frsrdg · GL04JO1 · 1998-01-01 00:00:00 — He told them he had a Swedish friend who lived in and who was interested in buying cocaine at 600 Swedish crowns per gram. They agreed to meet at the underground station at at 5 p.m. on 3 so that they could visit A.Ms non-existent friend. H. and A.M. were supposed to meet at the and then make their way to to meet A., who would take a sample of the cocaine with him. suggested to , and Redar Baskin that he could introduce Redar Baskin as a potential buyer of Greek origin. and decided that Redar Baskin should play the role of a buyer. Redar Baskin was told to act as the agent of a Greek buyer and to take things easy in order to see what would happen. As far as he could remember afterwards, H. and A. asked for 600 Swedish crowns per gram. Someone he could not remember who said that he would offer 650 Swedish crowns per gram. Redar Baskin and A.M. went to A.Ms room, and H. arrived there about an hour later. H. was alone. introduced Redar Baskin to H., who told him that a friend of his called A. was going to fetch the sample batch and that he was to meet him at . This turned out to be correct when a detective followed H. to . They agreed that H. and A. would bring the sample batch to the at 7 p.m. and , who suspected that H. and A. could end up showing the same quantity of drugs as previously, i.e. 50 grams of cocaine, decided that Redar Baskin would continue to play the role of a buyer. They told him to try to find out whether H. and A. had larger quantities on them but that he was not to appear to be too eager. When Redar Baskin met H., A. and A.M. in A.Ms room at the , . handed him a small amount of cocaine which he took out of his jacket pocket wrapped in a receipt from a shop in . A. told him that there were three of them selling cocaine, and that the third lived in . Redar Baskin got the feeling that A. was the ringleader as he was the one that took the initiative. A. asked him straight out how much he wanted one, two, three, five kilos? A. said that the cocaine was of very high quality and came from the jungles of and that at that moment they only had 500 or 600 grams available but that he could get hold of more later on. Redar Baskin was to get in touch with H. as A. was going to abroad during the following week. was very during this discussion and managed to convince A. and H. that this was a genuine deal and that Redar Baskin was a genuine buyer. A. seemed to be very eager to conclude the deal that same evening, and he proposed that the hand-over should take place at 9 p.m. Redar Baskin then suggested, as he had been instructed to, that the transfer should take place at the . A. and H. left the room to make a phone call, presumably to the individual in to ask where the transfer could take place. When they returned, A. said that the transfer would be at the railway station in at 11 p.m. Redar Baskin then said that he had to go and phone his mate about the deal. Redar Baskin told and that he had been offered 500 grams of cocaine, which was to be handed over at 11 p.m. and decided that Redar Baskin was to accept the offer. He then went back to A.Ms room and said that he would accept the offer and that he and his banker would be at at 11 p.m. Redar Baskin, A. and H. left the and walked to the underground station at , where A. and H. boarded a train. officers followed them to , where they disappeared into one of the housing estates. Redar Baskin told and that A. and H. had been very eager to conclude the deal that same evening and that it had all been surprisingly easy. He said that no definite sum of money had been mentioned, only that he would have money when the transfer took place. Redar Baskin later met A. at the railway station at . A., who did not have the cocaine with him, asked to see the money and said they had to take Redar Baskins car to an apartment a few blocks away. Redar Baskin proposed now following new instructions that A. should put the cocaine under a signpost at a petrol station in the centre of and that Redar Baskin would then come out into the open if he could see that A. was alone. After this, and decided that A. and H. were to be arrested if they turned up at the agreed meeting place and that Redar Baskin was to remain concealed. At around midnight A. turned up at the petrol station and placed a rucksack under the signpost. could see H. and a third person, later identified as O., approach A. and then, shortly afterwards, leave him to take up positions about 50 metres away. They appeared to be very nervous. Shortly afterwards all three were arrested. As rucksack was found to contain about 500 grams of cocaine. Before the arrests were made, a fourth person was observed standing close to an automatic till. This individual, whose head was covered by the hood of the sweater he was wearing, was standing smoking, and seemed to be waiting for something or somebody. Later, during interrogation of those involved, it transpired that this fourth person was P.S. who, armed with a pistol, was supposed to cover the transfer of the drugs. A report was filed at 1.15 a.m. on 4 1992, in which the unit making the report was identified as station K8. Its subject was a serious drugs offence and unlawful possession of weapons on 4 at 0.05 a.m. at the petrol station in the centre of . The suspects were A, O, and H. It contained the following details about the crime. After a tip-off had been received by the Narcotics squad at station, A. and H. were placed under surveillance. According to the informer they had access to a large quantity of drugs. They were followed to where they disappeared in a large housing estate near the centre. After some toing and froing in the centre of , they eventually came out of the same housing estate with a third person. A. stood on the road next to the petrol station and seemed to be waiting for someone. He was carrying a black shoulder bag which had not been seen earlier. O. and H. took up a position 50 metres away from A. and appeared