sou · H5B372 · 2017-09-27 00:00:00 — Vidare föreslås straffansvaret i 3 a § finansieringslagen som avser finansiering av terrorismresor utvidgas till att omfatta även finan- siering av offentlig uppmaning, rekrytering och utbildning samt med- verkan till brott. I ringa fall ska det inte dömas till ansvar. Straffskärpningsbestämmelsen i terroristbrottslagen utvidgas Straffskärpningsbestämmelsen i 5 § terroristbrottslagen föreslås ut- vidgas. Som försvårande omständighet vid bedömning av straffvärdet för exempelvis brukande av falsk urkund ska bl.a. beaktas om brottet begåtts med uppsåt att främja terroristbrott eller terrorismresor. Domsrätten utvidgas i vissa fall Som framgått görs bedömningen att svensk domstols behörighet inte i något fall som avses i instrumenten bör begränsas av ett krav på dubbel straffbarhet. Domsrättsregeln i 2 kap. 3 § 6 före- slås vara tillämplig även i förhållande till förberedelse och stämpling till terroristbrott. För brott som begåtts utom riket döms således även i annat fall än som avses i 2 kap. 2 § efter svensk lag och vid svensk domstol om brottet är terroristbrott enligt 2 § ter- roristbrottslagen eller försök, förberedelse eller stämpling till sådant brott. Även om det inte finns domsrätt enligt 2 kap. 2 eller 3 § brotts- balken föreslås att svensk domstol får döma för •brott enligt rekryteringslagen som har begåtts av en utlänning som befinner sig i , •brott enligt finansieringslagen som har begåtts av en utlänning med hemvist i , •brott enligt rekryteringslagen och finansieringslagen som har be- gåtts till förmån för en juridisk person som är etablerad i , och •brott enligt rekryteringslagen och finansieringslagen som har be- gåtts mot en av Europeiska unionens institutioner eller mot en av dess byråer eller ett av dess organ, om byrån eller organet har säte i . Domrättsreglerna i 9 § rekryteringslagen och 6 § finansieringslagen föreslås därför, utöver att de bör vara tillämpliga i förhållande till den nya reglering i lagarna som föreslås genomföra tilläggsproto- kollets och direktivets bestämmelser, vara tillämpliga också i dessa situationer. Lagen om ansvar för elektroniska anslagstavlor förtydligas Bestämmelsen om skyldighet för tillhandahållare av elektroniska anslagstavlor att vid straffansvar ta bort eller på annat sätt förhindra vidare spridning av meddelanden i 5 § lagen (1998:112) om ansvar för elektroniska anslagstavlor föreslås förtydligas så att det uttryck- ligen framgår att även meddelanden som utgör offentlig uppmaning enligt 3 § rekryteringslagen omfattas. Utökade möjligheter till hemliga tvångsmedel I betänkandet lämnas förslag till utvidgningar av straffansvaret för ett flertal brott. Det är viktigt att all verksamhet med anknytning till terrorism kan förebyggas och förhindras i ett så tidigt skede som möjligt. Det bör därför finnas möjligheter att använda hemliga tvångsmedel även för brott enligt förslagen. Med hänsyn till hur regler är konstruerade krävs det emellertid inte några lagändringar. The Inquiry’s remit, which is described in the final report, was to take a position on whether should accede to the Additional Protocol to on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS no 217, Additional Protocol) and, if so, what legislative amendments would be necessary, and to analyse the need for legislative amendments necessary to implement the Terrorism Directive.1 The remit also included presenting the necessary legisla- tive proposals. In its interim report entitled ‘Criminal law measures against ter- rorist ’ (SOU 2015:63), the Inquiry has already analysed the need for legislative amendments for to meet the require- ments for criminal law regulations to prevent and combat terrorism set by Resolution (2014), and whether ’s criminal law regulations to prevent and combat terrorism meet the requirements set by the Financial Action Task Force. Moreover, the Inquiry has previously, in its interim report ‘Criminal law measures against participation in armed conflict in support of a terrorist organisation’ (SOU 2016:40), analysed the need for further criminalisation to prevent and deter people from participating in armed conflict abroad within the framework of a terrorist orga- nisation, and considered whether should accede to the Protocol and the Convention. The Inquiry’s remit is described in its entirety in annexes 1–5. 