bet · GQ01KUU2 · 2003-05-22 00:00:00 — It will be veryhard to say in what directions all thechanges will go, but it is not the end ofhistory and not at all of Europe. I thinkit is just the beginning. There are, Ithink, a lot of very positivepossibilities in this process, as justmentioned by the former speaker.I think that one important thing is toreally understand that developmenttowards the Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy actually has been quite stable andpositive to Europe. we through thelast two crises under-stand that if it isnot working, then we have to improve it,which only shows that we need it. Buteven if we are looking at the last ten orfifteen years of changes, or even more,just from the sight of the captivenations living under the Sovietdictatorship, I can peacefully say thatif governments in the 80'shad listened to the public opinion andthe massive peace movement and not haddeployed the American missiles to Europe,we probably wouldn't have had theperestroika and the break-off of theEmpire, at least not in this way. This isa very simple thought as well about thepublic opinion, and at this time more orless actively, but the Europeangovernments just did what was the rightthing to do. They had not given theCommon Foreign and Security Policy onpaper, but they had this largely in fact,and it worked. Thanks to this and thanksto a lot of other steps, we are nowsitting at this table in such aconsultation.Lotta N (): Jag har en ganskaövergripande fråga. Kanske lyssnar jaghelst på svaret från hade en väldigt bra systematiseringav vilka strukturer som en gemensamutrikes- och säkerhetspolitik skullekunna komma att ta. Om vi bortser frånden sista, den om åternationalisering,undrar jag: En sådan här gemensamutrikespolitik är ju inte ettsjälvändamål utan har naturligtvis ettsyfte. Vilken typ av budskap - vilketinnehåll och vilken doktrin - skall viförmedla till omvärlden? I vilkenriktning vill vi påverka resten avvärlden med en gemensam utrikes- ochsäkerhetspolitik?Vad jag skulle önska att ni som svararhar i åtanke är vad vi har sett.Jag menar att vi har sett väldigt mycketav diskussioner om kapaciteter - var viskall hitta gemensamma styrkor och hur viskall få ett billigare försvar. Ett litesorgligt faktum tycker jag är att detprogram för förebyggande av våldsammakonflikter som antogs i i sambandmed inte finns medi diskussionen i konventsutfallet. Jagmenar alltså att den förebyggandefredsskapande verksamheten saknas. Vad ärdet budskap som en utrikes- ochsäkerhetspolitik skall sprida?Ordföranden: I have an extra question foryou, . You mentionedseven different options. I didn'tunderstand the difference between thesecond and the third option. The secondoption was creating a civiliansuperpower, and that was some kind offighting for our values. You said thatshould be in contrast to the Americans.The third option was more in atransatlantic relationship. Could youexplain that and evaluate it a littlemore as I'm not really sure that there isa difference between your second andthird option?Christopher : Let me answer thispoint first and then come to theimportant question of doctrine.Clearly, these options that I outlinedare what we call heuristic devices, theways of clarifying the debate. They arenot strictly speaking separate from eachother. Obviously, there is a lot ofoverlap. It would not in principle beimpossible for a civilian superpower tobe the second pillar of the West.Indeed plenty of people who have talkedabout the division of labour hypotheseshave suggested that's exactly what itshould be.On the other hand: This has oftenseemed to be a rather disreputableposition for Europe, both for someAmerican critics and for some Europeansthemselves. American critics like MichaelMandelbaum have talked about foreignpolicy as social work with Europe simplydoing the kind of cleaning-up businessafter the does thedifficult business of necessarilyfighting wars or opposing threats toEuropean or to Western liberties and allthe rest of it. Many Europeans wouldthink that there was something slightlydishonourable or frustrating in havingonly to do this kind of after-the-fact-work where Europe literally pays for andalso engages with its skills of postconflict repair and up societiesand so on, but doesn't want to get intoany serious issues of internationalconflict.So, those people who want to see Europeas a powerful entity in the world wouldsee this as too limited. And the UnitedStates might have a kind of politicalcontempt for that sort of role becausewhen it comes to a conflict, the civiliansuperpower wouldn't necessarily be ableto stand up to the . Notthat any of us envisage any kind ofmilitary conflict with the ,but when you want to have a politicalconflict, you've got to have some cardsin your hand, I suppose.Let me