sou · H3B337 · 2015-04-21 00:00:00 — Utredningen föreslår att talan i klander- och ändringsmål ska väckas genom att en ansökan ges in till och att förfarandet ska följa de regler som gäller för handläggning av ärenden om klagan över domvilla. Vidare bör anges att förhandling alltid ska hållas om part begär det samt att hovrättens avgörande sker genom beslut. Vid överklagandet ska ventilen vara kvar men det införs ett krav på prövningstillstånd i HD. I 43 § LSF föreskrivs att hovrättens avgörande av frågor om ogiltighet, och ändring av skiljedom enligt 33, 34 och 36 §§ inte får överklagas. Det finns dock en s.k. ventil: hovrätten får tillåta att avgörandet överklagas, om det är av vikt för ledning av rättstillämpningen att överklagandet prövas av . Om hovrätten lämnar ett sådant tillstånd krävs inte prövningstillstånd i . Ofta förhåller det sig så i klandermålen att det bara är en viss fråga som har prejudikatintresse. Hovrätten har emellertid inte möjlighet att begränsa ett tillstånd till överklagande till att gälla en sådan fråga. För att möjliggöra för HD att ta upp endast en viss fråga till prövning föreslår utredningen att det införs ett krav på prövningstillstånd vid överklagande till HD. Engelska kan vara rättegångsspråk i klandermål. Utredningen har fått i uppdrag att överväga vilka åtgärder som kan vidtas för att underlätta för icke svensktalande parter i klanderprocessen, däribland främst om engelska i vissa fall ska kunna användas som rättegångsspråk. Utredningen behandlar denna fråga ingående och tar bl.a. upp frågan hur en sådan lösning skulle förhålla sig till språklagen. Utredningen redovisar också förhållandena i en del andra länder. Det skulle naturligtvis underlätta för utländska parter som deltagit i skiljeförfaranden på främmande språk att få fortsätta att använda skiljeförfarandets språk i klanderprocessen. I praktiken rör det sig här om engelska; antalet klandrade svenska skiljedomar som meddelats på annat främmande språk är försumbart. Vad som framstår som särskilt angeläget är att skriftlig bevisning kan inges på engelska samt att vittnesförhör kan hållas på engelska. Utredningen anser att hovrätten bör få möjlighet att tillåta att rättegången i lämplig omfattning ska äga rum på engelska, om det begärs av någon av parterna och motparten samtycker till det. Hovrätten bör därvid regelmässigt pröva om skriftväxlingen ska kunna ske på engelska, om skriftliga bevis ska kunna vara avfattade på engelska och om förhör med vittnen och/eller parter ska kunna tas upp på engelska. Enligt utredningens mening bör med hänsyn till principerna i språklagen protokoll, eventuella beslut under rättegång samt slutliga avgöranden alltid avfattas på svenska. Den servicen bör dock lämnas parterna att, om någon av dem begärt det, dessa dokument ska finnas på engelska i anslutning till att de upprättas respektive meddelas. Utredningen behandlar också frågan hur det material på engelska som skulle tillkomma enligt utredningens förslag vid behov ska kunna göras tillgängligt för eventuella intresserade personer som inte behärskar engelska. En rad olika åtgärder är tänkbara beroende på omständigheterna i det särskilda fallet. I LSF bör införas en allmän regel om att, i den mån rättegången äger rum på engelska, hovrätten i rimlig utsträckning genom översättning eller på annat lämpligt sätt ska se till att allmänheten kan få information om rättegången på svenska. En avvisning ska kunna angripas med stöd av 36 § endast när beslutet grundats på att skiljenämnden funnit sig sakna behörighet. gäller att talan mot en skiljedom som innebär avskrivning eller avvisning ska föras i särskild ordning enligt 36 §. Bestämmelsen innebär att hovrätten ska göra en förnyad prövning av den genom skiljedomen avgjorda frågan, dvs. avskrivnings- eller avvisningsbeslutet. Hovrättens ställningstagande har alltså inte samma karaktär av en extraordinär prövning som vid en prövning efter . Regleringen i 36 § skapar emellertid problem i de inte så få fall då en skiljenämnd finner att käromålet ska avvisas av annat skäl än att skiljemännen saknar behörighet enligt ett gällande skiljeavtal. Fråga är då om ett rättegångshinder hänförligt till själva saken och en avvisning i ett sådant fall kan i praktiken ligga mycket nära ett ogillande. En avvisningsdom ska prövas i sak efter en talan enligt 36 § medan en ogillande dom kan prövas endast om det finns klandergrund. Det är mycket svårt att förklara denna reglering för utländska skiljemän, särskilt som den skarpa skillnad som i svensk rätt görs mellan avvisning och ogillande ofta saknar motsvarighet i utländska rättssystem. Utredningen föreslår att ett avgörande som innefattar avvisning ska kunna angripas utan endast när beslutet grundas på att skiljemännen funnit