sou · H3B32 · 2015-01-29 00:00:00 — Utredningens bedömning är att dagens svenska regler uppfyller direktivets krav med några smärre förändringar avseende samarbetet och informationsutbytet med byrån för samarbete mellan energimyndigheter () och Europeiska värdepappers- och mark- nadsmyndigheten (). En nyhet i MiFID II är bestämmelserna om system och skydd för visselblåsare. Direktivet ställer krav dels på effektiva system för rapportering och skydd för den som rapporterar överträdelser till den behöriga myndigheten, dels på att tillståndspliktiga företag ska inrätta sådana system för intern rapportering. En arbetstagare som rapporterar allvarliga överträdelser ska skyddas mot repressalier, diskriminering och andra former av missgynnande behandling. Där- utöver ska identiteten på både anmälaren och på den som anmäls (om det är en fysisk person) som huvudregel skyddas. Syftet med särskilda rapporteringssystem, s.k. visselblåsarsystem, är att möjlig- göra för i första hand samtlig personal att utan rädsla för rep- ressalier kunna rapportera allvarliga händelser. Skyldigheten för be- höriga myndigheter att inrätta effektiva procedurer för att motta och följa upp anmälningar om överträdelser föreslår utredningen genomförs genom föreskrifter på förordningsnivå. När det gäller identitetsskyddet är det utredningens bedömning att detta är omhändertaget av 30 kap. 4 b § offentlighets- och sekretesslagen (2009:400) som infördes för att genomföra motsvarande bestämmelse i kapitaltäckningsdirektivet. Utredningen föreslår dock att offentlighets- och sekretesslagen kompletteras med en bestäm- melse om att sekretess ska gälla även en fysisk person som i en anmälan pekas ut som ansvarig för en överträdelse. Utredningen föreslår också att den befintliga bestämmelse i lagen om värde- pappersmarknaden, som innebär att värdepappersinstitut ska ha ända- målsenliga system för att från anställda omhänderta anmälningar om eventuella missförhållanden inom instituten, ska gälla även för marknadsoperatörer och leverantörer av datarapporteringstjänster. Ingripanden (kapitel 13) Bestämmelserna om administrativa sanktioner och åtgärder i MiFID II skiljer sig väsentligt från motsvarande bestämmelser direktiv, vilka var utformade så att medlemsstaterna ålades att se till att det finns verkningsfulla sanktioner mot överträdelser av direktivets bestämmelser. Den närmare utformningen av sank- tionerna var sedan en fråga för varje medlemsstat att ta hand om. I MiFID II är bestämmelserna betydligt mer detaljerade. Där anges vilka överträdelser som ska kunna rendera sanktioner, att även fysiska personer i företagens ledningsorgan ska kunna påföras sank- tioner, de olika slag av sanktioner som ska finnas och storleken på sanktionsavgifter. För att genomföra dessa bestämmelser föreslår utredningen att det för , börser och svenska leverantörer av datarapporteringstjänster anges vilka bestäm- melser i lagen och MiFIR som kan medföra ingripanden vid en överträdelse. Om ett svenskt värdepappersinstitut, en börs eller en svensk leverantör av datarapporteringstjänster har överträtt en bestämmelse i lagen om värdepappersmarknaden eller i MiFIR ska företaget kunna påföras en sanktion. I sådana fall ska även en styrelseledamot eller en verkställande direktör i institutet eller börsen, eller deras ersättare, kunna påföras en sanktion, om personen i fråga av uppsåt eller grov oaktsamhet har agerat på ett sätt som föranlett överträdelsen. Detta gäller dock enbart om företagets överträdelse är av allvarligt slag. I lagen införs också en bestämmelse med inne- börd att ett ingripande inte ska ske om överträdelsen utgör en gärning som är föremål för åtal. De sanktioner som kan bli aktuella för företagen är desamma som enligt gällande rätt, t.ex. återkallelse av tillstånd och sank- tionsavgift. De sanktioner som kan bli aktuella såvitt gäller fysiska personer i ledningsorganet för ett svenskt företag är förbud att utöva ledningsuppdrag i ett värdepappersinstitut samt sanktions- avgift. Sanktionsavgift för fysiska personer ska bestämmas till högst ett belopp som motsvarar eller, i de fall beloppet blir högre och kan beräknas, till två gånger beloppet av de vinster som har erhållits eller de kostnader/förluster som har undvikits genom överträdelsen. Bestämmelsen om ingripande mot fysiska personer i ett instituts eller en börs ledningsorgan ska tillämpas också på utländska företag som hör hemma utanför EES och driver värdepappersrörelse från filial i , varvid den eller de personer som har ansvaret för ledningen av filialen ska kunna påföras en sanktionsavgift. Det nya sanktionssystemet påverkar också beslutsordningen för sanktioner. Utredningen föreslår att , liksom tidi- gare, ska fatta beslut om