sou · GXB341 · 2009-05-04 00:00:00 — Investerarskyddet berörs inte av ändringarna i insättningsgarantidirektivet och några förändringar avseende utbetalningstid och ersättningsrättens inträde föreslås inte av utredningen. Konkursförvaltaren ges en tydlig skyldighet att lämna uppgifter till garantimyndigheten, på motsvarande sätt som föreslås i insättningsgarantilagen. Utredningen har funnit att det för investerarskyddad verksamhet föreligger annorlunda förutsättningar och komplicerade transaktionsformer. Eftersom utredningsuppdraget för investerarskyddet endast omfattat en bedömning av vilka av de förändringar som görs för insättningsgarantins del som också bör göras för investerarskyddet har utredningen ansett att en djupare analys i denna del inte varit en uppgift för utredningen. Utredningens förslag bedöms inte påverka kostnaderna eller intäkterna för staten, kommuner, landsting, eller privatpersoner. ökade resursbehov vid prövning av konton kommer att finansieras av ansökningsavgifterna. Dessa avgifter får anses vara en i det närmaste försumbar kostnad för instituten. Utredningens förslag förväntas kunna spara kostnader. För det första kan det förväntas att ett tillförlitligt insättningsgarantisystem bidrar till den finansiella stabiliteten. Om ersättningsfall väl inträffar kommer förslagen att kunna bidra till en snabbare och resurseffektivare hantering av fallen. Snabbheten i hanteringen är i sin tur värdefull för insättarnas privatekonomiska situation, vilket är positivt såväl för konsumenter och andra insättare som för den finansiella stabiliteten. Insättare kommer att få bättre tillgång till tillförlitlig information om garantins omfattning. Det blir också lättare och billigare för instituten och garantimyndigheten att lämna information. De förslag som presenteras förväntas inte ge några betydande internationella konkurrensnackdelar för kreditinstitut eller andra berörda finansiella företag. De företag vars verksamhet omfattas av de regelverk som utredningen föreslår förändringar i kommer att få vissa ökade kostnader. Enligt insättningsgaranti- och investerar- skyddsdirektivens krav ska verksamheterna själva bära kostnaderna för systemen. Det är utredningens bedömning att de krav som föreslås i huvudsak redan uppfylls av de flesta institut som bedriver en seriös verksamhet De nya kraven på institutens system för hantering av uppgifter om insättare och investerare, och framför allt kraven på verifiering av systemens ändamålsenlighet, kan däremot medföra inte obetydliga kostnader, enligt Svenska Bankföreningens beräkning belopp mellan och , beroende på institutets storlek. Förslagen som berör ändringar i regler om tillsynsregler och andra rörelseregler föreslås träda i kraft . Förslagen om ändringar i insättningsgarantilagen och investerarskyddslagen föreslås träda i kraft , med ett undantag som berör föreskriftsrätten avseende förhandsprövning av konto. Det är utredningens bedömning att övergångsbestämmelser endast behövs avseende straffavgifternas bestämmande för sådana överträdelser som inträffat helt eller delvis innan lagens ikraftträdande. The Commissions remit has been to review the measures that need to be taken to further improve the efficiency of the regulatory framework for and supervision of institutions that accept deposits that are covered by the deposit guarantee scheme with the aim of improving consumer protection and stability within the financial system. The deposit guarantee protects deposits at banks, securities institutions and credit market companies. Investor protection provides protection for loss of an investors financial instruments and funds at a securities institution, a fund company or a management company. The regulatory frameworks were introduced in 1996 and 1999 respectively with the intention of complying with the requirements ensuing from EC directives. The Commissions remit been formulated in particular in the light of what is known as the Custodia case. In January 2006, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority () decided to revoke the licence of the credit institution . This decision was, however, inhibited by the county administrative court and could not therefore be implemented before . On 28 the same year, Custodia was declared bankrupt, whereupon the deposit guarantee came into effect. to the uncertainty about the information the institution provided about its depositors and their assets, there was a delay until February 2007 before practically all depositors had received payouts from the deposit guarantee. to the Custodia case, the main task of the Commission has been to review how the regulatory framework could be changed to provide investors with swifter access to their funds in the event of a credit institution encountering difficulties. In the