sou · GUB350 · 2007-01-01 00:00:00 — Beträffande handelsstopp föreslår utredningen att dagens bestämmelser ändras så att det i enlighet med MiFID blir tydligt att det är Finans- inspektionens beslut om handelsstopp av ett instrument på en marknadsplats som ska leda till handelsstopp även på andra mark- nadsplatser. Tillsyn och sanktioner (kap. 14) Genom införlivandet av marknadsmissbruksdirektivet, prospekt- direktivet och öppenhetsdirektivet har kon- trollmöjligheter och sanktioner utvidgats på flera områden. Listan på kontrollmöjligheter och sanktioner i MiFID är ungefär den- samma som i nämnda direktiv. Utredningen konstaterar att redan har flertalet av de kontrollmöjligheter en behörig myndighet ska ha enligt MiFID. För att hålla samman de regler som införlivar MiFID föreslår dock utredningen att bestäm- melserna om inspektionens tillsynsbefogenheter beträffande värde- pappersinstitut och reglerade marknader samlas i lagen om värde- pappersmarknaden. Rätten att företa platsundersökningar har i tidigare lagstiftnings- ärenden ansetts följa av de tillståndspliktiga företagens skyldighet att lämna de upplysningar inspektionen behöver. En uttrycklig lag- regel avseende platsundersökningar har dock i samband med genomförandet av prospektdirektivet införts beträffande börser och auktoriserade marknadsplatser. Utredningen föreslår därför att regeln om platsundersökningar i lagen om värdepappersmarknaden också ska gälla värdepappersinstitut. I MiFID anges att den behöriga myndigheten åtminstone ska ha rätt att tillfälligt återkalla ett tillstånd. Utredningen konstaterar i denna del att direktivet i och för sig kan tolkas så att rätten att definitivt återkalla tillståndet uppfyller direktivets krav på att åtminstone kunna återkalla tillståndet. Utredningen anser dock att ett tillfälligt återkallande av tillståndet kan vara en lämplig sank- tionsmöjlighet, t.ex. i de fall då ett värdepappersinstitut missköter en av de verksamheter institutet har tillstånd till så allvarligt att det i och för sig är motiverat men en återkallelse men att det går att konstatera att bristerna kommer att åtgärdas. Utredningen föreslår därför att ges rätta att tillfälligt åter- kalla tillstånd för värdepappersinstitut och börser. I kapitlet behandlas också de nya sanktionsmöjligheterna, t.ex. straffavgifter, som i har införts på bankområdet. För att samordna reglerna på värdepappersområdet med reglerna i lagen om bank- och finansieringsrörelse och åstadkomma konkurrens- neutralitet förslår utredningen att samma sanktionssystem som för banker, inklusive straffavgifter och förseningsavgifter, införs i lagen om värdepappersmarknaden. Samarbete mellan behöriga myndigheter (kap. 15) MiFID:s regler om gränsöverskridande verksamhet och filialetable- ringar bygger som nämnts på principen att ett tillstånd i ett land inom EES ska vara tillräckligt för att ett företag ska kunna driva sin verksamhet även i andra länder inom EES, det s.k. Europapasset. Företaget står enligt huvudregeln under tillsyn av den behöriga myndigheten i det land där företaget fått tillstånd. Detta gäller också om ett företag bedriver gränsöverskridande verksamhet. För filialer har dock värdmedlemsstaten ansvaret för övervakningen av filialens verksamhet i vissa avseenden – t.ex. beträffande de reglerna om skydd för investerare. För att Europapasset och den beskrivna delade tillsynen ska fungera krävs ett samarbete mellan de behöriga myndigheterna och att myndigheterna utbyter information. I MIFID finns en rad regler om hur samarbetet och informations- utbytet ska gå till. Utredningen föreslår att dessa delar av direktivet införlivas genom en allmänt hållen bestämmelse om att Finans- inspektionen ska samarbeta och utbyta information med andra behöriga myndigheter inom EES i den utsträckning som följer av MiFID. Utredningen föreslår också att bestämmelserna om Finans- inspektionens tillsynsbefogenheter utformas så att inspektionen direkt kan ingripa mot filialer genom rättelseföreläggande när det gäller efterlevnaden av kundskyddsreglerna, transaktionsrapporte- ringen och de genomlysningsregler som gäller värdepappersinstitut. ska i sådana fall underrätta den behöriga myn- digheten i företagets hemmedlemsstat om företaget inte följer före- läggandet. När det gäller gränsöverskridande verksamhet och de delar av filialverksamheten som inspektionen inte har tillsynsansvaret för förslår utredningen att inspektionen ska underrätta den behöriga myndigheten i företagets hemland om verksamheten strider mot de regler som antagits med stöd av MiFID. Om företaget trots detta fortsätter handla på ett sätt som tydligt skadar investerarnas intres- sen eller leder till att marknaderna inte fungerar korrekt får inspektionen förbjuda företaget att genomföra transaktioner i . Motsvarande förfarande ska också, enligt utredningens förslag, tillämpas på reglerade marknader och MTF:er utanför om svenska företag deltar i handeln. Konsekvenser (kap. 17) Införlivandet av MiFID i svensk rätt kommer att innebära en rad förändringar i det befintliga regelverket. Även om det i flertalet fall inte är fråga om några genomgripande förändringar innebär det stora antalet ändringar ökade kostnader för , värdepappersinstituten och börserna. Några av de föreslagna för- ändringarna – t.ex. kravet på transaktionsrapportering – är dock mer genomgripande och i avsnittet görs en uppskattning av de kostnader dessa krav kan komma att medföra. Kostnaderna kan dock ännu inte bedömas med någon närmare precision, bl.a. efter- som de är beroende av vilka föreskrifter kom- mer att meddela. Utredningen konstaterar också att de nya kraven på genomlysning och de ökade möjligheterna till konkurrens mel- lan olika marknadsplatser å den ena sidan innebär en risk för frag- mentisering av handeln men å den andra sidan kan ha positiva effekter på lite . In , Parliament and the Council adopted a Directive on markets in financial instruments (MiFID). MiFID replaces the Directive (ISD) from 1993. The Member States