sou · GTB310 · 2006-01-01 00:00:00 — Den av utredningen initierade uppföljningen av rutiner, arbets- former och myndighetsorganisation för tillstånds- och tilldelnings- processerna pekar också på att regelverket för systemet med handel med utsläppsrätter har fungerat minst lika bra som kunde förväntas med tanke på att det forcerades fram. Mot bakgrund av uppfölj- ningen vill delegationen dock peka på ett behov av ändring i regel- verket, nämligen att den installerade effekten som kriterium för att en förbränningsanläggning inom energisektorn skall ingå i systemet borde kompletteras med en nedre gräns för energiproduktionen under ett normalt år. Delegationen anser att regeringen bör pröva förutsättningarna för att ändra handelsdirektivet på den här punkten. On 1 January 2005, a scheme for trading in emission allowances (emissions trading) was introduced in the EU. This scheme is based on a directive (the emissions trading directive) that was formally adopted in October 2003.1 The trading scheme is an instrument of climate policy, aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the Union in a cost-effective and economically efficient way. It is a cornerstone of EU efforts to meet the Unions commitment under the Kyoto Protocol.2 Trading in emission allowances is based on the setting of a cap on total emissions for one year, for example, from the installations in a particular region included in the scheme. This does not, however, involve imposing a cap on emissions from individual installations. A certain number of tradable emission allowances are allocated to each installation covered by the scheme. One such allowance is defined, during the period 20052007, as the right to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2). Only installations that have obtained special permits are entitled actually to emit CO2. On the other hand, anyone legal entities and physical persons alike can buy and sell emission allowances. In aggregate, these allow- ances correspond to the cap on total emissions. The installations included in the trading scheme must then, at a defined date, be able to submit allowances corresponding to the respective installations actual emissions. Operators with high costs of reducing emissions will purchase emission allowances, which are offered on a market by operators with low costs of emission reduction. 1Directive 2003/87/EC of Parliament and of 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ No. L 275, Volume 46, 25 October 2003). 2The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. system of emissions trading comprises various phases. In the first (2005–2007), it is confined solely to CO2 emis- sions from installations in energy-intensive industry (production and processing of ferrous metals, , and paper, paperboard and pulp) and combustion units with capacity above a certain level in heat and power production. In the whole EU, the system covers roughly 12 000 installations; in , more than 700 are included. The work of the Commission on a system and regulatory framework for the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (the FlexMex2 Commission), begun in spring , has been mainly a matter of analysing the implications of the trading directive and of proposing principles and rules for its implementation in . The FlexMex2 Commission has previously issued three interim reports.3 With this final report, the FlexMex2 Commissions three- year assignment comes to an end. The final report has two main purposes. One is to summarise the work of implementing the trading directive and provide a clear account of the nature of the emissions-trading system. The second is to survey the future commitment periods of the trading system after 2007 and discuss requirements, if any, for changes in the governing conditions of the system and matters that may need regulating in the future. This discussion includes conditions for and consequences of the following options after 2007: including other sectors in the trading system (focusing primar- ily on the transport sector), including GHGs other than CO2 in the trading system, using the scope for allocating emission allowances in some other than allocation free of charge, using defined benchmarks in the allocation of emission allow- ances. The accounts of work to implement the trading directive (con- tained in Chapter 1) and the nature of the trading system (Chapter 2) are both summaries. There is therefore no reason to seek here to provide an even more condensed version of what these chapters contain. 