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Vodopivec, 2008, Does reducing unemployment insurance generosity reduce job match quality?, , 92, 684-695. , ., 1980, Progressive taxation as social insurance, , 14(1), 49-68. , M., 2014, Optimal education policies under endogenous borrowing constraints, Economic Theory, 55(1), 135-159. Wilkinson, R. and K. Pickett, 2009, The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone, Penguin, . Bilaga 4 till LU15 Yagan, D., 2013, Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut, Mimeo, , . Zagler, M. and G. Dürnecker, 2003, Fiscal policy and economic growth, , 17(3), 397-418. A: National accounting conventions It is well known that public sector activities are included in national account assessments of value added based on the input costs of production. The fundamental problem is that there by definition are no market values (prives) by which to assess outputs, and therefore they are imputed from the cost side. National account conventions have implications both for level and growth comparisons across countries.88 Across time and countries there are substantial differences in the allocation of activities between market and non-market activities. For non-market activities these may either be household or public sector activities (e.g. child and old age care). Since an important difference in welfare models across countries is the part of activities taken over by the public sector, and since public sector activities are included in GDP measures while household activities are not, this may lead to an upward lift in GDP measures for countries with a large public sector. Something (2006) termed “Scandinawizer swindle” or accounting trick. To assess the importance of this, the following makes a simple correction89 of GDP measures by deducting public sector activities 88Usually countries are compared based on GDP per capita. It could be argued that GNI is a better measure, but for most countries the difference is small, see . 89This is based on the national account relation: Y=C+A, where Y is GDP, C corrected GDP and A the activities included in GDP which we want to make a correction for. , C=Y(1-A/Y) and using GDP figures and values for A/Y, the corrected GDP measure follows. Bilaga 4 till LU15 like child and old age care which in some countries are mainly household activities and in others mainly public sector activities. The corrected GDP measure thus neutralizes whether these activities are within households or in the public sector. The result of such a correction can be read of Figure A-1. The corrections vary from 5–6 percent of GDP for and to 0.8 percent for . The correction is of quantitative importance but does not change the ranking of countries in a significant way. Figure A.1 GDP and GDP corrected for publicly provided personal welfare services AUS NLD SWE DEU BEL ICE FIN FRA GBR JPN GRC POR Corrected GDP per capita Note: GDP is corrected for old-age, incapacity and child care. Data applies to 2010. Gross domestic product per capita, current prices and current PPPs. Source: Own calculations based on data. Note that there may be other differences between household and public sector activities including quality difference, equal opportunity aspects etc. There are other problems in comparing GDP levels across countries. (2006) argues that while the GDP gap per capita between and Europe is about 30 percent, it is reduced to 17 percent when account is taken of excess energy use, prison population, metropolitan dispersion, and an inefficient care system. For a general discussion of GDP measures, see Stiglitz et al. (2009). Bilaga 4 till LU15 Appendix National account conventions have implications for measured growth rates. Let total output (Y) be decomposed into private ) and public output ( ), i.e. growth can be written , the output share of the output in the public sector is imputed from the input side, it follows that measured productivity level is unity and productivity growth thus zero. Assume that true productivity growth in the public sector is g>0 while the recorded growth is zero, then real growth as recorded in national accounts underestimates actual growth. Clear, other things being equal, this reduces output growth in countries with large public sectors. Commission has decided (Commission resolution of , 20.12.2002) on a new approach whereby output-indicators should be used to assess public production. This implies that productivity growth in the public sector is not zero by assumption. In an application of this method, it is found for that average productivity growth has been 0.8 percent over the years 2005–2012; see Statistics (2014). Accordingly, GDP growth rates have been assessed too low. This approach has not yet been applied for . B: Gross and net measures There are a number of important caveats to be taken into account when making cross-country comparisons of welfare state activities. The most important is whether we are comparing public sector provisions or the total provisions for social expenditures in various Bilaga 4 till LU15 countries, and whether gross or net numbers are compared, see , Fron and Ladaique (2011). As shown below the crosscountry comparisons are very sensitive to these issues. Table A-1 shows in the first row gross public expenditures on social purposes – the type of number often used for international comparisons. There are large differences in gross public social expenditures, e.g. with expenditures at