bet · GQ01KUU2 · 2003-05-22 00:00:00 — And itwent to the heart of the transatlanticrelationship, which has always been asource of difference in the EuropeanUnion between those who see Europe asdeveloping in rivalry and competitionwith the and believe thatEurope must be autonomous and must builditself as a rival pole in the world, andthose of another tradition who believethat Europe should be complimentary, thatwe should work on a transatlantic basisin a single cause of western values andthe tradition developed after the ofEnlightenment. That difference cametogether in the problem of . Europehas clearly been very badly split on thatissue. It lead to a lot of depression inthe European Convention, which is nowdiscussing the future treaty. There waseven a moment where some in theConvention said: "we should give upat the moment on the foreign policy andleave that aside, try and move forward onthe Treaty in areas apart from foreignpolicy and come back to it later. "I think wisely they decided not to dothat. They decided to push ahead, to tryto develop what we can in the area offoreign policy. That's what the heads ofgovernment in the middle of last month inAthens have asked for and what will bedone, I hope, by the 20th . I won'tin these introductory remarks go anyfurther than that, except to say thatthere is always going to be attention indeveloping European foreign policybetween the member states and the centralinstitutions of the Union. In the endthey've got to work together.As my commissioner has once said: TheCFSP, the Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy, is the child of two parents, themember states and the centralinstitutions. And as any psychologistwill tell you, the child is more likelyto be happy and healthy if the parentslove one another.Ordföranden: you very much. I wouldlike to invite to makehis introduction.Christopher : The first and mostimportant thing is to thank you very muchfor the honour of your invitation tospeak on this day of Europe to theRiksdag. I am a great believer in thedemocratic accountability of foreignpolicy. I think it's of enormousimportance that parliaments and theircommittees take this serious interest inwhat is going on in EU foreign policy.This is a neglected dimension by andlarge. It is true that on occasions likethe great crisis over everythinghits the headlines, and people come outwith bold statements about what Europecan and can't do and what foreign policycan and can't do at the national level.Then there are long periods of neglect ofthe issues, and certainly there is adifficulty about getting people in thewider public to understand the way inwhich, as has said, Europeanforeign policy activity is the child oftwo parents and is the result of aninteraction between member states and theinstitutions of the Union. Yet at thesame time we see that, broadly speaking,over the last 10 or 20 years, there hasbeen increased interest among publicopinion in foreign policy matters. Yetthere is a gap between the interest inthe substance of policy, the issues likeIraq or or whatever, or humanrights, whatever it might be, and theactual understanding of the processes andthe powers and who takes what decisionsfor whom. I very much welcome thisopportunity. Thank you very much.Let me just make a few preliminaryremarks. I suppose inevitably, as anacademic, I take a historical perspectiveas my starting point. It seems to methere are two interesting points to makehere.One is that whatever we think of theCFSP there has been nothing reallyattempted like it at anytime in historybefore. When I say CFSP I include theEuropean political co-operation processwhich started in 1970. There have beenmany occasions in which small groups ofstates have tried to align their foreignpolicies or they have created analliance, the Triple Entente before theFirst World War, or whatever. Even NATO,in a way, is a foreign policy generatingsystem. But none of them have attemped anacross-the-board systematic, more or lesspermanent, co-ordination, not necessarilyintegration, of foreign policies - which is supposed to be progressive.The hidden tell-us of all this in someways is: although common policies is whatwe are doing at the moment, i.e. separatepolicies grouped together, in the endmaybe it will be possible to produce asingle policy, which rather begs thequestion of what kind of European Unionwe'll develop. Nonetheless, it's animportant distinction, I think, thatbetween common and single policy.Don't forget that even NATO failed whenit tried to co-ordinate so called out-of-area policies, i.e. outside its immediateremit for the defence of the northAtlantic area. It is very difficult to co-ordinate national foreign policies. Inmany ways the countries of the EuropeanUnion did quite well.The second point is that - let's callit European foreign policy, as most of usdo, as a form of shorthand, ratherambitious shorthand - it has now beengoing on for 33 years, since 1970. Well,that's not very long as far as thehistorians are concerned. They wouldjudge the concept of Europe over acentury. But at the same time it is longenough for us to make some kind ofjudgement and for some sort offoundations to have been laid down.Indeed, those foundations have been laiddown. Because of the Treatyand the end of the Cold War, people tendto assume that - if I may disagree withAnthony, he gave the slight impressionthat this is a new thing and nothingreally was done of any significancebefore 1991 - in many respects there wereattempts to e.g. produce a commonEuropean policy on the Middle East, theVenice Declaration of 1980, or co-ordination in the Conference on Securityand Co-operation in Europe. These werematters not merely of rhetoric. Theydidn't always succeed, of course, farfrom it. But that is not the point.Sometimes pure diplomacy is also action,it can be a substantive matter. In-deed,most of us Europeans would prefer foreignpolicy to be words and diplomacy ratherthan fighting and physical intervention.We are caught in that slightcontradiction.What about other peoples' perceptionsof European foreign policy? They arealmost always critical outside, and evenmany of them inside. I myself patented aconcept about ten years ago called the"Capabilities-Expectations gap", whichsuggested that there was a gap betweenthe ability of the Union to produce thecapabilities necessary to make aneffective foreign policy and theperceptions of participants and theiroutsiders of that policy. In other words,we always have expectations that it isgoing to be just as effective as Americanforeign policy or even the foreign policyof the nation states. Yet thecapabilities are not there to enable usto do that. Inevitably people aredisappointed, and there is a reboundeffect. When I say capabilities I don'tjust mean military force or the budget ofthe European Union, I also mean decision-making capability, the ability to producea unified position on any given case.If there is a sense ofdisappointed expectations, I think thereis also a tendency to have cyclicalcrisis. We will have the big problemslike and the big disappointments. Itis very difficult to live up to a unifiedforeign policy when faced by somethingwhich genuinely does divide both informedand popular opinion. That's politics. Wecan't get away from that, nor should we.The consequence of democratic debate isthat we will some-times honourablydisagree, and powerfully, over foreignpolicy. Okay, that means we can't act aswe would like in a unified way. It is notnecessarily the end of the world. Icertainly don't think that we are in thebusiness of wanting to abolish the CFSP.I don't regard myself as a starry-eyedidealist about these matters, but Icertainly think that if we didn't havethe CFSP we would have to invent it insome form. I haven't heard even thestrongest critics say that we shouldreally simply re-nationalize foreignpolicy and go-it-alone on a nation-statebasis. We need multilateralism, andEuropean multilateralism is obviously themost immediate possibility and probablythe most effective for us.It is true there are differences ofview, even within the Union, of astructural kind. Perhaps this business ofnew and old Europe and the candidate newmembers being more supportive of theUnited States in recent times, suggestthat there is going to be some structuralthought line. I would think it unlikely.I think this is the product of aparticular phase and maybe even aparticular crisis. Although undoubtedlythe enlargement of the Union to 25 isgoing to make the decision-making offoreign policy much more complicated,it's not going to do away with theimpetus towards co-ordination. I thinkwhat it's simply going to do is to makeit more likely that we have a kind ofwhat used to be called variable geometryor flexibility, coopération forcée,whatever, that there will be some formsof coalitions of the willing according tothe issue at stake.It is said that public opinion, atleast it is said by those who read eurobarometer polls, wants a Europeansuperpower, it wants a European foreignpolicy. Those two things are verydifferent. My own Prime Minister calledin in 2000 for Europe to be asuperpower, not a superstate. Withrespect to think that was aserious contradiction in the samesentence. I don't think we are likely tohave Europe as a superpower withoutEurope as a superstate, and I don't thinkmany people in Europe want a superstate.Therefore, if we are going to have a moreeffective European foreign policy it isnot going to look like a superpower.On the other hand it's undoubtely truethat in so far as European opinion wasunited during the crisis