prop · GB0369 · 1987-12-31 00:00:00 — Inteti denna konvention må tolkas såsom medförande rätt för någon stat, grupp eller person att ägna sig åtverksamhet eller utföra handling, som syftar till att tillintetgöra någon av defri- och rättigheter, sora angivits i konventionen, eller tillatt inskränka deia i större utsträckning än som däri medgivits. Artikel 18 Prop. 1987/88: 69 Deinskränkningar, som i denna konvention medgivits beträffande dedäri upptagna fri- och rättigheterna, måicke vidtagas annat än i desyften, med hänsyn till vilka de tillåtits. Tilläggsprotokollden till konventionen angående skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna Envarfysisk eller juridisk persons rätt till sin egendora skall lämnas okränkt.Ingen raå berövas sin egendora annat än i detallmännas intresse och unde" de förutsättningar som angivas i lag och av folkrättensallraänna grundsatser. Ovanstående bestämmelserinskränka likväl icke en stats rätt att genomföra sådanlagstiftning som staten finner erforderlig för att reglera nyttjandet avviss egendom i överensstämmelse med det allmännas intresse eller för att säkerställabetalning av skatter och andra pålagor eller av böter och viten. Ingenmå förvägras rätten till undervisning. Vid utövaidet avden verksamhet staten kan påtaga sig i fråga om uppfostran ochundervisning skall staten respektera Prop. 1987/88: 69 föräldrarnas rätt att tillförsäkra sina barn en Bilaga1 uppfostranoch undervisning sora står i överensstämrrielse med föräldrarnas religiösa och filosofiska övertygelse. Dehöga fördragsslutande parterna förbindasig att anordna fria och hemliga val med skäliga mellanrum samt under förhållandensom tillförsäkra folket rätten att fritt ge uttryck åt sinmening beträffande sammansättningen av den lagstiftande församlingen. Protokollnr 4 den 15 septeiaber 1963 till konventionen angående SKydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna, avseende erkännande av vissa andra rättigheter och friheter äi dem som redan inskrivits i konventionen och dess första tilläggsprotokoll- Ingenmå berövas sin frihet enbart på grund avoförmåga att fullgöra avtalad förpliktelse. 1.Den som lagligen befinner sig på en stats område äger rätt att där fritt röra sig ocn att fritt välja bosättningsort. ägerfrihet att lämna vilket som helst land, Prop. 1987/88:69inbegripet sitt eget. Utövandet avdessa rättigheter får icke underkastas andra inskränkningar än sådana som äroangivna i lag och i ett demokratiskt samhälle nödvändiga med hänsyn till statens säkerhet och den allmänna säkerheten,för upprätthållande av den allmänna ordningen och förhindrandeav brott, för hälsovården samt för skyddandet av sedligheten eller av annans fri-och rättigheter. De rättighetersom angivas i mom. 1 må inora bestämda områden tillika bli föremål för inskränkningar,angivna i lag, vilka äro berättigade av hänsyn till det allmännas intresse i ettdemokratiskt samhälle. Ingenraå tvingas att lämna den stat vari han är medborgare, vare sig genom individuella eller kollektiva åtgärder, Ingenmå förvägras rätten att inresa i den stat vari han är medborgare. Kollektivutvisning av utlänningar är förbjuden. utdrag ur Prop. Protokolln:" 6 till konventionen angåendeskrjdd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggandefriheterna, avseende avskaffande av dödsstraffet Dödsstraffetskall vara avskaffat. Ingen får ådömas ett sådant straff eller avrättas. Enstat kan i sin lag föreskriva dödsstraff för handlingar som begåtts under krigstid ellerunder överhängande krigshot. Ett sådantstraff .skall tillämpas endast i de fall som anges i lagen och ienlighet raed dess bestämmelser. Staten skall underrättaSaroparådets generalsekreterare om de ifrågavarande bestämmelserna i lagen. Ingenavvikelse enligt artikel 15 i konventionen får ske från bestämmelsernai detta protokoll. Översättning enligt prop.1983/84:31' Utdrag ur Prop. 1987/88: 69 Protokollnr 7 till konventionen angående skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggandefriheterna. Enutlänning som lagligen är bosatt på en stats territorium får utvisas därifrån endast efter ett i laga ordning fattat beslut och skall tillåtas a) framlägga skäl somtalar mot utvisningen, b) få sin sal: omprövad, och c) för dessa ändamål företrädas genomombud infor vederbörande ramdighet eller inför gjeller flera av denna myndigriet utsedda persone". 2, Enutlänning kan utvisas innan han utövar sina rättigheter enligt moment 1 a, b och c i denna artikel, när utvisningen är nödvändig i den allmänna ordningens intresse eller motiveras av hänsyn till den nationella säkerheten. 