sou · H6B365 · 2018-08-16 00:00:00 — Enligt vår bedömning är ytterligare ändringar i sekretessregleringen inte nödvändiga för att åstadkomma ett mer effektivt informationsutbyte på lokal nivå till förebyggande av terrorism. Vi behandlar dock i avsnitt 9 några frågeställningar som vi uppmärksammat eller uppmärksammats på under arbetets gång. och Säkerhetspolisens tillgång till uppgifter om trängselskatt och Säkerhetspolisen har möjlighet att under vissa förutsättningar få tillgång till uppgifter som Transportstyrelsen hämtar in med hjälp av kameror vid betalstationer där trängselskatt tas ut. Uppdraget i denna del går ut på att utreda möjligheterna för polisen att på ett enklare och snabbare sätt än få tillgång till denna information i händelse av ett nära förestående, pågående eller begånget terroristattentat där det finns anledning att snabbt finna gärningspersonen för att förhindra ett attentat. En effektivare tillgång till uppgifter som hämtas in med hjälp av trängselskattekamerorna kan åstadkommas på olika sätt. Vi har funnit att direktåtkomst inte är en lämplig väg att gå för att åstadkomma ett effektivt utlämnande av uppgifter om trängselskatt till och Säkerhetspolisen inom ramen för de myndigheternas arbete med att förhindra eller på annat sätt ingripa mot terroristattentat. Skälen till detta är främst av teknisk och ekonomisk natur. Vi föreslår i stället att det i förordningen (2001:650) om vägtrafikregister förs in en sekretessbrytande uppgiftsskyldighet som anger att Transportstyrelsen på begäran skyndsamt ska lämna trängselskatteuppgifter avseende passager till eller Säkerhetspolisen om uppgifterna i ett brådskande fall behövs där för att förhindra eller på annat sätt ingripa mot en handling som kan utgöra brott enligt terroristbrottslagen. Införandet av en sådan uppgiftsskyldighet innebär att en sekretessprövning inte behöver göras inför utlämnandet, vilket kan medföra att uppgifterna kan lämnas ut på ett snabbare sätt än . För att få till stånd ett effektivt utlämnande av uppgifter som ligger till grund för beslut om trängselskatt bör vidare ett utlämnande från Transportstyrelsen till eller Säkerhetspolisen ske elektroniskt. Hur detta kan ordnas rent praktiskt är en samverkansfråga mellan myndigheterna som inte kräver författningsändringar. Förslagen förväntas få positiva konsekvenser för arbetet med att förebygga terroristbrottslighet och hantera konsekvenserna av ett terroristattentat. Den eventuella risken för ökat integritetsintrång som förslagen kan medföra är acceptabel i förhållande till det samhällsintresse som bekämpning av terrorism utgör. Förslagen innebär ingen försämrad rättssäkerhet för enskilda som kan komma att beröras av förslagen. Förslagen ger inte heller upphov till kostnader som inte kan täckas av befintliga ekonomiska ramar. Författningsförslagen föreslås träda i kraft . Några övergångsbestämmelser behövs inte. We have the remit of investigating the need for – and presenting the necessary proposals for – changes in the rules about secrecy and the exchange of information that apply to bodies including the Swedish Authority and municipal social services in work to counter terrorism. The purpose of this remit is to ensure that conditions are in place for an effective and legally certain exchange of information in this work. Our remit is divided up into number of questions. The first of these questions means that we are to investigate the need to be able to disclose information covered by secrecy at the Swedish Au- thority to public authorities and other actors, such as schools and social services, in a simpler way than at present as part of counterterrorism work. According to the second of these questions, we have to investigate whether it should be possible to disclose information covered by secrecy or the obligation to observe secrecy in the social services to the Swedish Authority and the to a greater extent than at present as part of counter-terror- ism work. According to the third of these questions, we have to investigate whether additional actors participating in counter-terror- ism work need better possibilities of exchanging information. The fourth question, which is slightly to one side of the others, is that we are to investigate how the Swedish Authority and the can be given simpler access to the information gathered with the aid of congestion tax cameras as part of their coun- ter-terrorism work and work to deal with the consequences of terrorist attacks. Scope of our remit Our main remit is to review the legal regulation of the exchange of information that needs to take place between actors collaborating in counter-terrorism work mainly at local level. However, the work currently being done at local level mainly concerns the prevention of violent extremism. This work is linked to a high degree with the work previously conducted by the national coordinator for the prevention of violent extremism and is now being conducted by (). We have interpreted our remit in broad terms as primarily covering the exchange of information that takes place at local level to prevent violent extremism. In our view this covers long-term terrorism prevention work. The Inquiry’s remit does not include stating how public authorities and other actors should work to prevent violent extremism or terrorism. does it include evaluating the work being done on these issues. Instead, our remit is about understanding how preventive work is being conducted and how collaboration has been designed so as to be able to come to a conclusion as to whether changes need to be made to the legal conditions for the exchange of information between collaborating actors. So our remit is about ensuring that there are no unjustified legal obstacles relating to the exchange of information for the work that is being or will be done and about ensuring that those who need more information are able to obtain it, provided that this can take place without disproportionate risks to