sou · H0B314 · 2012-03-14 00:00:00 — Syftet är att skapa tydliga roller inom ägarstyrningen med en tydlig mål- och resultatorientering, bättre redovisning och uppföljning samt ökad transparens. långsiktig ägarstrategi med övergripande strategiska mål för förvaltningen av det statliga ägandet av bolag, årliga riktlinjer för förvaltningen, utvärderingar av förvaltningen, samt grundläggande regler i lag. Inrättandet av förvaltningsbolag innebär att regeringens ägar- styrning i högre grad behöver ske med utgångspunkt i ett över- gripande ägarperspektiv. Regeringen föreslås utarbeta ett förslag till en långsiktig ägarstrategi för staten som beslutar. strategin ska lägga fast den övergripande strategiska inriktningen av ägarpolitiken och ägarstyrningen och ange långsiktiga mål och principer för statens ägande och förvaltningen av bolagen långsiktig ägarstrategi bör utarbetas och redovisas minst en gång per mandatperiod. Den långsiktiga ägarstrategin ska utgöra grunden för regeringens styrning av förvaltningsbolagen med långsiktiga mål och principer för statens ägande och för- valtningen av bolagen Regeringen föreslås besluta om årliga riktlinjer för den för- valtning som förvaltningsbolagen ansvarar för. Det bidrar till att öka tydligheten och transparensen i regeringens ägarstyrning och stödjer en ökad öppenhet i statens agerande som ägare. En jäm- förelse kan här göras med de riktlinjer som regeringen fastställer i fråga om förvaltningen av statsskulden. Förvaltningen av statliga bolag bör i likhet med annan för- valtning bli föremål för grundliga utvärderingar som underlag för regeringens och styrning. Förslaget är att utvärderingar genomförs och redovisas i en skrivelse till . får därigenom ett underlag för granskning av för- valtningsbolagen och förvaltningen av de statliga bolagen. Denna form av utvärderingar görs för t.ex. statsskuldsförvaltningen och AP-fondernas förvaltning. Det behöver också säkerställas att får den insyn, information och de underlag som krävs för att ska kunna utöva en övergripande styrning och granskning av förvaltningen. Utredaren bedömer att gällande ordning med riksdagsledamöters närvarorätt vid bolagsstämmor fortsatt ska gälla även i den föreslagna organisationen med förvaltningsbolag. har en viktig roll i granskningen av det statliga företagsägandet. Enligt förslaget ska kunna granska både förvaltningsbolagen och portföljbolag där staten har ett bestämmande inflytande. Utredaren bedömer vidare att det bör vara möjligt att utveckla formerna för information mellan förvaltnings- bolagen och ledamöter. Utredaren bedömer att vissa grundläggande bestämmelser som rör förvaltningen och styrningen av statens ägande av bolag bör regleras i lag. Utredaren lämnar därför ett lagförslag. Regeringen behöver som stöd för sin ägarstyrning ha kvar en ägarfunktion i . En central uppgift för den nya ägar- funktionen blir att stöda regeringen i styrningen och uppföljningen av förvaltningsbolagens och tillsätta styrelseordförande och ledamöter i förvaltningsbolagens styrelser. The State Ownership Committees remit is to submit proposals for how state ownership in enterprises currently administrated by the Swedish Government Offices should be organised and conducted in the future. Analysis and assessment of alternative forms of organisation to the current system were also part of the Committees remit. has consulted with current company administrators and owner-managed businesses, examined models applied in other countries and those in use both now and previously in other areas of central government as well as looked at the models and listened to the experiences of major private owners. The starting-point for the Committees work has been the premise that the administration of the state-owned enterprises shall be , efficient and professional, and responsible. It shall also generate long-term value and fulfil specific public service assign- ments. The scope of the Swedish Government and the Swedish Riksdag for insight into and overall governance of state-managed enterprises shall not be restricted. The Committees terms of reference also state that the Government is looking to streamline the Government Offices. The state is largest business-owner The Swedish state is a significant business-owner. It has an owner- ship stake in 58 enterprises, a small number of which are part- owned and three of which are listed on the stock exchange. These enterprises constitute a heterogeneous group. Their activities are vastly different and they are of varying backgrounds and sizes. Some have a complete or partial monopoly on their market while others are exposed to competition. Furthermore, some enterprises are partially financed by appropriations. In 2011, the state enterprise portfolio was valued at approximately billion (billion). Just over 100 000 people are employed in enterprises in which the state has an owner- ship stake. If we include associated companies, the figure rises to about 190 000. Problems in the current administration model has identified a number of problems in the current ownership administration model: There is a fundamental difference between political and business rationality when it comes to the governance of state-owned enterprises - a difference that is not sufficiently reflected in how the administration is currently organised and conducted. The state has a dual role as both legislator and business owner, two functions that are not differentiated clearly enough in the current system. The Government and the Government Offices risk taking on far too operative a role in their corporate governance of the enterprises, causing the boundary between the handling of ownership issues and corporate issues to become fuzzy. As a result, the political and owner-strategic governance of the administration becomes unclear and unstructured. Instead, the governance of companies tends to become ad-hoc and is characterised by disjointedness, a short-term approach and a lack of