frsrdg · GO04JO1 · 2001-01-01 00:00:00 — The management of the unit has been improved by the assignment in of this responsibility to a Chief Superintendent. A new section head was also appointed with effect from February 1 1999. The unit consists of an additional four superintendents and a sergeant. An additional sergeant has been posted to the unit until the summer of 1999. Today every complaint received is evaluated immediately and assigned directly to one of the officers. cases have been allocated to a special clearance group. Plans to dispose of the backlog A plan of action has been worked out in the unit. The backlog of cases is to be reduced considerably. This is scheduled to take place before 31 1999. Action will be taken immediately on new cases to which the prosecutors have decided to give priority, and within two months otherwise. Another objective is to reduce the number of complaints received by circulating information about the prevention of this kind of crimes and continued training in ethics. Three superintendents have been assigned to work primarily to clear the backlog of cases. Two superintendents are dealing with new cases. Civilian employees have been given new duties. These involve, for instance, procuring additional documents relating to the complaints. While the backlog of cases is being disposed of, therefore, the civilian staff will be augmented with one new post. Contact with the prosecution agency Meetings have been taking place between the Chief Commissioner and the Chief District Prosecutor for many years. The work of the Internal Investigations Unit is constantly being discussed. The Chief District Prosecutor, the Assistant and the Internal Investigations Unit also meet at regular intervals. Direct contact with the Prosecution Agency concerning individual cases takes place to an increasing extent. Assessment of the measures taken by the Authority The Authority is now able to keep track of all cases and monitor them effectively. Personnel resources are adequate in terms of numbers and training. Working methods have been modified and improvements made to the quality with which individual cases are dealt with. On 22 1999 the backlog of cases was 293, of which 55 had been submitted to the for a decision. It is estimated that the backlog will have been reduced to an acceptable level before the summer of 1999. In October 1999 new statistical information was requested from the IIU. This showed that on October 28 1999 there were 299 cases being dealt with, of which five dated from 1997, 69 from 1998 and the remaining 255 from 1999. At the same time, Chief Superintendent supplied the following information. 0RQLWRULQJ WKH EDODQFH RI FDVHV LQ WKH ,QWHUQDO ,QYHVWLJDWLRQV 8QLW At the end of 1998 the backlog of cases was 350. In April this backlog had been reduced to 300 despite the large numbers of new cases submitted. Subsequently the number of new cases increased to a level which indicated that the figure would reach 600 by the end of the year. When informed of these circumstances, the Chief Commissioner decided to reinforce the Internal Investigations Unit as soon as possible. On 1, two new superintendents were assigned to the unit, and yet another on 1. This means that the unit now consists of seven superintendents and two sergeants. The number of cases submitted up until October 28 1999 amounted to 482. During the year the unit has accounted for 524 cases. The total backlog has been reduced during the year from 350 to 300 cases. It is forecast that by 1999 600 cases will have been sub- mitted, 700 cases accounted for and the total backlog will then be 250 cases. As a result of the efforts devoted to disposing of the backlog of cases, during the first six months of 1999 charges were brought in 8 instances and 2000/01:JO1 Bilaga 5 summary conviction was issued in one. Two of the charges led to a verdict of not guilty, and two cases have not yet been heard. Two officers have resigned after the process leading to their dismissal had been set in motion. One other officer risks facing dismissal. In his adjudication of February 5 1999, WKH &KLHI 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ 2PEXGV PDQ 0U (NOXQGK included the following observations. The duties of the include, among other things, supervising the public order and security, preventing disturbances of public order and security and intervening when these have taken place, and also carrying out surveillance and investigations concerning crimes subject to public prosecution (Art. 2, The Act [1984:387]). To enable officers to discharge their duties, they have been granted extensive powers that include, for instance, the right in certain defined respects to limit an individuals constitutional freedoms and rights. These powers also include authorisation, in certain circumstances, to use force in the execution of their duties (cf. Art. 10 of the Act). officers can be described in principle as having a monopoly of the right to exercise the coercive powers against individuals invested in the state. Seen from this point of view, it is obviously of extreme importance that an effective and reliable system exists to monitor and ensure that officers use their powers in ways that meet the requirements of legality, and impartiality. A system of supervision and sanctions is essential if the general public is to be able to feel any confidence in the workings of the authorities. In a system of the kind described here, an important role is played by the regulations determining how complaints against officers are to be dealt with. Since January 1 1999 the provisions concerning the treatment of complaints against officers can be found in Chapter 5 of the Ordinance (1998:1558). Previously the corresponding regulations formed part of Chapter 6 of the Ordinance (1984:730). If a complaint is made to the alleging that a officer has committed some crime related to the execution of her or his duties or has in some other way acted incorrectly in exercising her or his powers, this complaint is to be submitted without delay to a prosecutor for a decision on whether a preliminary investigation is to be initiated or not (5.1.1) This also applies if an individual has sustained injury either through the action of a officer in the execution of her or his duties or while being detained by the and the injury is a serious one (5.1.3). Certain exceptions to the requirement that complaints be submitted to a prosecutor can be found in 5.1.2. Chapter 6 contains regulations on how complaints about crimes committed by officers that are not related to the execution of their duties are to be dealt with. In addition, has issued directives and general advice on dealing with complaints against officers and others (FAP 403-2). 