sou · GPB385d4 · 2002-01-01 00:00:00 — Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv och Bibliotek och ubåten: En rapport om vissa studier, för Psykologiskt Försvar, , Nr. Den främmande undervattensverksamheten på svenskt territorium sedd ur ett säkerhetspolitiskt perspektiv, Från Referensgruppen under ledning av till chefen för , daterad . Granskning av ubåtsjaktverksamheten mot bakgrund av händelserna i , Slutrapport till chefen för marinen från arbetsgrupp Ubåtsjaktverksamhet (under ledning av ), daterad . Försvarsstabens Informationsavdelning, Ubåt 137 på svenskt vatten, daterad . Försvarsstabens Informationsavdelning, Informationstjänsten i samband med ubåtskränkningarna i , daterad . Försvarsstabens Informationsavdelning, Dykarverksamhet i , daterad . Försvarsstabens Informationsavdelning, Särskild orientering om nationalitetsbestämning vid ubåtsskyddsverksamhet, daterad . /82: 35, Ubåtsaffären, : Riksdagstrycket. /83: 30, Ubåtsincidenten i : Riksdagstrycket. /84: 30, Riksdagsledamoten resa till och Viss utrikespolitisk rapportering, : Riksdagstrycket. /95: KU 30, Brev till President, : Riksdagstrycket. Rapport avseende främmande undervattensverksamhet i Karlskrona- området , utredning ledd av konteramiral , daterad . Rapport över utredning angående händelser i 03-04, utredning ledd av generaldirektören i förre hovrättslagmannen , av- given . Slutrapport , avslutande rapport från de svensk-ryska expertsamtalen i ubåtsfrågan, överlämnat . Att möta ubåtshotet: Ubåtskränkningarna och svensk säkerhetspolitik. : Liber/Allmänna förlaget. Svensk säkerhetspolitik inför 90-talet. Rapport års försvarskommitté. : Liber/Allmänna förlaget. Ubåtsfrågan 1981 1994. Betänkande av Ubåts- kommissionen. Undervattensverksamheten som riktas mot vårt land, läge , Rapport från Överbefälhavaren till Regeringen, daterad . Allmänna böcker och artiklar , W. 1986. Bakom ubåtskrisen: Militär verksamhet, krigsplan- läggning och diplomati i . , W. 2000. Fred och Fruktan: säkerhetspolitiska historia 1918 2000. : Historiska Media. (ed.) Fredens hav vredens hav. : och försvar. Not only Submarines: A Perspective on Swedish-Soviet Relations, International Relations, . & , K. (red.) & Samarbete, säkerhet och konflikter . Braconier, F. & , L. Striden om säkerhetspolitiken. Bynander, F. 2001 Securitizing the Submarine Threat: The Framing of Underwater intrusions in i , J. (red.) & , L. 1987. med alla till buds stående medel. Leitenberg, M. Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters 1980 1986. Ubåtar och svensk säkerhetspolitik. Lähteinen, J. Ubåtars territorialkränkningar – erfarenheter I och , Kungliga Hand- lingar och , . Stranger than Fiction: Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters. Myhrberg, I. Ubåtsvalsen: en motbok till rapporterna från ÖB och . Folkrätten i svensk säkerhetspolitik. (Doktors- avhandling.) , O. 1985 Immunitet och ubåtar än en gång i , Nr.1. , O. 1990. Ubåtsoperationer och folkrätt i till . Studies in International . Neutralitet och europeisk integration. Detter de Lupis, I. U-båtsspionaget och folkrätten i , Nr.2. U 137 – Folkrätt och neutralitets- politik i tillämpning, Kungliga Handlingar och , . Folkrätt och Säkerhetspolitik. Bildt, C. Ubåtskränkningarna mot – bakgrund, mönster, motiv i Kungliga Hand- lingar och , . Ett motiv till ubåtskränkningarna i i sjöväsende, Nr.1. 1996 Ubåtskränkningarna: Frågor om bakgrund och motiv, Internationella Studier, Nr.1. Tunberger, J. Ubåtarna, zonen och sanningen som den borde vara, i Fred och Säkerhet, Debatt och Analys 1982 1983. Fredskampanj och ubåtar – politik mot . Världspolitikens dagsfrågor 1982:11. The Soviet Union and Northern Waters. 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Ubåtshotet En kritisk granskning av Hårs- fjärden-incidenten och . & , A. Ubåt 137: som skakade . , S. 1991. och Ubåtskränkningarna, i Insikt och Beslut: Studier Tillägnade . : Militärhis- toriska Förlaget. Vi tvingades släppa rysk ubåt, Tidskriften , Nr. U137, U238 och Fredens hav, Kungliga Handlingar och , . Stefenson, B. (red.) Krishantering: U 137-krisen. & Sundelius, B. Managing Assymetrical Crisis: , the and U-137, International Studies Quarterly, 36, 213 239. The U-137 Incident: A Study in . thesis, : . Ubåtsjakt i svenska och internationella sammanhang Minkar eller ubåtar i den svenska ubåtsjakten. Anti-submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic Stability. Tactical ASW: old problems, new solutions, A Survey of Western ASW in 1985, Ubåtsjakt en subjektiv oförmåga, Vårt försvar nr 4. Larsbrink, G. Svenska ubåtsjakt i ett internationellt perspektiv, för sjöväsende, Nr. Den stora ubåtsfällan, , Nr. Wilkes, O. 1979. Strategic anti-submarine warfare and its implications for a counterforce first strike, World Armaments and Disarmament: 1979. Wit, J.S. 1981. Advances in Antisubmarine Warfare, Scientific American, Vol. 244, Nr. Adelsohn, U. Partiledare 1981 1986. : Gedins Förlag. Mitt i stormen. Ur skuggan av . Elmbrant, B. Elmbrant, B. , von H. I kampen mot överheten. En bonde blir statsminister. , O. 1993. Maktspel synat På , och tid. This summary deals mainly with the conclusions presented by the investigator, as well as the most important reasons for these conclusions, and some background information. On October 5, 2000 the Government decided to appoint a special investigator to analyse the political and military conduct of the submarine question from 1980 until today. The investigators assignment was to describe and evaluate how the Government, the Armed Forces and other competent authorities dealt with established and apparent underwater violations of territorial waters since the early 1980s. The submarine violations to which was subjected in the 1980s and 1990s should be considered in their broader security