sou · H0B313 · 2012-03-30 00:00:00 — För att klara detta uppdrag krävs en utveckling av polisens resultatredovisning. Resultaten från myndighetens interna styrning och kontroll samt uppföljningen och utvärderingen av verksamheten behöver analyseras och vid behov följas av åtgärder. För att polisverksamheten ska kunna vidareutvecklas krävs en systematisk omvärldsbevakning som tar sikte på såväl nationell som internationell utveckling. Till denna omvärldsbevakning hör även att studera och ta till vara resultat av kriminologisk och annan för polisväsendet närliggande forskning. Vad gäller verksamhet, med ett utökat ansvar för den forensiska processen, bedöms för- ändringen bidra till förbättrade verksamhetsresultat främst vad avser utredningsverksamheten. Kommitténs bedömning är att det dock finns en risk för att laboratoriets opartiskhet inte kommer att kunna säkerställas fullt ut på motsvarande sätt som . För att säkerställa opartiskhet och fortsatt hög kvalitet på den forensiska verksamheten, krävs att den nya polisledningen säkerställer att även fortsättningsvis tillför- säkras resurser för att bedriva såväl forensisk forskning som ut- vecklingsarbete. Övergången till en kommer att underlätta ut- bytet av uppgifter inom polisorganisationen genom att nuvarande myndighetsgränser upphör. Sekretess- och behörighetsregler in- skränker enskilda befattningshavares möjligheter att ha tillgång till andra uppgifter än sådana som behövs i arbetet. I en enmyndig- hetsorganisation är det än viktigare att åtkomsten till polisens system är begränsade till olika funktioner och behörighetsnivåer. Nuvarande flora av lokala datasystem och register av skilda slag kommer genom den nya myndighetkonstruktionen att reduceras, vilket efter hand kommer att leda till större enhetlighet, högre kvalitet samt lägre förvaltningskostnader för it-verksamheten inom myndigheten. Ett omfattande arbete kommer att krävas på det personal- politiska området innan den nya myndigheten kan inrättas. Över- gången till en arbetsgivarare och motsvarande anpassning för de fyra personalorganisationerna kommer inledningsvis att kräva såväl partsenskilda som partsgemensamma insatser. Det systematiska arbetsmiljöarbetet måste få en enhetlig hantering grundad på den nya organisationen. Vad gäller överföring av de polisanställdas anställningsavtal till den nya bör ett liknande resonemang kunna föras som när bildades. I en enmyndighetsorga- nisation finns t.ex. inte den geografiska begränsning som följer av dagens indelning i polismyndigheter. Det är något som sannolikt påverkar arbetstagarnas geografiska arbetsskyldighet. Frågan om arbetstagarnas arbetsskyldighet kräver dock ytterligare övervägan- den vilka bör hanteras inom ramen för genomförandeorga- nisationen. Den förändrade organisationsstrukturen medför behov av kompetensutveckling, omställningsåtgärder och eventuell nyrekry- tering. Omfattningen och inriktningen på dessa åtgärder är be- roende av vilka beslut som den särskilda utredaren fattar inom ramen för det förutsatta genomförandearbetet. Kommittén bedömer att lämnade förslag kommer att få ekono- miska konsekvenser endast för staten och framför allt handlar det om konsekvenser för polisverksamheten. Kostnaden för genomförandeorganisationen kan uppskattas till omkring . Omställningskostnaderna, som är av engångs- karaktär, kan uppskattas till omkring . Kommittén kan konstatera att de nämnda genomförande- och omställningskostnaderna inte ryms inom nuvarande anslagsram för polisen med mindre än att detta medför negativa konsekvenser för såväl förslagets genomförande som för polisverksamheten i stort. För att undvika en sådan utveckling krävs alternativ finansiering av genomförande- och omställningskostnaderna. Kommitténs samlade bedömning är att verksamheten, med oförändrad ambitionsnivå vad gäller uppdrag och kapacitet, lång- siktigt kan finansieras inom given anslagsram också när polisen går in i en sammanslagen organisation. Våra förslag innebär inte en generell centralisering av polisens verksamhet, arbetsuppgifter eller ledningsfunktioner. Tvärtom har ett tydligt fokus för kommittén varit att skapa förutsättningar för att utveckla och förstärka polisverksamheten på lokal och regional nivå. De förslag som kommittén lämnar skapar förutsättningar för en effektivitetsökning, vilken bland annat kan användas till att målmedvetet förstärka den lokala polisiära närvaron i såväl gles- bygd som i brottsutsatta områden i tätortskommuner. Ett huvudsyfte med förslagen är att polisverksamheten i en- lighet med regeringens ambition, ska uppnå högre kvalitet och bli mer effektiv. I detta ligger att övergången ska få effekter på brotts- ligheten och dels leda till att denna minskar, dels att fler anmälda brott utreds och leder till lagföring. Det gäller såväl brotts- utredningar i allmänhet som mängdbrottsutredningar i synnerhet, som polisen fortsätter att förstärka sin förmåga att be- kämpa grov och organiserad brottslighet. I vilken mån kommitténs förslag ger ett tillräckligt utrymme för att nå uppsatta mål och eftersträvade ambitionsnivåer kan få an- ledning att återkomma till. En naturlig följd av en ökad effektivitet inom polisorga- nisationen är att belastningen på övriga myndigheter i rättskedjan, , domstolarna och Kriminalvården, kommer att öka, vilket leder till behov av effektiviseringsåtgärder, alternativt resursförstärkning, hos dessa myndigheter. En effektivare polisiär verksamhet, liksom ett effektivare rättsväsende, bör i sin tur leda till en minskad brottsbenägenhet, att allmänhetens rädsla att ut- sättas för brott minskar och att tryggheten i samhället ökar, vilket är ett av målen med polisens verksamhet. Kommittén förordar att det genomförs en systematisk utvär- dering av reformen. En sådan granskning bör göras med beaktande av såväl medborgarperspektivet som verksamhetsperspektivet och rättskedjeperspektivet. har ett omfattande uppdrag framför sig. Vi bedömer att det kan komma