sou · GOB362d1 · 2001-01-01 00:00:00 — Föreslås någon som inte är upptagen på förteckningen, får domstolen efter att ha gett tillsynsmyndigheten tillfälle att yttra sig avgöra, om det är lämpligt att utse den föreslagna personen. Ett skäl att förordna denne kan vara att han skaffat sig en bättre kompetens än den som konkursförvaltarrådet fått kän- nedom om. Ett centralt, rådgivande organ – – inrättas I likhet med vad som skett i och menar utredningen att det i bör inrättas ett centralt, rådgivande organ för att främja en god konkursförvaltningssed samt effektivitet och enhetlighet i konkursförfar- andet. Ett lämpligt namn på organet är . Rådet skall när så är lämpligt utfärda rekommendationer i frågor om konkursförvaltning, den offentliga tillsynen över denna och därmed sammanhängande spörsmål. Rådet skall inte uttala sig i enskilda konkursärenden. skall vara sammansatt av företrädare för olika intressen- ter i konkursförfarandet, såsom , konkursför- valtarna, borgenärerna, åklagare och . Ledamöterna skall ha särskild insikt i och erfarenhet av frågor om konkurs. Rådet skall ha högst tio ledamöter. En av dem skall vara ordförande och dessutom rådets chef. Ledamöterna skall utses av regeringen och för en bestämd tid. För sin verksamhet skall hålla periodiskt återkommande sammanträden. Det behöver ha tillgång till en kanslifunktion och en sek- För kanslifunktionen bör kunna anlitas som värdmyndighet. Ändringar i reglerna om arvode till konkursförvaltare Liksom är det domstolen som skall bestämma arvodet till konkurs- förvaltaren. Domstolen skall bereda tillfälle att yttra sig i arvodesfrågan, men myndigheten får – med tanke på tillsyn- ens nya, selektiva karaktär – själv avgöra om den har något att anföra i saken. Den i utredningens direktiv nämnda möjligheten att inrätta en sär- skild arvodesnämnd anser utredningen inte vara något lämpligt alternativ till domstolsprövning. Med tanke på arvode i utdelningskonkurser föreslås att i KL tas in en regel om att konkursförvaltaren skall – när det behövs för att bedöma skäl- igheten av det begärda arvodet – ange den tid som gått åt för att fullgöra uppdraget, fördelad på de olika förvaltningsåtgärderna. Såväl domstolen som kan begära en sådan tidsangivelse. Konkursförvaltartaxans innehåll och omfattning föreslås ändrade. Ar- vodet till konkursförvaltare i konkurser som avskrivs enligt 10 kap. 1 § KL skall alltjämt bestämmas enligt en taxa. Denna skall normalt innefatta er- sättning för –omhändertagande av gäldenärens bo med den räkenskapsinformation och andra handlingar som rör boet, –upprättande av bouppteckning och förrättande av boupptecknings- sammanträde, –närvaro vid eventuell edgång, –upprättande av förvaltarberättelse och sluthandlingar samt, –i enkla fall, realiserande av tillgångar, avslutande av rörelse och un- dersökning av eventuell misstanke om brott. Taxenivån föreslås höjd från nuvarande () till . Förutsättningarna för överskridande av taxan skall vara samma som . Gränsen för överskridande blir alltså då skälig ersättning uppgår till . Även om ytterligare endast ett par hundra konkurser faller inom taxans område, innebär det en viss vinst för staten. Ändringar beträffande kostnadsansvaret i konkurs Liksom bör konkurskostnaderna täckas ur konkursboet, innan ut- delning till borgenärerna blir aktuell. Om en konkurs har uppstått på ansökan av någon annan borgenär än staten eller en borgenär, vars fordran omfattas av lönegaranti enligt löne- garantilagen, och konkursen avskrivs enligt 10 kap. 1 § KL, skall borge- nären – i den mån mån kostnaderna inte kan tas ut ur boet – svara för des- sa intill ett belopp som motsvarar 15 (: 10) procent av det vid tid- punkten för ansökningen gällande prisbasbeloppet enligt lagen (1962:381) om allmän försäkring. Statens kostnader för tillsyn, kungörelser och kallelser i konkurs täcks till viss del av tre olika avgifter. Enligt utredningens mening bör man som ekonomiskt mål eftersträva full kostnadstäckning för den kostnad som kan anses hänförlig till den enskilda konkursen. De nuvarande tillsyns-, kungörande- och kallelseavgifterna föreslås sammanförda till en enda avgift, kallad konkursavgift. Konkursavgiften skall i konkurser som avslutas genom att konkursen avskrivs eller läggs ned eller om konkursbeslutet upphävs eller om ett ackord har fastställts i konkursen tas ut med ett fast belopp beräknat på grundval av dels de nu- varande kungörande- och kallelseavgifterna (totalt ), dels en avgift för baskontrollen (). I konkurser som avslutas på annat sätt skall konkursavgiften tas ut med dels ett fast belopp motsvarande kostnaden för kungörande och kallelser och baskontrollen (tillhopa ), dels ett belopp som motsvarar av förvaltararvoden och av arvoden däröver. Ansökningsavgiften vid konkursansökan föreslås