bet · GQ01KUU2 · 2003-05-22 00:00:00 — "They tried to work very closely together,and I think on the whole they haveachieved that. They worked very welltogether, very closely together in theservice of the single policy, and thedifference between the two jobs really iswhether they can both contribute to theformation of the policy in the Council.The Commission has the right ofinitiative as do the member states. Theydiscuss policy together in the Council.Once that policy is decided it isJavier who is the main face andvoice of the policy, the main spokesmanfor it and the main mediator if itinvolves a process of mediation. But itis in the Commission who isresponsible for the instruments to giveeffect to the policy, whether it is tradepolicy or external assistance or whateverit may be. To some extent at the momentthe Commission is the engine room, andthe Council is the main driver of thepolicy, the main spokesman for thepolicy.It has been thought, and I thinkrightly, that it is rather weak astructure to have a person who is mostresponsible for the policy not having anycontrol over the leaders of theinstruments. So it was not unnatural thatpeople should think: Why don't we bringthese two figures together under one hatand then we will have a more integratedand coherent policy?I think that's probably over time a gooddevelopment. But as you say it opens upsome potential difficulties in the extentto which the whole policy becomesintergovernmentalized and we'll lose thedegree of integration that we havealready achieved.As said, foreign policygoes way beyond the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy in the second pillar ofthe Treaty subject to special rules. In away that is rather a small element of theforeign policy. Most of our foreignpolicy is what we are doing in externaltrade, external aspects on environmentalpolicy, external aspects on andhome affairs, the whole process ofenlargement and so on.The danger is that by creating a singlefigure who has a mandate from the Counciland comes to the Commission saying "thisis my mandate, this is what theCommission has to do to give effect tothe mandate, and this is the implicationsfor the industrial policy, environmentalpolicy, transport policy, or whatever itmay be", you might unravel a lot of whathas already been achieved in terms ofintegrating policy and having somesupranational authorities.I think it is a balance. There is avery strong argument for trying to createsuch a figure, and I think that if it canbe done it could be the source ofstronger and more integrated policy, butit the risks of unravelling whathas been achieved.What I very much hope is that as weproceed with this convention somesafeguards will be put in place to makesure that this figure is not able to leadto an intergovernmentalization of whathas been achieved, and in particular, Iam sorry to be technical, the Article 47of the present treaty says that nothingthat happens in the second pillar canunravel the existing aquis. And I thinkwe need some equivalent article in theamended treaty.Ordföranden: . Det skulle varaintressant att höra också ChristopherHills synpunkt på "dubbelhattning".Christopher : I am not part of theprocess so I can speek freely. Anthonyhas been very frank and I think he isbroadly right. I have sympathy with theCommission's position, 'sposition, because I think he has made anenormous effort. I think hasmade an effort as well, he has workedwell, and a lot of people have asked thequestion: Is it dependant on theirpersonalities? What happens when we getdifferent people?It does seem to be logic to push it alltogether. It's the question of who speaksfor Europe. You only want one personspeaking for Europe. But the trouble isthat it is not just or Patten. Wehave got to lose the rotating Presidency,so it seems, although I am not convincedthat's either going to happen. I thinkthere are compromises built into thedocuments I have seen, although it shouldhappen. I am rather devious about allthat.Be as it may, we know that there areplenty of opportunities for individualheads of government who are notpresidents or elected presidents of theCouncil or presidents of the Commissionto speak for Europe, I am including myown prime minister naturally.This problem is not going to go awaywhatever kind of solution isengineered. I think the real difficultyis going to be further down on thebureaucratic ladder in the sense that itmakes good sense to bring all together.As I said, this is the case at themoment: the expertise within theCommission at desk officer level, and theworking groups of the Council Secretariatand so on. that is the formation ofthe proto-European ministry of foreignaffairs. We are now going to haveapparently ministery offoreign affairs, but there won't be aministry.The trouble