turn to this important questionof doctrine. This, of course, very muchrelates to the current debate which israging around 's book OfPower and Paradise, where the Americancritics said that on military andsecurity matters the Europeans were fromVenus and the Americans were from Mars.Well, many Europeans might say: Yes,exactly. We would rather be from Venusthan from Mars - quite apart from thegender dimension of all this.Javier actually made a speech atHarvard on April 7th in which he said:"We don't have to make a choice betweenVenus and Mars. and Mars in factproduced the daughter ." It is aclassical analogy that we must see thatVenus and Mars are both absolutelynecessary.Kagan is a close and says: "If you look at the viewthat Europeans are talking about ininternational relations, it is a viewwhich is quasi-pacifist. It says thatforces no longer are of any use. We needalways multilateralism. We need co-operation." It is a kind of new varianton the old idealism of the inter-warperiod which the Americans used to callmoralism, legalism. This unfortunately,according to Kagan and many realists,European realists as well, is simplyinsufficient because sometimes you'llneed to overthrow oryou'll need to deal with al-Qaeda. NoEuropean country is pacifist in the senseof wanting to do without military forcesaltogether or in making the assumptionthat the world is a sufficiently safeplace, that we can all conduct to ourrelations in the way that we do insidethe European Union.Robert Kagan and , who isnow in - knows he wasTony Blair's key foreign policy ideas manfor some years - basically said: "Europehas to accept the double standardspolicy. We have to behave differentlytowards outsiders who might be moredangerous towards us than we behaveamongst ourselves. "This is an old version of the 19thcentury notion that there are barbariansoutside our civilized world, you know. Iam sure you don't agree with it. I don'tthink I do myself. But equally, I thinkit's very important that Europe doesn'tsimply have a view of internationalrelations which is the mirror image ofitself, which simply says: The world isas we would like it to be.I think we should all be realists interms at least of saying: The world isnot as we would like it to be, but thatdoesn't mean to say that we cannotimprove it. But it will take a reallylong, slow and difficult process.Unfortunately, there are some peoplealways who are not going to besusceptible to the power of our Europeanreason and our enlightenment. I'm afraidthat and his colleaguesmight be among that group. They aresimply not going to sit down and talk inthe way that we are talking now.Therefore we have to decide whethersomething has to be done or not. And asit happens, Europe is totally on board onthat aspect of it. The Americans have notreally complained about Europe co-operating in the war on terrorism in thequiet security means even insupport of the war and thewar which overthrew the talibans. It hascomplained of , and it will complaineven more of the debates about ,North , and so on.I think our doctrine is undoubtedlydifferent from that which is representedby the current administration inWashington. But it doesn't have to beautomatically and forever different fromthat which is American foreign policy -or Russian foreign policy, or Chineseforeign policy or all the policies ofother important elements in the worldsystem. Somehow we have to engage in amultilateralism which is not mereidealism but which is actually an attemptto build institutions and commonprojects, as we did with , in thestabilization of Eastern Europe after1991 - a great success, as andsome others have said.But don't forget: That was not the CFSP.That was not even called European foreignpolicy. In fact, it is a wonderfulparadox. The biggest achievement ofEuropean foreign policy has been theenlargement and it is never calledforeign policy, has nothing to do withthe CFSP.Anthony : I agree with very much ofwhat has said. I think heused the analogy of talkingabout Mars and . I think to someextent Europe, rather than being ,is the child of Mars. We have seen war.We know what war has done on ourcontinent. We want war to be the very,very last resort - so we don't excludethe need of resort to force. There willbe occasions, as says, whenpeople are not susceptible to reason andwhere force is in the end the resort thathas to be used. We also need the abilityto exert force in order to givecredibility to the premise that we reallysee it as a very last resort. And what wewant to do is to watch a world which isrule-based, which is co-operative, whichhas multilateral institutions anddisciplines. You say: What is it all for?I think it is for all those abstractwords which one can reel off: We wantpeace. We want co-operation. It's always slightly sort ofvacuous