sou · H4B341 · 2016-06-07 00:00:00 — Here we are not concerned with publication on the internet using what is known as a voluntary certificate of no legal impediment to publication, which provides protection under the Fundamental on Freedom of Expression and thus overrides parts of the Act. Publication without a voluntary certificate of no legal impediment to publication also falls outside the remit of the Act if publication is for “journalistic purposes”. The provision originates in Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive, which contains a corresponding . When the provision was tested by the Swedish Supreme Court, the court judged that activi- ties that involve informing, levelling criticism and initiating debate on social issues of importance to the general public must be consid- ered to have a journalistic purpose in the sense of the Act. It may also be a journalistic purpose to inform, criticise and de- bate on certain issues even if this is done in a which offends other individuals.10 9 See e.g. Supreme Administrative Court ruling HFD 2014 ref. 66, where the circumstance that a company was based in meant poorer confidentiality protection for data held by in a question of handing over data, because the Norwegian company was not bound by the Act. 10 NJA 2001 p. 409 and , Personuppgiftslagen (Act) (15 October 2015, Zeteo), comment on Section 7, paragraph 2 of the Act. In its application the provision has been broadly interpreted and has been applied, for example, to publication online in the form of blogs which contain personal data and which are seen as an infringe- ment of privacy by the people mentioned in them. Because the pur- pose of publication was judged to be journalistic, publication was not considered to be in breach of the Act.11 Another significant risk to the privacy of an individual lies in what users of social media may write and publish about other people on- line. In recent years an increasing number of different kinds of online hate campaigns have been reported. The phenomenon is often called internet hate. For example, the most recent report from the organisa- tion Friends on children’s and young people’s experience of the in- ternet shows that as many as one in three of those aged 10–16 have been the victim of online harassment in the past year.12 In all age groups it is more common for women to face harass- ment online than men. The Swedish Government report Integritet och straffskydd13 (Privacy and protection provided by criminal law) summarises research into breaches of privacy online. The summary states that there are researchers in the field who consider that many internet hate campaigns have a clear gender aspect in which women are exposed to sexualised harassment to a considerably greater extent than men. According to these researchers, in the long run this can lead to self-censorship, which could be seen as a threat to gender equality and freedom of expression. Internet hate can also be carried out by organisations. For exam- ple, individual journalists have suffered repeated and systematic on- line harassment from the organisations they are scrutinising, with the clear purpose of forcing this scrutiny to stop.14 11 NJA 2001 p. 12 Friends’ internet report 2016. 13 SOU 2016:7. 14 In the media, for example, a case in was recently reported; see the article Grävande journalist blev måltavla för proryska troll (Investigative journalist targeted by pro-Russian trolls), published on on 13 2016 and written by and . The internet is sometimes described as a new arena for threats and harassment. Through the internet and other electronic commu- nication, opportunities for individuals to disseminate information that breaches the privacy of others have increased considerably. New protective interests have therefore arisen, bringing with them a con- siderably increased need for better designed protection in criminal law for private life and privacy. With this in mind, the report Integritet och straffskydd15 proposes that a new penalty provision for unlawful violation of privacy be introduced in Chapter 4 of the Swedish Penal Code. The proposed provision would mean criminal liability for a person who violates another person’s private life by disseminating images or other information in a way that is intended to cause tangible harm to the person who is the subject of the information. Because internet hate as a phenomenon has thus recently been analysed and as this has also led to a proposal being submitted which seeks to tackle the problem, the committee will refrain from study- ing the phenomenon in any greater depth. 4.2.10Principle of public access to official documents The Freedom of the Press Act of 1766 introduced the principle of public access into Swedish law. It states that all exercising of author- ity is to be transparent and that anyone who wishes to do so has the right to read the authorities’ official documents. Since its introduc- tion the principle of public access to official documents has remained in force virtually continuously, with broad and strong support in the Riksdag. Today the principle is a cornerstone of Swedish democracy. The principle of public access to official documents takes as its starting point the fact that documents should be public, and that deviation from this may only be made under special circumstances and after the legislator has carefully weighed up the interests of the need for publicity on the one hand and the need for confidentiality on the other, in each individual case. With the growth of digitalisation new consequences have arisen for the principle of public access. The better and cheaper the techni- cal opportunities for processing data in combination with other data and for disseminating information over the internet become, the 15 SOU 2016:7. greater the commercial value of the personal data that government agencies possess. Many companies therefore want to access this data. Some agencies