3 Trading for a Better Climate (SOU 2003:60), Trading for a Better Climate – permits, allocation, etc (SOU 2003:120) and Trading for a Better Climate trading in emission allowances 2005–2007 etc (SOU 2004:62). Instead, the rest of this summary chapter is devoted to summa- rising the assessments reported by the FlexMex2 Commission regarding the need, if any, for changes in the conditions governing the system for the post-2007 period. In addition, we summarise observations and conclusions from an initial follow-up study of the routines, forms of work and government-agency organisation for the system of trading in emission allowances. The FlexMex2 Commissions view concerning whether to include the transport sector in the trading system In the FlexMex2 Commissions view, the Swedish Government should work for the transport sector to be integrated into the EU emissions-trading system. The FlexMex2 Commission considers that this should take place by means of a harmonised system com- prising all the Member States. Given the conditions imposed by the trading directive, it is probably not feasible to implement harmonised arrangements earlier than from the year 2013. The FlexMex2 Commission does not consider that should apply to integrate its own trans- port sector into the EU trading system unilaterally before this date. does the FlexMex2 Commission think that should develop a domestic system of trading in emission allowances within the transport sector. In the FlexMex2 Commissions view, emissions trading thus cannot be introduced for the transport sector except in the rela- tively long term. However, the CO2 emissions of the transport sector are substantial (domestic transport services, for example, account for nearly two-thirds of the Swedish CO2 emissions that will not initially be included in the EU emissions-trading system) and, moreover, increasing. Accordingly, a range of other measures are required to reduce emissions from this sector. Many measures of this kind have been implemented, are currently under way or have been proposed in recent years. In the FlexMex2 Commis- sions view, there should also be an investigation of the scope for combating the rise in emissions from the sector by means of the project-based mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, which is now coming into force. The FlexMex2 Commissions view concerning inclusion of GHGs other than CO2 in the trading system The Kyoto Protocol applies to a total of six greenhouse gases. Carbon dioxide is, as we have seen, the only one included in the EU trading system during the period 20052007. The other five are methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (laughing gas, N2O), fluorocar- bons (CFCs, HCFCs, HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). Since trading in emission allowances involves major financial values, reported emissions on which the trading is based must be correctly and reliably measured. At present, calculating emissions of GHGs other than CO2 is generally associated with high uncer- tainty. Until the uncertainty has been substantially reduced, the FlexMex2 Commission does not consider it advisable to include the other five GHGs in the trading system. However, there are a few well-defined areas of application for the other GHGs in which emissions can be reported with accept- able reliability. The aluminium sector, which emits both CO2 and PFCs, would be a valuable addition to the trading system since, in certain application areas, aluminium products are substitutes for steel and other products. The steel sector is already included in the system. To create a level playing field among these and other product groups, the FlexMex2 Commission proposes that the Swedish Government should work for the introduction of the aluminium sector into the EU emissions-trading system, and for PFC emissions in aluminium production to be covered by the system as well. In the FlexMex2 Commissions view, should not apply for permission to unilaterally add more GHGs to the trading system. It should be the task of Commission in conjunction with the report due to be issued not later than 30 2006 to assess whether it is advisable for additional GHGs to be included in the system. Although the other GHGs cannot, in general, be included in the trading system the FlexMex2 Commission considers that they should be regulated in various ways outside the system. The FlexMex2 Commission emphasises the importance of taking, at EU level, the kinds of measures that are aimed at further reducing uncertainty in emission measurement. The FlexMex2 Commissions view concerning scope for allocating emission allowances other than through free allocation during the period 2008–2012 Under the trading directive, EU member states are to allocate at least 95 per cent of the emission allowances free of charge during the three-year period 20052007. For the first commitment period, 20082012, at least 90 per cent are to be distributed free of charge. The FlexMex2 Commission