sou · GWB338d2 · 2009-01-01 00:00:00 — Utan att det påverkar tillämpningen av artiklarna 73, 86 och 87 och med beaktande av den betydelse som tjänster av allmänt ekono- miskt intresse har för unionens gemensamma värderingar och den roll som dessa tjänster spelar när det gäller att främja social och territoriell sammanhållning, skall gemenskapen och medlems- staterna, var och en inom ramen för sina respektive befogenheter och inom detta fördrags tillämpningsområde, sörja för att sådana tjänster utförs på grundval av principer och villkor som gör det möjligt för dem att fullgöra sina uppgifter. 1.Följande är oförenligt med den gemensamma marknaden och förbjudet: alla avtal mellan företag, beslut av företagssammanslut- ningar och samordnade förfaranden som kan påverka handeln mellan medlemsstater och som har till syfte eller resultat att hindra, be- gränsa eller snedvrida konkurrensen inom den gemensamma mark- naden, särskilt sådana som innebär att a)inköps- eller försäljningspriser eller andra affärsvillkor direkt eller indirekt fastställs, b)produktion, marknader, teknisk utveckling eller investeringar begränsas eller kontrolleras, c)marknader eller inköpskällor delas upp, d)olika villkor tillämpas för likvärdiga transaktioner med vissa handelspartner, varigenom dessa får en konkurrensnackdel, e)det ställs som villkor för att ingå avtal att den andra parten åtar sig ytterligare förpliktelser, som varken till sin natur eller enligt handelsbruk har något samband med föremålet för avtalet. 2.Avtal eller beslut som är förbjudna enligt denna artikel är ogiltiga. 3.Bestämmelserna i punkt 1 får dock förklaras icke tillämpliga – på avtal eller grupper av avtal mellan företag, –beslut eller grupper av beslut av företagssammanslutningar, –samordnade förfaranden eller grupper av samordnade förfar- anden, som bidrar till att förbättra produktionen eller distribu- tionen av varor eller till att främja tekniskt eller ekonomiskt fram- åtskridande, som konsumenterna tillförsäkras en skälig andel av den vinst som därigenom uppnås och som inte a) ålägger de berörda företagen begränsningar som inte är nöd- vändiga för att uppnå dessa mål, b) ger dessa företag möjlighet att sätta konkurrensen ur spel för en väsentlig del av varorna i fråga. Ett eller flera företags missbruk av en dominerande ställning på den gemensamma marknaden eller inom en väsentlig del av denna är, i den mån det kan påverka handeln mellan medlemsstater, oförenligt med den gemensamma marknaden och förbjudet. Sådant missbruk kan särskilt bestå i att a)direkt eller indirekt påtvinga någon oskäliga inköps- eller försäljningspriser eller andra oskäliga affärsvillkor, b)begränsa produktion, marknader eller teknisk utveckling till nackdel för konsumenterna, c)tillämpa olika villkor för likvärdiga transaktioner med vissa handelspartner, varigenom dessa får en konkurrensnackdel, d)ställa som villkor för att ingå avtal att den andra parten åtar sig ytterligare förpliktelser som varken till sin natur eller enligt handelsbruk har något samband med föremålet för avtalet. 1.Medlemsstaterna skall beträffande offentliga företag och företag som de beviljar särskilda eller exklusiva rättigheter inte vidta och inte heller bibehålla någon åtgärd som strider mot reglerna i detta fördrag, i synnerhet reglerna i artiklarna 12 samt 81–89. 2.Företag som anförtrotts att tillhandahålla tjänster av allmänt ekonomiskt intresse eller som har karaktären av fiskala monopol skall vara underkastade reglerna i detta fördrag, särskilt konkur- rensreglerna, i den mån tillämpningen av dessa regler inte rättsligt eller i praktiken hindrar att de särskilda uppgifter som tilldelats dem fullgörs. Utvecklingen av handeln får inte påverkas i en om- fattning som strider mot gemenskapens intresse. 3.Kommissionen skall säkerställa att bestämmelserna i denna artikel tillämpas och, när det är nödvändigt, utfärda lämpliga direk- tiv eller beslut vad avser medlemsstaterna. 1.Om inte annat föreskrivs i detta fördrag, är stöd som ges av en medlemsstat eller med hjälp av statliga medel, av vilket slag det än är, som snedvrider eller hotar att snedvrida konkurrensen genom att gynna vissa företag eller viss produktion, oförenligt med den gemensamma marknaden i den utsträckning det påverkar handeln mellan medlemsstaterna. 2.Förenligt med den gemensamma marknaden är a)stöd av social karaktär som ges till enskilda konsumenter, under förutsättning att stödet ges utan diskriminering med avse- ende på varornas ursprung, b)stöd för att avhjälpa skador som orsakats av naturkatastrofer eller andra exceptionella händelser, c)stöd som ges till näringslivet i vissa av de områden i Förbunds- republiken som påverkats genom delning i den utsträckning stödet är nödvändigt för att uppväga de ekonomiska nackdelar som uppkommit genom denna delning. 