may charge a fee for handing over certain data, where- upon the data gains economic importance for the agency too. Once companies have obtained data with the support of the principle of public access to official documents, they can disseminate and process the information for purposes completely different from those for which the agency originally gathered the data. Sometimes the com- panies may also publish personally sensitive data on the internet with the protection of the Fundamental on Freedom of Expression through a voluntary certificate of no legal impediment to publica- tion, with the consequence that some of the regulatory framework that protects privacy ceases to apply. The issue of the import of vol- untary certificates of no legal impediment to publication as regards privacy is currently the subject of an inquiry by on the Media.16 The Swedish principle of public access to official documents and data protection rules can be said to work in principle in different directions – the principle of public access to official docu- ments takes as its starting point publicity (and confidentiality provi- sions that regulate exceptions), while the main rule of the Data Protection Directive is that personal data must not be disseminated (unless this is supported by any of the provisions of the Directive). judges that the differences in principle have never- theless been able to be addressed when applying the legislation in practice. 4.2.11Privacy an important value for the whole of society Privacy is not merely important for the individual. It is essential for society in general that its population can be free to form opinions and make statements; that they can, fundamentally, spend time doing what they want to do with people they want to spend time with, without outside involvement or interference. The right to privacy (which is a human right enshrined in the in its own right) is thus also an important factor for other central and constitutional rights, i.e. for those rights that form the foundation of 16 Ju 2014:17. a democratic society, particularly the right to freedom of expression but also the right to freedom of information and freedom to disclose information. In recent years we have seen several examples of individuals being harassed in order to silence them from creating public opinion, or from engaging in political activity or journalistic scrutiny. If this type of infringement of our fundamental rights has the wider effect of affecting individuals’ willingness to communicate their opinion and take part in public debate, this constitutes a threat to democracy. In the same way, fundamental values can be damaged if individuals refrain from activities due to loss of trust or concern that they will be registered, surveyed or the object of surveillance in a way which could harm them in the longer term. There is no doubt that in individual cases there are people who have chosen to refrain from exercising their rights after having been the victim of various forms of harassment, threats or pressure. However, the committee has no evidence to definitively determine that the behaviour of the population in general has been affected by increased concern over being attacked on the internet, surveyed or the object of surveillance. Another rights-related problem is the massive collection of data that enables profiling and individually tailored marketing or individ- ually tailored search results (known as filter bubbles, described in more detail in the section addressing consumers) which can lead to discrimination and exclusion contravening Chapter 1, section 2 of the Instrument of Government, one of the fundamental laws that form the . A further risk involves a potential but far from impossible future scenario in which human rights are no longer upheld in the same way as today, in or in countries with which we cooperate and to which information flows relatively freely. The major opportunities that exist for agencies and companies to survey individuals might then be used in completely different ways that might be extremely negative for the individual. 4.3The development of technology In our examination we have particularly noted certain phenomena of a more technical nature which recur in several areas. These are in- creasing in use in purely general terms. In our view these are already of vital importance to the protection of privacy but can be expected to have an even greater significance in a not too distant future and may also re-draw the playing field in several ways. Big data and the internet of things are two such phenomena that we have addressed in the interim report. Two other phenomena are of an even more technical nature but will move the goalposts for how we will be able to handle personal data in the future: the development of artificial neural networks17 and the development of the computer.18 We have also noted that some other phenomena have not had the impact on privacy that was once predicted. One example of this is RFID tags, which we do mention as a potential risk to privacy, but which a few years ago were expected to have a considerably greater impact on privacy than we judge has actually been the case. This shows that it is hard to predict with any great accuracy which phe- nomena will have the greatest impact and influence even over a short time frame. Another observation we have made is that privacy protection technology could be used to a considerably greater extent than is currently the case. Several good examples are addressed in the over- 17 ’s encyclopaedia explains neural networks as networks of simple additive units that communicate by connections. In biological neural networks the units are nerve cells (neurons) and the links are connections. Biological neural networks have served as role models for the development of artificial neural networks, which are realised as computer programs, as integrated circuits (neurochips) or with the help of analogue optical technology, e.g. holography. What makes artificial neural networks stand out is partly their ability to learn, the parallelity that results in a high calculation speed and robustness in terms of errors and noise in input data and in the network itself. Examples of areas of application for neural networks include pattern and image recognition, forecasts and artificial intelligence. 