sou · H5B312 · 2017-03-10 00:00:00 — Erfarenheterna visar att staten hade mer information än kommunerna och att det behöver finnas bättre strukturer för förmedling av information mellan alla myndigheter i migrationsmottagandet. Med rätt information växte samverkan och samordning fram på många områden och det är strukturer som kan användas . Det finns en stor kunskap om mottagandet av människor på flykt och kunskapen används bäst när kommunerna och statliga myndig- heter samordnar sina verksamheter. Där finns ett lärande att ta tillvara för framtiden. Det finns också ett antal områden där den mycket ansträngda situationen gjorde det tydligt att ansvaret för mottagandet av människor på flykt måste förbättras för att det ska leva upp till våra internationella åtaganden och kraven på rätts- säkerhet och effektivitet. När det brister i samverkan och samordning myndigheter emellan behövs det en tydlig ledning och inriktning från regeringens sida. Vi har lyft fram olika områden som vi har identifierat skulle behöva en mer tydlig styrning från regeringens sida för att förbättra rättssäker- heten för enskilda och också effektiviteten i myndigheternas genom- förande av migrationsmottagandet. Dit hör också ett bättre sam- arbete med civilsamhället och frivilliga för att använda de resurser som finns. Det finns kunskaper att ta tillvara De erfarenheter som finns om migrationsmottagande innebär att det finns bättre kunskaper och bättre förutsättningar för ett bra mottagande när antalet människor på flykt som väljer att komma till ökar. Det är tydligt att myndigheterna arbetar enligt ansvarsprincipen. Det är lika tydligt att den kräver ett handlingsinriktat förhållnings- sätt. Ett tidigt agerande skapar bättre beredskap och bättre förutsätt- ningar för att hantera en situation som man inte vet hur den kommer att utvecklas. innebar att regeringen och myndig- heterna fick erfarenheter av att på ett strukturerat sätt samla infor- mation, analysera och genomföra åtgärder. Det innebär att det finns en större erfarenhet inför oväntade händelser . In autumn , a very large number of refugees arrived in . Our remit was to map out the course of events during autumn 2015 and, based on this, analyse the Government’s, the central government agencies’, the municipalities’ and the county councils’ responsibility and contingency planning for the situation and how they and civil society dealt with the situation. On the basis of our survey and analysis, we were to describe what lessons can be learned to strengthen the capacity of relevant government agencies and civil society to deal with any similar situations in future. Our remit did not include proposing measures. We have not been able to map out and analyse all of the work done in autumn ; instead, we have chosen to focus on the reception of the people who came by the government agencies and civil society. This means that we have not looked into issues concerning procurement, planning and regulations, fire protection or supervision and permits. The principle that all exercise of power must be in accordance with the law, the principle of legality and the principle of the equality of all people before the law apply to the exercise of all public authority, and they are fundamental to the reception of refugees. This applies even though the reception of refugees in autumn had to be carried out on a very large scale. One important starting point for our work was the standards required of the reception system in terms of ’s international commitments on human rights and the rights of the child, as well as the requirements of due process that must be observed in the exercise of public authority when receiving refugees. Human rights and due process apply for every individual who is received, even in a high-pressure situation. Refugees who come to are faced with a complex administration system where the responsibility for reception is divided between central government, the municipalities and the county councils. During autumn , the people who arrived here were met by committed and conscientious officials who carried out their work with a view to finding the best solution in a high-pressure situation. Our analysis is based on this, and focuses on how events were dealt with on the basis of the division of responsibility between central government and the municipalities; it is also based on the Government’s and the municipalities’ powers under the Instrument of Government. We considered our remit to be to analyse how the reception of refugees was organised during autumn by those who were responsible for the management of these activities. One fundamental prerequisite for being able to deal with unexpected events is good contingency planning. Efficient management requires the gathering of information as material for decision-making, a decision-making function that takes decisions on the direction of procedures, and a structure in which decisions can be implemented. The course of events In 2015, a total of 163 000 asylum seekers came to , of whom 114 000 arrived during the period –. 70 000 were children. In the same year, 35 000 children unaccompanied by a custodial parent sought asylum, of whom 26 000 arrived during the last four months of the year. On , a large number of people started arriving at station. The next day, large numbers of people started arriving at the central stations in and . The numbers continued to grow over the following months until the middle of , when the numbers quickly dropped. In addition to the asylum seekers, a number of people came who chose not to seek asylum, particularly during the early part of autumn . They chose either to remain in the country without legalising their stay or to continue to another country. We still do not know how many people chose one of these alternatives. The majority of asylum applications were submitted in County (54 000 applications), followed by County (46 000 applications) and County (34 000 appli- cations). The