3.Som förenligt med den gemensamma marknaden kan anses a)stöd för att främja den ekonomiska utvecklingen i regioner där levnadsstandarden är onormalt låg eller där det råder allvarlig brist på sysselsättning, b)stöd för att främja genomförandet av viktiga projekt av gemensamt europeiskt intresse eller för att avhjälpa en allvarlig störning i en medlemsstats ekonomi, c)stöd för att underlätta utveckling av vissa näringsverksam- heter eller vissa regioner, när det inte påverkar handeln i negativ rikt- ning i en omfattning som strider mot det gemensamma intresset, d)stöd för att främja kultur och bevara kulturarvet, om sådant stöd inte påverkar handelsvillkoren och konkurrensen inom gemen- skapen i en omfattning som strider mot det gemensamma intresset, e)stöd av annat slag i enlighet med vad rådet på förslag från kommissionen kan komma att bestämma genom beslut med kvali- ficerad majoritet. 1.Kommissionen skall i samarbete med medlemsstaterna fortlöp- ande granska alla stödprogram som förekommer i dessa stater. Den skall till medlemsstaterna lämna förslag till lämpliga åtgärder som krävs med hänsyn till den pågående utvecklingen eller den gemen- samma marknadens funktion. 2.Om kommissionen, efter att ha gett berörda parter tillfälle att yttra sig, finner att stöd som lämnas av en stat eller med statliga medel inte är förenligt med den gemensamma marknaden enligt artikel 87, eller att sådant stöd missbrukas, skall den besluta om att staten i fråga skall upphäva eller ändra dessa stödåtgärder inom den tidsfrist som kommissionen fastställer. Om staten i fråga inte rättar sig efter detta beslut inom före- skriven tid får kommissionen eller andra berörda stater, med av- vikelse från artiklarna 226 och 227, hänskjuta ärendet direkt till domstolen. På begäran av en medlemsstat kan rådet enhälligt besluta att stöd som denna stat lämnar eller avser att lämna skall anses vara fören- ligt med den gemensamma marknaden, med avvikelse från bestäm- melserna i artikel 87 eller de förordningar som avses i artikel 89, om ett sådant beslut är motiverat på grund av exceptionella omständig- heter. Om kommissionen beträffande ett sådant stöd redan har inlett det förfarande som avses i första stycket av denna punkt, skall kommissionen – i sådana fall där staten har lämnat in en be- gäran till rådet – skjuta upp förfarandet till dess rådet har tagit ställ- ning till statens begäran. Om rådet inte har tagit ställning till nämnda begäran efter det att den inlämnats, skall kommissionen fatta beslut i ärendet. 3.Kommissionen skall underrättas i så god tid att den kan yttra sig om alla planer på att vidta eller ändra stödåtgärder. Om den anser att någon sådan plan inte är förenlig med den gemensamma mark- naden enligt artikel 87, skall den utan dröjsmål inleda det förfar- ande som anges i punkt 2. Medlemsstaten i fråga får inte genomföra åtgärden förrän detta förfarande lett till ett slutgiltigt beslut. Rättsutlåtande om betydelsen av och konkurrensrätt för svensk bostadsmarknad och hyres- lagstiftning 1 Professor of European and Economic , , the . The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of lecturer at the of the . The Swedish housing market ....................................... Compatibility of the rent setting system with Art. 81 EC ................................................................. b. Agreements, decisions and concerted practice .............. Compatibility of the rent setting system with Art. 81 in combination with Art. 10, 3(g) EC ............................ Compatibility of the rent setting system with Art. 82 EC ................................................................. One or more undertakings holding a dominant Compatibility of the rent setting system with Art. 86 in conjunction with Art. 82 EC..................................... a.Public undertakings or undertakings with special or exclusive rights ............................................................ b.Obligation on Member States to refrain from adopting anticompetitive State measures....................... i.Situation 1: Two markets – existence of a conflict of ii:Situation 2: One market – no conflict of c. Exemption pursuant to Art. 86(2) EC........................... i.Undertakings entrusted with the operation (i) Entrustment........................................................ (ii) Services of General (SGEI)...................................................................... ii.Obstruction of the performance of the tasks Adverse development of trade................................ d.Liability for independent conduct of the Compatibility of the Swedish housing market with Art. 87 EC................................................................. a.Overview of the State aid provisions in Criteria for finding State aid................................... Transfer of State resources ........................... Effect on competition and trade .................. (i) Aid that is compatible with the Common Market – Art. 87(2) EC......... (ii)Aid that may be compatible with the Common Market – Art. 87(3) EC Procedure for the granting, notification and exemption of State aid...................................... b.Application of the State aid provisions to the Swedish housing market......................................... Transfer of State resources ................................... Application of the Altmark conditions ...... Effect on competition and trade ........................... Application of Art. 87(2) or (3) EC ............................ Art. 87(2) EC......................................................... Art. 87(3) EC......................................................... (i) Regional aid.................................................. (ii) Rescue and restructuring aid....................... Exemption pursuant to Art. 86(2) EC......................... Undertaking entrusted with the operation Proportionality of funding and Adverse development of trade .............................. 1.This report has been prepared at the request of the Inquiry on the Conditions for Non-Profit Housing (the Inquiry). I have been asked, in my function as an independent expert, to assess the compatibility of the Swedish housing market and the rent setting system with the EC rules on competition and State aid. 2.In this capacity, I will commence the report by briefly out- lining the facts and rules pertaining to the Swedish housing market insofar as they have been made available to me and insofar as they are of relevance to this analysis. In this context, I would like to emphasise that my report is solely based on the information which I received from the Inquiry. Thereafter, I will continue to assess the compatibility of the Swedish housing system with the rules relating to the conduct of individual under- takings, i.e. Art. 81 and 82 EC. This also implies making a detailed assessment as to whether public housing companies qualify as undertakings pursuant to the competition rules in spite of them being public and non-profit in nature. 3.However, when applying the competition rules to the Swedish housing market, it will quickly emerge that the conduct of the companies in the housing market is not the result of market forces or wilful behaviour but is dictated by rules of national legislation and State intervention which may lead to distortions of competition. Thus, the question arises whether the government could be held liable for its practice pursuant to Art. 81 in combination with Art. 10, 3(1)(g) EC Treaty2 or Art. 82 in conjunction with Art. 86(1) EC and if that is the case, whether Art. 86(2) EC applies. The application of Art. 86(2) EC will then, in the context of the definition of services of general economic interest (SGEI), raise the question as to the social role provided by the public housing companies, especially in view of the overall objective of social cohesion of the Swedish housing policy. It also needs to be 2 In the PreussenElektra case (Case C-379/98 and [2001] ECR I-2099) the Commission raised the argument that Art. 10, 3(1)(g) EC should also be used in combination with the State aid provisions, i.e. Art. 87 and 88 EC (para. Court of dismissed this argument by stating that Art. 87 and 88 are comprehensive as far as State behaviour is concerned and that Art. 10 cannot be used to extend their scope. determined whether more clear and distinct requirements should be imposed on the companies operating in this market. 4.After having explained the competition rules relating to anti- competitive State intervention, the report will turn to discuss the rules on aid control. I will start by giving a general overview of the substantive as well as the procedural State aid rules before applying them to the Swedish housing market in detail. In doing so, the Inquiry has asked me to address a number of general issues which are of special relevance to the way the housing market operates under the current legislation. Among those issues are: (1)The application of aid rules to the prime cost principle and the utility value system which are two of the main features of the Swedish rent setting system. (2)The application of rules relating to the compensation for public service obligations according to the Altmark3 criteria to the Swedish housing market. This includes an assessment as to whether the profit earned by the public housing companies and the dividends distributed to the