2000/01:JO1 Bilaga 5 The general provisions of the Procedural Code concerning preliminary investigations naturally also apply when a officer is involved. In this context, I would like to draw particular attention to the stipulation that a preliminary investigation is to be conducted as expeditiously as the circum- stances permit (Procedural Code 23.4.2). It is vital, if public confidence in the communitys supervision of activities is to be sustained, that this stipulation is complied with faithfully by the investigating agency. A fundamental principle in the process of investigating a crime alleged to have been committed by a officer is that a prosecutor should assume responsibility from the outset. It can be added that according to Art. 17 of the Ordinance on Prosecutors (1996:205) only certain prosecutors with special qualifications are allowed to deal with cases concerning crimes that employees within the force are suspected of committing in the course of their duties. The prosecutor is assisted by officers who carry out the day-to-day work of investigation. Often, these officers serve in a special internal investigations unit which is autonomous in its relationship to the other activities of the authority. There are special provisions in the Ordinance (5.3) concerning those empowered to question officers. If the regulations referred to here are to fulfil their purpose, it is obviously necessary for the prosecution agencies and the authorities concerned to be organised so that investigations can function effectively and appro- priately in every respect. Particular weight should be attached here to the fundamental principle applying to the investigation of any crime, which is that this must never be conducted in ways that give grounds for questioning the impartiality of the investigating agency. In my inspection of the IIU, I was able to establish that its performance did not meet the demands that must be made of it. As has been pointed out already, at the date of the inspection a large number of cases had been left for considerable periods of time, sometimes for more than two years, without any apparent action having been taken. In addition, obvious flaws in the units monitoring routines could be observed. In my opinion there are good grounds for taking a very serious view of the shortcomings that came to light. In the response submitted by the Authority, the length of time taken to deal with cases is explained by reference to an increase in the number of complaints submitted in recent years, inadequate follow-up of case-moni- toring routines and failure to classify all the cases in terms of priority. In addition, the authority has cited the long period of illness of one of the superintendents responsible for investigations and a dilatory recruitment process. I am aware that the IIU was working under a great deal of pressure. This notwithstanding, delays in dealing with cases as long as those found here are totally unacceptable. Some of the circumstances referred to by the Authority to explain the shortcomings cannot in themselves give grounds for criticism of any individual officer. However, , as head of the IIU, had overall responsibility for its performance and it was therefore his responsibility to ensure that cases were dealt with considerably more 2000/01:JO1 Bilaga 5 efficiently than was the case. His duties included, for instance, making sure that effectual monitoring routines were in place in the unit and that cases were effectively classified according to priority. His management of the unit cannot therefore escape criticism. The ultimate responsibility for the activities of a authority lies with its Chief Commissioner, in this case with Hans Wranghult. According to Art. 6 of the Ordinance on (1995:1322), the heads of these agencies are responsible for their activities, and 7.1 stipulates that the head of an agency is to ensure that these activities are conducted effectively and according to statute. Chapter 1.7 of the current Ordinance makes it clear that these regulations also apply to authorities. A regulation with the same import was also to be found in the previous Ordinance (1984:730). , therefore, can Hans Wranghult escape criticism arising from the shortcomings in the way in which the IIU dealt with its cases. As the response of the Authority reveals, during recent years it has adopted a number of concrete measures to cope with delays in dealing with cases. These measures have taken the form of modifications in the tracking and monitoring routines and organisational changes in some respects. For instance, there has been a major increase in the number of posts within the IIU. The unit now consists of seven superintendents and two sergeants. It is with some satisfaction that I observe that the Authority has taken cogent action to guarantee that in the future the IIU will function effec- tively and lawfully. In order to follow up this case, I am requesting the sub- mission of statistical information about the units performance during 1999. My observations in this case are such that I find it necessary to draw the attention of the and to the circumstances by submitting a copy of this adjudication to each of them. 2000/01:JO1 Bilaga 5 The question of the legality of participation by the Defence On