sou · GRB332d1 · 2004-01-01 00:00:00 — Vidare får rättsläget anses vara oklart såväl när det gäller använd- ningen av sådana manipulativa spaningsmetoder som provokation och infiltration som i fråga om vissa oreglerade spaningsmetoder som förutsätter tillgång till tekniska hjälpmedel. Det bör klargöras att strängare krav än eljest gäller, när det är fråga om sådana spaningsmetoder som är ägnade att vilseleda eller att medföra intrång i annans personliga integritet, även om de inte strider mot lag eller annan författning. Med hänsyn till är det av vikt att ett positivt lagstöd skapas för åtgärderna när förut- sättningarna härför är uppfyllda. Utredningen föreslår att det i polislagen (1984:387) införs regler om provokation, infiltration samt användning av kroppsmikrofoner och pejling. Sådana metoder skall kunna användas redan på spaningsstadiet, men endast om det är uppenbart att den skada eller det men som åtgärden medför inte står i missförhållande till syftet med åtgärden. Enligt överenskommelse kommer dessa författ- ningsförslag att läggas fram av Beredningen för rättsväsendets utveckling, med vilken utredningen har samrått. Om förslaget om en icke-polisiär civil säkerhetstjänst godtas före- slår utredningen att det även görs en översyn med sikte på att hemlig teleavlyssning, hemlig teleövervakning och hemlig kamera- övervakning för inhämtande av underrättelser skall kunna ske i preventivt syfte. Stannar statsmakterna för att buggning bör vara en tillåten arbetsmetod, bör övervägandena avse också denna metod. Spridning av nukleära/radioaktiva ämnen, smitta och kemikalier Utredningen ställer sig bakom ett av AgNBC väckt förslag om inrättande av en nationell insatsstyrka som en samlad nationell resurs till stöd för samhällets insatser vid sådana extrema NBC-händelser och masskadesituationer som kan tänkas ställa regionala och lokala operativa insatser inför övermäktiga krav och påfrestningar. Utredningen föreslår därför att denna tanke förverkligas. Utredningen föreslår vidare att 4 § lagen (1984:3) om kärnteknisk verksamhet (kärntekniklagen) kompletteras med en bestämmelse om att den som bedriver kärnteknisk verksamhet och på eget initiativ skall lämna sådana upplysningar till tillsynsmyndig- heten som har betydelse för bedömningen av säkerheten, när detta påkallas av olyckstillbud, hot eller annan liknande anledning. Utredningen föreslår också att det genom en ändring i 4 § kärn- tekniklagen klargörs att säkerheten vid kärnteknisk verksamhet skall upprätthållas även genom åtgärder som är nödvändiga för att förebygga sabotage. Enligt de myndigheter på området som utredningen har varit i kontakt med finns det i övrigt en rad större eller mindre brister eller oklarheter i den nuvarande beredskapen på NBC-området. Till den del dessa inte omfattas av redan pågående utredningar bör de tillhöra huvuduppgifterna för den nyinrättade Krisberedskapsmyn- digheten. Utredningen förordar att myndigheten organiserar sitt arbete på sådant sätt att inte bara myndighetsföreträdare utan också representanter för berörda departement ingår i arbets- och projekt- grupper. Det har ansetts oklart om bestämmelsen om husrannsakan i 5 kap. 2 § utlänningslagen (1989:529) är tillämplig i samband med kont- roller av fartyg. De motiv som har anförts till stöd för befogen- heten att undersöka bagageutrymmen och andra slutna utrymmen i bilar och m.m. har emellertid samma relevans när transportmedlet är ett fartyg. Eftersom det finns ett påtagligt behov för polisen och att kunna undersöka slutna utrymmen på fartyg och denna befogenhet inte saknar intresse från de synpunkter som utredningen har att bevaka, anser utredningen att bestämmelsen bör ändras i syfte att det skall stå alldeles klart att en befogenhet av angivet slag föreligger. Utredningen föreslår därför att polisen i samband med inrese- kontroll får undersöka bagageutrymmen och övriga slutna utrym- men i fartyg i syfte att förhindra att utlänningar reser in i i strid mot bestämmelserna i utlänningslagen eller i en författning som utfärdats med stöd av denna lag. Om inresekontrollen sker under medverkan av skall en tjänsteman vid Kust- bevakningen ha samma befogenhet. Omfattande terroristattentat och andra likartade extraordinära händelser berör som regel flera delar av samhället. Vid den här typen av händelser torde det direkt uppstå ett mycket stort behov av information från olika grupper i samhället som informationsunderlaget är bräckligt. Det ställs därmed höga krav på myndigheternas informationsberedskap och förmåga till kriskommu- nikation i förhållande till såväl allmänheten och medier som andra myndigheter. Som allmän princip gäller att den myndighet som ansvarar för en viss verksamhet också har informationsansvaret för denna. Utredningen föreslår att skall se till att det finns information att inhämta från berörda myndigheter och andra organ i samband med omfattande terroristattentat och andra likartade extraordinära händelser som berör . Krisberedskaps- myndigheten skall också lämna upplysningar om vilka myndigheter och andra organ som vid en sådan händelse kan lämna relevant information i en viss fråga. Frågan om ett rikstäckande gemensamt radiokommunikations- system för de svenska s.k. skydds- och säkerhetsmyndigheterna har största betydelse för samhällets förmåga att möta omfattande terroristattentat och andra likartade extraordinära händelser i . Utredningen utgår från att den nu är på väg att få sin lösning och hänvisar till det arbete som bedrivs av utredningen för effektiv ledning (). Utredningen har ansett att den närmare organisationen av Regerings- kansliets krisberedskap faller utanför utredningsuppdraget, men gör den reflektionen att den planerade utbildnings- och övnings- verksamheten inte lämpligen bör begränsas till de ledande chefs- tjänstemännen inom . Utredningen konstaterar vidare att övningsverksamheten rent allmänt är av grundläggande betydelse inte minst för att myndig- heterna skall kunna upprätthålla en i högsta