sou · GUB399 · 2007-01-01 00:00:00 — bör inte heller i beslut, enligt vilka verket lämnar en företagskoncentration utan åtgärd, uttala sig om huruvida anmälda avtal och förfaranden är att anse som acces- soriska eller inte. Den nuvarande bestämmelsen i 34 b § första stycket konkur- renslagen, som reglerar den situationen att bildandet av ett själv- ständigt fungerande gemensamt företag i vissa avseenden skall bedömas enligt 6 och 8 §§ samma lag, bör flyttas så att det klart framgår av konkurrenslagen att fråga är om en särskild bedöm- ningsgrund i koncentrationsprövningen. Nuvarande bestämmelse i konkurrenslagen om att förfarande- reglerna för företagskoncentrationer skall tillämpas vid prövningen av accessoriska begränsningar och gemensamma företag bör tas bort. Vi menar att rätt att godta åtaganden från företag i koncentrationsärenden uttryckligen skall framgå av konkurrenslagen. Tidpunkten för anmälan om företagskoncentration och sanktionsmöjligheter m.m. Det bör i konkurrenslagen föras in en bestämmelse om att en anmälan om företagskoncentration får göras så snart part eller annan medverkande kan visa att de avser att genomföra koncentrationen. Vi föreslår också att det av lagen uttryckligen skall framgå att en anmälningspliktig företagskoncentration skall anmälas till Kon- kurrensverket innan den genomförs. Dessutom bör det göras tydligt i konkurrenslagen att , från det att en fullständig anmälan kommit in till verket, skall antingen meddela beslut om att genomföra en särskild undersökning av företagskoncentrationen eller meddela beslut om att lämna koncentrationen utan åtgärd. Det saknas enligt vår mening praktiska skäl för att föreslå regler om direkta sanktioner mot bristande uppfyllelse av anmälningsplikten. Inte heller i övrigt har det kommit fram några skäl som talar för att närmare överväga om bör få sådana sanktionsmöjligheter och utredningsbefogenheter som kommissionen har. Det bör i konkurrenslagen föras in en bestämmelse som innebär att tidsfristen för beslut om att genomföra en sär- skild undersökning av en företagskoncentration eller lämna den utan åtgärd förlängs i de fall part lämnar åtagan- den. Vi föreslår att bestämmelsen i 3 § andra stycket lagen om tillämpningen av Europeiska gemenskapernas konkurrens- och statsstödsregler avseende befogenheter när verket bistår kommissionen vid undersökningar skall upphävas. I övrigt bedöms reglerna för svenska myndigheters bistånd till kommissionen, när denna genomför en undersökning i , vara ändamålsenliga. Förbud i väntan på slutlig prövning Vi föreslår att även i ett pågående mål om företagskoncentration skall kunna förbjuda parterna och andra medverkande i koncentrationen att vidta någon åtgärd för att full- följa företagskoncentrationen. Avgift för anmälan om företagskoncentration Vi har inte funnit tillräckliga skäl för att föreslå att Konkurrens- verket skall få ta ut en avgift för anmälan om företagskoncentra- tion. Vem får överklaga vissa av beslut? Vi menar att bestämmelsen om talerätt i nuvarande 60 § andra stycket konkurrenslagen bör ändras på så sätt att begreppet ett företag utgår. I lagtexten kommer då att föreskrivas endast att den som berörs av beslut har rätt att överklaga. Bestämmelser om konkurrensskadeavgiftens storlek Vi föreslår att nya, mer preciserade regler om vilka omständigheter som skall beaktas vid bestämmande av konkurrensskadeavgiftens storlek införs i konkurrenslagen. Syftet är främst att underlätta för parterna och domstolarna att identifiera överträdelser som är sär- skilt skadliga från konkurrenssynpunkt och som förtjänar höga avgifter. Förslaget bör dessutom öka möjligheterna till förutsebar- het och enhetlighet i rättstillämpningen. Med straffrätten som förebild föreslår vi att det införs ett argu- mentationsschema i konkurrenslagen som beskriver hur domsto- larna skall gå till väga när konkurrensskadeavgiften skall bestäm- mas. Överträdelsens allvar och varaktighet bör alltjämt vara utgångspunkten för att fastställa avgiftens storlek och bör sammanvägt utgöra ett utgångsbelopp (sanktionsvärde). När sank- tionsvärdet har fastställts för ett företag bör detta justeras med hänsyn till försvårande och förmildrande omständigheter. Slutligen kan konkurrensskadeavgiften i vissa fall behöva sänkas med beak- tande av bestämmelsen om nedsättning av avgiften. Vi föreslår vidare att beloppsgränserna i nuvarande 27 § konkur- renslagen tas bort. I lagtexten kommer då att föreskrivas endast att konkurrensskadeavgiften inte får överstiga av företa- gets omsättning föregående räkenskapsår. En kriminalisering på konkurrensrättens område och individuella sanktioner som kan utgöra alternativ till straff Vi anser att de skäl som talar mot en kriminalisering är starkare än de skäl som talar för en sådan reform. Som ett alternativ till straff föreslår vi dock att sanktionsmöjligheterna för vissa allvarliga överträdelser av konkurrensreglerna bör utökas med bestämmelser om näringsförbud. Det skall vara möjligt att meddela näringsförbud för personer som rättsligt eller faktiskt utövar ledningen över företag som ingår eller tillämpar avtal som är förbjudna enligt konkurrenslagen eller EG-fördraget och som innebär att företag i samma produktions- eller handelsled fastställer försäljningspriser, begränsar eller kon- trollerar produktion eller delar upp marknader. För att ett förbud skall kunna meddelas skall, i likhet med vad som gäller enligt lagen om näringsförbud, krävas att personen i fråga därigenom grovt åsidosatt vad som ålegat honom eller henne i närings- verksamhet, och att ett förbud är påkallat från allmän synpunkt. Vid prövningen av om ett näringsförbud är påkallat från allmän synpunkt skall bl.a. särskilt beaktas om förfarandet varit ägnat att allvarligt hindra, begränsa eller snedvrida konkurrensen. Närings- förbud skall inte anses påkallat från allmän synpunkt om exempel- vis den som kan komma i fråga för ett sådant förbud själv eller inom ramen för den bedrivna näringsverksamheten har medverkat till att