sou · H4B349 · 2017-01-01 00:00:00 — Större överensstämmelse mellan Konkurrens- verkets beslutsbefogenheter och jämförbara myndigheter inom EU underlättar verkets samarbete med andra myndigheter. En övergång till beslutanderätt för innebär att tekniska justeringar måste göras i konkurrenslagen, vilket redovisas i kapitel 9. ska som första instans kunna fatta beslut i ärenden om konkurrensskadeavgift och förbud eller ålägganden i fråga om företagskoncentrationer. Konkurrens- skadeavgifter ska betalas när verkets beslut vunnit laga kraft. Handläggningen av överklaganden av beslut bör ske i enlighet med ärendelagens regler, i överensstämmelse med den ordning som föreskrivs i lag (2016:188) om patent- och marknadsdomstolar. En utökad beslutanderätt innebär i överträdelseärenden att verket ges möjlighet att fatta beslut såväl i fråga om att fastställa att en överträdelse har ägt rum och vad denna har inneburit som att fastställa konkurrensskadeavgiftens storlek. Som en konsekvens av beslutanderätten i fråga om konkurrensskadeavgifter föreslår utredningen att verkets möjlighet att besluta om avgiftsföre- lägganden avskaffas. Mot bakgrund av att verket ges beslutanderätt om förbud och ålägganden i fråga om företagskoncentrationer förefaller det inte lämpligt att verket i samband med att en särskild undersökning ska inledas ska behöva gå till domstol och begära interimistiskt förbud mot att parterna fullföljer företagskoncentrationen. Därför bör det automatiska fullföljdsförbudet i enlighet med rådande modell för fas 1, utökas till att gälla även för fas 2. Ytterligare förslag på lag- ändringar redovisas i kapitel 9. Författningskommentaren återfinns i kapitel 12. fortsätter att vara en enrådighetsmyndighet I utredningsuppdraget ingår att föreslå vilka förändringar som behövs av beslutsfunktion och ledningsform. Valet beträffande ledningsform står mellan att föreslå att fortsätter som en enrådighetsmyndighet som eller att föreslå att verket i stället blir en styrelsemyndighet. I den intervjustudie som utredningen har låtit göra och som refererats ovan har det kommit fram att de intervjuade marknads- aktörerna känner bristande förtroende för verkets förmåga att vara opartisk. Studien kan inte säga vara representativ för en majoritet av marknadens aktörer, men utredningen har övervägt om verket borde bli en styrelsemyndighet, för att på så sätt internalisera en process där det som kommer fram i verkets utredande arbete blir föremål för ifrågasättande av en helt fristående instans som inte har befattat sig med utredningsmaterialet. , som kan besluta om mycket ingripande sanktioner, är t.ex. en styrelsemyndighet. Utredningen föreslår emellertid att ska fort- sätta som en enrådighetsmyndighet, dvs. ledas av en general- direktör som ensam har den formella rätten att fatta beslut. Skälen för detta är främst nödvändiga hänsyn till praktiska realiteter. De konkurrensrättsliga målen är bland de mest komplicerade som handläggs inom statsförvaltning och domstol. Det finns därför ett mycket begränsat antal oberoende personer med tillräcklig kompetens inom konkurrensrätt och ekonomi som skulle kunna vara tänkbara som styrelsemedlemmar. Antalet ärenden där en styrelse skulle besluta är dessutom med dagens förhållanden Det rör sig om cirka två till fyra ärenden , inklusive beslut om ålägganden. I fråga om ärenden om företags- koncentrationer måste verket vidare besluta om det ska gå vidare med fas 2-undersökningen , vilket gör att styrelseledamöterna måste vara ”stand-by” året om för att kunna kallas in för snabbt beslutsfattande. Kombinationen av komplicerade, ytterst brådskande men få ärenden, gör att utred- ningen avstår från att föreslå att verket ska bli en styrelse- myndighet. Utredningen föreslår därför att fortsätter att vara en enrådighetsmyndighet. Den interna organisationen bör vara en fråga för verket. Utredningen föreslår att författningsändringarna ska träda i kraft . I fråga om mål i vilka har väckt talan om konkurrensskadeavgift före ikraftträdandet, till- lämpas nuvarande bestämmelser. Även i fråga om företags- koncentrationer som har anmälts till före ikraft- trädandet tillämpas nuvarande bestämmelser. Konsekvenser av förslagen redovisas i kapitel 10. I den mån den utökade beslutanderätten leder till att förkorta de sammanlagda handläggningstiderna, vilket framför allt blir aktuellt i fråga om konkurrensskadeavgiftsärenden, får detta en positiv effekt för före- tagen och i förlängningen även för samhällsekonomin. De kostnader som förslagen kan tänkas medföra, framför allt hos , kan hanteras inom befintliga ramar. The Inquiry’s remit With each passing year, is becoming increasingly integrated with the rest of the world and production is becoming increasingly internationalised. Companies are selling goods and services across national borders at an ever greater rate. This leads to increased trade, productivity and growth. Trade with goods and services in digital environments enable producers in other countries to directly reach consumers in to an extent that is almost unlimited. in markets benefits all companies and consumers as well. However, well-functioning markets require effective supervision of competition. With effective competition supervision, businesses feel confident that competition in individual markets is not constrained by other actors’ anti- competitive behaviour. Visible and effective competition supervision is perhaps the single most important measure for small and midsize businesses to feel secure in trying to increase their market share and enter new markets. The Authority is the supervisory authority for large parts of competition legislation in . The reasons given in the committee terms of reference for again considering opportunities for the Authority to take decisions on sanctions in the event of infringements of competition rules are to further streamline the procedure