with Union isthat nothing can be done at a stroke,everything has to be coupled togetherover time and that then leads to aconfusion as to whether we gotessentially a centralized system or asystem of checks and balances, which wasalways built in from the and under the present arrangementis prefigured in the Conventiondocuments.It looks like we'll have the worst ofboth worlds. We won't have a properlycentralized system with a powerfulfigure, we'll just have a figure who iscalled foreign minister but will notnecessarily be able to deliver the goods.At the same time the Commission will beseriously weakened. It seems to me thatthe checks and balances will be lost.From the outside it looks like anintergovernmentalization of theCommission, and the Commission will alsocome even more under the control of theCouncil that it has been in recent yearswhen the Commission has certainly beendemoralized and weakened by comparison tothe years of last point relevant to this is thequestion of negotiating the agreements:Who negotiates the agreement? If the EUis to have a legal personality and it cansign an agreement the Presidency or thePresident or a minister can sign anagreement. But an agreement which ismainly on CFSP the Foreign Minister doesit and if it is mainly on pillar onematters it is the President of theCommission that signs it.This seems to be a recipe for confusionto me. Nobody is going to be able to saythat one agreement is largely on CFSP orlargely external relations. It's going tobe a serious and tough battle over whonegotiates, whereas at the moment thedivision is reasonably clear, not leastbecause you cannot sign an agreement onbehalf of the Union strictly speaking.That raises a further question in whichParliament no doubt will beinterested. That is the question ofconstitutional ratification. If Article24 is being abolished which says that ifa member state says that it wants toratify an EU agreement according to itsown national constitutional provisionsthey can have a referendum like the Irishhave done. That is going to be abolished.The only national provisions will bebefore the agreement is signed. Once anagreement is signed there will be no moreprovisions for referendum, as far as Iunderstand it.This is something that this parliament,this committee, it seems to me,should turn its attention to. It probablyhas done it already, I beg your pardon.Ordföranden: , vi skall absolut kommaihåg detta.Som jag sade har allmänhetenhaft en möjlighet att via vår hemsidaskicka in frågor till denna offentligautfrågning. Allmänheten är i dagrepresenterad av , som nufår ställa allmänhetens fråga.Håkan : Det har kommit in en mängdfrågor från allmänheten till den hemsidasom har öppnats för detta ändamål, intebara från svenska allmänheten utan ävenfrån den norska allmänheten har detkommit in en fråga. Den fråga som jagväljer att nu ställa handlar omprinciperna för ett agerande av EU iframtiden i fredsframtvingandeoperationer.Frågan lyder: I förslagen som ligger påbordet från framtidskonventet står detatt fredsframtvingande EU-insatser skallske i enlighet med principerna i . Detta är en vag formulering.Hur tolkar ni detta? Kommer EU attgenomföra sådana insatser även utan etttydligt och konkret FN-mandat?Anthony : Union as awhole I think believes very strongly inan international rules-based system andin working particularly with the UN andwith the authority of the UN. If we aretalking about the use of force in thesense of warfare I cannot conceive of asituation in which Europe collectivelywould choose to act without a UN mandate.But of course the Treaty also talksabout the potential use of force in othercircumstances, the use of force for whatis known as Petersberg tasks at themoment, of humanitarian and rescue tasks,of peace-keeping tasks, of crisismanagement and even peacemaking tasks.The Convention at the moment is lookingat the possiblity of enlarging that listto include joint disarmament operations,to include military advice andassistance, to include conflictprevention, to include combattingterrorism at the invitation of a thirdcountry, and to include post conflictstabilization.There are some areas where there might bediscrete, perhaps quite small operationswithin Union or within theborders of Union where onemight not need an explicit UN mandate,because it isn't a question of declaringwar or conducting a war. Apart from that,in any larger military conflict I cannotconceive of Europe acting outside a UNmandate.Carl B (): är detEuropadagen, och det är därför som vi hardet här seminariet just . Jag tänkteställa en lite annorlunda fråga.Europa är ju hemorten för de politiskaideologierna - konservatism, liberalism,socialism. Spelar de här ideologiernanågon som helst roll för utvecklingen,framtiden och innehållet i den gemensammautrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken, eller ärdet bara intressebaserat? Är det i såfall bra att ideologierna inte spelarnågon roll?Christopher : This sounds like aquestion for an academic, doesn't it? I'mafraid I don't necessarily have a verygood answer for it, but the answerrevolves around the extent to whichdomestic values penetrate foreign policy.The old realist notions, which haveactually never been completely dominantin any country at any time, but they havebeen the orthodoxy of the so calledexperts of international relations, said:You're quite right! Palmerson said inBritain: We have no eternal friends andno eternal enemies, just eternalinterests. Therefore, if you can identifythese interests you can scientificallyfollow them and you shouldn't be blownoff course by public opinion, liberalideology, conservative ideology orwhatever.I think that point of view was verynaïve, ironically, because realistsalways think they are the least naïvepeople in the world. It is naïve, becauseyou cannot nor should you in a democracyinsulate foreign policy from domesticpolitics. Your foreign policy is alwayseffected by the dominant ideology, theview of the world and the view of theideal society, which is debated among thegreat schools of thought and thepolitical parties. It variesaccording to country and the way that ithappens, of which is the dominantideology and so on. is it always agood idea if one simply translates one'sdomestic values into internationalrelations as if there were of nodifference. My earlier point was thatinternational relations unfortunately isa rather special kind of environment.What we have to do, therefore, is tocreate an effective trade-off between ourbeliefs and the kind of view that we haveof an ideal society, an idealinternational system and what is actuallyalso practical, the art of the possible.When we have countries which want toexport their domestic ideology, whetherit is Nazi or some periods ofcrusading of American democracy, maybeeven at the moment under , this isnot a good idea because it almost alwaysleads to other people saying: "No, no, wedon't want to live like you and we don'twant to certainly live like you becauseyou tell us to do it!" We want diversityand we want the right to make our owndecisions. International relations isabout accepting diversity and that makingsure that diversity doesn't becomeanarchy and dangerous to all.I think that we naturally as Europeansagree, even if we disagree on a lot ofthings, whether we are liberals orconservatives, socialists or greens orwhatever. But we also have certainagreements, and this is why we have thisdebate about and Mars. We have thisnotion that Europe stands for something,and we would like the rest of the worldto be more like us by and large. But weaccept not only the limits of what we cando, but the limits of how far we shouldshove these ideas down other people'sthroats because that is the nature ofinternational relations. Other peoplehave other societies and other domesticsystems. I think one of the reasons whyEuropean public opinion has been socritical of the even thougha brutal dictator has been removed, andmost of us welcome the human rights'advantages in or in North thatthat might bring, is that ultimately wedo have some notion that it is for thesovereign people of a given country orfor a particular region to develop itspolitics in the way that historically hasbeen its politics and not our politics. Ithink that that is something that we haveto bear in mind, because actually wehaven't got the capability of doinganything different anyway.Anthony : I just want to make anotherpoint. On ideology first, I think thatwhen talked about theend of history, he was meaning the end ofthe great isms, the sort of nazism orcommunism as a solution to everything. Hewas saying that certain ideas ofliberalism and human rights and so onwere now being taken up by all thosewithin the political debate who wereconducting serious political debate. So Ithink in that senseideology has become less important as adriving force for policy. Policy is moredriven by interest.But the real point I wanted to make wason interest, where I think there is, asChristopher says, rather a naïveté aboutthe idea of national interests as ifthese were some discreet things whichcould be defined in terms of a singlenation. and more in an increasinglyinterdependent world it is simply notpossible to pursue a very hard-headedpursutive national interest, becausenational interest can only be defined inan international context. Your nationalinterest on terrorism is to co-operatewith others in dealing with the problem.Your national interest on transnationaldiseases is to co-operate with others.Your national interest on the environmentis to co-operate with others. So