höjd från till . I enlighet med sina direktiv har utredningen behandlat en rad speciella frågor om kostnader i konkurs m.m., t.ex. konkursförvaltarens möjlighet att lyfta särskilt arvode för viss egendom resp. den del av ett yrkat arvode som motsvarar den mervärdesskatt som beräknats för arvodet. De reformförslag utredningen lägger fram om en förstärkning av kon- kursförvaltarnas kompetens, om en ny inriktning av den offentliga kon- kurstillsynen, om en ny, självständig tillsynsmyndighet och om inrättande av ett Konkursråd bör tillgodose önskemålet om att förvaltarna gör behöv- liga undersökningar om ekonomisk brottslighet vid konkurs. Utredningen föreslår inte några särskilda regler om tillsynsmyndighetens funktion i denna del. Utredningen beräknar att de löpande kostnaderna för en ny Konkurs- tillsynsmyndighet blir mindre än kostnaderna för nuvarande tillsyns- myndigheter. Skillnaden uppskattas till (44 ./. Ök- ningen av konkurssökande borgenärs ansvar resp. ansökningsavgiften be- räknas medföra en intäkt om (0,6 + =) . Tillkommande kostnader för och konkursförvaltarråden uppskattas till (0,75 + =) . Den totala besparingen blir därmed . Det föreslagna bör kunna inrättas oberoende av när övriga delar i reformen träder i kraft. Konkursförvaltarråden bör inrättas innan föreslagna ändringar i KL träder i kraft. Råden bör – eventuellt med bistånd av – börja fungera i sådan tid att domstolarna kan få ledning av rådens förteck- ningar över konkursförvaltare vid utseende av förvaltare i de enskilda konkurserna redan från lagändringarnas ikraftträdande. Inrättandet av den nya kräver inte obe- tydliga förberedelser såväl när det gäller rekrytering av personal som an- skaffande av lokaler m.m. Reformen gör det nödvändigt med insatser för information och utbild- ning. Reformen kan med tanke på det anförda träda i kraft tidigast vid års- skiftet 2001/2002. The terms of reference The original terms of reference of the Supervi- sion Commission in 1997 have been – with the starting point that the su- pervision function shall be public and linked to the (Kronofogdemyndigheterna – KFM) and that 's (– RSV's) central function should be retained – to inves- tigate –what aims and what detailed content public bankruptcy admini- stration supervision shall have, –what ought to apply for the appointment and payment of fees for bankruptcy administrators and –whether bankruptcy expenses viewed overall can be reduced and, in that event, how this can be achieved. The terms of reference have, by a supplementary directive in 1998 concer- ning expenses and administration in connection with bankruptcy, been defined in more detail to relate to –the need for coordination of charges in bankruptcy together with certain issues about other expenses in connection with bankruptcy and –certain questions concerning the administrator's reports, etc. By a supplementary directive in 1999, the task has been extended so that the investigation, though still with the starting point that bankruptcy admi- nistration supervision ought to be public, should without preconceived views review the future structure of the supervisory function. The Com- mission should, when conducting this review, take into account the public statements that slation made in the report 1998/99:LU11 on the aims of a reform and the questions that were dealt with in the Private Members' 1998/99:L301. The main points of the report A new, public bankruptcy administration supervision The overall purpose of the public supervision shall be, according to the proposal, to monitor that the bankruptcy administration promotes the best possible outcome for the creditors and satisfies the interests of the com- munity in connection with bankruptcy. Furthermore, it shall be monitored whether the administration is conducted in compliance with the Bankruptcy Act (1987:672, Konkurslagen – KL) and other statutes. The main part of the supervision should be at the economic level. The propo- sed formulation of the purposes provides that supervision also shall work to ensure that the winding up of a bankruptcy is not unnecessarily delayed. It is proposed that the methods for public supervision are altered. Su- pervision shall be general in the sense that no bankruptcies are left outside of any control. However, supervision shall be selective and its scope adapted to the need of public control in the individual bankruptcy. The supervisory body shall, at an early stage, decide about the need for moni- toring. This is simplified in the proposal by a requirement that the bankruptcy administrator, at the initial phase of the bankruptcy, should provide written notification about the scope and nature of the bankruptcy (bankruptcy administrator report). Guided by the report, the supervisory body shall