in competition law matters, and also to create greater conformity with the sanctioning powers available to Commission and other competition authorities in the EU. The Inquiry’s remit has therefore been to analyse the conditions and need for, and the appropriateness of, greater decision-making powers for the Authority in matters regarding sanctions against anti-competitive agreements, abuse of a dominant position, and prohibitions against or obligations regarding mergers. There are two main decision-making models regarding sanctions against companies that have infringed upon the prohibition against anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position, and when prohibitions against or obligations regarding mergers are considered. The two models are called the ‘judicial model’ and the ‘administrative model’, and are presented in Chapter 3. The judicial model is the model currently used in . This means that the Authority investigates matters but lacks decision-making powers regarding sanctions against infringements, and prohibitions against and obligations on mergers. The Authority must bring an action in the Patent and Market Court (and the Patent and Market Court of Appeal) and it is the court that has the power to take decisions in these matters. The administrative model is the name of the model used by Commission and a majority of the competition authorities in the EU. In this model the administrative authority investigates infringements and also takes its own decisions regarding sanctions, prohibitions and obligations. A review of the authority’s decision is then done in a court. Since the 1953 restriction of competition act, has used the judicial model. also chose to keep the judicial model in the 1982 Competition Act, the 1993 Competition Act and the current Competition Act (2008:570). However, since 1993, the rules have been designed using the rules as a model. Accordingly, there has been a harmonisation of the Act and the material competition rules in EU law, but not when it comes to the formal decision-making procedure. Regarding the rules on mergers, the Swedish rules were adjusted to the EU’s merger rules in 2000. Since 2004, Commission and all competition authorities in the EU – including the Authority – use a single regulatory framework in the area of competition law in cases where trade between Member States is affected, i.e. Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of Union and Council Regulation (EC) No 1/20031. Commission has been conducting a harmonisation initiative since 2014 to propose common minimum rules for the competition authorities’ investigative and decision-making powers, including issues on sanctions. The Commission’s efforts have as yet not resulted in any legislative proposals. Processing times at the Authority and the courts The Inquiry was instructed to conduct an inventory and analysis where relevant of processing times at the Authority and the courts for those matters that led to indictments with subsequent legal proceedings over the last six years, which is presented in Chapter 4. The Inquiry has chosen to present an account of the processing time at the Authority and the courts for the period – when the current Competition Act entered into force – until , which is somewhat longer than the period specified in the terms of reference. During this period of over seven years, eight matters concerning administrative fines and five matters of mergers – i.e. a total of 13 matters – have led to indictments and subsequent judicial review. It can be noted that although a limited number of cases and matters under the Competition Act the cases take quite a long time to settle. Actors in the market have informed the Inquiry that they wish the fastest possible processing. Processing times at the Authority before the Authority submits an indictment are about two years and two months. District Court has ruled in three cases out of eight during the period studied. The cases have taken between one year and two months and three years and four months to process. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance). Court has within the period in question not decided any case that was appealed there. The amount of time spent on infringement matters can be expected to be more than five years for matters examined at two levels of jurisdiction, which the Inquiry considers to be too long in relation to the market’s actors. Regarding matters dealing with mergers, all five cases stayed within the tighter time period prescribed by the Competition Act. Other Swedish public authorities and international conditions The Inquiry’s remit included reporting how decision-making is organised regarding similar issues at other public authorities, the procedure for competition matters in the Nordic countries and in applicable cases in the EU, and reporting any ongoing processes of change that affect these issues. The conditions in the EU are presented in Chapter 5, and other countries and other Swedish public authorities in Chapter 6. In the EU there are a few countries, alongside , where the competition authority must apply to a court for a sanction fee to be imposed regarding infringements of Articles 101 and 102, as well as in connection with prohibitions against mergers. Countries where action must be brought before a court of law in this way are , (by the state prosecutor in matters non- administrative fines), Estonia (regarding criminal procedures), and . In matters pertaining to mergers, and are except the only countries where the competition authority does not have its own decision-making power. Commission’s ongoing harmonisation initiative is presented in Chapters 5 and 8, with the approach that all competition authorities in the EU are to have decision-making powers in connection with sanctions. What are the actors’ views of greater decision-making