to be watching him. All three were kept under surveillance for a short period without anything happening. In view of the contents of the tip and the behaviour of the three individuals, the officers did not dare wait any longer but arrested all three as A. was about to leave the place. As shoulder bag was found to contain a coffee in which there was a large amount of white powder. All three were taken to station. When O. was searched before being held in detention, a flick knife (switchblade) was found in his back pocket and seven 22 cartridges in his jacket pocket. and drew up a memorandum on 4 1992 concerning a serious drugs offence on 3 & 4 1992 in and . This memorandum contained the information about Redar Baskins contacts with H. and A. which has, on the whole, been presented above. According to the register, the prosecutor took charge of the investigation on 4 1992. On February 25 1993, District Court sentenced O. to five and a half years imprisonment for a serious drugs offence, H. to four years and A. to four and a half years for the same offence. In the opinion of the District Court which referred to a statement made in the case reported in NJA 1985 p. 544 that there could be grounds for the reduction of a sentence if the had used methods which obviously appear to be improper, such as, for instance, inciting someone to commit a crime that he would otherwise not have committed the behaviour of the in this case did not warrant reducing the sentence. The of Appeal upheld the sentence of the District Court against O. on 5 1993, and on 10 1993 the Supreme Court decided not to permit review of the case. District Court sentenced P.S. on February 2 1994 to a prison sentence of six years for a serious drugs offence and unlawful possession of a weapon. This sentence was upheld by the of Appeal on 1994. On 11 1994 the Supreme Court decided not to permit review of the case. After having asked for the opinions of and the Prosecutor General, the Chief Parliamentary Ombudsman, . included the following comments in his adjudication of 19 1996. The legal regulations and statements about the legal situation The sequence of events subject to appraisal in this case include entrapment by the officers. Here entrapment is used to mean action that involves the inducing or urging a person to commit an act or make a statement that can create problems or in some other way have negative consequences either for himself or others close to him. A neutral response to an initiative from a perpetrator would not however be regarded as entrapment. In this context it is customary to make a distinction between inciting criminal activity, on the one hand, and actions taken in order to acquire evidence on the other. In the first case, the actions of the are intended to result in a crime being committed, the second is intended to yield evidence to prove that a suspected crime has taken place. The issue of the use of entrapment in combating crime was dealt with by the 1981 Commission on the in the context of the discussion of what were called unconventional methods of surveillance. The Commission stated that the starting point in this discussion was that officers should never be allowed to commit criminal acts in order to investigate or disclose a crime, nor should they be allowed to incite anyone or induce them in any other way to initiate criminal activity. The main principle that is to apply is that there must exist strong suspicion of a serious crime. In addition, the principle of proportionality is considered to mean here that no alternative, less intrusive approaches exist or that those that do exist have already been employed without success. Furthermore, the principle of proportionality also requires that the entrapment can be expected to yield important results that will be of use in the investigation. Where the power to decide on entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence is concerned, the 1981 Commission on the decided that decisions about the use of such methods during surveillance or the preliminary investigation of a case should always be taken by a prosecutor or by a senior officer. On the issue of the employment of civilians in surveillance, the Parliamentary Ombudsman has always made it clear that the restrictions which should apply generally to measures involving entrapment must apply to an even greater degree to collaboration between officers and civilians for entrapment purposes. It is more than likely that such collaboration may only be justified in extreme cases, for example during the investigation of particularly serious crimes, and under no circumstances is it permissible for officers to collaborate on an organised basis with civilians for the purpose of inciting criminal activities (the Parliamentary Ombudsmans Annual Report 1977/78 p. There are regulations in Article 23 of the Procedural Code and in the Ordinance on Preliminary Investigations (1974:94) concerning documentation of what transpires during a preliminary investigation. During a preliminary enquiry a written record is to be kept of all occurrences of significance for the investigation (23.21.1 in the Procedural Code). This record is to be kept so that it gives a faithful picture of what has occurred during the investigation of significance for the case (Article 22 in the Ordinance on Preliminary Investigations). On a number of occasions, the Parliamentary Ombudsman has emphasised the importance of a record of a preliminary investigation in accordance with these regulations, for instance in the Parliamentary Ombudsmans Annual Report for 1964 p. 120, which states the following: Here it should be pointed out that a thorough record of a preliminary investigation is important not only in order to document the results of the investigation and to prepare for the subsequent criminal proceedings but also make it possible to ascertain that the investigation has been properly conducted. This is important for the legal rights of the individual