sou · GNB3151 · 2000-01-01 00:00:00 — Likewise, the effect of church attendence is taken over by satisfaction with democracy in , by interest in the campaign for elections and by finding the EU a good thing.26 Table 4 leads to the following observations. First, a clear effect exists of opinions about the EU (good thing vs. bad thing), even when the other explanatory factors mentioned in this table are taken into account. Such an effect was not found in any of the other members of Union – at least as far as the 1989 and 1994 European elections were concerned.27 The effect may be not surprising in the light of the controversies in over membership of the EU and related matters (such as the common currency), but it raises the question whether in 1999 this is a spe- cific Swedish phenomenon, or a pattern that has emerged else- where as well. This report is not the place to investigate this ques- tion, and analyses about this will be reported elsewhere. Not only evaluative opinions about the EU have an effect on electoral participation, but also evaluations of Swedish democracy itself. Almost of the sample indicates that they are not very, or not at all satisfied with democracy in , and this opinion 26Interestingly, a strong correlation exists between being satisfied with democracy in and seeing the EU as a good thing. This suggests that a divide exists in the Swedish population, with on the one extreme a segment that does not approve of the EU and is dissatisfied with demo- cracy in (most strongly reprresented in the countryside) and on the other extreme a segment that is satisfied with democracy in as well as with its membership of the EU (most strongly represented in the urban areas). As far as evaluations concerning the EU is concerned, this is not a new insight. That it is linked to (dis)satisfaction with democracy in is less trivial, as well as politically more disturbing. This report, however, is not the place to elaborate these findings further. 27On this point see Franklin, van der Eijk and Oppenhuis (1996) and , Franklin and (1996, p. WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT is not only related to staying at home in elections of 1999, but also to feeling that Swedish membership of the EU is a bad thing. Being integrated into the social and political system is also clearly related to voting versus abstaining, quite in accordance with theoretical expectations described in part 1 of this report. Social integration is to some extent captured by church attendance, and being politically integrated by party identification, but the latter is captured even better by the question of whether the system con- tains at least one party that a respondent feels really positively about (the variable referred to in Table 4 as Preference for best party). Interest in election campaign, reading about this election in newspapers, and paying attention in general to political news, are also strong determinants of turnout. Surprisingly, in the light of findings for other EU members in previous European elections, the specific items about interest in the EE campaign are more powerful than general indicators of political interest. This suggests that, in contrast to other countries in 1989 and 1994, election in in 1999 contained an element that cannot be entirely reduced to the voters links to the domestic po- litical system. Again it will have to be seen in further research whether this is also to be found in other countries in 1999, and, again, such analyses will have to be reported elsewhere. Finally, in accordance with the theoretical expectations expres- sed in Part 1, feelings of political (in)efficacy do explain some of the differences between voting and non-voting, even when all other factors in Table 4 are simultaneously taken into account. Part 3: Reflective comments and informed speculation The empirical analyses contained in this brief report are limited. This is for a number of different reasons: Information about the mobilising efforts (or lack thereof) by political parties, media and other politically relevant actors, organizations and institutions is at this moment not available. Therefore, it is impossible to assess the kinds of forces that were referred to in part 1 as mobilising agents. This is not to say that these considerations are irrelevant when trying to explain the low turnout in the 1999 European elections in Swe- den, on the contrary. In , as in the other member states of the Union, parties, political leaders, relevant interest groups and media displayed a distinct lack of interest and activity, par- ticularly when compared to their behavior at the time of elec- tions for the Riksdag. This is, obviously, not the entire expla- nation for the low turnout in elections, but it should nevertheless not be ignored as a relevant factor. The drop in turnout between the first (1995) and the second (1999) European elections in may possibly be related to a difference in the level of activities of these political and social institutions. All member states of Union expe- rienced a distinctly higher turnout in their first than in their second and later European elections. This first-time boost seems at least to some extent attributable to the extra attention that is given to the novel phenomenon of European elections, a factor that is absent in all subsequent elections to Parliament. A fuller explanation for the low level of turnout in the Euro- pean election in in 1999 requires comparative analyses, where the comparisons involve both other elections in (such as previous European elections, various Riksdag elections, etc.), and European elections in other countries (in 1999, as well as at previous European elections. Obviously, this is not the place for such extensive comparisons, especially since much of the information that would be required is not, or not yet, WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT The approach, referred to in Part 1, that seeks