course of the Commissions work, this part of its tasks has been affected by the international financial crisis that broke out during the autumn of 2008. In October 2008, Commission presented a proposal for an amendment of Directive 94/19/EC, known as the deposit guarantee directive. These amendments were adopted in 2009 and the remit of the Commission was expanded through supplementary terms of reference to also propose the necessary amendments to implement certain of the amendments to the directive. In particular, these amendments entailed more stringent requirements for rapidity in the EU Member States deposit guarantee schemes, both as regards the coming into effect of the guarantee and the actual payout process. The expansion of the remit of the Commission also included issues relating to the extent of the deposit guarantee. The Commission was therefore also instructed to analyse whether the Swedish deposit guarantee should include bank money orders and deposits within the framework of individual pension savings, IPS. The Commissions remit also included examining how the Swedish deposit guarantee scheme could be reviewed to better meet the goals of good consumer protection and financial stability. One key area has been to analyse how powers of supervision and intervention should be designed in order to be effective with regard to institutions that accept deposits. Furthermore, the Commission has had the task of analysing the prerequisites and powers that the guarantee authority needs for efficient administration of the deposit guarantee. One important issue in this context has been to analyse whether the guarantee authority can be given powers to provide authoritative information to depositors on which deposits are covered by the guarantee, which is not the case in the current regulatory framework. The remit has also included analysing the extent to which the changes proposed concerning the deposit guarantee should also cover investor protection. The Commission considers that essentially has adequate legal powers for its task as a supervisory authority. The Commission is, however, proposing changes in certain respects. Licence and operating requirements As regards licence requirements to engage in banking or financing business, the Commission does not consider that a special licence should be introduced in order to accept deposits, since the need cannot be considered to be sufficiently strong to justify such an extensive change of the systematic approach in the Banking and Financing Business Act (2004:297). The Commission is not either proposing any tightening up of the requirements for assessment of suitability of the persons who are to serve on the management of a credit institution. The group subject to assessment shall continue to be limited to the board and the managing director, since an expansion of this group would entail problems of definition as well as leading to lack of clarity as regards the liability of the top management for the business. The Commission is proposing special requirements for reliability, security and rapidity of the systems that process information about depositors and investors and their deposits and investments in such companies and institutions that accept deposits. These requirements are to be introduced in the form of operating rules which shall consequently always be complied with. With regard to the supervision of credit institutions, the Commission proposes that be given the right, as an additional supervisory tool, to appoint special inspectors who shall be able to inspect the institution in some particular respect. However, the Commission is not recommending any tightening of the obligation to report of auditors, since the practice that has developed in this area over time may be considered as being satisfactory. The calculation model for penalty fees for credit institutions is to be changed. To create a clearer proportionality between the size of penalty fees and the institutions financial strength, the amount of the penalty fee is to be set in relation to a percentage of the institutions average turnover during the past three financial years, up to a maximum of three per cent. A nominal ceiling is to be retained but raised to million to enable penalty fees to be a more tangible sanction for larger institutions as well. The Commission is recommending some changes of powers to intervene in the management of credit institutions. is to have the right to appoint replacements for a board member or the managing director if such a position is vacant. This rule is to be introduced for all undertakings subject to supervision by . Furthermore, changes are proposed with a view to securing the right of postholders appointed by to remuneration for their appointment in the event of