sou · H0B395 · 2013-01-01 00:00:00 — regleras två olika former av olovlig underrättelseverksamhet i samma paragraf; dels olovlig underrättelseverksamhet som sker av en främmande makt i och som kan skada en annan främ- mande makts säkerhet, dels s.k. flyktingspionage. I båda fallen rubriceras brotten som olovlig underrättelseverksamhet. Vi föreslår att brottstyperna i stället regleras i olika paragrafer och får egna brottsrubriceringar; olovlig underrättelseverksamhet mot främ- mande makt respektive olovlig underrättelseverksamhet mot person. På så sätt blir lagstiftningen tydligare. När det gäller olovlig underrättelseverksamhet mot person innebär våra förslag även en utvidgning av det straffbara området och en skärpt straffskala. Enligt sin nuvarande lydelse omfattar straffbestämmelsen verksamhet som sker hemligen eller med användande av svikliga medel. Det innebär att verksamhet för anskaffande av personuppgifter som sker öppet men med hjälp av otillbörliga påtryckningar t.ex. genom underförstådda hot eller löften, inte omfattas av straffbestämmelsen. Enligt vår mening innebär det en brist i den nuvarande regleringen. Vi föreslår därför att straffbestämmelsen även ska omfatta verksamhet som sker med otillbörliga medel. Den nuvarande straffskalan för olovlig underrättelseverksamhet mot person innebär att böter eller fängelse i högst kan dömas ut. Enligt vår bedömning stämmer inte straffskalan överens med hur allvarligt det finns anledning att se på brottstypen, bl.a. med hänsyn till den kränkning av den enskildes personliga integritet som brottet kan innebära. Vi föreslår därför att böter utgår ur straffskalan. Slutligen föreslår vi att kravet på särskilt förordnande av reger- ingen avskaffas vid åtal för olovlig underrättelseverksamhet mot person. Vi föreslår således bl.a. att två nya straffbestämmelser införs i 19 kap. (se ovan). I båda fallen är de gärningar som träf- fas av straffbestämmelserna svårutredda till sin natur. Med hänsyn till vikten av de intressen som straffbestämmelserna är avsedda att skydda – säkerhet och en internationell militär insats som deltar i – samt till kravet på en effektiv strafflagstiftning anser vi att det är både rimligt och lämpligt att det finns goda möj- ligheter att använda s.k. hemliga tvångsmedel vid misstanke om brott. Enligt vår bedömning bör regleringen överensstämma med vad som gäller vid andra jämförbara brott enligt 19 kap. brottsbal- ken. Vi föreslår därför vissa ändringar i lagen (2007:979) om åtgär- der för att förhindra vissa särskilt allvarliga brott och i lagen (2008:854) om åtgärder för att utreda vissa samhällsfarliga brott. Vissa av våra förslag kan inkräkta på den grundlagsskyddade ytt- rande- och informationsfriheten och innebära en begränsning av dessa friheter. Detta gäller särskilt förslaget om en ny straffbe- stämmelse för utlandsspioneri. Vi har funnit att dessa konsekvenser kan accepteras med hänsyn till de starka skäl som motiverar krimi- naliseringen och till avgränsningen av det straffbara området. Vi föreslår även vissa ändringar i tryckfrihetsförordningen (TF) och i yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen (YGL). Ändringarna motiveras av de förändringar som vi föreslår ska genomföras i befintliga bestäm- melser i 19 kap. . Vi föreslår bl.a. att utlandsspioneri ska föras in som ett tryckfrihetsbrott i 7 kap. 4 § TF och tillföras uppräkningen i 7 kap. 3 § TF. Det senare innebär att en gärnings- man inte kan undgå straffansvar med hänvisning till s.k. meddelar- eller anskaffarfrihet. Vi anser att en sådan ordning har starka skäl för sig och är logisk och konsekvent. The task of the Inquiry has been to analyse whether the current legislation in Chapter 19 of the Penal Code is adapted to its pur- pose and provides adequate protection from the intelligence activi- ties of a foreign power. The remit included analysing whether the harm requisite in the provision concerning espionage is suitably designed, expressing an opinion on whether the protection against industrial and political espionage conducted by a foreign power needs to be enhanced, and clarifying whether there is a need to change the penal law regulations concerning the hidden intelligence activities of a foreign power conducted by means of secret and con- spiratorial methods. Our remit has also included presenting full legislative proposals where legislation is deemed appropriate. Background information to the remit has pointed out a need for enhanced protection of the state when foreign powers conduct unauthorised intelligence activities against . This need is based in part on a change in the security policy situation in regions close to , and that intelligence activities by foreign powers have to some de- gree changed focus to increasingly target circumstances pertaining to research and development in civil sectors. Another important change is increasing cooperation with other countries. One manifestation of this is that the Swedish Armed Forces cur- rently conducts a large part of its activities through missions abroad. Society has also changed in other ways, including advances in technology, and become more complex. Altogether, the above- mentioned circumstances show that there is reason to review the penalty provisions in Chapter 19 of the Penal Code, which are intended to protect the security of the realm against intelligence activities of foreign powers. Under the current wording of the provision on espionage, a re- quirement for criminal liability is that the harm requisite is met. This means that the field of application only includes information which, if disclosed to a foreign power, can cause harm to the secu- rity of the realm. We do not propose any extensive changes to the provision on espionage. The penalty provision is suitably designed and the field of application is well defined. The provision on espionage is in- tended to protect the security of the realm, i.e. security of the realm refers to protecting the independence and