sou · H2B383 · 2014-12-18 00:00:00 — Enligt kommittén föreligger en risk för att det uppstår en diskrepans mellan den bedömning som ISP skulle ha gjort – om ISP prövat frågan om tillverkning/tillhandahållande – och den bedömning som den aktuella myndigheten gör. Därutöver kan konstateras att de krav på egenfinansiering av verksamheten som över tiden i allt större utsträckning lagts på vissa försvars- myndigheter medfört att dessa kommit att bedriva verksamhet som är att betrakta som kommersiell. En omständighet som i sig talar för att verksamheten bör vara tillståndspliktig. Vidare anser kommittén att de massmediala affärer som berört vissa försvars- myndigheter tydliggjort behovet av en kontinuerlig uppföljning av myndigheternas verksamhet inom berört område. Kommitténs sammantagna bedömning är att det saknas bärande skäl för att undanta statliga myndigheter från kravet på tillstånd för att tillverka respektive tillhandahålla krigsmateriel. Undantagen från tillståndskravet att tillhandahålla krigsmateriel (4 § fjärde stycket krigsmateriellagen) för vissa andra aktörer än statliga myndigheter är relativt omfattande. Bestämmelsen är dock delvis otydlig, inte minst beträffande dess faktiska omfång, vilket kan skapa osäkerhet hos berörda. Av bestämmelsen framgår t.ex. att ett företag som tillhandahåller krigsmateriel till en statlig myndighet eller till en aktör som har tillstånd att tillverka den materiel som tillhandahållandet avser är undantaget från tillstånd- kravet. Om företaget i fråga även tillhandahåller materielen till någon annan än nu angivna mottagare inom landet måste företaget dock ha tillstånd. behöver tillstånd eller inte blir således avhängigt av olika yttre faktorer, som inte direkt är kopplade till företaget i fråga. Den osäkerhet som detta skapar rimmar illa med ambition att framstå som ett ledande land i arbetet med att kontrollera krigsmaterielområdet. Kommitténs uppfattning är att ISP i egenskap av kontroll- myndighet på området bör ha god kännedom om de företag som bedriver verksamhet med krigsmateriel för att myndigheten ska kunna upprätthålla en god exportkontroll. Enligt kommitténs för- menande är det önskvärt att regelverket är enkelt och tydligt samt att kontrollen inom krigsmaterielområdet är så omfattande som möjligt. Med hänsyn härtill finner kommittén att även detta undan- tag bör avskaffas. En konsekvens av detta blir att det införs ett generellt krav på tillstånd för tillhandahållande av krigsmateriel inom riket. Den föreslagna förändringen kommer att medföra en viss ökad administrativ börda för såväl ISP som berörda företag. Inte minst kommer arbetsbördan öka initialt p.g.a. att fler tillstånd behöver sökas och att ISP behöver bereda och pröva dessa. Kommitténs bedömning är dock att tillkommande administrativa bördan p.g.a. detta i flertalet fall bör vara begränsad. Exempelvis torde det vara möjligt att låta prövningen av tillverknings- och tillhanda- hållandetillstånden ske inom ramen för ett och samma ärende. Kommittén föreslår att lagändringarna ska träda i kraft . Förändringarna medför inget behov av övergångsbestäm- melser. Kommittén föreslår att regeringen utfärdar vissa före- skrifter, vilka bör träda i kraft per som lagändringarna. Kommittén bedömer att förslaget kommer att innebära en ökad arbetsbelastning för såväl ISP som SSM – dels i form av mer administration, dels i form av utökad tillsynsverksamhet – och att båda dessa myndigheter med anledning av detta behöver ökade resurser. I årsarbetskrafter mätt är kommitténs bedömning att ISP behöver två årsarbetskrafter och att SSM behöver en halv årsarbets- kraft. Den föreslagna sanktionsväxlingen kommer inledningsvis också att innebära ett visst administrativt merarbete för myndig- heterna. Detta merarbete bör över tiden minska i takt med att myndigheterna utvecklar sina rutiner. Myndigheternas kostnads- ökning bör delas mellan de privata aktörerna och staten. Där staten har att bära den merkostnad som uppstår på grund av att statliga myndigheter föreslås omfattas av ISP:s tillstånds- och tillsyns- verksamhet enligt krigsmateriellagen. För rättsväsendets aktörer i stort torde förslaget om sanktions- växling medföra ett merarbete. Kommittén bedömer att antalet överklagade sanktionsbeslut till förvaltningsdomstolarna kommer att vara fler än antalet anmälningar rörande dessa beteenden som hanteras av polis/åklagare och de allmänna domstolarna. Hur pass omfattande tillskottet av ärenden blir för förvaltnings- domstolarna är avhängigt av flera faktorer. Bl.a. inverkar omfatt- ningen av ISP:s och SSM:s tillsynsverksamhet. Ju mer omfattande tillsynsverksamheten är desto fler överträdelser kan nämligen förväntas bli upptäckta och administrativt sanktionerade, vilket i sin tur kan förväntas medföra ett ökat antal ärenden hos förvalt- ningsdomstolarna. Hur pass betungande den extra arbetsbördan blir för förvaltningsdomstolarna är också svår att förutse eftersom detta är beroende av flera olika parametrar. En sådan är huruvida klagande påkallar muntlig förhandling inför domstolen eller inte. Oaktat hur betungande den tillkommande arbetsbördan blir för förvaltningsdomstolarna torde den merkostnad denna medför vara större än den besparing som staten gör på att de aktuella över- trädelserna inte längre hanteras av polis, åklagare och allmänna En samlad bedömning är därför att förslaget, i vart fall på kort sikt, medför extra kostnader för rättsväsendet som sådant. Om utvecklingen inom detta tillsynsområde blir likvärdig med den utveckling som skett inom andra tillsynsområden där lagstiftaren infört sanktionsavgift, kan dock med tiden förväntas en förbättrad regelefterlevnad hos aktörerna. En sådan utveckling skulle minska den tillkommande arbetsbördan som beskrivits. För företagen och andra aktörer på krigsmaterielområdet inne- bär förslaget med ett utökat tillståndskrav en viss ökad admi- nistrativ börda. Genom att utarbeta rutiner torde den tillkom- mande administrativa bördan dock kunna begränsas. För de aktörer som efterlever