sou · GTB392 · 2006-01-01 00:00:00 — Regeringen tillsätter en stor mängd befattningar inom för- svaret. Utredningen föreslår att regeringen överväger att låta För- svarsmakten utse sin egen ekonomidirektör, chefsjurist och perso- nalchef. De informella kontakterna mellan Försvarsdepartementet och Försvarsmakten är frekventa. De är ofta viktiga. Utredningen före- slår att de stramas upp bl.a. genom att sammansättning, direktiv och avrapporteringstidpunkter mm för departementets arbetsgrup- per regleras i regerings- eller departementsbeslut. Utredningen föreslår att Rådet för insyn i Försvarsmakten av- skaffas. Det har inte fyllt det syfte som avsågs. Den sammanvävda verksamhet av försvarsmyndigheter som mo- dellen med den avgiftsfinansierade uppdragsstyrningen skapade utgör i stort sett ett självgående system, men även det behöver sty- ras. Det betyder att regeringen måste ta ett fastare grepp om styr- ningen och fastställa spelreglerna för myndigheterna. Utredningen föreslår att regeringen reglerar inom vilka områden stödmyndig- heterna får verka. Detta skulle tydliggöra förutsättningarna för uppdragsstyrningen. Utredningen har under styrning föreslagit att en samlad redovisning för det militära försvaret ska göras. Utred- ningen föreslår att regeringen ger i uppdrag till Försvarsmakten att redovisa om och hur utförarmyndigheternas tjänster kommit För- svarsmakten tillgodo. Utredningen föreslår även att stödmyndig- heterna redovisar nyckeltal på effektivitet och kostnadsutveckling, som kan läggas in i den årliga resultatsskrivelsen till . Det behövs nya mål för stödmyndigheterna, som bättre knyter an deras verksamhet till kraven på operativ förmåga. Inom Försvarsmakten kombineras två olika styrmodeller. Den ena är en centraliserad uppdragsstyrning och den andra är ett in- terndebiteringssystem med en beställar-/utförarrelation. Dessa båda modeller krockar och fördelarna med interndebiteringssyste- met kan inte utnyttjas till fullo. Utredningen föreslår därför att re- geringen ger i uppdrag till Försvarsmakten att anpassa sin interna styrning för att möjliggöra att fördelarna med interndebiteringssy- stemet kan få genomslag. Utredningen föreslår också att förband, skolor och centra själva ska få förhandla om sina hyror och lokaler direkt med Fortifika- tionsverket. Det skulle i kombination med en ändrad intern styr- ning ge förbättrade incitament för förbandschefer m.fl. att se över lokaleffektiviteten. Interndebiteringssystemet har givit en del fördelar, men det finns också brister i Högkvarterets styrning. Utredningen föreslår därför att Högkvarteret tar ett fastare grepp om interndebiterings- systemet genom att fastställa de regler, roller och ansvar som ska gälla för förband, skolor och centra. Högkvarteret bör också ta över en del av de kontrollerande uppgifter som ligger på FMLOG. Utredningen föreslår också att regeringen ger i uppdrag till För- svarsmakten att systematiskt gå igenom och pröva vilken under- hållsverksamhet som ska bedrivas inom ramen för Försvarsmakten och vilken verksamhet som kan läggas ut. Detta har endast skett sporadiskt tidigare. Principerna för prissättning inom FMLOG har frångåtts av För- svarsmakten. Hanteringen av överkapacitet och över- och under- skott stämmer inte överens med hur interndebiteringssystemet är tänkt att fungera. Utredningen föreslår därför att Försvarsmakten så långt möjligt avvecklar långvarig överkapacitet i FMLOG och att FMLOG tillåts att balansera över- och underskott för att uppnå nollresultat . Utredningen föreslår också att planeringsprocessen som sker i samband med uppdragsstyrningen förenklas och harmoniseras med interndebiteringssystemet. Antalet steg och aktiviteter i processen bör minska. Utredningen har inte funnit att det finns någon alternativ modell till den avgiftsfinansierade uppdragsverksamheten. Därför utgår utredningen från att modellen kvarstår som grundläggande princip. En del förändringar behöver dock göras. För att uppnå modellens syften bör användaren av en tjänst vara den som beställer och beta- lar. Utredningen föreslår därför att den internationella verksamhet som bedriver finansieras genom anslagsmedel direkt till myndigheten. Utredningen föreslår också att den del av mönstrings- och inskrivningsverksamhet som Försvarsmakten kan påverka också avgiftsfinansieras. Försvarsmaktens beställarkompetens är en viktig förutsättning för att uppdragsstyrningen ska fungera. Utredningen föreslår att Försvarsmakten arbetar systematiskt och kontinuerligt med att ut- veckla beställarkompetensen. Det kan bland annat göras genom att tillåta att personer på strategiska beställarfunktioner stannar på sina befattningar. Beställningsprocessen bör också ses över i syfte att förenkla och förkorta den. Processen för materielbeställningar är ett exempel på att beställningar av enklare tjänster har en lika omständlig process som komplexa tjänster. En grund för samarbetet mellan Försvarsmakten och övriga för- svarsmyndigheter utgörs av samordningsavtal. Dessa har fungerat bra. Utredningen föreslår dock att de ses över och kompletteras med klausuler som reglerar frågor om tvister, kvalitetssäkring, ut- värdering och återrapportering mellan myndigheterna. At the behest of the Swedish Government, the task of the Commission on Managing and Financing the Defence is to assess and evaluate the forms of governance and financing for military defence. The review covers the Swedish Armed Forces and the other central defence agencies, i.e. the , the , , the , and the . The Commission focuses, according to its directives, on how to improve the governance and monito- ring exercised by the Riksdag and the Government. The internal management of the Swedish Armed Forces and the use of the pur- chaser-provider-model are also discussed. The Commission sub- mits improvement proposals based on the results of its assessment. The commission has been authorized upon the request of the Riksdag. The Commissions points of departure Compared to many other