context. The inquiry therefore starts with a description of the strategic and security environment in the Baltic Sea region. This was one of the coldest periods of the Cold War, when the world came closer to nuclear war than for a long time. It was followed by a détente and political liberation in Eastern Europe and the emergence of a completely new political and strategic landscape. The most frequent incidence of submarine violations occurred at the beginning of this period. During the post-war period the Soviet Baltic Fleet was the dominant military factor in the Baltic Sea region, although , and later West , maintained significant naval capacity. Interest in the North increased as a result of strategic developments. The rapid naval buildup of the Soviet Union under Admiral Gorshkov created a new strategic situation. The expansion and modernization of the Soviet submarine force played a key role. However, the maintained technological and qualitative superiority, which the Soviet Union sought to offset by quantity. The shift to a forward naval strategy at the start of the 1980s increased the pressure, in particular, on the Soviet submarine fleet, and the areas immediately adjacent to in the North and the approaches to the Baltic Sea emerged as points of intersection in terms of naval strategy. to the increased emphasis on the possibility of a major conventional conflict on the continent, the need of military transports along the southern Baltic coast became an important factor. At the same time, NATO showed growing interest in the possibility of disrupting the Pacts troop movements and logistics transports through the southern Baltic to the central front. From the Soviet point of view, the Baltic Sea became a top priority strategic area, and the transport and supply routes in the southern Baltic were key components. As a result, the Soviet side upgraded the military significance of territory. During World War II archipelagos had sometimes been used by the submarines of belligerent states as safe havens. During the Cold War the Soviet Baltic Fleet had to take into account the possibility that in the event of war West German submarines might try to use territory. For this reason the Soviet Union might have considered it important to monitor the development of anti-submarine defence and to take steps to prevent NATO (West German) submarines using archipelagos for operations directed against the Pact. Two decades of submarine problems The period 1980-82 may be called the formative period, when frame of reference for dealing with the submarine question took shape. The main issue at that time was: which state is responsible for the violations? After the incident there was a period of political confrontation and continued violations. The main issue was: why are the violations continuing? From 1987 onwards a gradual reappraisal of the situation took place and the conventional wisdom was increasingly challenged. The main issue now was: to what extent did violations actually occur? The formative period 1980 82 As a result of the 1972 Defence Resolution a significant part of the navys submarine hunting capability was abolished. When international tension increased, this meant that the Swedish navy was ill-equipped to meet an increasingly serious submarine threat. The Utö incident in 1980 seemed to mark the beginning of a new pattern of submarine violations since the violating submarine did not immediately leave territory after being detected. The handling of the incident was marked initially by some restraint in the employment of weapons. The Minister of Defence called for more resolute action. This was one of the few occasions on which the Government sought to involve itself directly. The Utö incident was something of an alarm bell and led to a limited review of submarine hunting resources. It was not possible to establish the nationality of the submarines involved in the violations. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces referred to several indications that pointed in the direction of the Pact, including signal intelligence. However, this is open to doubt, and the remaining evidence consists of an optical observation at a distance of 300 metres. The behaviour of the submarine or submarines was thought to indicate that it was either a modern submarine type that had not previously been observed in the Baltic Sea or a West German submarine. However, both these alternatives were rejected. The general view was that they were Soviet submarines, and the possibility of a West German intrusion was not taken seriously. The intrusion of the Soviet submarine U 137 into on October 27, 1981 confirmed to the Swedish authorities and the Swedish public that Soviet submarines were violating Swedish The incident attracted considerable attention, both nationally and internationally. The handling of the U 137 incident was in many ways a successful example of a small nations management of a serious crisis, not least thanks to the clear division of roles between politicians and the military. The Supreme Commanders decision to proceed on the assumption that the violation was deliberate, without discussing it with the Government, set the tone for conduct throughout the crisis. The unusually clumsy nature of the intrusion and the submarines atypical behaviour raised questions as to whether or not the intrusion was deliberate. It has come to the knowledge of the inquiry that the Soviet side searched for the submarine for six hours in its designated patrolling area east of the of before realizing that the submarine was on Swedish territory. This has been known to the Swedish Armed Forces ever since the incident. However, the 1995 Submarine Commission concluded that, in view of the navigation and visibility