1 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of Parliament and of 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. However, the implementation of the provisions of the Terrorism Directive concerning protection of, support to and rights of victims of terrorism (Title V of the Directive) was not part of the Inquiry’s remit. ’s accession to the Additional Protocol on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS no 196, Terrorism Convention) was adopted in 2005. Under the Convention, the parties commit to criminalising public provo- cation to commit terrorist crimes, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism. signed the Terrorism Convention on 16 2005 and ratified it on 30 2010. On 19 2015, the Additional Protocol to the Convention was adopted to contribute to the implementation of Resolution (2014) in a uniform way in the Member States of . signed the Protocol on 22 October 2015. The aim of the Additional Protocol is to supplement the Terrorism Convention with provisions on criminalisation and thereby to in- crease the parties’ efforts to prevent terrorism. The Additional Protocol contains the requirement that certain acts that could typi- cally lead to terrorist offences being committed be criminalised, namely participation in an association or group for the purpose of terrorism, receiving training for terrorism, travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism, funding of travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism, and organising or otherwise facilitating travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism. The undertakings in the Additional Protocol largely correspond to the undertakings that follow from the Terrorism Directive, which has an obligation to observe. It is proposed that accede to the Additional Protocol. However, certain legislative amendments are necessary for to be able to accede, see below. for legislative amendments in light of the Additional Protocol and the Directive The Terrorism Directive, which was adopted on 15 2017, re- places the Terrorism Framework Decision2 and amends the Council Decision on exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences3. has implemented both decisions. The Directive, which largely corresponds to the Terrorism Frame- work Decision, aims to establish minimum rules on determining the constituent elements of offences and penalties in the area of terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group or offences related to terrorist activities (public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism, providing training for terrorism, receiving training for terrorism, travelling for the purpose of ter- rorism, organising or otherwise facilitating travelling for the pur- pose of terrorism, terrorist financing and other offences related to terrorist activities). The emphasis in both the Additional Protocol and the Directive is on criminal law provisions. However, the Directive is more far- reaching in its contents than the Protocol. In the report, similar pro- visions are dealt with together. The Directive contains the requirement that terrorist offences be criminalised. The acts that constitute offences and attempted offences are largely, but not fully, criminalised in Swedish law. The need for legislation exists so that 1) acts corresponding to the possession, acquisition, transport and use of radiological weapons, as well as research into, and development of such weapons and nuclear weapons are defined as terrorist offences in Swedish law; 2) acts correspon- ding to illegal system interference under the ‘Cybercrime Directive’ are defined as terrorist offences in Swedish law; and 3) the pro- vision on threats that can constitute terrorist offences is expanded so that it also covers threats to commit acts covered by the ex- panded criminal liability. The Directive also requires the criminalisation of recruitment for terrorism. The acts that constitute offences and attempted offences 2Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 2002 on combating terrorism. 3Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences. are largely, but not fully, criminalised in Swedish law. For example, it is not a punishable offence to recruit another person for that person to help commit an offence related to a terrorist group. There is also cause to clarify and adapt the legislation so that it better corresponds with the Directive. Legislation is therefore needed for the provision to be implemented. The acts that constitute offences under the provisions of the Directive on providing training for terrorism and attempts to do so are criminalised in Swedish law. However, with regard to crimi- nalisation demands targeting the purpose of complicity in offences, there is reason to clarify and adapt the legislation so that it better corresponds with the Directive. It follows from both the Additional Protocol and the Directive that receiving training for terrorism should be criminalised. The self- study that should constitute an offence under the provisions of the Directive is not criminalised in Swedish law. Legislation is there- fore needed for the provision to be fully implemented. However, with regard to criminalisation demands