i väsentlig mån underlätta utredning av överträdelsen. Konkurrenslagens struktur och överskådlighet För att fullgöra vårt uppdrag avseende konkurrenslagens struktur och överskådlighet föreslår vi en helt ny konkurrenslag. Vidare föreslår vi att de kvarvarande bestämmelserna i lagen om tillämpningen av Europeiska gemenskapernas konkurrens- och statsstödsregler som rör tillämpningen av arbetas in i konkurrenslagen. Vid beaktande av att rimlig tid måste sättas av för remissbehand- ling, fortsatt beredning inom och behandling i , bedömer vi att den nya konkurrenslagen kan träda i kraft först . De övriga ändringar i lagar och förordningar som vi föreslår bör i huvudsak träda i kraft . Konsekvenser av våra förslag Våra förslag bedöms sammantagna vara kostnadsneutrala ur ett statsfinansiellt perspektiv. Förslagen bedöms inte heller leda till ökade kostnader eller ökad administrativ börda för företagen generellt sett. För små och medelstora företags konkurrensförmåga i förhållande till stora företag innebär våra förslag vissa förbättringar. Remit of the inquiry Our terms of reference require us to undertake an open-minded analysis of how current procedures under the Competition Act are working in order to identify factors that may be slowing down the system. Using this as a basis, we are to present proposals for changes aimed at reducing the processing time for cases under the Competition Act (particularly cartel cases). Our task is primarily to consider an arrangement by which the Authority would be entitled to decide on financial penalties for infringing competition rules with the possibility of appeal directly to the Market Court. Secondly, we are to consider whether or not to introduce a leave to appeal procedure for the step between the Court and the Market Court. We are also instructed to consider whether, in view of Commu- nity law, there is reason to amend the wording of Article 23a of the Competition Act relating to decisions regarding acceptance of commitments, and if so, to present proposals for amendments. In view of the new EC Merger Regulation, we are also instructed to review the provisions of the Competition Act on mergers, and propose the necessary amendments to the Swedish regulatory sys- tem. We are to analyse in particular issues related to the substantive test, efficiency gains, the treatment of ancillary restraints, Swedish agencies assistance to the Commission in connection with inspec- tions and notification of mergers. It is also clear from our terms of reference that the new EC Merger Regulation may mean that the Swedish regulations also need to be amended in other respects so as to achieve the requisite legal equivalence between Community law and Swedish legislation, or for other reasons. We are therefore free to take up other issues that we believe need to be considered and to propose amendments to the legislation that we deem necessary. In addition, we are also instructed to assess whether the Swedish Competition Authority should be able to charge a fee for notifica- tions of mergers. Our terms of reference also require us to review the rules of the Competition Act on who is to be entitled to appeal certain of the Authoritys decisions. Our remit also includes proposing rules that express more clearly than hitherto the obligation to impose especially severe financial penalties for infringements of competition rules set in particularly serious cases. We are also required to examine the legislative proposals for criminalisation of cartel activities pre- sented by the Inquiry on modernisation of competition rules in its report entitled Competitive crime: A legislative model (SOU 2004:131). Our remit also includes a review of the structure and clarity of the Competition Act. Finally, we are required to present an account of the conse- quences of the proposals we have presented. We have not found support for any conclusion other than that the present system works relatively well. Some measures may be taken, however, to make procedures at the Authority and in the courts more efficient, appropriate and legally secure. These measures should be taken regardless of whether or not the Authority is granted decision-making powers. The Authority should strive to continue to improve the standard of its investigations and litigation and actively pursue more formalised, and thus more predictable proce- dures at the Authority. It should be left to the Authority to deter- mine the details of how and to what extent this should be done. In certain respects, however, we propose concrete changes that may help to raise the standards of the Authoritys investigations and lead to more formalised and predictable proce- dures at the Authority. With respect to the resources currently available to the courts, these appear to be sufficient to deal with matters and cases under the Competition Act at present. However, we consider that within the framework of the current reforms regarding the internal organisation of the courts, it should be quite possible to create an organisation that is better able to use the available resources. We do not propose any far-reaching changes in the procedural regula- tions. A necessary condition for procedures in courts to be efficient, appropriate and legally secure, however, is that courts make full use of the possibilities offered by the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure to exercise formal and material procedural leadership. It should, however, be left to the courts to determine in detail how these quality efforts should be managed in practice. We also propose concrete measures to make procedures at the Authority and in courts more effective. In order to make it easier for undertakings to make common cause with the Authority, and to achieve more efficient use of courts resources, we propose an option for the courts to consolidate cases concerning damages on grounds of competition law with cases concerning financial penalties for infringements