18 According to the major difference between an ordinary computer and a computer is that a string of bits in a computer may be found in a (coherent) superposition of all the bits included in the string, known as parallelism. The bits may also be entangled, which brings very unique opportunities for a computer to carry out calculations. It is these two characteristics, parallelism and especially entanglement, that give a computer its unique properties compared with an ordinary computer. A computer cannot carry out different calculations from an ordinary computer, it can merely perform them in a different way, but it would be able to carry out some calculations much faster than an ordinary computer. view of privacy protection technology referred to above. The starting point of the overview is that the use of well-designed privacy protec- tion technology makes it possible to achieve a more beneficial equi- librium in weighing up benefits and risks to privacy. In our view this is a clear area for improvement. Another observation that runs through the entire examination is that the state does not have any overall picture of development in general in this area, either in terms of the development of technology or regarding new working methods that involve processing personal data. According to several reports examining the issue, nor does the state have an overall overview or control over how its own adminis- tration is developing in this area, i.e. within government e-adminis- tration. Several general observations are made in the literature review carried out by referred to above concerning knowledge in the research field of digitalisation and privacy. We believe that their observations are also significant outside the academic environments and reflect general tendencies. The review shows that research into digitalisation and privacy is relatively strictly divided between three main academic fields. The first is a technical field that is largely about systems development. The second is a legal field focusing on questions of legislative protec- tion for privacy. The third is a more general field in the social sciences which encompasses subjects including informatics, psychology, marketing and management research. What all three fields have in common is that researchers in each respective field only rarely show interest in what is going on in any of the others. Another issue that has also emerged is that in research into privacy there is no shared conceptual apparatus or shared methods for the different scientific fields and disciplines. The observations in the review may partly help to explain why problems that arise in law (e.g. data being processed for new purposes that are incompatible with the original purposes for which they were gathered) do not to a greater extent draw on the field of technology in finding solutions (e.g. anonymising data in a way that minimises privacy risks without impairing the ability to gain new knowledge from the data collection). It is important to understand the drivers that lie behind the develop- ment in order to later be able to return to the right kinds of measures to attempt to resolve problems or deficiencies. One general driver is, for example, to make the most use of the information to which one has access. This driver unavoidably leads to fundamental principles such that data must be used for particularly stated purposes (the finality principle) and the obligation to delete data being under- mined. Another general driver among all actors – whether this con- cerns companies or government agencies – is to always make infor- mation as usable as possible for as many people as possible, with the aim of achieving maximum flexibility in the organisation concerned. Certain privacy protection measures, such as limiting internal access to personal data in the organisation, can make it more difficult to quickly switch staff between different duties, so affecting the effi- ciency of the organisation. Other drivers are more specific to their areas. For example, the business models for online advertising and for cloud services respectively mean that the processing of personal data is steered in a direction that may damage privacy. 5 Den personliga integriteten I kommitténs uppdrag ingår att utifrån ett individperspektiv kartlägga och analysera sådana faktiska och potentiella risker för intrång i den personliga integriteten som kan uppkomma i samband med använd- ning av informationsteknik i såväl privat som offentlig verksamhet. Vad som egentligen avses med begreppet personlig integritet är en ständigt återkommande fråga. Någon allmängiltig definition av be- greppet finns inte i svensk lagstiftning. Inte heller direktiven inne- håller någon definition av vad som avses. Den engelska termen privacy1, som anses motsvara det svenska begreppet personlig integritet, har beskrivits som ett kameleontliknande ord som används för att ge goodwill åt ett stort antal olika intressen – från sekretess för personuppgifter till reproduktiv autonomi.2 har till och med gett uttryck för uppfattningen att det mest slående med ”the right to privacy” kanske är att ingen verkar ha en klar bild av vad det är. Ordet integritet kommer från det latinska ordet integer som be tyder orörd, hel.4 I beskrivs ordet in tegritet som ”orubbat tillstånd; okränkbarhet; oberoende”. Som anges i direktiven brukar begreppet personlig integritet i vardagligt tal användas för att beteckna individens värde och värdighet. 