reception of refugees was unevenly distributed across the country and between the municipalities. Of those who sought asylum during autumn , 50 595 had still not received a decision in their asylum case in January 2017. Of these, 16 627 were unaccompanied minors. Of those still awaiting a decision, 40 492 people had still not had their asylum investigation initiated in January 2017. Of these, 14 933 were unaccompanied minors. Government agencies’ contingency planning and handling of events Autumn posed a major challenge for parts of ’s administration. There are differing views of how intense the strain became. We have chosen to describe the government agencies’ contingency planning and handling of events on the basis of their own descriptions. The overall picture that emerges is both clear and multifaceted. Taking in so many migrants in such a short space of time became an immense strain. Reception had to be organised by an administration system that was already under strain. The perceptions that government agencies or organisations had of their own handling of the challenge vary. They also have different views of their own capacity – and that of other agencies – for cooperation and colla- boration. It is perfectly reasonable for there to be differing views of how government agencies dealt with the course of events. These descriptions came in hindsight. The agencies had different tasks and different geographical areas of responsibility. The situation developed at differing speeds and in different ways in different parts of . The refugees who came to in autumn were met with a coherent reception regulation, but a complex administration which put the reception system into practice in different ways depending on government agency and area of . Government agencies’ contingency planning Everyone was caught unawares by the large number of refugees who made their way to . Neither the Government Offices, nor the , nor any other agency had foreseen the developments that would unfold during autumn . ’s 2015 forecast estimated that there would be considerably fewer asylum seekers than previously, but also that the number of unaccompanied minors would increase compared with previous forecasts. reported continuously to the Government Offices, and during the latter part of the summer there were indications that the forecast would not be accurate. The information was not passed on within the Government Offices or to the agencies working on the reception of refugees. It is not unreasonable to assume that contingency planning at the Government Offices and other agencies would have been better at the beginning of the autumn if more people had been privy to the knowledge that the forecast was inaccurate. Before autumn , the agencies working on refugee reception had varying levels of preparedness in terms of planning and resources. was under great strain even before 2015, with increasing processing times for asylum examinations and uncertain access to accommodation for asylum seekers. The situation was also strained for county councils and municipalities. The agencies that were used to their work being driven by events, those with previous experience of refugee reception and those that already had an efficient structure for cooperation with others were better prepared. Government agencies’ handling of events The Government Offices used its crisis management structure, which worked well after the first month. This meant the Government receiving the information and material required for making decisions. The Government took a large number of decisions during autumn . Many of these decisions were intended to improve the reception of asylum seekers and facilitate the acquisition of accom- modation. Later in the autumn, and following the migration policy agreement, the Government took two decisions aimed at reducing the number of asylum seekers. On , border controls were reintroduced at the internal border, and on the Government decided to introduce some ID checks that entered into force on . On , the Government announced that some ‘breathing space’ was needed and that ’s legislation on the right to asylum needed to be temporarily adapted to the minimum requirements under inter- national law, meaning that time limits were introduced for the right to a permit and the right to family reunification was reduced. Several legislative processes were initiated concerning the right to a permit and additional conditions for the imple- mentation of ID checks. The situation for the was extremely intense during autumn . prioritised the acquisition of accommodation, and it succeeded in living up to its ambition of organising a roof over the heads of everyone who came, apart from on one single night. simplified how it handled the registration of asylum seekers, but it still fell behind with registrations. This meant that asylum seekers had to wait for a long time to have their applications registered. There were very large numbers of people waiting. For example, adults and families had to wait at the Exhibition and , where conditions were very disorderly. Unaccompanied minors had to stay in temporary accommodation in the munici- palities where they had arrived and had to wait to be registered. Having to wait to register prolonged the asylum process for adults, children in families, and unaccompanied minors. Agency’s decisions on compensation to municipalities were delayed or unclear, leading to uncertainty among the municipalities about what compensation would be disbursed. had a coordinating role. It already had an effective structure for producing status reports and organising collaboration conferences. The Swedish Civil Con- tingencies Agency continuously provided the Government with status reports, which gave an overall picture of how the Agency considered the objectives for our security were affected in various ways. also organised a large number of collaboration conferences bringing together central government agencies