sou · GZB321 · 2011-03-08 00:00:00 — Invest hade fem utlandskontor – , , med filialkontor i samt . Invest rapporterar till . Styrelsen för ackreditering och teknisk kontroll (Swedac) Styrelsen för ackreditering och teknisk kontroll (Swedac) är nationella myndighet för ackreditering, dvs. granskning och god- kännande av certifieringsorgan, kontrollorgan och laboratorier. Swedac samordnar även den svenska marknadskontrollen och tar fram regler för exempelvis mätinstrument och ädelmetallarbeten. Inom samt- liga områden har Swedac internationella uppgifter. Lagstiftning och överenskommelser inom och globalt styr Swedacs verksam- het. Swedac rapporterar till . AB () är ett av staten helägt aktiebolag med UD som huvudman. SEK:s uppdrag är att säkerställa tillgång till finansiella lösningar för export och infrastruktur genom att tillhandahålla lång- och medelfristiga krediter. SEK hjälper företag att hitta rätt export- och projektfinansiering och samarbetar med banker och andra finansiella nå mindre och medel- stora företag med konkurrenskraftig finansiering. SEK är i första hand inriktat på finansiering av affärer med medellånga och långa exportkrediter. På uppdrag av svenska staten administrerar SEK det svenska systemet för statsstödda exportkrediter (CIRR-krediter). SEK rapporterar till . () är en myndighet under UD som har till upp- gift att sprida information och kunskap om i utlandet och att svara för utbyte med andra länder inom kultur, utbildning, forskning, demokrati och samhällsliv i övrigt (att sätta på kartan). SI är verksamt inom offentlig diplomati, dvs. att förstå, informera, påverka och bygga upp relationer med allmänhet, närings- liv och civila samhället i utlandet. SI har givits upp- gifter som innebär ett ökat fokus på Sverigefrämjande. Verksam- heten ska främja svenska intressen och bidra till tillväxt, syssel- sättning och kulturell utveckling i . Genom strategisk kommunikation och internationellt utbyte inom kultur, utbildning och forskning samt demokrati främjas samarbete och långsiktiga relationer med andra länder. Verksamheten genomförs i form av projekt och sker i hög grad i samverkan med de svenska beskick- ningarna och utländska samarbetspartners. Si har egen närvaro utomlands genom en avdelning i . SI rapporterar till . exportråd () har till uppgift att ge stöd till svenska företags internationella affärsutveckling. ägs gemensamt av staten och näringslivet. Staten representeras av UD (handelsministern) och näringslivet av (). Det delade ägarskapet ger en unik ställning som avspeglas i verksamheten. har ett offentligt finansierat uppdrag att främja svensk export men utför även avgiftsfinansierade konsulttjänster. Det statliga uppdraget innefattar avgiftsfri exportinformation, kompetensutveckling för företag och vissa riktade satsningar på mindre företag, strategiska affärssektorer och särskilt intressanta tillväxtmarknader. Verksam- heten i bedrivs vid huvudkontoret i och av regionala exportrådgivare i varje län. På huvudkontoret finns en central exportservice som förmedlar marknadsinformation och export- teknisk rådgivning som svar på frågor från företag och andra intressenter. Utomlands finns på plats med svenska och utländska medarbetare på drygt 50 marknader. samarbetar också med svenska ambassader, konsulat och handels- kammare över hela världen. standardiseringsråd (SSR) standardiseringsråd (SSR) är svensk huvudman för svensk standardisering som utförs av erkända svenska standardiserings- organ. Medlemmar är staten, Kommuner och Landsting (SKL), , och . SSR erkänner svenska standardiseringsorgan och till- handahåller ett register över fastställd och upphävd svensk standard. Ansvaret för statens medlemskap i ligger inom på . () är ett bolag under Närings- departementet som har i uppdrag att främja utvecklingen av kon- kurrenskraftiga små och medelstora företag samt stimulera nyföre- tagande i syfte att skapa tillväxt och förnyelse i svenskt näringsliv. finns i alla län och erbjuder hjälp med finansiering och råd- givning för affärsutveckling. Koncernen får driftsanslag från staten. Flertalet av regionala exportrådgivare för småföretag sitter i . inrättades och lyder under Försvarsdepartementet. Myndighetens verksamhetsområde är statligt svenskt exportstöd till försvarsindustrin och ansvar för för- säljning och upplåtelse av materiel inom försvarssektorn. Med exportstöd avses insatser för att stödja företagens exportansträng- ningar i form av t.ex. deltagande vid besök, resor och demonstra- tioner för intressenter och potentiella kunder. Myndigheten ansvarar även för försäljning av överskottsmateriel från Försvars- makten vilket () tidigare ansvarat för. Det finns över tio regionalt baserade handelskammare i , varav åtta är organiserade i . Deras huvud- uppgift är att skapa goda