sou · GLB3159 · 1998-01-01 00:00:00 — ställde sig i bakom de förslag till samordnade åtgärder mot de n organiserade brottsligheten som den s.k. högnivågruppen hade lagt fram. Förslagen är praktiskt inriktade. Inte minst föreslås åtgärder för at t underlätta samverkan mellan de olika brottsbekämpande myndigheterna i medlemsstaterna. Den framtida uppgiften för Europeiska unionen, inbegripet Europol, är grannlaga. Strategiska brottsbekämpningsfrågor skall hanteras me d bibehållen nationell självständighet för medlemsstaterna. Brottsbe - kämpningen skall vara effektiv, som rättsstatsprincipen iakttas och skyddet för den enskildes integritet respekteras. Det är ju till försvar för bl.a. dessa värden som kampen förs. För del blir en av konsekvenserna krav på ökade insatser av d e myndigheter som har till uppgift att bekämpa den organiserade, gränsöverskridande brottsligheten. Uppgiften är att i ett allt öppnar e hindra att sådan brottslighet får fäste i vårt land. Detta kan vara resurskrävande. Dessutom krävs att också uthålligt fortsätter de stö dinsatser, som inletts genom EU och andra internationella organisa- tioner eller nationellt. Det utredningsarbete som ligger till grund för denna rapport har tydligt visat några grundläggande saker: För det första: Fri rörlighet för personer är en av de grundläggand e friheterna i Europeiska unionen och representerar, när den har för - verkligats, en stor landvinning. utgör den en utmaning redan för de nuvarande medlemsstaterna. Denna utmaning skärps när frihete n utsträcks till kandidatländerna. bör förbättra sin utlännings - kontroll såväl vid yttre gräns som inne i landet. För det andra: Olaglig invandring och organiserad brottslighet plågar medlemsstaterna i Europeiska unionen. Brottsligheten har sina rötter såvål inom som utanför unionen. Den i llegala migrationen och den av allt att döma tilltagande organiserade brottsligheten i kandidatlä nderna representerar ett hot, oavsett utvidgningsfrågans lösning. Det bästa sättet att komma till rätta med detta hot är att dra in kandidatländerna i e n process som slutar med medlemskap i unionen. I de fall detta har framgång blir statsmakterna i kandidatländerna medarbetare i det pågå ende arbetet med att komma till rätta med olaglig invandring och organiserad brottslighet. Medlemskapet betyder då inte att ett problem uppstår, utan lösningen på ett problem. För del krävs ordentliga satsningar från de rättsvårdande myndigheternas sida när det gälle r samarbete över gränserna. För det tredje: Om man vill att kandidatländerna skall bli medarbetare i arbetet med att skapa ett europeiskt område med frihet, säkerhet oc h rättvisa, måste förtroende finnas mellan de gamla och nya medlems - staterna. Även om dessa länder övertar hela unionens regelverk på de t rättsliga och inrikes området, vilket är sannolikt, är den prakt iska tillämp- ningen av detta fortsatt osäker. Här är det största problemet bristerna i kandidatländernas nationella lagstiftning och administration. Konsekven- sen är att unionen och dess medlemsstater, däribland , måst e fortsätta och vidga sitt bistånd. This report deals with cooperation relating to judicial and home affairs (JHA) in an enlarged European Union. The JHA area usually includes asylum policy; external border control; immigration policy, especially the conditions for third country citizens entering and remaining in a country; the fight against illegal immigration; the fight against drug abuse; the fight against fraud on an international scale; civil and criminal law cooperation; and and customs cooperation. At the time of writing, the judicial and home affairs cooperation in the EU is regulated primarily by the Treaty on European Union (the ), under its third pillar, and, for visa requirements for third country citizens entering the EU, the . In addition, there are the Schengen Agreement and the convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (the Schengen Convention). Union was enlarged most recently in 1995 with the accession of , and . , seven Central and Eastern European states, and the three Baltic states have applied for admission in the next enlargement. The EU countries have carried out a review of the basic treaties in preparation for the coming enlargement. The result, the of the summer of 1997, has been signed but not yet ratified by the EU member states. It has been said in debate that the treaty revision did not go far enough. However, the reforms within JHA cooperation were considerable. This is particularly true with border control, the free movement of persons, immigration policy and refugee policy. These issues, like civil law cooperation, are transferred by the to the first pillar of the . Clear objectives and time limits for the implementation of measures in these areas have also been laid down. Free movement of persons through the removal of checks on persons at internal frontiers shall, within five years of the coming into force, be introduced throughout the Union, with the exception of and . In addition, the Schengen acquis shall also be added to the EU. This means, inter alia, that parts of the Schengen acquis will be incorporated into the . The transfer to the first pillar of conventions and decisions that have already been made within the framework of the third pillar, or which are in the Schengen acquis, does not happen automatically but requires negotiations. The decisions that are taken must be unanimous. This applies to both the actual transfer and the new form of the legal instruments. Putting large sections of the cooperation under the first pillar in this way will give it much more stability than before. Decisions will be in the familiar form of regulations and directives, whereas now, for example, they have been modelled on international conventions. The Court of and Commission will also be given full authority in these sections of the judicial and home affairs areas. It should be observed, however, that criminal law and cooperation, that