sou · GWB338d2 · 2009-01-01 00:00:00 — 249Reasonable profit means a rate of return on own capital that takes account of the risk, or absence of risk, incurred by the undertaking by virtue of the intervention by the Member State []. This rate shall not normally exceed the average rate for the sector concerned in recent years. (Ibid, Art. 5(4)) In the present case, the reasonable profit could be ascertained by comparison with private housing companies, which provide the same service. 250Supra, paras. 87 et seq. 251Response by the to the second complaint from the EPF of , pp. 13 and 14. panies consists in the fact that apartments are rented out also for commercial purposes and not only to disadvantaged persons in line with the social mission of the companies. Thus, the combination of public and non-public services would in prin- ciple require the of separate accounts for the different activities. 235.However, the Commission acknowledged in its Decision on funding granted by the to housing associations that separate accounts for apartments that are tem- porarily exploited commercially252 is impractical. It therefore imposed the obligation on the Dutch government to sell homes in order to limit the overcapacity and to invest the profit resulting from the renting of housing to normal persons back into social housing. Also, the net profit from such commercial exploitation has to be taken into account when calculating the net costs of the public service and the associated offsets.253 236.The same line of reasoning could be applied in the case of the Swedish public housing companies with respect to the renting of housing to disadvantaged and normal . As it seems im- practical to keep separate accounts for commercially exploited apartments as opposed to apartments rented out to disadvan- taged persons, it may be required from the Swedish govern- ment to sell any overcapacity and in the meantime to take any profits resulting from the commercial exploitation into account when calculating the net costs of the public service and the associated offsets. The Commission may also require from the to split the markets relating to the public service and the commercial activities in the future to allow a trans- parent allocation of costs and income to each activity and to avoid any overspill of State funds to the commercial or un- reserved market. 237.Coming back to our starting point and taking the existence of one market for housing provided to all income groups as a starting point, the obligation of separate accounts with respect to socially and commercially rented housing does not arise. In this second scenario, the only commercial activity that public housing companies engage in consists in the opera- 252State aid E 2/2005 – The , para. 253Ibid, paras 40 et seq. tion of commercial premises, etc, as explained above.254 The housing activity, however, does not comprise the commercial lease of apartments. Nevertheless, the obligation remains the same in that the operation of the other commercial activities requires the of separate accounts for the different activities. The difference to the first scenario outlined above consists in the fact that the public housing companies do not have the added difficulty of taking into account apartments that are temporarily exploited commercially when calcu- lating the net costs of the public service and the associated offsets. Yet, in both scenarios, the public housing companies engage in commercial activity which requires the of separate accounts. 238.Assuming that the costs in carrying out the public service of providing good housing to disadvantaged persons can be ascertained and assuming that the compensation granted by the indeed exceeds the actual costs (plus a reaso- nable profit),255 this would, in principle lead to the incompati- bility of the State support pursuant to Art. 87(1) EC. It seems, however, that with respect to social housing, the Commission may adopt a more lenient approach concerning the issue of overcompensation. As such, it explained in its Decision on the application of Art. 86(2) EC: []undertakings in charge of social housing which are entrusted with tasks involving SGEI have specific characteristics that need to be taken into consideration. In particular, account should be taken of the fact that at the current stage of development of the internal market, the intensity of distortion of competition in those sectors is not necessarily proportionate to the level of turnover and compensation. [] undertakings in charge of social housing providing housing for disadvantaged citizens or socially less ad- vantaged groups, which due to solvability constraints are unable to obtain housing at market conditions, should benefit from the exemption