sou · GZB321 · 2011-03-08 00:00:00 — It includes assessments of the resource implications of proposed projects, programs and/or policies, analyses of pro- ject risks, and advisory support and training for projects deemed to be at risk of failure. : This capability is a well- established best practice in resource and IT management. It merits separate treatment here because of its particular value as a decision support instrument for leadership. Its fundamental purpose is to provide a systematic, comprehensive and strategic basis for prioritizing among projects and for optimizing both their mix and their sequencing. It does so by translating the budget of the entire enterprise into a portfolio of on-going and time-limited projects and then analyzing each in terms of vari- ous customizable variables including cost, strategic value, risk, and path dependence. The process generates a comprehensive that greatly strengthens the ability of leadership to understand trade-offs in terms of strategic priori- ties and make decisions accordingly. The capabilities in this category yield their fundamental value by allowing leadership to set clear strategic priorities and then make near, medium and long-term decisions accordingly. In addition, these capabilities minimize the vulnerability of the decision-making process to political or bureaucratic biases, unforeseen conse- quences, near-term distractions, groupthink and a host of other painfully widespread dysfunctions. Capability Category 4: Alignment and Assessment of Action and The purpose of the capabilities in this category is to translate stra- tegic intent and policy priorities into continuously improving per- formance and results using all available sources of leverage. They are intended to: (a) drive focused, distributed action against speci- fied priorities; (b) allocate resources and manage performance against those priorities; and, (c) align the efforts and investments of all key partner entities in their achievement, including other government ministries, partner countries and non-state actors as appropriate. These are the capabilities that most distinguish stra- tegic management from traditional strategic planning by intro- ducing the cycle that connects defined priorities with necessary resources and actual accomplishment – or the lack thereof. It includes the process of analyzing and learning from both successes and failures to ensure continuous improvement in performance. The following specific capabilities represent this categorys baseline requirements. Leadership-led Strategy, Performance, and Process: This is the process by which performance against the strategic plans is periodically evaluated by ministry leadership in terms of results, resource expenditures and required refine- ments. It consists of a regular process in which the MFA leadership, including the Foreign Minister for key reviews, is briefed by the departments and missions on: (a) performance against the units strategy and its goals for the prior year, including resources expended; and, (b) proposed goals and requested resources for the coming year. This is also a formal context in which the heads of departments and missions can present strategic proposals that have come out of their own planning and innovation efforts to MFA leadership for invest- ment consideration. The key requirement for making this pro- cess meaningful is that it receives deep, unambiguous leadership support and engagement. To the extent that it does and is part of the Integrated Policy, Strategy and Resource Plan Deve- lopment process described above, this capability represents an unparalleled steering instrument for leadership. It allows them to drive their priorities systematically throughout the organiza- tion and to hear directly and consistently from front-line leaders about what is and is not working. Paradoxically, to the extent that the process is based on collaboratively developed goals and performance measures, the capability provides this control to leadership without stifling the creativity and independent action of the diplomats in the field. This is because strategic clarity (supported by values alignment and defined principles of con- duct) is the single greatest enabler of decentralized strategic coherence. When people are clear on the outcomes they are expected to achieve, their capacity for productive independent action is enhanced – not diminished. In addition, the process creates strong bureaucratic incentives to execute against objec- tives – particularly if tied to the promotion process. The value of this capability hinges significantly on effective performance measurement, including acknowledgement and analysis of fail- ures. While it has often been argued that foreign policy out- comes are almost intrinsically impossible to measure, there has been significant progress in this discipline in recent years using triangulation of measures and statistical analysis. Triangula- tion here refers to the practice of using multiple measures that are distinct in both analytic focus and source, and which together illuminate the trajectory of a given outcome in ways that single measures cannot. This includes integrating quanti- tative with qualitative and narrative evaluation techniques. Doing so requires access to fairly sophisticated analytical talent and a willingness by leadership to commit to the process of evolving useful measures over time. : This capability involves re-orienting the resource management and budget process such that it is driven by and integrated into the strategic management process. The intent is to ensure that: (a) all aspects of the MFAs strategic plan are grounded in realistic budgetary assump- tions; and, (b) the priorities specified in the strategic plan in turn drive the budget formulation and request processes. Managing resources strategically requires best-practice levels of financial : Central to the definition of next generation strategic management is