sou · GPB31d1 · 2002-01-01 00:00:00 — En nyhet i samman- hanget är att den nya lagen tillåter bolagen att emittera fristående teckningsoptioner. I likhet med vad som ovan sagts i fråga om bolagsbildning innebär den nya lagen ökade möjligheter för ägarna att besluta huruvida betalningen för emitterade aktier, eller för den delen teckningsoptioner eller konvertibler, skall utgöra bundet eller fritt kapital i bolaget. Det är en fråga som ägarna skall ta ställning till i emissionsbeslutet. Annor- lunda uttryckt har kommittén i detta sammanhang släppt den 18 En ny aktiebolagslag – sammanfattning traditionella kopplingen mellan aktiekapitalet och antalet aktier. Aktie- kapitalet kan ökas utan att antalet aktier ökas, och antalet aktier kan ökas utan att aktiekapitalet ökas. När ett publikt aktiebolag eller en aktieägare i ett sådant bolag offentliggör eller på annat sätt till en vidare krets riktar en inbjudan att förvärva aktier eller teckningsrätter i bolaget skall styrelsen , enligt bestämmelser i aktiebolagslagen, upprätta ett prospekt, om summan av de belopp som till följd av inbjudan kan komma att betalas uppgår till ett visst, i lagen angivet, belopp. Bestämmelser om emissionsprospekt finns förutom i aktiebolagslagen bl.a. i lagen (1991:980) om handel med finansiella instrument. I fråga om fond- papper som är inregistrerade vid eller avsedda att inregistreras vid börs finns bestämmelser om börsprospekt bl.a. i lagen (1992:543) om börs- och clearingverksamhet. Båda lagarna kompletteras av Finans- inspektionens prospektföreskrifter. Kommittén anser det vara olyckligt att aktiebolag och aktieägare, som avser att emittera eller sälja fondpapper skall behöva beakta prospektregler i flera olika lagar. I den nya lagen har därför inte upp- tagits några prospektregler. I stället föreslås vissa nya bestämmelser om prospekt i lagen om handel med finansiella instrument och lagen om börs- och clearingverksamhet. I detta sammanhang behandlar kommittén också frågan om vilket ansvar som skall kunna utkrävas av bolaget för felaktigheter och brister i ett upprättat prospekt. Rättsläget på denna punkt är i viss mån oklart. Enligt den i doktrinen förhärskande uppfattningen kan ett aktiebolag inte på kontraktsrättslig grund bli skadeståndsskyldigt mot aktieägare eller den som i väsentlig mån är att likställa med aktieägare, när dessa personers anspråk hänför sig till teckning eller förvärv av aktier eller andra fondpapper som givits ut av bolaget. Det är en inställning som skiljer sig från vad som är fallet i bl.a. och , något som inte sällan leder till svårutredda rättsliga frågeställningar vid svenska bolags emissioner på den internationella kapitalmarknaden. Kommittén föreslår mot denna bakgrund att aktie- bolag skall kunna åläggas ett skadeståndsansvar för felaktigheter och brister i prospekt som upprättats av bolaget vid en emission eller en aktieägares utförsäljning av en större aktiepost i bolaget. Bestämmel- serna om sådant ansvar föreslås tas in i lagen om handel med finansi- ella instrument. I 13 kap. har upptagits särskilda bestämmelser om vissa riktade emissioner m.m. Bestämmelserna svarar med smärre ändringar, bl.a. i fråga om tillämpningsområdet, mot vad som är lagen (1987:464) om vissa riktade emissioner i aktiemarknadsbolag, m.m. (LEO-lagen). Kommittén föreslår att den lagen upphävs. En av de materiella ny- En ny aktiebolagslag – sammanfattning 19 heterna i sammanhanget är att ett moderbolag som vill överlåta aktierna i ett dotter- eller dotterdotterbolag till det bolagets företagsledning eller anställda – en s.k. management buy out – inte behöver underställa beslutet moderbolagets bolagsstämma för godkännande. Till aktiebolagslagens hårda kärna hör reglerna till skydd för bolagets bundna egna kapital. Dit kan räknas, förutom reglerna om bolagsbildning, reglerna om nedsättning av aktiekapitalet, förvärv av egna aktier och vinstutdelning. finns bestämmelser om dessa förfaranden på olika ställen i lagen. Bestämmelserna är emellertid inte samordnade utan skiljer sig på flera punkter omotiverat från varandra. Kommittén föreslår att bestämmelserna samlas till ett gemensamt block, som inleds med ett för alla tre förfaranden gemensamt kapitel om värdeöverföringar. Sålunda finns i den nya lagens 14 kap. vissa grundläggande bestämmelser om värdeöverföringar, i 15 kap. be- stämmelser om vinstutdelning, i 16 kap. bestämmelser om förvärv av egna aktier och i 17 kap. bestämmelser om minskning av aktiekapitalet. De föreslagna reglerna innebär genomgående ökade möjligheter för företagen att fortlöpande anpassa sin kapitalstruktur till vad som anses vara mest gynnsamt för bolaget och dess ägare. Kommittén har också haft ambitionen att i lagen ge uttryck för den rättsutveckling som under ägt rum i praxis och doktrin på framför