sanktioner avseende juridiska personer, och även i frågor om fysiska personers underlåtenhet att anmäla förvärv och avyttringar av ett kvalificerat innehav i ett värde- pappersbolag, en börs eller en svensk clearingorganisation. När det gäller sanktioner mot ansvariga fysiska personer i ett svenskt värde- pappersinstitut eller en börs, i fråga om överträdelser från före- tagets sida, ska genom sanktionsföreläggande pröva frågor om sanktioner. Om ett sådant föreläggande inte god- känts inom föreskriven tid får ansöka hos Förvalt- ningsrätten i om att sanktionen ska beslutas. Ikraftträdande och övergångsbestämmelser (kapitel 14) Enligt MiFID II ska medlemsstaterna anta och offentliggöra de lagar och andra författningar som är nödvän- diga för att genomföra direktivet. De nationella bestämmelserna ska tillämpas , med vissa undantag. MiFIR ska, med vissa undantag, börja tillämpas . Avseende MiFIR innebär detta att nuvarande bestäm- melser i den svenska lagen som motsvarar bestämmelser i ska upphöra att gälla . Några särskilda åtgärder i övrigt för att förordningen ska börja gälla i ska inte vidtas och några övergångsbestämmelser behövs inte. När det gäller MiFID II ska de ändringar i lagen om värdepappersmarknaden som utredningen har föreslagit börja gälla , med undan- tag för bestämmelserna om en CTP:s skyldighet att samla in och offentliggöra information om handel med obligationer, struktu- rerade finansiella produkter, utsläppsrätter och derivat. Dessa reg- ler ska tillämpas . In 2014 Parliament and the Council adopted a Directive (MiFID II)1 and a Regulation (MiFIR)2 on markets in financial instruments, see Annexes 4 and 5. These legal instruments replace the MiFID of 2004.3 MiFID II and MiFIR contain a number of rules, mainly for invest- ment firms and regulated markets. The new legal instruments entail partly the transfer of a large proportion of the rules in the 2004 Directive more or less unchanged to the MiFID II, and partly the introduction of new rules or more detailed rules than those of the 2004 Directive. Some of the rules in the 2004 Directive – for example on transparency – are now found in MiFIR. This Regulation also contains entirely new rules. The main remit of the Inquiry has been to analyse what changes are required in current Swedish regulations in order to implement the new legal instruments. Moreover, the remit included reviewing some issues concerning financial advisory services that are not currently subject to licensing and commercial law regulation, con- sidering whether these advisory services should also be subject to licensing and commercial law regulation and if so draw up the necessary legislative proposals. 1Directive 2014/65/EU of Parliament and of 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU. 2Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of Parliament and 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 3Directive 2004/39/EC of Parliament and of the Council of on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC. After an introduction, in which the conditions for the Inquiry and its work are described (Chapter 2), the report describes the background to the new legal instruments, which are presented briefly (Chapter 3). There then follows a chapter with some general prin- ciples (Chapter 4). The report proposals are presented in Chapters 5– 14. The Inquirys main proposals from the different chapters are presented below. Scope etc. (Chapter 5) MiFID II and MiFIR, in common with the 2004 Directive, are applicable to certain services and activities referring to financial instruments. Thus when services and activities concern financial instruments they are subject to licensing and must be conducted in accordance with the MiFID II and MiFIR rules. The definition of the term financial instrument in the MiFID II is by and large the same as in the 2004 Directive. One new feature is that emission allowances are financial instruments under MiFID II and the Inquiry proposes that Swedish rules be changed so that this is stated in the Securities Market Act (2007:528). The investment services and activities that are subject to licensing requirements are also mainly the same in MiFID II and the 2004 Directive. However, the In- quiry proposes some adjustments in the designation and definition of the services and activities in the legislative text to achieve implementation that is closer to the Directive. One new feature in substance is operation of an organised trading facility (OTF), which is a new type of trading venue for financial instruments. The In- quiry proposes that this activity be included as a new investment activity subject to licensing in the Securities Market Act. Several of the provisions