that it be both a top- down and bottom-up process. Thus, it requires both: (a) that the expertise of those dedicated to the planning process be shared with personnel across the organization – including diplo- mats in the field; and, (b) that the leadership tap the collective intelligence of people throughout the entire organization by engaging them in the strategy process. This does not mean creating a democratic strategy development process geared toward achieving a lowest common denominator consensus. Rather, it consists of systematically and efficiently capturing and synth- esizing the diversity of perspectives and expertise in the organization at the appropriate levels and in a rational sequence. Accomplishing this requires that expert planning support be accessible and that basic planning competence be cultivated throughout the institution. The components of this capability include: -Planning Support: Supporting distributed organizational units in the design and execution of rigorous, future-oriented planning processes, including the development of the result- ing plans. The involvement of the professionals supporting this capability would help ensure the development of detailed plans with measurable results while reducing the planning burden on already over-stretched personnel in the field. -Training: Transferring knowledge regarding the techniques of planning and strategic analysis to personnel throughout the MFA. This includes development of planning toolkits and other learning guides to support teams throughout the MFA in using the methodologies of the planning process. This group of planning practitioners would serve as an inter- nal consulting and training unit serving to build effective strategic planning capacity throughout the ministry. Whole-of-Government Strategic Alignment: This capability con- sists of the authorities, joint strategic planning processes and integrated staffing arrangements necessary to allow an MFA to bring true strategic alignment to a states entire global affairs enterprise. For large countries and supranational institutions with many agencies overseas, this capability is necessary to avoid duplication of effort and even bureaucratic competition in the field. For smaller states it is equally important, albeit for different reasons – namely, the fundamental imperative to maxi- mize contextual awareness and the alignment of all available instruments of power and influence. Realizing this capability in practice requires first of all that the MFA be formally given the responsibility and authority to align the international policy efforts of the state in support of the elected government. With- out this clear authority, it is impossible to move from the current default of often grudging coordination to true inte- gration and alignment of effort and resources. Next, the MFA in this capacity would lead a collaborative, future-driven plan- ning process resulting in a whole-of-government strategic and resource plan. This plan should feature common objectives and specification of individual organizational roles, responsibilities and resource commitments – with a focus on making best possible joint use of complementary capabilities. The value of the capabilities outlined in this category is determined most directly by the extent to which the leadership of the organi- zation drives the process. To the extent that it does, these capa- bilities can become powerful instruments for steering not just the MFA itself, but the entire foreign policy enterprise. They are also invaluable in enabling the ministry to make compelling, analyti- cally-based business cases for necessary resources. Process Design Considerations and Critical Success Creating a strategic management process that meets the high ambi- tions articulated in this paper requires focused, long-term effort, a relatively modest investment of resources and clear support from specifically, the primary immediate chal- lenges for MFAs in becoming strategy-driven organizations are: (a) linking their existing planning and analytic assets together in a coherent, disciplined process that leverages current technology; and, (b) summoning the will and leadership capacity to make the process consequential – versus only symbolic and marginal as it so often is. Doing so can and must be customized in myriad ways to meet the specific characteristics and requirements of a given organization in terms of size, available resources, and culture. One key factor that should drive the focus of the process is the degree of intellectual consensus or division within the relevant network of individuals and organizations. Where intellectual divisions are unproductively predominant, the process can be geared very effec- tively to build strategic consensus across political, bureaucratic and other divides. Where consensus is so high that groupthink becomes an overriding risk, the process can be shifted to productive debate and challenge prevailing mindsets. Another cri- tical factor that must be addressed on a highly customized basis is the form and position of the orchestrating center of the process. To be effective, the capabilities outlined must be coordinated by some designated and empowered hub. In some countries, this is a role traditionally played by a unit in the Prime Ministers office. In others, it is located in a self-standing policy coordination center. However, as argued elsewhere in this paper, in many cases the MFA is the ideal location for this coordinating function – in part because of the naturally corresponding role of Ambassadors in the missions. Despite the clear need to customize the process, there are a number of design principles and critical success factors that apply to a large extent across organizations. The strategic management process should adhere to set of design principles including the following: Lightness: The process can and must be bureaucratically light, requiring neither significant additional human