förutsättningar för näringslivet i hemma- regionen och att främja handel över gränserna. Handelskamrarna erbjuder också tjänster, kurser, rådgivning och förmedlar affärs- kontakter mellan företag i olika länder. I ett drygt 20-tal länder finns svenska utlandshandelskamrar eller motsvarande. Det ingår i ett internationellt nätverk med över 10 000 handelskamrar. Utrikeshandelskamrarna utgör ett komple- ment till och kan företräda medlems- företag vid kontakter med myndigheter i värdlandet. De är också en samlingspunkt för svenska företag i utlandet. är ett av staten helägt aktiebolag med UD som huvudman. Bolaget erbjuder riskkapital och kompetens för investeringar i , , samt (ej EU-länder). Målet är att bidra till utvecklingen av lönsamma före- tag och därmed stimulera hållbar ekonomisk utveckling i de länder där investeringar sker. investerar tillsammans med stra- tegiska partners, i första hand svenska företag som vill etablera sig på en ny marknad eller expandera verksamheten. Den strategiska partnern ska vara beredd att dela den finansiella risken med Swed- fund och ta ett operativt ansvar. erbjuder riskkapital i form av aktiekapital, lån, garantier och delfinansiering av leasing- avtal. Beslut om investeringar fattas på affärsmässiga grunder. rapporterar till UD:s enhet för styrning och metoder i utvecklingssamarbetet (UD-USTYR). Tillväxtanalys (TA) Tillväxtanalys (TA) (och ) bildades och ersatte (), Verket för näringslivsutveckling () och . Myndig- heten lyder under och har regeringens upp- drag att belysa de områden som har störst betydelse för tillväxt. Myndigheten ansvarar för utlandsbaserad omvärldsbevakning vid kontor i , , , och . Ett kontor planeras att öppna i . Utlandskontoren ska samverka med andra svenska främjandeorganisationer på orten. Det över- gripande målet är att stärka den svenska konkurrenskraften och att skapa förutsättningar för fler jobb i fler och växande företag i alla delar av landet. TA arbetar med utvärderingar, analyser och statistik i ett brett svenskt och internationellt perspektiv. Arbetet vilar på vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet och TA:s kunskaps- underlag ska ligga till grund för politiska ställningstaganden i reger- ing och riksdag. Främjandet av som turistdestination hanteras främst av , som ägs till hälften av staten genom Närings- departementet och till hälften av , som i sin tur ägs av den svenska besöksnäringen. VisitSweden koncentrerar sitt arbete till 13 länder (, , , , , , , , , , , och ). VisitSweden har som övergripande mål att bidra till att har en hög attraktionskraft som turistland och har en långsiktigt konkurrenskraftig turistnäring, som bidrar till hållbar tillväxt och ökad sysselsättning i alla delar av landet. Anslaget från staten finansierar basverksamheten och uppdraget att marknadsföra varumärket . Besöksnäringen finansierar marknadsföringen för sina egna produkter. Utöver ovanstående aktörer kan även nämnas , Näringslivets Internationella Råd (NIR), , kommuner, regionförbund, landsting, länsstyrelser m.fl. The Capabilities Required to Manage Strategic Capital and Drive Policy Innovation in a Radically Changing World Prepared for the Inquiry The content of this paper represents solely the views of the author. It reflects neither the positions of the Swedish nor of the Inquiry. It is not based on an assessment of the planning functions of the Swedish , the U.S. or any other single organization. Its recommendations are based on work and conversations with many diplomats, diplomatic institutions and planning professionals over the last 7 years. Effective statecraft in the 21st century requires an unprecedented degree of strategic processing power. The global operating environment demands an enhanced ability to observe, interpret, prioritize and act on the massive global flow of interconnected events and information. This ability – or its absence – will determine significantly the adaptive capacity of the state in the period of historic change that we have entered. Given the intensity of the global competition for influence, developing this strategic processing power will be of particularly vital importance for medium and small states. They must compensate for their disadvantages in scale by asymmetric advantages in stra- tegic disciplines that effectively multiply power and influence: Anticipation: Anticipating events and acting early in the tem- poral sequence when leverage is greatest; Collaboration: Capturing, integrating and sharing diverse streams of knowledge and insight; Prioritization: Setting clear strategic priorities and making timely decisions accordingly; and, Alignment: Aligning all available sources of power, crisply and consistently following through on decisions, and learning from the results more rapidly