municipalities correspond to the costs which a typical, well run, undertaking would incur in this sector of the economy. (3)In case the operation of the Swedish housing market under the current legislation involves the granting of State aid, it is necessary to consider whether trade between Member States is affected as required by Art. 87(1) . (4)If the State measures are found to be incompatible with the Common Market, it is necessary to examine whether the exemption provisions of Art. 87(2) or (3) EC could be applied to the facts at issue. (5)And last but not least, if the measures taken by the State in support of the Swedish housing market do not qualify as compensation for services of general economic interest according to the Altmark criteria, it still needs to be assessed whether the measures can be exempted 3 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans und Regierungspräsidium Madgeburg [2003] ECRI-7747. according to Art. 86(2) EC.4 This also raises the question of the proportionality of State support and unlawful cross- subsidisation between public and commercial activities. 5.When applying the aid rules to the case at hand, I was advised by the Inquiry to take the aid measures as described in the complaints of Property Found (EPF) to Commission into account. Thus, when examining the aid measures put forward by the EPF as to their com- patibility with aid rules, I will try to answer the more general questions raised by the Inquiry in their specific context. In making this assessment, I will as much as possible refer to the relevant decision-making practice of Commission (Commission) and the case law of Court of (ECJ). The Swedish Housing Market5 6.The Swedish housing policy is characterised by the objective of achieving overall social cohesion in its rental market, i.e. furthering integration and countering segregation. The aim is to create socially, economically and ethnically mixed popu- lations in all neighbourhoods by providing reasonably priced accommodation for rent irrespective of income. In order to reach that aim, introduced the same rent setting system for all kinds of housing, whether provided by private or public housing company, to ensure that rents do not vary according to the income of the or according to the legal status of the housing company. 4It is common Commission practice to assess the State measures also pursuant to Art. 86(2) EC when dealing with public service obligations. The first assessment according to the Altmark conditions (see point (2)) contains both procedural as well as substantive require- ments and since most State measures fail in their formal test, they may still fulfill the con- ditions pursuant to Art. 86(2) EC which contains a substantive test for exemption. 5The following summary of facts relevant for our purposes is mainly taken from the Memo- randum PM 4, drafted by the Inquiry, the expert opinion of Per on the case fastiget AB v et al., and an extract from the book on International com- parison of rent setting and conflict resolution by , published by (extract provided by the Inquiry). 7.In the Swedish housing market, public utility housing companies are the commonest owners of flats in apartment blocks.6 A public housing company can be defined as a non-profit housing company over which a municipality has controlling influence.7 They are governed by the Act which imposes, inter alia, an obligation on the public housing companies to obtain a permit from the muni- cipality when selling property and the rule that dividends from a public housing company to the municipality are limited to a fixed percentage of the portion of share capital or paid-in mem- bership shares contributed by the municipality in cash. 8.The main principle of the Swedish rent setting system is that rents, both for public and private housing8, are negotiated freely between landlord and . In most instances, the collective negotiation system applies,9 which stipulates that rents are based on collective, local negotiations between land- lords and organisations. However, in case the parties cannot agree on the level of the rent, Section 55 of the Tenancy Act applies: If there is a dispute between landlord and concerning the size of the rent, the rent shall be set at an equitable amount. For this purpose, the rent is not to be deemed equitable if it is sub- stantially higher10 than the rent for dwellings of equivalent value. In the assessment as aforesaid, consideration shall above all be had to the rent of dwellings in owned and managed by non-profit housing utilities.11 If no comparison can be made with dwellings in the locality, consideration may instead be had to the 6Wiktorin, International comparison of rent setting and conflict