continued existence of the state. We consider that the field of ap- plication of the provision on espionage should continue to be re- served for such acts that typically can entail the risk of a significant negative impact on the security of the realm in the sense now stated. The circumstances that are important to the security of the realm, what can threaten the security of the realm and what is nec- essary to avert threats can vary over time. What the harm requisite covers, and thus also the field of application of the provision on espionage, must therefore be determined with consideration to developments in society and taking account of the circumstances at the time the crime was committed. The changes to the provision on espionage that we propose are primarily of a linguistic nature, aimed at making the legislation clearer and more modern. For example, we propose replacing the term security of the realm with security. In addition, it is proposed that the current exemplification of sensitive infor- mation, as well as the term total defence, be removed from the text of the Code. These changes are intended to clarify that the espionage provision is to be generally applied and that it is irrele- vant which sector of society is targeted by the intelligence activity as long as the harm requisite is met. Our terms of reference specifically mention the applicability of the harm requisite regarding intelligence activities targeting indus- trial or political interests. These kinds of intelligence activities can also be covered by the provision on espionage if the information concerns circumstances that, in the hands of a foreign power, can harm the security of the realm. We have not found sufficient rea- son to propose any changes in the current penal law. In line with what is stated in the terms of reference, we have also considered whether there is need to change the requirements for assessing the harm requisite in the provision on espionage. We have found no reason to present proposals for changes of the cur- rent system in this regard either. A new penal provision on foreign espionage Developments in society have meant that, to a greater extent, cooperates with other countries in the area of security and defence policy. In different contexts, the Government has asserted that the countrys security cannot only be safeguarded at our border, and that increased cooperation with other countries means better opportunities to deal with challenges and threats before they reach our own territory. It is felt that promoting international se- curity and defence cooperation is in interest, since it cre- ates confidence between states and lays mon security. As a part of this development, a significant amount of the Swe- dish Armed Forces activities are carried out abroad and in cooper- ation with other countries, including through participation in in- ternational military operations. Under the Act on Swedish Armed Forces personnel in international military operations (2010:449), an international military operation refers to activities conducted by the Armed Forces in a deployment area abroad aimed at averting the risk of armed conflict, stopping an ongoing armed conflict, supervising peace and ceasefire agreements or creating the condi- tions for lasting peace and security through humanitarian work in connection with an armed conflict. Information on the circumstances concerning an international military operation can be of a sensitive nature and of great im- portance to the operation and to , even if the harm requisite in the provision on espionage is not met. Despite this, espionage- like acts targeting such circumstances are in principle outside the penal area. In our view, this entails a shortcoming in the current legislation. We therefore propose that a new penal provision be introduced in Chapter 19 of the Penal Code that classifies foreign espionage and that imposes penal sanctions on espionage regarding infor- mation whose disclosure to a foreign power or association can cause serious harm to an international operation that par- ticipates in. The concept foreign association refers to a group that occupies a position of power and represents an opposing interest – usually by in some way being affected by the conflict that serves as a reason for carrying out the operation – but which is not covered by the term foreign power. If the circumstances are of such importance to secu- rity that the harm requisite in the provision on espionage is met, the penal provision is instead to be applied. The crime is to entail an applicable scale of penalties that pre- scribes imprisonment for at most four years or, if the crime is seri- ous, imprisonment for at least two and at most eight years. When assessing whether a crime is gross, special attention is to be given to whether the act concerned matters of major importance or en- tailed danger to peoples lives or health, or whether the perpetrator disclosed information entrusted to him or her by reason of their position in public or private service. We propose that criminal liability for foreign espionage is to re- quire direct intent, i.e. that the penal provision is only to cover acts directly aimed at aiding a foreign power or association. However, we also propose that equivalent acts that are carried out with intent but for a different purpose, or through gross carelessness, are to be punishable if they pertain to information concerning circumstances of a secret nature. It is proposed that such acts be criminalised by means of changes to the penal provisions for unauthorised dealing with secret information and carelessness with secret information. A new penal provision on unlawful intelligence activities against It is quite common for foreign powers to conduct prohibited intel- ligence activities in and that the activities are associated with secret or conspiratorial methods that make them difficult to detect and counteract. The phrase conspiratorial methods