is cooperation aimed at preventing and fighting crime, remain in the third pillar. This type of cooperation continues to be fundamentally international, even though it is being tightened up through the introduction of binding decision-making forms. At the same time, the role of the institutions in the remaining third pillar cooperation is considerably strengthened. The reader of this report may find it worrying that JHA cooperation is thus currently framed in three different bodies of legislation (the current treaties, the Schengen acquis and the ). This presumably makes the report difficult to read. The situation for the candidate countries will become clearer. Eventually there will be a single body of legislation to which they must adapt. That is what will happen when the has been implemented by the EU member states. also sets out another new objective for European cooperation. This objective is the creation of a European area of freedom, security and . Included in this is cooperation on judicial and home affairs issues. The name of this report is therefore obvious: An enlarged European area of freedom, security and . The collapse of the Soviet empire and the fall of the between 1989 and 1991 meant revolutionary changes for Central and Eastern European and Baltic candidate countries, as well as for the states in former and other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Liberation has meant a forced transition from a planned economy to a market economy at the same time as the previous cooperation and control structures in the area have largely broken down. As a reaction to earlier rigid restrictions, a liberal regime was introduced concerning the right to in and out of one's home country. The effects have manifested themselves in many ways. For this report, the most interesting effects are undoubtedly those connected with the free movement of persons and with its obverse, illegal immigration and international crime. The road that Europe has chosen is described in this report. The free movement of persons within the EU can refer to two different things. One aspect is the right of EU citizens to freely enter and remain in another member state in order to apply for and take up work, start a company or receive services, or otherwise legally reside there. This freedom has been realized in the Union and will (possibly after an agreed transition period) also apply to citizens of the new member states. The other aspect applies to the removal of checks on persons at internal frontiers, that is frontiers between EU member states. so far only been realized between eight of the EU countries and this has taken place within the framework for the Schengen Cooperation. It is the free movement of persons in the latter sense that is dealt with in this report. In order for this freedom to be realized, guarantees must be set up, as has already been said, against undesirable side-effects. It should, however, be immediately said that illegal immigration and international crime are well-known phenomena in today's EU. What is new is that conditions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic have now begun to negatively influence the EU countries, that is aggravate the situation. The candidate countries are, with one or two exceptions, all transition countries for illegal migration to the West. Organized crime has gained a foothold in all the candidate countries and has extended contacts into Western Europe. It is, therefore, more correct to say that these negative phenomena constitute a pan-European problem. Therefore a joint solution should be sought. By opening the door to membership, the EU has given the candidate countries a very strong incentive to participate in the work of finding such a pan-European solution. It could be said that the governments and citizens of these countries are being invited to join in the work of realizing an enlarged European area of freedom, security and . It remains to be seen whether this is successful. There is much to indicate that developments in the candidate countries are at present moving in the right direction, at least in most of them. If the preliminary negotiations are carried out properly, if the Central and Eastern European and Baltic candidate countries are given sufficient support during the process, and if international cooperation can be built on trust in the new member states, then EU enlargement will not create new problems in the area of and home affairs. On the contrary, it could be said that enlargement, under these conditions, would mean the solution to a problem. It should be added that pan-European cooperation must be extended to include states beyond the candidate countries, particularly , and , albeit in other forms. It is important to prevent the situation in these countries from destabilizing development in the new member states. Because of their geographical location, the latter risk importing problems from their neighbours, which is analogous to the situation in which the EU countries now find themselves vis-à-vis the candidate countries. The candidate countries must accept the EU JHA acquis in full. They cannot expect special treatment such as was given to and in . That means that the same demands are made of the candidate countries as were made of countries like , but there is a difference. We were not required to give evidence of stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for and protection of minorities. This requirement, which was formulated in in 1993 by Council, must be satisfied if membership is to be considered. The Commission has declared that one of the candidate countries, , does not at present fulfil the requirement. That is not to say, however, that the situation is unequivocal for the others. Union can be seen as a confidence pact. The free movement of persons in an enlarged EU requires that the participating countries have confidence in each other's ability to observe the mutual undertakings (regulatory legislation) in practice. Since implementation of all decisions and agreements in the JHA area is in the hands of the member states' governments and administrators, considerable responsibility is placed on the administrative authorities that uphold and administer the rule of law in the participating states. It is essential to bear this in mind when evaluating the consequences of enlargement. The candidate countries, or at least most of them, are expected to adopt EU legislation in the next few years. They must also introduce national legislation on closely related issues such as criminal and civil law, aliens and asylum law. The authorities which apply the legislation must be competent, have sufficient resources (which also permit them to participate in the many ramifications of EU cooperation), and work within the framework for the principle of the rule of law. It is chiefly this area on which they fall down. The courts in the candidate countries are now trying to deal with new legislation for which there is no established practice and for which judges lack training. Judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers are poorly paid and in short supply. This leads to uncertainty regarding the rights of the individual and in some cases to extremely long waiting lists. Policemen and customs officers often have low status, which is a left-over from before the liberation. The question could be asked whether a clear understanding of the role of the State in a modern society that is founded on the rule of law has had time to establish itself. Corruption is traditional and widespread. Competent staff with a command of foreign languages are too few, routines and equipment leave much to be desired. The question of confidence arises naturally. Cooperation between governments and administrative authorities in the EU JHA area concerns humanitarian issues such as border controls, the maintenance of law and order, the rule of law, the fight against crime, reciprocal legal assistance in criminal investigations, asylum policy and illegal immigration. International cooperation, which often involves the exchange of sensitive information, presupposes mutual confidence in the cooperation partner. The conclusion is that national legislation must be supplemented and functioning legal authorities built up in the candidate countries if they are to be successfully incorporated into a European Union of freedom, security and . There is a risk that the limited resources of the candidate countries will be invested in other areas that are regarded as more urgent. This work must therefore be given the full support of the EU and its member states. The EU countries and the Commission bear the responsibility that these aspects of membership will not be neglected during the negotiations. makes clear that the EU countries (with the exception of and ) must remove checks on persons at borders with other EU countries (internal frontiers) and harmonize high level control at borders with third countries (external frontiers). In this way, a single European area with the free movement of persons is created. Eventually, the candidate countries will be incorporated into this area when they become members of the EU. At the same time, the harmonized external border controls make it possible to coordinate member states' immigration and refugee policies, and to more effectively prevent illegal immigration into the Union. The road to this goal is long, however. So far, control at internal frontiers has only been abolished between eight of the Schengen countries. Checks on persons at frontiers serve several important purposes. They have a restraining effect on those who would seek to enter a country illegally. The identity of, and route taken by, asylum-seekers can more easily be established on entering the country than after they have entered. Checks on persons are also a step, an instrument, in the fight against international crime. It is therefore natural that a state which, like the Schengen countries, has abolished checks on persons at internal frontiers, should seek other guarantees that the risks will be manageable. Among the Schengen countries this expresses itself in close cooperation between countries that share a common border. In several instances, monitoring of the internal frontiers has been intensified using new methods which involve a greater presence in the border areas. One country, , has reintroduced checks on persons along some stretches of its frontier, citing an exemption in the Schengen Convention and the risk of illegal drugs traffic. should also find new methods of monitoring the movement of persons across internal frontiers when the present checks on persons are abolished. One possible model is the monitoring the customs authorities carry out with the support of special legislation introduced when earlier systematic customs checks ended on 's joining the customs union. A similar result can be achieved through greater cooperation with customs and authorities in the candidate countries. Experience shows that all this requires resources. However has an advantage in its geographical location. Only certain ports/ferry terminals and some airports will be internal borders with the new EU members in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic. The fact that a candidate country becomes a member of the EU does not necessarily mean that checks on persons at the borders between that country and other European countries are immediately removed. This requires a Council decision in the EU. Such a decision can be made when it is judged that the risk is manageable. For 's part, it ought to be the case that the risks involved in removing checks on persons at the border with a new member state that is, with one of the candidate countries should not be greater than the risk of removing checks between present EU countries. When the decision is made to remove internal frontier control, one of the most