allt vinstutdelningsområdet. I delbetänkandet Aktiebolagets kapital (SOU 1997:22) föreslog kommittén bl.a. att svenska aktiebolag, privata såväl som publika, skulle tillåtas förvärva egna aktier. Förslaget ledde i denna del till lag- ändringar . Vissa publika aktiebolag, huvudsakligen aktie- marknadsbolag, fick då rätt att förvärva egna aktier. Frågan om huru- vida även övriga publika aktiebolag och privata aktiebolag skall tillåtas förvärva egna aktier skall avgöras efter ytterligare utredning rörande skattemässiga frågeställningar som uppkommer i sammanhanget. Kom- mittén har i det nu presenterade lagförslaget inte lagt fram något nytt författningsförslag avseende egna aktier, men står fast vid den principiella uppfattningen att alla aktiebolag bör tillåtas förvärva egna aktier. Till kapitalskyddsreglerna kan också räknas 18 kap. om lån från bolaget till aktieägare m.fl. Kommittén föreslog i delbetänkandet Vinst- utdelning (SOU 1997:168) att det absoluta förbudet mot sådana lån skulle ersättas av mindre långtgående restriktioner. I det nu framlagda förslaget till en ny aktiebolagslag tar kommittén ytterligare steg i denna riktning. I korthet innebär förslaget att medel som skulle kunna användas för utdelning till aktieägarna också skall kunna lånas ut till ägare och andra särskilt nämnda personer. 20 En ny aktiebolagslag – sammanfattning Kommittén föreslår ett nytt 19 kap. om inlösen av minoritetsaktier och därefter ett 20 kap. om fusion och ett 21 kap. om fission. Medan fusionsbestämmelserna i allt väsentligt överensstämmer med gällande rätt är fissionsinstitutet en nyhet i svensk rätt. Det handlar, enkelt uttryckt, om en spegelbild av fusion – en uppdelning av ett aktiebolag i två eller flera nya aktiebolag. De nya reglerna ger svenskt näringsliv ännu ett instrument för omstrukturering och anpassning till nya förhållanden. Bestämmelsernas närmare utformning styrs i betydande utsträckning av EG:s sjätte bolagsdirektiv. I 22 kap. har upptagits bestämmelser om likvidation svarande mot kommitténs så sent som avlämnade delbetänkande Likvidation av aktiebolag (SOU 1999:36). I 23 kap. regleras byte av bolagskategori på samma sätt som sker i 17 kap. ABL. Till de centrala bestämmelserna i lagen hör 24 kap. om registrering. Kapitlet motsvarar 18 kap. ABL och är materiellt sett oförändrat. Inte heller föreslås några materiella ändringar i reglerna om aktiebolags firma, vilka upptagits i 25 kap. i den nya lagen. Sist i den nya lagen regleras i 26 kap. skadestånd och i 27 kap. straff och vite. Skadeståndsreglerna fick, på kommitténs förslag, en ny utformning . Bestämmelserna om straff och vite hålls även i den nya lagen på ett minimum. Kommittén har av regeringen fått i uppdrag att lägga fram ett full- ständigt förslag till ett aktieägarregister. Uppdraget redovisas i en bilaga till betänkandet. Beträffande förslaget till aktieägarregister hän- visas till den sammanfattning som återfinns i bilagan. A Act – a summary The corporation – or aktiebolag, as it is known in Swedish – is considered by many to be an important reason for the economic success of the Western World during the past century. The opportunity to accumulate capital through small contributions from a large number of investors has paved the way to todays multinational companies. The fact that shareholders in a corporation are not personally liable for the companys obligations has made this type of legal entity attractive to small business owners as well. As in many other countries, in the majority of companies are closely held corporations. As a result, Swedish company law must not only meet international and national demands but also be flexible enough to accommodate both large and small enterprises. The classification into public and private companies implemented in as part of its EU harmonization provides this flexibility and, for now at least, has silenced a longstanding debate on the need for a special business form for small companies. A national companies act must also be designed so that it wont quickly become outdated due to changing conditions. The pressure to change in the international arena in which large Swedish companies compete is very strong. Our current Companies Act dates back to 1975. During the quarter-century it has been in force, has joined the EU, the has fallen, and capital now flows almost freely between nations. It is no exaggeration to say that Swedish companies today operate in a completely different international environment than they did when the current Companies Act was written. Because of this, Swedish legislators have adopted a number of amendments to the Companies Act to meet new needs as they arise. In general, however, it is difficult to add a large number of amendments to an act of this significance without eventually