sou · GZB318 · 2011-03-02 00:00:00 — However, the Committee sees no reason to deviate from the position previously adopted on this issue by the Riksdag (parliament), namely that there is no legal justification for prohibiting processing since a ban on one particular method of managing spent nuclear fuel could lead to other methods that might subsequently prove to be less well-founded. is aware, however, that at the present time direct disposal of radioactive waste is much cheaper than waste treatment for recycling and reuse. As long as the economic gap between direct disposal and alternative treatment methods persists, there is of a change in strategy on the part of licence holders. The term nuclear waste is removed perceives point in the legislative distinction between nuclear waste and radioactive waste, and therefore proposes that the term nuclear waste not be included in the new law. Instead, all radioactive waste deriving from nuclear operations or other practices involving radiation is defined as radioactive waste. proposes, however, that the term nuclear fuel be retained. , partly because it is well established internationally and partly because of the safeguard management aspect. Also, the Swedish definition of radioactive waste explicitly corresponds to the internationally accepted definition. Management and final disposal of non-nuclear radioactive waste Most of the radioactive waste in is dealt with at the Studsvik facility on behalf of the party that generated it. In this connection, once the permit application has been approved by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the original waste operator hands over responsibility for the final treatment and disposal of the waste to . By means of a civil law agreement between and the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and (), Studsvik is assured of final disposal capacity at the SFR repository in Forsmark. The Radiation Safety Authority takes the view that the contracted volume of 7 000 barrel equivalents is enough to accommodate non-nuclear radioactive waste from the Studsvik facility. In light of this, the Committee finds that at present no specific action is required on the part of central government, e.g. trying to reach an agreement between the Swedish state and SKB to secure the final disposal of non-nuclear radioactive waste. This, however, presupposes that the content of the current agreement between relating to final disposal is not renegotiated. Regarding the partially unsatisfactory situation that has arisen in which some holders of radioactive waste are said to lack the financial means to dispatch their waste for treatment and final disposal via , the Committee has been unable to find any solution other than the one prescribed in current legislation, namely that the party possessing waste is responsible for ensuring its final disposal. This follows from the proposals regarding Chapter 12, Sections 23 and 24 of the Environmental Code. The holder is also required to defray the cost of disposing of the radioactive waste generated in the operation. Chapter 16, Section 3, first paragraph of the Environmental Code also prescribes that the validity of permits, approvals and exemptions may be made subject to the requirement that security is furnished for the costs involved in this connection. The operation concerned may not be launched unless this requirement is met. The dumping of radioactive waste at sea In the course of the inquiry, the question has arisen whether dumping – as the term is defined in the international conventions – may also apply to the final disposal of radioactive waste in special repositories beneath the sea bed. Based on the definitions laid down in the conventions to which is a party, the Committee takes the view that the final disposal beneath the sea bed of radioactive waste in special repositories connected to land is not to be regarded as dumping. The legal definition of practices involving radiation means that Chapter 12 of the Environmental Code could have an extremely wide area of application. Everything in our environment emits radiation in one way or another. To avoid establishing an overly wide and complicated area of application, it will be necessary, as in the case of the current provisions in the Radiation Protection Act, to limit the scope of Chapter 12 so that it deals only with protection against the harmful effects of radiation. Pursuant to the Governments authorisation, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority has both issued regulations on exemptions – known as clearance regulations based on established limit values/clearance levels – and granted exemptions in individual cases. One of the aims of the inquiry is to raise basic radiation safety principles from the level of agency rule to that of a law or ordinance. Provisions on exemptions from the area of application described in Chapter 12 are one example of the types of basic rules that in the Committees view should be brought together in an ordinance. The states responsibility of last resort for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive waste proposes that a legal provision be introduced regulating the states responsibility of last resort for spent nuclear fuel. Such a legislative measure has a number of advantages. By ratifying the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of and on the Safety of (the ), the Swedish state has accepted ultimate responsibility for ensuring safety. The legal provision proposed by the Committee makes clear the states responsibility in this respect. Such a provision can enhance security for the actors involved, such as the municipality in which the fuel is to be disposed of, its inhabitants, property owners and also the power industry. Systematic government supervision eliminates the risk that the licence holder may lose the motivation to assume responsibility for solving the question of final disposal, as required by law. A state takeover of rights and obligations in the absence of a licence holder who can