of competition rules. The Authority should be enabled to combine decisions with a conditional penalty when the Authority accepts commitments in connection with a merger or in a case when the Authority is con- sidering requiring an undertaking to cease its infringement of one of the prohibitions in the Competition Act or the . Information that a witness or a party has presented at a hearing at the Authority should be brought for- ward at a hearing in a court, if the information given by the person heard differs from that persons previous statement or the person to be heard declares that he or she is not able or not willing to make a statement. The rules concerning legal costs should be amended so that the provisions of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure on dis- putes are applicable to matters and cases under the Competi- tion Act. A special provision should also be inserted into the Act to the effect that where a damages case is being processed jointly with a case on financial penalties for infringements of competition law, the party bringing the action for damages is only to be responsible for the special costs that party has caused, and that the Authority should not be held responsible for such costs. The rules of the Competition Act on statutory limitation with regard to financial penalties should be amended so that certain measures taken by the Authority during its inquiry into a case mean that the period of statutory limita- tion is restarted. An absolute statutory limitation period of ten years should apply, however. Should the Authority be able to decide on financial penalties for infringements of competition rules? We have not found sufficient reason for proposing that the Authority should be generally authorised to take the first legally binding decision on financial penalties. How- ever, there are decisive arguments in support of the Authority being allowed to take decisions on financial penalties in cases that are not contested. We therefore propose that the Swedish Compe- tition Authority should be enabled, in these cases, to formulate a draft decision that will be legally binding if accepted by the under- taking concerned (an injunction to pay a penalty). Leave to appeal in the step between the Court and the Market Court We propose that all the decisions issued by the Court in competition cases and competition matters that may be appealed to the Market Court should be subject to the requirement of leave to appeal. Even for cross-appeals and appeals in damages cases that have been consolidated with cases concerning financial penalties for infringements of competition rules, leave to appeal should be required. Leave to appeal should, however, not be required when appealing decisions of the Court regarding the issue of setting aside an injunction to pay a penalty. Grounds for exemption should be the same in the Market Court as in the court of appeal, when the reform of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure approved by the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) enters into force. Leave to appeal should thus be granted if it is important for guidance in the application of the law that the appeal is heard by a higher court (precedent exemption); if there is reason to doubt the correctness of the conclusion reached by the City Court (leave for reversal); if, without granting leave to appeal it is not possible to assess the correctness of the conclusions of the district court (examination exemption); or if there are otherwise special reasons for examining the appeal (extraordinary exemption). Partial leave to appeal should be available with regard to a part of the district courts decision or judgment where the out- come cannot affect the rest of the decision. In more straightforward cases, the chair of the Market Court should be able on his/her own to grant leave to appeal that is not limited to a specific part of a case or matter. Under Article 23a of the Competition Act, the Swedish Competi- tion Authority may accept commitments from undertakings. This provision should be amended so that it clearly states that the only legal consequence of the Authority accepting a commitment is that the Authority, in view of the commitment made, no longer has cause to intervene against the conduct in question. The new EC Merger Regulation and the provisions on mergers in the Competition Act There are strong arguments in support of ensuring that concrete assessments of mergers are identical, regardless of whether an examination is undertaken under the Competition Act or the EC Merger Regulation. If the provisions of the Competition Act are simplified in certain respects so as to more clearly reflect the actual meaning of Com- munity law regulations, it should be possible to enhance the effi- ciency and predictability of their application. Such a reform of the regulatory system in the Competition Act could also meet reasonable demands for readability and intelligibility, at least with regard to the main features of the system. With regard to the formal rules as well, there are strong reasons in favour of the main features of these systems being identical. However, the rules of the Competition Act should continue to reflect Swedish legal culture with regard to procedures at authorities and in the courts. We propose that the Competition Act should state that a merger arises via transactions leading to a lasting change in control over one or several undertakings. The Act should also state that the expression party in a merger refers to the person(s) who acquire control over one or several undertakings or parts thereof, the undertaking itself or each and every one of the undertakings that are merged. A special provision should also be included in the Competition Act making it clear that, if a merger consists of several transactions by which parts of one or several undertakings are acquired, these transactions should be treated as a single merger when