refers to measures taken to conceal and facilitate a prohibited intelligence It includes measures taken while observing special precau- tionary measures and by using fraudulent means. The penal provisions can be considered to represent a protec- tion zone that aim to prevent damage to a specific interest worthy of protection. In general, an important interest worthy of protec- tion can justify a broader protection zone, i.e. more extensive criminalisation. The penal law regulations currently in question are intended to protect security, which is obviously of great importance. Prohibited intelligence activities conducted by a foreign power which are carried out using conspiratorial methods represent a threat to security. We consider that the current penal law regulations do not provide protection against such intelligence activities that is sufficient and adapted to its purpose. This is partly due to the fact that activities are designed in a way that makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to sufficient evidence against a perpetrator. Another factor is that the penal area is too limited to cover certain punishable activities that occur prior to and in connection with a crime involving espionage. All in all, we con- sider that there is reason to expand the penal area. We propose that a new penal provision be introduced into Chapter 19 of the Penal Code with the aim of enhancing the pro- tection of security. The proposal is intended to provide more effective and accurate legislation, and greater opportunities to intervene in a chain of events at an earlier stage and thus prevent damage. The new crime will be classified as unlawful intelligence activities against and will cover activities conducted se- cretly or by fraudulent means in order to acquire information de- scribed in the provision on espionage. The provision is modelled on the currently applicable crime of unlawful intelligence activities in Chapter 19, Section 10, first paragraph of the Penal Code. As is the case with espionage, criminal liability will require that the perpetrator has direct intent to aid a foreign power. Application of the penal provision does not require being able to prove exactly which information was the intended target of the act or even if any information has been obtained. Accordingly, there is no need to make an assessment of harm. The proposed scale of penalties is imprisonment for at most two years. If the crime is serious, it should be possible to result in a sentence of imprisonment for at least six months and at most four years. Even a person who lends more than occasional assistance to the crime may be subject to criminal liability. A new form of carelessness with secret information The penal provision for carelessness with secret information covers acts that involve a person who, through gross carelessness, dis- closes information concerning a matter that meets the harm requi- site in the provision on espionage and that is of a secret nature. According to practice, a disclosure is considered to have occurred when information has become available to an unauthorised person under such circumstances that it must be expected that the unau- thorised person will have access to it. Developments in society have brought about more methods of communication and more accessible information in various forms. If, for example, sensitive information is communicated openly over the internet, it is easy for unauthorised persons to access it without leaving any trace. Under the current arrangement, it is likely that the penal area does not cover a case of this kind. We consider that this represents a shortcoming in the legislation and means that punishable activities can be conducted without the risk of criminal liability. We therefore propose that, to meet the requirements for crimi- nal liability for carelessness with secret information, it should be sufficient for an act to entail a danger of an unauthorised person being able to access sensitive information. In this way, the penal area is expanded to also include careless actions that are typically associated with an imminent risk of information being disclosed to an unauthorised person. At present, the punishment in peacetime for carelessness with secret information is a fine or imprisonment for at most six months. In our view, the developments in society mentioned above have changed the conditions for the crime currently under consid- eration and mean that the penal provision can cover acts of a more serious nature than before. An act can pertain to larger quantities of information of a more sensitive nature and entail more serious consequences for safety. We consider that the current scale of penalties is not sufficiently broad for it to always be possi- ble to impose a sentence that corresponds to the seriousness of the crime. We therefore propose that the maximum penalty be in- creased to one year. However, it is not our intention to bring about a general increase in the severity of punishments for crimes of the kind now under consideration. Unlawful intelligence activities against foreign powers and against individuals At present, two forms of unlawful intelligence activities are regu- lated in the same paragraph – both unlawful intelligence activities conducted by a foreign power in and which can damage the safety of another foreign power, and what is commonly referred to as refugee espionage. In both cases, the crime is classified as un- lawful intelligence activity. We propose that these two types of crime instead be regulated in different paragraphs and assigned their own criminal classifications: unlawful intelligence activities against foreign powers and unlawful intelligence activities against individuals. This will help clarify the legislation. Regarding unlawful intelligence activities against individuals, our proposal also involves expanding the penal area and a more stringent scale of penalties. Under the current wording, the penal