are required by MiFID to incorporate common rules regarding investment firms and regulated markets – i.e. the operation that is conducted in by stock exchanges and authorised market places. MiFID, which is an extraordinarily extensive and complicated directive, has been prepared within the framework of the Lamfalussy Process (see further details of what this entails in Chapter 6). As a step in this process, the Com- mission will adopt two legal instruments with supplementary provisions: a directive and a regulation. At the time this report is submitted, these two legal instruments are still only drafts. The Implementing Directive will be incorporated into Swedish law while the Implementing Regulation applies directly. The main task of the Committee has been to analyse what changes need to be made to the current Swedish rules in order to implement MiFID. Furthermore, the mandate has also included, among other things, a review of (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority – FI) sanction powers, the responsibility that should have for the deter- mination of the listing requirements on regulated markets and the handling of conflicts of interest within investment firms and stock exchanges. Following an introduction, where the preconditions for the work of the Committee and the conduct of the work are described (Chapter 1), the Committee briefly describes the applicable condi- tions in the securities market area (Chapter 2), following which a brief presentation is provided of MiFID (Chapter 3). Following this there is a chapter on financial trade in (Chapter 4) and one regarding the fundamental bases for financial control (Chapter 5). The sections of the report dealing with proposals comprise Chapters 6 to 18. describes below the most im- portant proposals contained in the various chapters of the report. Certain principles for new regulation (Chapter 6) In this chapter, the Committee considers various issues of prin- ciple. The Committee concludes that MiFID in many respects entails a full harmonisation – i.e. the Member States may neither introduce more stringent nor less extensive rules than those prescribed by the Directive and the implementing measures. This applies to the areas that are covered by the Implementing Regula- tion but also, according to the main rule, the areas that are covered by the Implementing Directive. The Implementing Directive contains an express prohibition of national rules that impose further provisions beyond the common system of rules (referred to as goldplating). According to Article 4 of the Implementing Direc- tive, the Member States may not introduce any such rules, except in certain exceptional cases. proposes in this chapter that MiFID is imple- mented by a new act replacing both the Securities Business Act and the Operations Act. The Com- mittee also proposes that the Implementing Directive should largely be incorporated through regulations. It is also proposed that those parts of the Implementing Regulation where the Mem- ber States have been granted powers to introduce supplementary rules be implemented through regulations. The terminology in the new act should follow the terminology contained in MiFID in order to facilitate the application of the Implementing Regulation and the wording of the regulations incorporating the Implementing Directive. Terminological uniformity will also facilitate the ambi- tion of achieving similar regulation within the EEA. In this chapter, it is also proposed that should be a competent authority according to Article 48.1 of MiFID, i.e. the authority that is responsible for enforcement of the provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive. Scope (Chapter 7) MiFID contains a number of new definitions and terms. Examples of this are financial instruments, investment services, ancillary services and regulated markets. The scope of the Directive is determined by the definitions of what are deemed to be financial instruments, what investment services are subject to a licence obligation and what constitutes a regulated market. The Com- mittee proposes in these respects that the Swedish definitions are adapted both substantively and as regards terminology to the definitions contained in MiFID. As regards the term financial instruments, the proposal of the Committee means that a new definition of this term will be intro- duced and that definitions of transferable securities, fund units, money-market instruments and certain derivative instruments will be included in the Swedish Act. The area subject to a licence obligation for the investment firms contained in MiFID – the investment services – closely corres- ponds with what constitutes a securities undertaking subject to a licence obligation according to the Securities Business Act. Similarly, the ancillary services referred to in MiFID correspond to the ancillary operations referred to in the Swedish Act. However, none of the individual operations described in the Swedish Act correspond completely with the closest corresponding services as defined by MiFID. therefore proposes that the description of the services subject to a licence obligation is adjusted in relation to the current Swedish statutory provisions, so that each service corresponds both substantively and terminologically to a service according to MiFID. This chapter also deals with the new investment services invest- ment advice and MTF. These services are new investment services in relation to ISD but have been possible to be conducted in Swe- den and other Member States pursuant to a licence for other investment and ancillary services. The term MTF means a Multi- lateral Trading Facility that is conducted by a investment firm or a stock exchange and combines several buy and sell interests in financial instruments from a third party – within the system and in accordance with non-arbitrary rules – but which is not subject to regulation as extensive as that in a regulated market. The term