1 Dock torde termen privacy egentligen ha en något vidare mening än vad som oftast åsyftas med begreppet personlig integritet, och även innefatta personligt oberoende och självständighet (betänkande Skyddet för den personliga integriteten, SOU 2007:22 s. 53). 2 . BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection. 3 The to Privacy ur Philosofical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology. 4 Se t.ex. Kommitténs om genetisk integritet betänkande Genetik, integritet och etik, SOU 2004:20 s. 106. Detta kapitel innehåller en beskrivning av ett antal teorier om personlig integritet samt en redogörelse för hur det har tolkats i vissa tidigare lagstiftningsarbeten. Slutligen redovisas hur begreppet an- vänds i detta betänkande. 5.2Teorier om personlig integritet Personlig integritet diskuteras ofta utifrån ett rättighetsperspektiv och utifrån vad som utgör en kränkning av den. Uppfattningen om vad som omfattas av den personliga integriteten har varierat . En vid tolkning utifrån rättighetskatalogen i regeringsformen eller brukar omfatta rumslig integritet (), materiell integritet (egendomsskyddet), kroppslig integritet (skydd för liv och hälsa, mot ingrepp i eller mot kroppen, kroppsvisitation, kroppsbesiktning m.m.), personlig integritet i fysisk mening (per- sonlig frihet och rörelsefrihet) och den personliga integriteten i ideell mening (skyddet för personligheten och för privatlivet inklu- sive den privata ekonomin). I konsekvens med detta brukar rätten till personlig integritet beskrivas som den enskildes rätt till en privat sfär som är skyddad från fysiska och psykiska intrång. handlar personlig integritet om möjligheten att kontrollera spridning och användning av personlig information. Vilken information som vi vill hålla för oss själva eller dela med andra varierar efter sammanhang. En uppgift som inte är känslig i det sammanhang där den lämnas ut, kan vidare bli känslig t.ex. om den sammanställs med andra uppgifter. Även skälen till att vi vill hålla information för oss själva varierar. Det kan bl.a. handla om vardagliga och sociala behov som att göra skillnad mellan olika relationer och skydda oss från generande situationer, men också i mer utsatta situa- tioner om skydd för t.ex. vår åsiktsfrihet, vår fysiska säkerhet eller rättssäkerhet. vill vi också begränsa tillgången till information om oss av strategiska skäl, t.ex. i en förhandlingssituation.5 Vad vi anser höra till vår personliga sfär varierar också mellan individer, och förändras dessutom . 5 Se vidare , Personlig integritet på nätet, s. 8 f. Inom filosofin har olika aspekter på syftet med den personliga in- tegriteten behandlats. Från ett libertarianskt perspektiv har ansetts att det är en fråga om individens makt över sitt eget liv och ett begrän- sande av myndigheters godtyckliga makt, av självförverkligande skäl. Det egalitära perspektivet har däremot framhållit att den personliga friheten även gynnar kollektivet, genom att den möjliggör utövandet av grundläggande rättigheter som yttrande- och organisationsfrihet.6 . Solove7 vid har delat in olika teoribildningar kring den personliga integriteten i ett antal kategorier. Kategorierna innebär en generalisering och över- lappar till viss del varandra, men visar ändå på skillnader i de olika synsätten. 5.2.2Rätten att bli lämnad i fred Det första synsättet handlar om rätten att bli lämnad i fred (the right to be let alone). Detta synsätt genomsyrar och artikel i med titeln to Privacy, vilken torde vara en av de mest kända skrifterna om personlig integritet. Bakgrunden till artikeln var den teknik utveckling som då var aktuell. Tillgängligheten av kameror för privat personer, mindre och billigare än tidigare, och tryckpressar hade möjliggjort en ökad spridning av information om enskildas privatliv. Tillsammans med tidningarnas ”affärsmetoder” – på bara tionden hade antalet tidningar ökat från 100 som lästes av 800 000 per- soner till 800 tidningar med 8 000 000 läsare – ledde detta enligt och till ett ökat behov av skydd för privatlivet och, som det uttrycktes, ”the right to be let alone”. Vad som ansågs om- fattas av denna rätt att vara i fred framgick dock mindre klart.8 Synen på vad som är privat har förändrats och dagens tekniska företeelser – t.ex. sakernas internet (Internet of Things), big data, möjligheterna till avlyssning och lagring av trafikdata – innebär helt andra utmaningar. 6 , s. 18. 7 . Solove, Understanding Privacy. 8 Se vidare Understanding privacy s. 17. 5.2.3Oönskad tillgång till jaget Ett annat sätt att se på integritet innebär att individen ska ha möjlig- het att värja sig mot oönskad tillgång till ”jaget” (limited access to the self). har beskrivit detta som ett skydd mot att andra får oönskad åtkomst genom fysiskt tillträde, personlig information, eller uppmärksamhet.9 har uttryckt sig på lik- nande sätt. Enligt honom är rätten till privatliv en persons exklusiva rätt till en privat sfär där han eller hon har rätt att hindra andra från att titta, utnyttja eller invadera (inkräkta på, eller på annat sätt på- verka). Något förenklat kan personlig integritet enligt detta synsätt sägas handla om att begränsa andras tillgång till det som är privat.10 Skyddet för den privata sfären har ibland betraktats som något vi har en slags moralisk äganderätt till. Det vi äger får vi hantera som vi vill, så länge vi inte kränker andras motsvarande rätt. Vi kan dock ge upp denna rätt, t.ex. genom att exponera oss för andra i en offentlig miljö.11 I tredje kategorin ryms teorier som går ut på att offentliggörande av information som inte tidigare avslöjats innebär en kränkning av den personliga integriteten (secrecy, the concealment of certain matters from others). Mot detta synsätt har riktats kritik bl.a. på den grun- den att vilken information som är känslig, dvs. som vi vill hålla för oss själva, kan variera efter sammanhang och dessutom fylla olika syften. Att vi har delat med oss uppgifter om oss själva till en viss begränsad krets innebär inte nödvändigtvis att vi vill dela den med andra personer.12