resources nor a large process burden for personnel in the field. This requires its structure from the perspective of those who will use and support it. The use of clear templates, guidance and training; the provision of expert support; and, the careful design of the planning and reporting sequence can yield a process that that offers more in value than it demands in time and effort. Decision and Execution-Driven: All aspects of the process must be designed with an intense focus on supporting the actual decisions that the institutions leadership and professionals in the field must make every day and the actions they must take to execute them. This applies equally to decisions and actions regarding long-term strategy and the response to immediate events. This principle is the key bottom-line test of the rele- vance of all aspects of the capabilities proposed in this paper. Triangulation of Diverse Perspectives: Throughout the process, it is vital that multiple perspectives be brought to bear whenever possible to develop a triangulated view of a multi-dimensional issue or circumstance. This is a fundamental principle of complexity management and strategic humility too rarely applied in most strategic planning processes. Participation: The process must be continuously participatory and collaborative to secure the support and capture the know- ledge and insight of the entire organization. Across all phases, it must leverage interactive planning techniques and crowd- sourcing technologies to create a flow of information that is both top-down and bottom-up. Adaptive: The process must be designed to be self-evolving. It should include ongoing participant surveys and other forms of performance measurement to ensure that the strategic man- agement process itself is disciplined by a culture of continuous improvement. Successful implementation of this process requires the following: Leadership Support: It bears repeating that the single most criti- cal factor that will determine the ultimate success of this pro- posed effort is the unambiguous sponsorship, ownership and leadership of the very top ranks of the ministry. This support should be broad at that level, but having a single primary spon- sor is vital. Starting Small: Given the complexity of the envisioned process, it will be vitally important to start with a relatively small subset of capabilities and build on that foundation once it is stabilized. The foresight instruments outlined in Capability Category 1 represent a natural starting point. : To the extent that mature, successful examples of the various capabilities exist in government or the private sector in ways that can be leveraged, doing so can offer great value in terms of both the benefits of another perspective and potential resource economies. Balancing Flexibility and Discipline: Strategic processes must be flexible enough to adapt to aspects of the current systems that are working and disciplined enough to enforce compliance with the core requirements of the process. Discipline is of particular importance with respect to the integration of the various com- ponents of the process. Isolated successes can be of surprisingly small ultimate benefit as their linkage to actual decisions and action relies on the integrity of the process as a whole. Stakeholder Support: The support of primary stakeholders is an indispensable, if obvious, driver of success. In this case, key stakeholders include the Prime Ministers Office, the Par- liament, the other key global ministries, and external partners. The orientation of the entire process toward collaboration and transparency should have natural broad appeal to most of these actors – particularly if they are included in its design and imple- mentation planning. The Result: The Benefits of (or Business Case for) Next The value of creating the portfolio of planning capabilities outlined above is of course a function of both the investment of organiza- tional time and resources required to do so and the benefits that such a capability will generate for the ministry and the state. The investment required is not significant and can be made gradually over time. The first and most important step is to begin integrating the current policy, strategy and resource planning processes more closely. Doing so may actually make it possible to reduce some of the costs of maintaining these functions independently. mary new investments required are in the development of strategic management expertise, the design and implementation of new processes and the application of technology. All of these can be undertaken in ways that minimize cost and risk. They do not require a big bang approach. For example, the new areas of required expertise can be simul- taneously developed internally and accessed via network arrange- ments with think-tanks and the academic community. Technology components can and in many cases should be outsourced to optimize the investment required to keep the capabilities current as the external technology environment evolves. Perhaps the primary investment required is that of leadership involvement and political capital, which again will be the primary determinant of the success of the proposed transformation. This is balanced by the fact that the immediate benefits of the effort will accrue directly to the leadership of the ministry, strengthening their ability to achieve desired foreign policy outcomes on behalf of their fellow citizens. The broader benefits of creating this next generation strategic management capability have been highlighted throughout this paper, but can be summarized here in terms of three basic cate- gories as follows: Effectiveness: Effectiveness is traditionally defined to mean doing the right things. The proposed capabilities above are funda- mentally intended to drive effectiveness, which is founded on stra- tegic clarity and the ability to prioritize. As a set, the capabilities make it possible for an MFA to: Prioritize