losing some of its structure and making it difficult to comprehend. One example is that the current provisions on general and special reviews and on changes in company categories, respectively, were placed in chapters 11 and 17 solely for the reason that the latter chapter, which originally contained provisions on accounting and restricted versus unrestricted shares, was 22 A Act – a summary abolished as part of EU harmonization. It is obvious that such amendments, which can also be made at the paragraph level, affect the original logic of the provisions and make the Act more difficult to understand. Rarely has a version of the Act survived more than 30 years. Considering the tremendous changes that have taken place in the world, it is surprising that the Act of 1975 has not already been replaced. has held to the traditional view of Swedish company law and underscored, in among other places its report entitled, The Structure of the Corporation (SOU 1995:44), the important role of a companys shareholders: In a market economy, the of financial success are unevenly dispersed between various types of businesses and various companies. Those who wish to gain the maximum financial advantage of successful development work must steer their investments to businesses and companies with the best earnings . They also have to manage their investments by staying informed of how well these companies are developing and by trying to positively impact their operations. Corporate shareholders help to ensure that the resources of individual companies and the business sector as a whole are utilized as effectively as possible. Shareholders who take responsibility for the corporate and business development are therefore an important element in a prosperous market economy. In the opinion of the Committee, the Act should be designed in a way that promotes an ownership function. This ensures the best opportunities for companies to quickly and continuously adapt their organizations and operations to changes in the operating environment as well as for a dynamic business sector. This requires in part that the Act guarantees shareholders the ultimate decision-making authority in a company and in part that it facilitates changes in ownership (SOU 1995:44, p. The Government has applied the same logic in its current reform of the Companies Act, using the Committees proposal as a basis (see 1997/98:99, p. 75 f.). Another aspect worth mentioning here are the major changes in the ownership structures of listed Swedish companies during the latter half of the 1990s. Foreign investors now own more than half of many of our largest companies. These foreign owners in many cases are pension funds or other institutions that invest in stocks but rarely get involved in a companys management. Instead, they sell their shares if they become displeased with how the company is run. Of course, it is not only foreign owners that increasingly are institutions. Swedish owners also consist to a large extent of funds, insurance companies and other A Act – a summary 23 Individual investors, who a few decades ago had majority interests in our listed companies, have seen their influence wane considerably. , which has tried to create routines that give Swedish and international institutional investors an effective opportunity to participate in the management of Swedish companies, is proposing in this final report further measures to that end. feels, however, the Government would be wise to follow developments in this area and remain prepared should there be any indications that institutional investors are not taking responsibility for management of the companies they have invested in and, as a result, are impeding the development opportunities of the Swedish business sector. This final report is the seventh in a series issued by the Committee. By presenting its work in this way, the Committee has helped to smooth the way for partial reforms. Many changes have, in fact, been implemented, and others are in the process. This way of working, in which findings are presented gradually over time, has major advantages for end users. From a legislative standpoint, finished proposals can be adopted right away, without waiting for other proposals. The whole process of circulating proposals for review is also more effective, in the opinion of the Committee, if the proposals are spread over a series of reports, each relatively modest in scope, rather than in a single, comprehensive report; the comments on the last chapter of the above- mentioned Companies Act proposal of 1971 were relatively few in number, for example. In addition, the Committee has been able to utilize the opinions garnered on its earlier reports in designing the final edition. At first glance, the Companies Act