from notification provided for in this Decision, even if the amount of compensation they receive exceeds the thresholds 254Supra, para. 255The response by the Swedish government to the first EPF complaint seems to imply that the aid does not exceed the actual costs and that the support was limited to the minimum: the aid is minimised to the level required so that the municipality can fulfil its obligations with respect to housing provision and is limited to the costs that or the Government deem that the municipality is not able to bear itself based on a joint assessment of the municipalitys finances. (Response by the , Housing Division, to the first complaint of the EPF, dated 16 October 2002, p. However, this cannot be considered to be sufficient evidence to exclude any overcompensation. laid down in this Decision, if the services performed are qualified as SGEI by the Member States.256 It continues in Art. 6 of the Decision by stating that: In the sector of social housing, Member States shall carry out regular checks, or ensure that such checks are carried out, at the level of each undertaking, to ensure that the undertaking con- cerned is not receiving compensation in excess of the amount determined in accordance with [this Decision]. overcom- pensation may be carried forward to the next period up to of the annual compensation, provided that the undertaking concerned only operates SGEI.257 239.Thus, it appears that firstly, due to the special characteristics of the market, the issue of compensation remains to a large extent in the hands of the Member States which have to ensure through regular checks that the level of compensation does not exceed the costs. Secondly, although the SGEI in question may be overcompensated, the compensation may be carried forward and still be found compatible and therefore does not have to be notified to the Commission. 240.However, with respect to the other, commercial, activities of the public housing companies, the accounts should clearly be kept separate. Once the costs and income related to each acti- vity can be distinguished it can also be ascertained whether the compensation granted to the public housing companies is used for other, commercial, purposes relating to activities in unre- served sectors open to competition. This may be considered unlawful, as explained above, if it leads to conditions in the unreserved or commercial market which make it difficult for private competitors to compete. iii.Adverse development of trade 241.The explanations given in the context of Art. 86(2) in con- junction with Art. 82 EC also apply here, i.e. this condition involves more than an effect on trade in the sense of Art. 81 and 82 EC. There is a high burden of proof on the Com- 256Commission Decision on the application of Art. 86(2) of the to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, OJ 2005 L 312, recital 16. mission to prove an adverse development of trade to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Com- munity. This implies that as long as the Commission has not proven that this condition is fulfilled, an adverse development of trade cannot be assumed. The issue may be rendered even more difficult by the fact that the housing market has specific characteristics and that at the current stage of development of the internal market, the intensity of distortion of com- petition [] is not necessarily proportionate to the level of turnover and compensation.258 Thus, the Commission also needs to take the special nature of the housing market into account before concluding that trade is affected. 242.It can therefore be concluded that the aid granted by to the public housing companies constitutes State aid pursuant to Art. 87(1) EC and cannot be exempted pursuant to Art. 87(2) or (3) EC. However, the State support could be exempted according to Art. 86(2) EC, given the wide scope of discretion left to the Member States to define SGEI in the context of their national housing policies. 243.In the above analysis, I have examined the compatibility of the Swedish housing market and the rent setting system with the rules on competition and State aid. I reached the conclusion that the public housing companies cannot be held responsible for any infringement of the competition rules. may be held responsible for an infringement of Art. 86(1) in con- junction with Art. 82 EC if we assume the existence of two separate markets, a social/public and a commercial housing market, as the application of the utility value system could result in a conflict of interest for the public housing com- panies. In contrast, an infringement of Art. 86(1) EC cannot be found if we consider the specific characteristics of the Swedish housing policy which does not follow the example of most housing policies. As the Swedish housing policy aims to create one market for housing to all income groups, a conflict of interest can no longer be found to exist and Art. 258 Ibid, recital 16. 