to re- late levels of turnout (as well as individual differences in elec- toral participation) to what is at stake in various elections, is one that can only be employed in such a comparative approach – just like the approach that focusses on mobilizing agents, dis- cussed in the previous paragraph. Because of these limitations, the results of the empirical analyses reported here pertain only to individual differences in behavior within the single context of 1999 in . aspect of that context is thus a in this study and, even though these aspects may have contributed to the low over-all turnout (in Swedish perspec- tive), they remain inaccessible for research as long as they are . As indicated several times in Part 2, more elaborate analyses can be performed on the available Swedish data. Such analyses will explicate in greater detail the inter-relationships between the factors that influence individual electoral participation, and will thus help us to understand more precisely how factors such as, e.g., age, are related to differences in turnout. They will com- plement, but not replace, the major empirical findings reported in Part 2. Apart from pointing out the limitations of the analyses in this re- port, a bit of informed speculation seems in order to shed tentative light on the declining level of turnout in Swedish elections, for the Riksdag as well as for Parliament. The remarks below are to some extent based on earlier research28 and to some extent on logical extrapolation from the interpretations of that earlier research. Instrumental motivations are of great importance in explaining turnout in contemporary western electorates. From this follows the logic that turnout will be lower when the less is at stake in an 28 The most important previous research that I use here is and Franklin (1996), Oppenhuis (1995), Franklin, and Oppenhuis (1995), and (1999), Franklin (1996), and some of the sources referred to in these texts. That there is at stake in European elections is not because of the alleged limitations of the powers and prerogatives of Parliament. After all, the role of the EP has grown substantially in recent years, most recently since the ratification of the . Parliament has currently a far from negligeable role in the legislative process of the EU. This is evidenced by the fact that those who have a specific interest in certain EU legislation – such as branches of industry, social movements, and subnational government agencies – are willing to invest considerable resources trying to influence the results of EU legislation via lobbying at the EP. Yet, despite this increased role of the EP in the making of EU legislation, the power of the EP does not extend to the composition of Commission, let alone to that of the Council. Stated differently, European elec- tions decide the composition of Parliament, which in itself is important for the outcome of individual pieces of legisla- tion, but which is not in any way of relevance for the composition of the executive and policy-initiating institutions of the EU. In contrast to the situation that exists in the elections for the national parliaments of the EU member-states, it is absolutely impossible to link the composition of the EP to any kind of over-all policy direction that will be in force for the subsequent period. Moreover, the absence of a government vs. opposition divide in the EP makes it impossible for ordinary citizens (as well as for most media) to link the results of the elections for the EP to any kind of policy direction of the EU. These circumstances thwart almost any sort of instrumental motivation for casting a vote in elections. One could wonder why, given the logic described above, turn- out in European elections was generally higher in previous Euro- pean elections than in 1999.29 Apart from the drop in turnout after the boost that occurs only at the first time of European elections, turnout has continued to decline in most member-states, albeit 29 The arguments hereafter originate from intensive discussions on these topics between , and myself, conducted at various occasions. WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT with occasional increases, that often were attributable to occa- sional concurrency of elections with other elections in one of the member-states, as was the case with the Irish Dàil elections in 1989, and with regional elections in in 1999. Two different mechanisms can be expected to operate here. One is gen- erational replacement, by which former generations – socialized in conditions of cleavage politics and the resulting high degrees of electoral mobilization – are gradually replaced by new generations that were never subjected to such intense mobilizing efforts, and that have therefore a weaker internalization of the norm that one should vote. The second mechanism that would lead to the per- sistent decline in turnout for European elections may be thought of as gradual learning. It takes time before the default interpreta- tion of political systems along the patterns that one is most used to (i.e., the system of ones country) is experienced as inadequate when dealing with Union. A final remark that has to be made here concerns turnout in elections for the national parliaments of the member states of the EU. Although Topf described as late as 1995 the variations in turnout in these and other western countries as trendless fluctua- tion, more recent observations of turnout in national elections in EU countries point in the direction of a gradual decline. If this is indeed the case, one could, of course, point here too to the still further declining remnants of cleavage politics and generational replacement. In addition to this, however, one could think of a more structural reason that, if this speculation is correct, will have additional depressing effects on turnout in national parliamentary elections. If citizens learn as a consequence of being exposed to