plan the need for supervision. A basic control shall be conducted in all bankruptcies. This involves a control of legality of a formal kind, i.e., monitoring that the bankruptcy administrator submits the prescribed documents on time and that these satisfy the requirements of the Act. In many bankruptcies involving un- complicated circumstances, it should normally be sufficient with the basic control. This also serves as a documentary basis to determine whether a more extensive monitoring of the bankruptcy administration should be conducted. An extended supervision may be appropriate, primarily in bankruptcies where there are assets of some value or which relate to a business opera- tion that is not of a minor nature. How extensive such supervision should be is determined by the supervisory body in the individual case. The su- pervisory body may, in accordance with the proposal, limit supervision to that which is essential for control having regard to the scope of the bankruptcy and its nature. This means that the supervisory body is at li- berty to restrict, according to the circumstances, the monitoring to a basic control also in somewhat larger bankruptcies. In bankruptcies where supervision is from the outset restricted to a basic control, the supervisory body may transfer to an extended supervi- sion, provided this is justified having regard to matters that have sub- sequently transpired. The supervisory body can also decide to sub- sequently examine in detail a number of bankruptcies selected at random on the basis of a particularly theme such as a particular district, administ- rator or business sector. Thus, by such a theme examination it will be pos- sible, for example, to make a random check of how the bankruptcy admi- nistrator has managed the assets of a smaller business operation. It is proposed that the public bankruptcy supervision is given a new structure. Today, the supervision is linked to KFM, the authority that ac- cording to the current wording of the Bankruptcy Act is the supervisory authority. According to the proposal, the supervision shall be exercised by an independent, national authority (Su- pervisory Authority). This shall neither be placed structurally within the KFM's budget frame nor be subordinated to RSV. Besides the supervisory function, the new authority shall have an important information and trai- ning function in relation to the bankruptcy administrators (cf. that stated about the below) and retain the role that is a duty of the supervisory authority under the Wages Guarantee Act (1992:497). Supervisory Authority shall, according to the proposal, have a regional presence. It is proposed that the authority be divided into seven units for the day-to-day operations in various regi- ons. The offices of the units shall be located in , , Go- thenburg, , , and . The authority shall have a central function located in . The head of the autho- rity, personnel administration and IT services shall be located in . However, the authority will largely be able to determine how its internal structure is arranged. The influence of creditors is strengthened The Commission does not make any proposal that the creditors, viewed as a collective, should be given any formal influence in bankruptcy. How- ever, the possibility of creditors to influence the bankruptcy proceedings is strengthened by participation in the so-called bankruptcy administrator recommendation councils and the (see fur- ther about this below). Furthermore, it is proposed that a creditor shall be able to request that the bankruptcy court appoints a creditors' administra- tion committee. An issue concerning the appointment of such a committee should already be considered in conjunction with the bankruptcy decision. Among others, the bankruptcy administrator and the Bankruptcy Admi- nistration Supervisory Authority should be given an opportunity to express views. shall be a consultative body in relation to the admi- nistrator but not have any decision-making powers. As regards the influence of the creditors in connection with the appo- intment of the bankruptcy administrator in the individual bankruptcy, see below. Decision-making functions are altered in the bankruptcy proceedings Bankruptcy shall, according to the proposal, as hitherto be a continuous matter pending at the district court. However, it is proposed that certain decision-making functions are altered taking into account first the for clearly defining the operations of the courts, second the new selective nature of bankruptcy administration supervision. Therefore, a decision for the arrangement of proof of debt procedure shall be made by the bankruptcy administrator instead of by the court. Questions concerning respite with submission of the