86(1) EC would not apply. Finally, it was found that the State granted incompatible aid pursuant to Art. 87(1) EC. 244.Both infringements could be exempted pursuant to Art. 86(2) EC. The application of this provision, however, raises a number of problems in the present case and points to a series of shortcomings in the Swedish legislation relating to its housing policy. Firstly, the Swedish rules do not explicitly entrust services of general economic interest to the public housing companies. Additionally, although Member States retain a high level of discretion when defining SGEI, may be required to include a clear definition of services of general economic interest in the housing sector in its legislation. Secondly, it may be required to separate its SGEI from other, commercial, activities in this market. The fact that public and commercial activities are not sufficiently differentiated con- travenes the principle of transparency and separation of accounts which is necessary in order to ensure that any State support granted only benefits the public service sector. 245.It is reasonable to assume that the Commission and the Com- munity Courts, if the case was presented to them for assessment in the near future, will adopt a rather lenient approach in view of the specific characteristics of the housing market and the ongoing process of strengthening social cohesion which has been emphasized in the Presidency Conclusions of the Summit in 2000. Also, the Commission accepts that the internal market is not sufficiently developed yet and that therefore, not all State subsidies granted as compensation for the public service have to be notified as State aid. Therefore, aside from the possible obligation to redraft or adopt new legislation to fulfil the requirements set out above, an infringement of Art. 86(1) in conjunction with Art. 82 EC259 and of the State aid rules will, in all likelihood, be exempted pursuant to Art. 86(2) EC. 259 In case the existence of two housing markets is assumed, see paras 87 et seq. In its consulting commission, the Inquiry included a number of very specific questions relating to the Swedish housing market and the way in which it is organised. Most of these questions have been answered in my report. Those questions which have not been addressed are in my view not of direct relevance for the application of the and State aid rules. For the sake of com- pleteness and clarity, however, I will in the following address the questions shortly.260 (1)The Inquiry has asked me to explain the relationship between the Swedish rules pertaining to the housing market (especially the utility value system and the prime cost principle) and and State aid rules. As explained above, the utility value system may come into conflict with Art. 86(1) in con- junction with Art. 82 EC, presuming the existence of a conflict of interest, but may be exempted pursuant to Art. 86(2) EC provided that the Swedish legislation is changed. In the case of State aid, neither the utility value system nor the prime cost principle appear to be in contravention of Art. 87(1) EC as the ruling of the of Appeal in the case prevents any lowering of rents (due to State sub- sidies) to the detriment of private competitors if that results in a substantial deviation from the prime costs of the . (2)The Inquiry asked me to also take into account the developments surrounding public services of general economic interest. Indeed, the recent legislative package of the Commission relating to the application of Art. 86(2) EC specifically takes social housing into account and allows a less strict application of the State aid rules to this sector. (3)The trade criterion was discussed at various points in the report, always in relation to the respective provision for which it has to be assessed. (4)The rules relating to mixed administration or unlawful govern- ment conduct have been discussed at length in the report, both relating to Art. 81, 10, 3(g) EC and Art. 86 in conjunc- tion with Art. 82 EC. 260 Some of the questions have been merged into one central question. (5)The Inquiry asked me to address the non-profit nature of public housing companies and whether this warrants any difference in treatment under the competition and State aid rules. How- ever, as concluded in my report, in spite of the non-profit nature of the companies, they still constitute undertakings pursuant to the and State aid rules as they engage in an economic activity pursuant to the case law of the Community Courts