about 30 percent of GDP, 27.2 percent in , while the US is only at 19 percent of GDP. A very important aspect to take into account in cross-country comparisons is the tax treatment of social expenditures. This implies that there can be a huge difference between gross and net expenditures if e.g. transfers are paid as gross income from which both direct and indirect taxes should be paid. Since the tax treatment of transfers differs across countries, this may be a serious factor influencing cross-country comparisons. In addition expenditures to social purposes may arise as so-called tax expenditures, that is, if tax deductions are used instead of cashtransfers. Therefore tax revenue will be smaller than otherwise, and these expenditures should therefore also be included. Table 1 shows a correction for all these items in the row termed net current social expenditures. As seen, this narrows the differences considerably. The expenditure for and is 23.4 percent and 22.5 percent, respectively, and it is 20.1 percent for the . A further aspect to take into account is mandatory social expenditures; i.e. coverage is determined politically, but financing is private. In the row net public mandated social expenditures these items are taken into account (does not include mandatory pension contributions). This correction does not have a large impact. Finally, the role of private provision differs across countries, and the role is particularly large in the countries. The final row giving total social expenditures includes such private expenditures. This increases expenditure shares and implies more variation across countries. Interestingly, measured in this way the US has a higher total expenditure level than the Nordic countries. There is thus a tendency to a negative correlation between social and private provision; i.e. in the countries where the public sector Bilaga 4 till LU15 plays a large role the private provisions play a less important role, and vice versa. Table A.1 Gross and net social expenditures, countries, 2011 Net current public social Net public mandated social Net total social expenditure Note: Social expenditures relative to GDP market prices. Note for this includes activities. Source: Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). Finally, note that these numbers do not say anything about the distributional profile of these expenditures but only consider average expenditures in the respective countries. As argued above, public provisions of welfare services are redistributive, see Figure 3.4. 1.Deltagande med väpnad styrka En utökad beslutsbefogenhet för regeringen. MiFID II och MiFIR. 3.Med fokus på kärnuppgifterna. En angelägen anpassning av uppgifter på djurområdet. 4.Ett svenskt tonnageskattesystem. 5.En ny svensk tullagstiftning. 6.Mer gemensamma tobaksregler. Ett genomförande av tobaksproduktdirektivet. 7.Krav på privata aktörer i välfärden. 8.En översyn av årsredovisningslagarna. 10.Gränser i havet. 11.Kunskapsläget på kärnavfallsområdet 2015. Kontroll, dokumentation och finansiering för ökad säkerhet. 13.Tillämpningsdirektivet till utstationeringsdirektivet – Del I. 14.Sedd, hörd och respekterad. ihälso- och sjukvården. 15.Attraktiv, innovativ och hållbar – strategi för en konkurrenskraftig jordbruks- och trädgårdsnäring. 16.Ökat värdeskapande ur immateriella tillgångar. 17.För kvalitet – Med gemensamt ansvar. 18.Lösöreköp och registerpant. 19.En ny ordning för redovisningstillsyn. 20.Trygg och effektiv utskrivning från sluten vård. 21.Mer trygghet och bättre försäkring. Del 1 + 2. Rektorn och styrkedjan. Strategi och åtgärder för säker information i staten. 24.En kommunallag för framtiden. Del A + B . 25.En ny säkerhetsskyddslag. 27.Skatt på dubbdäcksanvändning i tätort? 28.Gör – digital kompetens. 29.En yrkesinriktning inom teknikprogrammet. Skatt på vissa konsumentvaror som innehåller kemikalier. 31.Datalagring och integritet. 32.Nästa fas i e-hälsoarbetet. 33.Uppgiftslämnarservice för företagen. 34.Ett effektivare främjandeförbud i lotterilagen. 35.Service i glesbygd. 37.Översyn av lagen om skiljeförfarande. 38.Tillämpningsdirektivet till utstationeringsdirektivet – Del II. 40.Stärkt konsumentskydd på bolånemarknaden. 42.Koll på anläggningen. 43.Vägar till ett effektivare miljöarbete. 44.Arbetslöhet och ekonomiskt bistånd. 45.SÖK – statsbidrag för ökad kvalitet. Generell tillsyn, enskildas klagomål och det allmänna ombudet inom socialförsäkringen. 47.Kollektiv rättighetsförvaltning på upphovsrättsområdet. 48.Bostadsmarknaden och den ekonomiska utvecklingen. 49.Nya regler för revisorer och revision. 50.Hela lönen, . Utmaningar för ett jämställt arbetsliv. 51.Klimatförändringar och dricksvattenförsörjning. 53.The and Economic Performance. Tillämpningsdirektivet till utstationeringsdirektivet – Del I. Tillämpningsdirektivet till utstationeringsdirektivet – Del II. Hela lönen, . Utmaningar för ett jämställt arbetsliv. MiFID II och MiFIR. + Bilagor [2] Ett svenskt tonnageskattesystem. [4] En ny svensk tullagstiftning. Krav på privata aktörer i välfärden. Överprövning av upphandlingsmål m.m. [12] En ny ordning för redovisningstillsyn. En kommunallag för framtiden. Del A + B. Skatt på dubbdäcksanvändning i tätort? Skatt på vissa konsumentvaror som innehåller kemikalier. Ett effektivare främjandeförbud i lotterilagen. Bostadsmarknaden och den ekonomiska utvecklingen. The and Economic Performance. Deltagande med väpnad styrka i utbildning utomlands. En utökad beslutsbefogenhet för regeringen.