sou · H2B370 · 2014-10-15 00:00:00 — Den europeiska åtkomstpunkten ska enligt direktivet upprättas . I avvaktan på att de tekniska förutsättningarna för åtkomstpunkten är färdig- ställda föreslår utredningen att ikraftträdandet av bestämmelsen om elektronisk åtkomst skjuts regeringen bestämmer. Ändringarna i öppenhetsdirektivet innebär att den behöriga myndig- hetens sanktionsbefogenheter stärks. Vid överträdelser av bestäm- melserna om regelbunden finansiell information, flaggningsbestäm- melserna samt öppenhetsdirektivets krav på offentliggörande av förändringar i rättigheter som är knutna till värdepapper som är upptagna till handel på en reglerad marknad, ska den behöriga myndigheten ha befogenhet att göra ett offentligt utlåtande om överträdelsen och vem som är ansvarig för den, besluta om ett före- läggande att den ansvarige ska upphöra med agerandet samt besluta om administrativa sanktionsavgifter. Utöver ovanstående befogen- heter ska medlemsstaterna se till att det enligt nationell rätt är möjligt att tillfälligt upphäva rösträtten till aktier vid överträdelser av flaggningsregelverket. För att ska ha de sanktionsmöjligheter som föreskrivs i den nya lydelsen av öppenhetsdirektivet föreslår utred- ningen att inspektionens nuvarande befogenheter att besluta om vitesförelägganden och sanktionsavgifter utsträcks till att även omfatta bestämmelsen i lagen om värdepappersmarknaden om att emittenter ska offentliggöra information om ändringar i de rättig- heter som är knutna till de värdepapper som är upptagna till handel på en reglerad marknad. Dessa sanktionsmöjligheter föreslås också omfatta de av utredningen föreslagna nya bestämmelserna i lagen om värdepappersmarknaden om att vissa emittenter ska offentliggöra en årlig rapport om betalningar till myndigheter samt att års- och koncernredovisningen ska upprättas med ett enhetligt elektroniskt rapporteringsformat. Utredningen föreslår också att Finansinspek- tionen, om det finns synnerliga skäl, så länge flaggningsskyldigheten inte fullgjorts får förbjuda den flaggningsskyldige att företräda aktier till den del innehavets andel av samtliga aktier i bolaget eller av röstetalet för samtliga aktier i bolaget uppnår eller överstiger ett flaggningspliktigt gränsvärde. Om det finns särskilda skäl, exem- pelvis för förvaltningen av bolaget, ska få ansöka om att tingsrätten förordnar en lämplig person att som förvaltare företräda de aktier som inte får företrädas av ägaren. Enligt öppenhetsdirektivets ändrade bestämmelser ska alla beslut om sanktioner och åtgärder med anledning av öppenhetsdirektivets bestämmelser, inklusive information om överträdelsens typ och karaktär samt uppgifter om vem som är ansvarig för överträdelsen, utan dröjsmål offentliggöras av den behöriga myndigheten. Offentlig- görandet får senareläggas eller anonymiseras i vissa fall. Till följd av direktivets ändrade krav föreslår utredningen att det genom före- skrifter på förordningsnivå införs en skyldighet för Finansinspek- tionen att utan onödigt dröjsmål publicera beslut om sanktioner och sanktionsavgifter. Genom ändringarna i öppenhetsdirektivet blir medlemsstaterna ålagda att införa sanktionsavgifter som uppgår till en viss storlek. För att genomföra dessa ändringar föreslår utredningen att Finans- inspektionen ska ha befogenhet att besluta om sanktionsavgifter för juridiska personer eller av årsomsättningen. I det fall beloppet blir högre och kan beräknas ska sanktionsavgiften uppgå till ett belopp som motsvarar två gånger de vinster som erhållits eller de förluster som undvikits genom överträdelsen. För fysiska personer föreslår utredningen att ska kunna besluta om sanktioner eller, i det fall beloppet blir högre och kan beräknas, upp till två gånger beloppet av de vinster som har erhållits eller de förluster som undvikits genom överträdelsen. De beloppsgränser som anges i direktivet uppgår till väsentligt högre belopp än de gränser som gäller i fråga om särskild avgift och straffavgift i gällande rätt. Det finns omständigheter som talar för och omständigheter som talar emot att sanktionsavgifterna i vissa fall kan vara att jämställa med anklagelse om brott enligt Europa- konventionen. Om i något fall en sanktionsavgift skulle kunna anses innefatta en brottsanklagelse enligt och samma gärning som ligger till grund för avgiften dessutom sam- tidigt omfattas av en bestämmelse i eller annan straff- rättslig lagstiftning får i det enskilda fallet göras en bedömning huruvida en sanktionsavgift kan påföras av , eller bör hanteras i straffprocessuell ordning. Utökat ansvar för fysiska personer Enligt de ändringar som införs i öppenhetsdirektivet ska, när en juridisk person bryter mot sina skyldigheter enligt direktivet, sank- tioner även kunna tillämpas mot medlemmarna i den juridiska personens administrativa organ, ledningsorgan eller tillsynsorgan samt mot andra personer som är ansvariga för överträdelsen. Utred- ningen föreslår därför att en enskild styrelseledamot, verkställande direktör, samt ersättare för någon av dessa personer, ska kunna påföras en sanktion eller administrativ sanktionsavgift om denne uppsåtligen eller av grov oaktsamhet har fattat ett beslut, eller underlåtit att fatta ett beslut, som fått till följd att den juridiska personen har begått en allvarlig överträdelse av någon av de bestäm- melser som följer av öppenhetsdirektivet. För att prövningen mot fysiska personer ska kunna hanteras så snabbt som möjligt föreslår utredningen att utreder frågan om ansvar för fysiska personer i samband med att frågan om bolagets ansvar utreds. Utredningen anser att en ordning med strikt ansvar inte är lämplig vid sanktioner mot ansvariga fysiska personer vid över- trädelser från bolagets sida. Sanktioner och sanktionsavgifter ska i dessa fall därför inte kunna beslutas om det inte föreligger uppsåt eller grov oaktsamhet (subjektiva rekvisit). Enligt utredningens förslag ska, i