powers? The Inquiry commissioned an interview survey to assess the current perception of actors operating in the area of competition law as regards the issue of the Authority’s decision-making power, and which arguments they feel are in favour of or opposed to greater decision-making power. Data for the study was collected by means of qualitative interviews with three respondent groups: competition lawyers, company lawyers and officials at the Authority. The study is presented as 3 to this report. An important issue concerning the efficiency of processing matters is whether the company has really provided the information and clarifications required by the Authority. Company lawyers and representatives are of the opinion that the Authority’s questions on providing information are taken very seriously and answered carefully. However, a number of officials at the Authority feel that the companies withhold relevant information from them, and do not present this information until a court proceeding. This means that there is a risk that investigations carried out by the Authority will be of poorer quality and that the total amount of time devoted will be longer if new information emerges after an indictment has been submitted. Officials at the Authority take a positive attitude towards increasing the Authority’s decision-making power. They feel that greater decision-making powers would help increase efficiency, provide conditions for better investigations and facilitate cooperation with other national competition authorities, who are felt to have more extensive decision-making power than the Authority. Greater decision-making power would provide an incentive for companies to ensure that the Authority has all the relevant data and reasoning earlier in the process than in the current decision model. In principle, representatives and company lawyers are opposed to greater decision-making power regarding both types of matters. The main argument against greater decision-making power for the Authority is that a system of this kind would have a negative impact on the legal certainty of companies. Some claim that greater decision-making power would turn the Authority into the “, prosecutor and judge”. These views are expressed although Swedish legal system always provides a comprehensive review of government administrative authorities' decisions in court. Giving greater decision-making power to the Authority is compatible with European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights The matter of legal certainty has long been perceived as problematic in connection with discussions on greater decision- making power for the Authority, which not least the interview survey conducted, summarised above, shows. The Inquiry devotes Chapter 7 to the issue of legal certainty aspects. The Inquiry’s view, based on an examination on established law, is that greater decision-making power for the Authority is compatible with Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the earlier Swedish Government Official Report A new competition act (SOU 2006:99), a thorough review of the entire law area was conducted, with the aim of streamlining procedures. According to its terms of reference, the 2006 Inquiry was to investigate whether it was possible to reduce the amount of time spent by cutting down the number of levels of jurisdiction to one. The Inquiry concluded that this was not possible in light of the requirements of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, unless the Authority could be organised in such a way that an independent decision-making function at the Authority could be considered to constitute a court. The Inquiry considered that such a procedure would hinder the efficiency of decision-making at the Authority to such an extent that there would be no efficiency gained by removing one level in the judicial chain. It is possible that statements in the SOU 2006:99 report concerning examination of competition law matters at only one court level has led to the of a perception in that a procedure with decision-making power for the Authority in matters concerning sanctions in general violates the requirements of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and is not legally secure. However, the Inquiry at the time did not take a position on a procedure with decision-making power for the Authority and subsequent court hearings at two levels. The legal situation has now become clear. In the Menarini case of 2011 (judgment of in the case of A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. , App. no 43509/08), Court of Human Rights did not consider that the Italian system in the competition law area violates Article 6 of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Court of Human Rights noted that Italian courts had not limited themselves to a pure examination of legality. Even if the competition authority is given scope for some discretionary assessment, this does not prevent courts from monitoring whether the authority has been guilty of misuse of powers or has used its authority inappropriately. The courts were also competent to assess the plausibility and proportionality of the choices on which the decisions were based. Above all, the courts were fully competent to amend the fines issued and the Supreme Administrative Court had also conducted a thorough analysis of whether the fine was adequate.2 The conclusion of Court of Human Rights was that a violation of Article 6 had not occurred. In 2011, the Court of of Union determined that the examination of Commission’s decision prescribed in the Treaties in the event of an action for annulment being brought under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of Union meant that the EU courts control both legal and actual circumstances, and they have competence to examine evidence, annul the appealed