sig sakna behörighet. I fråga om avskrivning bör nuvarande ordning behållas. Förbudet mot att hålla inne en skiljedom i avvaktan på ersättning upphävs. Talan ska inte få föras mot ett ersättningsbeslut som bestämts av ett skiljedomsinstitut och som inte gjorts exigibelt. Utredningen förordar att den nuvarande regeln i 40 § LSF om att skiljemännen inte får hålla inne skiljedomen i avvaktan på att ersättningen till dem betalas slopas. Bestämmelsen fyller inte längre någon funktion. I 41 § LSF föreskrivs att en part eller en skiljeman hos tingsrätten får föra talan mot skiljedomen om ersättning till skiljemännen och att sådan talan av part skall väckas från den dag parten fick del av domen. I sitt avgörande i rättsfallet NJA 2008 s. 1 118 fann HD att 41 § var tillämplig även på sådana ersättningsbeslut som fattats av ett skiljedomsinstitut men som i en eller annan form tagits in i skiljedomens domslut. Enligt utredningens mening finns det starka skäl för och inga betänkligheter mot att införa ett undantag från rätten att föra talan mot ett ersättningsbeslut när det gäller fall då ersättningen har fastställts av ett skiljedomsinstitut och skiljedomen inte innehåller något verkställbart förpliktande för parterna att betala ersättningen. Följdändringar och ikraftträdande m.m. Utredningen föreslår slutligen vissa följdändringar huvudsakligen i utsökningsbalken. Lagen föreslås träda i kraft . I de mål som avser skiljeförfaranden som påkallats före ikraftträdandet föreslås äldre föreskrifter gälla. The Arbitration Act (1999:116) is now fifteen years old. As far as the Inquiry has been able to ascertain, the general perception is that it has, on the whole, been effective. Nonetheless, under the terms of reference the Inquiry is to undertake a closer review of certain issues. Under the terms of reference, the Inquiry is free to look at other issues as well. When the Arbitration Act was established, the idea of having different laws for domestic and international disputes was rejected. Another question that was considered in some depth was the extent to which the legislation should build on the United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL) Model on Arbitration. These deliberations led to the conclusion that the Model should not form the direct basis of the new Swedish legislation in terms of either disposition or content. However, it was considered important to take account of the provisions in the Model in every aspect. With the limited review now called for, the Inquiry did not consider that these basic standpoints should be re-examined. However, the Inquiry has attempted to pick up on a number of problems identified by () and arbitrators, among others, and in the legal literature. The terms of reference may be interpreted as meaning that one of the primary interests is making Swedish arbitration even more attractive than at present, not just for Swedish actors but also for foreign parties and arbitrators. In line with this, the Inquiry has given particular weight to issues with that focus. The report discusses a number of issues on which the Inquiry does not make any proposals. The proposals made by the Inquiry are outlined below. The term ‘place’ to be replaced by ‘seat’. The term ‘place of arbitration’ is found in several provisions in the The term is not intended to limit arbitral proceedings geographically, but rather is of a legal-technical nature to do with whether Swedish law or foreign law is applicable to the proceedings. This term has caused misunderstandings in several cases, and the legislative history of the current regulations is not entirely illuminating. The Inquiry proposes that the Arbitration Act be aligned with the terminology that is most commonly used internationally, thus replacing the term ‘place of arbitration’ with ‘seat of arbitration’. This will make the meaning clearer, not least for foreign arbitrators and parties. It is necessary, but also sufficient, that the link between the arbitral proceedings and consists in the seat of arbitration being a location in for the Arbitration Act to be applicable to the proceedings. The arbitral tribunal is obliged to follow the parties’ choice of applicable substantive law. In the absence of agreement between the parties, the arbitral tribunal decides the applicable substantive law, taking account of the legal rules to which the dispute is most closely connected. The arbitral tribunal may only decide ex aequo et bono if the parties have expressly authorised it to do so. The Arbitration Act does not currently contain any provisions concerning how arbitrators are to establish which substantive law is to be applied to a dispute. This is undoubtedly something of a flaw. Following patterns in the regulations