sou · GUB374 · 2007-01-01 00:00:00 — Förslag: Börsens regler får inte hindra en deltagare att välja ett system för avveckling av de transaktioner som genomförts på den reglerade marknaden under förutsättning att förbindelserna och avtalen mellan det valda avvecklingssystemet och varje annat system säkerställer en effektiv och ekonomisk avveckling av transaktionen samt att har godtagit att det valda systemet används för avveckling av transaktioner på den reglerade marknaden. Enligt artikel 34.2 i MiFID ska medlemsstaterna kräva att de reg- lerade marknaderna ger alla sina medlemmar eller aktörer rätt att välja avvecklingssystem av de transaktioner som genomförts på den reglerade marknaden förutsatt att 1.förbindelserna och avtalen mellan det valda avvecklingssys- temet och varje annat system säkerställer en effektiv och eko- nomisk avveckling av transaktionen, och 2.den behöriga myndigheten som ansvarar för tillsynen över den reglerade marknaden har tillstyrkt att utnyttjande av ett annat avvecklingssystem av transaktioner som genomförts på den reglerade marknaden än det som valts av marknaden i fråga ger tekniska förutsättningar för att finansmarknaden ska kunna fungera friktionsfritt och korrekt. I 13 kap. 6 § i utredningens förslag till ny lag om värdepappers- marknaden finns bestämmelser om att en börs ska ha ändamåls- enliga regler för handeln på en reglerad marknad. Av reglerna ska bl.a. framgå bestämmelser om clearing och avveckling av de trans- aktioner som genomförts. Utredningen har uppmärksammats på att det i dess huvud- betänkande saknas förslag som genomför artikel 34.2 i MiFID. Denna fråga är emellertid mycket komplicerad. Det finns inte förutsättningar för aktörerna på en börs att välja avvecklings- system, eftersom en börs måste arbeta med standardiserade villkor när det gäller tid och plats för leverans och det saknas sådan för- bindelse mellan avvecklingssystemen i olika länder som gör det möjligt att fritt välja avvecklingssystem. Det pågår visserligen ett intensivt arbete inom EU på dessa frågor, men detta arbete har inte avancerat så långt att det går att överblicka om det inom överskådlig tid kommer att finnas förutsättningar för aktör- erna att välja avvecklingssystem utan att detta drar med sig skilda börslistor för olika system, något som inte kan vara tanken med artikeln. Detta skulle nämligen omöjliggöra eller i varje fall kraftigt försvåra en effektiv börshandel. Inom utredningen har ifrågasatts om det är meningsfullt att genomföra den aktuella artikeln, innan man vet om den kommer att svara mot en realitet, eftersom det kan hävdas att bestämmelser i ämnet blir missvisande. Att underlåta detta skulle emellertid innebära ett åsidosättande av den genomförande- plikt som gäller för medlemsstaterna. Utredningen har därför stannat för att komplettera sitt förslag med en bestämmelse mot- svarande artikel 34.2 i MiFID. Det är dock knappast tänkbart att det redan när de nya reglerna träder i kraft skulle kunna finnas för- utsättningar för val mellan andra avvecklingssystem än sådana där de aktuella marknadsplatserna, clearingorganisationerna eller cen- trala värdepappersförvararna genom avtal eller andra arrangemang har skapat länkar i syfte att möjliggöra gränsöverskridande clearing och avveckling (jfr kommissionens arbetsdokument om hantering av värdepappersaffärer efter handel, publicerat på kommissionens hemsida). Utredningen vågar inte ha någon upp- fattning i frågan om eller när det över huvud taget är eller kommer att vara tekniskt och praktiskt möjligt att skapa sådana förut- sättningar. Utredningen föreslår att kompletteringen sker genom att ett nytt stycke införs i 13 kap. 6 § lagen om värdepappersmarknaden. Detta bör innehålla att börsens regler inte får hindra en deltagare att välja ett system för avveckling av de transaktioner som genom- förts på den reglerade marknaden under förutsättning att 1) för- bindelserna och avtalen mellan det valda avvecklingssystemet och varje annat system säkerställer en effektiv och ekonomisk avveck- ling av transaktionen, och 2) har godtagit att det aktuella avvecklingssystemet används för avveckling av sådana transaktioner. Det bör därvid inte krävas att inspektionen har med- delat ett formligt beslut om godkännande utan endast att den inte gjort någon erinran med anledning av underrättelse om att exem- pelvis en viss länk för avveckling avses bli tillämpad. Inspektionen har därvid givetvis anledning att främst beakta intresset av att marknaden kan fungera effektivt och korrekt. 3.4Några rättelser i huvudbetänkandet Utredningen vill utnyttja tillfället att göra några rättelser av fel- skrivningar i författningsförslaget i huvudbetänkandet som upptäckts. Dessa felskrivningar är följande. -I 2 kap. 4 § 6 står stöd sitt. Det ska i stället stå stöd av sitt. -I 8 kap. 2 § görs en hänvisning till 4 kap. 1 § första stycket 2. Hänvisningen ska i stället göras till punkt 1 i samma stycke. -I 8 kap. 33 § 10 bör ordet lämplighetsprövning ersättas med ordet prövning. -I 11 kap. 3 § bör ersättas med riksbank. -Punkt 3 i övergångsbestämmelserna har fallit bort. Någon text saknas dock inte utan punkt 4 ska rätteligen benämnas punkt 3 osv. KOMMISSIONENS FÖRSLAG TILL GENOMFÖRANDEDIREKTIV COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES [Institutional Reference] implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms, and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive Note: this draft text is based on the text approved by 2006 (with typographical corrections). It remains subject to Parliamentary oversight. The final text will be that adopted by the Commission (probably in ) and subsequently published in the . implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive (Text with EEA Relevance) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing Community, Having regard to Directive 2004/39/EC of