indeed, the future places high demands on the preventive work, but no one can deny that there is now a platform for the efforts to prevent violent extremism. The year 2017 is not like 2014. 1Var på kartan finns den nationella samordningen? Av den svenska debatten om våldsbejakande extremism kan man ibland få intrycket av att samordningen har haft ett övergripande ansvar för samtliga nivåers insatser mot våldsbejakande extremism. I själva verket har utredningen ansvarat för samordningen av de förebyggande delarna av den svenska strategin mot terrorism. I strategin görs en uppdelning i förebyggande, förhindrande och försvårande nivåer, mot i sin tur svarande åtgärder och ansvar för olika myndigheter (skr. 2014/15:146). Det är i pyramidens spets – försvåra och förhindra – som rättsväsendet företrädesvis kommer in i bilden. Det gäller den uppföljning som Säkerhetspolisen och gör av riskpersoner som bedöms vara brottsaktiva. Dessa åtgärder ligger således inom ramen för brottsbekämpning och utanför samordningens förebyggande uppdrag (Samordningen 2016a, SOU 2016:92). Samordningens uppdrag – den förebyggande delen – har bestått av följande tre nivåer: Stärka demokratin för att motverka våldsbejakande extremism, motverka inträde, att personer ansluter sig till våldsbejakande extremism och underlätta utträde, att personer lämnar våldsbejakande extremism. Fokus i det förebyggande arbetet är kommuner, civilsamhället och företrädesvis myndigheter utanför rättsväsendet. De brottsbekämpande myndigheterna har dock en viktig roll i strategin genom sin kunskap om personer, miljöer och brott. Exempelvis ingår lokal polis ofta som part i olika fora för lokal samverkan. Den bas som samordningens arbete vilat på är allt det som görs för att främja demokratin. Dessa insatser och åtgärder är dock så breda att de inte ingått i samordningens uppdrag. De främjande åtgärderna är dock viktiga att lyfta fram eftersom samordningen har tagit sin ut- Var på kartan finns den nationella samordningen? gångspunkt i dessa och bygger vidare, men med åtgärder med större träffsäkerhet mot just våldsbejakande extremism. Gemensamt för de tre nivåerna i pyramiden – förebygga, förhindra, försvåra – är behovet av kunskap om de faktiska extremistmiljöernas omfattning och struktur. Det går därför att lägga till en fjärde punkt; kunskap om den våldsbejakande extremismens omfattning och struktur. De heldragna delarna – mittpartiet och sidorutan – omfattas av samordningens uppdrag. Var på kartan finns den nationella samordningen? I det följande illustreras samordningens uppdrag att värna demokratin mot våldsbejakande extremism. I de streckade delarna framgår också ”omvärlden”, med dels toppen som avser terrorstrategins delar om att förhindra och försvåra, dels det allmänna samhällsuppdraget att främja demokratin. Preventionspyramiden kan också sägas beskriva att ju närmare pyramidens topp man kommer, desto mer ingripande åtgärder finns för att motverka extremism (jfr Ayres och Braithwaite 1992 och deras regleringspyramid). Följaktligen finns straffrättsliga åtgärder i spetsen och mjukare insatser längre ner. Ett annat sätt att beskriva pyramidens olika nivåer – och därmed regeringens terrorstrategi – är att det handlar om att hantera risker. I pyramidens bas är risken för radikalisering och extremistbrott mycket låg, för att inte säga försumbar. Från ett strikt förebyggande perspektiv finns det dock skäl att vaccinera mot våldsbejakande extremism genom demokratifrämjande och demokratistärkande insatser. Riskerna för radikalisering och därmed extremistbrott ökar dock påtagligt när det finns anledning att motverka personers inträde i extremistmiljöer.