be held accountable would require careful consideration of the civil law implications with regard to ownership of the spent fuel. has also addressed issues associated with the property on which the final repository is situated, asking what might happen should the owning company go bankrupt or be liquidated. Its conclusion is that the property should preferably pass to the state if the licence holder were to cease to exist. In this connection, the Committee notes that Chapter 2, Section 5 of the Swedish Expropriation Act (1972:719) would allow the state to take over the property. An expropriation procedure may only be embarked upon, however, if the company owning the land on which the final repository for spent fuel is situated is in the process of being dissolved through liquidation or bankruptcy. These are the only circumstances under which expropriation is possible, given the constitutional division of responsibilities established between the state and reactor owners. Thus while the companies remain the state has no right to expropriate the land. Supervision of the radiation safety sphere Having reviewed how supervisory duties are discharged in the radiation safety sphere, the Committee is in a position to make some general observations. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority reports2 that its inspections of the health and care service have revealed poor compliance with the rules on the training of local staff, particularly doctors, in radiation protection and the handling of X- ray equipment. Other common failings include a lack of or incomplete method descriptions, inadequate follow-up of patients given radiotherapy, and insufficient reporting of work methods, as a result of which patient safety cannot be guaranteed. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority is of the opinion that these failings are largely due to roles and responsibilities not being properly defined within the licence holders organisation. Particularly in the case of activities in the health and care service, and of technical appliances and radiation sources in industry and research, it would appear that inspections need to be stepped up so as to remedy the shortcomings identified by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. During the period 2006–2008, for instance, a total of five inspections were carried out among 1 830 licence holders possessing technical appliances. The agency attribute3 this low rate of inspection to a lack of resources, implementation of the and the licensing requirement for existing radiation sources in . The agency also has plans to provide inspections at set intervals, e.g. in the laser and health and care spheres. Each year, one or two county councils are inspected. Adjusted for the size of care providers, this means that the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority is able to inspect each individual provider about every 20 years. In addition, a number of minor inspections governed by events are undertaken, as well as minor inspections focusing on only a small part of a given operation4. 2Supervisory Plan for the Health and , p. 3Supervisory Plan for Licence Holders, Occupational Practices and Work Activities, agency records (ML) 58/2009. 4Supervisory Plan for the Health and 2009–2013, agency records (ML) 59/2009. Regarding dental X-ray diagnosis, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority reports5 that it lacks systematic instruments for fully assessing compliance with laws and regulations in this sphere. The large number of activities involved, along with their broad geographical spread, means that conventional inspections are unrealistic in practical terms, although the extent of such activities means it is important to ensure proper control. The agency intends therefore to discharge its supervisory duties via reviews, licensing and communication. In light of the above, the Committee feels there may be cause to reflect on how the Swedish Radiation Safety Authoritys rate of inspection might be stepped up in certain areas of activity. The rate of inspection depends to a great extent on the proportion of time the relevant staff set aside for such duties, but also and above all on whether enough resources are available in relation to the agencys task. Supervision under the Environmental Code As of 1 2011, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority is responsible for operational supervision under the Environmental Code in matters relating to ionising and non-ionising radiation, i.e. nuclear operations under the Nuclear Operations Act and practices involving radiation under the Radiation Protection Act. The agency already has prime responsibility under the Environmental Code for supervising practices relating to ionising and non-ionising radiation. The bodies responsible for supervisory duties are set out in the Ordinance on Environmental Inspections (2011:13). The Environmental Code supervisory regulations set out in Chapter 26 are complete in that, as in the case of the Nuclear Operations Act and the Radiation Protection Act, they serve to support the supervisory authority in its efforts to ensure compliance with the rules on radiation safety. The agency is required to adopt appropriate measures to rectify irregularities in operations. Supervisory authorities are also required to continually check whether the stipulated conditions 5 Supervisory Plan for the Health and , agency records (ML) 59/2009, p. governing an activity are sufficient, given radiation safety considerations and the general aims of the Environmental Code. The supervisory authority is empowered to issue whatever orders may be necessary in individual cases, and these may be combined with a conditional financial penalty. Decisions prohibiting a particular operation or measure may also be taken where necessary. In addition, supervisory authorities can take action against anyone engaging in a practice involving radiation without permission. The supervisory authority may order anyone engaging in operations