sou · GUB343 · 2007-01-01 00:00:00 — Utredningen har däremot funnit att det finns ett underlag för en avgiftsbelagd finansiering inom ramen för den statliga garantimo- dellen som kan komplettera den nivå som är möjlig att försäkra. Utredningen föreslår att regeringen av skall bemyndigas att mot en riskavspeglande avgift ikläda staten ekonomiska förplik- telser på atomansvarsområdet. En sådan förpliktelse bör enligt utred- ningens uppfattning i första hand utformas som ett återförsäkrings- åtagande. Utredningen gör bedömningen att en sådan finansiering av anläggningsinnehavarens ansvar kan vara motiverad upp till 1 200 mil- joner euro. Denna finansieringsnivå har utredningen funnit vara rimlig med hänsyn till de överväganden som gjorts internationellt med beaktande av å ena sidan de kostnader som kan vara förbundna med en radiologisk olycka och å andra sidan risken för en sådan olycka samt vidare med hänsynstagande till kärnkraftsindustrins sam- manlagda skatte- och avgiftspålagor. En annan omständighet som utredningen beaktat är att ett på förhand avgränsat belopp ökar möjligheten att finna försäkring på den privata mark- naden. Utöver den nivå , som utredningen före- slår att anläggningsinnehavaren till följd av det obegränsade ersätt- ningsansvaret själv skall finansiera, gäller i händelse av en olycka med katastrofala följder att det s.k. gemensamma statsansvaret enligt tilläggskonventionens tredje steg träder in i intervallet 1 200 till . Detta innebär att samtliga stater anslutna till tilläggskonventionen bidrar i förhållande till respektive stats kraft- produktion (baserad på kärnteknik) och till en mindre del i förhål- lande till bruttonationalprodukten. Om skadorna efter en olycka skulle överstiga även denna nivå kan det bli aktuellt att ta i anspråk anläggningsinnehavarnas samtliga tillgångar inom ramen för det obegränsade ansvaret. Någon garanti för hur långt dessa förslår finns inte och bedöms inte realistiskt kunna tillskapas av skäl som har nämnts. På samma sätt som gäller föreslår utredningen härutöver att ges en möjlighet att fastställa eventuell kompletterande ersättning efter särskilt beslut. Sådan er- sättning kan aktualiseras om en olycka får så extrema skadeverk- ningar att även nivån över tilläggskonventionen passeras och anlägg- ningsinnehavarens samlade tillgångar inte förslår eller staten bedömer att de lämpligen inte bör tas i anspråk inom ramen för en konkurs. Utredningens förslag innebär alltså sammanfattningsvis att ett obegränsat skadeståndsansvar för innehavare av kärntekniska anlägg- ningar som huvudregel skall vara täckt av försäkring eller annan finansiell säkerhet . I utredningens uppdrag har det också ingått att behandla frågor som hör samman med regleringen av skadorna vid en eventuell radiolo- gisk olycka. Efter en genomgång av de bestämmelser i gällande rätt som är av betydelse för skaderegleringen vid en radiologisk olycka konstate- rar utredningen att det i stort sett, liksom i de flesta andra konven- tionsstaters rättsordningar, saknas särskilda regler om hur skador efter en allvarlig radiologisk olycka skall regleras. Utredningen anser att detta är en brist och att det är att föredra att det finns ett på förhand utarbetat system för skadereglering. Inte minst är samordningen av ersättningsmedlen viktig eftersom dessa som nämnts kommer från olika källor. Utredningen konstaterar att en sådan samordning kan ske endera genom att staten ansvarar för skaderegleringen i dess helhet eller att ansvaret för skaderegleringen knyts till försäkringsgivaren. Det är också enligt utredningens mening möjligt att låta var och en av de aktörer som ställer ersättningsmedel till förfogande svara enbart för regleringen av skador hänförliga till de egna medlen och att komplettera denna ordning med en skyldig- het att samråda. En sådan samrådsskyldighet skulle kunna regleras i författning. Om ansvaret knyts till staten har utredningen funnit att ett system där skaderegleringen hanteras i domstol inte kan förordas. Enligt ut- redningens mening är det ett bättre alternativ att låta en myndighet eller nämnd sköta skaderegleringen. Utredningen konstaterar emel- lertid att det inte finns någon på förhand given myndighet för detta ändamål och finner därför också denna lösning mindre lämplig. Även om utredningen i och för sig anser att en skadereglerings- modell med en samrådsskyldighet skulle kunna vara en fullt tänkbar lösning förordar utredningen ett alternativ med en skadereglering där ersättningsmedlen koncentreras till Nordiska Kärnförsäkrings- poolen eller annan verksam direkt försäkringsgivare. Denna koncentration av ersättningsmedel kan ske naturligt genom att staten uppträder som återförsäkringsgivare inom ramen för den statliga garantimodellen. Den direkta försäkringsgivaren svarar då för skaderegleringen . När det gäller den ersättning av gemensamma statsmedel som eventuellt kan komma att betalas därutöver och krävs en avtals- reglering på förhand mellan försäkringsgivaren och staten som mot en skälig avgift binder regleringen av skador även för dessa ersätt- ningsmedel till den direkta försäkringsgivaren. Utredningen har vidare övervägt en kompletterande författningsreglering som i första hand skulle samla ersättningsmedlen för det fall någon ny svensk eller ut- ländsk försäkringsgivare, annan än Nordiska Kärnförsäkringspoolen, skulle aktualiseras . Utredningen har emellertid funnit att detta inte är någon framkomlig väg. Konsekvenser och genomförande av utredningens förslag Utredningens bedömning är att förslagen i betänkandet inte omedel- bart medför några ökade kostnader för det allmänna. För den enskilde anläggningsinnehavaren medför förslagen däremot ökade kostnader avseende försäkringspremier och statens avgiftsbelagda åtagande inom ramen för den statliga garantimodellen. Dessa kostnader be- döms, jämfört med de stora belopp som kraftproduktionen i landet genererar, bli måttliga och kan inte anses annat än marginellt på- verka