sou · H0B377 · 2012-11-29 00:00:00 — De förslag som kommittén lämnar ger myndighetsledningen och ytterst säkerhetspolischefen möjlighet att ta ett helhetsansvar för verksamheten hos och för de resultat som uppnås. Detta skapar bättre förutsättningar för strategisk ledning och styrning. Säkerhetspolisen ska samarbeta med i den utsträckning som behövs för verksamheten. Säkerhetspolisen måste också sträva efter att finna goda former för att samverka med den nya nationella operativa avdelningen. Det är angeläget att de båda polismyndigheterna tillsammans identifierar områden där det finns utvecklingspotential vad gäller samverkan och samarbete. En ombildning av Säkerhetspolisen till en fristående myndighet påverkar, enligt kommitténs mening, inte förutsättningarna för Säkerhetspolisen att även fortsättningsvis ha ett gott samarbete med såväl andra myndigheter som internationellt. Det finns ett fortsatt behov av sekretess och diskretion för vissa delar av Säkerhetspolisens verksamhet och för vissa anställda. Hur Säkerhetspolisen ska hantera frågorna om diskretion bör inte regleras i lag eller annan författning. Det bör istället lämpligen tas om hand av Säkerhetspolisen eller av Säkerhetspolisen i överenskommelse med annan myndighet. Vid ombildningen kommer det för Säkerhetspolisen initialt att krävas vissa resurser för att inventera och ta fram de bestämmelser som behövs för att bedriva verksamheten som en självständig myndighet. Arbetet kommer i förlängningen att medföra ökad tydlighet och mer anpassade bestämmelser för verksamheten. En ombildning av Säkerhetspolisen förutsätter att vissa kompetenser och funktioner tillförs organisationen. Det kan avse arbetsrättslig kompetens, kompetens inom HR samt inom upphandling. Konsekvenser som rör arbetsgivaransvaret och det personalpolitiska området Det är viktigt att Säkerhetspolisen även fortsatt har en god framförhållning och en löpande dialog med den övriga polisen i de situationer då det finns ett behov av att rekrytera personal från . En konsekvens av att ombilda Säkerhetspolisen till en fristående myndighet är att det blir tydligare att det är Säkerhetspolisen som fullt ut utövar alla delar av arbetsgivaransvaret gentemot personalen. Ombildningen påverkar inte den tjänstgöringsskyldighet efter order som gäller för de anställda vid . Inte heller skyldigheten för polismän vid att ingripa påverkas av de organisatoriska övervägandena. För , , del kan förslaget att ombilda Säkerhetspolisen föranleda visst merarbete. Detta arbete hör samman med själva ombildandet och upphör den dag som den nya myndigheten har bildats. Den finansiella styrningen kommer inte att förändras eftersom Säkerhetspolisen har ett eget anslag. Kommitténs förslag att ombilda Säkerhetspolisen får ekonomiska konsekvenser. Dessa avser dels att regeringen bör omfördela nuvarande anslag som belöper på den övriga polisen, dels ekonomiska konsekvenser som är att hänföra till själva ombildningen. Kommittén bedömer att de omställningskostnader av engångskaraktär som avser ombildningen uppgår till . Kommittén föreslår att Säkerhetspolisen bör leda arbetet med att förbereda och genomföra ombildningen. Detta arbete bör inte fogas till den genomförandeorganisation som kommittén har föreslagit ska förbereda bildandet av den nya . Det är dock viktigt att Säkerhetspolisen etablerar en god kontakt med genomförandeorganisationen för . Ombildningen av Säkerhetspolisen bör samordnas tidsmässigt med att den öppna polisen övergår i en ny struktur. The present part of the Organisation Committees remit involves analysing the consequences of a possible reorganisation of the into an independent authority within the service and presenting the proposals that such a reorganisation would require (additional terms of reference to , ToR 2012:13). The remit should be seen in the context of the proposals the Committee presented in its report SOU 2012:13, which called for the reorganisation of , the 21 authorities and the National Laboratory of Forensic Science into a single unified authority and the reorganisation of the into a separate authority independent of the rest of the service. In the additional terms of reference, the Government has indicated that separating the from the rest of the service would have a number of consequences. The main issue concerns the form of management the independent should have, and associated issues. Moreover, questions arise concerning cooperation between the and the National Criminal , as well as cooperation with the county authorities. A further consequence to which the additional terms of reference draw attention concerns the relationship between the and the staff disciplinary board. Organisation and management structure of the At present, is the central administrative authority for the services, over which it exercises supervision. is led by the National Commissioner. is a part of but not formally a separate authority, even though it operates as such in practice. is led by a Head of the . The Head of the takes both operational and administrative decisions, both of a policy nature and in current business. However, matters that come under the ambit of the but have substantial consequences for other parts of the service may be subject to decision by the National Commissioner. The National Commissioner may also make decisions in other matters if there are special grounds for this. The Government governs the activities of the by a range of instruments, including statutes, appropriation directions with guidelines for the direction of activities, and special decisions. However, the fact that the is a part of has no influence on the form or content of the governance that the Government now exercises. currently has independent status, with its own Direc- tor-General, its own appropriation, its own appropriation directions specifying the objectives of its activities, and its own ordinance containing instructions to the . The responsibilities and operations of the The core