proposes amending the trading directive to make it compulsory in the EU for 10 per cent of emis- sion allowances during the first commitment period, 20082012, to be sold on the market. The FlexMex2 Commission has not concerned itself with how the state should sell these emission allowances. The method of sale, i.e. either selling the allowances directly on the secondhand market or auctioning them, and (if the latter method is chosen) the precise nature of the auction design that should be used, should be decided at the time of the EUs review of the question of a compulsory harmonised allocation method. The FlexMex2 Commission recommends using the revenue from the sale to reduce competition-distorting taxes. The FlexMex2 Commissions view concerning scope for using benchmarks in the allocation of emission allowances For the years 20052007, has opted to allocate all emission allowances to the installations concerned free of charge. This free allocation can take place in many different ways. For the years 20052007 it has, for part, been based on historical activities. One alternative may be to use benchmarks of some kind, i.e. a comparative measure that is common to a group of operators (e.g. their average emissions per unit produced), as the basis for allocation. In the FlexMex2 Commissions view a benchmark model, like all forms of free allocation, is primarily an instrument for wealth distribution. The value of emission allowances, whose number is predetermined, accrues to companies. The question is how this capital contribution should be distributed among the companies. The use of a benchmark as a basis for allocation is only one of many options. According to the FlexMex2 Commission, certain requirements must be met before a benchmark method is feasible and suitable for use in allocating emission allowances in the trading system: 1.The products on which the comparison among the installations included in the system is based, must be homogeneous and comparable. 2.The benchmark must be perceived as an equitable basis for allo- cation of emission allowances free of charge. This means that the benchmark must: In our case, it seems reasonable for the bench- mark to give some indication of GHG emissions, in a way that allows comparison. The FlexMex2 Commission has discussed average emissions per unit produced for the installations concerned. Where an average emission figure is used as a benchmark there should, for the benchmark to be meaningful, be a sufficient number of installations to form the basis of the benchmark calculation. b.Result in financial distributional effects that are acceptable both to political decision-makers and to companies taking part in the trading system. This requires, according to the FlexMex2 Commission, that all winners and losers from this kind of allocation are found solely within the group of installations that are compared with the benchmark. The starting point for the FlexMex2 Commissions view is the favourable basic attitude towards benchmarks shown by the Swedish Government and Parliament (Riksdag) in their processing of the bill Trading in Emission Allowances II (Govt. 2004/05:18, report 2004/05:MJU5, Govt. 2004/05:43). In the FlexMex2 Commissions estimation, it is advantageous in terms of wealth distribution to have a system in which compensa- tion, in the form of emission allowances allocated free of charge, is given to installations that, at a given time, emit less GHGs than the average emissions per unit produced for the installations concerned in a particular sector. Benchmarks can provide the basis for such allocation. The FlexMex2 Commission wishes to emphasise that, irrespective of the allocation method, the price of emission allow- ances is always what should govern the measures taken by individ- ual installations to influence their emissions. At the same time, the FlexMex2 Commission seeks to pinpoint the problems that introducing a benchmark method involves. One problem is that benchmark models – whether based on national or international data – can be used only for products that are homo- geneous and comparable. The FlexMex2 Commission's opinion is that benchmarks based on international data should be used only if their application is compulsory for comparison of installations producing the same product types in every EU country. One par- ticular problem for international benchmarks is therefore obtaining political acceptance in the EU member states for the fact that, in a transnational allocation system of this kind, the winners from allo- cation may be in a country other than ones own. In contrast, in the current allocation system the winners and losers that arise as a result of a countrys allocation are all within the country concerned. The FlexMex2 Commission