to list objectives of foreignpolicy because there are always the samewords - words about security, prosperity,peace, co-operation and so on - butnevertheless tremendously important atthe moment.Ordföranden: Jag tillåter mig att hängapå det sistnämnda som säger.I det sammansatta konstitutions- ochutrikesutskottet och också iutrikesutskottet diskuterar vi nämligenjust hur vi skall använda Europeiskaunionen för att bidra till det som Carysäger - fred, utveckling i världen och såvidare. Men ofta störs vi av attpolitiken från den europeiska unionen,från kommissionen, inte är koherent.Man kan jämföra med det bistånd som viger till några och denjordbrukspolitik som Europeiska unionenhar eller andra handelshinder som integer de här länderna en chans att faktisktväxa.Du har en stor insyn i hur kommissionenfungerar. Jag är lite nyfiken att fåveta: Hur skall vi skapa en sådan merkoherent utrikespolitik? Det handlar intebara om hårda militära försvarsfrågorutan om hur vi skall bli mer koherenta ide mjuka frågorna.Anthony : First of all I can say: Meaculpa. I think the Commission recognizesthat there is indeed a lot of incoherencein European policy. When we were e.g.discussing the agenda for theJohannesburg Conference on SustainableDevelopment and were trying to write apolicy paper there was a group ofcommissioners who said: "We must be readyto move quite a long way for example onagricultural policy in the interest of asustainabledevelopment. "But the Commission is not anindependant actor and doesn't have power.It is in the end, although it can proposepolicy ideas, decisions that have beentaken democratically in the Council ofMinisters by elected representatives ofelected governments.There are great differences between theviews of different formations of theCouncil. will take a particular view onmaintaining the existing structures ofthe CAP, which may not be the same viewthat has been taken by foreign ministersand external relations council and may bedifferent from views taken elsewhere. Sowhile it sounds rather cheating to saythat problem in the end is not ours, itis up to elected governments, I think itis true.Ordföranden: . Om jag uppfattadeChristopher rätt i hans inledningpekade han på att det även i framtidenkommer att finnas utrikespolitiska frågordär vi inte kommer att vara överens ochatt det är naturligt att det är såeftersom det handlar om demokratier därman har olika åsikter som diskuteras ochdebatteras. Jag delar uppfattningen attdet kommer att finnas svåra frågor även iframtiden.Med bakgrund i måste jagsäga att jag har upplevt det som oerhörtfrustrerande att EU inte har kunnat ageragemensamt. Hur skall vi göra ?Vad skall vi förvänta oss av dengemensamma utrikes- ochsäkerhetspolitiken, och hur skall viförhålla oss till den just när det gällerde riktigt svåra frågorna där det kommeratt bli svårt att komma överens? Skall vibara samarbeta om det som vi kan enas om,och så låter vi bli att prata om detandra? Det skulle vara en modell som ialla fall jag tycker känns oerhörtotillfredsställande.Jag är intresserad framför allt av vadAnthony tror om detta. Hur skall viförhålla oss till de verkligt svårafrågorna ?Anthony : As I tried to say in myintroductory remarks I think that weshouldn't be too blown off course by whathas happened in if you look in theround of what we have achieved, and whatChristopher said about theenlargement is also true. That's been amost important foreign policy, it's beena tremendous source of stability on ourcontinent. I think it helped a softlanding from the break up of the SovietUnion in the same way as it earlierhelped to cement the democracies inSpain, and Portugal.So, overall I think the ledger shows avery positive balance sheet, but therewill be difficult issues. As I said Ithink we shouldn't hide, we shouldn'tpretend that we can create foreign policyat level in our life-times,which is going to be a single policywhere everybody buys into the policy onall issues because we are not seeking tocreate a superstate, we are made up byindependant nations, they will sometimesdiffer.There will be occasions when we dodiffer, and I think we should behonest about that, because if we don't dothat then, as said, therewill be a "Capabilities-Expectationsgap".What I think is also true is that overtime there is a gradual coincidence ofperception and interest between Europeannations. We had 20-30 years ago when wewere closer to the time when there hadbeen great empires, European powers whichwere , very different interestsin the world and we were used to waringeach other and fighting for our interestsin the world. We had particular customersand interests in the world which tendedto be in conflict with one another. Itwas often very difficult for us to have acommon analysis of events in orAsia or wherever it might