and civil The results of this work were passed on through infor- mation published on the website krishantering.nu, for example. in autumn , the Swedish Authority decided to work within the framework of a decision on a special event (). The worked at central stations and ferry terminals carrying out the internal control of aliens, dealing with crimes and public disturbances close to or in asylum centres, and later in the autumn conducting border controls. A large number of other central government agencies, such as , the Health and Social Care Inspectorate, the , the for Education, the Swedish Schools Inspectorate, for Youth and , dealt with different parts of refugee reception, for example by carrying out various government assign- ments. The county administrative boards have national responsibility for geographical areas. The county administrative boards took different courses of action when dealing with the large numbers of refugees. Some county administrative boards used their crisis management structures, whereas others worked within their regular structures. This may have been because the situation varied between counties. The county administrative boards took part in the collaboration conferences organised by the and had their own collaboration conferences at county level with central government agencies, municipalities and county councils. Municipalities and county councils bore the cost of most of the reception of refugees who arrived in autumn . The situation was particularly strained for the few municipalities in which un- accompanied minors arrived, as it took some time for the to allocate each child to a municipality for the duration of the asylum examination. The municipalities to which children were allocated had difficulties organising accommodation for the children that came, and these children had to move between municipalities as and when the accommodation issue was resolved. There was a serious shortage of suitable people who could be recommended as legal representatives. When the opened an asylum centre in any given municipality, both the municipality and the county council were affected, as they were responsible for schooling, social services, health and care, and dental care at short notice. Civil society and the Authorities and Regions Both civil society and the Authorities and Regions made important contributions in autumn . NGOs and volunteers met refugees at central stations and ferry terminals before the government agencies had managed to get themselves organised in these locations. After a few days of disorder, co- operation was organised between NGOs and volunteers, and their cooperation with government agencies worked well. NGOs also provided assistance in several other ways, for example by organising accommodation and employment. The Authorities and Regions had a coordinating role between different municipalities and county councils and vis-à-vis the Government, and raised issues that needed to be dealt with based on the perspective of the municipalities and county councils. Responsibility for different parts of the refugee reception system is divided between many different agencies at central government and municipal level. This means that there are a great deal of inter- dependencies between agencies and the work of one agency affects the conditions for another. This places great demands when the different activities and services need to be scaled up very quickly. Collaboration, coordination and leadership towards a joint goal are absolutely essential. Contingency planning by the Government and agencies Migration is part and parcel of the global society and a rapidly increasing migration flow is not a threat in itself, even if the situation can become very strained. Neither the Government, nor the Government Offices, nor any of the central government or municipal agencies had contingency plans in place for the event that so many refugees chose to come to . There were early indications, but even at the beginning of , when a large number of people had already come to , the Government and the entire administration still assumed that the number of asylum seekers would be in line with the ’s forecast. A good structure is in place in the Government Offices for gathering information and analysing it, but the Government Offices still did not realise before anyone else that the number of migrants would increase considerably. Experience of previous extraordinary events indicates that it is important to act on early information even if it is uncertain. If the early information that was available had been considered and used – despite the fact that it was by no means complete or analysed – it could have meant better preparedness for the course of events that was to unfold. The work of government agencies to identify risks can be developed, but there must also be contingency plans in place to other – and perhaps as yet unverified – information and use it. The Government’s management The Government governs the realm. This means that in autumn 2015, it was the Government’s job to coordinate and manage the reception of refugees from a holistic approach and in a common direction. The Government made a large number of decisions during the autumn of 2015 to improve the possibilities of receiving the large number of asylum seekers. In some areas, clearer management on the part of the Government was needed. Cooperation between the and the county administrative boards could have been more efficient if the Government had more clearly stated the conditions of both their remits. was under a great deal of pressure, and when its activities were not functioning in various areas, problems arose for other government agencies, and the legal rights of individual asylum seekers were jeopardised. In hindsight, there is reason to reflect on whether the Government’s management of the should have been clearer. Another lesson is that better analysis may be needed of the material upon which