regulated market in its turn corresponds most closely to a stock exchange operation. The term is of importance both for the application of MiFID and for the application of a number of other Directives. It is when an instrument is admitted to trading on a regulated market that, for example, the requirements for a prospectus according to the Prospectus Directive, the issuers obli- gations to provide information according to the Transparency Directive and the requirements for public offers according to the Take-over Directive become applicable. proposes in this chapter that market places that are currently stock exchanges and authorised market places according to the Act are defined as regulated markets. also proposes that a distinction is made so that the term regulated market refers to the actual market place and the party who operates the market place is called a stock exchange. According to the Committees proposal, it should be possible for a stock exchange to operate several regulated markets. It should also be possible for a stock exchange to operate a regulated market in such a way that the trading system itself is within a legal person other than the stock exchange. However, all obligations according to MiFID are imposed on the party operating the market, i.e. the stock exchange. This chapter also deals with the classification of clients as professional and retail clients and other equal counterparties, which is new to Swedish law. The client protection rules contained in MiFID apply to both professional and retail clients. However, when the firm provides services to retail clients, the demands imposed on the investment firms are greater and more detailed. However, the rules on exchange of information, best execution, etc. do not apply at all in relation to equal counterparties. proposes in this situation that definitions, corresponding to the MiFID definitions of the various client cate- gories, be included in the Act. Finally, certain exemptions from the provisions of MiFID are dealt with in the same chapter. Licences for Swedish undertakings (Chapter 8) In this chapter, the Committee concludes that Swedish legislation broadly corresponds to MiFID as regards requirements for man- agement, ownership and capital. In these parts, the Committee only proposes a few minor adjustments, for example regarding capital requirements in relation to the new services investment advice and MTF, that the minimum number of members of the board should be three instead of five and that investment firms that are also credit institutes should not be subject to the mandatory liability insurance requirements. Among MiFIDs provisions on the requirements regarding the organisation of investment firms, there are rules that the firms should document services and transactions so that the competent authority will be able to verify that the firms have fulfilled their obligations under the Directive. In this respect, detailed docu- mentation requirements are contained in the implementing meas- ures only as regards certain services. At the same, it is stated in the Implementing Directive that the competent authority should prepare a list of the documentation to be kept by an investment firm. has interpreted this to mean that the Member States can specify the documentation requirements nationally regarding the services, for example investment advice and portfolio management, where the implementing measures do not contain detailed provisions. therefore proposes that the Government, or the authority appointed by the Government, is authorised to issue regulations regarding docu- mentation requirements. As regards the organisation a party operating a regulated market, MiFID, among other things, imposes the requirement that such a party must identify and deal with conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest can arise between the commercial interests of the stock exchange on the one hand and the super- visory function of the stock exchange on the other. There have been discussions about whether supervision should be attended to by someone other than the stock exchange – e.g. Finansin- spektionen. However, according to MiFID, it is an obligation of the Member States to ensure that a party operating a regulated market has efficient supervision of both the trade as such and issuers and participants. Anyone operating a market place also has a personal interest in ensuring efficient market supervision, regard- less of the public regulation. In purely practical terms, it is also the stock exchange that has the greatest opportunity to supervise, in an efficient , trade on a regulated market that the stock exchange itself controls and operates. To impose the primary responsibility for market supervision on would consequently entail a duplication and comprise a less efficient means of dealing with this task. that market supervision and supervision of issuers and participants, in accordance with MiFID, should be attended to by the party operating a regulated market, i.e. the stock exchange. In order to ensure that conflicts of interest that may arise with such a solution can be dealt with, the Committee proposes that a stock exchange should establish a function that is independent from the business operation to deal with supervision. This inde- pendent function should have sufficient resources and powers for the task in hand. Supervision by in this respect is thus oriented towards verifying that the market supervision is attended to efficiently and sufficiently independently. This chapter also deals with the tied agent phenomenon, which is new to Swedish law. According to MiFID, a tied agent can per- form certain identified investment services at the risk of an invest- ment firm without a licence. The preconditions for this are that the agent only acts for one investment firm, that the firm is responsible for the agents actions and that the agent is registered in a public register. proposes introducing the