central government activities, those of Armed Forces are very varied, extensive and complex. They are of outmost importance for guaranteeing the sovereignty and democ- racy of . The Armed Forces are undergoing an extremely radical transi- tion from defence against invasion to an operational defence force. This places particular demands on governance. The Commission feels, however, that there is sufficient room for necessary impro- vements in the forms of defence governance within the framework of the Swedish public administration model. The forms of governance are to be well suited to their purpose so as to maximise the impact of defence-related decisions taken by the Riksdag and the Government. The Riksdag shall be able to exercise its financial power regarding defence issues, as it is able to do within other areas. Within a clearly set framework, the appro- priate pre-conditions should be created for the Swedish Armed Forces to be able to supply the type of defence ordered by the Riksdag and the Government. The Swedish Armed Forces and other central defence agencies must therefore not only be governed individually but also jointly as a sector. The problems associated with defence governance have been highlighted many times in recent years in different contexts inclu- ding by the the standing committeeCommission on Defence of the Riksdag, government audit bodies, government commissions and the . The conclusions reached by the Commission in its assessment do not essentially change the problem scenario that has emerged. Defence governance exercised by the Riksdag Parliamentary governance by the Riksdag is a form of performance management that allows the Government and the Armed Forces considerable freedom to choose the means by which they imple- ment the defence-related decisions of the Riksdag within essenti- ally one single economic and organisational framework. The goals set by the Riksdag for the defence sector are specific objectives to guide the Government and the defence agencies as to which activities are to be pursued. It is difficult to determine whether these goals have been achieved. The reason for this is that the armed forces basically develop military units that stand in rea- diness and are not used for their actual purpose and therefore dont give rise to any direct effects. The Commissions opinion is that it is possible to formulate monitorable demands on operative capability (defence effect). This would necessitate a more precise definition of operative capability, however. Evaluations of this must be performed. Solely using simple key indicators cannot monitor goal achievement. The Riksdag needs background data that will enable it to follow the relationship between threat or crisis scenarios, required defence capability, the need for combat units and the costs involved. Such background data is currently unavailable to the Riksdag. It must also be possible to present the realistic costs involved in running an operational defence force, i.e. mechanised battalions, anti-aircraft battalions, surface combat , JAS 39 squadrons, etc. Neither the Government nor the Armed Forces are currently able to submit well-founded estimates of how much a specified operational defence force will cost. The Commission feels, howe- ver, that the situation is beginning to change for the better with the introduction of the Armed Forces new financial management system, which facilitates estimates of operational unit costs. An appropriations structure that corresponds to an organisatio- nal structure based on operative capability would provide the Riksdag with greater scope for governance. The Riksdag would then be able to exert direct influence when the requirements for operative capability are being considered. Regarding the issue of whether the Riksdag should decide on individual procurements of defence materiel, the Commission feels that the information recei- ved by the Riksdag, as a result of the detailed presentation in the Governments budget bill, is sufficiently comprehensive to allow the Riksdag to exert the necessary influence over materiel procu- rements and thereby exerting its financial power. The Riksdag decides on the basic organizational structure of the armed forces, i.e. its regiments, aircraft wings, schools, centres, etc., thereby limiting the scope of the Government and the Armed Forces to decommission or relocate a unit without parliamentary approval. The Government must have the consent of the Riksdag to undertake any changes in that structure. The day-to-day gover- nance of the defence organisation is left to the Government. The lack of coherence between defence and budget bills has pre- viously been a problem. The new system, whereby regular defence policy decisions are no longer taken by the Riksdag but are now part of the annual budget process, has solved this problem. The budget bill needs to be reformulated, however, so that it ties together long-term objectives with annual activities. Results, goal analyses and resource utilisation can also be presented to the Riksdag as part of a special communication, which could also give the Riksdag an overview of the activities conducted by the other central defence agencies. Monitoring the performance of the defence sector is relatively easy regarding the number of operational combat unitsset up and the total costs involved but more difficult when it comes to measu- ring the quality attained by the units. No evaluations are performed by independent actors (i.e. not from within the Armed Forces). European cooperation provides new scope for assessment within the military field, however, enabling Swedish units involved in international duties to be more easily evaluated. Defence governance exercised by the Government The governance exercised by the Government focuses almost enti- rely on the Armed Forces, which in turn governs the other defence agencies by allocating them tasks. Governance exercised by the Government of the other