consistency. The complicated owner tasks and complex goals that characterise many of the state-owned enterprises have not been sufficiently clarified to be able to form the basis for clear and effective corporate governance. Neither are these differences adequately reflected in the view of how ownership of the enterprises should be administrated, which leads to a far too uniform and undifferentiated manage- ment model that does not suit all the enterprises. These problems have significant consequences: The shortcomings lead to ineffective corporate governance that does not realise the potential for value generation in enterprises owned by the state. Neither does the current model provide satisfactory democratic influence, as exercised by the Swedish Riksdag, over the strategic focus of the corporate administration. To solve these problems, an independently accountable, professional organisation for operative corporate administration should be established as a link between the political and strategic governance from the Riksdag and the Government on the one side, and the individual portfolio companies on the other. The proposals sub- mitted aim to create this link. Based on its terms of reference and the problems identified, the Committee has formulated the following overarching objectives for the administration of the states corporate ownership: Better value generation in all enterprises. Clear political influence on the strategic level. Stable conditions for the enterprises operations and develop- ment. Operative administration in limited companies proposes that the operative administration of enterprises owned by the state be transferred to two 100 percent state-owned limited companies that own the shares in the portfolio companies and have the following responsibilities and tasks: 1 will be responsible for the corporate administration of enterprises whose main task is to generate value. 2 will be responsible for the corporate administration of enterprises whose main task is to generate public benefit. A solution with a separate organisation for operative admini- stration lays clearer structure and more distinct division of roles and responsibilities in the administration of the states corporate ownership. Responsibility for the overarching and strategic governance of the states ownership and the tasks of the enterprises will continue to rest with the Riksdag and the Government while operative manage- ment will be implemented by the holding companies. This will create the prerequisites for combining democratic influence over the states ownership with , efficient and professional admini- stration that can contribute to long-term value generation in state- owned enterprises in the broad sense. The reason why the enterprises shall be administrated by limited companies is because this business form is considered to be the one that best satisfies the demands for efficient and professional administration and that is best-placed to attract the skills, business acumen and experience required at the top executive level. The alternative of the administration being conducted by a government agency is feasible but is considered to be less bene- ficial. The limited company corporate model is also particularly well suited to the administration of business-driven enterprises. Dividing the administration of state-owned enterprises between two holding companies is motivated by the fact that two main cate- gories of state-owned enterprise have been identified: enterprises whose fundamental objective is to generate financial value, enterprises whose fundamental objective is to create public benefit. In the Committees opinion, this difference in mandate and focus can best be underpinned by dividing the function between two manage- ment organisations. The holding companies shall be controlled by the Government, who will be responsible for operations and have to report results to the Riksdag. The Government shall formulate provisions in the articles of association and otherwise provide the necessary opera- tional guidelines. At annual shareholders meetings, the Govern- ment shall appoint the chairpersons and members of the holding company boards. In accordance with the Committees proposal, the holding companies could start operations at the beginning of 2013. The holding companies mandate The mandate of the holding companies shall be to operationalise and implement the corporate governance adopted by the Riksdag and Government. They shall fulfil the tasks required to implement and professional corporate governance and as owners appoint boards and chairpersons in the portfolio companies. The tasks also include defining clear mandates and objectives for each company and supporting and monitoring their fulfilment. Major emphasis shall be put on formulating clear and consistent governance targets for each company that reflect the companies collective task in terms of both financial value and public benefit. The administration and management of the enterprises shall be , focusing on developing and realising the potential of the portfolio companies to generate value in a broad sense. The admini- stration shall be characterised by transparency and accountability and a high level of professionalism, and be implemented based on the states specific role as owner and the core values it is founded upon. The holding companies shall be led, organised and staffed in a way that reflects the enterprises different mandate. Considerable emphasis shall also be put on developing and utilising synergies both between and inside the holding companies. Capital in the portfolio companies that is not needed to fulfil the companies tasks shall be distributed to the owner and, with the exception of limited amounts to finance the holding companies operations and provide scope for capital transfers between the portfolio companies, passed on to the state. 