att krävas för att lösa alla de frågor som ska hanteras. Det krävs också tid att genomföra de förändringar av lagar och förordningar som är nödvändiga, liksom förändringar av administrativa och operativa stödsystem. Nuvarande förordnanden av ledamöter i polisstyrelserna upphör vid utgången av 2014. Vår bedömning är att en lämplig tidpunkt för införande av den nya organisationen, och därmed etablerandet av den nya myndigheten , är . The remit of is to analyse whether the current organisation of the constitutes an obstacle to the Governments requirements for higher quality, increased cost-effectiveness, increased flexibility and a substantial improvement in performance. If the Committee considers that the organisation constitutes an obstacle in these respects a new organisation is to be proposed. The remit can be seen in the light of the considerable additional resources the service has received. During the period 2000– 2010 the service appropriation increased by more than 40 per cent to billion for 2010. At the same time the number of service employees increased by 26 per cent to 28 000, of whom 20 300 were officers, making the the largest state-controlled activity in . The Government´s assessment is that the increased resources are not reflected in performance. is a state service consisting of 21 authorities with geographical areas of responsibility that follow the county boundaries, and the National Laboratory of Forensic Science. is the superordinate authority for the National Laboratory of Forensic Science. Criminal and the are constituent parts of , alt- hough the in practice functions as an independent authority. is the central administrative agency for services and has a supervisory function. is led by the National Commissioner, who is employed by the Government. The governing board of the Natio- nal is a board with limited liability whose members are appointed by the Government. The authorities are responsible for leading and imple- menting activities in their respective districts. The authorities are directed by a chief commissioner and a local board. Both the chief commissioner and members of the local boards are appointed by the Government. Management structure of the Operational activities are mainly conducted by the authorities. , as central administrative agency for services, has certain powers over the authorities. is responsible for develop- ing and specifying the targets and guidelines that the Riksdag (the Swedish Parliament) and the Government decide for activities and communicating them to the entire organisation. is also tasked with distributing the funds allocated to the by the Government. The tasks of also include supervision of services. is to promote method, coordination and rationalisation in the , which means that technology and methods development as well as follow-up are important parts of its activities. has limited powers to take measures to change the direction of activities or to correct deficient perfor- mance at a authority. If a activity does not live up to the requirements made of it, , in its role as supervisory authority, must work to bring about improvement by means of remarks and recommendations, or in some other way. Where necessary must also report such circumstances to the Government. The governing board of is responsible for the annual report, interim report and budget documentation. The governing board also decides on guidelines, etcetera for internal audit and regulations directed at individuals, municipalities and county councils. Within the authorities each local board decides on the operational plan, budget, internal organisation and rules of pro- cedure for the authority, while the chief commissioner has respon- sibility for the day-to-day operations and finances. The chief com- missioner must ensure that operations are conducted effectively and in compliance with current law and that they are reported reli- ably and fairly. The local board is to assist the chief commis- sioner and propose measures it finds reasonable. activities are extensive and varied. Apart from preventing and investigating crime, the must also provide protection, information and other assistance. objectives include reduc- ing the risk of crimes being committed, endeavouring to ensure that more crimes lead to prosecution and increasing public safety. The exercise of public authority by the must be predictable and consistent and be conducted effectively and be of high quality. Performance and the degree to which objectives have been achieved are difficult to assess for many duties. This applies not least to large sections of crime prevention work. The number of crimes reported has increased in the past ten years, partly due to increased operations regarding traffic offences and drug offences, and a greater percentage of crime is cleared up now than before. On the other hand the percentage of crime that leads to prosecution remained unchanged in the period 2000–2010. The quality measurements carried out in recent years show, however, that the work of the on the whole effectively satisfies the needs and expectations of the public and that most of the popula- tion have great confidence in the . The difficulties of assessing other aspects of performance in terms of quality and cost-efficiencyare associated with the in some respects incomplete reporting of performance and the impact of activities in relation to the targets set for them. Another reason for the difficulties of assessing efficiency in law enforcement is that the emphasis of work during the period has gradually shifted in favour of more prevention measures, with increased visibility and more traffic controls, collaboration with municipalities and other local actors, etc. In addition, the structure of crime has changed, with an increasing proportion of violent crime, fraud and other economic crime, as well as IT-related crime. Swedish membership of the EU and participation