the Government bases decisions to extend internal border controls and to introduce ordinances on ID checks. In addition, we have learnt that responsibility issues need to be clarified and skills improved in various areas so that can live up to its international commitments and the requirement of due process. There are other areas, but one important example is the reception of children and the work of government agencies to prevent children disappearing, as well as cooperation between agencies when children do go missing. It is also important that we clarify responsibility issues and what the public undertakings are vis- à-vis people who reside in the country without seeking asylum. Knowledge is a prerequisite for safeguarding legal rights during the reception process With better knowledge, the reception of the people who came to during autumn could have been more legally certain and efficient. People who seek asylum must be given knowledge about their own asylum process at an early stage. During autumn , the people arriving at central stations and ferry terminals initially received information of varying quality. One explanation for this was that there were no government agencies there to provide information. NGOs and volunteers provided information, but it was not always correct. It is important for the legal rights of individuals that the information given is correct and offers knowledge of the asylum process. We can also see that the lack of information and knowledge meant that some asylum seekers who were transported in buses from or who waited to be registered at the Exhibition and felt that their freedom was being restricted. At the , asylum seekers received less information than previously – and this applied to adults, children in families and perhaps above all unaccompanied minors, who were not assigned adequately qualified legal representatives in time either. One lesson to be learned is that it is a fundamental requirement of due process that asylum seekers are given the right knowledge. A person seeking asylum must also be dealt with by know- ledgeable officials from government agencies. We were able to ascertain that there was – and still is – a need for more knowledge, both at government agencies and in civil society, on the rules governing the reception of refugees. The Government took several initiatives to improve the spread of knowledge, but knowledge still did not reach everyone. One lesson here is that it is important in a high-pressure situation that clear structures are in place for where to find the right information and knowledge. From information to coordination and leadership We consider that the work carried out by the to produce status reports and arrange collaboration conferences was necessary in order to achieve a more coherent picture for the Government and government agencies. However, this work was not enough. The right access to information at all levels and throughout the country is a fundamental prerequisite to fulfil the public undertaking of receiving refugees. Experiences from autumn show that central government had more information than the municipalities, and that there need to be better structures for communicating information between all of the agencies involved in the reception of refugees. With the right information, collaboration and coordination emerged in many areas – and these are structures that can be used in future. There is a great deal of knowledge about the reception of refugees, and this knowledge is put to best use when municipalities and central government agencies coordinate their activities. There are lessons to be learned here for the future. There are also a number of areas where the very strained situation of autumn made it clear that the responsibility for receiving refugees has to be improved so that we can live up to our inter- national commitments and requirements in terms of due process and efficiency. When there are shortcomings in collaboration and coordination between agencies, clear leadership and a clear direction are needed from the Government. We have highlighted various areas that we have identified that need more clear management on the part of the Government to improve the legal rights of individuals, but also efficiency in the government agencies’ implementation of refugee reception. This also includes better cooperation with civil society and volunteers in order to make use of the available resources. The experiences that have now been gained of refugee reception mean that better knowledge is available and conditions are better for a good reception system when the numbers of refugees choosing to come to increases. It is clear that government agencies work in accordance with the principle that areas of responsibility in normal circumstances remain an agency’s areas of responsibility in a crisis. It is equally clear that this principle calls for a more action-oriented approach. Action at an early stage means better preparedness and conditions for dealing with a situation whose development is difficult to predict. Autumn gave the Government and government agencies experience of gathering information, analysing it and implementing measures in a structured way. This means that there is greater experience ahead of unexpected events in future. 1Utredningens uppdrag och arbete Direktiven för vårt arbete beslutades vid regeringssammanträdet (dir. 2016:47). Av direktiven framgår att vårt över- gripande uppdrag har varit att utvärdera hanteringen av flykting- situationen i genom att göra en kartläggning av händelseförloppet . Utifrån den ska vi analysera regeringens, de statliga myndigheternas, kommunernas och lands- tingens ansvar och beredskap inför situationen samt deras och civil- samhällets hantering av situationen. Med utgångspunkt i vår kart- läggning och vår analys ska vi redogöra för vilka lärdomar som kan dras. Lärdomarna kan avse såväl svagheter som styrkor i hanteringen av och beredskapen inför situationen.