Additional file 1: Further description of methods, definitions and statistical analysis, and Tables E1-E4. The file contains additional information on exclusion criteria and definitions of PSI, ARDS and MODS. The statistical tests used are described. The additional file also includes four tables. Table E1 defines the resulting haplotypes from SNPs combination in SFTPA1 and SFTPA2 genes. Table E2 presents demographic and clinical characteristics of CAP patients. Table E3 shows the pairwise linkage disequilibrium measure for surfactant proteins A1, A2 and D alleles. Table E4 compares haplotypes of SFTPA1, SFTPA2 and SFTPD between patients with pneumococcal CAP and controls.  Survival of Influenza A(H1N1) on Materials Found in Households: Implications for Infection Control BACKGROUND: The majority of influenza transmission occurs in homes, schools and workplaces, where many frequently touched communal items are situated. However the importance of transmission via fomites is unclear since few data exist on the survival of virus on commonly touched surfaces. We therefore measured the viability over time of two H1N1 influenza strains applied to a variety of materials commonly found in households and workplaces. METHODOLOGY AND PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Influenza A/PuertoRico/8/34 (PR8) or A/Cambridge/AHO4/2009 (pandemic H1N1) viruses were inoculated onto a wide range of surfaces used in home and work environments, then sampled at set times following incubation at stabilised temperature and humidity. Virus genome was measured by RT-PCR; plaque assay (for PR8) or fluorescent focus formation (for pandemic H1N1) was used to assess the survival of viable virus. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: The genome of either virus could be detected on most surfaces 24 h after application with relatively little drop in copy number, with the exception of unsealed wood surfaces. In contrast, virus viability dropped much more rapidly. Live virus was recovered from most surfaces tested four hours after application and from some non-porous materials after nine hours, but had fallen below the level of detection from all surfaces at 24 h. We conclude that influenza A transmission via fomites is possible but unlikely to occur for long periods after surface contamination (unless re-inoculation occurs). In situations involving a high probability of influenza transmission, our data suggest a hierarchy of priorities for surface decontamination in the multi-surface environments of home and hospitals. Influenza transmission is well documented in households and other residential settings [1] [2] [3] [4] . Yet the underlying mechanisms of transmission remain poorly understood and hotly debated [5, 6] . Although transmission by aerosols (particles typically ,5 mm in diameter), larger droplets and contact transmission (direct and via fomites) probably all play some role, the relative importance of each is uncertain, which has led to difficulties regarding the provision of evidence-based infection control advice for both pandemic and seasonal influenza [7] . If virus can survive for meaningful periods on surfaces and objects, or alternatively, if surfaces are frequently re-inoculated (e.g. by toddlers), then it is feasible that transmission via fomites might occur.