I thinkit is actually rather a feeble-mindedidea to believe that you can have thisvery hard-headed pursuit of nationalinterest outside a wider internationalcontext.Göran Lennmarker (m): Utöver viceordförande i utrikesutskottet är jagledamot av konventet och dess arbetsgruppom utrikespolitik. Där var vår idé attutrikesministern, som det kallas, skullesyfta till att föra ihop de två delarnaav EU:s utrikespolitik. En del är den somligger inom kommissionen och som harbeskrivits här. Det är enmycket effektiv och stark del. En del ärden mer klassiska utrikes- ochsäkerhetspolitiken. Bekymret med detta ärdock om denne skall rapportera till tvåskilda chefer - en kommissionspresidentoch en möjlig vald president i rådet,eller dubbelörnen, som till just . Det voreintressant att höra er kommentar. Är detverkligen möjligt att få en sammanhållenoch effektiv utrikespolitik om vi påtoppen av detta har två skilda chefer,nämligen både kommissionens och enpresident i det ?En annan aspekt av detta är att om maninstitutionaliserar utrikespolitiken ochstartar i det gemensamma i stället föratt förhandla mer utifrån nationelltperspektiv finns det en betydligt störremöjlighet för små länder, somtraditionellt har haft ett mycket mindreinflytande på utrikespolitiken, att varamed och påverka. Det kunde varaintressant att höra vad ni säger omdetta. Ni båda representerar ju eneuropeisk supermakt vad gällerutrikespolitik. Vilket perspektiv har nipå att även vi som inte är fullt så mångaoch fullt så inflytelserika kan växa iinflytande just genom eninstitutionalisering av den gemensammautrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken?Anthony : First of all, I don't atall feel that I represent a superpowerand I do believe that it is a veryimportant part of the foreign policy ofthe that it is working inan increasingly integrated Europeanforeign policy. As I think I saidearlier, I believe that the small memberstates can gain influence and contributeto policy in an increasingly integratedforeign policy process.Christopher talked earlier about thedanger of creating institutions that gobeyond what the market will bear - beyondreality - and become incredible and then,instead of leading the process forward,simply become absurd and hold it upbecause it either leads to splits or itis impossible to work the machinery. Ifit is decided by the Convention and laterby the Intergovernmental Conference to goahead with this idea of a foreignminister I think we are right on the cuspof whether this will be something whichcan give impetus to foreign policy orwhether it is beyond what the market willbear.People often talk about political will inforeign policy. It is true that oneshould call on the member states todemonstrate political will to really makethe machinery work. But also, politicalwill isn't something that can becreated in the abstract. It very muchhelps to give affect to make realpolitical will by having someinstitutions, for example a commission toput forward joint ideas around whichpeople can then coalesce. The ideas won'tdrop out of the sky. You need somemachinery to produce and keep the enginemoving and give people something toassemble around. I think that a foreignminister could be very helpful in thatcapacity, in pulling things together.But, as I said earlier, the danger isthat by having this figure you will,instead of pushing further towards anintegrated policy, tend tointergovernmentalize what we already haveand make us weaker rather than stronger.I think it is still all to playful, but Iwould be more comfortable if we couldbuild in to the Treaty some moresafeguards.Christopher : I think this is a veryimportant issue. It could go either way,not only in the respect of the smallstates but in general terms. This newforeign minister position could have somequite significant consequences forEurope. I suppose in the past theCommission has always been seen as asafeguard of the small states' interests,especially in international organizationswhere it sometimes had a seat. There wererows in the 70's whether it should evenhave a seat.If this double-hatted thing occurs onecould see, as I suggested earlier, thatit would represent the try of anintergovernalism and that gradually eventhe president of the Commission will bereduced to a kind of head of a personnelservice, just organizing a particulargroup of fonctionnaires. There will belots of boring but also time-consumingdisputes over who is whose boss, who isto go where, who is to be paid at whatrate and all that kind of thing - thekind of thing that gives a badname. This will probably become evenworse because of the two-bosses-problem,the lion-staff-relationship.But in terms of looking after the smallstates' interests I suppose it followsthat if the Commission is no longer goingto have