andcritical of American policy, that impliedthat they wanted a united Europeanposition to stand up to the UnitedStates. Well, did they? I think this is arather weak finding, i.e. the idea thatthe European opinion wants a strongcommon foreign policy. It is a questionof at what cost. Do they want it at thecost of spending a lot more on defence?Do they want it at the cost of a greaterEuropean activism in the world? Do theywant it at the cost of a serious falling-out with the ? I don't saythose things simply to say it isimpossible, but simply to point out thatit is rather more complicated than it isoften suggested when people cite theseopinion polls in favour of a commonEuropean security policy.Let me finish by making two points, ifI may in this preliminary phase. One isabout institutions. We are going throughthis very important process of theconstitution, the Convention effectivelyat the moment. There are going to bechanges in the treaties and in theorganization, the decision-making, ofEuropean foreign policy. I would simplyissue one caveat. In the past when-everwe've had a problem of foreign policy wehave tended to assume that it can besolved by institutional reform, that wecan just invent some new highrepresentative or some new committee, ora bit more qualified majority voting, andeveryone will be happy. I am afraid thatis a non sequitur of enormousproportions. We can mess around withinstitutions as much as we like, but itwon't necessarily, certainly in the shortmedium term, affect the politicalrealities. Indeed it may make thingsworse. If the institutional descriptiongets too far out of line with politicalrealities it may actually lead to evenmore disappointed expectations and a lossof public credibility. the QMVdebate is an example of that.I mean, if you spoke to the averageinformed persons on the street and toldthem that you are about to increase thequalified majority voting on foreignpolicy in the EU and that this would makethings better, they would immediately sayto you: "Well, if that would have solvedthis disagreement between the British andSpanish led group and the French andGerman led group over ." Well, ofcourse, it wouldn't have done. We knowthat people would not fall in lineautomatically according to voting rules.They will, if they feel that it is in thelong term a benefit and if it is on amatter within the grandes lignes offoreign policy, and that may take a greatdeal of time.The second point I want to make isabout the options for us. What we've gotto decide in the short run and medium runand in this convention and in the IGC iswhat is feasible, what we can actually dowhile the system working. But wealso must decide in the long run. We musthave some ideas, and that is why a debatelike this is so important, about what isdesirable, what we actually want. Whatkind of Europe in the world should it bethat we should, broadly speaking, worktowards?I'll just list seven options for you tothink about, if I may.The first option is the famoussuperpower, which I more or less said isthe far end of the spectrum.The second option is a notion of acivilian superpower, i.e. : Europe shouldbe , united, deploy its resourcesglobally but should eschew militaryforce, should not get involved in war-fighting or up a militaryindustrial complex. Obviously that wouldbe very attractive to many people,especially to the human rights lobby inEurope.The third option is that we should beas co-ordinated as we can but accept thatwe are the famous second pillar of theWestern Alliance. We are broadly closelyrelated to the , and weshould not do anything collectively whichwould endanger Western freedom andsolidarity in the world. Therefore we'llhave to make compromises with Americanpolicy.The fourth option is almost theopposition of that. It says Europe shouldbe a big neutral - I say that inStockholm as it perhaps has a particularresonance - that Europe as a whole shouldbehave like , or like orIreland. We all know that there are verydifferent kinds of neutrality, of course.But Europe should not necessarily quarrelwith the , but itshould not automatically support iteither. Perhaps it should be rather moreisolationist, should have a quietistforeign policy - lots of attractions forthat not least but because that the ColdWar is ended. What happens in the Taiwanstraits in ? It is not necessarilygoing to lead to a war in Europe, whichis what might have happened before 1990.So maybe Europe doesn't have to be quiteso global in its interests and activitiesas it was before.The fifth option is core-periphery,that there will be an inner group ofcountries, the famous directoire, whichwill make foreign policy. They will bethe activists, and then the rest of the25 will be a kind of chorus, or the outerring, which may or may not take aninterest on a given