important foundations for the decision is the quality of external frontier control. This is particularly so for the candidate countries. These countries are in the process of establishing a modern border control with the help of the EU and its member states, including . In some cases, considerable progress has been made. In many cases, there are manifest weaknesses. These weaknesses concern both equipment and staff, including the corruptibility of officials. The candidate countries also have other problems to solve along the way. Enlargement ought not to mean that the EU imports border disputes. These should be solved before accession. For some candidate countries, such as , increasing checks on persons at frontiers could cause difficulties, since there are close linguistic, cultural and historic ties with population groups in neighbouring countries. For 's part, our external EU frontier will change very when the EU is enlarged to include Central and Eastern European and Baltic states. The whole of our coastline will continue to be our external frontier. Since traffic across the Baltic will presumably increase with time (it is already considerable) surveillance of the Baltic Sea coast should be strengthened. The coast constitutes part of the EU's external frontier, which it is 's duty to monitor. A chain is no stronger than its weakest link. The demands that we make of the candidate countries are demands that we should also be able to fulfil ourselves. Another consequence of the free movement of persons in an enlarged EU is that the internal control of aliens must be improved. Each country is individually responsible for this. The instrument of control that is generally used in countries, apart from border control, is the permit. Swedish regulations apply to everyone with the exception of Nordic citizens. The fundamental principle of free movement of EU citizens within the EU means, however, that the permit as a control instrument is of most interest with respect to third-country citizens. This will not change with the enlargement of the EU. Discussions are going on in the EU on the status to be awarded to such third-country citizens living legally in a member state. An example from the present EU is Turkish citizens living in and, from the candidate countries, the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and . Of more immediate interest to , however, is the question of what to do about illegal immigration and in our country. We cannot ignore the fact that the risk will increase in the future. It has been said that roughly two million people are living illegally in the EU. The situation is similar in the candidate countries, whose borders are sometimes poorly monitored and which have therefore become both recipient and transit countries for illegal migration. control of aliens is at present very weak. Improving the effectiveness of this control would be a natural consequence of opening up the internal frontiers to new member states from the former eastern bloc. Refugee policy in the EU is an issue which every member state chiefly handles itself. All member states are bound to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (, 28 1951) and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (, 31 January 1967). A few steps have also been taken towards a coordinated refugee policy within the EU, and as a result of the treaty amendments in the issue was inserted into the first pillar of the . This means a further harmonization of EU asylum policy through the introduction of common minimum standards or minimum norms for such issues as receiving asylum-seekers, processing asylum applications, granting refugee status, and giving temporary protection to displaced persons. is also given the powers to decide on the division of responsibility between member states in connection with measures for receiving refugees. The Convention regulates the question of which member state is responsible for processing an asylum application which is made in an EU country. The harmonization of refugee policy is not designed to deny a member state the possibility of pursing a more generous asylum policy than the others. The candidate countries have acceded to the Convention and the Protocol. The inclusion of the candidate countries in the EU is not expected to have any significant negative consequences on refugee policy. On the contrary, enlargement will mean that more countries will play a part in developing European refugee policy, and that they will participate actively in consultations. problems arising as a result of the candidate countries' weak administrative structure should be rectified by continued support from the EU and its member states. Organized, international crime exists in the EU as it does in the candidate countries. Europe is an operational field for internationally criminal syndicates which often have their origins in southern, western or eastern Europe, but sometimes have more distant sources such as and Latin . Cooperation within the EU to combat this type of crime was long regarded as a necessary support measure to enable the abolition of checks on persons at internal Union frontiers. But this restricted view is misleading. The coordinated fight against crime can be traced back to, among other things, the work of , and it has, in the , been given independent status. clearly states that preventing and fighting crime is a step towards affording citizens a high level of security within a European area of freedom, security and . Cooperation is to take international forms. Authorities that fight crime, particularly the and customs authorities, are to work together, both directly and through Europol. Organized crime in Europe concerns itself with different types of criminal activity. Often an activity is chosen because it combines maximum financial profit with a minimum of risk. The ongoing internationalization of communications, in the broad sense, is used for criminal purposes.