rir · GZB59 · 2011-02-24 09:00:00 — ökade kreditförluster eller åtminstone att kreditförlusterna skulle ha uppstått snabbare och blivit sammanpressade till en kortare period.45 Till yttermera visso skulle en lettisk devalvering ha medfört ett tryck på de andra två baltiska länderna att devalvera, med ytterligare negativa konsekvenser för svenska banker som följd. Argumentet har avvisats av bland annat finansministern som hävdar att den svenska avsikten med lånet enkom var att stödja 43Carl B , Är baltkrisen deras fel? 44Finansutskottet (2009/10 FiU:20). 45Se t.ex. (2010). Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet i dess strävanden att hantera krisen.46 har finansministern hävdat att och sannolikt skulle gått över styr om tvingats devalvera.47 Den baltiska utvecklingen visar att det kan uppstå ett läge där en svensk bank inte skulle behöva statligt stöd för sin fortlevnad men där en stängning eller neddragning av verksamheten skulle få påtagliga och i extremfallet kanske avgörande ekonomiska effekter på ett lands utveckling, om banken har en dominerande roll i landet ifråga. Utvecklingen reser frågan om staten bör ha en åsikt om bankers utlandsetableringar som medför att de får en ledande position i ett annat land. står det banker fritt att expandera utomlands så länge de uppfyller bestämmelserna i lagen (2004:297) om bank- och finansieringsrörelse. Innebörden av 7 kap. 12 § i lagen är att ett kreditinstitut måste söka tillstånd hos om det avser att förvärva en egendom, till exempel en utländsk bank, för av sin kapitalbas. Regleringen på detta område syftar till att säkerställa att bankerna har tillräckligt med eget kapital. Lagstiftaren har emellertid inte haft några synpunkter på det faktum att staten riskerar att få ett implicit ansvar för ett annat lands utveckling ifall den svenska banken hamnar i ekonomiska svårigheter och därigenom indirekt kan tvinga staten att agera på ett eller annat sätt. Det isländska exemplet kan illustrera vad som kan inträffa när staten inte har några synpunkter på bankernas expansion utomlands och deras storlek. De isländska bankerna expanderade kraftigt utomlands. På bara steg deras tillgångar från att ha varit dubbelt så stora som den isländska bruttonationalprodukten till att bli tio gånger så stora. så stor relativt landets ekonomi blir den svår att hantera och statens implicita garanti väldigt omfattande. I det isländska fallet sattes hela landets ekonomi på spel utan några åtgärder från myndigheterna.48 Men i slutändan tvingades den isländska staten träda in när bankerna inte kunde finansiera sin verksamhet längre. Priset för krisen blev extremt högt för den isländska befolkningen. Före krisen låg statsskulden, mätt som andel av BNP, på . Den andelen väntas enligt den isländska nå under 2010.49 Befolkningen har inte bara drabbats av statens åtgärder för att sanera statsbudgeten utan även av kraftigt stigande arbetslöshet, fallande tillgångspriser och stigande inflation. 48The Althingi Special Investigation Commisson (2010). 49Statsskulden har förvisso stigit i alla , men den genomsnittliga uppgången är betydligt mer begränsad, från före krisen till 2010. Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet Hushållens reala disponibla inkomster sjönk med och 2010. kan kontrollera en svensk banks förvärv av en utländsk bank om köpeskillingen överstiger av kapitalbasen. Flera mindre köp kräver emellertid inte tillstånd. Vidare har bara rätt att basera sina undersökningar och beslut på det enskilda objektet, inte på hur stor den sammanlagda risken för banksystemet blir. Den svenska staten har därför inga verktyg för att hindra banksektorn, och därigenom statens implicita garanti, från att bli oproportionerligt stor. Staten har emellertid i spåren av den finansiella krisen skapat en stabilitetsfond (Lag [2008:814] om statligt stöd till kreditinstitut). Stabilitetsfonden ska finansiera statens åtgärder för att stödja det finansiella systemet. Genom att banker och andra kreditinstitut finansierar fonden via avgifter skapas enligt lagstiftaren ett långsiktigt hållbart finansieringssystem som ligger utanför statsbudgeten.50 Avsikten är att fonden ska växa tills dess den uppgår till av BNP. Det är dock en nivå som inte är i närheten av att kunna finansiera bankfallissemang av den storleksordning som inträffade på . Fonden kan heller inte hindra att banksystemet skapar betydande implicita risker för staten,51 bara att banksystemet självt får svara för (en del av) de kostnader staten tvingas ikläda sig för att stödja institutens överlevnad. De övriga samhällsekonomiska kostnader som instabilitet i det finansiella systemet drar på sig i termer av ekonomisk nedgång, företagskonkurser och ökad arbetslöshet med mera ligger helt utanför stabilitetsfondens område. Regeringen bör utreda om riskerna i banksektorn och den därmed sammanhängande implicita statliga garantin kan begränsas. Regeringen bör se till att den löpande medvetengörs om vilka risker, utöver de risker som handlar om bankernas kapitalsituation och som löpande övervakar, som bankers verksamheter i andra länder kan medföra Det är tveksamt om dessa risker kan reduceras utan att det läggs restriktioner på bankernas möjligheter att expandera utomlands. Men redan kännedom om riskerna bör leda till att staten skapar en beredskap för att möta dem. 50Stabilitetsfondens namn antyder att medel fonderas. Så är emellertid inte fallet. Bankernas avgifter fonderas inte utan istället medför de att statens upplåningsbehov minskar. Det finns således inga avsatta medel om och när det behövs insatser för att stödja ett kreditinstitut. Staten får istället låna upp medel för att finansiera eventuella stödinsatser. 51För en översyn av statliga risker och garantier se (2009). Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet Lagar, riksdagstryck och propositioner Betänkande 2009/10:FiU20, Riktlinjer för den ekonomiska politiken bilaga 12 framställning till om vissa utredningsbehov med anledning av finanskrisen (2009/10:RB4) Proposition 2002/03:139 Reformerade regler för bank- och finansieringsrörelse Förordning (2009:93) med instruktion för Kommittédirektiv (Dir. 2011:6) Översyn av regelverket för hantering av finansiella kriser Lag (1988:135) om Riksbank Lag (2004:97) om bank- och försäkringsrörelse Lag (2006:1371) om kapitaltäckning och stora exponeringar Lag (2008:814) om statligt stöd till kreditinstitut Agnello, L. och L Schuknecht, Booms and Busts in the Housing Markets Determinants and Implications, ECB working paper No 1071, 2009 The Althingi Special Investigation Commisson (2010) Baker, B och A-M , (2010), The in the EU New Member States: Bad or Bad Policies?, IMF Working Paper 10/130 Borio, C och P , (2002), Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus, BIS Working Paper No 114 (2010), En bostadsbubbla kostar Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet Estonian Financial Supervision Authority Yearbook, (2002) , K-M and N-B Vonnák, (2006), in Central and Eastern Europe: Convergence or Boom?, MNB Working paper 2006/10 Global Property Guide, /Europe//Price-History , Finanssektorns stabilitet 20042008 , B, (2010), Fritt fall, Spelet om , Ekerlids förlag. , T och L , (2005), 1990-talskrisen Hur svår var den?, Ekonomisk debatt 2005:8 , C B, (2009), Är baltkrisen deras fel?, DI debatt IMF, (2006), Country report No. Ingves, S, (2010), Krisen i åtgärder, bedömningar och lärdomar. , Penningpolitiska protokoll 2010 , (2009), Statens garantier i finanskrisen, RiR 2009:26 Statskontoret, (2009), verksamhet och resurser , W, (2006), Is price stability enough?, BIS Working Papers No 205 Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet for Supervision (The ) Foreword to the review 1.This document is the revised version of the for Supervision, which (the Committee) originally published in . Along with the , the have been used by countries as a benchmark for assessing the quality of their supervisory systems and for identifying future work to be done to achieve a baseline level of sound supervisory practices. Experience has shown that selfassessments of countries compliance with the have proven helpful for the authorities, in particular in identifying regulatory and supervisory shortcomings and setting priorities for addressing them. The revision of the provides an additional reason for countries to conduct such self-assessments. The have also been used by the IMF and the in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Program to assess countries banking supervision systems and practices. Since 1997, however, significant changes have occurred in banking regulation, much experience has been gained with implementing the in individual countries, and new regulatory issues, insights and gaps in regulation have become apparent, often resulting in new Committee publications. These developments have made it necessary to update the and the associated assessment Methodology. 2.In conducting this review of the and their Methodology, the Committee was motivated by a to ensure continuity and comparability with the 1997 framework. The 1997 framework has functioned well and is seen to have withstood the test of time. Thus the intention was not to radically rewrite the but rather to focus on those areas where adjustments to the existing framework were required to ensure their continued relevance. The review does not in any Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet way call into question the validity of previous work already conducted, not least country assessments and reform agendas based on the 1997 framework. 3.Another aim of the review was to enhance where possible consistency between the and the corresponding standards for securities and insurance as well as for anti-money laundering and transparency. Sectoral core principles, however, are designed to focus on key risk areas and supervisory priorities, which differ from sector to sector, and legitimate differences have to remain. 4.To conduct this review, the Committee acted in close consultation with, and built on the work of, the , a working group that regularly brings together senior representatives from Committee member countries, non-G10 supervisory authorities, the IMF and the . The Committee consulted other international standard-setting bodies the IAIS, IOSCO, the FATF and the CPSS during the preparation of drafts. Regional groups of supervisors were invited to comment. 5.The are a framework of minimum standards for sound supervisory practices and are considered universally applicable.4 drew up the and the Methodology as its contribution to strengthening the global financial system. Weaknesses in the banking system of a country, whether developing or developed, can threaten financial stability both within that country and internationally. believes that implementation of the by all countries would be a significant step towards improving financial stability domestically and internationally and provide a good basis for further development of effective supervisory systems. 6.The define 25 principles that are needed for a supervisory system to be effective. Those principles are broadly categorised into seven groups: Objectives, independence, powers, transparency and cooperation (principle 1); Licensing and structure (principles 2 to 5); regulation and requirements (principles 6 to 18); Methods of ongoing banking supervision (principles 19 to 21); Accounting and disclosure (principle 22); Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors (principle 23); Consolidated and cross-border banking supervision (principles 24 and 25). The principles are: Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet Principle 1 Objectives, independence, powers, transparency and cooperation: An effective system of banking supervision will have clear responsibilities and objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks. Each such authority should possess operational independence, transparent