sou · GNB3151 · 2000-01-01 00:00:00 — This holds for all kinds of veto points, but if some of the veto points are not controlled by elected bodies the problem is more severe, as the veto point then can act more independently. union has more veto points than its member- states, even if the number of veto points in the union vary between different policy areas. The decision-making process vary from re- gulating the common market, where there are at least three veto points – the Commission, the Parliament and TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL LEVELS nisters – to decisions on the competence of union, which takes ratification in the national parliaments. The turnout in the elections to parliament should reach a lower level because of the veto-points, compared to an institutional set-up with less veto-points.3 From a normative democratic perspective, the veto points of union are problematic. By adding veto points to a democratic decision-making procedure, the organisation gives more resistance to a majority of citizens supporting a political change. Instead of treating all possible alternatives alike, a deci- sion-making procedure with many veto points favours status quo, which implies a bias of conservative ideology (thus violating the idea of a politically neutral decision-making procedure). This de- mocratic problem holds for all kinds of veto points. But in union there are two further problems: (1) there is only one veto point which is directly elected (the other ones having their legitimacy mainly from non-democratic sources); (2) the formation of public opinion against and in support of the politics pursued by parliament, is hampered by linguistic, organisational and maybe cultural constraints. That turnout is lower in organisation C than in organisation A because its higher number of veto-points, could thus be re-phrased by saying that turnout is lower in organisation C than in organisation A because C is less democratic than A. Lets now turn to the comparison between turnout in different democratic units. 3 The relation is complex between turnout in the elections to the Euro- pean parliament and the internal veto points of . If reaches a decision, its number of veto points could actually increase the influence of parliament, as the internal veto points weakens makes it easier for the Parliament to gain support for its position in a bargain with the Council. If however doesnt reach a decision, the number of internal veto points will decrease the interest of parliament, as it cant influence the situation. Two democratic organisations, A and B, in the political system (sharing the same citizens/voters) This time we have organisation A on the vertical axis and organi- sation B on the horizontal axis. For the moment we have also included a simplification, a premise that says: every power and competence which is added to organisation B is taken from organi- sation A. Later on we will depart from this simplification. But for the sake of lucidity I start with a simple model. Its not much to say about this diagram. As we have defined – in the premise – the power of organisation B as what is taken from organisation A, the graph should be inverted. The more power or competencies to or- TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL LEVELS ganisation B from organisation A, the lower expected turnout in organisation A. Now take a look at a diagram which includes the turnout in two democratic units in the same political system. Two democratic organisations with the same relevant characteristics, A:1 and A:2 Given that the organisations are alike in relevant aspects – number of citizens and number of veto points – we should expect a sym- metrical trade off between the turnout in the two democratic units. What you gain in one unit you will lose in the other. Of course we should be aware that the overall system capacity is probably not the same when competencies and power are taken from one unit to the other in the same political system. But for still some time we stay with the ideal-type premise of the diagram. We now come to the rather predictable comparison, between two more or less democratic units that differs from each other in aspects relevant for the level of turnout. Take for example a com- parison between the organisations A and B, which we have pre- viously identified, or the more provocative comparison between organisation A and C. Two more or less democratic organisations, A and B. B has either more citizens than A or more veto points TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL LEVELS Two more or less democratic organisations, A and C. C has both more citizens than A and more veto points To make the situation even more obvious we can turn this diagram around and place organisation C on the horizontal axis instead of organisation A, while the same relation between the two. Two more or less democratic organisations, A and C. C has both more citizens than A and more veto points In this diagram we can easily see that its irrational to transfer any power from A to C or B, if you want to maximise turnout in gene- ral election. Yes, transferring power and competencies from orga- nisation A to C or B will yield a higher turnout in C or B; but by doing this you will lose more turnout in A than you win in C or B. As a small central state like for example