the political clout to be able todo that in some sort of balancing waythat function would move over to theMinister of Foreign Affairs. But byextension it wouldn't solve the problembecause if the Minister of ForeignAffairs becomes a sort of spokesman forthose countries which don't have so muchclout, which are not superpowers, as yousaid, within Europe it follows that thosewhich are bigger will not be representedand will not see that minister as beingtheir spokesperson. They will continue touse ther national foreign ministries andforeign ministers as direct actors on theinternational scene. So the Europeanforeign minister will become one foreignminister among many, but not thespokesman for the whole system. I have nodoubt that if a person of appropriateseniority and personal weight like Solanaor Patten were to be that person theywill be taken seriously, but, as it were,as an individual rather than thespokesman for the whole system.Again, simply creating a greater forcefor centralization doesn't mean to saythat you solve the problems of coherencethat we talked about earlier. These existof the national level. How do we relatedevelopment policy to foreign policy?Should development policy be at theservice of foreign policy because ofpolitical conditionality and nationalinterest? Or should it be protected fromforeign policy in order to preserve thebudget for the attack on world poverty?This debate is raging within individualcountries and it is raging in ,as I understand it. Should DG VIII beabolished effec-tively and the wholething be brought inside the foreignpolicy structure or not? Even if you havea single foreign minister you are stillgoing to have those kinds of arguments onwhich the individual member states havevery different positions as well.It is not enough simply to say: Therewill be difficulties! There are alwaysgoing to be difficulties. Your grouprecommended a quite perfectly sensiblereform from one point of view. But Ithink it's the assumptions which arebehind the reform that are important.What do you realistically expect this tobe able to achieve? If it's waving amagic wand and say that Europe will nowbe a single actor in the world, I'mafraid that is slightly to be mistaken.Ordföranden: Jag tackar ochChristopher för att ni har varitvänliga att komma till ochbidra till en bra diskussion på dennaoffentliga utfrågning. Ni har bidragitmed mycket tänkvärt tankegods för oss idet sammansatta konstitutions- ochutrikesutskottet när vi kommer attfortsätta arbeta med EU-frågorna.PausPaneldebatt om framtid underledning av talman vonSydowTalmannen: deltagare! Vi fortsättermed den blandade språkregimen svenska ochengelska. kommer jag att säga någraord på svenska.Vi framför ett varmt tack för dengångna sessionen. har som varit vicestatsminister och Sverigesutrikesminister tagit plats. är regeringens representant iEuropeiska konventet. Dessutom harKatarina kommit. Hon ärdepartementsråd och ansvarig för enlångsiktig analys inomFörsvarsdepartementet.Jag skall inledningsvis göra någrakorta reflexioner. Morgonens inledningvisade ju att EU:s gemensamma utrikes-och säkerhetspolitik är ett område somkan beskrivas på två nästan motsattasätt. Å ena sidan lyfte deltagarna framtendensen till bristande sammanhållning.Så fort en viktig utrikespolitisk frågakommer upp går de stora länderna sin egenväg. Å andra sidan kan man hävda att överen , och nämndes,har det varit en otvetydig utveckling motmer av en gemensam utrikes- ochsäkerhetspolitik. Och en fråga vi kanfortsätta att diskutera är dessamotstridiga tendenser.En annan fråga som vi har varit inne pågäller relationen mellan EU och USA.Olika länder i EU har olika uppfattningom hur den relationen bör se ut. Vi komin på boken som skrivits av Kagan. Jaghar också läst den, och jag finner tillmin glädje att politiker efter politikersom man träffar i alla partier i Europaläser den. Den är säkert lika intressantsom bok var.Jag vill ställa en fråga i min egenskapav före detta försvarsminister: satsa på att minska det militäragapet till i syfte att förbättrarelationen över , eller finns detandra vägar man kan gå för att förbättraförhållandet över ?Utvidgningen har ju förvandlat EU frånen västeuropeisk union till enalleuropeisk union. De nyamedlemsstaterna deltar sedan en veckafullt ut som observatörer i ministerrådoch Europaparlament. Som medelstort landbehöver nära kontakter med andraländer för att bygga allianser somhjälper oss att påverka EU i den riktningvi vill. Då kommer vi in på saker som jagockså tycker kunde vara intressanta attdiskutera vidare. Är det så att allamedlemmar vill delta fullt ut isamarbetets olika delar? Det tror jagpersonligen är en mycket betydelsefullsak. Det finns redan exempel på att mangår i lite olika takt: Schengensamarbetetoch naturligtvis valutaunionen.