Parliament and of the Council of on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC1, and in particular Article 4(2), Article 13(10), Article 18(3), Article 19(10), Article 21(6), Article 22(3) and Article 24(5) thereof, (1) Directive 2004/39/EC establishes the framework for a regulatory regime for financial markets in the Community, governing, among other matters, operating conditions relating to the performance by investment firms of investment services and, where appropriate, ancillary services and investment activities; organisational requirements for investment firms performing such services and activities, and for regulated markets; reporting requirements in respect of transactions in financial instruments; and transparency requirements in respect of transactions in shares admitted to trading on a regulated market. (2) The rules for the implementation of the regime governing organisational requirements for investment firms performing investment services and, where appropriate, ancillary services and investment activities on a professional basis, and for regulated markets, should be consistent with the aim of Directive 2004/39/EC. They should be designed to ensure a high level of integrity, competence and soundness among investment firms and entities that operate regulated markets or MTFs, and to be applied in a uniform . (3) It is necessary to specify concrete organisational requirements and procedures for investment firms performing such services or activities. In particular, rigorous procedures should be provided for with regard to matters such as compliance, risk management, complaints handling, personal transactions, outsourcing and the identification, management and disclosure of conflicts of interest. OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. (4)The organisational requirements and conditions for authorisation for investment firms should be set out in the form of a set of rules that ensures the uniform application of the relevant provisions of Directive 2004/39/EC. This is necessary in order to ensure that investment firms have equal access on equivalent terms to all markets in the Community and to eliminate obstacles, linked to authorisation procedures, to cross-border activities in the field of investment services. (5)The rules for the implementation of the regime governing operating conditions for the performance of investment and ancillary services and investment activities should reflect the aim underlying that regime. That is to say, they should be designed to ensure a high level of investor protection to be applied in a uniform through the introduction of clear standards and requirements governing the relationship between an investment firm and its client. On the other hand, as regards investor protection, and in particular the provision of investors with information or the seeking of information from investors, the retail or professional nature of the client or potential client concerned should be taken into account. (6)The form of a Directive is necessary in order to enable the implementing provisions to be adjusted to the specificities of the particular market and legal system in each . (7)In order to ensure the uniform application of the various provisions of Directive 2004/39/EC, it is necessary to establish a harmonised set of organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms. Consequently, Member States and competent authorities should not add supplementary binding rules when transposing and applying the rules specified in this Directive, save where this Directive makes express provision to this effect. (8)However, in exceptional circumstances, it should be possible for Member States to impose requirements on investment firms additional to those laid down in the implementing rules. However, such intervention should be restricted to those cases where specific risks to investor protection or to market integrity including those related to the stability of the financial system have not been adequately addressed by the Community legislation, and it should be strictly proportionate. (9)additional requirements retained or imposed by Member States in conformity with this Directive must not restrict or otherwise affect the rights of investment firms under Articles 31 and 32 of Directive 2004/39/EC. (10)The specific risks addressed by any additional requirements retained by Member States at the date of application of this Directive should be of particular importance to the market structure of the State in question, including the behaviour of firms and consumers in that market. The assessment of those specific risks should be made in the context of the regulatory regime put in place by Directive 2004/39/EC and its detailed implementing rules. decision to retain additional requirements should be made with proper regard to the objectives of that Directive to remove barriers to the cross-border provision of investment service by harmonising the initial authorisation and operating requirements for investment firms. (11)Investment firms vary widely in their size, their structure and the nature of their business. A regulatory regime should be adapted to that diversity while imposing certain fundamental regulatory requirements which are appropriate for all firms. Regulated entities should comply with their high level obligations and design and adopt measures that are best suited to their particular nature and circumstances. (12)However, a regulatory regime which entails too much uncertainty for investment firms may reduce efficiency. Competent authorities are expected to issue interpretative guidance on provisions on this Directive, with a view in particular to clarifying the practical application of the requirements of this Directive to particular kinds of firms and circumstances. Non-binding guidance of this kind might, among other