opposing interests. One part of our remit is to make a survey of the needs different actors have of better possibilities of exchanging information as part of terrorism prevention work. In addition to studying relevant publications we have, when conducting this survey, visited a number of municipalities and government agencies and have also had a great many further contacts with representatives of relevant actors working on these issues at various levels. Our remit to chart the need to exchange information and better possibilities for this has been made more difficult by a number of This is because it has turned out, during our survey work, to be difficult to obtain a clear picture of what kind of preventive work is being performed at local level specifically to prevent terrorism or violent extremism. It is clear that the work to address violent extremism conducted by the national coordination function has led to activities in municipalities. However, there seems at present to be uncertainty about how to conduct this work at local level. In our view there are sometimes also differing opinions about what various actors can and should do to prevent violent extremism as part of their particular mission. This means that there is some lack of clarity about who should or can take action as part of preventive work at local level on information that, for example, comes from the or schools. It is another matter that there is an obligation overriding secrecy for a number of the actors involved to make a report to the social services if, in the course of their activities, they become aware or suspect that a child is coming to harm by, for example, being drawn into violent extremism. The roles of the various municipal authorities in terrorism prevention work are not fully clear and it can be noted that this has resulted in some difficulties in our work. This means that it is not possible to state with certainty in every situation what use potential recipients of information covered by secrecy have of the information transferred and how it is intended to be handled after a transfer. So it is difficult to see what general needs would be served by amended regulation. However, our overall view after the survey conducted is that no picture has emerged of a clear and defined need regarding the exchange of information in collaboration specifically against terrorism that differs from the other problems that may occur generally in collaboration between authorities in, for instance, crime prevention contexts. This does not mean that we have not been told that more information is needed. Some actors have, in fact, shared this picture with us. However, there are actors that say that they do not need to have access to more information, especially since they are not able to act on it anyway. So we have received contradictory signals. Some municipalities have told us that, on the whole, the exchange of information works fairly well at present. So, in some of these municipalities actors have said that the problem is not a lack of possibilities to exchange information. Instead, the problematic point here is seen to be uncertainty about what should or can be done with the information. One probable explanation of why the exchange of information is problematic when it comes to collaboration against violent extremism is the uncertainty at all levels about the location of dividing line to what may be a dubious exchange of information in relation to constitutional rights and freedoms about people who hold extreme but not prohibited opinions. This is linked, in turn, to a natural uncertainty about what interventions society has any right to undertake regarding individuals – at any rate adults – who, without committing any offence, profess undemocratic and violent opinions. An effective and legally certain exchange of information does not build solely on secrecy provisions. It is also very much to do with the forms for collaboration. What we have been able to see is that more progress has been made regarding collaboration to prevent terrorism in municipalities that have a history of good cooperation between authorities, for example the social services and the Swedish Authority. In these cases it seems to be simpler for collaborating parties to see the possibilities of exchanging information that are accommodated within the applicable secrecy legislation and not only obstacles. Starting points for our work On the basis of our survey we have formulated certain principles that we have chosen to use as starting points for our work. One of these starting points is that the relaxation of secrecy protection to protect the individual should only take place in an activity and for a purpose that that can be traced to clear statutory support. There should also be a clear statement of what may be the overall purpose of an exchange of information covered by secrecy for it to be justified to amend statutory regulation to make the exchange possible. The overall purpose of the exchange of information must also be set in relation to the fundamental purposes of the activities of the disclosing and receiving authorities. A further starting point is that our proposals have to be fully compatible with the fundamental rights and freedoms that follow from the Instrument of Government and international undertakings and must, in themselves, not open the way to discrimination of any kind. Common general regulation for public authorities not proposed In our survey work we have not found a general, clear and definable need to share information in terrorism prevention work that provides reasons to introduce a general secrecy override provision for the actors involved. The lack of legal clarity in the division of roles between and expectations of what several of these actors shall, can or may do makes it difficult to set up specific constellations for collaboration that override secrecy while achieving a legally certain exchange of