1.Var och en som dömts av domstol för brottslig rning skall ha rätt att få skuldfrågan ellerstraffet Översättning enligt prop. 1984/85:123. omprövat av högredomstol. Utövandet av denna rätt, Prop. 1987/88:69inbegripet grunderna för dess utövande, skall regleras Bilaga 1 i lag. 2,Undantag från denna rätt får göras vad avser mindre grova gärningar,enligt föreskrift i lag, eller j_ q fall då vederbörande har dömts i första instans av den högsta domstolen eller har dömts efterdet att en frikännande dom har överklagats. Haren lagakraftvunnen dom varigenom någon dömts för brottslig rning senare upphävts ellernåd beviljats på grund av en ny eller nyuppdagad omständighet,som styrkt att doiaen var felaktig, skall den som undergått strafftill följd av domen gottgöras i enlighet med den berördastatens lag eller praxis, ora det inte visas att det helt eller delvis berott på honom själv attden tidigare ej kända omständiglieten inte blivit uppdagad . Ingenfår rannsalas eller straffas på ni'tt genom brottmålsförfarande i samma stat för ettbrott för vilket han redan blivit slutligt frikänd eller dömd i enlighet med lagen och rättegångsordningen i denna stat. Bestämmelsernai föregående moment skall inte utgöra hinder för att målet tas upp på nytt i enlighet med lagen och rättegångsordningen i den berördastaten, om det föreligger bevis om nya eller nyuppdagade omständigheter eller om ett grovt fel begåtts i det tidigare rättegängsförfarandet som kan ha påverkat utgången i målet. 3.Ingen inskränkning i denna artikel får görasmed Prop. 1987/88:69 stöd av artikel 15 i konventionen. Miakarskall vara likställda i fråga om rättigheter och ansvar av privaträttslignatur inbördes samt i förhållande till sina barn, vid äktenskapetsingående, under äktenskapet och i händelse av dess upplösning.Denna artikel skall inte utgöra hinder för staterna att vidta sådana åtgärder som är nödvändiga ibarnens intresse. EtlGELSKORIGINALTEXT TILL CITATEI1 I AVSNITT 3 (Art.10 i PN:s deklaration) Everyoneis entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent andimpartial tribunal, in the determination of his rigiits and obligations (droitset obligations) and of any criminal charge against him. (Förslag vidmöte med expertkoramitté ) Inthe determination of aiy criminal charge against him or of his rights and obligationsin a suit at law (droits et obligations de caracture civil) everyone isentitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunalestablished by law. (Sammanfattningav diskussion) The"common law" counfries pointed out that "civil rights andobligations", as recognised by the administrative authorities, were notprotected by an administrative tribunal. In this respect, there was animportant difference from the "civil law" counfries. the words"in a suit at law" ("contestation" in the French text) whichwould enäble administrative Prop. 1987/88:69 proceedings to be excluded from the field of ' application of theConvention. Inthe determination of any criminal charge against him or his rights andobligations in a suit of law (droits et obligations de caractérecivil), everyone is entitled to a fair g public hea-ing by an independent andimpartial tribunal established by law and within a reasonable time. (Koiaraissioneni fallet Ringeisen) Accordingto French legal terminolog/, the word "civil" is not arabiguous tothe same extent. Althougl-i, under the influence of Anglo-American terminology,the term "droit civils" is sometimes used as signifying politicalrights of the citizen (equivalent to "droits civiques"), the meaningis generally quite different. It refers to rights and obligations under civillaw, as distinct from public law and penal law. This is a classical distinctionin the legal systems derived from Roman law and the term "civil" inthat context refers to the legal relations between individuals and otherprivate subjects of law, as distinct from legal relations between privatecitizens and public authorities. Following this terminolog/ the French 10 1987/88. text of Artide 6 is clear,The term "droits et Prop. obligationsde caracture civil" means rgiits and Bilaga 1 obligationsappertaining to that branch of the legal system which is called "droitcivil. (Kommissioneni fallet Ringeisen) Thisexamination of the text of the Convention and its drafting history leads to theconclusion that the term "civil rights and obligations" must beinterpreted restrictively so as to comprise such legal relationships only asare typical of relations between private individuals, to the exclusion of sucnlegal relations in which the citizen is confronted v/itii those who exercisepublic authority. (Kommissioneni fallet Ringeisen) TheCommission has consistently held that the term "civil rights andobligations" v/ithin the meaning of Artide 6 (1) of the Conventionembodies an autonomous notion, However, that notion ceases to be an autonomousnotion if it is considered in the sense of referring strictly to the rights andobligations between private