does not consider that should develop its own voluntary domestic system based on international benchmarks. In general, the endeavour should be to harmonise the allocation systems that will be used, to include the whole of the EU. The FlexMex2 Commission proposes that the Swedish Govern- ment should work for the EU to introduce a compulsory method of allocating emission allowances, based on international bench- marks in sectors that are suitable for the purpose, with well- defined, comparable products. In the FlexMex2 Commissions view, the allocation of emission allowances to district-heating installations in should be based on a national benchmark system. The official appropriation document for the 2005 budget year instructs the , not later than , to assess the feasibility of using benchmarks as the basis for allocation in the energy sector. Moreover, not later than 31 October 2005, the Agency is to design benchmarks for electricity and heat production as a basis for allo- cating emission allowances to both existing and new system participants. The FlexMex2 Commissions view concerning routines, forms of work and organisation In , tasks connected with the trading system have been assigned to several agencies. In particular, the National Environ- mental has been entrusted with responsibility for such matters as allocation of emission allowances; the responsibilities include compiling and administer- ing the national registry intended to keep the system in order, and preventing any errors from arising when emission allowances are issued, transferred or cancelled; and the county administrative boards have been put in charge of granting permits for CO2 emis- sions. Regarding the task of allocating emission allowances we should, however, mention that the and the agreed, in practice, to collaborate in reviewing the allocation applications. A council () has also been set up under the , with representatives from the Agency itself, the and the (). is to review companies applications for allocation of emission allowances, and submit draft decisions to the . The routines, forms of work and agency organisation for the permit and allocation processes seem, on the whole, to have func- tioned well in the circumstances. Virtually all the problems and difficulties revealed in a follow-up study conducted by the for on behalf of the FlexMex2 Com- mission are due, at least partially, to the extreme time pressure to which the work has been subject. Since the agency organisation used to date has, broadly speaking, coped with the task as well and efficiently as conditions have allowed, the FlexMex2 Commission recommends, as the main option, retaining the current agency organisation for the permit and allocation processes. In response to the follow-up study carried out, the FlexMex2 Commission has thus revised the recommenda- tion made in its first interim report that a special agency should be formed to carry out several of the agency functions included in the emissions-trading system. Some reservation should, however, be made for the fact that the allocation and permit processes are still under way and therefore cannot be fully evaluated, and also in the event of the regulations or other conditions applying to the period 20052007 undergoing essential changes before future periods. If changes of this kind take place, there may be reason to re-examine the matter of organisa- tion. The FlexMex2 Commission wishes to stress the importance of systematically collecting data on experience of using the emissions- trading system. Regarding the permit and allocation processes, premises should include the administrative courts decisions in cases that are appealed and the cases few as they are on which government agencies have disagreed in . The follow-up study initiated by the FlexMex2 Commission of routines, forms of work and agency organisation for permit and allocation processes also indicates that the regulations for the emis- sions-trading system have worked at least as well as could be expected, given that they were produced under heavy time pres- sure. In the light of the follow-up, however, the FlexMex2 Commission wishes to indicate a need for amendment of the regu- lations: as a criterion for whether a combustion unit in the energy sector should be included in the system, installed capacity should be supplemented by a lowest limit for energy production during a normal year. In the FlexMex2 Commissions view, the Govern- ment should review the scope for amending the trading directive to this effect. 