In conclusion, our study shows that HBoV was frequently detected in both symptomatic and asymptomatic children during the winter of 2002-2003 in Quebec City. Conversely, this virus was rarely found in the adult population during the same period. Further studies are needed to establish whether this recently described parvovirus is pathogenic by using well-matched control groups and sequential samples to detect viral persistence. (1) . Numbers along branches are bootstrap values from 1,000 replicates. Scale bar shows 1 substitution for every 1,000 nucleic acid residues. Pandemic Influenza Planning in the United States from a Health Disparities Perspective We explored how different socioeconomic and racial/ethnic groups in the United States might fare in an influenza pandemic on the basis of social factors that shape exposure, vulnerability to influenza virus, and timeliness and adequacy of treatment. We discuss policies that might differentially affect social groups’ risk for illness or death. Our purpose is not to establish the precise magnitude of disparities likely to occur; rather, it is to call attention to avoidable disparities that can be expected in the absence of systematic attention to differential social risks in pandemic preparedness plans. Policy makers at the federal, state, and local levels should consider potential sources of socioeconomic and racial/ethnic disparities during a pandemic and formulate specific plans to minimize these disparities. T he threat of pandemic infl uenza has generated concern among politicians, policy makers, healthcare professionals, and the general public. For the past several centuries, major infl uenza pandemics have occurred every 10 to 30 years (1); it is widely believed that a new pandemic is "inevitable" (2) . The possibility of an imminent infl uenza pandemic has been heightened by the appearance and spread of avian infl uenza A (H5N1), which has a case-fatality ratio of >50% (3) . Although the assumption has been that avian infl uenza viruses could not directly infect humans, the transmission of infl uenza virus (H5N1) directly from chickens to humans in 1997 caused experts to reconsider that assumption (4) . Genetic changes in infl uenza virus subtype H5N1 in 2003 resulted in a new strain of the virus, which spread to multiple countries in East and Southeast Asia (5) , as well as Europe and Africa. Whether the avian infl uenza virus (H5N1) develops human pandemic potential, its spread from birds to humans and the severity of the resulting disease have heightened concerns about a possible future infl uenza pandemic.