reality, they not only learn that the results of elections for the EP are unrelated to any kind of policy direction for the EU, but they also learn that their own governments (and the parliamentary ma- jorities upon which these rest) become increasingly less influential for a growing number of policy areas, as EU legislation and regu- lation become more important and limit the scope of national po- licy-making. As the EU syphons off policy making powers from national parliamentary regimes, the stakes in national elections become smaller, and the same instrumental logic that generates declining turnout in EP elections will equally give rise to declining turnout in national elections. Such a development would not be detrimental from a normative democratic point of view if the diminished importance of the (party) composition of national parliaments would be compensa- ted by an increased importance of the party composition of Parliament. As argued above, however, this is not at all the case because of the current institutional structure of the EU. Seen from this perspective, the citizens of the EU are gradually disempowered electorally, and the declining turnout in national and European elections can only be regarded as a rational reaction of the voters to this development. In another context I argued with my co-authors that the conditions that turn European elec- tions into so-called second-order elections undermines not only the democratic character of the EU, but tends to do so for domes- tic political processes as well (Franklin, van der Eijk and Marsh, 1996). A declining impact of elections on policy-direction and a declining participation of citizens in the electoral process – at the national as well as the the EU level – can only increase this danger. WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT Biorcio, R. and R. (1995) Relationships between Citizens and Political Parties. Klingemann and D. , eds., Citizens and the State. : ; pp. Blumler, J.G., ed. (1983) Communicating to Voters. Popular Responses to the First European Community Elections. Brug, W. van der (1997) Wheres the Party? Voters Perceptions of Party Positions. R.J. and M.P. Wattenberg, (1993) The Not so Simple Act of Voting. Finifter, ed., Political Science: of the Discipline II. : American Political Science Asso- ciation , M. van (1999) Rain Falls on All of Us (but Some Manage to get more than Others). Accounting for Context Through the Individual in Electoral Participation. Paper, presented at EPOP, Northampton, Eijk, C. van der, and (1998) Different at the Sur- face, Similar in Depth – Attitudes towards Politics in and the , : DIA Eijk, C. van der, and M.N. Franklin, eds. (1996) Choosing Europe? Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. Eijk, C. van der, and E.V. Oppenhuis (1990) Turnout and Second- order Effects in Elections of 1989 – Evidence from the . Acta Politica, vol. 25, nr.1:67– 94 Eijk, C. van der, M.N. Franklin and T. (1996) The Dog that Did Not : The 1994 Elections in the Light of 1989. In C. van der Eijk and M.N. Franklin, eds., Choosing Europe? Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. ): ; pp. Franklin, M.N. (1996) Electoral Participation. In L. LeDuc, R.G. and P. , eds. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. Thousand Oaks (. ): ; pp. Franklin, M.N., C. van der Eijk and M. Marsh (1996) Conclusions: The Electoral Connection and the Democratic Deficit. In C. van der Eijk and M.N. Franklin, eds., Choosing Europe? Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. ): ; pp. Franklin, M.N., C. van der Eijk and E.V. Oppenhuis (1995) The Motivational Basis of Electoral participation: European Elections provide a Critical Test. Paper, presented at ECPR Joint Sessions, Franklin, M.N., C. van der Eijk and E.V. Oppenhuis (1996) The Institutional Context: . In: C. van der Eijk and M.N. Franklin, eds., Choosing Europe? Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. ): ; pp. Franklin, M.N., T. and H. Valen, eds. (1992) Electoral Change. Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries. , D. and S. (1988) Matters: Social Psychology and Voting Behavior in and the . Gunsteren, H. van, and R.A. Andeweg (1994) Het grote Ongenoe- gen: over de Kloof tussen Burgers en Politiek. Kaase, M. and K. , eds. (1995) Beliefs in Government. Lijphart, A. (1968) The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the . Lipset, S. M., and S. Rokkan (1967) Cleavage Structures, Alignments. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT eds., Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. Marsh, M., and M.N. Franklin (1996) : Unanswered Questions from the Study of European Elections, 1979–1994. In C. van der Eijk and M.N. Franklin, eds., Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. ): ; pp. , J.S. (1974/75) A System of Logic. vii and viii in Collected Works of . : Routledge and Kegan (originally published in 1843) Oppenhuis, E.V. (1995) Voting Behavior in Europe. , G., G. Moyser and N. (1992) Political Participation and Democracy in . Przeworski, A., and H. Teune (1970) The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. , K., ed. (1985) Ten European Elections: Campaigns and Results of the 1979/81 First Direct Elections to Parliament. , K., and H. (1980) Elections. A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Euro- pean Election Results. , 8:3–44 , R., and D. Urwin (1970) Persistence and Change in since 1945. Political Studies, vol. , H., and J. , eds. (1999) Political Representation and legitimacy in Union. : Univer- sity Press (1913) Tableau Politique de la de lOuest sous la Troisième République. (1937) Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics. : King and Son Topf, R. (1995) Electoral Participation. Klingemann and D. , eds., Citizens and the State. : Univer- sity Press; pp. Verba, S. and N. Nie (1972) Participation in . Political Democracy and Social Equality. Verba, S., N. Nie and J.O. (1978) Participation