be.As I say, it seems to me that ratherrapidly over time we are getting thiscoincidence of perception and interest,and it is becoming easier and easier forus to find agreement even on difficultissues, both because the member statesrecognize that they can be more effectivenationally when they can agree on theEuropean level and because they anywayare tending to get a common analysis. Myoverall view is a very optimistic one.Christopher : I would like to commenton this issue. It seems to me that thecrucial question is: What are thedifficult issues?The two most obvious difficult issuesare: Whether to go to war, and whether todisagree with the United Statessystematically, publically and at thecost of various damaging consequences inour relationship, which in many ways weare having anyway even though we aredivided, or some of the member states aregoing to be punished. Do we want to getpunished collectively? we won't beable to be punished collectively becausewe will be too strong. The United Stateswill use that language if we are allunited. That's the powerful argument forbeing united on this difficult issue.I tend to believe that we have onlyinvented a European foreign policyhistorically in order to disagreepolitely with the . Becauseif we agree with the onmost things there would be no need for aparticular European policy, we just within and therewould be some people who would beoutliers or neutral and dissociatethemselves, and that wouldn't be a bigproblem.Why does Europe need to have a distinctpolicy? Partly to do things politicallyas the consequences of its economicstrength, like development policy ortrade policy which have politicalovertones, so we need to have a politicalprofile. But also we learned the lessonof the War that we need to havesome capacity collectively to say to theUnited States: "Sorry, we think this is abad idea by the way and we are not goingto be associated with it." And in theVietnam War, apart from de , allthe Europeans were totally quiet.When it came to the Middle East crisisover the war in October 1973, althoughthe Europeans were divided, it was clearthat there was a powerfulEuropean-American difference. TheAmericans were very unhappy about it andtried to play on those differences.Now we could say 30 years after 1973that we are not doing all that muchbetter. We are divided again, theAmericans are unhappy, we are unhappy,and yet we have not collectively managedto have the political strength to say tothe : This is a bad idea.I don't think personally that this wasinevitable. I think that if andMr and so on had really tried toact together earlier in the process, andif an early warning system had workedproperly so that they understood theseriousness of the American intentions onIraq they could have said: First of all,please, don't do this, this is a badidea. Or if you are going to do it, youdon't do it with our blessing orwhatever." This may sound like a form ofpious sky idealism.I don't think the British Governmenthad to take the line that did,which was to run immediately toWashington and say: "Yes, I think youshouldn't do it immediately afterSeptember 11th, but if you are going todo it then we will be alongside you." Hegave away all the bargaining, theleverage, I think, at an early stage andthat was a mistake. It was also a mistakefrom the French and the German side notto try to work more closely with Britainand other states inside the EuropeanUnion.The second difficult issue is: Do wewant to go to war on any given issue? Ifwe look back to 1974 when invadedCyprus, what did Europe do? We never had the capacity,either politically or militarily, to goto war as Europeans, as opposed to theAtlantic Alliance. At the moment weprobably don't have it either.We can have a solidarity in thenew treaty, but it's only related toterrorism as far as I understand it. Andif there will be terrorist attacks inParis, or anywhere in Europe weare all going to say: Yes, we are goingto work against it. That is not quite thesame as the border crossing activitywhere we actually might have to fightanother state.Thank God it doesn't appear to be anyreal to that for any Europeancountry at the moment, not even in theTurkish-Greek context. But it mighthappen one of these days. Even though weare the closest group of countries in theworld in many respects, we dont't giveeach other a mutual security guarantee.So it is still quite far away from thisdifficult issue.The last category difficult issues isless dramatic. It is things like Zimbabwewhere we couldn't, I say this as aBritish, find it particularly strikingthat the French decided not to giveBritain something over . Theydeliberately made it difficult forBritain. Why was this the case? Partlybecause the countries have their ownseparate sets of interest in orwhatever, and partly because