than other actors. In most states, the institution that most clearly has the human capital, global presence and networks, and – of particular signifi- cance – the mandate to lead the development and coordination of this strategic capacity in support of the elected government is the (). While the military and intel- ligence communities also have critical responsibilities in these areas, they are limited by mandate and orientation to a focus on threats and the assessment of existing choices. The role of MFAs, on the other hand, is distinguished by its vital focus on strategic opportunities as well as threats and its responsibility for creatively and trans- parently generating foreign policy alternatives. That is, in most countries, MFAs represent the indispensable engine of innovation in foreign policy and grand strategy. The challenge, however, is that in terms of the strategic management capabilities required to play this role, many MFAs are still relying on an institutional nervous system that was designed to manage a very different global operating environment using what are now outdated tools and processes. As a result, notwithstanding the indispensable role of these national diplomatic institutions in securing the interests of their citizens in the future, their capacity to do so is unclear. In particular, in categories that represent negative corollaries to each of the strategic disciplines above, many existing MFA strategic planning processes feature the following weaknesses: Inability to Enable Anticipatory, Proactive Action and Invest- ment Systematically Lack of Systematic Preparedness for Potential Strategic Shocks Lack of Processes for Identifying and Managing Strategic and Operational Risk Inability to Capture, Integrate and Synthesize Organization-wide Knowledge Weak Institutional Capacity for Collaborative Planning and Innovation with Insufficiently Actionable Clarity of Strategic Intent Absence of Rigorous Decision Support Capabilities Inability to Prioritize Comprehensively and Lack of a Capabilities-Based Planning Capacity Lack of Standing Processes for Driving Whole-of-Government Strategic Alignment Weak Linkages Between Goals and Resources Inadequate Results-Based Performance Measurement and Accoun- tability Capacity in the Field Inconsistent Ability to Requests To the extent they apply, these weaknesses in the strategic manage- ment process significantly diminish the potential effectiveness of diplomatic institutions. In particular, they naturally lead to: An Event-Driven Orientation: A predominantly tactical and reactive rather than proactive approach to policy development and diplomatic action Unpreparedness: A need to reinvent the wheel at the begin- ning of each new, unanticipated crisis Lost Leverage and Opportunities: A tendency to focus on threats to the exclusion of opportunities and difficulty in accessing the knowledge of the entire organization and the distributed net- work of partners to identify all potential sources of leverage Confusion in the Field: Insufficiently precise strategic clarity empowerment and independent action Accelerating Obsolescence of Capabilities: A portfolio of insti- tutional instruments that often lags current best practice standards by several generations Weakened Impact: Challenges in concentrating effort and investment to achieve decisive, enduring results caused by an insufficient institutional ability to prioritize strategically and the absence of strong, inclusive processes for joint planning and col- laboration Chronic Underfunding and Understaffing: An insufficient ability to make persuasive cases for resources To address these common weaknesses and to create a truly trans- formative strategic capacity, this paper recommends investing in the following capabilities in 4 categories: Anticipation, Orientation and Preparedness: The purpose of the capabilities in this category is to maximize the extent to which the decisions of leadership are informed by awareness of the current and future and operating environment, the long-term interests of citizens in that environment, and critical potential contingencies and risks. Contingency Prioritization and Preparedness Planning Integrated Collective Intelligence: The purpose of the capabilities in this category is to harness the power of the collective knowledge, social capital and innovative capacity of the institution and its extended network in support of both policy design and execution. Collaborative Planning and Innovation Processes/Toolset Prioritized Direction Setting and Decision Support: The purpose of the capabilities in this category is to ensure that strategic priorities are set and necessary decisions made regarding long-term direction and immediate events on a timely basis and with