sou · GLB3160d2 · 1998-01-01 00:00:00 — Evaluation of the supportive measures in relation to the support criterion is, in other words, impossible, and the present Objective 6 ought instead to be defined with reference to regions with large depopulation problems. , with its high level of prosperity, may thus incur the phasing out proposed in Agenda 2000, as indeed the Government anticipates. This will mean a reduction of the current frame for structural measures in and would affect the regions belonging to Objectives 2, 5b and 6. No calculation of the effects is possible, because no one can foresee the amount by which a change in the current distribution would reduce grants from the EU. Greater co-ordinated measures will in cases of this kind have to be taken for communities in the interior and in other parts of with similar problems. The fact of belonging to a union which is planning to admit new members successively augments the pressure of competition on those regions of which, under present circumstances, have difficulty in maintaining their position in the process of change. The EU, through its very existence, constitutes a growing pressure of competition on both strong regions and not-so-strong ones. )MPLICATIONS FOR %5 BALANCES As the report observes, there are considerable difficulties involved in linking together institutional questions, policy changes and budget within the Union. A coherent grasp of these questions has up till now been lacking. Previous experience testifies that these bundles of questions have been broken up into smaller sub-issues in connection with membership negotiations, causing the internal policies of the EU to be fashioned by interstate settlements. The result has been side-payments which have sometimes devoted more attention to questions of form and compensation between states than to substantial content. In the end the stepwise method has come to leave its imprint on the process as a whole. Financial resources look for an outlet and create their own dynamic through the genesis of policy networks. In the absence of a coherent, written constitution, the addition of new members necessarily changes the established policy networks. Given that institutional relations within the EU vary a good deal, each individual candidate state should develop institutions appropriate to its own internal economic, political and cultural structure - an order of things capable of dealing with minority issues, regional economic differences and questions concerning the distribution of It is important for the integration process that these institutions should be capable of guaranteeing national security and meeting democratic requirements. This is also essential if they are to be capable of becoming fully fledged partners within the framework of wider policy networks and of competing for EU project funding. The EUs policy for the regions, then, is on the verge of thoroughgoing changes. With many new members there will be no scope for generous side-payments in line with previous expansions. measure must be clear in form and effect. As the Union grows, its acquis communautaire must be correspondingly refined. The achievement of clearer rules of conduct would seem to be in line with Swedish interests. Demands for the introduction of a greater element of popular sovereignty and democracy are likely to be irresistible in the long run. Faced with developments of this kind, it is important here and now to begin thinking in terms of power balances between central EU institutions. A stronger role for Parliament is a procedure which will not immediately lead to a stronger hierarchy but which demonstrates an attitude in favour of steps being taken towards further deepening and a greater element of democratic decision- making procedures. An alternative approach is to press the question of stronger support from national parliaments. This would mean a completely different interpretation of the need for double majorities, with decisions requiring approval both from one of the central EU bodies (or the Parliament) and the Swedish Riksdag (parliament). Parallel to the growth, through structural commitments, of responsibility for developments in new Member States, the organisational shortcomings of the Union will be increasingly exposed. The organisation was originally conceived of as having six members and before long may have 26. The institutional questions will have to be dealt with before an enlargement can be possible. Policy shifts, compared with institutional changes, are relatively easy to accomplish. A qualified majority in is sufficient for the adoption of a new policy and, moreover, the directly elected Parliament is playing a far greater role now than it used to. As has already been remarked, regional and structural policies have been palpably changed in connection with enlargements. The difference this time is that stepwise solutions can prove very costly to the EU. The economic development of Central and Eastern Europe is lagging so far behind that their internal problems cannot be fully allowed for at European level; many of those problems demand national solutions. Their unfavourable negotiating position will make it hard for them to exact various forms of compensation in return for membership. The EU Member States are under pressure not to let slip a historic opportunity. Disappointment and widespread social discontent in the applicant countries are liable to roll back what has so far been achieved in the form of integration with Western Europe if there is loss of confidence in democracy and the market economy as the solutions to their national problems. In connection with enlargements, the scale of the budget becomes a subject of interstate negotiations. Experience has shown the budget to be greatly affected by the side-payments occurring as a consequence of negotiations during a governmental conference. Putting it drastically, every government probably has an interest in recovering as much as possible, preferably more, of what it pays in membership contributions. To avoid large transfers on the grounds of showing solidarity with the states of Eastern and Central Europe, a reduced membership contribution can be offered instead for a phasing-in period. This will give the present EU countries time for their internal preparations for enlargement. Regional and structural policies together with agricultural policy account for the overwhelming bulk of expenditure. If phasing in is to be facilitated through a reapportionment of expenditure, both these policy fields should be subjected to an open-ended review. They occupy some 80 per cent of the EU budget and are conservative in character. The CAP because it favours the original members, and regional and structural policy because it is a result of and adapted to previous enlargements. The reductions now planed in the number of fund