sou · GSB3108 · 2005-01-01 00:00:00 — Mötena bör ses som en fortgående dialog där Säkerhetspolisen bl.a. ger den säkerhets- skyddsinformation som bedöms nödvändig och informerar om hur aktuell hotbild ser ut och där skyddspersonen och skyddsperso- nens medarbetare kan framföra erfarenheter och synpunkter. består livvaktsskydd av minst två livvakter. Enligt min mening finns det anledning för Säkerhetspolisen att överväga om inte livvaktsskyddet kan göras mer flexibelt och anpassat till den aktu- ella hotbilden och omständigheterna i övrigt. Att låta en skydds- person åtföljas av endast en livvakt bör kunna vara en tillräcklig åtgärd särskilt om skyddet kompletteras genom åtgärder av den lokala polisen. Den öppna polisens medverkan i personskyddet Säkerhetspolisens respektive polismyndigheternas ansvar för personskyddet Jag föreslår att Säkerhetspolisen med bindande verkan för polis- myndigheterna skall kunna besluta när ett distansskydd skall ges och vilken form – platsbevakning, hotellbevakning, färdvägs- bevakning och/eller eskort – detta skall ha. På så sätt förtydligas ansvarsfördelningen mellan Säkerhetspolisen och den lokala polisen. En sådan ansvarsfördelning står också i bättre överens- stämmelse med bestämmelserna i instruktionerna för Rikspolis- styrelsen respektive Säkerhetspolisen än nu gällande föreskrifter och allmänna råd (FAP). Säkerhetspolisens beslut skall ses som en miniminivå för distansskyddet. Det är sedan den lokala polisen som skall avgöra om ytterligare åtgärder behövs samt ansvara för och operativt leda distansskyddet. Jag föreslår vidare att Säkerhetspolisen i samband med att den bestämmer distansskyddsform också beslutar om medverkande polismän skall vara uniformerade och/eller civilklädda. Förslaget är föranlett av att det förekommit att civilklädda polismän deltagit i distansskyddsåtgärder utan att detta varit känt för livvakter, skyddspersonen och hans eller hennes medarbetare. När dessa poliser agerat har det skapat oro hos såväl livvakter som skydds- personen med medarbetare. Några frågor om polismyndigheternas deltagande i personskyddsinsatser Jag förordar att Säkerhetspolisen och polismyndigheterna över- väger hur samarbetet dem emellan kan fördjupas vid det praktiska genomförandet av personskyddsåtgärder. Jag föreslår också att det införs ett system för återrapportering från den lokala polisen till Säkerhetspolisen om hur distansskyddet fungerat under en insats. Med ett sådant system hade Säkerhetspolisen bl.a. fått information om tillfällen då poliser från polismyndigheten inte funnits på plats trots att Säkerhetspolisen och polismyndigheten kommit överens om detta. När det gäller polisernas uppträdande i samband med genom- förandet av distansskyddet anser jag att de poliser som deltar i sådan verksamhet bör ha fått vissa instruktioner om hur de bör agera och vad de särskilt bör tänka på. Statsrådens resor med statsrådsbilar För att ytterligare – utöver mina övriga förslag – förstärka och förbättra säkerheten för statsråden anser jag att de, oavsett hotbild, vid transporter bör undvika kollektiva färdmedel och i stället utnyttja statsrådsbil. Brukandet av statsrådsbil bör följaktligen inte medföra några skattemässiga konsekvenser för statsråden. Med mina förslag kommer Säkerhetspolisen att behöva utöka liv- vaktsstyrkan rejält. Hur många ytterligare livvakter som kommer att krävas är i det närmaste omöjligt att svara på men ett minimiantal är 50 stycken. Jag har övervägt om andra personer än de som genomgått full- ständig polisutbildningen skulle kunna anställas som livvakter men kommit fram till att detta inte är någon bra lösning. Livvakterna bör även i fortsättningen rekryteras bland poliser och dessa bör liksom tjänstgöra hos . En så stor rekrytering som behöver göras kan dock knappast ske på en gång utan den får ske etappvis i ett längre perspektiv. Mina förslag medför även att personalen som arbetar med hot- bildsbedömningar behöver utökas, att fler gruppchefer behövs och att administrationen behöver förstärkas. Syftet med förslagen i detta betänkande är att säkerheten för personerna i den centrala statsledningen skall öka. Eftersom det alltså är vitala intressen som står på spel går det inte att på sed- vanligt sätt väga ekonomiska för- och nackdelar mot varandra eller att föreslå en finansiering. Säkerhetspolisens kostnader för löner, sociala avgifter, materiel och utbildning kan med mina förslag rent överslagsvis komma att öka med ca 80 milj. kr. Därtill kommer ökade utgifter för lokaler, kontorsutrustning m.m. Vid en utbyggd personskyddsverksamhet ökar också polismyn- dighetens kostnader. Dessa kostnader bör i viss utsträckning kunna hanteras inom gällande ekonomiska ramar. Kostnadsökningarna för Säkerhetspolisen och polisväsendet i övrigt torde dock endast i mycket ringa omfattning kunna finansi- eras inom ramen för nuvarande anslag. Särskilda medel måste där- för anvisas. My commission and the implementation of it The Government has commissioned me to evaluate the system for personal protection for the central government in . Under the terms of my assignment I have been instructed to conduct a survey and analysis of the regulations and procedures for the personal protection of the central government, an examination of how the system of personal protection was applied in connection with the murder of Minister for Foreign Affairs and a study of how the personal protection of the central government is organised in other countries that are comparable with , especially the Nordic countries and some EU countries. It has also been part of my task to consider whether any changes are needed in the system of personal protection and, if I find they are, to propose such changes. In order to information I have met almost 100 people in the course of my work. I have visited counterparts of our secret service in , , the Hague, , and . In addition, I have examined a large number of files and other documents held by the . I have also studied some other