effort and investment based on rigorous future-driven analysis, clear and granular understanding of long-term national priorities and interests, and detailed knowledge of cross-govern- ment capabilities Prepare for the most likely and potentially significant external contingencies and internal risks on a prioritized basis – inde- pendently and in concert with partners to leverage the com- parative advantages of all actors the most relevant knowledge and social capital of the entire ministry to bear on any given issue Systematically support the decision-making processes of policy- makers Continuously and comprehensively assess and drive improve- ment in the performance of all ministry efforts Efficiency: The proposed capabilities drive efficiency (or doing things right) throughout the organization by: Enabling early proactive and preventative action which is drama- tically more efficient than crisis response Systematically minimizing duplication of effort and investment through integrated planning processes Assessing all investments in terms of strategic value and risk to eliminate low value streams of expenditure Maximizing rational alignment of effort and capacity across the government Leveraging the capacity of key national and non-state partners as appropriate Anticipatory Action and Asymmetric : Much has been written about the asymmetric power and influence of terrorist organiza- tions and other emerging non-state actors that leverage new tech- nologies and light, adaptive networked organizational structures to trump the scale and firepower of established powers. What is less commonly discussed is the fact that these same capabilities can be used by states to maximize their strategic leverage on behalf of their citizens. The portfolio of capabilities proposed in this paper is intended to provide a next generation nervous system that will allow diplomatic institutions to be more anticipatory, agile, and disciplined and therefore able to consistently generate power and influence out of proportion to their size. Taken together, they represent a diplomatic force multiplier by enabling superior anti- cipation, collective intelligence, clarity of intent, speed of decision- making, alignment of effort and rapid learning from results – all hallmarks of strategic excellence. This paper began with a discussion of the role of institutions as the instruments by which human beings manage uncertainty. They are designed and constructed to manage specific types of uncertainty and often struggle to remain relevant and effective as the world changes and the circumstances that led to their creation either shift or disappear. Diplomatic institutions are in the midst of this pro- cess. They were formed to manage an important, but fairly narrow domain of uncertainty that was informational and pertained for the most part to the intentions, orientation, capabilities and nego- tiating positions of other states. Today, and increasingly in the future, the uncertainty that diplomatic institutions must manage on behalf of their citizens is fundamentally strategic. That is, they are responsible for the massive uncertainty that is at the intersection of evolving long- term national interests and the complex, intensifying conditions of the global operating environment. This uncertainty includes the intentions and orientations not only of other states, but also of a range of other actors. It also includes a host of new sources of change that were previously less relevant to statecraft, but are increasingly vital – e.g., scientific, , and technological advance, the dynamics of business competition, innovation and its role in national competitiveness, and complex global issues such as climate change and global health. Given this changing scope of uncertainty, MFAs must adapt to ensure their relevance and sur- vival. However, the importance of doing so goes far beyond that. Ministries of Foreign Affairs often are the institutions most responsible for making it possible for their elected govern- ments to manage global uncertainty effectively and on a genuinely whole-of-society basis. This role cannot exclusively be the province of military or intelligence communities given the central require- ments of maintaining collaborative transparency, generating inno- vative policy alternatives and considering strategic opportunities as well as threats. It is also not a role well-suited to ad hoc arrange- ments and the occasional think-tank white paper. can it, for the foreseeable future, be entirely passed on to a transnational body. Specifically national interests will persist in the period of historic transition and great uncertainty that we have entered and still must be protected and advanced by national governments. Doing so in the 21st century will require intensely proactive state- craft oriented by the integration of future-driven analysis with the real-time, real-world insight and influence that only diplomats in the field can provide. To achieve tangible, enduring results, it also will require the ability to translate that anticipatory insight syste- matically into aligned investment, action and follow-through on Finally, it will require a newly innovative orientation, including a willingness to experiment and an enhanced ability to learn rapidly and continuously from successes and failures and refine efforts accordingly. The recommendations in this paper are intended to make this level of performance possible. Figur 1 Antal tjänstgörande i uppdelat i utrikesförvaltningen (UD), Förvaltningsavdelningen (FA) och övriga delar av (övriga RK) 2001–2010 Antal anställda respektive tjänstgörande i utrikesförvaltningen 2007–2010 samt preliminär prognos Figur 3 Antal tjänstgörande i UD respektive utrikesrepresentationen –2010 samt preliminär prognos Figur 4 Antal tjänstgörande i utrikesrepresentationen per region 2007–2010 Antal tjänstgörande per personalgrupp i utrikesförvaltningen 26 st till SB, 25 st till FA, 54 st till Ju