defence agencies manifests itself mainly by means of owner governance (i.e. the governance of agency efficiency and organisation). No other policy area is as comprehensively planned as defence. This planning involves assessment and analysis of both political and military actions. Politicians and military personnel must meet and have a dialogue on these issues in order to formulate proposals. The Government and the have to play a more role in the planning process. The large number of objectives set down in the appropriations directions given to the Armed Forces and other central defence agencies means that the agencies themselves must decide how to balance all the objectives and priorities. Instead of improving governance, this weakens it. The Government also defines appropriation items and maximum amounts for various purposes, large and small. Governance is however less detailed regarding actions to be taken to achieve ope- rational goals, apart from for intelligence and peace-promotion operations. On a number of occasions, the Government has altered the conditions on which the Armed Forces bases its planning by capping expenditure and reducing appropriations, which has led to consequences in the form of delays and price increases in conjunc- tion with the delivery of materiel. The Government doesnt instruct the operational force to do anything other than what the Riksdag has decided on, apart from decisions relating to levels of preparedness and materiel. Governance is now increasingly focused on specifying combat units and levels of preparedness. The Commission still feels, howe- ver, that the Armed Forces has considerable scope for making its own assessments of military unit design. The Government demands a large amount of information from the defence agencies. It is difficult for the Government to adopt positions on the information submitted. Evaluations make up only a small part of reporting requirements. There are several shortco- mings in the way the reporting requirements are formulated, howe- ver. Internal management exercised by the Swedish Armed Forces The use of the internal debiting system within the Armed Forces has provided benefits in the form of more time to tackle core acti- vities and better quality maintenance services. On the other hand, it conflicts with the centralised management system. Incentives for cost-efficiency are thereby removed. The control exercised by the Armed Forces Headquarters over its logistics arm, (), and the military units is also partly flawed and unclear. This concerns not only the ground rules but also accountability and the chain of management. The planning process in the internal debiting system is both complex and resource-demanding, allowing leeway for evalu- ation. The principles applied for pricing and over-capacity at FMLOG contribute to the non-fulfilment of the aims of the inter- nal debiting system. There is also a lack of economic perspective on the units, which affects the scope for linking activities and finances. This results in unit commanders not being held sufficiently accountable. The Purchaser-Provider relation between the Armed Forces and the other defence agencies The Purchaser-Provider model has come in for harsh criticism, but the Commission has not found a better model of governing the support to the Armed Forces provided by the other defence agen- cies. A closer review of the various support agency services indicates that the existing distribution of appropriations and fees is basically appropriate In order to realise the aims of the purchaser-provider model the basic principle should however be that the end-user of the service should also be the one who orders and pays for it. However some adjustments have to be made regarding the finan- cing of the enrolment and enlistment activities and of the international operations at the . Persevering with the Purchaser-Provider model brings added significance to the purchasing skills of the Armed Forces. These have in some respects improved in recent years, but the problem of high internal personnel mobility still remains unsolved. Neither does the Armed Forces carry out any systematic evaluation of the services provided by the support agencies. The Armed Forces is well placed to be able to control the price and resource consumption of a service, but seldom does so. The Commissions assessment is that it is important to pursue a discus- sion about prices and resource consumption when a purchase is made. The purchasing processes between the Armed Forces and the support agencies are sometimes not adjusted to suit the complexity of the various services, i.e. the process is complicated even if the service is simple. Materiel purchases are one such example. There is therefore reason to review the purchasing processes. Coordination agreements drawn up between purchasers and providers help to formalise the purchasing process. There is, howe- ver, no mention of how the tasks are distributed among the agen- cies regarding quality , evaluation and reporting. Defence governance in other countries The Commissions comparative study of defence governance in , , and the UK has produced a few gene- ral conclusions. Effective governance demands understanding and consensus in defence issues at an early stage. It also requires clearly formulated goals and a common understanding of what these entail as well as efficient monitoring and financial control systems. Closer coope- ration between military and civilian personnel when preparing deci- sion supporting documents results in better understood and more effective defence decisions. Overall analysis of governance in the defence sector There are good reasons for a discussion of the governance of the defence sector as a whole. The Commission discusses both the chain of governance (the Riksdag-Government-the Armed Forces- central defence agencies) and the Governments integrated gover- nance of the sector as a whole. Possibilities for the Riksdag