operations of the are to protect national security and the Swedish polity against criminal attacks. The main emphasis of its responsibilities is on preventing crime, whereas criminal investigation comprises only a small proportion of its activities. Unlike other operations, items of business handled by the derive only in exceptional cases from reports of crimes. The Security Service conducts extensive security intelligence to produce assessments of threats and vulnerabilities. These assessments provide a basis for deciding on measures the will take in its preventive work. The assessments also provide a basis for decisions on dignitary protection or other protective security measures. Security intelligence assumes a well-developed and functioning exchange of information with security services in other countries. Effective information-gathering methods are also required. In addition, the methods and know-how must not be revealed to outsiders. The focus of the is not on prosecution but on obtaining decision-making data for measures to reduce threats and vulnerabilities, and on taking such measures. International cooperation is an essential element of this work. Given the responsibilities of the , its focus and methods differ markedly from those of the regular service. Partnership and cooperation with other actors For the to be able to fulfil its main responsibilities, the organisation has a great need of cooperation and partnership with the defence intelligence agencies. Much of this cooperation concerns exchanges of information and experience to improve assessments. One example of more formal cooperation is , where these agencies and authorities together produce strategic assessments of the threat posed by terrorism. Another cross-agency cooperative forum in which the participates is the . is a forum for partnership and knowledge exchange and brings together 14 agencies that have various roles before, during and after a terrorist attack. also participates in the national mobilisation scheme against serious organised crime. The purpose of this scheme is to make effective use of expertise from different agencies and authorities to hamper criminal networks. Criminal is responsible for national coordination in combating serious organised crime, while the has the main national responsibility for preventing serious organised crime from having an unlawful impact on important public services. With regard to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the works with the Swedish Customs, the for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls, the , the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and the Swedish Armed Forces. Access to foreign intelligence is vital to the ability of the to conduct its activities. Internationally, the Security Service cooperates primarily with security and intelligence services in Nordic and European countries. is also dependent on regular collaboration with security and intelligence services in other parts of the world. In addition, it participates in various multinational organisations. and the regular service collaborate and cooperate to a varying degree, depending on points of contact between the operational branches concerned. This cooperation is based on relations and contacts that are built up over the long term. It is described in greater detail in section 4.6. Why should the be reorganised as an independent authority within the service? The background to the need to reconsider the organisation of the is that the Committee has presented a proposal for a reorganisation of the regular service that will make it impossible to retain the as part of . has not perceived its task to involve suggesting any changes in the responsibilities of the . What is involved here is rather the organisational structure within which the should operate in future. starts out from the proposal in SOU 2012:13 that the should be reorganised as an independent authority. This proposal was based purely on administrative considerations. In this report, the Committee elaborates on the administrative reasons for reorganising the and then goes on to examine whether the most appropriate solution from an operational perspective is to make the an independent authority within the services. As in its previous report, the Committee has chosen to be guided by a principle of . One of the implications of this principle is that when operations are working well, they should not be changed more than is absolutely essential for their continued development. Further, if changes do need to be made, each change should be examined on the basis of a well-defined picture of the problems to be addressed. already has an independent status relative to . In certain respects, the Government governs the as if it were a body completely detached from the rest of the service. This manifests itself in various ways: the Government lays down rules for the work of the in separate instructions, and it appoints and employs the Head and Deputy Head of the . Moreover, the has its own appropriation and appropriation directions. A reorganisation of the as an independent authority would not entail any real change, in practice, in the way in which the Government governs operations under the ambit of the . The reorganisation also ensures a wellbalanced division of power within the new organisation. Making the an independent authority will clarify the division of responsibilities. The operations of the will be placed formally directly under the Government. The Head of the will be more clearly accountable for its operations and management and responsibility issues will be clarified. The National Commissioner will no longer have the power to decide in matters that can be classified as within the ambit of the . This will mean a clearer decisionmaking mandate for the Head of the but will also require certain mechanisms for division of responsibilities in situations where regular operations coincide with