documentation such as judgments, reports of government commissions and inquiries, behavioural science reports and a study by the U.S. Partly in view of the public debate on personal protection following the murder of , I have sought to give an open account of the current system for personal protection and of my deliberations. However, special secrecy regulations circumscribe the activities of the in a number of areas, including personal protection. In this report I have tried to strike a reasonable balance between the demands of secrecy and the interest of openness. Some starting points for my deliberations The concept of personal protection covers both technical measures to improve security for a particular person and the use of personnel from the to detect and prevent attacks on that person. Technical measures can include the installation of special locking devices, the provision of alarm telephones, etc. The use of personnel can take the form of bodyguard protection and protection in other forms, such as on-site surveillance and route surveillance as well as protective investigation. Current rules class the Head of State, the Riksdag, including the Speaker and the Members of the Riksdag, the Cabinet and its members and State Secretaries as belonging to the central government. has the main responsibility for the personal protection of members of the central government and out bodyguard protection and technical protection. The authorities around the country are responsible for on-site surveillance, route surveillance, etc. In making my deliberations I have had the following starting points. I consider that it is not part of my task to carry out any general review of whether the concept of central government should be expanded to also include people other than those covered by current rules. However, I suggest that the leaders of the parties represented in the Riksdag are included in the concept of the central government even if they are not members of the Riksdag. One question that has been asked many times since the murder of Prime Minister is whether it should not be compulsory for certain members of the central government to have personal protection. I share the view taken by several previous inquiries that the individual for whom protective measures are being considered must personally have the final say as to whether and how much protection is to be provided. Another issue is what interests are to govern personal protection. I consider that the starting point should be that the special dangers associated with a position as member of the central government should be the motive for personal protection. The responsibility of the should extend no further than this. However, if a person is entitled to protection on account of his or her position he or she must also be protected from other risks. In my view personal protection issues must be assessed not only on the basis of known threats but also in the light of the risk of unforeseeable events. An important factor in this context is that many members of the central government have considerable mass media exposure. This makes them well known and easy to recognise when they are in public. I consider that personal protection measures must continue to be based on an assessment of the risks of attack as regards both long-term risks (tactical assessments) and risks relating to certain events, engagements and so on (operational assessments). My assessment of current system is capable of satisfactorily assessing known threats and risks. One disadvantage of threat assessments as carried out today is that, by starting from known threats, you exclude or overlook that there may be unknown or latent threats and risks. Previously another weakness of long-term threat assessments was that individual assessments were only drawn up for the King and the Prime Minister. Other people – ministers, the Riksdag Speaker, the leaders of Riksdag parties, etc. – were only covered by a general threat assessment drawn up for the Riksdag as a whole. It is also a shortcoming of current tactical threat assessments that they are only updated every six months unless special circumstances motivate a review of the threat picture in the intervening period. Basis for assessments by the The information in the lists of ministerial engagements regularly sent by the Government Offices to the is an insufficient basis for assessments of personal protection measures. A particular problem is that information on alterations of engagements often reaches the at a late stage and sometimes when the engagement in question has already taken place. It also appears that procedures in the Government Offices for sending engagement lists are not uniform. Moreover, there seems to be a lack of uniform procedures for the handling by the Government Offices of threatening letters and other messages that can be of importance for threat assessments by the . The Government Offices appear only very rarely to report incidents, etc. that occur during Ministers meetings outside the ministries. Another shortcoming is that the Government Offices do not normally notify the of controversial issues currently handled in a ministry that can increase the risks for the responsible minister. seems only to receive a modest amount of information of importance for threat assessments from authorities around the country. In my view it is also a shortcoming that, on account of current secrecy regulations, the is not able, even on request, to obtain certain essential information from the health and services and the prison and probation authorities and that, in general, conditions for closer cooperation between the and the relevant authorities do not appear to exist. The interaction between the and other authorities At present the is in charge of close protection measures – primarily bodyguard protection – and the relevant local authority is in charge of distance protection – mainly on-site surveillance at events in which