in MiFID II, including most of the investor protection rules, are also applicable when an investment firm sells or provides advisory services on structured deposits4, which are not financial instruments as such. The Inquiry proposes that this extension of scope also be introduced in Swedish law. 4 Deposits made to credit institutions, in which the interest or return is determined by an index, one or more financial instruments, commodities or an exchange rate. Under MiFID II a number of firms, occurrences and activities are outside its scope. By and large the exemptions are the same as in the 2004 Directive with some minor differences, for example as regards some activities referring to commodity derivatives and emission allowances. It is also clear from MiFID II that central securities depositories – called centrala värdepappersförvarare in Swedish law – will be exempted. The Inquiry proposes that the exemptions under Swedish law be adapted to the changes mentioned. Infrastructure of the securities market (Chapter 6) Many of the provisions of MiFID II and MiFIR concern the infra- structure of the securities market, i.e. the different types of trading venues (regulated market, MTF5 and OTF) that exist, how they should be organised and how trading should be conducted there and outside the market places. Also included in this area are issues concerning transparency (i.e. publication of orders and transactions), requirements of investment firms that conduct algorithmic trading, transaction reporting and position limitats when trading in com- modity derivatives and emission allowances. The new data reporting services also constitute part of the infrastructure of the securities market. As mentioned, the Inquiry proposes that operation of an OTF be included as a new investment activity subject to licensing in the Act. In addition, the Inquiry proposes some adjustments to the Swedish definitions of regulated market and MTF to achieve regulation that is more in line with the Directive. MiFID II contains a number of detailed rules for trading in regulated markets. The Inquiry proposes that the new require- ments in MiFID II for synchronisation of clocks, trading systems with sufficient capacity and resilience, written agreements on market making activities, transparent and non-discriminatory fee structures and rules on co-location and tick sizes be included in the Securities Market Act. The Inquiry also proposes that the rules on suspension and removal of a financial instrument from trading be adapted to 5 Acronym for the English term multilateral trading facility, MTF, see definition in Article 4.1.22 of MiFID II. the requirements of MiFID II. This means that an explicit rule will be included in the Act concerning suspension and removal decided by an operator of a trading venue and how this is to be commu- nicated to (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority). Most of the rules for regulated markets should also apply to MTF´s and OTF´s. The Inquiry also proposes that an MTF could be registered as an SME (small and medium-sized enter- prises) growth market. Small and medium-sized enterprises are companies with an average market value of less than million. Such registration means some relaxation in the requirements for admission to trading and to information about issuers. Several of the provisions in the directly effective Regulation (MiFIR) have no equivalent in Swedish law. This applies for example to the requirements to trade derivatives in a marketplace, some rules concerning central counterparties for clearing, rules on bench- marks and the obligation of investment firms to trade shares on a trading venue. These rules will not entail any legislative amend- ments. The rules concerning transparency, i.e. the requirements to publish orders and transactions for financial instruments are found in MiFIR. The same applies to the rules on documentation of orders and transactions and reporting transactions to the competent authority. The rules on systematic internalisers, i.e. investment firms which systematically deal on their own account when exe- cuting client orders outside a regulated market, are now found in MiFIR. In view of this, the Inquiry proposes that the current provisions on transparency, documentation of orders and trans- actions, transaction reporting and on systematic internalisers be removed from the Securities Market Act. In MiFID II there are, in relation to the 2004 Directive, new rules concerning limits for position management and reporting positions in commodity derivatives and emission allowances etc. The Inquiry proposes that the Securities Market Act prescribe that must establish quantitative thresholds for