the work of the . If the is reorganised as an independent authority within the services, it will naturally be necessary to clarify the regulatory framework that applies in its area. A clearer regulatory framework will provide better conditions for internal man- Furthermore, an independent authority can take its own decisions on the regulations and general advice that apply to its operations. A reorganisation of the will also make it clearer to the general public that the responsibilities and operations of the have a different focus than those of other services. Because of its responsibilities and main areas of activity as national security service, the occupies a unique position in the service. Many parts of its operations have few points of contact with other operations. This applies, for example, to its work in the areas of counter-espionage, protective security and preventing the proliferation, acquisition and production of weapons of mass destruction. Turning to the focus and purpose of national intelligence operations, the points of contact between the and the regular service are too limited for these operations to benefit from incorporating the in the new Authority. The intelligence gathered in many parts of operations rarely focuses on the types of crime that the regular service works on. also obtains information from other channels. The fact that the will continue to operate separately from the rest of the service will safeguard international security intelligence activities. Incorporating the in the Authority, and thereby strengthening the link to the regular service, would obviously risk undermining the confidence that the has built up with other countries securityand intelligence services. This is undesirable bearing in mind the key role of intelligence in the operations and its ability to perform its task of protecting national security. has also made the assessment that the and the regular service do not have to belong together in organisational terms in order to enjoy a well-developed partnership. See sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.4. of the as an independent authority proposes that the itself should decide on its organisation. Given the nature of its operations, the must be able to adapt to changes in crime trends and security policy over time. The authority requires flexible management to respond effectively to such changes. The Government can also demand clearer accountability of the management if the authority is allowed to decide on its own organisation. Form of management of the new authority proposes that the be an authority without a board, governed by a head of authority directly answerable to the Government. This proposal is motivated by the special nature of the operations, the need for rapid adaptability to external changes and the Governments need to govern the with clarity. Management of the will be vested in a head of authority. proposes that the should have an advisory council. This council should be able to observe all the operations conducted by the . The members of the advisory council should be nominated by all parties represented in the Riksdag. However, given the special features of the , it is appropriate to ensure that the group of persons with access to its operations does not grow too broad. Advisory council members should also be subject to security clearance. The work of the Security Service includes operations of a sensitive nature for personal integrity, where transparency to citizens and democratic influence are important. An advisory council can provide knowledge, breadth and diversity to support the authoritys management. proposes that the head of the be given the title of Head of the . This title is already well established. Further, the Committee proposes that the Head of the personally should appoint her or his colleagues at management level. This proposal is in line with the rules laid down in the Ordinance and general administrative policy considerations. Staff must continue to have good opportunities to move between the and the regular service. proposes that the Government prescribe in an ordinance that staff will be permitted a leave of absence from the Authority without a special decision being required, in order to hold a temporary position in the . Opportunities to work in the other organisation, and the associated improved career opportunities, are of great importance to employees and employers. It is an advantage to the that there are good of recruiting staff who have a background. This applies to all staff, but especially close protection officers and surveillance officers. Reorganising the as an independent authority will not affect the need to be able to transfer an employee to another position in certain exceptional situations and for operational purposes. Consequently, after the organisational changes, when an obligation to transfer arises – and a new position in the regular service is concerned – the new Authority will be the authority that decides on such positions. Processing of cases involving offences committed by employees Cases involving offences committed by employees are to be processed at the Authoritys special investigations division. proposes that this be stated in the instructions to the . The reason for this arrangement is that the ordinance regulating these cases has employees in view, i.e. employees of both the Authority and the . In its previous report, the Committee proposed that cases involving offences committed by employees should be processed at the Authoritys special investigations division. proposes that the should have a staff disciplinary board. This proposal follows the general rule that staff disciplinary issues should be examined by the agency or authority employing the staff member concerned. Moreover, the having a staff disciplinary board of its own is the arrangement that will best suit the purpose. The relatively large number of employees is another argument