there areall kinds of games being playedsimultaneously that link up andcomplicate each other. With 25 membersunfortunately, as the games theories willtell you, the chances of getting awinning coalition, a maximum coalition,become even lower.Ordföranden: har fått in frågor frånallmänheten som berör just det sista somChristopher tar upp,solidaritetsklausul, gemensamförsvarsunion, Natoutvidgning.Mart Laar måste snart åka tillbaka tillTallinn. har vi chansen att ställa enfråga till representant. MartLaar som premiärminister har ett enormtarbete för att skall kunna blimedlem i Europeiska unionen men också iNato. Många som har hört av sig på vårhemsida undrar över allt detta. Natoutvidgas nu till att omfatta 26 länder,vi har en västeuropeisk union medförsvarsgarantier och ändå sitter fyraländer i och diskuterar att skapaen försvars- och säkerhetspolitisk union.Hur många säkerhetsgarantier måste manskapa i ? Hur ser pådetta?Mart Laar: As I said in my introductoryremarks I think that most important is tomake the structures which we have to workwell, then we can see what the next stepwill be. Looking on the NATO enlargementand European Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy, if I take these aspects, they cannaturally be supported very well, becauseboth sides are very interested in Europehaving possibilities to intervene, whichit does not have now.I don't think it is funny at all tohear that the ' Senate islaughing at and making remarks on theRomanian participation in ,that they cannot even transport theirbattalion there. It is not very nice fromtheir perspective, but this is thereality and I think this is why thecommon security policy is very importantand actually why NATO is supporting thisinitiative in this connection.I am not so pessimistic in the aspectthat the enlargement will make thedecision process weaker. I think that thelesson we can learn from the crisisis that there was a possibility to have acommon position, but the possibility wasjust missed. And it was missed becausethere was no idea to talk because, to bevery frank, I am bit of anoutsider, looking at European foreignpolicy it has very often been so thatsome major countries have come togetherand made their decisions, and then nobodyelse has had anything more to say onthose questions.At this moment some countries whichotherwise maybe had been silent realizedthat can have some new and theyused the memento. It shows very well oneimportant thing, that was mentioned,namely that it was very easy for Germanyto support against the UnitedStates but with it will be a lotmore difficult.In this context the enlargement can havea balancing and developing role inpressing to more consultations, pressingto more talk. This is the key issue. I amquite sure that if there had been moreearly warning consultations on the matterthere had been good possibilities to havea common position on as well.Ordföranden: you very much forsharing your valuable time with us today.We know that you are in a rush back toTallinn, and we wish you a safe flight.Thank you very much for coming.Ingvar (): Jag har en fråga avkonstitutionellt och principielltintresse som kanske främst riktar sigtill unionen är ju en unikkonstruktion när det gäller balansenmellan institutionerna. Vi har rådet,kommissionen och Europaparlamentet.Kommissionen skall stå för långsiktighet,stabilitet och oberoende, medan kanskerådet och faller in ikortsiktighet.Det finns nu ett förslag frånkonventets presidium om en"dubbelhattning" när det gällerutrikesfrågorna. Man skall utse enutrikesminister i rådet, till och med som dessutom skall varavice president i kommissionen. Utgör intedetta en risk att man blandarihop de här institutionerna och skaparproblem, en utrikesminister som kanskefrämst har sin status i Europeiska rådetblir en trojansk häst i kommissionen?Det finns en dunkelhet i förslagen frånkonventets presidium, nämligen attutrikesministern och kommissionen skallkunna lägga fram gemensamma förslag ochförslag var för sig. Skall man lägga framförslag var för sig förutsätter det enhög grad av schizofreni, eftersomkommissionen är ett kollektiv, och vicepresident ingår där och dessutom ärutrikesminister i rådet.Det är en intressant frågeställning, ochjag undrar hur ser på den.Anthony : When the HighRepresentative for the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy was created and there wasalso going to be a commissioner forexternal relations, in the figure ofJavier and , there wasa tremendous excitement in thejournalistic community. They thought thatthey were bound to have wonderful,theatrical and public fights, becausethey were bound to be in rivalry witheach other for control of the policy.Chris Patten was determined that thisshould not happen. He said by a Chineseproverb: "We shall be lips and teeth.