of 1975 seems mainly to be a rulebook. It contains detailed checklists of the documents needed for every area covered by the Act, often with detailed instructions on their contents. The Act proposed by the Committee is in with this tradition. In fact, the number of checklists has increased, as has the length of the lists. namely feels that it will be easier for all the parties involved, including the Swedish Patent and Registration Office, if there are clear rules on which documents are required in different situations, including when it comes to recording decisions in the share register. In addition, the Committee has tried to avoid cross- references and has therefore written out each checklist, despite that the list for a specific issue may be identical to one used for another type of issue. The mere fact that there are so many checklists in the Committees proposal should not be misinterpreted to mean that the Committee is suggesting tighter overall control over companies. On the contrary, the 24 A Act – a summary Committees work is marked by a willingness to allow the market to handle many of the problems that previous legislators tried to regulate. The new opportunities for companies to repurchase their own shares and the Committees proposal to permit stock loans are just two examples of a liberalization and shift toward self-regulation, more of which follow below. One important part of its work has drawn particular attention now that the Committee is presenting its proposal for a completely new Companies Act, i.e. its effort to make the Act as understandable and easy to read as possible. has tried to apply consistent systematics, limiting the length of the provisions and making extensive use of headings and subheadings, so it will be easier for readers to find the information they need. Lastly, the Committee has tried to use as simple a language as the subject matter will allow. Much of the contents of the final report has already been made known through previous reports and partial reforms that have already been implemented – e.g. the elimination of restricted shares, harmonization with the EUs company law directives on private and public companies, the new organizational rules, and the opportunities for listed companies to repurchase their own shares. The Swedish Government is currently reviewing a report by based on the Committees proposal regarding profit distributions, reductions in share capital, and liquidations. What then remains to be addressed from the Committees previous reports are its proposals on incorporation, limitations on the transfer of shares, increases in share capital, and the mandatory redemption of minority shares. In the final report it now presents, the Committee not only summarize its previous proposals, however, but also address a number of new issues. The difference between the current and new Companies Act proposed by the Committee can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1 contains general provisions on corporations, as does the current Act. The Acts portal paragraph dictates the fundamental characteristic of the corporation – i.e. the freedom of shareholders from personal liability for the companys obligations. has considered whether to add a general exception to this provision for the concept of lifting the corporate veil, but has ruled against it. There is one area where the Committee finds good reason for this concept to be set forth in law - namely, the environment – although this should be done in the Environmental Code, not the Companies Act. The first chapter also stipulates that a company can be private or a public and that the Act applies to all companies unless stated otherwise. This categorization, as mentioned above, was introduced in A Act – a summary 25 connection with EU harmonization. to the new rules on the structure of the corporation, it has increased in importance, and in the new Act will be utilized to an even greater extent. To protect a companys creditors, the first chapter also mandates that it must maintain a minimum share capital, which can be divided into one or more of shares. One important new principal in the revised Act is that shares will no longer need to have a specific par value. The system of par values will be abolished and replaced by a ratio system in which each share represents an equal percentage of the companys share capital (ratio value) and thus of its assets. The transition to a ratio system also affects the new Acts rules on forming a company and increasing or decreasing its share capital. Moreover, the first chapter defines the concept of a group. Since the accounting rules in the Companies Act were replaced by special legislation in 1996, this definition is of relatively limited significance. The Act, in