Sunday 1998, two individuals staged a robbery at a military unit in . In the course of the robbery a number of AK5 automatic rifles were stolen. The search for the suspected perpetrators soon came to focus on the Nature Reserve at , just outside . The area concerned had been searched in vain by officers on the ground. In addition a helicopter equipped with infra-red cameras had been used without success. After a request from the Authority in the County of , the - the Supreme Commander - decided that a military helicopter could be used to assist the in their investigations. During the evening and night of October 23 1998, a military helicopter and its crew participated in the search for the thieves who had stolen the firearms. An anonymous complaint that was received by the Parliamentary Ombuds- man on October 19 1998 raised the question of the legality of military personnel and equipment being used in the search for the suspected thieves. The complainants, who claimed to be employees of the and the Authority in the County of , maintained that in participating the had become improperly involved in a operation concerning civilians that only authorities are entitled to undertake. The complainants also drew attention to certain hazards that they considered this operation had given rise to. On October 26 1998 WKH 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ 2PEXGVPDQ 0U 3HQQO|Y, decided to initiate an enquiry into the matter. responses to the complaint. In his adjudication dated 8 1999, WKH 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ 2PEXGV PDQ 0U 3HQQO|Y included the following comments. The use of military personnel and equipment in activities constitutes an exception and must be limited strictly to situations where the regulations in force permit such assistance and it is on principle extremely important that a distinct line of demarcation is maintained between military actions and the normal activities (cf. 7KH 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ 2PEXGVPDQ¶V 5HSRUW 197 f.). During recent years the Riksdag and the Government have made statements advocating increased support from the Defence authorities to civilian society. In this context, however, it has been pointed out that military resources are not to be used in ways which could be considered to conflict with the fundamental principle that the Defence authorities must not become involved in measures that comprise the use of force or coercion against individual civilians (cf. Government 1995/96:12 p. 4851 and FöU 1995/96:1 p. The response submitted by contains a detailed account of the statements made by the Riksdag and the Government on this issue. have described the regulations that govern and limit their participation in tasks other than those traditionally belonging to the field of military action. The provisions that are of primary importance in this case are Articles 2 and 5 of the Ordinance on Military Involvement in Civilian Activities (1986:1111). Art. 2 states that the Defence authorities may place personnel and transport facilities at the disposal of the force, for instance, if there is a pressing need of transport. According to Art. 5, the Defence authorities are also permitted to undertake and provide transport services and other work and services if such activities can be arranged as part of the training programmes organised for defence personnel or are of benefit to the state or other public interests. The enquiry has shown that the task entrusted to the Defence authorities and which it carried out in the case in question was to conduct a detailed search of the area with the help of light intensification equipment and heat sensitive cameras. If and when any observation indicated the possible presence of the thieves, the crew of the military helicopter were to inform the of their position and then terminate their participation. The involvement consisted therefore not only of assisting the with the transport of personnel and equipment but the military helicopter did in fact, albeit to a limited extent, play an role in the course of a operation. In view of the fact that this was not merely a question of simple transport, to what extent it was based in law has to be assessed in the light of the regulations in Art. 5 of the Ordinance on Military Involvement in Civilian Activities. have stated that the support requested by the could, in view of the circumstances, be considered to benefit the public interest and that the reconnaissance activities were not considered to involve the use of force or coercion against civilians. As the have pointed out, determining what is of benefit to the public interest or what constitutes the use of force or coercion against civilians is no simple matter. What has come to light in this case does not in my opinion provide sufficient grounds for criticism of the . In making this assessment I have taken into account, for instance, the lack of clarity to be found in the regulations concerned. The statements made by the Riksdag and the Government on repeated occasions have not, in fact, led to any clarification of the regulations in the Ordinance on Military Involvement in Civilian Activities. I have also borne in mind the necessity, in view of the circumstances, of a rapid response to the request for assistance. When one authority requests the assistance of another in the exercise of its duties, obviously the main responsibility for ensuring that the request is dealt with in the appropriate lies with the latter. The agency making the request, however, also has responsibilities in this respect, and these include refraining from making such a request if the participation of the other authority is in direct breach of the statutes or inappropriate. On 10 1999, wrote to the Government requesting that the Ordinance on Military Involvement in Civilian Activities be modified in order to give the greater scope in the use of Defence Authority helicopters. In this request it is stated, among other things, that 2000/01:JO1 Bilaga 5 Defence Authority resources will not be used for aspects of actions in which there is a risk that the or the means of transport used by the could be exposed to the use of any form of violence. I share this point of view. In view of the report that the suspected thieves allegedly had access to a considerable number of military firearms with ammunition, I consider that questions can be raised as to whether it was appropriate in this case for the to request assistance from the . If the military helicopter had come under fire, there could well have been fatal conse- quences in a number of respects. I am presuming that the required appraisal of the risks took place. From this point of view as well, I can find no grounds for expressing criticism. 