the bankruptcy of the company, as this may be an important factor for enabling to obtain suitable postholders. Remuneration to an appointed managing director shall not be covered by the limitation rule of four basic amounts that applies for the state wage guarantee. As regards payment to a board member appointed by , the Commission recommends that a general priority right be introduced. obligation to appoint a public attorney in the event of the bankruptcy of a credit institution is to be replaced by a right to do the same. Winding up of the credit institutions after revocation of licence Under current law, a banking limited company shall be wound up if its licence is revoked. Credit market companies in the same situation shall, however, wind up the business themselves, which has proven to be associated with certain risks and problems. The Commission considers that this difference is unjustified and that credit market companies should, as a main rule, also be subject to compulsory liquidation with a view to achieving the prerequisites for an orderly winding up. However, there shall be a possibility of exceptions from the obligation to liquidate for credit institutions, if the company wishes to continue the activity in another form. It shall be possible to consent to exceptions of this kind if Finansinspektionen considers that the activity for which the licence has been revoked can be wound up without detriment to depositors, other creditors and the public. Unlike the case today, this activity could be not subject to licence. The coming into effect of the right to compensation According to the current regulatory framework, the deposit guarantee comes into effect in the event of bankruptcy. With a solution of this kind, there is a risk, as in the Custodia case, that depositors will have to wait for a long time before obtaining access to their funds, reckoning from the time that problems are revealed in an institution that accepts deposits. In the view of the Commission, changes in the regulatory framework are required for the Swedish deposit guarantee system to comply with the requirements ensuing from the deposit guarantee directive in its wording after the amendments adopted on 11 2009. The right to payment shall – as well as in the event of bankruptcy – also be able to come into effect when an institution shows indications of problems in paying a deposit to a depositor if the assessment is made that the problems are other than temporary. In accordance with the systematic approach in the deposit guarantee directive, decisions on the coming into effect of the guarantee in a situation of this kind shall be made within five working days, after which the guarantee authority has twenty working days to administer guarantee payouts to all depositors entitled to payment. This decision is to be made by . The institution shall be able to apply for review of decision at of decisions on support to credit institutions. The task and powers of the guarantee authority In order for the guarantee authority – unlike the case at present – to be able to provide authoritative information to depositors in advance on which deposits are covered by the deposit guarantee, mandatory consideration shall be introduced of all kinds of accounts used by an institution to accept deposits. It is recommended that the institutions obligation to inform depositors on whether the deposit guarantee applies for deposits in the account or not should be retained. The content of the information which can be provided will be more reliable since it will be associated in this way with an advance ruling. To enable the guarantee authority to implement the payout process, in the event of payment, within the twenty working days now stipulated by the deposit guarantee directive, the authority must have access at an early stage to reliable information about depositors and their deposits. The proposed quality requirements for the institutions IT system for information about depositors and their deposits will be part of the resources that create the prerequisites for a swifter and simpler payout process. The Commission proposes that the guarantee authority be given clearer powers to obtain information that the authority needs for its work. This is to include the introduction of a right for the guarantee authority to carry out investigations at the institution. Special questions relating to the extent of the guarantee In the Custodia case, uncertainty arose as to whether deposits made after decision to revoke the licence but before the decision had obtained legal force were to be considered as being covered by the deposit guarantee. In order to remove this lack of clarity, the Commission proposes that a rule be introduced to the effect that deposits shall be covered by