programmes and Community initiatives are a necessary step. Also, it is uncertain whether a spending frame of 1.27 per cent of the Unions GDP will suffice for the admission of ten new members, all the more so as that frame presupposes 2.5 per cent annual GDP growth in EU-15. is there any preparedness for economic or political crises in the applicant countries or in the EU itself. The applicant countries, even though they are passing through a sensitive transitional phase, are expected to display political and social stability. The capacity of the applicant countries to absorb funds is probably no less than that of the former DDR. Experience of German reunification tells us that, even with generous measures of support, the transformation process takes a long time to accomplish. Limiting the amount of support to 4 per cent of the Member States GDP may therefore impair the possibilities of coping with the new situation which membership entails. Limited support can lead to a growth of tensions between regions in these countries, at the same time as they are under great pressure of change. complication will be added if the divided commencement of negotiations becomes a fact. Increased support of ECU 7bn seems too small a figure to enable those who are to wait for negotiations to catch up. In other words, the danger is that the costs of enlargement have been underestimated. The Commission presents far too uncomplicated a picture of the future. After all, we are talking about a transitional period between 6 and 10 years ahead. The case of the DDR has taught us that, even with unusually strong financial support, the processing of adapting production and living conditions to western standards takes a long time. It is difficult, however, to envisage the present EU organisation being equal to negotiating with all applicant countries at once. Adapting the organisation to such a large influx is a tremendous experiment, but once the promises have been made it is the EUs duty not to create greater problems than the proposed enlargement was intended to solve. Despite aims of making no distinction between the Member States, with the enlargement now planned there is a gradation in sight. joining the EMU in 1998 will form an inner core. In practice this means that we already have a group of states WITHIN the EU which are preparing to join the monetary union, while others have chosen to wait on events. It is this latter group of countries that the Eastern and Central European countries will in future be able to join. If the EMU materialises, new members will join up with an outer circle of EMU non-members, because countries liable to cause a noticeable weakening of the common currency are unlikely to be admitted to the monetary co-operation. The aim for an impending enlargement should be to minimise the number of side-payments. There is also much to suggest that structural and regional policy will have to be allotted a different role from that which they have played in previous enlargements. 2EGIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE APPLICANT COUNTRIES The regional level, generally speaking, is weak in all the applicant countries. This is partly due to the historical legacy of the Soviet area, but there are other reasons as well. One of them is that many of these countries are small in area and, therefore, have had no need for regional thinking, They are and have been easily surveyable from the centre. This is above all true of the Baltic Sea States. The regional level has not been very thoroughly treated in Commissions country review. It seems as though the Commission perceives the necessity of policies in all fields during an initial phase having a properly co-ordinated national strategy in order to succeed. The present Committee can endorse that idea for a brief transitional period, but in the longer term it will be essential for the now so complicated processes to which the networks involved are contributing to be accepted and understood at both regional and local levels. Regional development cannot be initiated without a high level of administrative competence, and without democratic support it cannot be implemented. All the applicant countries, therefore, are in need of extensive and direct measures of assistance in order to develop their national concepts of regional policy and the social organisation in which those concepts are to be rooted. A large number of national authorities and private interests have been in most of the applicant countries since the beginning of the nineties. Swedish interests are involved in all the applicant countries round the Baltic. Measures take the form of experience interchange between national authorities and educational institutions. Private business interests are also abundantly represented, and the combined presence of all these players presents an opportunity for the interchange of knowledge and a means of broadening the competence of the new array of administrators and leaders in the applicant countries. This is a highly important process which, given measures of co-ordination, can be accelerated in the Baltic Sea region. The Baltic Sea Programme initiated by the Government should for the future have the clearly declared aim of co-ordinating a comprehensive system of exchange between , other Nordic countries, the Baltic Sea states and , with a view to up a new cadre of officials, teachers, researchers and entrepreneurs at regional level. Joining together the regions in all the states round the Baltic at the earliest possible opportunity must be the most efficient means of achieving both depth and breath in the task of strengthening connections between them. This would also help to give the development process the democratic footing essential for its long-term viability. If corresponding programmes are consistently implemented in the other Nordic countries, this could mean a good start for the new age that awaits us. For the remaining applicant countries, similar agreements with neighbouring states would be a step in the right direction. One promising sign is the realisation by most of the applicant countries of the need for a regional development process. Several of them, moreover, have seen to it that someone at governmental level is made responsible for the co-ordination of regional development questions right from the start. This, hopefully, can lead to the regional development process becoming a dynamic political theme as a counterpoise to the lingering old order. The fact of several states not being considered mature enough to open negotiations in the first round can be a trifle disturbing from the viewpoint of regional development. Being considered mature enough to open negotiations at the same time as everyone else is probably a source of inspiration for further reforming endeavours. Regions bordering on , for example, have a very low standard