grad nödvändig förmå- ga att samverka över verksamhetsgränserna i krissituationer. I sammanhanget noteras att enligt sin instruktion skall sprida kunskap om och stärka samhällets kris- hanteringsförmåga genom att initiera, planera och genomföra utbildning och övningar. Utredningen lägger inte fram några förslag i dessa delar. Utredningens förslag ger inte upphov till kostnader som kräver ökade anslag. Förslagen syftar till att motverka terrorism och delvis brott mot rikets säkerhet. Förslagen antas i övrigt inte ge några konsekvenser av det slag som anges i 15 § kommittéförordningen (1998:1474). Författningsförslagen bör kunna träda i kraft . The Commission has been given the assignment to survey and analyse the overall emergency preparedness capacity of the Swedish public authorities and other public bodies to prevent, combat and generally deal with large-scale terrorist strikes and other similar extraordinary events in . The Commissions assignment also included the survey and analysis of the capacity of the authorities and other public bodies in such situations to cooperate in an efficient with other Swedish and foreign authorities and organisations. The assignment also required an investigation of whether the current legislation and other legal rules provide the authorities and other public bodies with the capacity to rapidly and efficiently implement measures to prevent, combat and generally deal with large-scale terrorist strikes and other similar extraordinary events. The Commission has written to a number of authorities and others, requesting the provision of information regarding their organisation, planning and preparedness, etc. in preparation for large-scale terrorist strikes and other similar extraordinary events. The majority have submitted a written information-base for the Commission. However, the Commission has also had one or more meetings or virtually continuous verbal contact with some of those most closely affected, such as the Security and the Armed Forces. The investigation has also obtained information about the situation in a number of other countries. A brief commentary is provided on the deliberations and proposals of the Commission in the following. The tasks of the Armed Forces in the event of large-scale terrorist strikes Before the terrorist attacks in the on , the view was generally held that there was no right to military self- defence against international terrorism. Through, among other things, resolutions passed by the UN and other international organisations, the international community has supported the view that a right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter also applies in the event of large-scale terrorist strikes. This view must now be deemed to reflect current international law. , Chapter 10, Section 9, first paragraph, states that the Government may deploy the Swedish Armed Forces, or parts thereof, in combat to meet armed attacks against . It is indicated by the travaux préparatoires for the Instrument of Government that it was an express aim to adapt this provision to a right of self-defence according to the above- mentioned article of the UN Charter. It must therefore be assumed that the provisions contained in the Instrument of Government may now be applied also in the case of self-defence against certain attacks of a terrorist nature that do not emanate from a foreign state. However, this can only be deemed to apply in an emergency situation. Furthermore, it is required that the attack is of substantial dignity or concerns the central functions of the Realm and can therefore be said to be directed at the Realm. In the opinion of the Commission, there is a clear need of supplementary regulation for the eventuality that time is not available to wait for a decision by the Government. One must also anticipate cases when communications with the Government may be broken or temporarily disrupted. The Armed Forces can, in accordance with the provisions contained in the Ordinance concerning Intervention by Swedish Defence Forces in the event of Violations of Territory in Peace- time and in Neutrality, etc. (1982:756) (IKFN Ordinance), counter surprise attacks from a foreign state with armed force without a preceding decision by the Government. No such possibility exists in the case of an attack from a terrorist organisation, and it may be uncertain how to proceed if it is not known who the attacker is. Terrorist attacks that are not of such a substantial kind that they can be classified as armed attacks against the Realm should, as to date, basically be a matter for the . However, the do not have the capacity to intervene against violent acts from the air or underwater. The capacity of the and Guard to intervene against violence from on the surface is limited. The Commission considers that a competent authority from the or Guard, subject to certain preconditions, should be able to call for the assistance of the Armed Forces in such a situation. The Commission proposes that the Government and the Parlia- ment give their explicit support to an interpretation of Chapter 10, Section 9, first paragraph, first sentence of the Instrument of Government, whereby the Government may deploy the Swedish Armed Forces or parts thereof to combat an armed attack against the Realm, even when the attack does not emanate from a foreign state. The Commission will also submit a proposal for a new Armed Forces Peacetime Powers Act based on this interpretation. In the event of an armed attack against the Realm or an imminent threat of such an attack, and when time is not available to wait for a Government decision without immediate danger to the security of the Realm, to human life or for substantial destruction of property, the Armed Forces may, in accordance with regulations contained in the Act, use such force as is necessary to avert the immediate danger, regardless of whether or not the attack or threat may be deemed to emanate from