likhet med vad som tidigare gällt, handlägga och besluta i ärenden om sanktioner. Vad gäller prövningen av sanktioner mot ansvariga fysiska personer vid överträdelser från bolagets sida föreslår utredningen att det ska krävas subjektiva rekvisit (se ovan), vilket motiverar att prövningen sker i domstol. En ordning som innebär att måste väcka talan i domstol skulle dock enligt utredningen försena handläggningen och leda till att sanktionssystemet blir mindre effektivt. Utredningen föreslår därför en ordning där Finansinspek- tionen först utfärdar ett sanktionsföreläggande, som om det god- känns är att likställa med en lagakraftvunnen dom. Om förelägg- andet inte har godkänts inom utsatt tid får ansöka hos allmän förvaltningsdomstol om att sanktionen ska beslutas. En liknande ordning har föreslagits i fråga om sanktioner som ska beslutas av i enlighet med närliggande EU:rättsakter på finansmarknadsområdet. Utredningens förslag att ansökan ska ske hos allmän förvaltningsdomstol skiljer sig dock från vad som föreslagits av tidigare utredningar. Att förlägga pröv- ningen till allmän förvaltningsdomstol bedöms gynna bl.a. prejudikat- bildningen, rättssäkerheten och medföra processekonomiska för- delar för såväl den enskilde som för det allmänna. Lagändringarna föreslås träda i kraft . De skärpta sanktionsbestämmelserna ska inte tillämpas i fråga om överträdelser som inträffat innan ikraftträdandet. Bestämmelserna om offentliggörande av en rapport om betalningar till myndigheter ska tillämpas på rapporter som upprättas för räkenskapsår som inleds närmast efter eller . In October 2013, Parliament and Council adopted a directive on amendments to the Directive 2004/109/EC of Parliament and harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, the so called Transparency Directive. The Transparency Directive regulates which information should be published about companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (issuers) within the EEA. The aim of the Directive is to secure good access to information in the securities market, which is a prerequisite for both market efficiency and investor protection. The Transparency Directive regulates time limits for and the content of the financial information that must be published regularly by issuers (annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements, as well as interim management statements). The Directive also contains provisions concerning the publication of changes to major securities holdings (flagging rules) and certain other provisions concerning which information is to be filed by issuers. Furthermore, the Directive regulates the forms of publication – dissemination and language – and how information is to be stored. Compliance with the Directive is to be monitored by a competent authority in line with the principle of home country supervision. detailed rules concerning some of the Directives provisions are stated in Commission Directive 2007/14/EC on rules for the imple- mentation of the Transparency Directive. The amendments now being made to the Transparency Directive are aimed at simplifying the regulatory framework for small and medium-sized enterprises in particular and making it easier for these enterprises to finance their activities in the securities market. Other important reasons for the amendments now being made are to prevent hidden takeovers through financial instruments that have previously not been subject to the flagging requirement, and to make the regulations more effective through the use of extended and tougher sanctions. Starting points for the Inquirys proposals The Transparency Directive has been implemented in Swedish law through provisions in the Act (1991:980) and the Securities Market Act (2007:528). The Inquiry proposes that the legislative amendments needed to imple- ment the amendments to the Transparency Directive in Swedish law be made to the above-mentioned acts. The main starting point when the Transparency Directive was originally implemented in Swedish law was to place the regulations on a par with the Directive. Regulations that were stricter than those contained in the Directive were chosen only in the areas where there was reason to assume that the regulated area would not be subject to supplementary self-regulation and where there was a risk of lower standards in the provision of information. The Inquiry has not found reason to assume an approach that is different to that pre- viously adopted. The Inquirys legislative proposals have thus mainly been kept on a par with the Directive. However, where the Inquiry considered it justified to maintain the current level of information provision and where legislation was considered to be the most effective option for achieving this, stricter regulations have been proposed. New provisions on home Member State The regulations contained in the Transparency Directive are based on the principle of home country supervision. This means that for every issuer the regulations in one EEA country apply, irrespective of whether the issuers securities are admitted to trading on regu- lated markets in more than one EEA country. The principle of home country supervision also means that the competent authority in the home is responsible for checking that the issuer follows the provisions contained in the Directive. For issuers of debt securities with a denomination per unit of less than 000 or of shares and that have their registered office in the EEA, the country in which the issuer has its registered office is the home . Other issuers are to choose a home . The new provisions in the Transparency Directive clarify the regulatory framework concerning choice of home for issuers of debt securities with a denomination per unit of less than 000 or of shares and that have their registered office outside the EEA. A rule is also being introduced that aims to establish which country