the positions in commodity derivatives an individual person or an indi- vidual firm can hold. Operators of trading venues must monitor the positions in commodity derivatives that individuals or firms hold and must be able to force a termination or reduction of a position and also be able to force the holder of a large or dominant position to provide liquidity back to the market. Moreover, operators of trading venues which trade commodity derivatives, emission allowan- ces or derivatives thereof, must publish a weekly report with the aggregate positions in the relevant financial instruments. The market operator must also provide on a daily basis more detailed infor- mation showing a breakdown of positions per holder to Finans- inspektionen. As a result of MiFID II a number of data reporting services are subject to licensing. This is a matter of providing an approved publication arrangement (APA), of being a consolidated tape provider (CTP) and providing an approved reporting mechanism (ARM). An approved publication arrangement (APA) means that someone publishes transactions on behalf of an investment firm in accordance with the transparency rules of MIFIR. A consolidated tape provider (CTP) provides a consolidated view of transactions from several different trading venues and participants, which facilitates for market participants to gain access to relevant information. Finally, an approved reporting mechanism (ARM) reports transactions to the competent authorities or Securities and Markets Authority () on behalf of an investment firm. This mainly refers to transaction reporting under MiFIR. The licensing condi- tions and the requirements of licensed firms are similar to the conditions and requirements applicable to investment firms. The Inquiry proposes that this be provided for in a separate chapter of the Securities Market Act. MiFID II includes a number of rules concerning algorithmic trading and algorithmic high frequency trading. The rules aim to deal with the risks and problems associated with this type of activity. The provisions of MiFID II are directed at both investment firms own trading and at their trading on behalf of clients. The rules are new in the sense that previously there were no binding rules in the area in any directive or regulation. The Inquiry proposes that an investment firm that conducts algorithmic trading on its own behalf must, in accordance with the provisions of MiFID II, have effective systems and risk controls to ensure that the firms trading systems are resilient and have sufficient capacity. The system must have the necessary thresholds, limits and filters to prevent incorrect orders and to prevent the system functioning in a way that disrupts the market. The firm must also have effective systems and controls to ensure that the algorithmic trading is not used for market abuse or to violate trading rules in the trading venue where the trading takes place. The firm in question must have continuity arrange- ments that can deal with any failure of its trading systems. In addition, firms must notify the competent authority and the trading venue where the trading takes place of their arrangements in these respects. The competent authority may require an investment firm – on a regular or ad hoc basis – to provide a description of the nature of its algorithmic trading strategies, details of the trading parameters or limits to which the system is subject and the controls that the firm has in place to ensure compliance with the rules. Even if an investment firm does not itself engage in algorithmic trading, it may have clients that do so, for example in that they use direct electronic access. For this reason MiFID II includes provisions on controls and responsibilities for investment firms that provide direct electronic access. The Inquiry proposes that provisions be included in the Securities Market Act stipulating that these firms must have effective systems and controls in place to ensure proper assessment of the suitability of clients to whom the service is provided. There must be trading and credit thresholds that clients may not exceed, and trading must be monitored so that the firm can prevent trading that could create risks to the investment firm itself or that could create a disorderly market or could be contrary to the Market Abuse Regulation (Regulation of Parlia- ment and of the Council [EU] 596/2014). The firm must also ensure that there is a written agreement that specifies the rights and obligations of the client and the investment firm. Firms that provide direct electronic access must also inform their competent authority as well as the relevant trading venue of this. The competent authority may