exportkontrollagstiftningen kommer förslaget om sanktionsväxling i övrigt inte att medföra några extra kostnader eller förändringar. Endast för de aktörer som begår överträdelser kommer förslaget att medföra ökade kostnader, vilket är ett av syftena med kommitténs förslag. För att förebygga dessa kostnader kan förväntas att aktörerna kommer att behöva förbättra sin exportkontroll, vilket över tiden kommer att bidra till en bättre regelefterlevnad. Sanktionsväxlingen blir på så sätt brottsföre- byggande. The overall task for the Committee is to review the export controls on military equipment and propose how the control system should be designed in the future. The remit has two main parts: the ques- tion of stronger export controls with respect to non-democratic states, and the question of introducing financial penalties in the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance. has chosen to address the latter part in this interim report. The first question – that of stronger export controls with respect to non-democratic states – will be addressed in the Committees final report. has taken a broader approach to the question of penalties than simply examining the appropriateness of replacing criminal penalties with financial penalties in the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance. also examined whether criminal penalties should be retained but a greater number of punishable infringements should be pursued with administrative penalties other than financial penalties. has used the term penalty-shift to describe its proposed shift from criminal penalties to administrative penalties (financial or other repressive penalties). In assessing whether a system of financial penalties should be in- troduced in the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance, the Committee paid particular attention to the guidelines and viewpoints on when financial penalties can be used, outlined in Government 1981/82:142. Moreover, the Committee took account of the views on this issue of the Inquiry on the use of criminal law (SOU 2013:38). Export controls of strategic products, i.e. military equipment and dual-use products, as well as technical assistance with respect to such controlled products, ultimately aim to prevent these products ending up in the hands of the wrong end-users. One important instrument in ensuring that the export control regulations are fol- lowed by the relevant natural persons and legal entities is the exist- ence of effective, dissuasive penalties. Effective penalties therefore contribute to greater compliance with the regulations. Effective penalties are also a prerequisite if is to be considered to have fulfilled its international obligations and commitments in this area. A further aspect is that effective export controls can be a pre- requisite to allow Swedish companies to get access to controlled products from other states. The current penalty system The penalty system laid down in the Act and the Act on Controls of Assis- tance is mainly criminal in nature. It therefore primarily targets natural persons. In addition, the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance also include certain possibilities to issue administrative penalties, which can also target legal entities. These include the withdrawal of licences or prohibitions on using general licences already granted. Pursuant to the Swedish Penal Code, it is also possible to punish a business operator via corporate fines for offences committed in the exercise of business activities. Such matters are examined by a gen- eral court on the application of a prosecutor. Are there flaws? observes that the possibilities to pursue detected infringements of the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance are lim- ited. The system of penalties in its current form is not applicable to such infringements. This circumstance in itself an obvious risk of undermining confidence in and compliance with the regu- latory framework. With the aim of learning about any flaws in the current system of penalties, the Committee gathered information and statistics from the supervisory authorities – the for Non- Proliferation and Export Controls and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority – and from other relevant agencies. These ac- counts indicate that since 1993 there have been at least a few hundred suspected infringements of the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance. Only a few of these have led to a prosecution, and fewer still have resulted in legal proceedings. This is partly due to the fact that the majority of the suspected infringements were in- significant in nature and were deemed minor offences by the law enforcement authorities. offences are exempt from criminal liability under the regulations. Another reason is that it has been difficult for and prosecutors to demonstrate that offenders in specific cases have acted negligently or intentionally contravened the regulations. The authorities accounts also indicate a lack of uniformity in the processing and investigation of infringements of the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance. One reason for this is that several law enforcement authorities are authorised to conduct investi- gations, and such matters can be handled by both general and specialist prosecutors. The accounts from the supervisory authori- ties also indicate that existing administrative penalties have only been imposed for infringements in exceptional cases. has found that the current penalty system under the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance are not fit for the purpose of pursuing the infringements that occur. The penalty system there- fore needs to be overhauled to make it more applicable, particularly with respect to less serious infringements. proposes that a penalty-shift be implemented in the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance. This shift consists in criminal penalties being replaced or