and also for those of the investigating officers, should any complaint be made about their actions. It is obvious that what is said here also applies to the use of what are known as unconventional methods of surveillance. The 1981 Commission on the , for instance, stated that stringent demands were to be made of the records to be kept in such contexts. There is a comment in the memorandum RPS RAPPORT (Report of ) 1994:3 that only in exceptional cases can information about entrapment lack significance. The decision concerning entrapment From what has already been stated, any action taken by officers to acquire evidence of a drugs offence which involves their acting as the buyers of drugs which the sellers already possess should in itself be regarded in principle as entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence. The information given by A.M. concerned a drugs offence that had already been committed which consisted of possession of a large quantity of cocaine. This was, in other words, a serious crime. I share the opinion expressed by others referred to in this case that the suspicion provided sufficient grounds to decide to employ entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence. Assuming that the desired result could only have been attained by the use of entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence, the fundamental requisites for the use of this measure were therefore fulfilled. One question which is central in this context is who is to make the decision to employ entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence. As has already been pointed out, one of the fundamental requirements for the use of such a measure is that the crime is a serious one. Entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence is therefore excluded on principle if the crime suspected is of the simple kind referred to in 23.3.1 of the Procedural Code. If there are good grounds for suspecting someone of a crime, therefore, from the main stipulation in this Article it follows that the prosecutor is responsible for direction of the investigation and it is therefore the prosecutor who is to decide on the use of entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence. Even in cases where the suspicion of a crime is sufficiently well-grounded to provide the basis for a decision to employ entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence but the identity of the perpetrator is unknown a possibility that can arise for instance in cases of blackmail (cf. SOU 1982:63 p. 130) the decision to utilise entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence must be made by the prosecutor. This, in my opinion, is what derives from the regulation in the second sentence of 23.3.1 of the Procedural Code stipulating that the prosecutor is also to take charge of the preliminary investigation of a crime even when no individual can on good grounds be suspected of committing it, if there are special reasons for doing so. In this context I would also like to draw attention to the National Boards Report (1994:9) entitled Återköp och betalning för information (Repurchase and Paying for Information) which states that the decision to repurchase should always be made by the prosecutor as this kind of situation must normally be regarded as involving difficult considerations and it is the prosecutor who must later present the case in court (p. 85 f.). These points of view obviously apply generally to situations involving entrapment. It is therefore my opinion that, in principle, the regulations in 23.3.1 of the Procedural Code contrary to the opinions expressed in the travaux préparatoires of the Act exclude the possibility of a decision to employ entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence being made by a senior officer. It would be odd if this were indeed the case, as senior officers as a rule do not conduct criminal investigations. It is quite another matter that the prosecutor, before deciding on such a measure, should consult the senior officers responsible and that it is then up to the authorities to make the operational decisions needed if the measure is to be implemented (cf. Report of 1994:9 p. In conclusion, I consider, like and the Prosecutor-General, that the direction of the preliminary investigation in the case concerned should have been transferred immediately to the prosecutor who would then have had the responsibility of deciding, after consultation with a senior officer, on the question of employing entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence. The execution of the entrapment Where the execution of the entrapment is concerned, I would like initially to emphasise how important it is for those involved in the entrapment to adopt a passive role in what occurs. I share the opinion of the Prosecutor-General that the officers must not be too assertive or use the inducement of high prices. As is pointed out in the Prosecutor-Generals statement, in this case it is unclear whether it was at the initiative of A.M. or the officers that the price was raised to more than the sellers had demanded. The enquiry shows that the decision to employ entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence was made as a result of an initiative by A.M. and that he later played an role in events. As has already been observed, it has been considered that there is a certain scope for the to seek the help of civilians in connection with entrapment. How appropriate this is must, as point out, be assessed from case to case. The general rule that should apply, however, is that great restraint should prevail when using civilians in such situations. The reasons for adopting this standpoint can be found in the statement from the Prosecutor-General. I would like to point in particular to the risk of the prosecutor and the losing control, which may in its turn lead to the failure of the operation or to difficulty in establishing what actually occurred and who