a foreign state. Upon a request from the or Guard, the Armed Forces may, according to the proposal, also intervene in connection with other violent acts or imminent threats of violent acts, if such acts are exercised from a or aircraft. Guarding tasks of the Armed Forces The Protection of , etc. Act (1990:217) (Protection Act), contains provisions on certain measures to protect against sabotage, use of force, threats or compulsion for political aims (terrorism), espionage and the disclosure in other cases of secret information relating to the Total Defence. The provisions of the Act mainly relate to monitoring of pre- determined objects of protection. The provisions of the Protection Act and the Protection of , etc. Ordinance (1990:1334) (Protection Ordi- nance) do not impede military personnel being utilised to guard civil objects of protection. However, the Armed Forces cannot, without express legislative support or a decision by the Govern- ment, be deemed to have the task of monitoring civil objects. The Commission considers that it would possibly be advantageous if military personnel, in certain very special situations, could guard or assist in the guarding of civil objects. This primarily applies in those cases where external threats require that the personnel have at their disposal special equipment or have the possibility of getting substantial reinforcements. The general threat profile may also be so extreme that the resources of the are insufficient to cover such important civil objects that undoubtedly need to be guarded. The Commission proposes that the Armed Forces, in accordance with regulations contained in the Protection Ordinance, may temporarily assist in the guarding of civil protection objects following a request by a county administrative board. Furthermore, the Commission proposes an amendment of the Protection Act whereby a protection guard may have the same powers as a officer – within a protection object, in its vicinity or during the flight of a suspect from the object – to apprehend a person concerning whom there is reason to arrest for terrorist offences or preparation for such offences. This provision currently only applies for protection against espionage and sabotage. Certain other issues concerning support by the Armed Forces Should a large-scale terrorist strike occur involving the use of NBC weaponry1 or if a threat is made that such means may be used, great demands may be placed on the special competence and material resources of the . In such a situation, the Armed Forces have NBC protective resources, primarily at present through the NBC Rapid Reaction Force, which can be deployed to temporarily support the . In the opinion of the Commission, it is of great importance that organised cooperation is established to ensure that the will rapidly be able to get the support that is necessary should a terro- rist attack of the this kind actually occur. The Armed Forces can, in the assessment of the Commission, provide such support in accordance with the Armed Forces Support of Civil Operations 1 Nuclear/radiological, biological or chemical weaponry . Ordinance (2002:375). However, if another assessment is made on this matter, the Commission considers that this cooperation is so important that the Government should issue a general relaxation for such cooperation pursuant to its general powers, under Chapter 11, Section 12 of the Instrument of Government, to grant exemp- tions from regulations contained in ordinances. Furthermore, it can be conceived that situations will arise when it would be of value if the Task Force were reinforced by specially trained personnel from the Armed Forces. Collaboration of this kind would necessarily be based on perma- nently employed military personnel being put under the command of a Commissioner. The Commission proposes, set against the background of that stated above, that and the Armed Forces should have organised collaboration in order to be able to deal with large-scale terrorist strikes involving the use of NBC weaponry and threats of such attacks. Moreover, it should be an obligation of the said authorities to jointly consider the need of and the pre- conditions for reinforcing the Task Force with specially trained military personnel from the Armed Forces in certain situations. Consequences for Armed Forces persons subject to national Total Defence duties The Commissions proposal regarding the functions of the Armed Forces in the event of large-scale terrorist strikes and guarding duties does not give cause to amend any of the provisions concerning the service duty of persons subject to national Total Defence duties. This service duty covers, in the opinion of the Commission, such cases when the Armed Forces must respond to an armed attack against the Realm, even when the attack does not emanate from a foreign state. However, the service duty does not cover those cases when the Armed Forces intervene upon the request of the or the Guard, except where the Armed Forces have for their part considered the matter and determined that it constitutes an appropriate opportunity to conduct an exercise. The intelligence operations of the Armed Forces The intelligence operations of the Armed Forces shall, in accord- ance with Section 1, first paragraph of the Defence Intelligence Operations Act (2000:130), be conducted to survey external mili- tary threats against and as a support for the Swedish foreign, defence and security policy. The activity also includes cooperating in Swedish participation in international security cooperation and, in accordance with the detailed directions of the Government, assisting with intelligence to support society in the event of severe pressure on society during peacetime. It is stated generally in Section 4 of the Act that defence intelligence operations may not relate to tasks that, according to law or other rules, fall within the framework of the crime combating and crime prevention