1Arbetet med att införa handel med utsläppsrätter Europeiska unionen har tagit initiativ till att införa ett system för handel med utsläppsrätter . Beslu- tet om EU:s handelssystem fattades innan Kyotoprotokollet ratifi- cerades. Bakgrunden till beslutet är EU:s behov av att minska sina utsläpp av växthusgaser på ett kostnadseffektivt sätt. EU:s ut- släppshandel bygger på handelsreglerna i Kyotoprotokollet, som efter ratificering träder i kraft . Med detta slutbetänkande sammanfattar klimatpolitikens utveckling och gör också utblickar mot första åta- gandeperioden (2008–2012) enligt Kyotoprotokollet. I detta kapitel redovisas klimatpolitikens utveckling (1.1), delegationens arbete med handelsdirektivet (1.2), slutbetänkandets syfte (1.3) samt dess disposition (1.4). Forskning visar att klimatet har förändrats genom människans på- verkan.1 Atmosfärens halt av koldioxid har ökat med drygt 30 pro- cent sedan industrialiseringens . I den senaste rapporten från FN:s klimatpanel, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), konstateras att frågan är om klimatet förändras, utan hur mycket och hur snabbt detta kommer att ske. I rapporten understryks också att effekterna av människans påverkan på klimatet är mycket långvariga. En fjärdedel av den ök- ning av koncentrationen av växthusgaser2 som sker kommer att vara kvar i atmosfären . Även om världen skulle lyckas med att stabilisera koncentrationen av växt- 1IPCC, Climate Change . 2De sex viktigaste växthusgaserna är koldioxid, metan, dikväveoxid (lustgas), fluorkarboner, perfluorkarboner och svavelhexafluorid. Arbetet med att införa handel med utsläppsrätter husgaser i atmosfären kommer havens yttemperatur, p.g.a. ocea- nernas termiska kapacitet, ändå att öka efter att denna stabilisering skett. Mot denna bakgrund av starka vetenskapliga bevis blir uppgiften för världssamfundet att minska utsläppen av växthusgaser innan effekterna blir alltför allvarliga. har tillsammans med mer- parten av världens länder skrivit under . Det betyder att vi förbundit oss att arbeta för att minska utsläppen av växthusgaser till atmosfären. Konventionens mål är att halten av växthusgaser i atmosfären skall stabiliseras. På vilken nivå stabilise- ringen skall ske samt vilka vägar och styrmedel som leder dit hör till det som diskuteras inom ramen för de internationella klimat- förhandlingarna. För att på lång sikt begränsa risken för framtida klimatföränd- ringar måste alltså de globala utsläppen minska. Att stabilisera kon- centrationen av växthusgaser i atmosfären utgör en väsentlig utma- ning som möter det internationella samfundet under detta århund- rade. För svensk del t.ex. bör enligt landets totala utsläpp av växthusgaser ligga på en nivå som omräknat i koldioxid- ekvivalenter är lägre än och invånare för att därefter minska ytterligare.3 Stabiliseringen skall nås som man söker nå en högre levnadsstandard. Med nuvarande teknologi kommer det att bli utomordentligt svårt. En begränsad klimatpåverkan kan endast uppnås genom en aktiv klimatpolitik som integreras i hela samhället. För att uppnå målet erfordras dessutom ett omfattande internationellt samarbete och insatser i alla länder. Utgångspunkten är att klimatpåverkan är ett globalt fenomen. Det spelar ingen roll var på jorden utsläpps- minskningarna sker. Effekten på atmosfären blir densamma. Vid världstoppmötet om hållbar utveckling i undertecknades av 154 stater. Genom det s.k. Kyotoprotokollet4, som antogs på konventionens tredje partsmöte i och som är juridiskt bindande, åtar sig industriländerna att minska sina utsläpp med drygt fem 3Genom att omräkna övriga växthusgasers klimatpåverkan i s.k. koldioxidekvivalenter får man ett jämförelsemått på de olika växthusgasernas styrka (se vidare kapitel 4). utsläpp motsvarade koldioxidekvivalenter per capita. 4Kyotoprotokollet till ramkonvention om klimatförändringar. Kyoto- protokollet träder i kraft efter att minst 55 länder omfattande av världens utsläpp ratificerar överenskommelsen. I och med att registrerade sin ratificering hos FN kommer protokollet att träda i kraft . hade 132 länder, av utsläppen ratificerat protokollet. Arbetet med att införa handel med utsläppsrätter procent som ett genomsnitt under den första s.k. åtagandeperio- den, dvs. åren 2008 2012, jämfört med nivå. EU:s med- lemsstater har åtagit sig att sammantaget minska utsläppen med åtta procent.5 Protokollet innehåller regler och strikta system för övervakning och kontroll av utsläpp liksom utsläppsminskningar. Kyotoprotokollet anger att tre styrmedel – s.k. flexibla mekanis- mer6 – får användas för att hjälpa till att nå industriländernas åtaganden . Dessa styrmedel är viktiga för att uppnå kostnadseffektiva minskningar av utsläpp av växthusgaser, något som klimatkonventionen betonar. En av de flexibla mekanismerna är handel med utsläppsrätter.7 och övriga EU-länder ratifice- rade Kyotoprotokollet . EU-länderna förband sig dess- utom att fullfölja de åtaganden man gjort i protokollet även om detta inte skulle ratificeras.