should be the home in cases where an issuer that is required by the Directive to choose a home neglects to make a choice. Provisions concerning the publication of choice of home are also being introduced. In addition, the provisions concerning home contained in Directive 2003/71/EC of Parlia- ment and of prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, (the Prospectus Directive), have been adapted to the new regulations contained in the Transparency Directive. As a result of the amended provisions in the Transparency Directive, the Inquiry proposes that an issuer of debt securities with a denomination per unit of less than 000 or of shares should be able to choose as home if the securities have been admitted to trading on a regulated market in . Moreover, an issuer that has chosen as home should be able to alter this choice if the issuers securities are no longer admitted to trading on a regulated market in . The Inquiry also proposes that be home for issuers that are required by the Transparency Directive to choose a home and whose transferable securities have been admitted to trading on a regulated market in , if the issuer has not chosen another country as its home within three months of or the day on which the issuers securities were first admitted to trading. Under the Inquirys proposals on amendments to the Securities Market Act, the choice of home should be published and reported to the relevant competent authorities. Changes to information requirements Information on changes to major securities holdings (flagging rules) The provisions implementing the regulations in the Transparency Directive concerning information to be filed when major changes occur to securities holdings (flagging rules) are contained in the Act. The flagging rules that already apply under Swedish law are stricter in some areas than the rules laid down in the Transparency Directive. The Inquiry proposes that these stricter national rules be abolished in two areas: firstly, the current requirement for the aggregation of a persons own holdings of shares with those of their spouse or cohabiting partner, any minor children and other close relatives; and secondly, the time limit for submitting a flagging notification. The Inquiry proposes that a flagging notification should be received by the issuer and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority no later than four working days following the day on which the obligation to submit such a notification arose. The Inquirys reason for proposing an extension to the time limit is that the regulatory framework in this area should be harmonised, for competition reasons, with the rules in much of the rest of Europe. Moreover, as a result of the amend- ments to the Directive, the flagging requirement will be broadened to cover additional and more complicated instruments, which is another reason for extending the time limit for aggregating and calculating the proportion of all shares in the company or the number of voting rights for all shares in the company. The signi- ficantly increased penalty measures being introduced as a result of the amendments to the Directive (see below) are also a reason for extending the time limit. The Inquiry proposes the Swedish rule stating that flagging must occur at a ceiling of 90 per cent of all shares in the company or of voting rights for all shares in the company, partly because of the link with the provisions contained in the Swedish Companies Act concerning majority owners buy-out obligation. The amending Directive introduces regulations aimed at preven- ting hidden acquisition strategies through transactions with certain types of financial instruments that have not previously been covered by the flagging requirement. This applies, for example, to certain types of swap agreements, repurchase agreements and contracts for differences. As a result of these amendments to the Directive, the Inquiry proposes that the provisions on the flagging requirement apply not just to shares but also to other financial instruments that have an economic impact equivalent to the right to acquire shares, irrespective of whether or not the financial instrument confers a right to a physical settlement. The Inquiry proposes that a special calculation rule be introduced by law for the calculation of the proportion of all shares in the company or voting rights for all shares in the company that derive from financial instru- ments that only confer a right to a cash settlement. As a result of the changes to the Transparency Directive, the Inquiry also proposes that shares acquired with the aim of stabilising prices be exempt from the flagging requirement under certain conditions. The exception should only apply on the proviso that the owner ensures that the voting rights attached to the shares are not exercised or used in any other way in the management of the company. The Transparency Directives requirement that issuers must regularly publish financial information has been implemented through provisions contained in the Securities Market Act. These rules essen- tially match those contained in the Transparency Directive. How- ever, Swedish accounting regulations carry certain additional require- ments concerning the content of annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and interim management state- ments. The amendments to the Transparency Directive remove the requirement for quarterly reporting by issuers of shares via either interim management statements or quarterly reports. The possibility for Member States to introduce national requirements for more frequent financial reporting than biannually is also limited, particu- larly regarding small and medium-sized issuers. As a consequence of the amendments to the Transparency Directive, the Inquiry pro- poses removing the current requirement contained in the Securities Market Act stating that