in favour of the authority having its own disciplinary board. The Committees assessment is that if the is reorganised as an independent authority within the service, this will have no effect, in practice, on the possibility of partnership and cooperation with the regular service. must continue to have a good partnership and efficient cooperation with the regular service and other national agencies and authorities. In addition, there must be effective collaboration with other countries, foreign authorities and international organisations. proposes that it be specified in the 's instructions that the is to continue to work in partnership with these actors. In certain special situations, however, mechanisms will be needed to decide on the division of responsibilities between the and the Authority. and the Authority jointly must make a clear agreement regarding division of responsibilities in the event of a special situation of this kind arising. A reorganisation of the as an independent authority will not require any changes in current secrecy provisions to allow an efficient exchange of information between the authorities. Consequences of the Committees proposals Consequences from a citizen perspective The proposed advisory council will strengthen democratic transparency and control in operations. Confidence between the authority and citizens will be enhanced by clarifying issues of responsibility, ensuring good conditions for democratic transparency and providing unchanged opportunities for the public to contact the . Consequences from a judicial chain perspective After reorganisation as an independent authority, the will continue to be in a good position to contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial chain and to work in partnership with authorities in the system. One consequence of the proposal that the decide on its own organisation is that this will give the authoritys management, and ultimately the Head of the , organisational flexibility for conducting operations. The Government will also be able to demand clearer accountability of the management if the authority is allowed to make its own decisions on its organisation. The Committees proposals enable the authoritys management, and ultimately the Head of the , to take comprehensive responsibility for the operations of the and the results achieved. This will create better conditions for strategic management and governance. is to cooperate with the Authority where this is necessary for operations. must also seek good arrangements for working in partnership with the new national operations division. It is essential that both authorities together identify areas where there is potential for developing partnership and cooperation. In the Committees opinion, reorganising the as an independent authority will not affect the ability of the to maintain its good cooperation with other government agencies and internationally. Secrecy and discretion will continue to be needed for certain parts of operations and certain employees. How the handles issues of discretion should not be regulated by law or other statutes; it is more appropriate for the authority to make its own rules on this, either on its own or in agreement with another authority. In connection with the reorganisation, the will initially need certain resources to take stock of and produce the regulations required to conduct operations as an independent authority. However, in the longer term, this work will lead to greater clarity and more suitable provisions for operations. A reorganisation of the presupposes that it acquire certain skills and functions, such as specialist staff with expertise in labour law, human resources and procurement. Consequences in the areas of employer responsibility and staff policy It is important that the Security Service continues to plan well ahead and maintains an ongoing dialogue with the Authority when staff need to be recruited. Separating the from the rest of the service will clarify that the Security service is the employer of the staff. The reorganisation will have no impact on the existing obligation of staff to serve in accordance with orders, nor will the organisational considerations affect the obligation of officers in the to intervene when off duty. Consequences for the Government Offices The proposal to reorganise the may lead to a certain amount of extra work for the Government Offices (the ). This work will derive from the reorganisation itself and will end once the new authority has been established. There will be no change in financial governance, as the already has its own appropriation. The Committees proposal to reorganise the will have financial consequences. These concern, firstly, that the Government should reallocate current appropriations that now accrue to other services and, secondly, financial consequences directly attributable to the reorganisation itself. estimates that the one-off costs of reorganisation will come to approximately 000 000. proposes that the should lead the work of preparing and implementing the reorganisation. This work should not be incorporated in the implementing organisation proposed by the Committee to prepare the creation of the new Authority. However, it is important that the establishes good contacts with the implementing organisation for the Authority. The reorganisation of the should be coordinated in time with the transition of the regular service to a new structure. förordning (201X:XX) med instruktion för Säkerhetspolisen Allmänna uppgifter och ansvarsområden 1 § Av 7 § polislagen (1984:387) framgår att Säkerhetspolisen ansvarar för den polisverksamhet som syftar till att förebygga och avslöja brott mot rikets säkerhet. I samma bestämmelse anges också att regeringen får uppdra åt Säkerhetspolisen att i särskilda hänseenden ansvara för annan polisverksamhet. 2 § Säkerhetspolisen ska, utöver vad som anges i 7 § polislagen, leda och bedriva polisverksamhet när det gäller