things, clarify how the provisions of this Directive and Directive 2004/39/EC apply in the light of market developments. To ensure a uniform application of this Directive and Directive 2004/39/EC, the Commission may issue guidance by way of interpretative communications or other means. Furthermore, the Committee of Regulators may issue guidance in order to secure convergent application of this Directive and Directive 2004/39/EC by competent authorities. (13)The organisational requirements established under Directive 2004/39/EC are without prejudice to systems established by national law for the registration of individuals working within investment firms. (14)For the purposes of the provisions of this Directive requiring an investment firm to establish, implement and maintain an adequate risk management policy, the risks relating to the firms activities, processes and systems should include the risks associated with the outsourcing of critical or important functions or of investment services or activities. Such risks should include those associated with the firms relationship with the service provider, and the potential risks posed where the outsourced activities of multiple investment firms or other regulated entities are concentrated within a limited number of service providers. (15)The fact that risk management and compliance functions are performed by the same person does not necessarily jeopardise the independent functioning of each function. The conditions that persons involved in the compliance function should not also be involved in the performance of the functions that they monitor, and that the method of determining the remuneration of such persons should not be likely to compromise their objectivity, may not be proportionate in the case of small investment firms. However, they would only be disproportionate for larger firms in exceptional circumstances. (16)A number of the provisions of Directive 2004/39/EC require investment firms to collect and maintain information relating to clients and services provided to clients. Where those requirements involve the collection and processing of personal data, firms should ensure that they comply with national measures implementing Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. (17)Where successive personal transactions are carried out on behalf of a person in accordance with prior instructions given by that person, the obligations under the provisions of this Directive relating to personal transactions should not apply separately to each such successive transaction if those instructions remain in force and unchanged. Similarly, those obligations should not apply to the termination or withdrawal of such instructions, provided that any financial instruments which had previously been acquired pursuant to the instructions are not disposed of at the same time as the instructions terminate or are withdrawn. However, those obligations should apply in relation to a personal transaction, or the commencement of successive personal transactions, carried out on behalf of the same person if those instructions are changed or if new instructions are issued. (18)Competent authorities should not make the authorisation to provide investment services or activities subject to a general prohibition on the outsourcing of one or more critical or important functions or investment services or activities. Investment firms should be allowed to outsource such activities if the outsourcing arrangements established by the firm comply with certain conditions. (19)For the purposes of the provisions of this Directive setting out conditions for outsourcing critical or important operational functions or investment services or activities, an outsourcing that would involve the delegation of functions to the extent that the firm becomes a letter box entity should be considered to undermine the conditions with which the investment firm must comply in order to be and remain authorised in accordance with Article 5 of Directive 2004/39/EC. (20)The outsourcing of investment services or activities or critical and important functions is capable of constituting a material change of the conditions for the authorisation of the investment firm, as referred to in Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/39/EC. If such outsourcing arrangements are to be put in place after the investment firm has obtained an authorisation according to the provisions included in Chapter I of Title II of Directive 2004/39/EC, those arrangements should be notified to the competent authority where required by Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/39/EC. (21)Investment firms are required by this Directive to give the responsible competent authority prior notification of any arrangement for the outsourcing of the management of retail client portfolios that it proposes to enter into with a service provider located in a third country, where certain specified conditions are not met. However, competent authorities are not expected to authorise or otherwise approve any such arrangement or its terms. The purpose of the notification, rather, is to ensure that the competent authority has the opportunity to intervene in appropriate cases. It is the responsibility of the investment firm to negotiate the terms of any outsourcing arrangement, and to ensure that those terms are consistent with the obligations of the firm under this Directive and Directive 2004/39/EC, without the formal intervention of the competent authority. (22)For the purposes of regulatory transparency, and in order to ensure an appropriate level of certainty for investment firms, this Directive requires each competent authority to publish a statement of its policy in relation to the outsourcing of retail portfolio management to service providers located in third countries. That statement must set out examples