the deposit guarantee if they were made during the period when the institution in question had a licence. In other words, the time at which the revocation decision is enforceable will be crucial. Furthermore, the Commission has found that bank money orders are not covered by the Deposit Guarantee Acts definition of the term deposit and are therefore not protected by the deposit guarantee. The Commission is not proposing any change of the definition of deposit for this reason. The Commission considers that deposited funds in individual pensions saving should be protected. This protection should be achieved by the claim on deposited funds be covered by general right of priority in a bankruptcy. The importance of the recommendations for investor protection Compensation from the investor protection scheme comes into question only after the declaration of bankruptcy when it has been established that an investors financial instruments or funds held by the company with the duty to render account cannot be returned to the investor. Investor protection is not affected by the amendments to the deposit guarantee directive and the Commission is not proposing any changes concerning payout time and the coming into effect of the right to payment. The bankruptcy administrator is given a clear obligation to provide information to the guarantee authority, in the corresponding way as proposed in the Deposit Guarantee Act. The Commission has found that there are other prerequisites and complicated forms of transactions for investor-protected activity. Since the remit of the Commission for investor protection only covered an assessment of which of the changes made for the deposit guarantee should also be made for investor protection, the Commission considered that an in-depth analysis in this area was not included in the Commissions remit. Consequences of the proposals The Commissions proposals are not considered to affect expenditure or revenue central government, municipalities, county councils or private individuals. The increased need for resources of the guarantee authority when considering accounts will be financed by the application fees. These fees may be regarded as an almost negligible expense for the institutions. The Commissions proposals are expected at the same time to able to cut costs. In the first place, it can be expected that a reliable deposit guarantee system will contribute to financial stability. If payment cases do occur, the proposals will be able to contribute to a swifter and more efficient use of resources when processing cases. The rapidity of processing is in turn valuable for the depositors private finances, which is positive both for consumers and other depositors and for financial stability. Depositors will have better access to reliable information on the extent of the guarantee. It will also be easier and cheaper for institutions and the guarantee authority to provide information. The proposals presented are not expected to give any significant international competitive disadvantages for credit institutions or other financial companies involved. The companies whose activities are covered by the regulatory frameworks for which amendments are proposed by the Commission will incur certain additional expenses. According to the requirements of the deposit guarantee and investor protection directives, the activities shall themselves bear the cost of the schemes. The Commission considers that the requirements proposed are mainly already met by most institutions engaged in serious activity. The new requirements on the institutions systems for processing information about depositors and investors, and, in particular, the requirements for verification of the systems fitness for their purpose, may, however, entail not insignificant costs, estimated by the at between and per year depending on the size of the institution. Provisions on taking effect and transitional provisions The proposals relating to changes in the rules on supervisory rules and other operating rules are proposed to take effect on 1 2010. It is proposed that the recommended amendments to the Deposit Guarantee Act and the Investor Protection Act come into effect on 1 January 2011 with an exception concerning the right to issue regulations relating to advance consideration of accounts. The Commission considers that transitional regulations are only needed for the determination of penalty fees for those breaches that occurred partly or prior to the coming into effect of the legislation. 