individuals. Indeed, in the legal systems derivedfrom Roman term "civil law" is understood as referring tothat branch of domestic law which is also called "private law" aidwhich envisages the particular relationship between private It is notpossible to say that the notion Prop. 1987/88:69 embodied in Artide 6 (1) of the Convention is Bilaga 1 autonomousif its scope is being deterained by simple reference to the notion of"civil law" as it emerges from the legal systems of certain countriesof Europé. Itis also to be observed that an element of anomaly would be introduced in thatprovision if, in the interpretation of Artide 5 (1) the scope of the notion in questionwere to be so restricted. Convention - as well as incidentally theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1956 -envisages basicallythe protection of the individual vis-å-vis the State, that is to say against arbitrary actscommitted by the public authorities. It is clear that, by the term "civil rightsand obligations". Artide 6 (1) of Convention refers to the righitsand obligations flowing from domestic law. The rde which the Convention lays do\vnin rggpect of these riglits and obligations is as follows: "In the determinationof his civil rights and obligations ,,. everyone is entitled to a fair and publichearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal establishedby law". It seeras stränge that this rule, which has been induded in an internationaltreaty envisaging the protection of the individual vis-ä-vis the publicauthorities, should not grant the individual concerned any right to a judicial remedyor any right to a fair trial, in the case of an arbitrary interference by the public authorities with the rightswhich are granted to him Prop. 1987/88:69 by the domestic law. (Kommissioneni fallet ) However,when a public agency admits a person to the practice of medicine, the effect ofthis normally is that civil rights and obligations arise in connection with thatpractice. This effect must be distinguished from performance of functions in thepublic service. The conditions of admission do not in themselves make a doctora public agent, exercising governraental or administrative authority, or establisha confractual relation between him and the State or any public agency. The applicantpractised medicine as a private individual, Such a doctor, in and for the practiceof medicine, becomes vested with a number of civil righits and obligations: professionalreputation; the recovery of professional fees and expenses; the lease or ownershipof consulting room or clinic; employment contracts wit.h staff, and so on. (Kommissioneni fallet ) Thisbeing so it seems desirable first to consider whether in principle the choiceand exercise of a profession or economic activity in the private sector shouldbe considered as civil rights. In our opinion the answer to this question can onlybe in the affirmative, Prop. Theexercise of a profession or economic activity ma,' be defined as the applicationof a person's physical skill, intellectual, artistic and other abilities and knowledgein most cases for the purpose of obtaining material reward in the form of wagesor some other consideration, The right to exercise a profession is thus identicalwith the riglit to work guaranteed by the constitutions of the majority if notof all the States in . Amongthese so called public freedoras we find as jäst raentioned the right of propertywhich the Commission has always recognised as a civil rigjit, a solution which wasexpressly confirmed by the Ringeisen judgment quoted above. V/hen we come to comparethe right to work with the right of property we find that they are of an undeniablysimilar nature since the riglrt of property is essentially the riglit to use, enjoyand dispose of the thing to which it applies in most Cases with a view to obtainingan economic benefit from it. It is thus difficult to see why one should refuse tneright to work the character of a civil right which has been recognised in the caseof the right of property. What has been said abovewould however be subject to Prop. reservationswhere the right to wo"k implied in one way or another participationin political action, in the exercise of public authorityor the management of a public department of theState, the provinces, the localauthorities or even of a semi-nationalised Admittedlyat least in certain countries access to these occupations is very widely subjectto an administrative authorisation which is only granted to persons with aproper professional qualification and of good reputation. The practice of certainprofessions is subject to special regulations and a more or less strictsupervision. However,these regulations have neitlier the object no" the effect of changing the natureof the activities of