administrator's report shall be considered by the Supervisory Authority instead of by the court. Also, the present requirements for formal consent from the supervi- sory authority for certain measures on the part of the administrator shall be abandoned. This applies, for example, to private sale of pledged movable property (Chapter 8, Section 7, second paragraph KL). It is proposed that the current arrangements with mandatory meetings for the taking of oaths before the district court are withdrawn. The debtor shall instead confirm in writing the correctness of the estate inventory for the bankruptcy administrator at the estate inventory preparation meeting. A creditor, the administrator and the Supervi- sory Authority are given an opportunity to call for the taking of oaths by the debtor before the court. The taking of oaths may be appropriate, for example, on the grounds that it is suspected that a crime may have been committed by the debtor or because the debtor refuses to confirm the cor- rectness of the estate inventory for the administrator. Amendment of the forms for appointment of bankruptcy administrator The Commission proposes several changes as regards the forms of appo- intment of bankruptcy administrators. The most important are the fol- lowing: –The requirement for specialist skills imposed in connection with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1979 should apply generally and be explicitly stated in the KL. –Regional assessment bodies (bankruptcy administrator recommendation councils) are established with operational areas linked to the Supervisory Authority's regional units. The councils shall be composed of representatives of interested parties in the bankruptcy proceedings, including among others the creditors and the Supervisory Authority. The task of the councils shall be to determine, at periodically recurring times, the circle of people who may, upon application, be consi- dered suitable to be given assignments as administrator. The councils pre- pare schedules of these people. The schedules shall serve to guide the court when it appoints an administrator in the particular bankruptcy. There will be no opportunity to appeal against the decisions of the councils con- cerning the schedules. The bankruptcy administrator recommendation councils shall conduct these assessments at specific intervals of time, for example, every three years. Those who wish to be listed in the councils' schedules shall, through an application procedure, provide information concerning his/her skills in the field, using documentation provided by the councils as a basis. When making its assessment, the bankruptcy administrator recommen- dation councils shall take into account the development with bankruptcy that may be expected during the forthcoming years and, among other things, in this way limit the size of the circle of administrators. The possi- bility should hereby be created to counteract the risk of having a far too large group of administrators and to maintain the requirement of speciali- sation. – The court should normally select a bankruptcy administrator from the circle that is included in the bankruptcy administrator recommendation councils' schedules. When making its choice, the court should take into account whether any special kind of knowledge is required concerning, for example, a particular branch in order to be able to deal with the administ- ration. The cost aspects should also be taken into account. A provision is to be introduced to the KL providing that the court should preferably ap- point the person whose engagement may be assumed to involve the best outcome for the creditors. Supervisory Authority shall be given an opportunity to express its views in connection with the appointment of the bankruptcy administrator. Bearing in mind the new, selective nature of supervision, the authority may itself determine, in the particular case, whether it has anything to state concerning the choice of administrator. Bearing in mind the proposed participation of creditors in both the bankruptcy administrator recommendation councils and the (see further concerning this below), the Commission considers that special rules are not needed in the case where a creditor makes a proposal for a bankruptcy administrator. If a creditor has propo- sed someone who, in the view of the court, is suitable and who is further- more listed in the bankruptcy administrator recommendation council's schedule, there is no reason not to appoint this person as administrator. This will also apply if the proposal has been made by the debtor. If some- one is proposed who is not listed in the schedule, the court shall, after ha- ving given the Supervisory Authority an opportunity to express its views, determine