to govern and control defence poli- cies and the Armed Forces have been weakened in several respects. achievement cannot be monitored, resource allocation and costs are not reported in ways relevant to policy goals and imple- mentation. The Purchaser-Provider model involves delegating decision- making regarding the type and scope of services and goods the Armed Forces should purchase from other defence agencies in order to achieve its goals. The Armed Forces themselves cannot hold them accountable, however, other than via the requirements specified in the purchase orders. This financing option and the wording of instructions given to central agencies allows and stimulates the support agencies to turn to outside the defence if orders from the Armed Forces decrease. According to the Commission, the Government should exercise a more integrated governance of the defence sector. The Government should consider what functions the agencies shall have and in what areas they shall operate. The responsibility for securing long-term planning in the various agencies also lies with the Government, especially when savings are to be made. The transition the defence is undergoing places particular demands on the Government to be clear on what has to be done and who is responsible. It also places demands on the communica- tion between the Riksdag, the Government and the personnel and management of the central defence agencies. Defence governance is also influenced by cultural differences between the political and military sphere. To overcome cultural differences politicians and militaries have to communicate extensi- vely in order to come to an understanding of the competences and work conditions of both parties. The Commissions point of departure is to keep within the frame- work of the Swedish public administration model. Governance exercised by the Riksdag The goals should on the other hand be sufficiently clearly defined so that an assessment can be made as to whether or not they have been achieved. Regarding operative preparedness capability, the Government should also report the status of the operational force and its state of preparedness. Prior to new operative capabilities being formulated in a way that enables them to be monitored and evaluated, the Riksdag should in future decide on the operational force. The Commission proposes that the Riksdag should decide on the main features of the operational force, i.e. type and approximate number of units. The Commission has not found grounds for altering the basic forms of financing the defence sector. The two appropriations placed at the disposal of the Government should be retained. The Riksdag should also decide on appropriations to the basic consc- ription at the and defence reserach carried out by and the . The Riksdag should also state an appropriate balance of resources going into national defence and international operations. Furthermore, the Riksdag should conti- nue to authorise the Government and the Armed Forces to pur- chase defence materiel. The Riksdags decisions on frameworks, the upward and downward adjustment of scope and appropriations should also be made simpler and more transparent. The Commission proposes that that the Government at first opportunity proposes to the Riksdag clear principles for when the Riksdag and the Government is to decide on the basic organisatio- nal structure of the Armed Forces. There are shortfalls in the decision supporting documents sup- plied to the Riksdag by the Government. The Commission there- fore proposes that the Government submit an annual scorecard, in the form of a consolidated report for the defence agencies which provides as well an overall picture of the entire military defence sector and its aggregated results as accounts for each individual The budget bill should also be shortened and focus on information that is relevant to parliamentary decisions. Separate defence bills should only be put before the Riksdag when impor- tant policy decisions are to be taken. Governance exercised by the Government The Governments governance and monitoring must be strengthe- ned. The Commission therefore proposes that a coordinating body be established for the defence sector, chaired by the State Secretary at the and including the supreme commander of the Armed Forces and directors-general of the defence agencies. Owner governance issues should also be given a prominent place in the activities of the Ministry and a chief administration officer should be appointed. There should also be a unit within the that is given the responsibility and resources to carry out evaluations. Efficient financial accounting is required in order for the Government to be able to exercise control over the defence sector. It is the opinion of the Commission that defence planning sho- uld be coordinated by the . The analysis, plan- ning and control capabilities of the Ministry should be strengthe- ned in order for it to manage this role. This can be achieved by rec- ruiting suitable personnel with the right skills to the Ministry. The threatening and conflict situations that form the basis of planning should be communicated to the Riksdag so that it can make infor- med decisions about the operational force. The Commission proposes that the Governments decisions on operative partial capability be supplemented by decisions on goals that are well suited to the activities pursued by the support agen- cies. In addition to this, the Government should also take decisions on concrete goals concerning, for example, military unit readiness horizons. The Government should also reduce the number of other goals, priorities, tasks and reporting requirements in relation to the defence agencies. The Commission also proposes that the large number of smaller maximum amounts be replaced by statements of accounts. As regards the major restructuring problems facing the armed forces, the Commission feels that the Government should be restrictive