in these instruments targeting the purpose of complicity in offences, there is reason to clarify and adapt the legislation so that it better corresponds with the instru- ments. The acts that constitute offences under the provisions of the Additional Protocol and the Directive on travelling (abroad) for the purpose of terrorism and attempts to do so are only partially crimi- nalised in Swedish law. For example, undertaken with the intention of complicity in terrorist offences or other particularly serious crime is not a punishable offence. Legislation is therefore needed for the provisions to be fully implemented. Both the Additional Protocol and the Directive contain the requirement that terrorist financing be a punishable offence. The re- quirement contained in the Additional Protocol is limited to funding travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism, whereas the require- ment in the Directive is more far-reaching and covers the financing of a large number of acts that can typically be seen to result in ter- rorist offences being committed. The acts that constitute offences and attempted offences under the abovementioned provisions have only been criminalised to a certain extent in Swedish law. Swedish law meets the requirements concerning the criminalisation of financing terrorist offences and terrorist (given that the re- quirements in the instruments’ provisions on terrorist offences and terrorist are met), but not in other respects. There is there- fore a need for legislation criminalising the following acts: 1) financ- ing of offences related to a terrorist group, public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment for the purpose of terrorism, providing training for the purpose of terrorism, receiving training for the purpose of terrorism and organising or otherwise facilitating travelling for the purpose of terrorism; 2) financing of complicity in all of the abovementioned acts; and 3) attempts to finance all of these acts and complicity in them, with the exception of attempts to finance terrorist offences. The Directive states that aggravated theft, extortion and the drawing up or use of false administrative documents with a view to committing terrorist offences should be considered offences related to terrorist activities. The acts referred to are largely, but not fully, regulated in Swedish law. Legislation is therefore needed for the pro- visions to be implemented. In other respects, Swedish law meets the criminalisation require- ments contained in the Additional Protocol and the Directive. The same applies to the instruments’ requirements concerning penalties for natural persons etc., liability of and sanctions for legal persons and investigative tools and confiscation. The equivalent applies to the undertakings in the instruments on information exchange etc. It is proposed that the be appointed contact point under Article 7 of the Additional Protocol. Further, Swedish law essentially meets the requirements in the instruments’ provisions on jurisdiction and prosecution. However, legislation is needed for the requirements to be fully met. More- over, the Inquiry considers that the jurisdiction of a Swedish court should not, in any of the cases referred to in the instruments, be limited to a requirement concerning dual criminality. In certain respects, legislation is needed for the requirement concerning dual criminality to be waived. Through existing regulations, Swedish law fulfils the undertaking in the Directive’s provision on measures against public provocation content online. However, certain legislation is needed in this respect too for the sake of clarity. Implementation of the Additional Protocol and the Directive in Swedish law As stated above, certain legislative amendments are necessary in order for Swedish law to be considered to fulfil the undertakings in the Additional Protocol and the Directive. One fundamental prerequisite when drawing up the legislative amendments is that this is done in accordance with ’s inter- national obligations concerning both undertakings to criminalise certain acts and undertakings to protect human rights. The legislative proposals presented should enter into force on and entail essentially the following. The penal provision on terrorist offences will be expanded We propose that the provision in Section 3 of the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist (2003:148), hereinafter referred to as the Terrorist – which states which acts con- stitute terrorist offences under certain given circumstances under Section 2 of the same Act – be expanded to essentially also cover: 1.gross breach of data; 2.intentionally conducting, without a specific permit, nuclear ac- tivities or neglecting a certain notification obligation during