resolution, , p. 7Memorandum PM 4, p. 8Private housing in this instance refers to private, for profit, housing. There exist also privately owned, non-profit, housing companies in , which fulfill the same role than the public, non-profit, housing companies but they constitute only a minor component of the Swedish housing market. (Memorandum PM 4, p. 9For the collective negotiation system to be applicable to an apartment, it has to be covered by a negotiation rule, which is the most common case for rental apartments in . About 1,4 million apartments are covered by annual negotiations under the collective negotiation system. (Memorandum PM 4, p. 10The limit for what is considered to be a substantially higher rent is usually five percent. (Memorandum PM 4, p. 11This refers to the obligation on the parties to identify apartments of equivalent value in order to enable the tribunal to make a direct comparison between the rent levels of these apart- ments. If the parties fail to provide acceptable comparison material, the rent tribunal makes a general assessment of fairness using the rents cited by the parties as background material. (Memorandum PM 4, p. rent for dwellings in another locality with a comparable level of rents and otherwise similar conditions in the rental market []. 9.Thus, in case of a dispute concerning either a public housing apartment or a privately owned flat, either the landlord or the can refer the matter to the rent tribunal,12 which shall set the rent at a fair amount. A rent is considered to be set at a fair amount if it is not substantially higher than the rent of apartments considered equivalent in utility value,13 the so- called utility value system. As reference material, the tribunal uses rents of apartments in owned and managed by public housing companies located in the same municipality. 10.This leads to the situation that, in practice, public housing com- panies are given a rent normative function for privately owned housing, both in reviews by rent tribunals as well as in rent negotiations. The rent for a privately owned apartment may not exceed the rent for an equivalent apartment owned by a public housing company located in the same municipality by more than five percent. 11.However, in order to ensure that rents charged by public housing companies are not unreasonably high or low (which would lead in turn to unreasonably high or low rents for privately owned dwellings), they must be determined based on the prime cost principle. This means that the level of the rent has to be such as to allow the rents to cover direct costs as well as include a reasonable return on the capital invested14 but not be significantly higher or lower. As such, it exerts a restraining effect on rent levels, which is also in line with the public housing companies being non profit in nature. Therefore, only rents set according to the prime costs of a specific are given a 12Rent tribunals are bodies similar to courts whose purpose is dispute resolution in land- lord/matters. The rulings of rent tribunals may be appealed to the of Appeal. (Memorandum PM 4, p. 13The utility value of an apartment is determined by factors including its size, degree of modernity, floor plan, position within the , standard or repair and soundproofing. Amenities that affect utility value include access to a lift, rubbish chute, laundry room, special storage space, good services, garage and car park. Also the general location of the , overall housing environment and proximity to communications as well as the state of maintenance are determinative factors. (Memorandum PM 4, p. 14In more detailed terms, total rental income at company level has to cover all of the com- panys costs for property management (such as operating and maintenance costs and taxes), plus funds for consolidation and distribution of dividends on invested capital; all capital invested in the properties shall yield interest and be written off. The prime cost principle also allows surpluses to be used for investments in new construction and refurbish- ment/rebuilding. (Memorandum PM 4, p. normative effect when rents in the private housing market are determined. 12.This is an important element considering the usual practice of housing companies to allocate prime costs not at but at overall company level, i.e. they reapportion the costs within the housing stock and in this way, equalise heavy expenditure on e.g. newly built homes. This may lead to the situation that the rental income from a particular does not necessarily correspond to the prime cost of the but may either be higher or lower. Thus, for instance, new productions with lower prime costs through redistribution can enforce a rent reduction on private landlords.