1Förslag till lag om ändring i förmånsrättslagen (1970:979) Härigenom föreskrivs i fråga om förmånsrättslagen (1970:979) dels att 10 § ska ha följande lydelse, dels att det i lagen införs en ny paragraf, 11 §, av följande lydelse. Allmän förmånsrätt följer med 1. den kostnad som borgenär 1. den kostnad som borgenär haft för försättande av gäldenären haft för försättande av gäldenären i konkurs och för beslut att ett i konkurs och för beslut att ett dödsbos egendom skall avträdas dödsbos egendom ska avträdas till förvaltning av boutrednings- till förvaltning av boutrednings- man samt begravnings- och man samt begravnings- och gäldenären avlidit före kon- gäldenären avlidit före kon- 2. arvode och kostnads- 2. arvode och kostnads- man enligt nämnda lag eller man enligt nämnda lag eller (1987:762), förordnad boutredningsman, om fordringen avser tid inom sex styrelseledamot som förordnats av ningen gjordes eller därefter, lagen (2004:46) om investerings- 1 Senaste lydelse 1996:769. fonder, lagen (2004:297) om bank- och finansieringsrörelse, lagen (2007:528) om värde- pappersmarknaden eller försäk- ringsrörelselagen (1982:713), om fordringen avser tid innan konkursansök- ningen gjordes eller därefter, 3.kostnad för särskilda åtgärder som som nämnts under 2 vidtagits med rekonstruktörens eller tillsynsmannens godkännande eller av boutredningsmannen och uppenbart varit till borgenärernas bästa, 4.andra fordringar som grundar sig på avtal som gäldenären med rekonstruktörens samtycke träffat under en företagsrekon- struktion enligt lagen om företagsrekonstruktion. Förmånsrätt enligt första stycket 1–3 gäller endast i den mån beloppet med hänsyn till omständigheterna är skäligt. Förmånsrätt följer med en fordran mot ett pensionsspar- institut avseende sådana medel som placerats som inlåning enligt 2 kap. 1 § lagen (1993:931) om individuellt pensionssparande. Denna lag träder i kraft . 2 11 § upphävd genom 2008:988. 2Förslag till lag om ändring i lagen (1972:262) om understödsföreningar Härigenom föreskrivs i fråga om lagen (1972:262) om under- stödsföreningar att 69 § ska ha följande lydelse. förordna revisor att jämte övriga att förordna en eller flera revisorer för viss understöds- valtning och föreningens räken- Inspektionen kan när som helst återkalla uppdraget. att förordna en eller flera sär- skilda granskare med uppgift att granska föreningen i ett visst som helst återkalla ett sådant förordnande och utse en ny revi- sor eller en ny särskild granskare. granskaren har rätt att få skäligt de föreskrifter, som arvode av föreningen för sitt skall betalas av föreningen med belopp som inspektionen bestäm- 3 Senaste lydelse 1992:1624. ska utfärda en instruktion för en revisor eller en särskild granskare som förord- nats av inspektionen. En revisor eller särskild granskare som förord- nats av ska oavsett stämmans anvisningar följa den instruktion som inspektionen har utfärdat. Denna lag träder i kraft . 3Förslag till lag om ändring i försäkringsrörelselagen (1982:713) Härigenom föreskrivs i fråga om försäkringsrörelselagen (1982:713) dels att 19 kap. 11 d–h §§ betecknas 19 kap. 11 e–i §§, dels att 10 kap. 2 och 9 §§, 19 kap. 1 och 11 c §§ och den nya 11 f § ska ha följande lydelse, dels att det i lagen införs en ny paragraf, 19 kap. 11 d §, av föl- jande lydelse. förordna en eller flera revisorer i att förordna en eller flera varje försäkringsbolag, om övriga revisorer delta i revisionen av ett försäkringsbolag. av andra skäl anser det obehöv- inspektionen har även rätt att förordna en eller flera särskilda granskare med uppgift att granska bolaget i ett visst avseende. Inspektionen får när som helst och utse en ny revisor eller en ny den särskilde granskaren har rätt att få skäligt arvode av bolaget arvodet beslutas av Finansinspek- För revisorer som inspektion- en förordnar skall den utfärda en instruktion för en revisor eller Revisorn har rätt att en särskild granskare som förord- nats av inspektionen. eller särskild granskare som förord- 4 Senaste lydelse 1991:1767. oavsett stämmans anvisningar följa direktören skall ge revisor till- direktören ska ge revisorn och fälle att verkställa granskningen den särskilda granskaren tillfälle i den omfattning som revisorn att verkställa granskningen i den finner behövlig samt lämna de behövlig samt lämna de upp- lysningar och det biträde som hon eller han begär. gentemot revisor i moder- revisor i ett dotterföretag gente- mot revisor i moderbolaget. utöva tillsyn över att verksam- utöva tillsyn över att verksam- bedrivs i enlighet med denna lag bedrivs i enlighet med denna lag förverkats, till dess verksamheten Inspektionen ska i sin tillsynsverksamhet samarbeta med motsvarande utländska tillsynsmyndigheter och Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission i den utsträckning som följer av medlemskap i unionen. När ett försäkringsbolag har påbörjat sin verksamhet, ska styrelsen och verkställande direktören genast underrätta Finans- inspektionen om det. 5 Senaste lydelse 2008:102. Om någon som ingår i ett Om någon som ingår i ett