processes, sound governance and adequate resources, and be accountable for the discharge of its duties. A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary, including provisions relating to authorisation of banking and their ongoing supervision; powers to address compliance with laws as well as safety and soundness concerns; and legal protection for supervisors. Arrangements for sharing information between supervisors and protecting the confidentiality of such information should be in place. Principle 2 Permissible activities: The permissible activities of institutions that are licensed and subject to supervision as banks must be clearly defined and the use of the word bank in names should be controlled as far as possible. Principle 3 Licensing criteria: The licensing authority must have the power to set criteria and reject applications for that do not meet the standards set. The licensing process, at a minimum, should consist of an assessment of the ownership structure and governance of the bank and its wider group, including the fitness and propriety of Board members and senior management, its strategic and operating plan, internal controls and risk management, and its projected financial condition, including its capital base. Where the proposed owner or parent organisation is a foreign bank, the prior consent of its home country supervisor should be obtained. Principle 4 Transfer of significant ownership: The supervisor has the power to review and reject any proposals to transfer significant ownership or controlling interests held directly or indirectly in existing banks to other parties. Principle 5 Major acquisitions: The supervisor has the power to review major acquisitions or investments by a bank, against prescribed criteria, including the of cross-border operations, and confirming that corporate affiliations or structures do not expose the bank to undue risks or hinder effective supervision. Principle 6 Capital adequacy: Supervisors must set and appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements for banks that reflect the risks that the bank undertakes, and must define the components of capital, bearing in mind its ability to absorb losses. At least for internationally banks, these requirements must not be less than those established in the applicable requirement. Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet Principle 7 Risk management process: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks and banking groups have in place a comprehensive risk management process (including Board and senior management oversight) to identify, evaluate, monitor and control or mitigate all material risks and to assess their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile. These processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the institution. Principle 8 Credit risk: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a credit risk management process that takes into account the risk profile of the institution, with policies and processes to identify, measure, monitor and control credit risk (including counterparty risk). This would include the granting of loans and making of investments, the evaluation of the quality of such loans and investments, and the ongoing management of the loan and investment portfolios. Principle 9 Problem assets, provisions and reserves: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks establish and adhere to adequate policies and processes for managing problem assets and evaluating the adequacy of provisions and reserves. Principle 10 Large exposure limits: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have policies and processes that enable management to identify and manage concentrations within the portfolio, and supervisors must set limits to restrict bank exposures to single counterparties or groups of connected counterparties. Principle 11 Exposures to related parties: In order to prevent abuses arising from exposures (both on balance sheet and off balance sheet) to related parties and to address conflict of interest, supervisors must have in place requirements that banks extend exposures to related companies and individuals on an arms length basis; these exposures are effectively monitored; appropriate steps are taken to control or mitigate the risks; and write-offs of such exposures are made according to standard policies and processes. Principle 12 Country and transfer risks: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies and processes for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling country risk and transfer risk in their international lending and investment activities, and for maintaining adequate provisions and reserves against such risks. Principle 13 Market risks: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place policies and processes that accurately identify, measure, monitor and control market risks; supervisors should have powers to impose specific limits and/or a specific capital charge on market risk exposures, if warranted. Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet Principle 14 Liquidity risk: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a liquidity management strategy that takes into account the risk profile of the institution, with policies and processes to identify, measure, monitor and control liquidity risk, and to manage liquidity on a day-to-day basis. Supervisors require banks to have contingency plans for handling liquidity problems. Principle 15 Operational risk: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place risk management policies and processes to identify, assess, monitor and control/mitigate operational risk. These policies and processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the bank. Principle 16 Interest rate risk in the banking book: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have effective systems in place to identify, measure, monitor and control interest rate