and thus they fall within the scope of the rules. (6)As to the question whether the public housing companies are subject to certain requirements concerning the profit they can earn and the dividends they can distribute, special attention should be paid to the application of the market economy investor principle and the question whether a private investor would have undertaken similar transactions as the considering the limited dividends he would receive. (7)On the social role fulfilled by the public housing companies, as explained in the report, the Swedish legislation includes several shortcomings with respect to the definition of SGEI. This raises difficulties in the application of Art. 86(2) EC which need to be addressed by adopting new legislation or redrafting the existing one. (8)The Inquiry raised the question whether public housing com- panies can become part of a group of companies where some companies are also in sectors other than housing and operate with a view to making profit. This is, in principle, unobjectionable as long as the costs and income of each acti- vity and the accounts relating to each activity are kept separate to allow the Commission to monitor whether any State support is indeed used for the provision of SGEI and not for other, commercial, purposes. (9)As to the question on the extent of the aid, this only makes any difference if the aid granted is below the de minimis threshold of EURO 100,000261 over a period of three years. This is clearly not the case here. 261 This limit was recently (mid ) raised to over a period of three years: Commission Regulation 1998/2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the to de minimis aid, OJ 2006 L 379/5. Rättsutlåtande om betydelsen av för svensk bostads- marknad och hyreslagstiftning *Disputerade vid med avhandlingen aid rules applied to taxes – An analysis of the selectivity Criterion (Iustus Förlag 2005, Skrifter från i 95) Övergripande om systemet....................................................... Tillståndsplikt vid försäljning av aktier.................................... 3 Allmänt om om statligt stöd........................... 3.2.2 Konsekvenserna av att inte anmäla............................... 4 När är en åtgärd att betrakta som statligt stöd? 4.2.2 Begreppet stöd ........................................................... 4.2.3 Om inte annat föreskrivs i fördraget ........................... 4.2.4 Av en medlemsstat eller med hjälp av statliga medel...... 4.2.4.2 Direkt av staten ........................................................... 4.2.4.3 Organ utsedda av staten.............................................. 4.2.5 Snedvrider eller hotar att snedvrida konkurrensen ..... 4.2.6 Påverkar handeln mellan medlemsstaterna .................. 4.2.7 Gynnar vissa företag eller viss produktion .................. 4.2.8 Innebär en fördel för mottagaren................................. Två vägledande principer........................................................... Stöd till företag som utför tjänster av allmänt intresse ........... 4.5 Förbudet i artikel 87.1 är inte absolut...................................... 4.5.2 Undantag enligt artikel 86.2......................................... 4.5.3 Undantag enligt artikel 87.2 och 3............................... 4.5.3.2 Undantag enligt artikel 87.2 a) .................................... 4.5.3.3 Undantag enligt artikel 87.3 a) och c)......................... 4.6 Olika kategorier av stöd............................................................ 5 En stödrättslig bedömning av det svenska bostads- och 5.2 Kommunala stöd ....................................................................... 5.2.2 Förenlighet med artikel 87.1 ........................................ 5.2.2.2 Övriga stöd ................................................................... 5.2.2.2.2 Reducerade lånekostnader .................................... 5.2.2.2.3 Reducerade kostnader för eget kapital ................. 5.2.2.2.4 Reducerade kostnader i form av otillräckliga 5.2.4 I enlighet med kommissionens beslut angående tillämpningen av artikel 86.2 – ingen anmälan .......... 5.2.4.2 Tjänster av allmänt intresse.......................................... 5.2.6.2 Undantag enligt artikel 86.2 ........................................ 5.2.6.3 Undantag enligt artikel 87.2 a) .................................... 5.2.6.4 Undantag enligt artikel 87.3 ........................................ 5.3 Statliga stöd i form av upprättandet av Bostads- delegationen och SBN ........................................................... 5.3.1 Övergripande om systemet........................................... 5.3.2 Prövning enligt artikel 87.1........................................... 