2000/01:JO1 Bilaga 5 The question of whether the superintendent of a residential treatment centre for substance abusers had the right to confiscate a cashpoint card and an ID card from one of the residents 2000/01:JO1 Bilaga 5 A.G., who had been committed for treatment according to the stipulations of the Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act (1988:870), submitted a complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsman about the confiscation of his cashpoint card and ID card by , the superintendent of the treatment centre at Hornö. The complaint was forwarded to for enquiry and a statement. In its response, signed by the Director General, , and drawn up by its , made the following points. (The response also contains a reply concerning case 1323-1999, which dealt with a complaint submitted by T.J. to the Parliamentary Ombudsman on a similar issue). has been committed in accordance with the Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act to the residential treatment centre at Hornö on a number of occasions during the last three years. On 20 1997 he was admitted to the centre for the first time. After a short period, however, he was transferred to the treatment centre at Frosö, as he was considered far too unruly to be able to stay at the centre in Hornö. On 5 1998 he was admitted to the centre at Hornö for the second time. On October 12 of the same year, a transfer was arranged, as laid down in Art. 27 of the Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act, to the centre at Jälla, and on 1998 he was discharged from the centre at Hornö. On 1998 he was again admitted to the centre at Hornö according to the provisions of Art. 13 of the Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act. The emergency committal was discontinued, however, on . A mere two weeks later, on 1998, he was admitted for the fourth time to the treatment centre at Hornö. On February 3 he was transferred to the centre at Jälla in accordance with Art. 27 of the Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act, but returned the following day to the Hornö centre. On 1 1999 he absconded, but he came back to the centre on the same day and gave a urine sample which, when analysed, turned out to show traces of amphetamine. He is still currently (1999) undergoing residential treatment at the Hornö centre. From 1998 and subsequently, A.Gs cashpoint card and ID- card have been confiscated in accordance with Art. 31 of the Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act each time he has been admitted to the treatment centre at Hornö. The cashpoint card and the ID card were returned to him on the two occasions when he left Hornö to be placed in the treatment centre at Jälla as laid down in Art. 27 of the Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act. On every occasion when A.Gs cashpoint card and ID card have been confiscated it has been the judgement of the superintendent that his possession of these documents would be detrimental to the treatment programme and the maintenance of good order within the centre as laid down in Art. 31 of the Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act. There is documentary evidence of A.Gs destructive and impulsive behaviour. During one of the periods of placement at the treatment centre at Jälla, when the cashpoint card and ID card had been returned to him, he absconded almost immediately and reverted to his addiction. If those committed to the treatment centre at Hornö were allowed to retain possession of items that can easily be used to acquire cash, which can in its turn be used to abscond or to buy classified substances, this would, to begin with, encourage impulsive actions such as absconding and lapsing into addiction, which is injurious to the treatment programme and the maintenance of good order within the treatment centre. Secondly, it could also result in trade and bartering that would be detrimental to good order. 2000/01:JO1 Bilaga 5 The superintendents confiscation of the cashpoint card and the ID card was based on Art. 31 of the Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act and his assessment that A.Gs, and later T.Js, possession of these items could be detrimental to the treatment programme and the maintenance of good order within the centre. In the opinion of , Art. 31 of the Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act provides a basis for confiscating cash, except for small amounts, and items that make it easy to acquire cash or objects that are particularly useful in connection with absconding. It is therefore the view of that that there is no reason for considering the superintendent to have lacked justification for his confiscation of the objects. was given the opportunity to comment on this response. In an adjudication issued on April 7 2000 WKH 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ 2PEXGVPDQ 0V $QGUp included the following observations. Those who are committed for treatment by virtue of the stipulations contained in the Care of Abusers (Special Provisions) Act are not for this reason deprived of the right to dispose of their own property. This right may, however, be restricted for reasons of the order in the treatment centre and so that the treatment can be completed.