provision covers activities conducted secretly or by using fraudu- lent means. This means that activities aimed at procuring personal data that occurs openly but with the aid of improper pressure, such as implied threats or promises, are not covered by the penal provi- sion. In our view, this represents a shortcoming in the current reg- ulations. We therefore propose that the penal provision also cover activities conducted using improper means. Under the present scale of penalties for unlawful intelligence activities against individuals, fines or imprisonment for at most one year can be imposed. We consider that the scale of penalties does not correspond to the seriousness with which this type of crime should be viewed, taking account of such matters as the violation of personal privacy of the individual that the crime may entail. We therefore propose removing fines from the scale of penalties. Finally, we propose that the requirement of special authorisa- tion by the Government regarding prosecution for unlawful intelli- gence activity against individuals be abolished. An option to use coercive measures Our proposals include the introduction of two new penal provi- sions in Chapter 19 of the Penal Code (see above). In both cases, the acts targeted by the penal provisions are, by their nature, diffi- cult to investigate. Considering the importance of the interests that the penal provisions are intended to protect – the security of the realm and an international military operation that partici- pates in – and the requirement of effective penal legislation, we consider it both reasonable and appropriate that good options are available for using secret coercive measures if a crime is suspected. In our view, the regulations should correspond to that which ap- plies regarding other comparable crimes under Chapter 19 of the Penal Code. We therefore propose making certain changes to the Act on measures to prevent certain particularly serious offences (2007:979) and the Act on measures to investigate certain crimes that are threats to society (2008:854). Freedom of the press and of expression Some of our proposals can be considered to encroach on freedom of expression and information, which are protected by the consti- tution and entail a restriction of these freedoms. This applies par- ticularly to the proposal on a new penal provision regarding foreign espionage. We have found that these consequences can be accepted in light of the compelling reasons that justify criminalising these acts and to the restrictions in the penal area. We also propose certain changes to the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental on Freedom of Expression. These are motivated by the fact that the changes we propose will be im- plemented in the existing provisions of Chapter 19 of the Penal Code. We propose inserting foreign espionage as a crime against freedom of the press in Chapter 7, Article 4 of the Freedom of the Press Act and be included in the list in Chapter 7, Article 3 of the same Act. The latter means that a perpetrator cannot escape crimi- nal liability by referring to freedom of source or procurement. We consider that there are strong arguments in favour of an arrange- ment of this kind, and that it is logical and consistent. lag om ändring i Härigenom föreskrivs i fråga om dels att rubriken till 19 kap. ska ha följande lydelse, dels att 19 kap. 5–10 och 14–16 §§ ska ha följande lydelse, dels att det i 19 kap. ska införas tre nya paragrafer, 5 a §, 10 a och 10 b §§, av följande lydelse. 19 kap. Om brott mot rikets säkerhet 19 kap. Om brott mot säkerhet Den som, för att gå främ- mande makt tillhanda, obe- hörigen anskaffar, befordrar, lämnar eller röjer uppgift rör- ande försvarsverk, vapen, förråd, import, export, tillverkningssätt, underhandlingar, beslut eller något förhållande i övrigt vars uppenbarande för främmande makt kan medföra men för totalförsvaret eller eljest för rikets säkerhet döms, vare sig upp- giften är riktig eller ej, för spioneri till fängelse i högst . Detsamma skall gälla, om Den som, för att gå främ- mande makt tillhanda, obe- hörigen anskaffar, befordrar, lämnar eller röjer uppgift rör- ande något förhållande vars uppenbarande för främmande makt kan medföra men för säkerhet döms, vare sig uppgiften är riktig eller inte, för spioneri till fängelse i högst . Detsamma ska gälla, om 1 Senaste lydelse 1981:1165. någon i syfte som sagts obehörigen framställer eller tar befattning med skrift, teckning eller annat föremål som inne- fattar sådan uppgift. Är brott som avses i 5 § att anse som grovt, döms för grovt spioneri till fängelse , lägst fyra och högst , eller på livstid. någon i syfte som angetts i första stycket obehörigen framställer eller tar befattning med skrift, teckning eller annat föremål som innefattar sådan uppgift. Den som, i annat fall än som avses 5 §, för att gå främmande makt eller sammanslutning till- handa, obehörigen anskaffar, befordrar, lämnar eller röjer uppgift rörande något förhållande vars uppenbarande för främ- mande makt eller samman- slutning kan medföra allvarligt men för en internationell militär insats som deltar i döms, vare sig uppgiften är riktig eller inte, för utlandsspioneri till fängelse i högst . Detsamma ska gälla, om någon i syfte som angetts i första stycket obehörigen framställer eller tar befattning med skrift, teckning eller annat föremål som inne- fattar sådan uppgift. Är brott som avses i 5 § att anse som grovt, döms för grovt spioneri till fängelse , lägst fyra och högst , eller på livstid. Är brott som avses i 5 a § att anse som grovt döms för grovt utlandsspioneri till fängelse i lägst två och högst . 2 Senaste lydelse 2009:396. Vid bedömande av om brottet är grovt ska särskilt beaktas om gärningen var av synnerligen farlig beskaffenhet med hänsyn till pågående krig eller rörde förhållande av stor betydelse eller om den brottslige röjde vad som på grund av allmän eller enskild tjänst betrotts honom eller henne.