1 comprises portfolio companies that have financial value generation as their main task and whose targets are mainly financial in nature. They may also, to the extent deemed necessary, be subject to supplementary restrictions of a public benefit nature. It is proposed that 28 portfolio companies be included in this holding company, including the majority of the largest and financially most valuable enterprises. The governance target for this holding company should be to generate long-term stable growth in value measured as the sum of the value generated in all its portfolio companies over time. The skills requirement for the board, executive and administration in the company include a high level of business acumen and sound political judgment. 1 should be divided into two sub-categories, large enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) based on different governance rationales. Large enterprise sub-category will be responsible for 80 percent or more of the value in the states portfolio of or partly owned companies. All the businesses are mature companies that are commercially run but may have certain special commitments or restrictions. SME sub-category consists of a few small but mainly of medium- sized enterprises, several of which may be deemed to have con- siderable development potential. Accordingly, the corporate governance of these enterprises should be focused on utilising this potential. Several of the enterprises can be categorised into a few coherent industrial groups. 2 comprises portfolio companies whose over- arching task is to create public benefit. It is proposed that 27 enter- prises be included in 2. In some cases, it is a question of corporatised government operations that have a business- specific public assignment as their main task. The portfolio companies in this holding company have sector- political targets. Several of the companies also have financial objectives, which constitute restrictions for the fulfilment of their specific public assignment. In their running of the holding comp- any and their administration of the portfolio companies, board members, executives and administrators must have sound political judgement, good skills and specific expert knowledge in the relevant policy areas in addition to the required business acumen. An important task for 2 will be to develop methods and techniques for the efficient administration of compa- nies that have public benefit as their main objective. The company needs to develop a new bank of professional expertise and experience in order to be able to effectively administrate companies whose main objectives are not financial. The portfolio companies in this holding company can also be divided into two sub-categories. It is proposed that one of these contain a significant number of companies with the purpose of sustaining economic growth. These are mainly companies in the enterprise policy area that often have no profitability targets. The other proposed sub-category would contain companies whose purpose is to contribute to public welfare. These companies are of varying size and are in several policy areas although most of them have socially, culturally and environmentally moti- vated assignments. The costs of the new management organisation are estimated to be approximately million (million) per year. The current management system is estimated to cost about million (million) a year. The reason for the increased costs is a significantly higher level of ambition regarding both in terms of numbers and skills. Compared to other actors, however, the costs are considerably lower, in relation both to the value of the portfolio holdings and to the number of employees. It is proposed that the costs be financed by allowing the holding companies to keep a small proportion of the profit dividends from the portfolio companies which means they would not be financed from the central government budget Certain start-up costs will be incurred in connection with the of the holding companies, estimated to be in the region of –20 million (–2.3 million). Dividends and capital contributions Profit dividends from state-owned companies will continue to go to the state and be assigned as earnings in the central government budget. proposes however that the holding companies be given the opportunity to redistribute the profits in an efficient among the portfolio companies within a framework established by the Riksdag. Major capital contributions or contributions aimed at achieving strategic reorientations of a companys operations shall continue to be decided by the Riksdag under the provisions of the Budget Act. It is proposed that the holding companies not be allowed to finance their operations through loans. The premise is that a new organization may be reconciled with a strong democratic influence over state ownership. The scope of the Swedish Government and the Swedish Riksdag for insight into and overall governance of the state-owned enterprises shall not be restricted. The Government is responsible for the governance of the holding companies. There is a need to develop a clear framework for how to exercise parliamentary and governmental governance of and influence over the administration of state-managed companies. The aim is to create clearl corporate governance roles, better accounting and monitoring, and greater transparency. It is proposed that this framework include: A long-term ownership strategy with overarching strategic goals for the administration of the states corporate ownership. Annual administration guidelines. The of holding companies means that the Govern- ments corporate governance needs to be based to a greater degree on an overarching ownership perspective. It is proposed that the Government develop a long-term ownership strategy that establishes the overarching strategic focus of the ownership policy and corporate governance for many years to come. This long-term ownership strategy shall constitute the basis for the Governments governance of the administration and of