fact, contains few rules concerning groups, and the Committee has found no interest in adding provisions on so-called group law. Chapter 2 contains provisions on the formation of a company. In this respect, the new Act is a major simplification of the current law. The concept of successive formations, which is rarely used, is being eliminated, and the rules on simultaneous formations are redesigned. According to the new Act, a person or persons who want to form a company must draw up a deed of formation, subscribe for all the shares directly in the deed, pay for the shares, establish and allow an authorized or approved public accountant to review an opening balance sheet, finalize the deed of formation and apply to register the company. One important change is that the founders themselves, while taking into consideration that they maintain a specific minimum share capital, can determine the extent to which payment for shares is applied to share capital or constitutes unrestricted shareholders equity in the company. Chapter 3 contains provisions on shares and their transferability. Two fundamental principles are laid down. One is that all shares have an equal right in the company unless otherwise stated in the articles of association. The second principle is that shares are freely transferable. Limitations on this transferability may be stipulated in the articles of association, but only with the support of the law. While current law only permits limitations in the form of preemption , the new Act opens the possibility for all companies to use both preemption and right of first refusal , and for private companies to apply consent as well. This satisfies the demand for greater flexibility in this 26 A Act – a summary area, primarily in companies with a limited ownership base, while leaving the basic principle on free transferability in place. All shares in a company must be recorded in a register, the provisions for which are covered in chapter 4. The new Act distinguishes more systematically between the rules for coupon companies (e.g. privately held family-owned companies) and VPC- registered companies. At the request of the Government, the Committee has given special consideration to limiting the current principle that makes share registers public information, due to the risk of fraud perpetrated against shareholders. In the opinion of the Committee, the information in the share register confidential would not be an effective preventive. is therefore proposing that the share register remain public information and thereby facilitate research and debate on share ownership and influence in public companies. VPC-registered companies are currently bound by a limitation rule that prohibits them from issuing printouts of their share registers that include the names of shareholders with up to 500 shares. instead is proposing that the limitation rule be designed so that printouts exclude shareholders whose holdings represent less than one thousandth of the voting rights of all shares in the company. In coupon companies, a shareholder, upon request, may have his or her share certificates issued. The provisions on share certificates are in chapter 5. VPC-registered companies may not issue share certificates. Instead, shareholdings are manifested as listings in a share register maintained by a central custodian. At the suggestion of the Committee and in line with the growing debate on corporate governance in the 1990s, new provisions on the structure of corporations were added to the Act in 1999. is proposing that these provisions, which must be applied consistently by all companies, be given a more prominent place in the new Act and that the hierarchal structure with shareholders as the ultimate decision-makers be underscored by placing the provisions on general meetings ahead of the provisions on the board of directors and managing director. Thus, chapter 6 contains the provisions on general meetings, while chapter 7 covers the board of directors and managing director. An important idea behind the rules on general meetings, as currently designed on the basis of the Committees previous proposals, is to promote an ownership role primarily in companies with many shareholders. The new Act takes several further steps in this direction, including an increase in the opportunities to utilize electronic aides and modern communication technology at the general meeting. For example, the Act is introducing a provision permitting the general A Act – a summary 27 meeting to approve participation via the Internet or other computer network. The rules on the structure of the corporation are also covered in chapter 8 on auditing and chapter 9 on accounting in general. With a couple of minor exceptions, they coincide with current regulations.