companies whose shares have been admitted to trading on a regulated market must publish an interim management statement during the first and second halves of the financial year, or a quarterly report. In the Inquirys view, reporting on a quarterly basis is better regulated within the framework of the regulations that each regulated market puts in place for the issuers whose securities have been admitted to trading. Under the Transparency Directive, issuers of shares and debt securities must publish a biannual report. The amended provisions in the Directive extend the time limit for publishing the biannual report from two to three months. However, the Inquiry proposes retaining in Swedish law the current time limit of two months, which has long been established on the Swedish market and is considered to be advantageous for investor protection. As a result of amendments to the EUs Accounting Directive, companies operating in the extractive industry or in the logging of primary will be covered by the requirement to prepare an annual report on payments to governments starting from the first financial year that begins after or later. Under the current amendments to the Transparency Directive, if the companys securities have been admitted to trading on a regulated market, the report must also be published in line with the provisions on publication laid down in the Directive. The Inquiry therefore proposes that issuers operating in the extractive industry or the logging of primary should publish an annual report on certain payments to governments no later than six months after the end of each financial year. Through the amendments to the Transparency Directive, a provision is being introduced that requires issuers of shares, by 2020, to use a common electronic reporting format to prepare their annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements. The requirement is subject to the condition that out a cost- benefit analysis. detailed provisions on the reporting format that is to be used will be communicated in technical standards to be adopted by the Commission. The Inquiry proposes the introduction of a legal requirement for a single electronic reporting format with a delayed entry-into-force date. A decision on entry into force should be taken by the Government once ESMAs cost-benefit analysis is complete. The provision is to be applied at the earliest to annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements prepared for the financial year that ends on . Other information requirements for issuers and access to information With the amendments implemented in the Transparency Directive, the current requirement that an issuer must publish information about new loan issues has been removed. As a result, the Inquiry proposes that the corresponding provision in the Securities Market Act be removed. In the Inquirys view, the markets need for information about loan issues is met by other regulations. The amendments to the Transparency Directive have also seen the removal of an earlier requirement stating that an issuer that proposes changes to the companys articles of association or equi- must inform the competent authority and the regulated market about the proposed change. The Inquiry has not found cause to keep the equivalent Swedish provision in the Securities Market Act and proposes therefore that this also be eliminated. Flagging notifications, periodic financial information and other information published by issuers in line with the Transparency Directive, and information affecting prices that is published in line with the national regulations based on Directive 2003/6/EC of Parliament and of dealing and market manipulation, (the Market Abuse Directive), must be filed with the competent authority (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) at the same time as it is published. The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority is responsible for the electronic storage of this information and for making the information available for the public. Provisions concerning the publication and storage of information under the Transparency Directive are contained in the Securities Market Act and in agency regulations. As a result of the amendments to the Transparency Directive, the Inquiry proposes that it be made possible to obtain access to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authoritys storage function through a European electronic access point for information. detailed regulations concerning the electronic access point will be contained in technical standards adopted by the Commission. Under the Directive, access point is to be established by 1 January 2018. In anticipation of the completion of the technical conditions for the access point, the Inquiry proposes that the coming into force of the rule on electronic access is postponed until the day the Govern- ment decides. Amendments to the Transparency Directive have strengthened the sanctioning powers of the competent authority. In the event of breaches of the provisions on periodic financial information, flagging provisions and the Transparency Directives requirement concerning the publication of changes to rights attached to securities that have been admitted to trading on a regulated market, the competent authority is to have the power to make a public statement on the breach and who is responsible for it, to decide on an order requiring the party responsible to cease the conduct constituting the breach and to decide to impose administrative pecuniary sanctions. In addition to the above powers, the Member States must ensure that it is possible under national law to temporarily suspend voting rights for shares in the event of a breach of the flagging regulation. In order for the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority to have the sanctioning powers provided for in the new wording of the