decision and change the level of the fine (e.g. case C-272/09 P, KME and others v Commission, EU:C:2011:810). A legal examination such as an action for annulment thereby does not violate the principle of an effective remedy under Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Inquiry’s conclusion is that, from a legal certainty perspective, there is no impediment to give the Swedish 2 Menarini, pp. 63–66. Competition Authority greater decision-making power with regard to any of the types of matters. The Authority should be given greater decision-making power concerning sanctions Reasons of efficiency support a reform As a supervisory authority, the Authority should have decision-making power that is tailored to its needs and efficient to ensure that supervision can be carried out quickly, in a legally secure way and efficiently, with high-quality decision- making. In the view of the Inquiry, every opportunity should be utilised to increase efficiency of supervision of competition. The total time spent by authorities and courts on processing competition law matters remains too long. The total time required for processing the competition-law matters in the authority and the courts is in fact today at least about 3.5 years from the launch of a case until the decision has been tried in the first instance. The time for final decisions to be examined in two instances is currently estimated to be five to seven years. This is too long. The recently adopted judicial reform with the introduction of specialized courts for cases under competition law can however be expected to lead to reduced turnaround time in court, but there is a need to enhance the powers of the Authority as well. With regard to efficiency, which refers to quick decision- making with high accuracy, while taking due account of requirements concerning impartiality, objectivity and legal certainty, it can be said that greater decision-making power can lead to actual efficiency gains in concrete cases. Simply put, a first authoritative decision is taken faster in a system in which the competition authority has decision-making power. Decision-making power for the Authority should also be able to lead to the following: •Increased incentive for actors to interact with the first decision- maker, i.e., the Authority. •Increased incentive for fast high-quality decision-making by the Authority, which will steer the process on its own up to the first decision. •Elimination of all time losses that might arise as a result of the Competition Authority working out a lawsuit instead of a decision of the authority. •In all cases in which decision-making is quicker overall, resources are freed up at the Authority. This can lead to more decisions and thereby increased risk of detection and better regulatory compliance. •The Authority’s ‘leniency programmes’ has the potential to be more efficient, since companies that are interested in exposing cartel cooperation can have greater confidence in holding a dialogue on leniency with the actual decision-maker. •A strengthened role for the Authority by giving it greater weight as a supervisory authority. •A strengthened role for the Authority in () cooperation, since the Authority will no longer belong to the small minority of competition authorities that lack decision-making power, which comparable authorities in other countries have. •The strengthened role for the Authority in the ECN cooperation can make it easier for the Authority to act together with other competition authorities, making it easier for it to develop and take in ‘best practice’ from its authorities in the EU. Harmonisation reasons also support a reform It may be noted that although the , as a result of the outcome of the referendum in 2016, in the future will be leaving the EU, this does not reduce the need for the Authority to carry out its supervisory work in close cooperation with the competition authorities of the remaining EU It will be an advantage for Swedish companies to face the same kind of decision-making in the Swedish market that exist in other markets in the EU. authorities in the EU cooperate across national borders and also apply the same treaty and ordinance rules, there is an expressly applicable need for powers that are as similar as possible. The legal handling of competition limitations with effects on trade between Member States can just as well be handled by two to three authorities in close cooperation as by Commission itself. Having the same decision-making power as other authorities makes participation in operational work in the ECN easier for the Authority. Greater decision-making power for the Authority A transition to decision-making power for the Authority means that technical adjustments must be made in the Competition Act, as presented in Chapter 9. The Authority, as the first instance, must be able to take decisions in matters concerning competition infringements and prohibition or orders concerning mergers. Financial penalties for competition infringements are to be paid when the Authority’s decision is final. Processing of appeals of Authority decisions should be done in accordance with the rules of the Court Matters Act, in compliance with the procedure provided for by the Patent and Market Court Act (2016:188). Greater decision-making power means that in infringement matters, the Authority is given the opportunity to take decisions both with regard to establishing that infringement has taken place and its implications, and with regard to establishing the size of the penalty. As a consequence of decision-making power with regard to financial penalties for infringement of competition, the Inquiry proposes that the Authority’s possibility to decide on penalty orders should be abolished. In light of the fact that the Authority will be given decision-making power concerning prohibition and orders