was responsible at different stages of the events. In addition, in certain cases the individuals concerned may be exposed to danger. A somewhat similar argument applies to the use of an inexperienced officer in this case a cadet as the agent provocateur. An operation involving entrapment, however well planned and well prepared, may easily take an unforeseen course. This can give rise to situations which make great demands on the skills and experience of the officers involved. They must, for example, be able to evaluate rapidly the risks for the investigation itself and for their own and other peoples safety associated with different courses of action. I therefore consider it generally unsuitable to employ cadets and other inexperienced officers as agents provocateurs. If there are not enough human resources to justify a reasonable assessment that the planned entrapment operation can without risk lead in an organised way to the desired result, it should obviously not be undertaken. It is, in my opinion, unacceptable to employ a civilian and a cadet, as in this case, for such a delicate task as negotiating a drugs transaction. I share the opinion of the Prosecutor-General that the involvement of A.M. in the events that ensued should have been limited to participation in deciding on the time and place for the meeting between the suspects and the officer or officers who were to act as agents provocateurs and that the possibility of finding a more experienced officer to undertake this role should have been considered. As the Prosecutor-General has pointed out, it is particularly important that the record of what has taken place during a preliminary enquiry is correct and comprehensive where entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence is involved. The prosecutor must have a full and correct picture of what has happened on which to base his subsequent actions, and, in addition, there must be an adequate factual basis to enable a well-grounded decision to be made if the suspect claims to have been subject to improper behaviour by the . The description of what occurred found in the report submitted on 4 1992 is laconic and in important respects downright misleading. For instance, there is nothing at all to suggest that the arrest was made in an entrapment situation. As is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court on 11 1996 in Case B264/96, the degree of truth demanded in a preliminary investigation cannot be disregarded even in an emergency situation, except in extremely exceptional circumstances. It is obvious that accounting for the sequence of events that culminated in the arrest in a memorandum that was not written until a month afterwards is not satisfactory. For example, the information that came from the . about the traffic in drugs should have been registered immediately after it had been received. In conclusion, it can be observed that a number of fundamental principles about deciding on and the implementation of entrapment for the purpose of acquiring evidence have been disregarded in the case in question. The decision to employ entrapment was made by two police-inspectors who had not, as far as can be seen from the enquiry, considered to any greater extent the legal rights or the personal safety of those involved. Moreover, in implementing the entrapment a great deal was left in the hands of a civilian, and both he and a young and inexperienced officer became involved in a negotiation situation that was in many respects delicate. Finally, the documentation of what occurred did not in any way satisfy the demands that must be made of it. Actions taken by school managers against pupils wearing Nazi symbols unlawful encroachment of freedom of expression or acceptable for the maintenance of order? A number of private individuals were of the opinion that the managers of various schools had encroached on pupils freedom of expression by, for example, prohibiting the wearing of certain kinds of garments or symbols with Nazi connotations. The private individuals complained to the Parliamentary Ombudsman. In addition, the Parliamentary Ombudsman initiated her own investigation of certain information in the mass media that the principal at one school had, because of their contents, prevented the circulation of certain leaflets to pupils at the school. Most of these cases were investigated on behalf of the Parliamentary Ombudsman by the for Education. Others were dealt with by requesting statements from the concerned. In her adjudication of 1996 the main points made by the Parliamentary Ombudsman, . , were the following. Nazism is an ideology of violence which advocates the persecution of various minority groups on racial grounds. This ideology is obviously in conflict with the values that underlie Swedish democracy. In recent years, groups of young people who have adopted Nazi ideas have created problems in schools. Several very serious violent crimes have been committed by young people belonging to these groups. In view of the current regulations that apply in this area, school managers have a direct responsibility for ensuring that this philosophy of violence does not gain ground within the educational system. The cases submitted to the Parliamentary Ombudsman show how school managers are attempting to come to grips with the problem in different ways. The task of the Parliamentary Ombudsman has been to assess whether the measures adopted can be regarded as acceptable or if the schools have in any way overstepped their authority. The point of departure for this enquiry has been to assess what limitations in the freedom of expression guaranteed by the constitution can be considered permissible with regard to the statutory obligation of schools to maintain order. From the first chapter of the Instrument of Government it follows directly that public agencies are to take an role in ensuring that the principles of democracy are to function as guidelines within every sector of society.