policy. But by andlarge, the periphery will be quietist,and the core will be activist. It is onepossibility.The sixth option is variable geometry,coalitions of the willling. The group ofactive states will just vary according tothe issue. There will be a constantmovement - no strong central core.And lastly the other extreme from thesuperpower: re-nationalization of foreignpolicy. CFSP gradually fades or falls topieces. Union goes on as atrade actor in many other areas ofinternal policy. It doesn't really have aforeign policy. Foreign policy toSweden, to , to and so on.I won't tell you what I think is mostlikely - I'm sure you have your own viewsanyway, but it seems to me that it isimportant for us to concentrate not onlyon the very details and complex mattersto do with the legality of the treatiesand their rewriting, which I certainlydon't underestimate, but also on some ofthe bigger political choices that are atstake for us in the next decade or two.Ordföranden: you very much, MrChristopher ! Now we are eager tolisten to from the EstonianParliament.Mart Laar: Thank you! I am very honoured to speakhere today in this panel discussion onthe European and in such an importantquestion as that of European CommonForeign and Security Policy. It is areally important matter - whether we likeit or not, or what people on the streetsthink of it or not.Let's be frank. Owing to the largedivisions towards the war in , Europeat this moment has lost a lot of itsauthority. This is a sad fact in theworld. The question is not only thatthere have been divisions or conflictswith our allied over the butalso that Europe is not looked upon as aserious player in the world after thosedivisions. This is a reality, lookingfrom the point of view outside Europe aswell. Such a situation only shows againthat it is very necessary to developEuropean Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy because Europe really needs it. Ifit is not existing or not working, we allcan get into trouble and problems and seea loss of the importance of Europe.Estonia as a candidate country andfuture member state believes that such acommon policy on foreign and securityaffairs can strengthen Europe and ourtransatlantic ties and make both of usstronger. Of course those words arebeautiful, and we have heard a lot ofsuch words and ideas in the last fewyears. Reality has, unfortunately, movedin the opposite direction, but itdoesn't make the ideas wrong. It is veryimportant to discuss just now how toachieve those goals because somethingprobably has gone wrong in the process ofworking out such a policy or during therealization of some parts of it.I think there are two mistakes doneduring the last months. First of all it'sreally important to understand that wemust first realize the initiatives thatwe have, including the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy, and not all the timehave new initiatives. Such ideas as thenew proposals given by the four Europeanmembers some weeks ago can be verybeautiful, and even right and nice, butat this moment they are highlycounterproductive and will not work inthe direction in which it is necessary togo. First of all it's necessary to finishthe job we already have and then look forthe new one.Secondly I think that in some circlesin Europe there is a hope that we cansolve those problems of common foreignand security in someinstitutions of reform, which means thatif one institution maybe doesn't look towork so well, we will create anotherinstitution. Instead of an eagle with onehead, we thus must have an eagle with twoheads - a European union with twopresidencies. I don't think it will bringus more of Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy. I'm afraid that if it goesthrough, it actually can move us far awayfrom it and keep the conflicts. That'snot what I think is the idea of where wemust go.So, to put it shortly, we must talk moreto each other. The CommonForeign and Security Policy cannot beachieved in the way that some countriesmust shut up and others can talk. Iactually don't believe very much from thetheories on the new and the old Europewhere this division is made on the basisof anti-Americans and pro-Americans. Inthis context I only can welcome GreatBritain to the new Europe - the oldestEuropean nation-state. I don't knowexactly where to put in thismatter as a new member state in Europe,in the Union, as well. Ten years, or lessthan ten years, is not a very long time.I think that such comments and ideas thatthere is a conflict between pro-Americanstates and less pro-American states arenot actually true and not showing what isreally going on in Europe. I think now isthe important time to understand that ifwe want to have the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy, then we must worktogether