ministers and others take part. Several protected persons have made critical comments about distance protection, while there seems to be general satisfaction with the bodyguards and their performance. I share the view taken by other inquiries that in the area of personal protection there is a grey zone concerning the division of responsibilities between the and other authorities. According to my interpretation of the current system of regulations there is also a discrepancy between the governmental regulations on the duties of and the , on the one hand, and the regulations in this area issued by , on the other. Another shortcoming is that there is no report-back system from the local authority to the on how distance protection has functioned in specific cases. My assessment of the application of the personal protection system in connection with the murder of Minister for Foreign Affairs At the time of the murder of , the procedures of the for drawing up tactical threat assessments were not good. These assessments were prepared far too rarely and, as in the case of ministers, they were too general. I have, however, no basis for stating that the threat assessment for would have been different if a separate tactical threat picture had been drawn up close in time to the murder. On the contrary, I have found no information that might suggest the existence of any known threats to in the period immediately before her murder. My review of the lists of her engagements for the period when the murder took place well illustrate the shortcomings that I have drawn attention to in another context. However, even if the information from the Government Offices had been clearer and more detailed, I am convinced that, considering the circumstances, the would not have had reason to make a different assessment of need of personal protection than it actually did. based its threat assessment on known threats, in line with the rules and general advice issued by . If the had also taken account of any potential or latent threats, then the threat picture for would probably have been very different given the level of exposure she was being subjected to. In the light of the relevant regulations I do not, however, find reason to criticise the because it did not take these considerations into account in its assessment. However, a question that deserves to be asked is whether the rules should already have been altered at the time. Associates of have made some criticisms of the personal protection or rather lack of protection provided for her by the . has rejected their opinions. Without more detailed documentation, especially within the , I have not been able to afterwards investigate what actually took place at the events covered by the criticism. I can, however, conclude that these events seem to have been perceived in different ways. I can also conclude that, on several occasions, distance protection in the form of outer surveillance seems to have failed and that the has not been made aware of this through its contacts with the local . Changes to threat assessments I consider it is urgent to establish a system to ensure that action will be taken to combat not only known threats but also potential and latent threats. I do not see increased information gathering concerning potentially violent individuals to be a feasible approach. do I consider that personal protection should be provided generally for a considerably larger number of individuals or that protective measures should be dependent on the role certain individuals have in the central government. Instead the existing categories of threat assessments – terrorism, domestic extremism, other expressions of opinion, mental disorder and transferred threat picture – should be supplemented by a new category of assessments linked to the situation of the person concerned. The basic approach should be that there is always a certain, but low, risk of the realisation of latent or potential threats. The situation of the protected person may, however increase or even greatly increase this risk. Many factors can affect such a threat assessment. Some examples are the extent of media exposure to which a person is subjected, how media depict a person, whether the person appears to be controversial or to represent an opinion that many reject or whether the person, such as a minister, is responsible for a proposal that has aroused strong public feeling. In my view, a threat assessment of the kind proposed provides scope for more flexible personal protection, where action can be geared to what is actually required in the particular circumstances. The current term mental disorder as a category for threat assessments is misleading and should be changed to the more adequate term threats that can be linked to individuals. A separate assessment should always be made of the tactical threat picture for the Head of State, the Prime Minister, other ministers, the Speaker and the party leaders. For others, separate threat assessments should be carried out when justified by the circumstances. should review the tactical threat pictures more continuously than every six months. It should still be possible to regulate the grounds for threat assessment in the National Boards regulations and general advice (FAP). Should the counter-terrorism unit do threat picture work? I propose that threat assessment should no longer be carried out by the counter-terrorism unit. Instead these tasks should be transferred to a new unit of its own. In its work on threat assessments the uses experts, especially experts in psychology. I consider that it is urgent that the also obtains the assistance of experts in other areas. Moreover, I consider it is important that the establishes contact with the university and higher education community in order to draw on the most recent findings in behavioural science and other areas. Information from the Government Offices, the Riksdag and the Royal Court Information on the planned