5.3.3 Förenlighet med den gemensamma marknaden .......... Artikel 295 i EG-fördraget stadgar att: Detta fördrag skall inte i något hänseende ingripa i medlems- staternas egendomsordning. Enligt uttalanden i ett kommissions- meddelande angående planerat förhållningssätt beträffande trans- parensdirektivet efter upphävande av 5 § i samma direktiv innebär budskapet i artikel 295 att det ligger inom medlems- staternas kompetens att besluta hur deras egendomsordning skall se ut.1 Fördraget förhåller sig enligt samma källa därmed neutralt till medlemsstaternas beslut om vilken verksamhet som skall bedrivas i privat respektive offentlig regi. En konsekvens av att fördraget är neutralt i denna mening är att även offentliga företag är under- ställda fördragets regler om konkurrens, i vilka statsstödsreglerna ingår. Mot den bakgrunden måste eventuellt stöd till offentlig verksamhet bedömas på samma sätt som stöd till privata ekono- miska aktörer samt anmälas i förväg till kommissionen. Hänvisningen till neutralitet förutsätter dock att de privata och offentliga företagen befinner sig i jämförbara situationer. Den metod som tillämpas för att bedöma om det föreligger stöd till offentliga företag om de anses befinna sig i en med privata aktörer jämförbar situation är principen om den ekonomiske investeraren. När det gäller frågan om offentliga företag befinner sig i en med privata aktörer jämförbar situation är det av intresse att erinra om EG- domstolens kommentarer i de förenade målen 188–190/80, , och mot kommissionen som handlade om transparensdirektivets laglighet.2 I punkt 21 sade domstolen att: Inom den tillämpliga lagstiftningens gränser lägger de privata före- tagen emellertid upp sin produktions- och handelsstrategi med särskild hänsyn till lönsamhetskraven. De offentliga företagens beslut, där- emot, kan påverkas av faktorer av annat slag, nämligen när de offentliga myndigheterna, som kan påverka besluten, strävar efter det allmänna bästa. De ekonomiska och finansiella konsekvenserna av ett sådant inflytande leder till att det upprättas finansiella förbindelser av särskilt slag mellan dessa företag och de offentliga myndigheterna, vilket skil- jer sig från förbindelserna mellan de offentliga myndigheterna och de privata företagen 1Commission communication to the Member States, OJ C 307, 13.11.1993, s. 3–20. 2Förenade målen 188–190/80 , och mot kommissionen [1982] ECR 2545. Uttalandet är egentligen ett resonemang för varför domstolen inte godtog klagandes argument om att transparensdirektivet var diskri- minerande men det speglar också att kravet på neutralitet inte torde anses gälla förutsättningslöst utan närmare hänsyn till den faktiska verksamheten. Det sätt varpå gemenskapen tycks ha löst problemet med att offentlig verksamhet kan påverkas av andra faktorer och därmed inte kan anses befinna sig i samma situation som privata aktörer synes vara möjligheten till undantag enligt artikel 86.2 i EG-för- draget. har problematiken med offentliga företag som utför tjänster i konkurrens med privata aktörer utvecklas i flera hänseenden som har betydelse för om förehavanden mellan staten eller myndigheterna och de offentliga företagen är att betrakta som stöd överhuvudtaget. Om förehavandena dock betraktas som stöd så skall de anmälas till kommissionen i förväg och kan åtgärderna inte undantas enligt artikel 86.2 måste åtgärden bedömas enligt de andra möjligheter till undantag som fördraget erbjuder. Om åtgär- den inte kan undantas är det fråga om förbjudet stöd. Trots att jag i rättsutlåtandet inte närmare avser att kommentera transparensdirektivet särskilt bör det dock erinras om att kom- missionen för att kunna tillförsäkra principen om neutralitet och principen om att privata företag inte skall diskrimineras i för- hållande till offentliga aktörer antog transparensdirek- tivet. Direktivet ställer som krav på medlemsstaterna att för företag som beviljats särskilda eller exklusiva rättigheter enligt artikel 86.1 eller som anförtrotts att utföra tjänster av allmänt intresse enligt artikel 86.2 eller för företag som bedriver ett stort antal olika verk- samheter, med ett par undantag, framförallt kräva separat och till- förlitlig redovisning för olika verksamheter som bedrivs av samma företag.3 För att fullgöra mitt uppdrag att beskriva de EG-rättsliga stats- stödsreglerna som kan ha betydelse för svensk bostadsmarknad och hyreslagstiftning samt besvara frågan om de kommunala bostads- företagen och det svenska hyressättningssystemet är förenliga med har jag valt att inleda med en beskrivning av det svenska hyressystemet såsom jag har uppfattat det i avsnitt 2. Därefter följer en beskrivning av relevanta statsstödsregler i avsnitt 3 och 4. I avsnitt 5 gör jag en statsstödsbedömning av det svenska