require the investment firm to provide, on a regular or ad hoc basis, a description of the systems and controls that the firm has in place regarding direct electronic access. A consistent regulation of financial and investment advice (Chapter 7) MiFID II contains a number of rules aimed at protecting investors. The rules in the Directive are, however, solely directed at invest- ment firms and are dealt with in Chapters 8 and 9. Chapter 7 deals with the national issue of whether it is possible to achieve con- sistent regulation for all providers of advisory services to consumers on investment, regardless of corporate form. The main regulation of this type of advice is in the to Con- sumers Act (2003:362) (Act) and in the Securities Market Act. But activities that in themselves may entail elements of advisory services are regulated in the Insurance Mediation Act (2005:405), the Insurance Business Act (2010:2043), the Invest- ment Funds Act (2004:46) and the Act on Managers (2013:561). The rules are very similar and have the same consumer protection purpose. The Inquiry proposes that the rules be completely aligned so that they are not only similar but exactly the same. Consequently, the Inquiry proposes that a pro- vision be introduced into the legislation for each corporate form that the rules on advisory services in the Securities Market Act be applicable when the firm in question provides advisory services to consumers. Rules on benefits to or from third parties (Chapter 8) MiFID II contains a minimum rule on benefits from third parties to independent advisors and portfolio managers. If the investment firm has informed the client that the advice is independent, the firm may not accept and retain benefits from any third party, and in its advice the firm must assess several different product pro- viders and issuers products as well as those of its own or of firms with close links to the investment firm. may a portfolio manager, under the minimum rule, accept and retain benefits from third parties. If an independent advisor or portfolio manager accepts a benefit from a third party the advisor/manager must forward this benefit to the client. This rule must be introduced into Swedish law, which is also what the Inquiry proposes. However, in the opinion of the Inquiry, the minimum rule alone would not rectify the commission problems. Supervision by has shown that benefits from third parties lead to conflicts of interest and advisors putting their own interests in obtaining large com- missions before the clients interests. The minimum rule would not lead to sufficient reinforcement of consumer protection. The Inquiry proposes therefore that takes the opportunity to go further than the minimum rule and extend the prohibition against accepting benefits from third parties to cover all advisory services, independent or not, to non-professional clients. The same should apply to portfolio management provided to non-professional clients. The Inquiry proposes that the prohibition be designed so that benefits from a third party that may have a negative effect on clients interests be forbidden and that be given the right to prescribe in detail the benefits in question. This kind of commission prohibition may be designed to apply to commission that entails a negative impact on clients interests, without applying to commission that does not. As previously mentioned, the Inquiry proposes that the same rules should apply to all advisors, regardless of corporate form. This means in the area of commission that the prohibition on accepting and retaining benefits from third parties that may have a negative impact on clients interests will also apply to insurance companies and insurance intermediaries when they provide financial advice to consumers in the course of their ordi- nary business. The Inquiry also proposes that goes further than required by the Directive as regards the requirements to be met in order to be called an independent advisor. Under the minimum rule an independent advisor may give advice on its own products as long as the advisors range of products includes a sufficient number of external products. The Inquiry proposes that the requirement be tightened so that only those advising on external products may call themselves independent advisors. These provisions will also apply to insurance companies and insurance intermediaries. Apart from the rules specifically applicable to investment advice and portfolio management, MiFID II also includes general pro- visions on benefits from third parties that apply to all investment services. The rules mean that an investment firm, when rendering services to clients, may not accept benefits from anyone other than