in the Schengen cooperation have gradually led to both new conditions and new obligations for the . Demographic and other changes in society have also had an effect on activities. For example, the population increased by six per cent between 2000 and 2010, with a population concentration in the metropolitan regions. The disparity in performance between different authorities as regards investigation activities, for example, indicate that there is potential to improve the quality and efficiencyof activities. In the view of the Committee, these differences can be ascribed either to the underlying documentation for per- formance reporting or differences in priorities and working meth- ods. The existence of such differences is, in the opinion of the Committee, closely linked to the limited remit of to make decisions in these matters that are binding on authorities. Confidence in the design and reliability of the performance reporting system is weak within the organisation and there is no common view as to what constitutes good performance in activities. These factors in turn impact the possibility of implementing effective strategic management and control of activities. Obstacles in the current leadership structure and organisation Insufficient national decision-making powers and unclear division of responsibilities can note that has lim- ited powers to act in the areas that fall under its responsibility. For example, has limited possibilities of making the decisions required to ensure that activities comply with the objectives and guidelines decided by the Riksdag and the Government. Despite the fact that ensuring this is one of its main tasks, has to resort to using a combination of policy instruments and informal processes to try to induce the authorities to act in accordance with the will of This means that the expectations and demands placed on go hand in hand with what it is in reality able to deliver under its instructions and regulatory framework. The National Boards mandate to issue regulations on matters primarily of an organisational nature is not clear in relation to the powers and responsibility of the authorities and local boards. This undoubtedly constitutes an obstacle to efficient management of activities. A large number of actors are now involved and, proceeding from different points of view, assert their claim to manage operations. The current chain of command is very difficult to comprehend. Powers overlap in several areas, including between the local boards and , as well as between the local board and the chief commissioner. From this follow problems of interpretation and application. In the areas in which has the authority to act, such as specifying and communicating objectives and guidelines and promoting method, coordination and rationalisation in the service, the authorities are obliged to follow the Boards directions. At the same time it follows from the provisions of the Ordinance that the local board and chief commissioner are responsible for activities in the county and that the local boards have their own powers of decision-making on certain matters, including the organisation of the authority. These conflicting circumstances contribute to the lack of clarity within the organisation about the extent to which directions in these respects are binding on the authorities. To the extent there is such a lack of clarity, the consequence is that it is difficult for to effectively and firmly ensure that national, consistent working methods are implemented. The National Board conducts its supervisory activities through special inspections, for example. Reports containing criti- cism and remarks on the basis of these inspections are published and communicated to the authorities. However, within the is perceived as unclear and the recommendations made, as far as the Committee can tell, have far too limited an impact on the activities of the authorities. does not have a mandate to order the authorities to rectify the deficiencies discovered. Through its right to issue regulations, and by other means, has some authority to ensure satisfactory internal management and governance, but the Committee notes that it is questionable whether the powers held by the National Commissioner match up to the responsibilities that formally rests with that position. A consistent problem in supervision, internal audit and internal management and control within the is that is not in a position to order the authorities to rectify identified deficiencies. This means that there are no formal requirements for the authorities to carry out proposed measures. In practice the chief commissioner concerned decides if and when a measure will be taken. In this respect the current form of organisation of the is a clear obstacle. In the assessment of the Committee, the organisation is thus characterised by a chain of command that prevents the National Boards supervisory and monitoring function from having the impact on management and governance required to ensure that operations are efficient and effective. has also noted that at regional level opinions are divided as to the division of responsibility between the chief commissioner and the local board at the different authorities. Many authorities of differing sizes The authorities are separate profit centres and thus expected by and large to maintain the competence and functions required for their task. The authorities in the counties of , and , due to their size, are largely equipped to cope with these demands. However, the smaller authori- ties have some difficulty in maintaining specialised skills in all their different areas of activity. For high-quality crime prevention and crime investigation activities, there is a constantly growing need for specialists and leading-edge skills. Demands are also increasing for certification of some functions, such as operators in communica- tion centres. notes that the