den svenska industrins konkurrenskraft. Den nya lagen som föreslås och övriga lagändringar som aktua- liseras skall träda i kraft den dag då ändringsprotokoll till Paris- och tilläggskonventionen träder i kraft för . När detta kommer att ske är inte möjligt att fastställa. Rege- ringen bör därför av bemyndigas att bestämma dagen för ikraftträdandet. Basis of the Inquirys remit The Inquirys overall assignment has been to conduct a review of the regulations given in Swedish law on liability for damage caused by radiological accidents and to identify financial solutions that could provide a basis for covering the liability of operators of nuclear in- stallations as far as possible. The Inquiry sets out from the inter- national commitments that is bound by in the area and that have also been subjected to quite far-reaching review in recent years. The present Swedish regulations on liability for damage arising as a result of radiological accidents at nuclear installations and during carriage of certain types of nuclear materials or nuclear waste are pro- vided in the Nuclear Liability Act (Atomansvarighetslagen, 1968:45)1. This Act is based on international commitments. The conventions that bind , and that have been drawn up within the , are the 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the 1963 Supplementary Convention (as amended by the protocols adopted in 1964 and 1982). Corresponding international liability regulations in the area are given in the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, developed under the auspices of the , the . 1 It follows from the Inquirys proposals that the definitions given in the Nuclear Liability Act (Atomansvarighetslagen) will be changed. Under the Inquirys proposals, the concept atombränsle (nuclear fuel) and the first element of the concept atomsubstans (nuclear substance) will be replaced by the concept kärnämne (nuclear material), the second element of the con- cept atomsubstans and the concept radioaktiv produkt (radioactive product) will be replaced by the concept kärnavfall (nuclear waste), atomskada (nuclear damage) and atomolycka (nuclear incident) will be replaced by the concepts radiologisk skada (radiological damage) and radio- logisk olycka (radiological accident), and atomanläggning (nuclear installation) will be replaced by kärnteknisk anläggning (nuclear installation). Further, the Inquiry proposes that the prefix atom- shall be replaced by kärn- in the definition of a nuclear installation. The expression is the same in English, i.e. This summary uses the new definitions proposed by the Inquiry. are outside the Convention and the Supplementary Conven- tion are parties to the Convention. The Convention and the Supplementary Convention have now been amended in several important points by a protocol adopted in 2004. The process of revision has been greatly influenced by the previously conducted review of the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. The basic liability regulation remains unchanged in the revised conventions. This means that an operator of a nuclear installation (an operator) is liable without fault. The operator is therefore liable irrespective of culpability, i.e. on objective grounds, for damage that arises in connection with operation of the plant. The liability for radiological damage is channelled to the operator. With few excep- tions, this means that only the operator of the nuclear installation can be liable to pay compensation for radiological damage. In addition, even after the amending protocols, the Conven- tion and Supplementary Convention constitute a three-stage system of compensation. As previously, the first stage expresses the level of operator liability that applies under the Convention, but the level of liability is considerably raised and is now expressed as a lowest acceptable amount (reference amount). This must be covered by insurance or some other financial guarantee. This solution means that Convention States now have the explicit option to introduce unlimited third party liability for operators. The second stage, which under the Supplementary Convention consists of the interval between 700 and , assumes that liability rests with the state in which the liable operators in- stallation is located. This liability can diminish, or even disappear, depending on how far the first-stage liability of the operator itself extends. In the third stage, the Convention States are jointly liable under the Supplementary Convention for compensation in the interval between 1 200 and . points of the report accession to the amending protocols and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (radiological damage) The task of the Inquiry has been to investigate the conditions for Swedish accession to the amending protocols. The Inquirys deliberations have led it to conclude that should accede to the protocols amending the Convention and the Supplementary Convention as they entail an obvious im- provement of compensation protection in the event of radiological accidents. This means that the legislation must be adjusted and several central provisions amended (transformation) in order to bring Swedish law into line with the partially or completely new commitments that follow from the revised conventions. The Inquiry has also been instructed to assess whether should accede to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (radiological damage). This fourth convention in the area of liability has been developed at the and regulates compensation from public funds outside the Supplementary Con- vention. The convention has not yet entered into force. In the Inquirys view there is not sufficient reason at present for to accede to the Convention on Supplementary Compen- sation for Nuclear Damage (radiological damage). Proposed new act on liability and compensation in the event of radiological accidents The legislative amendments that the Inquiry