contained in other countries’ arbitration legislation, the Inquiry proposes a provision to the effect that a dispute is to be resolved applying the law or legal rules agreed on by the parties. If the parties have agreed that the law of a certain country is to be applied, under our proposal this should be interpreted as referring to the substantive law of that country, not to its conflict of laws rules, unless otherwise expressly agreed. If the parties have not agreed on the applicable law, under the Inquiry’s proposal the arbitrators would decide which law or legal rules are to be applied, taking particular account of which legal rules the dispute is most closely connected to. Furthermore, we propose a regulation to the effect that the arbitral tribunal may only decide ex aequo et bono if the parties have expressly authorised it to do so. There is no such provision in the Arbitration Act at present, but a regulation to that effect is recommended in the Model , and is standard in other countries’ arbitration legislation. District courts appoint all arbitrators if the opposite parties to the claimant cannot agree on the arbitrator. Consolidation of several arbitral proceedings is to be possible in certain circumstances. The Arbitration Act is based on the premise that there are two parties to arbitral proceedings; the Act essentially lacks provisions for multi-party proceedings. Problems can arise in cases involving several disputes, or when there are three or more parties all with conflicting interests. Issues in such cases may include how the arbitral tribunal is to be appointed, and the conditions for consolidating several proceedings into one. It is a basic principle of both Swedish and international arbitration law that the parties are to be treated equally (principle of equal treatment of parties). One way in which this principle is expressed is the fact that each party is considered entitled to appoint its own arbitrator, and that opposing parties or interests are to have the possibility to influence the composition of the arbitral tribunal. In the Inquiry’s view, the current regulations in the Arbitration Act do not fulfil the principle of equal treatment of parties (as expressed internationally) in all multi-party proceedings. To remedy this, the Inquiry proposes that a provision be introduced that is applicable to arbitral proceedings in which the parties have not decided how the arbitrators are to be appointed and when the parties on either side of the dispute cannot agree on an arbitrator. In such cases, the district court should, at the request of any of the parties, appoint all arbitrators to the arbitral tribunal, notwithstanding any prior selection of arbitrator by one of the parties. This kind of system guarantees that the principle of equal treatment of parties is observed, as all of the parties have the same possibility to influence the composition of the arbitral tribunal. Consolidating several arbitral proceedings (consolidation or joinder) can have major benefits, in that evidence only needs to be presented once, and the evidence will be assessed uniformly. This often saves costs and simplifies proceedings for both the arbitral tribunal and the parties. The Arbitration Act currently contains no provisions on this matter. The Inquiry considers that there are clear advantages to non-mandatory regulation in the Arbitration Act making it possible to consolidate arbitral proceedings. To minimise potential complications, the conditions for consolidating proceedings should be that the same arbitrators are appointed in all of the arbitral proceedings to be consolidated, that all parties request that proceedings be consolidated, and that the arbitrators deem it advantageous for the arbitral proceedings in question that they be consolidated. The Inquiry does not, however, propose any regulations on the possibility for third parties to take part in arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may order a security measure via a special award if the parties have agreed to this in the arbitration agreement. Under the Arbitration Act, if the parties have not agreed otherwise the arbitrators may, at the request of one of the parties, decide that the opposite party must, during the proceedings, take a certain measure to secure the claim that is to be examined by the arbitrators. The arbitrators may require the party requesting the measure to provide reasonable security for the damage that may be incurred by the opposite party due to the measure. A decision on interim measures under this provision is not enforceable, and is, therefore, non-binding in legal terms. The Inquiry does not consider that this system should be changed. One particular reason for this is