of cases where the competent authority is unlikely to object to such outsourcing, and must include an explanation of why outsourcing in such cases is unlikely to impair the ability of the firm to comply with the general conditions for outsourcing under this Directive. In providing that explanation, a competent authority should always indicate the reasons why outsourcing in the cases in question would not impede the effectiveness of its access to all the information relating to the outsourced service that is necessary for the authority to carry out its regulatory functions in respect of the investment firm. (23)Where an investment firm deposits funds it holds on behalf of a client with a qualifying money market fund, the units in that money market fund should be held in accordance with the requirements for holding financial instruments belonging to clients. (24)The circumstances which should be treated as giving rise to a conflict of interest should cover cases where there is a conflict between the interests of the firm or certain persons connected to the firm or the firms group and the duty the firm owes to a client; or between the differing interests of two or more of its clients, to whom the firm owes in each case a duty. It is not enough that the firm may gain a benefit if there is not also a possible disadvantage to a client, or that one client to whom the firm owes a duty may make a gain or avoid a loss without there being a concomitant possible loss to another such client. (25)Conflicts of interest should be regulated only where an investment service or ancillary service is provided by an investment firm. The status of the client to whom the service is provided – as either retail, professional or eligible counterparty – is irrelevant for this purpose. (26)In complying with its obligation to draw up a conflict of interest policy under Directive 2004/39/EC which identifies circumstances which constitute or may give rise to a conflict of interest, the investment firm should pay special attention to the activities of investment research and advice, proprietary trading, portfolio management and corporate finance business, including underwriting or selling in an offering of securities and advising on mergers and acquisitions. In particular, such special attention is appropriate where the firm or a person directly or indirectly linked by control to the firm performs a combination of two or more of those activities. (27)Investment firms should aim to identify and manage the conflicts of interest arising in relation to their various business lines and their groups activities under a comprehensive conflicts of interest policy. In particular, the disclosure of conflicts of interest by an investment firm should not exempt it from the obligation to maintain and operate the effective organisational and administrative arrangements required under Article 13(3) of Directive 2004/39/EC. While disclosure of specific conflicts of interest is required by Article 18(2) of Directive 2004/39/EC, an over- reliance on disclosure without adequate consideration as to how conflicts may appropriately be managed is not permitted. (28)Investment research should be a sub-category of the type of information defined as a recommendation in Commission Directive 2003/125/EC of implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of Parliament and of the Council as regards the fair presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest2, but it applies to financial instruments as defined in Directive OJ L 339, 24.12.2003, p. 2004/39/EC. Recommendations, of the type so defined, which do not constitute investment research as defined in this Directive are nevertheless subject to the provisions of Directive 2003/125/EC as to the fair presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest. (29)The measures and arrangements adopted by an investment firm to manage the conflicts of interests that might arise from the production and dissemination of material that is presented as investment research should be appropriate to protect the objectivity and independence of financial analysts and of the investment research they produce. Those measures and arrangements should ensure that financial analysts enjoy an adequate degree of independence from the interests of persons whose responsibilities or business interests may reasonably be considered to conflict with the interests of the persons to whom the investment research is disseminated. (30)Persons whose responsibilities or business interests may reasonably be considered to conflict with the interests of the persons to whom investment research is disseminated should include corporate finance personnel and persons involved in sales and trading on behalf of clients or the firm. (31)Exceptional circumstances in which financial analysts and other persons connected with the investment firm who are involved in the production of investment research may, with prior written approval, undertake personal transactions in instruments to which the research relates should include those circumstances where, for personal reasons relating to financial hardship, the financial analyst or other person is required to liquidate a position. (32)Small gifts or minor hospitality below a level specified in the firms conflicts of interest policy and mentioned in the summary description of that policy that is made available to clients should not be considered as inducements for the purposes of the provisions relating to investment research. (33)The concept of dissemination of investment research to clients or the public should not include dissemination exclusively to persons within the group of the investment firm. (34)Current recommendations should be considered to be those recommendations contained in investment research which have not been withdrawn and which have not lapsed.