the benefit of both the best possible insight and most powerful supporting instruments. Integrated Policy, Strategy and Resource Plan Development Decision, Analysis and Program Evaluation Support Alignment and Assessment of Action and Investment: The purpose of the capabilities in this category is to translate strategic intent and policy priorities into continuously improving performance and results throughout the organization using all available sources of leverage. Leadership-led Strategy, Performance, and Resource Reviews The Case for Investment The value of creating the portfolio of planning capabilities outlined above is a function of both the investment of organizational time and resources required to do so and the benefits that such a capa- bility will generate for the ministry and the state. In terms of bene- fits, these tools are intended to improve both the effectiveness and the efficiency of diplomacy by enabling superior anticipation, collective intelligence, clarity of intent, speed of decision-making, alignment of effort and rapid learning from results – all hallmarks of strategic excellence. While framed here from the perspective of MFAs, these benefits would accrue to the full spectrum of diplo- matic institutions including, for example, () which has the advantage of starting from a relatively clean institutional slate. In terms of costs, the investment required is not significant and can be made gradually over time. The first and most important step is to begin integrating the cur- rent policy, strategy and resource planning processes more closely. The primary new investments required are in the development of strategic management expertise, the design and implementation of new processes and the application of technology. All of these can be undertaken in ways that minimize cost and risk. They do not require a big bang approach. For example, the new areas of required expertise can be simultaneously developed internally and accessed via network arrangements with think-tanks and the academic community. Technology components can and in many cases should be outsourced to optimize the investment required to keep the capabilities current as the external technology environ- ment evolves. Perhaps the primary investment required is that of leadership involvement and political capital, which again will be the primary determinant of the success of the proposed transformation. This is balanced by the fact that the core benefits of the effort will accrue most to directly to the leadership of the ministry, strengthening their ability to achieve desired foreign policy out- comes on behalf of their fellow citizens – the ultimate beneficiaries. The Strategic Role of Diplomacy in 21st Century Statecraft The most appropriate institutional home for the portfolio of capa- bilities proposed here is certainly a worthy subject for debate and no doubt varies by country. In general, however, Ministries of Foreign Affairs are the institutions most responsible for making it possible for their elected governments to manage global uncertainty effectively and on a genuinely whole-of-society basis. This role cannot exclusively be the province of military or intelligence communities given the central requirements of main- taining collaborative transparency, generating innovative policy alternatives and considering strategic opportunities as well as threats. It is also not a role well-suited to ad hoc arrangements and the occasional think-tank white paper. can it, for the fore- seeable future, be entirely passed on to a transnational body. Specifically national interests will persist in the period of historic transition and great uncertainty that we have entered and still must be protected and advanced by national governments. Doing so in the 21st century will require intensely proactive statecraft oriented by the integration of future-driven analysis with the real-time, real- world insight and influence that only diplomats in the field can provide. To achieve tangible, enduring results, it also will require the ability to translate that anticipatory insight systematically into aligned investment, action and follow-through on the ground. Finally, it will require a newly innovative orientation. This must include an increased willingness to experiment and an enhanced ability to learn rapidly and continuously from successes and failures – and to refine efforts accordingly. The recommendations in this paper are intended to help make this level of institutional performance possible. Introduction: Strategic Humility and Its Imperatives the famously said, No plan survives contact with the enemy. This can be extended with equal accuracy to the encounter of strategic plans with the world. For this reason, traditional strategic