and finish the initiatives wealready have before we are starting withnew ones.Ordföranden: you very much, MartLaar! Now we'll continue in Swedish.Jag skulle vilja inbjuda ledamöterna fråndet sammansatta konstitutions- ochutrikesutskottet att ställa frågor. Ordetgår först till , viceordförande och ledamot i . Varsågod!Gunnar (): Tack så mycket ochtack för spännande och trevligainledningar till den här diskussionen.En sak som det är lätt att sägaär att den gemensamma utrikes- ochsäkerhetspolitiken inte fungeradesärskilt väl i samband med Irakkrisen.Men skall man ge lite rättvisa kandet väl också sägas att vi har tio årbakom oss av en enorm och fantastisktomvälvande förändring. Plötsligt hardiktaturer fallit. Två delar av Europaåterförenas. Den inre marknadenförverkligas. Euron har lanserats medmera.Det här innebär en förändring somkanske är mycket större för oss självaoch inte minst för dem som är närmastberörda av denna utveckling i det dagligaarbetet. På sätt och vis kan man säga attdetta var första gången som EU mötte utrikespolitisk fråga och detverkligen inte bara var sex nationer därTyskland och bestämmer utan detvar 15 nationer. står vi inför enutvidgning som kommer att ge ossytterligare tio medlemsländer.Den fråga som jag skulle vilja ställatill er i varierande kapaciteter ärföljande: Vilket inflytande, vilkenbetydelse, tror ni att de tio nyastaterna kommer att få dels när detgäller själva innehållet i kraven på dengemensamma utrikes- ochsäkerhetspolitiken, dels när det gällerrelationerna mellan olika stora länder?I har vi tidigare sett attTyskland och haft ett väldigtinflytande. ser vi att till exempelPolen träder fram som en mycket storeuropeisk nation. Det skulle varaintressant att få höra från er ominnehållet i denna utvidgning, hur denkommer att påverka. Och hur kommer deformella relationerna och begränsningarnaatt vara?Anthony : First of all, can I say howmuch I agree with you about the progressthat has been made over the last tenyears, which I think has been remarkable.As I said in my introduction, I think weshouldn't be too dismayed by what hashappened over , given how much hasbeen achieved and how much progress wecontinue to make. I would say that evenon incidently, although we disagreedabout the point at which to foreclose onresolution , we actually agreed inEurope about an awful lot, even betweenthose who are fighting within Europe. Weagreed about the involvement of the UN.We agreed about the possibility of apeaceful resolution to the crisis rightto the end. We agreed about the need tosee it in a wider context of the MiddleEast peace process. We agreed that it waspart of the war on terrorism, which isreally a matter for a wider range ofthings needed to be done also ininternational development. So a lot ofthe underlying themes were actuallymatters of agreement rather thandisagreement.On the entry of the new member statesand the difference that is going to make,there has been a tendency, I think, inthe to wonder whetherEurope should now be desegregated,whether it might be more in 'sinterest to deal with Europe separatelyfinding coalitions of the willing,dealing with the groups where it is ableto find agreement rather than atraditional American postwar policy ofencouraging integration in Europe.There are those, I think, in the UnitedStates who believe that it is in theirinterest to have a desegregated Europewhere they can make coalitions of thewilling. I feel very strongly the otherway, that it is actually not only aninterest of Europe but also an interestof the that Europe shoulddevelop an integrated policy. It was putto me rather well by a German ambassadorwho said: "It is possible that willdecide for against . Itis very unlikely that will decidefor against and . "I think that it is true that with a widerEurope it is very likely that anintegrated Europe will actually be whatChristopher earlier talked about, asecond pillar of -something that contributes to atransatlantic view of the world. But adivided Europe will have one part of thatdivision, will be positively anti thetransatlantic theme and will thereforetend to weaken so that Europe as a wholewill be unable to support the valueswhich we all believe in. But the factthat it has a part of it which isactively trying to undermine thesepolicies will also be a thorn inthe flesh of the in the UN,in NATO or wherever it may be. So I thinkthat the arrival of the new member stateshas brought a very interesting andimportant new dimension to foreignpolicy. It is maybe even more importantthat we should try to integrate foreignpolicy as far as we can.Mart Laar: I think it is a veryinteresting question, and I think it isthe very last time to realize that insome way the changes will be bigger thanwe imagine today after the enlargement inall different contexts.