estimating turnover. This rule should, however, only include transactions that take place within a two-year period. We consider that the provisions of the Competition Act prohi- biting mergers should be amended to the effect that a prohibition be imposed with regard to mergers that are liable to significantly prevent the existence or development of effective competition in the country as a whole or a significant part of it, if a prohibition can be imposed without setting aside essential national security or supply interests. The text of the Act must make it clear that, when assessing a case, particular account should be taken of whether a merger will lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Claims of efficiency gains and that one of the undertakings concerned is threatened by bankruptcy In our opinion, claims of efficiency gains and claims that one of the merging undertakings is threatened by bankruptcy should be assessed in the same under the Competition Act as under Community law. Explicit provisions that regulate such issues should not, however, be included in the Competition Act. As in Community law, such claims should be examined in the context of the substantive test. Ancillary restraints and the special grounds for assessment that apply to independently functioning joint in some cases We propose that a provision be inserted into the Competition Act that makes it clear that an examination of a merger includes the judicial acts that are fundamental to the initiation of the merger and such competitive restraints as are directly connected with, and necessary for implementing the merger (ancillary restraints). It should also be made clear in the Act that other competitive restraints that may occur in connection with a merger may be examined under the prohibitions of the Competition Act and the . No other rules on ancillary restraints should be included in the Competition Act. should the Autho- rity, in decisions under which the Authority takes no action against a merger, express an opinion on whether the agreements and procedures notified are to be regarded as ancillary or not. The present provision in Article 34b, first paragraph of the Competition Act, which regulates a situation in which the creation of an independently functioning joint venture should in certain respects be appraised in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the same Act, should be moved so that it is clear from the Competition Act that this is a matter of special grounds for appraisal when examining the merger. The present provision in the Competition Act concerning the procedural rules for mergers that are to be applied when examining ancillary restraints and joint should be repealed. In our opinion, the right of the Authority to accept commitments from undertakings in merger cases should be made explicitly clear in the Competition Act. The point of time for notifications of mergers and the possibility of sanctions etc. A provision should be incorporated into the Act requiring noti- fication of a merger to be made as soon as the parties or other participants can show that they intend to implement the merger. We also propose that it should be explicitly clear in the Com- petition Act that a merger that is subject to compulsory noti- fication must be notified to the Authority before it is implemented. In addition, it should be made clear in the Competition Act that no later than 25 working days after receiving full notification, the Authority must either issue a decision to undertake a special investigation of the merger or a decision not to take any action with regard to the merger. In our opinion, there are at present no practical reasons for proposing rules on direct sanctions against failures to fully meet notification obligations. have any other factors come to light that would indicate the need for closer consideration of whether the Authority should have the same possi- bility to impose sanctions and investigatory powers as the Com- mission. A provision should be incorporated into the Competition Act to the effect that the time limit for a decision by the Authority to conduct a special investigation of a merger or not to take action will be extended to 35 working days in cases where the parties have provided commitments. Assistance to the Commission We propose that the provision of Article 3, second paragraph of the Act on the application of and state aid rules, concerning the powers of the Authority when the Authority is assisting the Commission in investigations, should be repealed. In other respects, the regulations concerning Swedish authorities assistance to the Commission when it is conducting an investigation in are considered to be appropriate. Prohibitions pending final examination We propose that in ongoing cases concerning mergers, the Market Court should also be empowered to forbid the parties and other participants in the merger to take any action to complete the merger. Fees for notification of mergers We have not found sufficient reasons for proposing that the Authority should be entitled to charge a fee for notification of mergers. Who should be entitled to appeal certain Authority decisions? In our opinion, the provision on the right to appeal in the present Article 60, second paragraph of the Competition Act should be amended so that the concept of undertakings is removed. The text of the Act will then only prescribe that those who are affected by a decision of the Authority have the right to appeal. Provisions on the size of financial penalties for infringements of competition rules We propose that new, more precise rules on the circumstances to be taken into account when determining the size of financial penalties for infringements are incorporated into the Competition Act. This is primarily intended to make it easier for parties and courts to identify infringements that are particularly damaging from the point of view of competition and that deserve heavy penalties.