the holding companies. It is proposed that the ownership strategy form the basis for a consultation with the Riksdag on issues that concern overarching and long-term objectives and principles for state ownership and corporate governance. This consultation could take place at least once per term of government. It is proposed that the Government adopt annual administration guidelines in the form of governance tasks to the holding companies. This is help to increase transparency in the Govern- ments corporate governance and support more openness is the states role as an owner. A comparison can be drawn here with the guidelines established by the Government as regards management of the national debt. The administration of state-owned enterprises should, as is the case with other management activities, be the subject of thorough assessments as a basis for the Governments and the Riksdags governance. The proposal is to perform assessments every second year and for them to be presented in a report to the Riksdag, which will then have a basis for its audit of the holding companies and the administration of state-owned enterprises. This type of assessment is already carried out by the authorities responsible for manage- ment of the national debt and the national pension funds. The Riksdag must also be given the insight, information and basis necessary for it to be able to exercise overall governance and perform an audit of the administration in its capacity as represent- ative of the owners and the countrys citizens. It is the assessment of the Committee that the current arrangement whereby members of the Riksdag are allowed to attend annual shareholders meetings shall continue to apply even in the proposed new organisation with holding companies. Audit Office has an important role in the auditing of the states corporate ownership. According to the Committees proposal, the National Audit Office shall be able to audit both the holding companies and the portfolio companies in which the state has a controlling influence. also considers that it should be possible to develop forms for disseminating information between the holding companies and members of the Riksdag. is also of the opinion that certain fundamental provisions concerning the administration and governance of the states corporate ownership could be regulated by lawThe Committee is submitting a complete legislative proposal. To support its corporate governance, the Government needs to retain resources in the Government Offices. This new ownership function shall support the Government in its role as an owner representative. A central task will be to support the Government in its governance and monitoring of the holding companies activities, including the appointment of chairpersons and members to the holding company boards. lag (2012:000) om förvaltning av ägande i vissa statligt ägda aktiebolag Härigenom föreskrivs följande. 1 § Denna lag innehåller bestämmelser om regeringens förvaltning av ägandet i statens förvaltningsbolag och vissa bestämmelser för statens förvaltningsbolag som gäller utöver bestämmelserna i aktiebolagslagen (2005:551). 2 § Med statens förvaltningsbolag avses i denna lag de två aktiebolag som bildats för att äga och förvalta aktier i bolag som överlåtits till bolagen från staten eller förvärvats av bolagen efter godkännande av regeringen. Principer och riktlinjer för förvaltningen 3 § Regeringens förvaltning av ägandet i statens förvaltningsbolag ska ske i enlighet med av fastställda principer samt bestämmelserna i 4– 8 §§. Regeringen ska även tillse att statens förvaltningsbolag utövar sin förvaltning i enlighet med de principer som avses i första stycket. 4 § Regeringen ska besluta om närmare riktlinjer för den förvaltning som avses i 3 §. 5 § Statens förvaltningsbolag ska betala samtliga utdelningar som bolaget erhåller till staten med de undantag som anges i andra stycket. Regeringen får efter bemyndigande av godkänna att statens förvaltningsbolag 1.för finansiering av sin verksamhet behåller en del av de ut- delningar förvaltningsbolaget erhåller, och 2.använder en mindre del av de medel som avses i punkt 1 för att tillskjuta kapital till företag i vilka förvaltningsbolaget innehar aktier. Förändringar i innehav av aktier och andelar m.m. 6 § Regeringen får inte utan bemyndigande godkänna att statens förvaltningsbolag 1.förvärvar aktier eller andelar i ett företag eller på annat sätt ökar sin röst- eller ägarandel i ett företag, 2.genom försäljning eller på annat sätt minskar sin ägarandel i företag där bolaget har hälften eller mer än hälften av rösterna för samtliga aktier eller andelar, eller 3.tillskjuter kapital till ett företag, utöver vad som följer av 5 § 7 § Statens förvaltningsbolag får inte utan regeringens god- kännande 1.förvärva aktier eller andelar i ett företag eller på annat sätt öka sin röst- eller ägarandel i ett företag, 2.genom försäljning eller på annat sätt minska sin ägarandel i företag där bolaget har hälften eller mer än hälften av rösterna för samtliga aktier eller andelar, eller 3.tillskjuta kapital till ett företag, utöver vad som följer av 5 § 2. 8 § Riksdagsledamöter har rätt att närvara vid bolagsstämmor i de 1.statliga förvaltningsbolagen, och 2.bolag i vilka de statliga förvaltningsbolagen innehar mer än hälften av aktierna eller rösterna., förutsatt att bolagen har mer än 50 anställda. 9 § får i enlighet med vad som närmare föreskrivs i 4 § lagen (2002:1022) om revision av statlig verksamhet m.m. granska den verksamhet som bedrivs av statens förvaltningsbolag och de bolag i vilka de statliga förvaltningsbolagen som ägare eller genom tillskott av statliga anslagsmedel eller genom avtal eller på något annat sätt har bestämmande inflytande över verksamheten. Vid tillämpningen av 9 kap. 8 § aktiebolagslagen (2005:551) ska de bolag som avses i första stycket jämställas med bolag som avses i 2 § 4 lagen om revision av statlig verksamhet m.m. Redovisning och utvärdering m.m.