information. As a result the Inquiry is not proposing a common secrecy override provision for public authorities for terrorism prevention work. Release of information covered by secrecy from the Swedish Authority A large part of the information sharing that takes place from the Swedish Authority to prevent terrorism takes place at a general and overarching level. This is often done by sharing local situation reports that describe how extensive the set of problems is and where the problems are located. General and overarching information is used in this way to spread knowledge about what problems of violent extremism are found in a municipality and it forms a common starting point for decisions and action. There are not normally any secrecy problems when general and overarching information is released by the Swedish Authority since information that is covered by secrecy to protect public and private interests can be 'laundered out’. The secrecy problems only arise in the sharing of information about individuals, where the information may be protected by secrecy to protect the individual under Chapter 35, Section 1 the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400), called below. This kind of information is shared to a more limited extent. The release by the Swedish Authority of information that is covered by secrecy to protect the interests of a private individual can mainly take place pursuant to the secrecy override in the general in Chapter 10, Section 27 of . We have found that the general and the other existing secrecy override exceptions are not sufficient to make possible the kind of information sharing on the part of the Swedish Au- thority to municipal authorities in the social services that is needed and justified in terrorism prevention work. We therefore propose introducing a secrecy override exception for the release of information as part of terrorism prevention work that takes place to a municipal authority in the social services that can be assumed to need the information in its activities if, in view of the circumstances, it is not inappropriate to release the information. The proposed provision expands the Swedish Authority’s possibilities of releasing information to the municipal social services about matters including adults’ links to violent extremism and terrorism. With the aid of this information the social services can, at any rate, offer these adults support and assistance and perform outreach work. The social services also have good secrecy protection for the information transferred. Even though the regulation of secrecy leads to some difficulties in collaboration with authorities and actors other than the social services, our view is that, at present, sufficient reasons have not emerged to introduce relaxations that would allow the release of more information to them than is possible today. So we are not proposing the introduction of a secrecy override exception for the release of information related to individuals from the Swedish Authority to schools, for example. Until the role of schools in work to counter violent extremism has been made clear, we cannot see that schools have a sufficiently substantial need to have access to more information about individuals’ links to violent extremism in order to be able to perform their task than schools can obtain today. Release of information covered by secrecy from the social services The social services are covered by strong secrecy to protect the individual under Chapter 26, Section 1 of . The purpose of this strong secrecy is to ensure that the individual can feel confidence in the social services and that the threshold for individuals to turn to them is low. For instance, the social services have more limited possibilities than most other public authorities of releasing information to the Swedish Authority and the . However, over the years some relaxations of secrecy regulations have gradually been introduced as a result of the needs of society and expressions of political will. For example, it is possible, pursuant to Chapter 10, Section 23 of , for authorities in the social services to release information about a suspicion of a terrorist offence committed under the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist (2003:148), called the Terrorist below, or an attempt to commit such an offence. However, under those regulations it is not possible to release information about suspected preparation or conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence. is it possible to release information about suspicions of offences committed under the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Public Provocation, Recruitment and Training concerning Terrorist and other Particularly Serious Crimes (2010:299), called the Recruitment Act below, or under the Act on Criminal Responsibility for the Financing of Particularly Serious Crime in Some Cases, etc. (2002:444), called the Financing Act below. Under Chapter 10, Section 18 a of it is possible in order to prevent crime for the social services to release information to the Swedish Authority about an individual who has not attained 21 years if certain specific conditions are met. There used to be a similar possibility in relation to the but it disappeared in connection with the implementation of the reorganisation. The question of whether social services secrecy should be relaxed for the purpose of preventing terrorism contains a number of sensitive and difficult balances that have to be struck between important opposing interests. The restrictive regulation of the release of information from a social services authority to other public authorities reflects the values underlying the Act (2001:453). This regulation is an important protection for integrity of the individual. So there must be strong reasons for expanding the area in which social services professionals may forward information about individuals that they gain access to in