work of the and other authorities. In the assessment of the Commission, it is very doubtful whether the said Act can be deemed to provide any independent powers for the Armed Forces, within the framework of their own intelligence operations, to collect, process and analyse intelligence concerning international terrorism. As regards such external armed threats as may constitute a direct risk to , the Commission considers that it is unavoidable that such threats are to some extent the subject of an intelligence operation. Otherwise, an important part of the protection of the security of would be at risk of falling between two stools. However, the question does arise of whether intelligence operations of this kind should be included in the defence intelligence operations or be an obligation of the civil security services or, possibly, a task for both of these organisations. basically do not work outside the frontiers of . According to international practice, it is considered that a organisation should not work in a foreign state without special permission. As indicated by the following, the Commission proposes that the Security is reconstituted to a non-police civil security service. In this way, there would not be anything against the intelligence operations abroad being carried out through the civil security service. However, the Commission is doubtful about such a change and also considers that it does not in any event have a basis for proposing this in the current situation. The Armed Forces have personnel abroad, in contrast to the Security , which means that certain kinds of surveillance initiatives, for example in conjunction with centres of conflict in foreign countries, must reasonably be a task for the Armed Forces. The legislation for the participation of the Armed Forces in combating terrorism that has been proposed by the Commission also means that it appears natural for certain intelligence operations of the kind in question to be a function of the Armed Forces. It is for several reasons advisable for more than one body to have the task of conducting permanent intelligence operations outside the frontiers of ; an arrangement that is also not found in such countries with which usually compares itself. As regards an issue as important as the security of , it is necess- ary that the situation regarding responsibilities is clearly laid down and appropriate for the task in hand. That part of the defence intelligence operations conducted to support Swedish foreign, defence and security policy has continued to grow in importance. Regarding this part of the operation, the Commission considers it hard to see that special statutory restric- tions should apply, besides that it should be conducted abroad or aimed at foreign situations. The Commission therefore proposes that the Defence Intelligence Operations Act is amended so that it is clearly stated that defence intelligence authorities may obtain intelligence reports abroad that are important for the protection against terrorist strikes and also process and analyse such information. The same applies in relation to other intelligences, if this is necessary to support the Swedish foreign, defence and security policy. However, such operations may only be conducted abroad or aimed at foreign situations. The civil security service The current structure of the Security as a kind of indepen- dent agency within leaves scope for significant objections. The organisation imposes a very diffuse responsibility on the National Commissioner for the operations of the Security . In a corresponding way, an unclear situation arises concerning the management of the Security in relation to the management of . The current organisation also creates certain problems in the relationship between the organisations and in relation to the Government Offices and other authorities, as well as the public. In the opinion of the Commission, a transformation to a non- security service would entail substantial advantages. The operation would be directly subordinate to the Government, which means that it would be easier for the Government to improve the efficiency of operational coordination work conducted by the civil and military security and intelligence services. A transformation to a non-police security service would certainly also facilitate recruit- ment and contribute to enhancing the overall competence and efficiency of the organisation. Moreover, the security service would be released from the basic duty to report and intervene against offences that are fundamental for the operation. This duty could, as regards the security service, entail the discontinuance of the gathering of valuable intelligence. The release of the civil security service from the reporting and intervention obligation is also of great importance for the cooperation of the security service with intelligence opera- tions within the Armed Forces and with security services in other countries. A further advantage is that the problems with so-called information overload will reduce very greatly if the civil security service are released from the and from the reporting obligation. As mentioned above, there is no impediment to a non- security service working abroad. Indeed it is the view of the Commission that it should normally only work in , but sometimes exceptions are called for, for example when a person from whom the security service receives information leaves the country. It is difficult to assess whether transformation to a non-police security service is likely to enhance the confidence of the public for the operation. However, it is likely that a new order would from this perspective have rather positive consequences. The Commission proposes that the Security are removed from and reconstituted as a non-police civil security service directly reporting to the Government. The Commission also proposes that, in conjunction with this, a new unit is formed within operations.