supplemented with administrative pen- alties. In the assessment of the Committee, the proposed change will lead to improved confidence in and compliance with export control legislation. At first glance, the proposed change might be thought to make the penalty system in the export control regulatory framework less incisive. However, in practice the penalty-shift means that in- fringements of a less serious nature, which today cannot be pursued because they are deemed minor offences, will be pursued to a greater extent in the future. The actual result of the penalty- shift will therefore be a tightening of the penalty system, because it will be possible to issue administrative penalties even for minor infringements. A further advantage of administrative penalties is that they can target legal entities, which will in turn have a greater incentive to improve export controls and devote adequate re- sources to them. This will, in itself, limit the number of infringe- ments. The penalty-shift will therefore bring about a de facto tightening of the export controls on military equipment and dual- use products. Basis for the penalty-shift One starting point for the Committees deliberations is that the changes proposed to the penalty system should contribute both to improved stakeholder compliance with export control legislation and to fulfilling its international obligations and commit- ments in this area. To achieve this, it must be possible to use the proposed penalties when infringements occur, even if they are less serious offences. It is desirable that the penalty system be designed to be effective and to dissuade infringements of the regulations. Less serious infringements that are deemed minor offences are often due to carelessness, oversights, etc. on the part of the actors. It can be assumed that these infringements are, to a significant ex- tent, the result of the actors in question not devoting sufficient resources to export controls. Effective export controls of controlled products require companies to have good knowledge of the export control regulations. One risk in this context is that carelessness etc. that is deemed a minor offence can have serious consequences and that controlled products end up in the wrong hands. Even minor offences can, therefore, lead to the aim of export controls not being fulfilled. Another starting point for the Committees proposal of a penalty-shift is the legislators explicit aim of seeking more moderate use of criminal law, including in special criminal law branches. The assessment of whether a penalty-shift should take place therefore includes an examination of whether the criminal penalty for a certain type of conduct should be abolished or not. In examining whether conduct should be criminalised or not, the Committee considered the criteria outlined by the Inquiry on the use of criminal law. These criteria do not constitute absolute rules, but rather were the basis for the reasoning employed by the Com- mittee when examining the question of a penalty-shift. The criteria are as follows: The intended criminal penalty must concern an identified and concrete interest that is worthy of protection (acceptable pro- tection interest). The action that is to be criminalised must be capable of causing damage or a risk of damage to the protection interest. Only those who have proved to be at fault – acted in a blame- worthy fashion – should be criminally liable, which means that criminalisation is not permitted to jeopardise the application of the fault principle. There must not be any sufficiently valuable opposing interest. There must not be any sufficiently effective alternative method for addressing the undesirable conduct. The following should be considered with respect to this criterion: a)Are there already any binding rules of conduct that are sufficiently effective to combat the undesirable conduct? b)If it is necessary to introduce a binding rule of conduct – can the conduct be combated sufficiently effectively with a rule that is not repressive (e.g. a civil law rule on damages)? c)If it is necessary to introduce a repressive binding rule of conduct to combat the undesirable conduct, fines, financial penalties or the withdrawal of licences should be considered first. Criminal penalties should be the last resort. The implementation of the penalty-shift proposes that the penalty-shift be implemented in two ways. Firstly, certain criminal penalties should be abolished and replaced with financial penalties. Secondly, additional adminis- trative penalties should be introduced in the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance (fines and warnings) and these proposed additional ad- ministrative penalties, along with the existing ones, should be used more than is currently the case. Reasons for the proposal The majority of the infringements that occur are deemed to be minor offences and are, therefore, exempt from criminal liability. Replacing the criminal penalties with financial penalties or supple- menting the criminal penalties with other administrative penalties offers better opportunities to pursue this type of infringement. Another effect of an increased use of administrative penalties is that they can be imposed on legal entities. An expanded toolbox of administrative penalties for the supervisory authorities increases the possibilities for them to pursue infringements committed within the framework of a legal entitys activities, and to do so as soon as the infringement is detected. In the Committees assess- ment, this can help ensure that legal entities devote adequate resources to export control activities to a greater extent than at present. Which criminal penalties should be replaced with financial penalties? Criminal penalties send a strong signal, and the penalties them- selves signal that society takes a serious view of the conduct being punished. In the view of the Committee, this means there can be no question of scrapping criminal penalties for those