that –unlike most other European countries – does not have a system in which courts order executive measures. The Inquiry proposes that an express rule be introduced whereby an arbitral tribunal may order a security measure via a special award, if this is allowed by the arbitration agreement. Such special awards would become enforceable, but also be subject to the regular rules on applications for setting aside and suspension. If the parties agree, a dismissal may be designated an award. Section 27 of the Arbitration Act establishes that issues that have been referred to the arbitrators are to be decided in an arbitral award. It states further that where the arbitrators terminate the arbitral proceedings without deciding such issues, this also takes place through an award. This means that such decisions to dismiss or reject a matter are to be designated awards. The fact that dismissals due to withdrawal are to be designated awards repeatedly causes problems with practical application. would appear to be the only country in the world that calls a dismissal an award. After careful consideration, however, the Inquiry has decided not to propose any change in this respect. According to the legislative history of the current regulations, it would however appear that it was intended that, if it follows from arbitration rules of procedure or other agreement that a dismissal is to be designated a decision, it is possible to do so, and the decision is then to be treated as an award when applying the legislation. The Inquiry considers that system thereby implied should be expressed in the Act. Once arbitral proceedings have been convened, declaratory claims concerning the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction may not be raised other than by a consumer. The arbitral tribunal’s decisions concerning their jurisdiction taken during proceedings may be appealed to the of Appeal. At present, under Section 2 of the Arbitration Act the arbitrators may rule on their own jurisdiction to decide the dispute, but this does not prevent a court from examining the question at the request of a party. A party is considered eligible to bring a positive or negative declaratory claim before a district court concerning the jurisdiction of the arbitrators at any time during proceedings. The arbitrators may continue the arbitral proceedings pending the court’s decision. As such, even if the arbitrators have, in a decision during proceedings, found that they have jurisdiction to decide the dispute, their decision is not binding. As far as we know, there does not appear to be any country other than –and possibly and –that applies a system involving a practically unlimited right for one party to bring a declaratory claim in court with respect to the validity of an arbitration agreement before an arbitration award has been issued. The Inquiry considers it evident that a party must have the opportunity to bring a declaratory claim in court with respect to the validity or applicability of an arbitral agreement before arbitral proceedings have been convened. Once arbitral proceedings have commenced, however, there may be serious concerns about this kind of possibility. For example, if the district court proceedings are not completed when an award is issued and subsequently contested, there can be dual proceedings ongoing with respect to the same matter. Foreign arbitrators and representatives seem to consider this quite anomalous. In addition, such proceedings tend to be complicated and time-consuming. To remedy these problems in circumstances not involving consumers, the Inquiry has decided to limit the possibility to bring declaratory claims by means of a solution whereby if the arbitrators have ruled during proceedings that they have jurisdiction to decide the dispute, any party that is dissatisfied with this ruling may request an examination by a court of appeal, specifically the of Appeal. Such a request should, in accordance with the Model , be brought within thirty days of receiving notice of the ruling. The arbitrators may continue the arbitral proceedings and even issue an award pending a decision of the court of appeal. The same limitations should apply for the possibility to appeal the decision of the court of appeal to the Supreme Court as apply for applications for setting aside. The time limit for applications for setting aside remains three months, unless the parties have agreed on a shorter limit. The Inquiry was tasked with considering whether the currently applicable time limit of three months for applications for setting aside should be shortened in the interests of, for example, ensuring a swift final decision. Having investigated time limits internationally and considered the