is most re- sembling to A, and the large European union with several veto points is most resembling to C, we have now reached a quite dif- ferent conclusion than the more simple one drawn by . His point was that an increase of power and competence of the Euro- pean parliament would solve some of the democratic shortcomings of the union. At this moment we rather say that increasing the power of parliament would worsen the democratic TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL LEVELS shortcomings of the union, though at the national level, as long as the competencies and powers transferred to parlia- ment comes from national parliaments or bodies controlled by these. But this conclusion is also premature. The premise – saying that every power and competence added to organisation A is taken from organisation C – is not true for all expansions of power and competencies in parliament. Its thus time to pro- blematize the premise and differ between policy areas where we believe that the premise is true and policy areas where we believe the premise to be false. I shall try to give a presumptive answer to this question. What we are trying to identify is a situation where the power and competencies of one democratic unit can be expanded, with- out any negative effects on the other democratic unit. We thus look for a situation with the following structure. Two more or less democratic organisations, A and C. C has both more citizens than A and more veto points Where can we find this? To use the term of this structure would be find in areas where the power is alienated, and not delegated, from the democratic units (1982:6, 47–53). If the power at present isnt democratically controlled, then it can be added to another political level with no negative effects on turnout and democratic legitimacy. I will take three popular examples of this kind of power, which are commonly believed to need another political level than the nation-state for its effective implementa- tion. The first example is found in security policy. According to a popular realist thesis integration is taken forward by the necessity for nation-states to co-operate if they are to succeed in protecting their citizens from war. Put in another way: until integration, in the modern sense of this term, the secu- TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL LEVELS rity policy of nation-states was a disaster of ineffici- ency. During less than seventy years and fighted against each other in three wars. So, if the security policy is trans- ferred to level, that would not decrease turnout in national elections, as this policy couldnt be effectively pursued on the national level anyway. The problem here is that not all countries have had such a bad efficiency in security policy. hasnt fought a war since 1809. You can accuse for having an immoral security po- licy during the second world war, and also for hiding its agenda after the war. But measured by its goal – to protect its citizens from aggressors – the policy has been efficient. It might then be difficult to convince a Swede that his or her state really has lost the possibility to pursue an efficient security policy. The second example is found in environmental policy. Pollu- tions of air and water can easily be taken from one nation to another; the same holds for global heating. According to a simple Prisoners Dilemma logic – that is where no state acts individually as all states need to act for solving a common problem – this could be a serious problem for the nation-states and might thus require an international level for effective governance. This is probably true. One problem however, is that environmental issues, though important and requiring international co-operation, might need a political level both above , and in some cases, below. For example, to rise the problem-solving-capacity of environmen- tal policy in , its citizens need to co-operate with citizens in the Baltic states, , , , , US and , but not to the same extent with citizens in and . The third example is found in economic policy. The globalisa- tion of capital and factors of production is often said to limit for example the tax-capacity of the nation-states. If capital, persons and factors of production easily can exit from a certain jurisdic- tion, no state will tax them higher than any other, which theoreti- cally would yield a race to the bottom of taxation on these tax- bases. As the free movement of persons, capital, services and commodities is more intensive inside union than outside, the union seems to be a feasible organisation for retaking some of the lost power to tax mobile tax bases. This should not affect the turnout in national elections, as long as the tax-power couldnt be exercised nationally anyway. This time the problem is that such matters seem very hard for the member-states to agree on. Even if there is today social democrats in thirteen of fifteen member-state government, governments which are not by ideo- logy opposed to public tax-capacity, the most radical decision up till now is the code of conduct, taken by in late 1997; and that is far less radical than the tax-competencies of mobile tax-bases which we are discussing now. So, the conclusion from this three examples – security, envi- ronmental and economic policy – is that there are competencies and power which could be