actions that cause or may cause damage to something that is deemed to have an interest that is particularly worthy of protection. This means that actions that lead to controlled products and technical assistance relating to such products ending up in the hands of end-users deemed unacceptable by should continue to be subject to criminal penalties. However, actions that cause or may cause dam- age to an interest worthy of protection with lower relative safe- guards could be the subject of a penalty-shift, meaning that criminal penalties are replaced with financial penalties. This in- cludes actions such as failing to submit requested information to the for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls or the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority within the prescribed time. This kind of failure has for the most part no direct effect on the licence-issuing process itself. proposes that the criminal penalties be dropped from Section 27, first paragraph, points 1, 4 and 6 of the Act and from Section 22, first paragraph, points 2–7 of the Act on Controls of Assistance. Introduction of additional administrative penalties In parallel with the change proposed above, the Committee also proposes that increased use be made of administrative penalties other than financial penalties. These administrative penalties can be used for both actions that are subject to criminal penalties and those subject to financial penalties. With the aim of creating greater for the for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority to pursue infringements via administrative penalties, two new penalties should be introduced in the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance, in the form of a general possi- bility to issue fines and warnings. The supervisory authorities should also, within the framework of their supervision under the Act on Controls of Assistance, be given the right to issue regulations in the same way as already follows from the Act. These new administra- tive penalties should, like the existing ones (licence withdrawal and prohibition), be applicable alongside a criminal penalty or financial penalty. for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority will there- fore be able to choose between enforcing a measure via a fine or levying a financial penalty afterwards (in the case of an action sub- ject to that kind of penalty) or initiating a notification of prosecution which might result in a criminal penalty (in the case of an action subject to that kind of penalty). It is not possible to issue several different penalties for the same action (prohibition of double jeopardy). Financial penalties in detail proposes that financial penalties should amount to a minimum of 000 and a maximum of 000. This range was chosen in light of the financial penalties that exist in other supervisory areas in which supervisory authorities impose penalties, and also in light of the type of conduct for which this kind of penalty is proposed and how such conduct should be as- sessed compared with other conduct that is subject to criminal penalties under the relevant legislation. To create clarity and pre- dictability, financial penalties of set amounts should be imposed. The precise amount for each type of conduct punishable by finan- cial penalty should be set by the Government. The decision to impose a financial penalty should be taken by the relevant supervisory authority. Liability to pay a financial pen- alty is based on the principle of liability without fault. In light of this, and also to allow consideration for special circumstances, there should be an option for the supervisory authorities to adjust the penalty or, in certain cases, set it aside entirely. Before a finan- cial penalty order is issued, the subject of the financial penalty should be given an opportunity to comment. A financial penalty order can be appealed to a court of law. Liability via reference to other regulations When the Committee reviewed the provisions in the Act and the Act on Controls of Assistance, the Committee observed that there are a number of uncertainties regarding some penalty provisions in- volving liability via reference to other regulations, where these in- clude imprisonment in the scale of penalties and are supplemented by regulations issued by Swedish Customs, the for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. The uncertainty consisted in the fact that was not possible to establish the extent to which the authorities regu- lations on these issues constituted a essential part of the penalty provisions. It was therefore impossible to rule out the fact that the current provisions, with their liability via reference to other regu- lations, may be incompatible with the regulations in the Instru- ment of Government concerning standard-setting. In light of this, the Committee proposes that the current provisions encompassing liability via reference to other regulations be addressed. The Com- mittee propose that this be done by replacing some of the penalty provisions with financial penalties, and by the Government, rather than the administrative authorities under it, issuing regulations in cases where no penalty-shift is implemented. proposes that the exemption from the licence re- quirement for the manufacture and supply of military equipment that applies to Swedish government agencies be abolished. Moreo- ver, the Committee proposes that the exemption from the licence requirement for the supply of military equipment that applies to actors other than government agencies also be abolished. Under the current regulations, certain Swedish government agen- cies are not subject to ongoing supervision by the for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls. The lack of ongoing supervision by the for Non-Proliferation and Ex- port Controls means that it is not possible for the Agency to ob- tain a complete picture of who handles military equipment in and what equipment is handled.