possibility of engaging tied agents in and that registration is effected at the Registration Office, as it is for affiliated insurance arrangers. Cross-border operations (Chapter 9) MiFIDs rules on Passport, the investment firms right to, with reference to a permit in its home country, provide services and establish branches in other Member States, basically correspond with those contained in ISD. Consequently, in principle no material amendments are proposed. Regulated markets do not have a direct equivalent to the Euro- pean Passport. However, MiFID contains some provisions on the possibility of implementing measures in other Member States in order to facilitate participation in trade from there. In accordance with MiFID, the Committee proposes that Swedish stock exchanges should report to if they implement such measures in other Member States and that the agency should forward this information to the competent authority in the Mem- ber State involved. Transparency (Chapter 10) MiFIDs provisions on prices and post-trade information (trans- parency) relate to trade through an investment firm, trade on an MTF as well as trade on a regulated market. One aim of the Direc- tive in this respect is to create competitive neutrality. However, this ambition has only been clearly expressed as regards informa- tion about trade relating to shares admitted to trading on a regu- lated market. It is intended that information regarding prices and transactions should be publicised regardless of where such shares are traded – on a regulated market, on an MTF or directly under the auspices of an investment firm, for example against its own stock or through a combination of two clients orders. The requirements for information regarding quotes and prices on a regulated market already exist in and the material amendment proposed by the Committee in this area is that the requirement for trading information regarding instruments other than shares is formulated in less detail in the Act compared with that today. also proposes that the requirements for information on trade on an MTF are formulated in a corresponding way. There is no express requirement for information about quotes for the investment firms transactions outside a regulated market or an MTF – except in certain cases as regards their liquid shares, see below. However, an investment firm shall publicise limit orders that cannot be effected immediately unless the client has otherwise instructed. Such publication can be effected by the order being entered into the trading system on a regulated market. The investment firms must also publicise information retroactively about closing prices, volumes, etc. as regards transactions with shares admitted to trading on a regulated market. proposes that new provisions corresponding to these requirements are included in the Swedish Act. The chapter on transparency also deals with the debated rules on the obligation of the investment firms to publicise firm quotes – and effect retail clients orders in relation to these quotes. These only apply to shares included for trade on a regulated market that are deemed to be liquid according to the computation models con- tained in the Implementing Regulation. The requirement to publi- cise quotes and complete transactions against the quotes applies to those investment firms that effect clients orders on an organised, frequent and systematic basis through making completing trans- actions against their own stock outside a regulated market or MTF, systematic internalisers. proposes that these rules are introduced into the Swedish Act. Reporting transactions (Chapter 11) The ISD already contains a requirement for investment firms to report all completed transactions to the competent authority – regardless of whether they have been effected on a regulated mar- ket or outside. This provision has, at least in , and , been incorporated by a reporting obligation to the mar- ket place where the security in question is listed. As the market place is normally subject to the supervision of the competent authority, this authority has in any event indirect access to the information. MiFID contains a similar requirement for reporting transactions regarding shares that have been accepted for trade on a regulated market to the competent authority. However, the requirement in MiFID is combined first with a requirement for the rapid exchange of information between the competent authorities, and second with a requirement that the investment firms should be able to report their transactions in four different ways: themselves; through a regulated market; through a third party; or through an order matching or reporting system. A national requirement to report to a regulated market would consequently violate MiFID. therefore proposes that the obligation to report transactions is formulated with four possible reporting routes, as in MiFID. MiFIDs rules on transaction reporting are minimum require- ments within certain limits. The Member States can also require the reporting of transactions regarding instruments other than shares admitted to trading on a regulated market. The Member States can also require that the reports should contain more information, for example about the end-user identity, than the minimum informa- tion that is required according to the Implementing Regulation. In this respect, the Committee proposes that the Act imposes requirements on reporting corresponding to the minimum requirements under MiFID. The question of whether the reports should contain more information, for example the identity of the end-user – something which would like – has been extremely controversial within the Committee. Such an increased reporting obligation has advantages from the monitoring perspective but is exceptionally expensive for the firms; it may be estimated to cost several hundred million kronor. The factual base currently available is not sufficient to be able to make a decision on this matter.