their work to the Swedish Authority and the . It can be noted that there is a clear risk that disclosures of information to the Swedish Authority and the Swedish Security Service about non- criminal acts or behaviour will erode confidence in necessary relationships between the social services and its clients. These relationships are , supportive interventions, which may be decisive in countering affiliation to violent extremism or terrorism. Our assessment is therefore that no secrecy override provision should be introduced to give the social services expanded possibilities of releasing information covered by secrecy about individuals that does not relate to suspicions of criminal acts to the Swedish Authority and the as part of these two authorities’ terrorism prevention work. Legislation in the area of terrorism has undergone great changes in recent years. A number of preparatory acts linked to terrorism have been made punishable in order to prevent the occurrence of terrorist attacks. The expansion of criminalisation that has taken place, is under way or may take place of conduct linked to terrorism makes it simpler for public authorities to collaborate in preventive work since a release of information can be linked to criminal conduct. In our view there is reason to focus the possibilities of releasing information from the social services to the Swedish Authority and the on the situations that have gone so far as to be punishable. We therefore propose entering a new secrecy override provision in Chapter 10 of that gives authorities in the social services the possibility of releasing information covered by secrecy that also concerns suspicion of offences committed under the Recruitment Act and the Financing Act and preparation and conspiracy committed for a terrorism offence under the Terrorist to the Swedish Authority and the . We also propose reintroducing the possibility that authorities in the social services used to have, pursuant to Chapter 10, Section 18 a of , of releasing information to the Swedish Security Service about an individual who has not attained 21 years in order to prevent crime. Possibilities for other actors to exchange information In our assessment, further amendments to secrecy regulations are not necessary to achieve a more effective exchange of information at local level to prevent terrorism. However, in Section 9 we deal with issues we have noted or that have been brought to our notice during the course of our work. Access of the Swedish Authority and the Swedish to information about congestion tax The Swedish Authority and the are already able, under certain conditions, to access information gathered by the with the aid of cameras at payment stations where congestion tax is levied. This part of our remit is about investigating the possibilities for the to access this information in a simpler and quicker way than at present in the event of an imminent, ongoing or recently committed terrorist attack where there is reason to quickly find the perpetrator in order to prevent an attack. effective access to information gathered with the aid of congestion tax cameras can be achieved in various ways. We have concluded that direct access is not a suitable path to take to achieve the effective release of information about congestion tax to the Swedish Authority and the as part of the work of these authorities on preventing terrorist attacks and intervening against them in some other way. The main reasons for this are technical and financial. Instead, we propose entering a secrecy overriding obligation to release information in the Road Traffic Register Ordinance (2001:650) stating that the shall on request promptly release congestion tax information regarding passages to the Swedish Authority and the if the information is needed in an urgent case there in order to prevent or intervene in some other way against an act that may be an offence under the Terrorist . The introduction of such an obligation to provide information means that an examination of secrecy is not needed before it is released, and this can result in the information being released more quickly than at present. Moreover, to achieve an effective release of information on which congestion tax decisions are based, a release from the to the Swedish Authority and the should take place electronically. The purely practical arrangements for this are a matter for collaboration between these authorities that does not require legislative amendments. The proposals are expected to have positive impacts on work to prevent terrorist crime and to deal with the consequences of terrorist attacks. The risk of greater intrusion into integrity that may result from the proposals is acceptable in relation to the public interest of combating terrorism. The proposals do not weaken legal certainty for individuals who may be affected by the proposals. do the proposals cause costs that are not covered by existing financial frameworks. It is proposed that the legislative proposals enter into force on . No transitional provisions are needed. 1.1Förslag till lag om ändring i socialtjänstlagen (2001:453) Härigenom föreskrivs i fråga om socialtjänstlagen (2001:453) att 12 kap. 10 § ska ha följande lydelse. Lydelse enligt SFS 2018:690 Av 10 kap. 2 § offentlighets- Av 10 kap. 2 § offentlighets- sekretesslagen (2009:400) framgår att socialnämnden utan framgår att socialnämnden utan hinder av sekretess kan polis- hinder av sekretess kan polis- anmäla brott som hindrar nämn- anmäla brott som hindrar nämn- Av 10 kap. 21– Av 10 kap. 21– 23 §§ samma lag följer att sekre- 23 a §§ samma tess även i vissa andra fall inte sekretess även i vissa andra fall hindrar att uppgifter som angår inte hindrar att uppgifter som misstanke om brott lämnas till angår misstanke om brott lämnas till en åklagarmyndighet, Polis- eller annan myndighet som har eller annan myndighet som har till uppgift att ingripa mot till uppgift att ingripa mot