arguments for and against a shorter time limit than that currently applicable for applications for setting aside, the Inquiry has decided not to propose any change in this respect. To allow for autonomy of the parties, however, it is proposed that the parties be allowed to agree on a shorter time limit for applications for setting aside, as is the case in the German system. of Appeal should always be the forum for applications for setting aside and amendment. At present, applications for invalidity, setting aside or amendment of an arbitral award are to be considered by the court of appeal of the court district in which the arbitral proceedings took place. The terms of reference, which strongly emphasise the efficiency and effectiveness of setting aside proceedings, expressly state that it is not part of the Inquiry’s remit to consider changes whereby a court other than a court of appeal would have jurisdiction to examine applications for setting aside in the first instance. Under the Inquiry’s proposals, written proceedings would become the general rule in setting aside cases, which would mean that the parties would not need to attend court to the same extent as if the case involved oral hearings. Furthermore, the Inquiry’s statistical analysis has shown that the number of setting aside cases considered in the of Appeal is bigger by far than those considered in the other courts of appeal put together. This means that the other courts of appeal do not have the opportunity to acquire the same experience as the of Appeal of the often very intricate procedural law issues that arise in cases of this kind. Moreover, it seems disproportionate to apply the special measures needed to enable cases to be processed in English (see below) to all of the courts of appeal, given the relatively modest number of applications for setting aside involving foreign parties that are considered by courts of appeal other than the of Appeal. All of this strongly argues in favour of deviation from the main principle that all courts of appeal should process all types of case, and that applications for setting aside and amendment should be concentrated within the of Appeal. The Inquiry advocates this solution. The invalidity rules are to be repealed. The public policy rule is to become a new ground for setting aside. Actions may be brought before a district court with respect to whether a document has legal force as an arbitral award. Under current regulations (Section 33, first paragraph of the Arbitration Act), an arbitral award is invalid if 1) it includes examination of an issue that under Swedish law may not be decided by arbitrators; 2) the award or the in which the award arose is clearly incompatible with the basic principles of the Swedish legal system; or 3) the award does not fulfil the requirement with regard to the written form and signature in accordance with Section 31, first paragraph. There is no time limit on when an application for invalidity of an award can be brought. The distinction in the Arbitration Act between grounds for invalidity and grounds for setting aside has no support in the Model , and no such distinction would appear to be found in any foreign legal system other than the Finnish one. Moreover, in the Inquiry’s experience the invalidity rule has been perceived as problematic by both Swedish and foreign actors. If a document designated an award includes examination of an issue that under Swedish law may not be decided by arbitrators, the question also arises as to whether the document can be considered an award at all. The same applies with respect to awards that are not issued in written form or not duly signed. This is a matter of what can be designated nullity, and the fact that such documents or declarations lack legal force as awards should be clear without any special provision. In addition, the public policy rule can be cited without time limit, and no countries other than or have such a rule. In the Inquiry’s view, the public policy provision should be moved to the section that deals with setting aside upon application of a party (Section 34), with the result that if it is to be used as the grounds for an application this must be done within the time period generally applicable to applications for setting aside. This would mean that the Arbitration Act is brought in line with what can be considered the international standard. On this basis, there is no longer a need for a section in the Act concerning invalidity of awards. The Inquiry proposes that Section 33 be repealed. However, it is conceivable that one of the parties may want to bring a declaratory claim on whether a document designated an award or equivalent can be considered to have legal force as an award.