programmes of protected persons In all essentials, I am in favour of ministerial engagement lists containing the information set out in a list that the presented to the Government Offices in the spring of 2004. It is important that the Government Offices use clearer guidelines and better and more regular follow-ups to establish uniform procedures for what information must be supplied to the and how this is to be done in practice. When these guidelines are drawn up, decisive importance should be attached to the wishes of the . The Government Offices and the should have an ongoing dialogue on procedures relating to the engagement lists. Short-notice alterations to ministers programmes can lead to problems. Of course, it is impossible to tie ministers to a previously decided programme. One way of dealing with at least part of this problem is to improve and deepen contacts between the Government Offices and the . With the changes I propose in threat assessment the Riksdag will have to provide more information about the planned programmes of party leaders. The Head of the Department should be responsible for providing this information. The party secretariats in the Riksdag, which are the bodies with access to the relevant information, have stated that they are willing to assist in supplying this information to the Head of the Security Department. It is important that the party secretariats and the Head of the Security Department consult to try to develop functioning procedures for how the is to be made aware of programme changes. Information on the receipt of threatening letters, etc. The Government Offices should tighten up their procedures concerning threats received. Clear guidelines need to be designed about what to send to the and what procedure to use. These guidelines should be drawn up after consultations with the . A type of information that can be of importance for threat assessment and that I consider should be passed on to the by the Government Offices consists of letters and other messages that, while not containing direct threats, express an prejudiced or peculiar attitude to a minister or to the issues that he or she is responsible for. Information on incidents that have occurred I consider that it is urgent for the Government Offices to establish reporting procedures for incidents that occur outside the premises of the Government Offices, such as when a minister takes part in an open-air meeting, and that can be of importance for personal protection work by the . Information on controversial issues I propose that the Government Offices supply the with information on issues viewed as controversial by the public. Controversial issues can also be pursued by individual members of the Riksdag or by a Riksdag party that is not in government. The Head of the Department has indicated that he is prepared to continually supply the with such information. Other measures to improve information from the Government Offices to the To augment and improve information from the Government Offices to the I propose that an official in the is stationed in the Government Offices. This person, who should have good knowledge and experience of the personal protection work, will be tasked with coordinating contacts between the Government Offices and the . Information from the regular service I propose that the intensifies its efforts in working actively to increase the flow of information from the regular service. I cannot see any solid reasons why should not be able to release forensic psychiatric examinations to the when a court is able to do so under certain circumstances. I therefore propose that the Governmental Regulation on Forensic Psychiatric Examinations should be amended to permit the release of a forensic psychiatric examination when requested by a authority and needed for the personal protection of members of the central government. This means that secrecy for forensic psychiatric examinations will be broken for the personal protection work of the . When it comes to the relatively small number of people who have become known for making serious threats against people in the central government, I consider that it is appropriate for the to be able to obtain information from the health and services that is of direct and decisive importance for their threat assessment. I therefore propose that the Act on the Exercise of Health- and professions is amended to require personnel in the health and services to release information needed in work for the personal protection of members of the central government if the information is requested by a authority in a particular case. This provision will break professional secrecy for staff in both public and private employment. may need information from the prison and probation authorities in the same way as from the health and services. In view of this I propose that the governmental regulations on the execution of prison sentences and the execution of probation sentences are amended to require the prison and probation authorities to release to the information about the personal circumstances of a convicted person when the requests this in a specific case and the information is needed for the personal protection of members of the central government. Information from the to ministers and other protected persons I consider that information meetings between the and protected persons and their closest associates should be held regularly and at least once a year. Ultimately it must be up to protected persons to decide which of their associates should take part in these meetings. The meetings should be seen as an ongoing dialogue where the provides the security protection information considered necessary along with information on the current threat picture and where the protected person and this persons associates are able to present their views and experiences. Dimensioning of bodyguard protection Today bodyguard protection consists of at least two bodyguards.