whether it is appropriate to appoint the person proposed. One reason for appointing this person may be that he/she has attained better skills than those known to the bankruptcy administrator recommendation council. A central, advisory body – the – is established In line with developments in and , the Commission is of the view that should establish a central, advisory body to promote good bankruptcy practice together with efficiency and uniformity in the administration of bankruptcy. An appropriate name for the body is the . shall, when it is appropriate, issue recommendations on matters concerning bankruptcy administration, public supervision of this and questions connected thereto. shall not express views on individual bankruptcy matters. shall be composed of representati- ves of various interested parties in bankruptcy proceedings, such as the Supervisory Authority, the bankruptcy admi- nistrators, the creditors, prosecutors and the National Courts Administra- tion. The members shall have special knowledge and experience concer- ning questions relating to bankruptcy. shall have at most ten members. One of them shall be the chairman and also the head of the Co- uncil. The members shall be appointed by the Government and for a fixed term. shall for its operations hold periodi- cally recurring meetings. It needs to have access to a clerical service and a secretary. It should be possible for the Super- visory Authority to be used as host authority for the clerical services. Amendments to the rules concerning fees for bankruptcy administrator As previously, the court shall decide the fees for the bankruptcy administ- rator. The court shall give the Supervisory Authority an opportunity to express its views on the issue of fees, but the Authority may – taking into account the new, selective nature – itself de- termine whether it wishes to state anything concerning the matter. The possibility of appointing a special fees board mentioned in the Commis- sion's terms of reference does not appear to be an appropriate alternative to consideration by the court, in the view of the Commission. Bearing in mind fees in bankruptcies with assets sufficient to make a distribution, it is proposed that a rule is included in the KL that the bankruptcy administrator shall – when it is necessary in order to assess the reasonableness of the fees requested – specify the time that has been used to fulfil the assignment, split according to the various administrative mea- sures. Both the court and the Supervisory Au- thority can request such a specification of times. It is proposed that the content and scope of bankruptcy administration tariffs are altered. The fees for the bankruptcy administrator in bankruptcies that are written off in accordance with Chapter 10, Section 1 KL shall still be determined according to a tariff. This shall normally comprise remuneration for –taking care of the debtor's estate with the accounting information and other documents concerning the estate, –preparation of an estate inventory and administration of an estate inven- tory meeting, –attending any taking of oaths, –preparation of an administrator's report and final documents, and also –in simple cases, realisation of assets, winding-up of business operation and investigation of any suspicions of crime. It is proposed to increase the level of the tariff from the current (year 2000) to ,000. The preconditions for exceeding the tariff should be the same as today. The limit for exceeding shall thus be reasonable remuneration amounting to at least ,000. Even if only a further couple of hundred bankruptcies fall within the scope of the tariff, this involves some gain for the state. Amendments concerning costs liability in bankruptcy As previously, the bankruptcy expenses are paid for by the bankruptcy estate, before any distribution to the creditors comes into question. If a bankruptcy has occurred on the application of some other creditor than the state or a creditor whose claim is subject to the salary guarantee in accordance with the Salary Guarantee Act, and the bankruptcy is writ- ten-off in accordance with Chapter 10, Section 1 KL, the creditor shall – to the extent the costs cannot be taken out of the estate – bear these costs up to an amount that corresponds to 15 (today 10) per cent of the price base amount applicable at the time of the application under the Act (1962:381). The expenses of the state for supervision, public notices and notices of meetings relating to bankruptcy are today covered to some extent by three different charges. In the view of the Commission, one should as an eco- nomic objective endeavour to achieve full cover for expenses in respect to those costs that are considered referable to the individual bankruptcy.