of living in European eyes, but also by comparison with regions bordering on and . The tension that can develop out of this regional imbalance must be made a subject of special measures in all states. doubts whether the funds which have been set aside will cover needs during the waiting period assumed by Commission. The ECU 45bn budgeted by Commission for the period between 2000 and 2006 is unlikely to cover the cost of enlargement, and it will therefore be hard to accommodate the budget within the EUs budget ceiling of 1.27 per cent of the Member States total GDP. As far as the Committee is able to understand, there are no strong objective reasons for excluding any candidate state on the grounds of its administrative apparatus or its capacity for receiving and using programmes being inferior to another countrys. There are differences, but it is impossible today to place the countries in ranking order in the light of available facts. This is particularly true of the Baltic Sea States, where Commissions negative attitude to regional policy preparedness does not tally with the view taken by the Lithuanian Government. None of the applicant countries in question wishes to be left out, and an apparently unjustified and impenetrable ranking system can generate tensions within and between the applicant countries. The Union has already committed itself to an eastward enlargement. And there cannot be any decisive argument in allowing certain states to commence negotiations while others have to wait. All should be enabled to start simultaneously but to conclude their negotiations at different points in time, in which case there would at least be no room in the debate for the argument concerning unfair treatment. A common opening of negotiations would also give the applicant countries a breathing space and afford less scope for the oppositional forces wishing to prevent an enlargement of the Union from having special consequences for their own country. Perhaps the limitation lies more in the structure of the EU itself than in that of the applicant countries? Given the potential which is now being established in the neighbouring region, and the entire Baltic and Bothnian Sea region will achieve greater accessibility and a more central location in relation to the growing European markets. The best way of developing trade with Central and Eastern Europe is by opening the way to imports from these countries and, since trade is above all impeded by link-related deficiencies and transport links include elements giving them the character of semi-collective goods, a central policy conclusion must be that: -EMBERSHIP FOR THE APPLICANT COUNTRIES OF A %UROPEAN TRAFFIC POLICY AIMED AT DEVELOPING THE TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS LINKS WHICH ARE LACKING BETWEEN %ASTERN AND 7ESTERN %UROPE can also play a decisive part in the development of, above all, the Baltic Sea States and . Sustainable development of the applicant countries will require measures over and above Union-financed support. 4HE REGIONAL PROCESS IN THE APPLICANT COUNTRIES MUST BE SUPPORTED BY THEIR NEIGHBOURS #IMPORTANT IN THIS RESPECT In order to keep track of the course of events in Central and Eastern Europe, knowledge production relating to the regional development process must be linked more closely with research. One way of achieving this would be by setting up an institute responsible for regional development in the applicant countries - an institute which, it is suggested, can be localised in one of the new Member States. is it absolutely certain that the markets themselves are capable of accomplishing the structural renewal which the regions of have been greatly in need of for a long time now. A renewal of the regional enterprise structure is needed, regardless of EU enlargement. If enlargement results in declining industries encountering a growth of demand, the desirable pressure for change may be reduced. It is therefore important that the structure-conserving parts of Swedish and EU-initiated labour market, enterprise and regional policies should be abolished. %UROPEAN AND 3WEDISH POLICIES FOR ENTERPRISE AND THE REGIONS SLANTED CLEARLY IN FAVOUR OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE On the other hand it is policy measures themselves, in relation to enterprise structure and regional development during the 80s and 90s, which demonstrate the uncertainty of the political process being able to cope with this kind of change better than the markets. product-developing signals must therefore be made the focus of attention for the regional labour markets. )T this connection, increased competition from Eastern Europe can indicate more clearly the sectors in which the growth of earnings is going to be further decelerated. growth is a dominant tendency of long-term population movements. Small regions without at least a knowledge-oriented urban community acquire vulnerable labour markets. Residents of small communities with low access to knowledge-oriented towns and cities must be prepared for slower income growth than people living in regions with more dynamic job If the regional population base goes on stagnating, this is bound to mean a growing concentration of population. 2EGIONS MUST THEREFORE DEVELOP THEIR COLLECTIVE RESOURCES IN THE FORM OF FACTORS OF PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENT AND NETWORKS IN ORDER TO CREATE ATTRACTIVE In order for the regions themselves to be capable of acting and in order for national and European policy-making bodies to be able to decide on trans- regional measures, a coherent picture is needed of regional links and resources. Knowledge of the national and international dependencies of the Swedish regions and of their available resources today constitutes a limiting factor of regional policy. 4HE INSUFFICIENTLY CLEAR AT PRESENT What is more, the possibilities of responding more distinctly and rapidly to the adjustment requirements and the cyclical sensitivity entailed by an integrated European market call for a high level of efficiency in regional policy. 4HROUGH SECTORIALLY CO ORDINATED AND CONCENTRATED MEASURES A NEW REGIONAL POLICY CAN MAKE 3WEDEN is also important for this course of events to be more closely linked with research in the field. Comparisons with German reunification show that the cost of an eastward enlargement can be considerably greater than Commission has bargained for. This makes heavy demands on a thoroughgoing reform of the common regional and demands greater concentration lead to a revised definition of SUGGEST THAT 3WEDEN MUST BE ALLOCATIONS FROM THE %5. and clarity, which in turn must ultimately Objectives. !CCORDINGLY THERE IS MUCH TO PREPARED FOR A REDUCTION OF ITS FUNDING Finally it is worth mentioning that in its material the Committee has found no clear objective reasons for splitting the commencement of negotiations.