and Political Equality. Institutions, Attitudes and Participation This paper begins with a description of the problem of low partici- pation in European Parliament elections and, in the course of these observations, it makes some preliminary suggestions as to the cau- ses of variation in turnout. In order to place the problem of low turnout in context, the paper then looks briefly at attitudes to European integration and at the relationship between the citizens and the Union. The issue of the discrepancies in prevailing inter- pretations of the sources of low turnout in European Parliament elections is then considered. A concluding section tackles the question of what should be done about the problem of abstention, considering the matter under two headings: the facilitation of participation and the mobilisation of participation. The variations in turnout in European Parliament elections the period since 1979 and as a direct result of successive revi- sions of the EU treaties, the powers of Parliament 1 The author is professor of Politics at Department and on Public Opinion and Political Behaviour at University college . have increased significantly. In contrast to the increasing power and importance of the Parliament, turnout in European Parliament elections has declined – from an average turnout of 65.9 per cent in 1979 to 52.4 per cent in 1999. In fact the picture is worse than these figures indicate. Three countries in Union (, , and ) have compulsory voting and had compulsory or at least quasi-compulsory voting until 1993. Furthermore certain countries either regularly or from time to time hold concurrent nation-wide elections (national, regional or local) that artificially boost the turnout in elec- tion. Leaving these countries to one side, turnout in the remaining member states was 52.9 per cent in 1979 and only 39.4 per cent in 1999 (see Table 1). Apart from the boost arising from compulsory voting and the concurrence of other elections, turnout in European Parliament elections is affected by the day of voting (Sunday versus weekday), with weekday voting contributing to low turnout in European Parliament elections in , the , and . Beyond these few obvious factors , however, there is wide- spread disagreement as to what causes low turnout in European Parliament elections. This issue will be analysed in some detail be- low. But first it is necessary to consider the matter of overall atti- tudes to European integration among the citizens of the Union. Turnout in five European Parliament elections, 1979–99 voting or concurrent nation-wide elections *Concurrent nation-wide elections Attitudes to European integration The measurement of support for European integration is highly sensitive to variations in question wording. The four standard Eurobarometer indicators of attitudes to integration are customarily labelled unification, membership, benefits, and dissolution. The levels of support for integration elicited by these questions depend both on the stimulus presented in the question and on the response categories, in particular on whether the response catego- ries offer an explicit middle position. The unification indicator measures support for a very general aspiration (efforts to unify Western Europe) and does so on a four point scale (very much for, to some extent for, to some extent against, very much against) that does not provide an expli- cit middle or neutral point. The rather vague stimulus and the absence of a middle position combine to produce high levels of support for integration, touching almost 80 per cent at the begin- ning of the 1990s (see Figure 1). The membership indicator provi- des a more concrete stimulus (country Xs membership of Union) and a three point scale that includes an explicit middle position (a good thing, neither good nor bad, a bad thing). As such, it probably provides a more realistic gauge of support for integration that typically runs some 10 to 20 percen- tage points behind the unification indicator. The third Eurobaro- meter indicator asks whether the respondents country has benefi- ted from membership of the Union but, like the unification indi- cator, it does not provide a middle position (the response categories are benefited and did not benefit). Because it involves an element of perception as well as evaluation, it is not surprising that the benefits indicator registers a positive response that is slightly lower than that registered by the membership indicator. Indeed, the gap between the two might be greater were it not for the pre- sence of a neutral category in the membership indicator and the absence of such a category in the benefits indicator. Finally, there is the dissolution indicator. This question poses the hypothetical situation of the scrapping of the Community or Union, with strong negative and positive options and a middle position (very sorry, indifferent, very relieved2). The indicator has been criticised because it is hypothetical; nonetheless it provides a useful measure of enthusiasm or lack of enthusiasm for European integration, showing, in –1994 for example, a quite modest level of enthusiasm (43 per cent) that was actually slightly lower than the level of indifference and dont know combined (46 per cent) (see Figure 1). Attitudes to Union four Eurobarometer indi- cators (unification, membership, benefits and dissolution) 1973–1998 2 The very was added to relieved in 1993. None of these questions is an ideal indicator of attitudes to inte- gration; nor could it be said that they together form an adequate battery of items. One must therefore exercise a certain degree of caution in interpreting the evidence. In particular, attempts to ca- tegorise the indicators in terms of diffuse-affective versus specific- utilitarian dimensions of support quickly run into difficulties. As Niedermayer (1995; 54-5) notes, the only unambiguously utilita- rian measure is that based on the benefits question.