considers necessary relate to a large number of provisions in the Nuclear Liability Act. They affect, for example, the scope of the Act, the definitions of certain concepts, the regulation of liability and levels of liability, the level of obligatory insurance, the rules on compensation out of public funds and the rules about competent courts. The Inquiry has also been instructed to propose possible measures to modernise the Nuclear Liability Act and make it more accessible. Consequently some provisions need adjustment in linguistic and other respects. The Inquiry has furthermore found there is reason to bring the present definitions of central concepts into line with more modern and more current usage. This means that the concepts atomolycka (nuclear accident) and atomskada (nuclear damage) will be replaced by radiologisk olycka (radiological accident) and radiologisk skada (radiological damage) respectively. The Inquiry also proposes re- placing the concepts atombränsle (nuclear fuel), atomsubstans (nuclear substance) and radioaktiv produkt (radioactive product) with the concepts kärnämne (nuclear material) and kärnavfall (nuclear waste). The changes are so extensive that this in itself – added to which the need for a new legislative structure – has led the Inquiry to pro- pose a completely new act on liability and compensation in the event of radiological accidents. The basic approach has been to start out from the present regula- tions given in the Nuclear Liability Act, analyse the amendments that are required or are considered appropriate following accession by to the amending protocols and, based on this, create more modern and more accessible legislation. It follows from the Inquirys proposals that the present Nuclear Liability Act will be repealed. The Inquiry proposes unlimited liability with guaranteed funding up to In the latest relevant legislative matter, which concerned the issue of increased third party liability for operators, the Government emphasised, as it has done elsewhere, that liability should rest in the first instance with the nuclear energy industry and that unlimited liability should therefore be introduced as soon as possible (Govt. 2000/01:43). The Inquirys remit has included giving special consideration to how unlimited liability for operators of nuclear installations should be implemented in Swedish law and to propose the level up to which this liability must be covered by insurance or other financial security. The Inquiry proposes that as a general rule, unlimited third party liability with financial coverage up to shall be introduced for operators of nuclear installations in . The Inquiry proposes further that in cases where radiological damage arises outside the Government shall have the option of directing that the operators liability to compensate shall be limited to the amount of liability that applies in the other state with regard to (reciprocity). Under the Inquirys proposal, however, such a limitation of the liability to compensate can never be considered with regard to states that have no nuclear installations in their terri- tory. The following sections describe the level up to which liability must be covered by insurance and the other securities and systems of compensation that have been considered capable of financing the unlimited liability. The first step towards funding liability: liability insurance Under the revised Convention the general rule is that an ope- rator is obliged to have liability insurance or other acceptable finan- cial security up to a sum of at least . The Inquiry has been able to establish that at present there is a lack of insurance capacity in the private market above a level of . This liability insurance then also covers damage caused by acts of terror. It has been established that even if acts of terror are excluded, the insurance capacity cannot be increased. It follows from this that in order to reach the reference amount set by the Convention, the operator is required to provide other acceptable security from up to at least . However, for certain types of less risky installations and for carriage that in view of the nuclear material or nuclear waste in carriage is considered to involve less risk, the Inquiry considers it essential that the Government has the option of deciding that the amount to be covered by insurance or other financial security can be set lower than . A provision providing a basis for lower insurance levels in these cases has therefore been pro- posed in the new act. On the basis of the revised Convention, however, the level of insurance must never be less than . The Inquirys proposals in this area mean that the state bears secondary liability for damage in the interval between the lower insurance level and . Additional steps: Funding to supplement liability insurance and financial solutions that can guarantee the operators unlimited liability One important element of the Inquirys task has been to consider what financial or legal solutions in the private market could prin- cipally serve to supplement liability insurance so as to achieve the highest possible levels of compensation. In view of the level of liability insurance available, the Inquiry has proceeded on the assumption that there is a need for a system in which financial guarantees or public commitments provided subject to charges are used as a supplement to liability insurance from upwards. As part of a legal solution the primary issue considered has been piercing the corporate veil. The Inquiry has arrived at the assess- ment that there is no legal possibility at present of securing additional assets alongside the operators share capital. In the opinion of the Inquiry, the principles concerning piercing the corporate veil that have developed in the case law do not imply that shareholders can become personally liable for the debts of the company in which they hold shares, or that the parent company can