or taking measures covered either by the Environmental Code or by regulations based on the Code, to submit whatever information and documents that body may require in the performance of its duties. The same applies to whoever may be otherwise obliged to deal with the negative effects of such operations or measures. The supervisory authority is also able to demand investigations and similar types of inquiry on the part of the operator if this is deemed necessary to ensure proper supervision. Such a requirement may for instance involve samples being taken, inquiries being made or investigations being launched. A supervisory authority may decide that its decision is to take immediate effect even if an appeal is lodged against it. In order to accomplish its task, a supervisory authority has the right to demand access to property, , other facilities and means of transport. It also has the right to carry out whatever investigations and take whatever measures it deems necessary for the proper performance of its supervisory duties. This right of access further applies to anyone acting on the supervisory authoritys behalf, e.g. an expert charged with inspecting a facility or engaging in some other form of investigation prior to a decision by the authority. finds that only a few minor additions are required to the provisions in Chapter 26 of the Environmental Code if the radiation safety aspect is incorporated into Chapter 12. -Chapter 26, Section 1 needs to be supplemented by a reference to practices involving radiation, if substantive radiation safety provisions are incorporated into Chapter 12 of the Environmental Code. -Chapter 26, Section 3 needs to be supplemented by a reference to the Radiation Safety Authority being the supervisory body for practices involving radiation. -Chapter 26, Section 20 needs to be supplemented by a reference to the permit requirement as prescribed in Chapter 12, Section 5. -Chapter 26, Section 27 needs to be supplemented by a reference to conditions of importance for national security. Nuclear power accounts for a significant share of power supply and is therefore deemed to impact on the countrys total defence system. Consequently, activities involving the countrys nuclear power reactors have a bearing on national security and are covered by the provisions set forth in the Security Protection Act (1996:627). Security protection refers partly to protection against espionage, sabotage and other crimes that may constitute a threat to national security, partly in other cases to the protection of information covered by the secrecy provisions in the Public Access and Secrecy Act (2009:400) relating to national security, and partly to protection against terrorism pursuant to Section 2 of the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist (2003:148), even where such offences do not threaten national security. Clearer supervisory responsibility within the framework of the Work Environment Act, the Health and Act, and the Devices Act Besides the Radiation Protection Act, provisions concerning radiation safety are also to be found in the Work Environment Act, the Health and Act and the Devices Act. Four different agencies are responsible for supervising their respective spheres of activity where radiation also affects staff, patients and the general public, namely the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the Swedish Work Environment Authority, and the . The relevant laws – the Work Environment Act, the Health and Act and the Devices Act – along with the new Chapter 12 of the Environmental Code as proposed by the Committee, apply in parallel. Without changing the allocation of supervisory responsibilities or the current division of labour among the agencies involved, the Committee believes the responsibility for supervising radiation safety should be made clearer. This can be achieved by inserting text into each law giving priority to the radiation protection provisions wherever protection against radiation is dealt with in that policy area. Accordingly, the Committee proposes that the Work Environment Act, the Health and Act and the Devices Act be supplemented by an annotation making clear that where radiation protection is concerned the provisions in Chapter 12 of the Environmental Code apply. As at present, this means the provisions on radiation safety in the Environmental Code should apply alongside the Work Environment Act, the Health and Act and the Devices Act. Thus the aim is for the four laws to be fully applicable in parallel. The Committees proposal in this respect means that radiation protection regulations or conditions stipulated on the basis of the Radiation Protection Act should be established by the Swedish Work Environment Authority, and the as a basis for their assessments and be regarded as a minimum requirement that must be met in all circumstances. This proposal would ensure that responsibility for overall radiation protection was more clearly established in law. Besides the for a clearer division of responsibilities, one of the basic reasons for this proposal is that radiation is a very broad term and the question of what shape protection against its harmful effects should take is one that requires a considerable degree of expertise to answer. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority possesses such expertise within its organisation. Another reason is that the EUs basic security standards for protecting the health of the general public, patients and employees against the risks posed by ionising radiation are currently being revised. The new rules are expected to be more wide-ranging than those currently in effect pursuant to Council Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 1996. Without making any fundamental changes in the division of labour that now applies, the priority accorded the provisions on radiation protection should be annotated in each respective law in the proposed by the Committee. Naturally, it is important to continue striving for integration of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authoritys regulations and general advice concerning radiation with the regulations and advice issued on the basis of the Work Environment Act, the Health and Act and the Devices Act. Emergency preparedness in the event of a release of radioactive material Responsibility for preparedness for accidents and incidents in involving radioactive material is shared among a large number of actors, including government agencies, county administrative boards and municipalities. Responsibility in the case of government agencies is defined in existing laws and ordinances and translated into practical measures and contingency plans setting out procedures to be followed independently or in collaboration with other bodies in the event of an emergency. Plans and preparations are tested regularly in planned emergency exercises and lessons learned are translated into measures designed to improve their performance and effectiveness. To ensure that agencies are alerted promptly when an accident occurs, and that a response is initiated as soon as possible after an alarm is triggered, agencies have officers on 24-hour standby. Standby officers receive alarms and are normally authorised to make critical decisions on their own initiative on behalf of their agency, concerning measures that are needed in the early stages of an accident before the relevant contingency organisations are assembled. Swedish legislation has for many years required the and maintenance of contingency planning, measures and organisations in the event of an accident at a nuclear power station or other radiological or nuclear emergency. Preparedness must span the entire threat spectrum, from minor incidents to a major breakdown at one of the countrys nuclear plants. In the Committees view, the laws and ordinances currently in force are sufficient for this purpose and there is at present no need for statutory amendments in this area. Direct access to operating data A party licensed to own and operate a nuclear power facility is required to implement measures designed to prevent the harmful effects of radiation and to mitigate the adverse effects of radiation exposure should an accident occur. In the event of an accident involving radiation contamination at a nuclear power plant, it is of crucial importance that rapid, reliable information be relayed from the licence holder to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, so that the authority can in turn provide guidance on and support for measures necessary to minimise the risk of injury to people and damage to the environment. Advice and/or support may for instance include advice to the emergency and rescue services coordinator in the immediate area, on the ingestion of iodine tablets, on evacuation measures or on grazing bans. In light of shortcomings with regard to the transfer of information identified by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority in the course of emergency preparedness exercises, the Committee considers that the agency should be provided with more effective tools to enable it to carry out a rapid, reliable assessment of the status of a nuclear facility and provide a prognosis and impact assessment of a possible radioactive spill. The ability of an agency to gain access to relevant data from a nuclear power plant in the event of an accident can be assured by requiring the automatic transfer of important plant data directly from the facility to the agency's emergency centre. This allows the agency to gain an immediate overview of the status of the facility and quickly make its own estimation of the source term. Source term assessment is an important prerequisite for conducting dispersion analyses and thereby guiding and advising the emergency and rescue services coordinator. Systems for the automatic transfer of data from a facility to a supervisory authority are already in use at a number of such bodies in other countries. In light of the above, the Committee considers that there are grounds for proposing that a party licensed to own and operate a nuclear reactor be required to ensure that the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority has access to operating data from the reactor via direct data transfer. This will enable the agency to make rapid, well- founded assessments aimed at minimising the harmful effects of radiation on people and the environment. accordingly proposes that a new provision be included in Chapter 12, Section 22 of the Environmental Code to the effect that a party licensed to own and operate a nuclear reactor must ensure that the supervisory authority has direct access to operating data from the reactor where there is a risk of harmful effects from radiation in the event of a reactor breakdown or other such circumstance. Non-proliferation of nuclear material and technology proposes the introduction of a new law, the Control of Nuclear Material Act, to cover areas and activities currently within the purview of the Nuclear Operations Act and the International Inspections Act. The provisions to be set out in the Control of Nuclear Material Act aim to ensure that honours its international non- proliferation commitments, primarily its undertakings under the (NPT). undertakes not to manufacture or store nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and to agree to international inspections. In addition, undertakes not to assist in or contribute to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by another country. This commitment is fulfilled primarily through export controls.6 is bound by UN resolutions in this sphere, in particular by Resolution (2004), which is mainly aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. A law on the control of nuclear material would thus aim to ensure that meets its international commitments regarding disarmament and non-proliferation. has not proceeded with proposals aimed at significantly extending existing provisions in the non-proliferation sphere, although it would be possible to do so.