re- search or development activities concerning processes or systems related to nuclear plants, nuclear material or nuclear waste; 3.intentionally and without a permit manufacturing, importing, transporting, selling, transferring, granting the right of use of, acquiring, possessing, using, depositing, recycling or re-using a radioactive substance or material that contains radioactive sub- stances; 4.smuggling or gross smuggling if the offence concerns the kinds of goods covered in points 2 and 3 above; and 5.unlawful threat and gross unlawful threat involving the threat of committing acts covered by the expanded criminal liability. The penal provision on recruitment will be made clearer and expanded We propose that the penal provision on recruitment in Section 4 of the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Public Provocation, Recruit- ment and Training concerning Terrorist and other Par- ticularly Serious Crimes (2010:299), hereinafter referred to as the Recruitment Act, be made clearer and expanded to also cover per- sons who, in certain cases, seek to make another person commit a particularly serious crime or in any other way make another person complicit in the attempt, preparation or conspiracy to commit such crime. infringements will not be penalised. The penal provisions on training will be made clearer and expanded We propose that the penal provision on providing training in Sec- tion 5 of the Recruitment Act be made clearer in terms of the trainer’s knowledge of the trainee’s intentions. We therefore pro- pose that the provision cover persons who issue or seek to issue in- structions on 1) the manufacture or use of explosives, weapons or harmful or hazardous substances that are particularly well-suited to use in particularly serious crime; or 2) other methods or techniques that are particularly well-suited to such ends. The above will only apply if the act has been committed in the knowledge that the re- cipient intends to use the instructions to commit or in some other way aid particularly serious crime. We propose that the provision on the seeking and receiving of training in Section 5a of the Recruitment Act be made clearer so that criminal liability covers persons intending to use the instructions to commit or in some other way aid particularly serious crime. Moreover, we propose that the provision in Section 5a be ex- panded and that a special criminal liability for ‘self-study’ be intro- duced. We therefore propose that the provision also cover persons seeking out or receiving instructions as referred to in Section 5 of the Act with the intention of using them to commit or in some other way aid particularly serious crime. infringements will not be penalised. The penal provision on will be expanded We propose that the penal provision on in Section 5b of the Recruitment Act be expanded to also cover to countries of citizenship (not ) and persons travelling with the intention of conspiring to commit or be complicit in particularly serious crime or with the intention of seeking out instructions under Section 5a of the same Act. We therefore propose that the provision cover persons travelling or embarking upon to another country with the intention of committing particularly serious crime or preparing, conspiring to commit or be complicit in such crime, and with the intention of issuing, seeking out or receiving instructions under Section 5 or 5a of the Recruitment Act. The provision will not apply to Swedish citizens who or embark upon to . infringements will not be penalised. The penal provisions on financing will be expanded We propose that criminal liability for the financing of terrorism be expanded through the far-reaching criminalisation of the financing of acts that can typically result in terrorist offences being committed. We propose that the provision in Section 3 of the Act on Criminal Responsibility for the Financing of Particularly Serious Crime in Certain Cases (2002:444), hereinafter referred to as the Financing Act, be expanded to cover not only financing of particu- larly serious crime, but also financing of complicity in particularly serious crime or attempts, preparation or conspiracy to commit such crime. infringements will not be penalised. Moreover, we propose that criminal liability in Section 3a of the Financing Act concerning the financing of terrorist be ex- panded to also cover the financing of public provocation, recruit- ment and training, and complicity in crime. infringements will not be penalised. The provision on stricter penalties in the Terrorist will be expanded We propose that the provision on stricter penalties in Section 5 of the Terrorist be expanded. When assessing the penalty for an act such as using a false document, it should be seen as an aggravating circumstance