the persons practising these professions. The activitiesof skilled t-adesmen, merchants, bankers, and underwriters remain governed bycivil (or commercial) law. They participate in no way in the exercise of publicauthority or the operations of a public service. The lawfulness of these professionalregulations is not in issue. The Federal Government point out that thei- basicpurpose is to maintain public order, safety and health. But' it does not followthat they can transform a relationship which by its nature belongs to the fieldof p"ivate law, into a relationshipgoverned by public law. (Domstoleni fallet ) Whetheror not a right is to be regarded as civil within the meaning of this expressionin the Convention must be determined by reference to the substantive contentand effects of the right - and not its legal classification - under the domesticlaw of the State concerned. In the exercise of its supervisory functions, the Courtmust also take account of the object and purpose of the Convention and of thenational legal systems of the other Contracting States. (Domstoleni fallet ) TheCourt notes that, in the Federal Republic of , the running of a private clinicis in certain respects a commercial activity carried on with a view to profit, classifiedby German law as a "Gewerbe". This activity is carried on in theprivate sector through the conclusion of contracts between the clinic and itspatients and resembles the exercise of a private right in some ways äkin to theright of property. Private clinics are certainly subject to supervision effectedby the authorities in the public interest in order, inter alia, to protect health; supervision in the public interest,which moreover Prop. exists as a general rulefor all private professional Bilaga activitiesin the member States of the Council of Europé, cannotof itself lead to the conclusion that the running of a private clinicis a public-law An activity presenting,under the law of the State concerned, the characterof a private activity cannot automatically be convertedinto a public-law activity by reason of the factthat it is subject to administrative authorisationsand supervision, includingif appropriate the withdrawal of authorisations, providedfor by law in the interests of public order and publichealth. Themedical profession counts, in the "al Republic of , among the traditionalliberal professions; moreover, Artide 1 a 2 of the Federal Act expressly soprovides. ,., Even unde" the national health scheme, the medicalprofession is not a public service: once authorised, the doctor is f"ee topractise or not, and he provides treatment for his patients on the basis of a contractmade with them. Of course, besides treating his patients, the practitioner,in the words of the above-mentioned Act, "has the care of the health of thecommunity as a whole". This responsibility, which the profession bearstowards society at large, does not, however, alter the private character of themedical practitioner's activity: whilst of great importance fromthe social point of view, that responsibility is Prop. 1987/88:69 accessoryto his activity and its equivalent is to be Bilaga 1 found in otherprofessions whose nature is undeniably private. (Domstoleni fallet ) Allthat is relevant under Artide 5 § 1 of the Conventionis the fact that the object of the cases in questionis the determination of rights of a private Sinceit thus considers the rights affected by the witdrawal decisions and forming theobject of the cases before the administrative courts to be private righits, theCourt concludes that A"ticle 6 § 1 is applicable, without it being necessary in thepresent case to decide whether the concept of "civil riglits andobligations" within the meaning of that p"ovision extends beyond thoserights which have a private nature. (Domstoleni fallet Le Compte ra,fl.) Unlikecertain other disciplinary sanctions that might havebeen imposed on the applicants (warning, censure andreprimand .,. ), the suspension of which they complainedundoubtedly constituted a direct and mate"ial interferencewith the right to continue to The fact that the suspensionwas temporary did not prevent its impai"ing thatright ...; in the "contestations" (disputes) contemplatedby Artide 5 a 1 the actual existence of a"civil" right may, of cou"se, be at stake but so jna' the scopeof such a riglit or the in whicli the , beneficiarymay avail himself thereof. Citat 14 Prop. (Kommissioneni fallet Spo"rong och ) TheConmission recalls that it has always recognised the right of property as acivil right. Consequently, expropriation proceedings relating to particular propertiesconcern the civil rights of those owners whose properties are being expropriated.Moreover, in the present cases, the Commission has just found ... that theexpropriation