risk in the banking book, including a well defined strategy that has been approved by the Board and implemented by senior management; these should be appropriate to the size and complexity of such risk. Principle 17 Internal control and audit: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place internal controls that are adequate for the size and complexity of their business. These should include clear arrangements for delegating authority and responsibility; separation of the functions that involve committing the bank, paying away its funds, and accounting for its assets and liabilities; reconciliation of these processes; safeguarding the banks assets; and appropriate independent internal audit and compliance functions to test adherence to these controls as well as applicable laws and regulations. Principle 18 Abuse of financial services: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies and processes in place, including strict know- your-customer rules, that promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities. Principle 19 Supervisory approach: An effective banking supervisory system requires that supervisors develop and maintain a thorough understanding of the operations of individual banks and banking groups, and also of the banking system as a whole, focusing on safety and soundness, and the stability of the banking system. Principle 20 Supervisory techniques: An effective banking supervisory system should consist of on-site and off-site supervision and regular contacts with bank management. Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet Principle 21 Supervisory reporting: Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analysing reports and statistical returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and a means of independent verification of these reports, through either on-site examinations or use of external experts. Principle 22 Accounting and disclosure: Supervisors must be satisfied that each bank maintains adequate records drawn up in accordance with accounting policies and practices that are widely accepted internationally, and publishes, on a regular basis, information that fairly reflects its financial condition and profitability. Principle 23 Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors: Supervisors must have at their disposal an adequate range of supervisory tools to bring about timely corrective actions. This includes the ability, where appropriate, to revoke the banking licence or to recommend its revocation. Principle 24 Consolidated supervision: An essential element of banking supervision is that supervisors supervise the banking group on a consolidated basis, adequately monitoring and, as appropriate, applying norms to all aspects of the business conducted by the group worldwide. Principle 25 Home-host relationships: Cross-border consolidated supervision requires cooperation and information exchange between home supervisors and the various other supervisors involved, primarily host banking supervisors. Banking supervisors must require the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same standards as those required of domestic institutions. 7.The are neutral with regard to different approaches to supervision, so long as the overriding goals are achieved. The Principles are not designed to cover all the needs and circumstances of every banking system. Instead, specific country circumstances should be more appropriately considered in the context of the assessments and in the dialogue between assessors and country authorities. 8.National authorities should apply the Principles in the supervision of all banking organisations within their jurisdictions. Individual countries, in particular those with advanced markets and institutions, may expand upon the Principles in order to achieve best supervisory practice. 9.A high degree of compliance with the Principles should overall financial system stability; however, this will not guarantee it, nor will it prevent the failure of individual banks. Banking supervision cannot, and should not, provide an that banks will not fail. In a market economy, failures are part of risk-taking. Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet 10.The Committee stands ready to encourage work at the national level to implement the Principles in conjunction with other supervisory bodies and interested parties. financial institutions and donor agencies to use the Principles in assisting individual countries to strengthen their supervisory arrangements. will continue to collaborate closely with the IMF and the in their monitoring of the implementation of the Committees standards. is also committed to further enhancing its interaction with supervisors from non-G10 countries. Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet Intervjuade personer och institutioner generaldirektör under de relevanta åren, , har erbjudits, men inte ställt upp på, intervju. Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet Myndigheternas insatser för finansiell stabilitet Alla tidigare utgivna rapporter finns tillgängliga på Styrning inom arbetsmarknadspolitiken mål, styrkort och Från många till en sammanslagningar av myndigheter Klassificering av kurser vid universitet och högskolor regeringens styrning och uppföljning Arbetsförmedlingens arbete med arbetsgivarkontakter Inställda huvudförhandlingar i brottmål Hanteringen av mängdbrott en kärnuppgift för polis och åklagare Säkerheten i statens betalningar Tillämpningen av det finanspolitiska ramverket. i tider av kraftiga värdeförändringar. En granskning av åtta statligt bildade stiftelser och regeringen Informationsutbyte mellan myndigheter med ansvar för trygghetssystem har möjligheter till effektivisering utnyttjats? Den nordiska stridsgruppen 2008 - en del av EU:s Statliga stöd i alkoholpolitiken Påverkas ungas alkoholkonsumtion? Underhållsstödet för barnens bästa? Polisens brottsförebyggande arbete har ambitionerna uppnåtts?