conditions at the time of the incident, the intrusion must have been deliberate. The investigator has not found it necessary to take a definite stand on the question of whether or not the violation was deliberate. political and military conduct after the incident was based on the assumption that it was deliberate. Whether or not this assumption was correct, the crisis was handled firmly and the deterioration of relations between and the Soviet Union may be regarded as a consequence for which the violating state must be prepared, regardless of whether the violation was deliberate. The incident was preceded by Operation Notvarp, a secret Swedish operation whose purpose was to capture a submarine and force it to the surface. Notvarp was the first proactive Swedish operation and it has not previously been disclosed. Together with an American naval visit and large-scale NATO manoeuvres in the Baltic Sea both before and after the incident, the operation was part of the naval environment in which the incident occurred. Perhaps one could say that Operation Notvarp achieved results at the right time but in the wrong place. Nevertheless, the planning of this operation may be questioned, particularly in view of the fact that it was carried out during an ongoing change of government in and replacements among the chiefs of staff. Had Notvarp produced results, this could have come at a time when was less well-prepared. The handling of the incident was marked by hesitation and confusion, not least as regards orders. to an obvious lack of tactical leadership and central intervention from the military leadership, there was a failure to take action and opportunities were missed. This gave rise to a number of rumours and speculative hypotheses: for example, that some or all the intrusions were made by NATO submarines with the tacit consent of the Swedish Navy, that the chiefs of staff deliberately allowed submarines to violate Swedish territory, that submarines were released with the tacit consent of the Government, etc. The inquiry has not found any factual basis for these rumours and concludes that they may be attributable to a confused chain of command. The handling of tapes and other evidence, in particular, must be criticized. The tapes recorded during important events were not carefully stored, the results of water samples and oil analyses, as well as photographs, were not preserved, and data were found to be missing from the Supreme Commanders military diary. The investigator agrees with the assessment of that the division of responsibilities between the Government and the Armed Forces was normal and appropriate. Other aspects, such as relations with the media and the Governments handling of the situation that arose, were not equally satisfactory. The 1983 Submarine Defence Commission The Submarine Defence Commission presented what it called the probable course of events. However, this was only one of several possible scenarios that the Armed Forces and the presented to the Commission. The problem was that the Commission did not make a sufficiently clear distinction between assessments of missions for military operational purposes and assessments of missions for political purposes. assessments were not sufficiently reliable and realistic to provide guidance for balanced political decisions. Today, the evidence advanced for identifying the Soviet Union as responsible for the violations does not seem conclusive. The Commissions chairman, , and its members made a political rather than an objective judgement. They considered the identification necessary regardless of the evidence. The same goes for the Governments decision to endorse the Commissions conclusions although, in view of the prevailing political situation, it seems unreasonable to criticize this decision. However, the Governments decision to appoint the Submarine Defence Commission meant that it ceded control of the political outcome of this key issue, and it must therefore be questioned. The submarine issue had a great impact on foreign policy during the 1980s and made a rational approach to security and defence policy difficult. The reason for this unfortunate development was not that the Government agreed with the conclusions of the Submarine Defence Commission, but that it ceded control by appointing the Commission in the first place. Political confrontation and continued violations After the incident the submarine question became a political divider in Swedish politics and triggered a succession of political affairs – the Bildt affair, the affair and the affair – while reports of new violations poured in. Neither political nor military measures seemed capable of putting an end to the violations. This situation eroded the confidence of the media and the public in the Armed Forces. The incident, 1983 The incident in 1983 occurred at the same time as the Submarine Defence Commission presented its report to the Government. It was interesting for several reasons, one of which was the large number of optical observations that were made. Tapes that were recorded in connection with this incident were subsequently lost. The Analysis Group concluded in its analysis that the action taken was on too small a scale and that depth charges must be dropped in large fields to have any effect. The experiences of the and incidents led to the conclusion, on the one hand, that more depth charges should be used since they had not had sufficient effect, but on the other hand that mines should only be used restrictively until the functioning of the systems had been properly checked, since their effect might appear excessive. This dilemma is an instructive illustration of the parameters of submarine hunting efforts. The incident, 1984 The events in the area during the