permits and the prohibition on construction constituted a substantialinterference with the applicants' right to peaceful enjoyment of theirpossessions within the meaning of the fi"st sentence of the first paragraphof Art. 1 of Protocd No. However, this finding does not necessarily mean thatthe provisions of Art, 6 (1) are automatically applicable to all aspects or stagesof proceedings concerning exprop"iation. In particular, a further conditionof its applicability is that there is an issue - normally a dispute - v/ith respectto civil rights and obligations which requires a determination, This appears clear,notably from the French text of art. 6 (1) which speäks about "contestationssur droits et obligations de caracture civil". Inthe opinion of the Commission, a decision which constitutes an interference withcivil rights and obligations is not the same as a determination of such rightsand obligations. The fact that Art. 6 (1) requires a "determination"makes it necessary to distinguish between the various aspects and stages ofexpropriation proceedings. In particular, the initial steps taken by the publicautho"ities towards a late" expropriation, preparing for it and creatingits legal basis, must be distinguishedfrom its actually being carried out. The granting of a rigiit to expropriate createsthe legal basis for a late" deprivation of property, However, in the Commission'sview, neither a law that directly permits an expropriation, nor a permit to expropriateauthorised by law of the kind issued by the respondent Government in thepresent cases amounts to a determination of the civil rights and obligations ofthe property owners concerned in the sense of Art, 6 (1) of the Convention. Prop.1987/88: 69 Bilaga 1 Itfollows that neither the proceedings by which the Government authorised theCity of to expropriate the applicants' properties and renewed these permits,nor, a fortiori, the rde of the municipality in seeking, obtaining and holding therelevant permits, involved decisions of this character, which must be taken o"be subject to control by a courf having to act "within a reasonable time".It is not in dispute between the parties that, althougli thro-aghout theseadministrative proceedings the applicants suffered practical inconveniences, theirlegal rights as property owners, and thereby their civil rights, remained unaffectedat all the relevant stages. However,this interpretation .does not imply that expropriation proceedings may not raiseissues where Art. 6 (1) applies, in particular when at a låter stagean actual expropriation occurs. (Kommissionen ifallet och ) According to the Court's reasoningin the Ringeisen and it seems clear that measures taken by public authorities whose resdtis decisive for Prop. p-ivaterights fall under Art. 6, para. 1.,, . outcomeof an expropriation procedure is certainly so decisive.Is this true also for the granting of an expropriationperrait, the fi"st step leading up to expropriationunder Swedish law? The granting of the perraitis only the first step but it determines the legalityof the exprop"iation under Swedish law, which cannotbe attacked late" before the courts. thatit is already decisive for the dete"mination of If an applicant disputes the legality ofthe permit or of the extension he m'ust be able to geta court decision on that legality unde- Art. 6, Itis of course correct to say that this implies a procedure of court reviev.' forall exprop"iation procedures. This, it seeras to me, is the inevitable consequenceof the Köning holding. However, I would like to stress thatit does not mean all public decisions affecting property without coraing nearto formål expropriation must also be open to court review. Where the loss of ownershipis at stake as in expropriation procedures, the outcome is decisive for privaterights and Art. 5, para. (Domstoleni fallet och ) Inits ... judgment of , (the Court) Prop, 1987/88:69 pointedout that Artide 5 a 1 "is not applicable Bilaga 1 solelyto proceedings which are already in progress: itmay also be relied on by anyone who considers that aninterference with the exe-cise of one of his (civil) rightsis unlawful and complains that he has not had thepossibility of submitting that claim to a tribunal meeting the requirementsof Artide 6 a 1"... . It is oflittle consequence that the contestation (dispute) concernedan administrative measure taken by the corapetentbody in the exe"cise of public authority... . (Domstoleni fallet och ) Giventhat the applicaits regarded as -unlavrful the adoption or extension of measuresv/hich affected their "ight of property and had been in force for pe"iod5of the kind encountered in thei" cases, they were entitled to have this questionof domestic law determined by a t"ibunal. (Domstoleni fallet Benthem)