planning and its focus on the production of planning documents is often dismissed as being of second order importance at best or complete irrelevance at worst. This critique is entirely valid – and increasingly irrelevant. Strategy is no longer about plans, if it ever were. At the best practice level in both public and private sector organizations today, strategy is a dynamic, distributed process that functions in effect as the nervous system of the organization – linking awareness and understanding to intention and action. It is the continuous process of assessing the emerging operating environment, defining objec- tives and pathways of innovative action through it, taking focused action accordingly, and adjusting the approach based on results and ongoing changes in the environment. Traditional strategic planning often featured both the hubris of believing that a most likely future can be known and a lazy willingness to leave bedrock assumptions unexamined. Next generation strategic management, on the other hand, is grounded in both humility and resource-sen- sitive practicality. It continually challenges its own assumptions and those prevailing in its domain, systematically expands and deepens its sphere of awareness, and rigorously prioritizes among multiple courses of action and investment. It encourages intelligent debate, orchestrates higher-order collective intelligence, and continuously drives innovation in all areas to maximize both readiness for the future and clarity of intent regarding its desired form. this type of next generation strategic management capability requires time, investment, expertise and – perhaps most of all – leadership. It particular, it requires an acknowledgment of the fact that strategy is a distinct, demanding professional dis- cipline. It is not an activity that can be performed proficiently without training and support. Nevertheless, its implementation does not require massive investment or a big bang process of organizational change. Its main components (with the possible exception of a core group of trained strategists and planners) are already in place in most global institutions – albeit on a fragmented basis. Given this, the widespread absence of effective strategic management across many types of organizations is usually a func- tion of one of three factors: (1) sheer bureaucratic dysfunction and structural weakness; (2) unfamiliarity with the current disciplines of strategic management and their benefits; or, (3) a leadership that believes that it is capable of designing and managing strategy and sustaining continuous improvement in performance without a systematic means of doing so that leverages the entire organization. In diplomatic institutions, this last issue often predominates. better or worse, the days when even the most brilliant leaders can be effective in developing and executing strategy without strong sup- porting systems and processes are long over. The complexity and competitive intensity of the global operating environment are now simply too great and evolving too quickly. Thus, the imperative for diplomatic organizations is to institutionalize attributes that have long distinguished great diplomats – deep understanding, foresight, prioritization, execution and follow-through. This paper outlines a portfolio of institutional capabilities for doing precisely that. I.Context: of Radical Change The world that is rising is still half buried beneath the debris of the world that has fallen, and amid the immense confusion of human affairs, no one can say what will remain of old institutions and mores and what will eventually disappear. It may be an intrinsic aspect of human nature to think that the times in which one is living are the most complex and challenging ever witnessed. Only historians seem immune to this perception. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that the world has entered a period of uncertainty and accelerating change that, if not unique, is certainly extreme in both magnitude and complexity. In particular, the world is in the midst of at least five historic transitions:1 The shifting balance and changing nature of geopolitical and eco- nomic power, including the rise of state capitalism The radical democratization of both knowledge and the instru- ments of global communication The accelerating and pervasive explosion of scientific, engineer- ing and technological advance An unprecedented demographic and social transformation and the proliferation of fragile states A growing disequilibrium between economic competition, resource availability and environmental security 1 These transitions (and the trends of which they consist) are not the focus of this paper and are therefore presented only at the very highest level here.