transferred to union, or competencies which has already been transferred, without decrea- sing turnout in the national elections, as the powers are not con- trolled by the national parliaments anyway. But we have also observed problems in each example, implying that the short- comings of democratic legitimacy in union will not be satisfactorily solved by following the political implication of this analysis. Finally then, my very simple answer to the initial question – about when its better or worse to divide a system in two levels, measured against a norm of democratic legitimacy – is that a divi- sion is better when the public that policies can be effectively pur- sued on one level but not at all on the other. And if this criterion is not fulfilled, we should keep decision-making power on the level with lowest possible number of citizens and veto points, if we want to maximise democratic legitimacy. To improve turnout its of course also directly elected bodies that should have decision- making power when competencies are transferred to a higher level. TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL LEVELS Beetham, (1991) The Legitimation of . (1982) Dilemmas of Pluralist . , (1999) . s å a r b e t a r D e m o k r a t i u t r e d n i n g e n analyserar den svenska folkstyrelsens förutsättningar inför 2000-talet. Det sker i ljuset av bl.a. globaliseringen, EU-medlem- skapet, förändringarna i medieland- skapet, den nya IT-tekniken, förnyel- searbetet inom offentlig förvaltning och folkrörelsernas förändringar. Kommittén har också fått i uppdrag att förklara det sjunkande valdeltagandet samt stimulera det demokratiska enga- gemanget. skall utred- ningen presentera en sammanvägd analys i form av ett slutbetänkande. Utredningen vill redan under arbetets gång bidra till att fördjupa demokratidebatten genom en webbplats för debatt och information kommer fortlöpande under arbetets gång att publicera en skriftserie med essäer, debattartiklar, seminarieinlägg och forskarantologier. Den omfattande demokratiforsk- ning som bedrivs vid våra universitet och högskolor ställs på detta vis till för- fogande för alla som är intresserade av demokratifrågor. Information om titlar, utgivnings- dag, priser m.m. finns på utredningens webbplats. En av utredningens uppgifter är att sti- mulera det offentliga samtalet. Därför anordnar vi offentliga semi- narier runt om i landet. Till seminarierna bjuder vi in fors- kare och idédebattörer att bidra med sin kunskap och sina värderingar kring de frågor vi tycker är värdefulla att sam- tala kring. Varje seminarium dokumenteras i form av en skrift. är adressen till webbplats. Här finns möjlighet att föra en fri debatt kring demokratin – demo- kratitorget är öppet för alla. Ett antal krönikörer kommer att kommentera demokratiproblem och andra demokratidebatter. Här kan Du också informera dig om och föra dialog kring utredningen. Direktiv i fulltext, arbetsplan och utredningens protokoll är dokument man kan hämta hem. Här informerar vi också fortlöpan- de om aktuella skrifter och seminarier. Man kan dessutom ta del av debatt- inlägg vid seminarier samt beställa utredningens skrifter. Länkar finns till andra delar av nätet där demokratifrågor dryftas på olika sätt. Vi svarar gärna på frågor och lämnar ytterligare information om utredning- ens arbete. Adress och telefonnummer till utredningens kansli finns på nästa sida. () tel: () ledamot av tel: () ledamot av POSTADRESS: 103 33 . Dokumentation från ett seminarium (SOU 1998:55) En god affär i . Journalisternas avslöjanden och läsarnas etik (SOU 1998:63) Att rösta med händerna. Om stormöten, folkom- röstningar och direktdemokrati i (SOU 1998:85) 4.Gör barn till medborgare! Om barn och demokrati (SOU 1998:97) 5.Det unga medborgarskapet. Dokumentation från ett seminarium (SOU 1998:101) 6.Lekmannastyre i experternas tid. Dokumentation från ett seminarium (SOU 1998:102) 7.Demokrati på europeisk nivå? (SOU 1998:124) 8.Läsarna och demokratin. Ett brev till det läsande (SOU 1998:134) Exempel och analyser (SOU 1998:155) En intervjubok från Socialtjänst- utredningen (SOU 1998:161) Demokratin möter marknaden. Tre ronder (SOU 1998:164) 12.EU – ett demokratiprojekt? Dokumentation från ett seminarium (SOU 1998:145) 13.Invandrarskap och medborgarskap. Dokumentation från ett seminarium (SOU 1999:8) 14.Att slakta ett får i . Om religionsfrihet och demokrati (SOU 1999:9) 15.Etik och demokratisk statskonst (SOU 1999:13) 16.Elektronisk demokrati (SOU 1999:12) 17.Den skyddade provinsen. En essä om demokratins värde och värdighet (SOU 1999:22) 18.Lobbning (SOU 1998:146) 19.Demokratin i den offentliga sektorns förändring. Dokumentation från ett seminarium (SOU 1999:40) Om domstolarna, lagen och de individuella rättigheterna i (SOU 1998:103) 21.Bör demokratin avnationaliseras? (SOU 1999:11) 22.Globaliseringen och demokratin. Dokumentation från ett seminarium (SOU 1999:56) 23.Löser juridiken demokratins problem? (SOU 1999:58) 24.Representativ demokrati (SOU 1999:64) 25.Demokratin och det gemensamma bästa (SOU 1999:74) 26.Demokratiopinioner (SOU 1999:80) 27.Olydiga medborgare (1999:101) 28.Demokratins förgörare (1999:10) 29.Civilsamhället som demokratins arena. Några kritiska reflektioner (SOU 1999:112) 30.Demokrati på remiss (SOU 1999:144 31.Vad hände med ekonomi efter 1970? 32.Citizen Participation in European Politics (SOU 1999:151)