first quarter of 1984 were difficult to understand and gave rise to several unanswered questions. Even while these events were unfolding a number of theories were suggested as to what was happening. The Supreme Commander was initially somewhat doubtful about the validity of the reported indications, but became more certain as time went on. The local military authorities, and to some extent the Defence Staff and the , seemed more convinced. Assessments of what happened were to a large extent based on the conclusions of the . Weapons were rapidly employed on rather uncertain grounds. The reliability of observations and indications varied, and most of the military personnel had no training for such activities. The Government assumed a cautious and somewhat sceptical attitude, as did the media. In connection with the investigators visit to both local military commanders stated that they were no longer certain whether a submarine had in fact been inside the barrier. A widening credibility gap between the Armed Forces on the one hand and the public, press and politicians on the other, became increasingly apparent. This gap was a result of the inconclusive outcome of the incident and became wider still after . As a result of increasing demands for evidence, the Armed Forces adopted a more restrictive information policy, which was a feature of reporting about violations in 1984 and afterwards. The incident, 1987 The incident was one further example of the sentry effect, i.e. people see what they want to see. There were indications that a foreign power was engaged in underwater operations, but they could not be confirmed. The commander of the area repeatedly requested that the submarine hunting force should be sent up to . These requests were not granted, partly due to staff holidays, but also due to the suspicion of submarine activities in other places. Although the operation demonstrated the will and ingenuity of the Armed Forces, the lasting impression was one of failure. Instead of launching such an operation, it would have been better to recognize that there was no of a successful operation. Reappraisal of the submarine question A process of reappraisal of the submarine question appears to have started in response to the Supreme Commanders report in 1987. Perceptions of the threats changed, and technical analyses subsequently threw new light on the extent of the violations. The Supreme Commanders report, 1987 The Supreme Commanders 1987 report described the general state of knowledge since the early 1980s. The description of submarine hunting operations presented in the report was not confined to individual operations. A picture emerged of self-perpetuating activities. Proactive operations provoked events that provided justification for further action and use of resources. At the centre of this setup were the forecasts made by the . These forecasts, rather than individual indications, decided where and when operations were to be undertaken or concluded. The crucial question was whether the forecasts were correct, i.e. whether the action taken was appropriate in terms of space and time. Information gathering became an end in itself and sometimes took precedence over interventions that should have been undertaken in accordance with the Armed Forces Instructions in Peacetime and Wars in which is Neutral on the grounds that such interventions might prejudice the aims of the action. The report describes a self-perpetuating method: itself decided where to take action regardless of whether there were any indications of violations. The aim was to as much information as possible in order to substantiate hypotheses about the alien systems. It was therefore important not to frighten off the intruder by unnecessary use of weapons. Evaluations were carried out with the help of the indications generated by the internal system, which almost always showed that the hypotheses were correct. Since the level of secrecy had to be high, a system within the system was set up, an inner circle that directed the anti-submarine operations mainly on the basis of forecasts and analyses. Such a system entails an obvious risk of losing touch with reality. The investigator finds it difficult to accept the idea that those responsible for operations felt free to ignore the obligation to repel submarines under the Armed Forces Instructions with a view to maintaining a long-term deterrent. Although these methods were dubious, it must be said that the buildup of capacity and innovative submarine hunting methods gradually achieved results, and the reduction of the number of assumed violations towards the end of the 1980s may in part be due to enhanced submarine hunting capability. With his 1987 report the Supreme Commander sent the Government a signal that there were grounds for publicly identifying the Soviet Union as the violating state. However, the Supreme Commander himself stated that there was no conclusive evidence, and instead the report once again mentioned a number of factors that were considered links in a chain of circumstantial evidence pointing to the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister appointed an inquiry group from the Government Offices for the purpose of examining the Armed Forces analysis. The group concluded that there was no valid basis for identifying any nation or military alliance as responsible for the violations. By subjecting the Armed Forces analysis to an inquiry overseen by the Prime Ministers Office, the Prime Minister retained political control of the issue. This also made it possible to strike a balance between the strategic and security dimensions. Unlike the situation in 1982, the Government retained full control of the submarine question and thus of its political consequences.