authorities in many cases are too small to be able to achieve efficiencyand quality in all functions. Even if they could manage to maintain skills in all func- tions, this would not be reasonable, since the volume involved in some duties is too limited and thus not cost-effective. In the opinion of the Committee, analysis and follow-up of the authorities performance is a further area in which the present orga- nisational structure leads to quality shortfalls. There is a need to strengthen the ability to analyse results achieved so as to improve the management of activities and deepen the performance culture in the organisation. Performance monitoring should support the work of development and improvement in the service. The task of analysing overall performance is a national responsibility, but achieving that requires high-quality documentation from all authorities. The current organisational structure with 21 county authorities and one central administrative agency makes this work . Another problem with todays organisational structure is that confidentiality rules and separate systems of storing and processing information prevent rapid and seamless exchange of information between authorities. However, the new Act offers increased opportunities for some types of information ex- change between authorities concerned, provided the technology is adapted to the new legislative provisions.1 Another obstacle is terms of employment which are applied differently between authorities. This is a limitation to staff mobility within the organisation. The current division of responsibilities in the service in- volves major shortcomings in overall responsibility for acti- vities in the country and restricts the chances of collaboration be- tween authorities. This is partly because such collaboration must be based on voluntary participation on the part of the authorities. Another effect of the lack of comprehensive responsibility is that it is difficult for best practices to spread. The current system also involves some difficulties regarding strategic collaboration with the Swedish Prosecution Authority at national level and impedes contacts with other agencies of importance to activities, since the decision-making functions are on different levels. The current organisation also coordinated action in international contexts and the diffusion of international experience within the organisation. 1 Act applies from 1 2012 (SFS 2010:361). The Committees proposed new organisation A unified Swedish service has analysed the possibility of improving activities and performance, in accordance with the requirements set by the Government, through changes in the existing organisational structure. has also looked into the possibility of improvements by extending the National Boards mandate or, alternatively, reducing the number of authorities. The Committee concludes that neither of these alternatives is sufficient to achieve the desired effects. Many government agencies, such as the Swedish Prison and , the Swedish Prosecution Authority and the , have been reorganised in recent years as mono-agencies.2 The reasons for these reorganisations were to achieve clearer leadership and management, increased flexibility of operations, more effective use of resources, increased legal security and consistency. In order for the to be able to reach their full development potential and for the organisation structure to provide the conditions for meeting the Governments requirements for higher quality, increased cost-effectiveness, increased flexibility and sub- stantially improved performance, the Committee assesses that an equivalent reorganisation should also be implemented for the . Consequently, the Committee proposes that and the 21 authorities, together with the National Laboratory of Forensic Science, be reorganised as a unified agency. At the same time the Committee proposes that the be merged into a separate agency.3 A starting point for the Committees proposal regarding the new organisation of the has been the Governments state- 2The mono-agency form of organisation regardless of geographical location and internal organisation, the operations are led by a director-general or board that is (nationally) accountable to the Government for all operations. (This is not the same thing as an agency group in which there is a central agency that is usually the superordinate agency for the other agencies in the group. These other agencies have often been regional, but sometimes local or with operations throughout the country. The subordinate agencies in a group have powers to take independent decisions on certain matters, decisions that the central agency has no formal right to govern.) 3The question of the organisation and management structure of the will be further analysed and the more detailed considerations necessary will take place in the course of the Committees continuing work (ToR 2012:13). ments in the Administrative Policy Bill4 and what is stated in the Ordinance (2007:515). In the opinion of the Committee the new Authority should be a director-general-governed agency5 headed by a direc- tor-general appointed by the Government. pro- poses that the name of the new agency should be the Authority. By reorganising the Swedish as a unified agency it will be possible for the agency leadership to take comprehensive responsibility for activities throughout the country. The responsibility for activities can then be delegated via a straight and clear chain to the leadership at regional and local levels and on out to the local operational units of the organisation. Compared with the present overlapping areas of responsibility and unclear chains of responsibility, the division of responsibilities in such an organisational structure can be made clear and the chain of governance can be rationalised. This sets the conditions for more effective management, governance and review of activities.