when the offence has been committed with the intention of promoting terrorist offences or terrorist . Jurisdiction will be expanded in certain cases As has been stated, the Inquiry considers that the jurisdiction of a Swedish court should not, in any of the cases referred to in the instruments, be limited to a requirement concerning dual criminality. We propose that the jurisdiction rule in Chapter 2, Section 3, sixth paragraph of the Swedish Penal Code also apply in relation to pre- paration and conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence. Therefore, for offences committed abroad, a judgment is also passed under Swedish law for cases other than those referred to in Chapter 2, Section 2 of the Swedish Penal Code, and before a Swedish court if the offence is a terrorist offence under Section 2 of the Terrorist or attempts, preparation or conspiracy to commit such offences. Even if there is no jurisdiction under Chapter 2, Section 2 or 3 of the Swedish Penal Code, we propose that judgments be passed in Swedish courts for: •offences under the Recruitment Act committed by an alien in ; •offences under the Financing Act committed by an alien resident in ; •offences under the Recruitment Act and the Financing Act com- mitted for the benefit of a legal person established in ; and •offences under the Recruitment Act and the Financing Act com- mitted against one of Union institutions or against one of its agencies or bodies, if the agency or body is based in . We therefore propose that the jurisdiction rules in Section 9 of the Recruitment Act and Section 6 of the Financing Act also apply in these situations, in addition to the fact that they should be applicable in relation to the new legislation that is proposed for the implementation of the provisions of the Additional Protocol and the Directive. The Act on Responsibility for Electronic Bulletin Boards will be made clearer We propose that the provision on the obligation of the providers of electronic bulletin boards to, in the event of criminal liability, re- move or in some other way prevent the further spread of commu- nications contained in Section 5 of the Act on Responsibility for Electronic Bulletin Boards (1998:112) be made clearer so that it explicitly states that communications that constitute public provo- cation under Section 3 of the Recruitment Act are also covered. Greater scope for secret coercive measures The report contains proposals on the expansion of criminal liability for a number of offences. It is important that all activities related to terrorism can be prevented and deterred as early as possible. There should therefore be possibilities for the use of secret coercive measures even for offences in accordance with the proposals. How- ever, in view of how the rules of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure are designed, no legislative amendments are necessary. lag om ändring i Härigenom föreskrivs att 2 kap. 3 § ska ha följande lydelse. För brott som begåtts utom riket döms även i annat fall än som avses i 2 § efter svensk lag och vid svensk domstol, 1. om brottet förövats på ett svenskt fartyg eller luftfartyg, eller om det begåtts i tjänsten av befälhavaren eller någon som tillhörde besättningen på ett sådant fartyg, 2. om brottet begåtts av någon som tillhör Försvarsmakten på ett område där en avdelning av Försvarsmakten befann sig eller om det begåtts av någon annan på ett sådant område och avdelningen befann sig där för annat ändamål än övning, 3. om brottet begåtts vid tjänstgöring utom riket av någon som är anställd i Försvarsmakten och tjänstgör i en internationell militär insats eller som tillhör Polisens utlandsstyrka, 3 a. om brottet har begåtts i tjänsten utom riket av en polisman, tulltjänsteman eller tjänsteman vid , som utför arbetsuppgifter enligt en internationell överenskommelse som har tillträtt, 4. om brottet förövats mot , en svensk kommun eller annan menighet eller en svensk allmän inrättning, 1 Senaste lydelse 2017:497. 5. om brottet begåtts inom ett område som inte tillhör någon stat och förövats mot en svensk medborgare, svensk sammanslut- ning eller enskild inrättning eller mot en utlänning med hemvist i 6. om brottet är kapning, sjö- 6. om brottet är kapning, sjö- eller luftfartssabotage, flygplats- eller luftfartssabotage, flygplats- försök till sådana brott, olovlig försök till sådana brott, olovlig befattning med kemiska vapen, befattning med kemiska vapen, osann eller ovarsam utsaga inför osann eller ovarsam utsaga inför en internationell domstol, ter- en internationell domstol, ter- (2003:148) om straff för terro- (2003:148) om straff för terro- ristbrott, försök till sådant brott, ristbrott, försök, förberedelse eller brott som avses i 5 § samma lag, stämpling till sådant brott, brott