be forced to assume responsibility for the subsidiarys liabilities in situations where the operator is unable to compensate any persons suffering damage after a radiological accident. In addition, the Inquiry has made the assess- ment that at present introducing such an arrangement exclusively in the area of nuclear liability would have too far-reaching implica- tions. The other financial solutions that the Inquiry has considered are security interests provided by guarantees or pledges, systems in which compensation funds are built up, risk-spreading by pooling arrange- ments or bilateral agreements and a system of catastrophe bonds. After examining these financing solutions in the private market, the Inquiry concludes that there are no working solutions that can be regarded as a satisfactory alternative to insurance. To be sure, an ope- rators parent company may conceivably provide a guarantee for the interval between 550 and , but such a commitment is only a partial solution as it cannot realistically extend to sub- stantially higher levels. The Inquiry has found, on the other hand, that there is a basis for financing subject to charges within the framework of the state guarantee model, which can supplement the level that is currently possible to insure. The Inquiry proposes that the Government be authorised by the Riksdag to shoulder the state with financial commitments in the area of nuclear liability, against charges that reflect the risk. In the Inquirys view, such a commitment should preferably take the form of a reinsurance commitment. The Inquiry makes the assessment that such financing of the operators liability may be warranted up to . The Inquiry has found this level of financing reasonable with reference to the deliberations that have taken place internationally, taking into account on the one hand the costs that may be associated with a radiological accident and on the other hand the risk of such an accident, as well as the total burden of charges and taxes on the nuclear energy industry. Another factor that the Inquiry has taken into account is that having an amount that is limited in advance increases the likelihood of finding insurance on the private market in future. Above the level up to , which the Inquiry proposes the operator itself should finance as a consequence of the unlimited liability for compensation, the situation is that in the event of an accident with disastrous consequences the joint public responsibility provided for in the third stage of the Supplementary Convention kicks in for the interval between 1 200 and . This means that all States Parties to the Supplementary Conven- tion contribute in proportion to each states energy production (based on nuclear technology) and to a lesser extent in proportion to their gross national product. If the damage after an accident should exceed even this level, the question may arise of claiming all the operators assets within the framework of their unlimited liability. There is no guarantee of how far these assets would suffice and for reasons just discussed it is not considered realistically possible to obtain any such guarantee. Just as is now the case, the Inquiry pro- poses in addition to this that the Riksdag be given the option of setting any supplementary compensation by special decision. The issue of such compensation may arise if an accident has such extre- mely harmful effects that even the level above the Supplementary Convention is passed and the total assets of the operator do not suffice or the state considers it would be inappropriate to claim these assets in a bankruptcy situation. To sum up, the effect of the Inquirys proposals is therefore that an unlimited third party liability for an operator of a nuclear in- stallation should in general be covered by insurance or other financial security up to . The Inquirys remit has also included addressing issues associated with the settlement of claims in the event of a radiological accident. After going through the provisions in current law that are relevant to the settlement of claims in the event of a radiological accident, the Inquiry notes that by and large, as in the legal systems of most other Convention States, there is a lack of special rules for how to settle claims after a serious radiological accident. The Inquiry considers this to be a deficiency and believes it would be preferable to have a system for settling claims worked out in advance. The coordination of compensation funds is particularly important, since as mentioned these come from different sources. The Inquiry notes that such coordination can be achieved either by the state assuming overall responsibility for the settlement of claims or by the responsibility for settlement of claims being tied to the insurer. Another possibility, in the opinion of the Inquiry, would be to let each of the actors making funds available for compensa- tion responsible exclusively for the settlement of claims pertaining to their own funds and to supplement this arrangement by an obligation for them to consult one another. Such an obligation to consult could be regulated in legislation. If the responsibility is tied to the state the Inquiry has found that a system in which a court handles the settlement of claims cannot be recommended. In the opinion of the Inquiry, a better alternative is to let a government agency or board take care of the settlement of claims. However, the Inquiry notes that there is no agency that is obvious for this purpose in advance and therefore does not find this solution very appropriate either. Even though the Inquiry certainly considers that a claims settle- ment model involving an obligation to consult could be a fully con- ceivable solution, the Inquiry advocates an alternative model for settling claims in which the funds for paying compensation are consolidated in the Nordic Nuclear Insurers or some other direct insurer operating in the future.